TROP Report Final-2

BUILDING INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES:
A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH TO
PEACEKEEPING
Faculty Advisor: Elisabeth Lindenmayer
Kelly Joseph
Julien Delemontex
Laho Bangoura
Susan Din
Tabatha Pilgrim Thompson
Stefania Doebbel
Hyomi Carty
Chencheng Du
Isabela Messias

Cover Image: Peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Repub-
lic (MINUSCA) patrol through the streets of Bangui, the capital city of the CAR.
Photo Credit: Susan Din (MPA ’17)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research project would not have been possible without the sup-
port of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the
leadership and staff of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Mul-
tidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA).
The research team is especially indebted to Professor Elisabeth
Lindenmayer of the School of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia University, for creating the opportunity to work on this proj-
ect, for her vision and academic guidance since the project’s inception,
and her steadfast support throughout the research and report-writing
process.
DEDICATION
This research is dedicated to the people of Liberia and the Central
African Republic, who also contributed to this report and whose resil-
ience and hope served as inspiration for its completion. This report is
for them, and for all conflict-affected societies, in the hopes that it will
help drive real progress in how governments prioritize inclusivity on
the path to peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acronyms..........................................................................................................................................................................
Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................................
IntroductionandBackground....................................................................................................................................
Normative Evolution of a New Paradigm in Peacekeeping.............................................................................
Political and Institutional Constraints to Implementation..............................................................................
Research Objectives......................................................................................................................................................
Methodology...................................................................................................................................................................
Case Study: The Central African Republic..............................................................................................................
Context................................................................................................................................................................
Analysis of primary stakeholders................................................................................................................
ConsultativeMechanisms.............................................................................................................................
Tools for Community Engagement............................................................................................................
Challenges and constraints to eff ective engagement......................................................................
The way forward: Opportunities for meaningful engagement.......................................................
Looking ahead..................................................................................................................................................
Case Study: Liberia........................................................................................................................................................
Analysis of primary stakeholders................................................................................................................
Existing tools and mechanisms for community engagement........................................................
Challenges and constraints to effective engagement.......................................................................
Potential areas for growth ...........................................................................................................................
Bright Spots.......................................................................................................................................................
Looking ahead..................................................................................................................................................
Conclusionandrecommendations..........................................................................................................................
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix A: Key concepts..........................................................................................................................................
Appendix B: Tools for Community Engagement.................................................................................................
Appendix C: List of meetings conducted by Liberia research team............................................................
Appendix D: List of meetings conducted by CAR research team.................................................................
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16
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34
36
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39
44
47
51
53
55
56
60
65
66
68
69

1
ACRONYMS
AGE Advisory Group of Experts
CAN Community Alert Network
CAR Central African Republic
CLA Community Liaison Assistant
CPP Community Protection Plan
CSO Civil society organization
CVR Community Violence Reduction
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
GA General Assembly
G8 Group of 8, also known as the International Contact Group on CAR
IMF International Monetary Fund
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
JPT Joint Protection Team
LNP Liberian National Police
MINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO Non-governmental organization
PCS Peace Consolidation Services (UNMIL)
PKO Peacekeeping operation
PK5 Point Kilometrique 5, the main Muslim district in Bangui, CAR
QIP Quick Impact Project
RCPC Recovery and Peace Consolidation in the Central African Republic
SAM Strategic Assessment Mission
SG Secretary-General
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN United Nations
UNCT UN Country Team
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPOL UN Police
WHO World Health Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In October 2014, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
convened a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations (HIPPO) to conduct a strategic review of
United Nations peace operations, resulting in the
2015 report Uniting our Strengths for Peace – Politics,
Partnership and People. Commonly known as the
HIPPO report, this assessment provides a detailed
account of the evolution of peace operations and
makes a significant call for change in the way peace
operations carry out their work. Among several
recommendations, the report calls for peacekeeping
operations to shift towards a more people-centered
approach that involves“working in partnership with
the local people and, where appropriate, acting
as a bridge between local communities and host
authorities.”1
This recommendation is the focus of this
report.
While it is broadly accepted that peacekeeping
missions must work in consultation with host
governments to foster national ownership of the
peacebuilding process, there is a growing recognition
that governments must take ownership by genuinely
engaging and consulting all stakeholders of their
country. This represents a shift from national
ownership to inclusive national ownership, reflecting
a deeper shift in the paradigm of peacekeeping.
The new paradigm calls for a departure from the
traditional state-centric approach to one that
recognizes communities as key agents of peace.
While peacekeeping has already devised a number
of tools to strengthen community engagement, this
shift will require missions to integrate these tools
and incorporate genuine consultation with local
communities into their broader political strategy.
It will also involve encouraging and supporting
governments to prioritize consultation and forge a
social contract with their people, in order to build a
shared vision for the future of their country. For peace
to be sustained, it is essential that peacekeeping
missions incorporate these strategies at every stage
of the mission cycle, from initial deployment to final
drawdown. Thus, a more people-oriented approach to
peacekeeping will entail significant changes not only
in the way missions carry out their tasks on the
ground, but also in how the UN, and the Security
Council in particular, formulates their mandates
before and during deployment.
This research argues that the implementation of a
more people-centered approach to peacekeeping –
one that seeks to foster inclusive national ownership
at every stage of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding
process – is essential to achieve sustainable peace.
As the HIPPO report states, a more inclusive, people-
oriented approach to peacekeeping will help to
improve mandate implementation, ensuring that
technical tasks are not implemented in a vacuum, but
rather are part of a common political strategy to build
more inclusive societies. Although peacekeeping
operations are uniquely situated to support host
governments in this regard, the Security Council has
primarily focused peacekeeping efforts on stopping
violence and stabilizing conflict-torn countries
through a template of technical tasks. It is increasingly
recognized, however, that this approach has not
effectively addressed root causes and conflict drivers,
nor has it created the conditions for sustainable peace
after the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces.2
In the
absence of a common vision between governments
and their people, peace will remain extremely fragile.
Thus, the focus for peacekeeping should not only
be to help a country build strong institutions and
reinforce state authority, but also to support national
efforts to engage local communities and rebuild trust.
The research seeks to provide an analysis of the
normative evolution of this new paradigm in
peacekeeping, as well as the political and operational
constraints that peacekeeping operations face in
implementing this shift. The research focuses on two
peacekeeping missions operating at very different
stages in their mission cycles: the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which
deployed in 2014 as the UN’s newest peacekeeping
operation, and the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL), which is drawing down after thirteen years
of peacekeeping. Using these two case studies,
the objective of the research is to show what
peacekeeping is already doing in the field to
1 The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-
Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, P65.
2 Ibid., P3.

4
implement this shift, as well as the practical
challenges and impact on the ground. The research
consisted of a seven-week course and intensive desk
research under the academic leadership of Professor
Elisabeth Lindenmayer at the School of International
and Public Affairs at Columbia University, followed by
four weeks of field research in Liberia and the Central
African Republic by two research teams.
Based on interviews and focus groups with over 200
stakeholders in each country, the research findings
show that a lack of community engagement can lead
to a misalignment in priorities, high levels of mistrust
of peacekeeping personnel and sustained fragility.
In cases where community engagement occurred,
whether through peacekeeping tools or broad-based
consultations, such as the Bangui Forum on National
Reconciliation, this appears to have contributed to a
stronger sense of local ownership, better community
relations and a more positive outlook on the country’s
future. UNMIL illustrates the case of a mission which
may have prioritized community engagement too
late in its cycle. It has therefore, at best, stabilized
the country without sufficiently addressing the root
causes of the conflict or laying the foundations for
sustainable peace. There is still time for MINUSCA
to learn the lessons from UNMIL to avoid the same
pitfalls.
The lessons learned from the two case studies serve
as a basis for a number of policy recommendations
aimed at making peacekeeping operations more
people-centered. It is fully recognized that such
a shift will not be easy and will require political,
institutional and operational changes on the
part of an organization that remains essentially
state-centric. Given the increasingly complex and
protracted nature of conflicts today, it is clear that a
new approach is needed, and peacekeeping must
strike a better balance between the rights of states
and the rights of the people, in order to better serve
those they are mandated to assist. As noted in the
recommendations, this will require first and foremost
the full and undivided support of the Security Council.
It is hoped that these recommendations can inform
current and future peacekeeping operations, and
make a contribution to the field of peacekeeping.
Key Recommendations
• Ensure the Security Council prioritizes inclusive
national ownership and community engagement
in the mandate. This must apply to all peacekeeping
tasks throughout all stages of the mission cycle. As
stated in Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016),
echoed by General Assembly resolution 262 (2016),
this will help to ensure that the needs of all segments
of society are taken into account.
• Institutionalize community engagement as a
general practice within peacekeeping. As evidenced
by the two case studies, prioritization of community
engagement may depend on mission leadership and
continues to be carried out in an ad hoc manner. The
important work done primarily by Civil Affairs has
yet to be integrated into the broader political and
operational strategy, both at headquarters and field
level. Thus, it is critical that the Security Council and
peacekeeping integrate community engagement
as a general practice, in order to have consistent
implementation across mission cycles and across
peacekeeping deployments.
• Encourage and support host governments to
foster inclusive national ownership from the
beginning. Peacekeeping must act“as a bridge
between local communities and host authorities”to
help build a common vision on the priorities of the
country and regain or strengthen the trust of the
people.3
This is crucial for peace to be sustained when
peacekeeping operations leave a country.
• Advocate for a quid-pro-quo compact with the
host government. This kind of framework can be
leveraged to ensure that consultation with the people
is a main component of the political strategy for all
parties, and that government policies are in line with
and reflective of the priorities of the people.
• Build transparent communication strategies with
and for communities. It is critical that peacekeeping
operations establish and expand two-way
communication channels with local communities, in
order to: 1) better manage expectations and ensure
that people receive the information they need to
organize themselves, 2) leverage local knowledge and

5
networks to obtain timely information, and 3) to build
a community of trust.
• Provide more training and capacity building for
civil society organizations to better advocate and
lobby for the people. Civil society and community
organizations are often said to have the will, but lack
the resources and skills to effectively advocate for
the needs of the people. This is particularly true in
countries where organized civil society is a relatively
new development, as in Liberia and CAR.
• Take advantage of traditional community
structures. In Liberia, the Ebola response proved
that leveraging traditional community structures
was highly effective, such as using communication
networks to disseminate important information
in a timely manner. Similarly in CAR, broadcasting
messages through religious leaders and networks
have been effective in reaching the broader
population.
• Recruit troops, police and staff appropriate for
the local context. Language barriers, perceptions of
conflicts of interest on the part of some peacekeepers,
and a general lack of understanding of the local
context were cited as some of the main constraints
to effective community engagement. However, it is
recognized that this may remain a challenge given the
constraints faced by peacekeeping.

6
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In October 2014, United Nations Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon appointed a High-Level Independent
Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to conduct a
comprehensive assessment on the current state
of peacekeeping operations. The report, entitled
Uniting our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership
and People, advocates for peace operations to
become more“people-centered”as one of four major
recommendations to shift the UN’s approach.4
As
the report notes, efforts to sustain peace have often
broken down due to“a failure to establish inclusive
political arrangements, a fair sharing of resources and
just accommodation of ethnic and religious
diversity.”5
It therefore calls for“working in partnership
with the local people and, where appropriate,
acting as a bridge between local communities
and host authorities, … [in order to] help facilitate
more inclusive political processes that address
social cohesion, inequalities and marginalization,
and contribute to a more sustainable peace.”It
further recommends that missions achieve this by
developing“strategies for community engagement at
various stages of the mission cycle – from assessment,
analysis, planning, implementation, review and
evaluation.”6
Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, Pviii.
5 Ibid., P3.
6 Ibid., P66.
A view from inside the headquarters of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINUSCA) in Bangui.

7
The HIPPO recommendation was strongly echoed
by two other reports on peace and security that
came out in 2015, including The Challenge of
Sustaining Peace: The 2015 Review of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Architecture by the UN Advisory Group
of Experts (AGE) and Preventing Conflict, Transforming
Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the
Implementation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.
The AGE report emphasized the importance of
“fostering‘inclusive national ownership’… whereby
the national responsibility to drive and direct efforts
[to sustain peace] is broadly shared by the national
government across all key social strata and divides,
across a spectrum of political opinions and domestic
actors, including minorities.”7
It also stressed that
peace operations should encourage and assist host
governments to“broaden ownership to as wide an
array of domestic stakeholders as possible, so that
the latter can engage with those governments and
participate maximally in all stages of peacebuilding.”8
Recognizing that peacebuilding is not merely
a post-conflict activity, the report argued that
“sustaining peace”must be the“thread that must run
strongly through all of the UN’s work in prevention,
peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping,
as well as through post-conflict recovery and
reconstruction.”9
The Global Study on Resolution 1325 underscored
the central role of women in building sustainable
peace and echoed the call for more inclusive political
processes, particularly with regards to women. The
report highlighted that“women’s participation
and inclusion makes humanitarian assistance more
effective, strengthens the protection efforts of our
peacekeepers, contributes to the conclusion of
peace talks and the achievement of sustainable
peace, accelerates economic recovery, and helps
counter violent extremism.”10
As the report notes, the
historical and systematic exclusion of women from
peace processes has been a major obstacle to the
progress and development of countries emerging
from conflict.
These three reports form the impetus behind a
growing call to shift the paradigm of peacekeeping
7 The Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. (2015). The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of
the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, P21.
8 Ibid., P21.
9 Ibid., P12.
10 The High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study. (2015). Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Imple-
mentation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. UN Women, P5.
operations towards a more strategic approach that
firmly places people at the center of their work. While
it has been broadly accepted that peacekeeping
missions must work in consultation with host
governments to foster national ownership of the
peacebuilding process, this has tended to occur in
the absence of broader participation from domestic
stakeholders. There is a growing recognition, however,
that governments must take ownership by genuinely
engaging and consulting all stakeholders of their
country – to shift from national ownership to inclusive
national ownership. This shift reflects a departure
from the traditional state-centric approach towards
one that recognizes communities as key agents of
peace.
While peacekeeping has already devised a number
of tools to strengthen community engagement (see
Appendix B), these tools have yet to be integrated
into the broader political and operational strategy of
peacekeeping, both at headquarters and field level.
To implement a more people-oriented approach,
peacekeeping must integrate these tools and
incorporate genuine consultation with all segments
of society as part of a strategy to actively build and
cultivate good relations for the mission’s presence
and work. This must also involve encouraging and
supporting host governments to forge a social
contract with their people as a way to build trust and
put forth a common vision of the priorities of the
country. For peace to be sustained, it is essential that
peacekeeping missions incorporate these strategies
at every stage of the mission cycle, from initial
deployment to final drawdown. As the HIPPO report
states, a more inclusive, people-oriented approach
to peacekeeping will help to improve mandate
implementation, ensuring that technical tasks are
not implemented in a vacuum, but rather are part of
a common political strategy to build more inclusive
societies.
Peacekeeping operations are uniquely placed to
support governments in this process, as they maintain
political leverage through their relationships and
good offices as mediators between conflicting
parties. Yet, their primary focus has been on stopping
violence and stabilizing conflict-torn countries

8
through a template of technical tasks mandated by
the Security Council. It is increasingly recognized,
however, that this approach has not effectively
addressed root causes and conflict drivers, nor
has it created the conditions for sustainable peace
after the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. While
peacekeeping operations can intervene to neutralize
active conflicts, peace will remain extremely fragile
in the absence of a common vision between
governments and their people. Thus, the focus for
peacekeeping should not only be to help a country
build strong institutions and reinforce state authority,
but also to support national efforts to engage local
communities and rebuild trust. This is essential for
peace to be sustained after a peacekeeping operation
leaves a country, and to better serve the people they
are mandated to assist.

9
The synergy among the three reports provided a
strong foundation on which to build momentum for
a shift towards a more people-oriented approach
to peacekeeping. Prior to their publication, this
new paradigm had already taken root at the Fourth
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which took
place in Busan in November 2011, convening over 40
countries and organizations to adopt the New Deal for
Engagement in Fragile States. The New Deal included
commitments to“support inclusive country-led and
country-owned transitions out of fragility”,“support
inclusive and participatory political dialogue”, and to
develop strategic frameworks built on“a broad range
of views from multiple stakeholders and the public.”11
However, prior to 2015, the concept of inclusivity had
not gained much traction. Since the release of the
three reports in 2015, it has made uneven progress
but continues to build momentum as more and more
Member States, both within the Security Council and
the General Assembly, begin to recognize the need
for this shift.
Uneven progress in 2015
In September 2015, the UN Secretary-General (SG)
released a report on the implementation of the
HIPPO recommendations.12
While the report affirmed
that“strategic communication and community
engagement are essential”for peace operations, and
that effective conflict response requires“building
domestic capacity to protect and strengthen inclusive
peace,”the call for a more inclusive, people-centered
approach to peace operations was not a priority in
this report, let alone recommending strategies to
implement this new concept.13
The UN Security Council held its first meeting to
discuss the SG’s report in November 2015.14
In
advance of the meeting, the United Kingdom,
11 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. (2011). International Dialogue on Peacebuilding
and Statebuilding, P1-2.
12 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. (2015). The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of The Recommenda-
tions of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. United Nations, A/70/357-S/2015/682.
13 Ibid., P14&4.
14 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Proces Verbal: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/PV.7564.
NORMATIVE EVOLUTION OF A NEW
PARADIGM IN PEACEKEEPING
In preparation for the 2016 International Day for UN peacekeepers (May 29), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) uniformed
personnel are getting ready for a joint parade with Liberian armed forces and police officers.
Photo Credit: Hyomi Carty (MIA ’17)

10
as President of the Council, circulated a concept
note that focused primarily on two specific HIPPO
recommendations: sequencing peacekeeping
mandates and achieving political settlements. It
did not address the recommendation for a more
people-centered approach to peace operations, nor
did it address the issue of inclusivity. While Council
members welcomed the SG’s recommendations,
Spain and the United Kingdom were the only Council
members to highlight the importance of this shift in
their statements: Spain highlighted the importance
of“inclusive political institutions and translating the
ground-based, people-centered approach into reality,”
and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of
“engaging with the local community”and“putting
people at the centre.”15
No explicit reference was
made to inclusivity or people-centered approaches
in the presidential statement that came out of this
meeting.16
The tepid support of the Secretary-General
and the Security Council to explicitly support this
new paradigm may be attributable to the traditional,
state-centric approach to peacekeeping and the
challenge of convincing host governments to build
more inclusive societies.
Nevertheless, the new paradigm achieved significant
gains in 2015. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development by UN Member States in
September represented an important milestone,
particularly through Sustainable Development Goal
16, which seeks to“promote peaceful and inclusive
societies for sustainable development, provide access
to justice for all and build effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions at all levels.”17
In addition, during
a high-level meeting on peacebuilding at the end
of September, the Secretary-General firmly rooted
this new paradigm as a condition for sustainable
peace, stating:“sustainable, durable peace can only
ever be built on genuine, broadly inclusive national
ownership.”18
In December 2015, the Security Council
also adopted Resolution 2250 which urged Member
States to“increase inclusive representation of youth in
decision-making at all levels”as a key to“preventing
conflict and enabling long-term stability and
sustainable peace.”19
Building momentum in 2016
The new paradigm gained more momentum in
2016, particularly within the Security Council and
the General Assembly. Between February and March,
the SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Operations
(C-34) discussed the HIPPO report extensively,
recognizing the importance of a people-centered
approach at every stage of a peacekeeping mission.
In particular, it stressed“a cohesive mission strategy
to engage communities, in full acknowledgement of
the primary responsibility of the governments of the
host countries to provide for their citizens”and listed
a number of peacekeeping tools to achieve this end.20
In April, the Security Council and General Assembly
adopted a landmark dual resolution (Security Council
Resolution 2282 and General Assembly Resolution
262) on a new vision for the UN’s peacebuilding
architecture, representing a transformative and
groundbreaking milestone in the evolution of this
new paradigm of inclusivity. The dual resolution
expanded the definition of sustaining peace as
“a goal and a process to build a common vision of
society,”firmly putting governments and their people
in the lead.21
It further endorsed the conclusions in
the Special Committee report and called for a shift
from peacebuilding to sustaining peace, stating
that peacebuilding is no longer confined to post-
conflict situations but rather applies to all stages of
conflict.22
It also emphasized that“the responsibility
for sustaining peace is broadly shared by the
government and all other national stakeholders”and
called for“close strategic and operational partnerships
between the United Nations, national governments
and other key stakeholders, including…civil society
organizations, women’s groups, youth organizations,
and the private sector.”23
In addition, the resolution
15 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Proces Verbal: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/PV.7564, P10&22.
16 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Statement by the President of the Security Council: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United
Nations, S/PRST/2015/22.
17 United Nations General Assembly. (2015). Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations, A/RES/70/1, P14.
18 Ban, K. (2015). Message to the High-level Meeting on A New Approach to Peacebuilding. United Nations.
19 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/RES/2250(2015), P2-3.
20 United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations, A/70/19, P31.
21 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-conflict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P1.
United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P2.
22 Mahmoud, Y., & Súilleabháin, A. Ó. (2016). With New Resolutions, Sustaining Peace Sits at Heart of UN Architecture. International Peace Institute Global
Observatory.
23 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-conflict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P3&6.
United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P4&3.

11
affirmed that“inclusivity is key to advancing national
peacebuilding processes and objectives”and
underlined“the importance… of inclusivity in order
to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are
taken into account.”24
The resolution thus reinforced
the notion that peacekeeping operations are only one
of the many actors involved in helping a country to
chart a path to sustainable peace, and must therefore
integrate this new paradigm together with the other
partners on the ground.
Following the adoption of the dual resolution, the
General Assembly held a high-level debate during
which Member States expressed strong support for
security at the UN have increasingly taken note of this
new paradigm.
Influence on peacekeeping operation
mandates
This trend has had a positive impact on the mandate
of peacekeeping missions, which demonstrates
stronger awareness of and support for a more people-
oriented approach within the Security Council. Since
the release of the HIPPO report, some Security Council
resolutions on peacekeeping mandate renewals have
included tasks related to inclusivity. This represents a
new development and an expansion beyond the
the conceptual shift
from peacebuilding to
sustaining peace. For
peace operations, the
debate reinforced the
importance of“placing
people at the heart of their
engagement,”recognizing
that local populations are
the main stakeholders and
that“communities should
be front and center in
decision-making.”25
Since
the adoption of the dual
resolution and subsequent
General Assembly debate,
major documents and
meetings on peace and
mandates.
In March 2016, the renewed mandate for the UN
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) called for an
“inclusive and transparent political dialogue among
all Congolese stakeholders with a view to furthering
reconciliation and democratization.”26
In addition,
in June 2016, the renewal of the Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
included a priority task“to support dialogue with and
among all stakeholders towards reconciliation and
social cohesion… by promoting the participation of
civil society, including women’s organisations, as well
as youth organisations.”27
To further support
engagement with
the local population,
MINUSMA radio was
highlighted as a key tool
to“raise awareness and
understanding about [the
Mission’s] mandate and
activities.”28
The renewed mandate of
the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central
African Republic
(MINUSCA), adopted in
July 2016, emphasized
the importance of inclusive national ownership by
stating that“any sustainable solution to the crisis in
the CAR should be CAR-owned…through an inclusive
process that involves men and women of all social,
economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds,
including, those displaced by the crisis.”29
In its
operative paragraphs, the resolution provided a
mandate to support national efforts“to address
marginalization and local grievances, including
through dialogue with the armed groups, civil society
leaders including women and youth representatives,
and by assisting national, prefectoral and local
authorities to foster confidence among
Peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINUSCA) patrol through the streets of Bangui, the capital city of
the CAR.
24 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-conflict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P2&3. United Nations General Assembly. (2016).
Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P2&4. 25 United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Outcome
Document of the High-level Thematic Debate “A World of Risks -- A New Commitment for Peace”. United Nations, P5.
26 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations, S/RES/2277(2016), P11.
27 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on the Situation in Mali. United Nations, S/RES/2295(2016), P8.
28 Ibid., P10.
29 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the Central African Republic. United Nations, S/
RES/2301(2016), P1.

12
Several political and institutional constraints exist
to implement this recommendation. The first
lies with the Security Council given that it is the
primary body responsible for formulating and
authorizing mandates for peacekeeping operations.
Historically, there has been a lack of clear mandate
to foster inclusive national ownership and engage
communities as part of the broader political strategy
of peacekeeping operations. The Council continues
to design and authorize mandates with the aim of
stabilizing a conflict-torn country, rather than creating
or investing in the conditions for sustainable peace.
It has repeatedly emphasized that the process of
peacebuilding belongs to the government and has
mandated peacekeeping operations to consult with
governments as the primary interlocutor accordingly.
Thus, peacekeeping mandates have seldom included
explicit mandate tasks to engage communities or
foster inclusive national ownership, making it difficult
for peacekeeping missions to prioritize resources to
this end. As will be described in the case study, UNMIL
illustrates a prime example of a missed opportunity
in this regard. In addition, given short-term mandates
and planning horizons, there is often a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the availability of resources or
whether the mission will be renewed at all, making it
challenging to develop a longer-term strategy.
Another constraint derives from the principle of
consent of parties. Peacekeeping operations can
only deploy with the prior approval of the host
government, which can be revoked at any time.
Therefore, missions must actively retain consent
by sustaining a good working relationship with
the host government, so as to maintain presence,
legitimacy and influence. In the absence of this,
they run the risk of becoming ineffective or even
unwelcomed, and may trigger a negative reaction
by the government. Thus, there is a delicate balance
between engaging controversial actors, such as non-
state armed groups or other opposition groups, as
part of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process,
and maintaining a constructive relationship with the
government. Trust is key and serves as the primary
tool that missions have to support a government
in building institutions and improving governance.
Thus, if the host government does not see the value in
putting people at the center of the mission’s work or
engaging with the broader population - either due to
a lack of political will, more pressing priorities or other
practical obstacles – the space for the peacekeeping
operations to engage local communities and actors
can be very limited.
A further obstacle concerns the difficulty of defining
who the people are, particularly in countries like
CAR where the multiplicity of non-state armed
actors poses asymmetric threats. Given the nature
of conflicts today, peacekeeping often deploys
into contexts where armed groups thrive – some
with extremist worldviews, others with links to
transnational organized crime. More often than not,
these actors are not engaged in a negotiated political
solution.
Peacekeeping operations also face the constraint of
being deployed for a limited time, during which they
must be able to prove results on the tasks of their
mandates. Given limited resources, peacekeeping
operations are expected to deliver on a number
POLITICAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS TO
IMPLEMENTATION
communities.”30
In addition, it requested the mission
to use“relevant and tailored communication tools,”
such as radio, as part of“an effective political strategy”
to engage communities and build trust with the local
population.31
The successful implementation of this paradigm shift
within the UN system will depend upon the political
support of Member States in the Security Council and
the General Assembly, as well as the political will of
host governments. Over the past year, there has been
a growing awareness and recognition of the need for
a more people-oriented approach to peacekeeping.
Yet, given the novelty of this new paradigm and
the varying priorities among Member States, it will
remain challenging to translate this normative shift
into institutional changes at UN headquarters and
operational changes on the ground.
30 Ibid., P10.
31 Ibid., P14.

13
of technical tasks, in order to meet predetermined
benchmarks as part of their exit strategy. The results
of technical tasks are also relatively easy to prove
since they can be quantified. It is more difficult to
measure results for concepts like inclusive national
ownership given that they are qualitative in nature.
In addition, peacekeeping can only be fully effective
during its limited deployment if it has a solid partner
in the host government. If the government is not
willing to take ownership or lacks the capacity, then
gains will be lost after the drawdown of a mission.
The lack of accountability mechanisms also serves
as a constraint and is often mentioned in debates
on community engagement and peacekeeping.
Simply put, even if the host government incorporates
inclusivity into its strategy and policies, peacekeeping
missions do not have the tools to hold the
government accountable if such policies are not
implemented. To address this issue, the HIPPO report
recommends a forming a“compact”between the UN
and the host government to serve as a framework
of mutual accountability.32
The report notes that if a
compact was established from the beginning of the
peacekeeping mission, host governments could be
more inclined to consult with their people and have
their voices reflected throughout the peacekeeping
process.
There are also operational constraints to
peacekeeping operations engaging communities on
the ground, such as lack of resources, lack of capacity,
language barriers and lack of understanding of the
local context. These constraints are further elaborated
in the two case studies.
The objective of the research is to show what
peacekeeping operations are already doing to put
this new paradigm into practice, and to shed light
on the opportunities and challenges they face in
implementing it on the ground. The study focuses
on two peacekeeping missions operating at very
different stages in their mission cycles: the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
deployed since 2014 as the UN’s newest
peacekeeping operation, and the United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) deployed since 2004 and
currently in its drawdown phase. Drawing upon
these case studies, the report seeks to show that a
more people-oriented approach – one that seeks to
foster inclusive national ownership at every stage
of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process – is
essential to achieve sustainable peace. The research
attempts to address the following questions:
1. How and to what extent are peacekeeping
operations engaging civil society and local
communities?
2. How are peacekeeping operations supporting
host governments to engage their citizens to
build inclusive national ownership?
3. What constraints do peacekeeping operations
face on the ground to engage communities and
shift towards a more people-oriented approach?
4. To what extent can the impact of community
engagement, or lack thereof, make the case that
inclusivity is one of the conditions for sustainable
peace?
The case studies provide a brief analysis of the root
causes of conflict and current context of each country.
They also describe the tools and mechanisms each
mission is using to engage communities and bridge
the space between the government and its people, as
well as the constraints missions face on the ground.
The lessons learned from the two case studies serve
as the basis for several policy recommendations
aimed at making peacekeeping more people-
oriented. It is hoped that these recommendations can
inform current and future peacekeeping operations,
and make a contribution to the field of peacekeeping.
The research consisted of a seven-week course and
intensive desk research in New York, followed by four
weeks of field research in Liberia and the Central
African Republic by two research teams. A variety of
research methods and tools were employed.
SIPA course and desk research
The first stage of the research consisted of a seven-
week course from March to May 2016, under the
academic leadership of Professor Elisabeth
RESEARCH
OBJECTIVES METHODOLOGY

14
Individual names have been excluded to ensure
confidentiality.
Both teams were hosted and supported by the
peacekeeping mission in each country, which proved
highly useful in facilitating access to key informants
both within and outside the mission. Interviewees
and participants were largely recruited via a‘snowball’
or network approach, and both teams sought to
ensure maximum variation among interviewees (i.e.
across diverse segments of society) to the extent
possible, so as to gain a wide variety of perspectives.
In Liberia, the team conducted its research in the
capital city Monrovia (Montserrado County), and in
other counties including Bong, Grand Gedeh, Grand
Bassa and Bomi. In CAR, the team mainly conducted
its research in the capital city Bangui, and it also had
the opportunity to visit Kaga Bandoro, a town in
northwestern CAR.
Upon returning from the field, the teams consolidated
and analyzed their findings, sharing data to
identify common trends and connections between
the two case studies. Neither the report, nor its
recommendations express the team’s personal
opinions or beliefs. The information presented in
this report – both country-specific and general –
reflect perspectives from the ground, on issues and
concerns described by interviewees. Throughout the
report there are several references to key concepts,
including community engagement, inclusive national
ownership and civil society, among others. A
summary can be found in Annex A.
Limitations of the research
While conducting interviews and focus groups, both
teams came across a number of research limitations,
including:
• Time constraints: For financial and logistical
reasons, the research teams were only able to
spend four weeks in each country. Thus, it was
challenging to collect substantial data with a
large number of stakeholders in such a limited
period of time.
• Sample size and accessibility of stakeholders: Teams
were unable to speak to certain groups who were
initially targeted as key stakeholders, either due to
their unavailability or inaccessibility. In Liberia, for
example the upcoming elections created a
Lindenmayer at the School of International and Public
Affairs at Columbia University. The course aimed
to provide students with a conceptual and critical
understanding of some of the key frameworks, tools
and approaches used by peacekeeping operations.
The purpose was to prepare students to conduct
research in New York and in a peacekeeping
operation, and build on the body of existing research
to make a contribution to the field of peacekeeping.
It examined some of the tools used by peacekeeping
operations in the implementation of their mandates
and the usefulness of these tools in achieving their
goals, with particular attention to the complex and
difficult tasks of peacebuilding and the achievement
of sustainable peace. The course also provided an
analysis of the background and current context of
both case study countries, and students were divided
into two research teams assigned to either Liberia or
CAR.
The findings and arguments presented in this
research are grounded in an intensive and
comprehensive review of existing literature on
community engagement in peacekeeping and both
case study countries. Students also conducted several
interviews with UN officials and other experts in New
York City (see Appendix B and C). In line with ethical
and compliance standards, the team completed
the Human Subjects Protection Training through
Columbia University’s Research and Compliance
Administration System, and the research protocol
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of
Columbia University (see Appendix E).
Field research
Over a four-week period from May to June 2016,
the two research teams conducted qualitative
research in Liberia and CAR, which consisted of
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.
In both countries, each team met with over 200
stakeholders at the local, national and international
level and across various sectors. Interviewees and
participants included representatives from the
UN, host government, regional organizations,
international NGOs, foreign governments, local
authorities as well as a wide range of community and
civil society groups, including traditional, religious
and community leaders, women, youth, former
combatants, refugees and returnees, among others.
A list of organizations and social categories that each
team met with can be found in Appendix B and C.

15
politically sensitive environment in which some
government officials were unwilling to talk to the
team. In CAR, women in general were difficult to
access, and representatives of women’s groups
were repeatedly unavailable.
• Security: The security environment in the Central
African Republic remains extremely fragile and
volatile. The research team was subject to UN
safety protocols required of all UN workers
and affiliates, and unaccompanied travel was
not permitted. Thus, the team was restricted
to MINUSCA transportation, which limited the
team’s ability to improvise interviews with the
local population. In addition, areas outside of
Bangui remain largely under the control of armed
groups, which are designated as high-risk zones.
This restriction limited the geographic scope of
the research in CAR, as well as access to groups of
certain social strata.
• Mobility: Infrastructure in Liberia is still largely
underdeveloped, and accessing the interior of the
country is often difficult unless traveling by plane.
The team also visited the country during rainy
season, which made access and mobility even
more difficult. Dirt roads made it impossible to
travel by land, and flights were often cancelled or
postponed due to weather conditions.

16
CASE STUDY:
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
The CAR research team meets with United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head
of MINUSCA, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, in his office at MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui.
Photo credit: MINUSCA staff
After years of brutal internal conflict and a historic
transition to democratic rule, the Central African
Republic (CAR) finds itself at a crossroads. Following
the election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra
in February 2016, there is a great deal of hope in
the new government to set the country on a new
path towards sustainable peace. Yet, CAR continues
to face enormous challenges: insecurity persists in
many parts of the country, economic development
remains extremely low and the near total absence of
the state outside of the capital, Bangui, prevents any
meaningful consolidation of peace. Nevertheless,
given its recent deployment, the Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA) has an opportunity to foster
inclusive national ownership from the outset of a
post-conflict transition.
This case study presents an overview of the
opportunities and challenges for inclusivity and
community engagement, based on interviews and
discussions with a range of international, national and
local stakeholders across various sectors. First, the
study provides a historical context of CAR, focusing
on the root causes and major events of the most
recent conflict from December 2012 to the present.
Next, it analyzes the characteristics and perceptions
among the main stakeholders in the country,
including the MINUSCA, the CAR government, civil
society, armed groups and the International Contact
Group on CAR, known as the G8, in order to gain a
deeper understanding of the dynamics between
them. The case study then takes a closer look at the
Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, a recent
consultative forum organized by the CAR transitional
government with hundreds of national and local
stakeholders, and the subsequent monitoring and
implementation mechanisms put in place. Then,
the case study identifies the current tools and
mechanisms used by MINUSCA to engage civil
society and local communities directly in the work
of the Mission or to facilitate post-Bangui Forum
engagement with the government. The case study

17
also provides an analytical description of the
constraints and challenges to effective engagement
as highlighted by various actors the research team
interviewed. Finally, it explores the way forward
in CAR by discussing the various priority setting
initiatives that are currently ongoing among key
stakeholders and the role of civil society.
The country has reached several milestones – most
notably the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation
as well as presidential and parliamentary elections
and a constitutional referendum – and it will be
critical for the new CAR government, with the support
of MINUSCA and international partners, to build on
the momentum of these achievements by acting on
the Forum’s recommendations and institutionalizing
mechanisms for community engagement. MINUSCA
must also continue to engage civil society and
local communities through its work to ensure that
technical tasks are not implemented in a vacuum and
that root causes are addressed. In this regard, the case
study focuses on the process of forming a common
vision for the future of the country between the new
CAR government, international partners, and the
people of CAR.
CONTEXT
Since it gained independence in 1960, the Central
African Republic has witnessed surges of violence
and instability throughout its tumultuous history of
military coups, rebellions, and foreign interventions.
In the context of weak state institutions, gross
socioeconomic disparities and deep inter-ethnic
cleavages, the situation in CAR remains extremely
fragile, and the country ranks 187 out of 188 on the
UN’s Human Development Index.33
Several enabling
factors - namely, the pervasive climate of impunity,
the exploitation of natural resources and the
proliferation of arms - have contributed to a reality
in which the vast territory outside of Bangui, remains
largely under the de facto rule of various armed
groups. At the root of the conflict, the historical
marginalization, disenfranchisement and exclusion
of Muslims from the country’s political, economic
and social development have fomented deep-seated
resentment among the Muslim population, driving
many to take up arms to gain power. Despite a long
history of peaceful coexistence, decades of
“predatory governance,”including the deliberate
manipulation of ethnic and religious divisions for
political ends, have fueled sectarian clashes between
armed groups, which then metamorphosed into
widespread inter-communal violence between
Muslims and non-Muslims across the country.34
The
most recent internal conflict has eroded the social
fabric and cohesiveness of the population, resulting
in thousands of casualties, mass displacement and
widespread destruction.
In December 2012, the newly-formed Séléka Alliance,
a coalition of predominantly Muslim rebel groups
from the north, took over the northern and central
regions of the country, and eventually marched on
Bangui. By March 2013, the Séléka had overthrown
President Francois Bozizé, and the leader of the
Séléka, Michel Djotodia, declared himself President
- the first Muslim President in CAR’s history. In
the following months, inter-communal tensions
escalated as predominantly Christian self-defense
militias formed, calling themselves the Anti-balaka
(meaning‘anti-machete’) to retaliate against Séléka
rebels. By the end of 2013, clashes between Séléka
rebels and Anti-balaka militias had turned into a
full-scale sectarian war, with both sides committing
mass killings and grave human rights violations.
This prompted the UN Security Council to authorize
the deployment of the African-led International
Support Mission to the Central African Republic
(MISCA) along with Operation Sangaris, a French
peacekeeping mission. Yet, despite regional and
French peacekeeping presence, both sides continued
to target civilians and commit grave abuses, which
spiraled into a vicious cycle of reprisal violence.
By January 2014, UN officials were warning the
international community of the risk of genocide of
CAR’s Muslim population.35
Under pressure from regional leaders, Djotodia
resigned in January 2014, and Catherine Samba-
Panza, the former Mayor of Bangui, was appointed
to head the new interim government. In April 2014,
the Security Council authorized the deployment of
MINUSCA with a priority task to protect civilians.
MINUSCA officially assumed peacekeeping
responsibilities in September 2014, taking over from
33 United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development. UNDP, P227
34 Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too Little, Too Late: Failing to Prevent Atrocities in the Central African Republic. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, Occasional Paper Series No. 7, P6.
35 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Proces Verbal: Central African Republic. United Nations, S/PV.7098.

18
ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY
STAKEHOLDERS
MISCA and operating alongside French Operation
Sangaris. The transitional government took significant
steps to resolve the conflict by signing a ceasefire
agreement between armed groups in Brazzaville in
July 2014 and facilitating nation-wide consultations
leading up to the Bangui Forum on National
Reconciliation in May 2015.36
The Bangui Forum
convened nearly 700 leaders from across CAR society
and set forth several actionable recommendations to
promote national reconciliation, democratic elections,
good governance, security, rule of law and sustainable
development.37
In February 2016, the country held its second
democratic elections in its history, and following
several delays in the electoral process, Faustin-
Archange Touadéra, former prime minister under
Bozizé, was declared the winner. The electoral
process was widely recognized as free and fair and
a step towards reconciliation after years of conflict.
In his inaugural speech, Touadéra outlined his
administration’s priorities, including disarmament
of the country’s rival factions, reform of the national
army and boosting economic development. However,
the virtual absence of state authority outside of
Bangui remains a major challenge, to the extent that
peripheral regions of CAR, including the north in
particular, maintain a stronger connection to CAR’s
neighbors than to the CAR government itself.38
Moreover, the country remains deeply divided given
the de facto partition between the predominantly
Anti-balaka-controlled West and the former Séléka-
controlled East. In addition, according to UN
estimates, more than 80 percent of CAR’s Muslim
population has been forcibly displaced outside of the
country.39
For 20 years, CAR has seen a succession of UN and
regional peacekeeping missions, special political
missions, peacebuilding initiatives and bilateral
military interventions (France and Chad). Yet, it
appears that they have only sought to treat the
symptoms of the conflict, rather than the root
causes that have fueled longer-running tensions and
mistrust. As one scholar on CAR pointed out:
“Immediate concerns of short-term stabilization
have trumped long-term investment in addressing
underlying causes of violence and conflict. Interest
in CAR has therefore resembled an accordion with
‘an influx of peacekeeping, peacebuilding forces
and humanitarian agencies during peaks of violence
followed by a prompt exit to focus on the next crisis
of the day.”40
CAR remains under the strong influence
of regional and international actors, particularly the
G8 – all of whom have their own agendas which
have not always been aligned. Following a recent
meeting with President Touadéra, the UN Secretary-
General welcomed“the resolve of the President and
his Government to pursue [a comprehensive] process
in a spirit of national reconciliation and inclusiveness,
guided by the principles and recommendations of
the Bangui Forum.”41
It will be critical for the new CAR
government to follow through on this commitment to
ensure that an inclusive and resilient society emerges
from the wreckage of civil war.
The following section analyzes the characteristics of
and perceptions among the main stakeholders in the
country, including MINUSCA, the CAR government,
civil society, armed groups and the G8. These
descriptions are based on interviews and discussions
with a variety of international, national and local
stakeholders and provide valuable insight on the
dynamics and relations between them. Perceptions
play an extremely powerful role in a society such as
CAR where low levels of literacy and a strong oral
tradition prevail. Understanding these dynamics
is crucial to identifying the opportunities and
challenges to building a more inclusive society in the
country.
MINUSCA
Through many interviews, it became increasingly
clear that distorted perceptions of MINUSCA, and its
peacekeeping troops in particular, among the local
36 Interim government of CAR. (2015). Immediate Priorities for Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic: Advocacy
Document Presented at the High-Level Side Event on CAR at the 70th UN General Assembly. Interim Government of CAR.
37 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic. United Nations, S/2015/918.
38 Carayannis, T. & Lombard, L. (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books.
39 United Nations Security Council. (2014). The International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic: Final Report. United Nations,
S/2014/928.
40 Akasaki, G., Ballestraz, E. & Sow, M. (2015). What Went Wrong in the Central African Republic?. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Paper No. 12.
41 United Nations News Centre. (2016). Ban Welcomes Central African Republic President’s Resolve to Seek All-inclusive Resolution to Crisis. United Na-
tions.

19
The CAR research team meets with the UN Police Commissioner and
UNPOL staff at MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui.
Photo credit: MINUSCA staff
population were a direct consequence of insufficient
community engagement by the Mission. As a result,
many interviewees among the local population,
including youth, women and community leaders,
expressed a level of distrust with the Mission and
a misunderstanding of what MINUSCA is in the
country to do. This could be due, in part, to a lack
of clear mandate to pursue a more people-oriented
approach through consultations and community
engagement. MINUSCA’s initial mandate focused on
stemming the violence, stabilizing the country and
protecting civilians; it did not include a specific task to
engage a broader range of local stakeholders outside
of the CAR government. Other tasks in the initial
mandate included support for the transition process,
facilitating humanitarian assistance, promotion and
protection of human rights, support for justice and
the rule of law, and disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation processes.42
Many local interviewees perceive MINUSCA as
having failed to prevent and respond to threats,
risks and alerts of violence in a consistent and
timely manner. According to MINUSCA staff, this is
partly due to logistical challenges, such as lack of
telecommunication service and weak infrastructure
in the country, but some interviewees also attribute
this to weak presence and poor training of UN troops.
This has contributed to a pervasive sense of insecurity,
as evidenced by the prevalence of community
self-defense groups throughout the country. The
perceived lack of responsiveness to threats and acts of
violence has engendered a lack of trust of MINUSCA
within some communities, according to several
community leaders, and there is a common feeling
that MINUSCA has not upheld its mandate to protect
civilians. In one example, one local interviewee
recalled a situation in which a fight broke out in the
middle of the street in Kaga Bandoro, and MINUSCA
troops simply drove around it, ignoring the need
to intervene. Other local interviewees have also
recounted massacres and acts of violence that
occurred with no reaction from MINUSCA troops.
Feelings of mistrust have been further compounded
by recent mass allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse as well as some allegations of extrajudicial
killings by peacekeepers in CAR.43
Many interviewees among civil society leaders and
human rights activists recognized the valuable
deterrent effect of MINUSCA’s peacekeeping
presence around the country. However, the perceived
inconsistency of MINUSCA’s response to some acts
of violence and not others, as well as the inability of
troops to explain why they don’t or can’t intervene,
has contributed to a deep misunderstanding
of MINUSCA’s mandate, particularly regarding
protection of civilians. During a civil society meeting
organized by MINUSCA that the research team
attended, several community leaders from PK5, the
main Muslim community in Bangui, underlined the
necessity of MINUSCA having clear explanations
and commitments in line with the mandate,
demonstrating that confidence in the Mission remains
weak.
Some local interviewees, including civil society
leaders, also expressed stronger confidence in
certain troop contingents, notably francophone
African troops, while others expressed skepticism
and distrust towards other contingents, such as non-
French speaking or neighboring country troops. It
emerged from interviews with community leaders
that language barriers between UN troops and the
local population are a major obstacle to community
engagement and therefore building trust. Several
interviewees noted that the cultural and linguistic
affinity of certain francophone African troops enabled
a stronger level of community engagement and
confidence building. At the same time, community
leaders in Bangui expressed a strong level of
skepticism and distrust of troops from neighboring
countries deployed along their respective borders.
42 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Security Council Resolution on Central African Republic. United Nations, S/RES/2149(2014).
43 Human Rights Watch. (2016). Central African Republic: Murder by Peacekeepers -- Discovery of Mass Grave Provides New Evidence. Human Rights
Watch.

20
Given certain dynamics within the region, such as
exploitation of natural resources, regional conflicts
and geopolitical factors, interviewees were highly
skeptical of the motives behind neighboring country
peacekeeping presence.
Some interviewees, particularly those in the internally
displaced persons camp at M’Poko International
Airport in Bangui, perceive that MINUSCA lacks
impartiality by focusing its protection effort on certain
groups. They expressed the belief that the Mission
is partial to Muslim communities given the strong
presence of MINUSCA troops around Muslim areas.
For example, in the Muslim area of PK5 in Bangui,
UN troops have helped some Muslims move freely
outside of the area by providing protection, which has
created some negative perceptions among the non-
Muslim community that troops are not impartial. One
civil society representative cited an instance where
some residents of PK5 went outside of the enclaved
area and killed some non-Muslims, and when
they returned to PK5, UN troops had secured and
blocked the area to non-Muslims who were seeking
revenge. According to interviewees, this perception
of partiality contributes to the divisiveness between
communities, which is perceived as continuing the
legacy of colonialism and protecting foreign interests
in CAR. Interviewees insisted on the need to keep
outside intervention in CAR completely impartial,
without favoring either side in the conflict.
From the viewpoint of the government, officials
recognized the critical role of MINUSCA during the
crisis, but there is a general feeling that MINUSCA’s
role needs to be redefined to adapt to the post-
transition context. According to a former official,
MINUSCA’s mandate should be reassessed in light
of multiple and complex challenges the country still
faces, particularly with regards to security. According
to the official, there is a risk that the current mandate
does not allow MINUSCA to act forcefully enough to
respond to acts of violence or security challenges. As a
result, there is a major gap between the interpretation
of the mandate and the expectations of the people
of CAR in terms of protection and security. At the
same time, a government official insisted that“all the
partners, including MINUSCA and UN agencies who
wish to assist CAR, should do so in close coordination
with the government to avoid duplication and
unnecessary misunderstandings.”
During an interview, a representative of a regional
organization in CAR argued that the UN must learn
to limit its missions’mandates to specific timelines.
The representative argued:“The UN is not intended
to run a country. It should not perpetuate its
presence in a country; otherwise it will make the
country more dependent on external assistance.”He
expressed the opinion that, at its current rate, the
MINUSCA is likely to stay for more than a decade in
CAR. The representative further argued that“if the
UN continues to remain in a country for more than
five years, it should conclude that it has failed and
withdraw.”In his view, there are diminishing marginal
returns with the presence of UN peacekeeping
beyond five years, at which stage its presence does
more harm than good. Upon the withdrawal of
peacekeeping, this should not mean a change of
SRSG or Force Commander, but rather the focus
should be on capacity building of the national and
local governments. He mentioned that MINUSCA has
made considerable efforts in stabilizing the country,
but its reputation remains tarnished by the gap
between the expectations of the local population and
its effectiveness on the ground. As long as there is no
local ownership over the peace process, the situation
will remain extremely fragile with a high risk of
return to conflict. In addition, the country will remain
dependent on external actors for both security and
development.
Government of CAR
Different regimes throughout CAR’s history have
had very different relations with civil society and
therefore varying levels of community engagement.
During President François Bozizé’s rule from 2003 to
2013, the government was generally open to working
with civil society organizations (CSOs) and organized
two inclusive political dialogues in 2003 and 2008.
The purpose of these dialogues was to put forth a
shared diagnosis of the underlying sources of tension
and conflict in CAR society and to identify potential
solutions among national stakeholders. However,
following the overthrow of Bozizé, Michel Djotodia’s
regime cut off relations with civil society and human
rights activists.44
Subsequently, many CSOs left the
country and their national counterparts were put
on standby. During the transitional government of
interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, civil society
actors were re-mobilized in popular consultations
through the Bangui Forum process.
44 Michel Djotodia was the President of the Central African Republic from 2013 to 2014.

21
During interviews, some government and civil
society actors noted that the CAR government
has a long history of organizing national-level
consultations, including seminars, debates,
reconciliation conferences and dialogues.
However, the implementation of the outcomes
and recommendations of these fora have
consistently been lacking. According to civil society
interviewees, CSOs are often asked to provide
recommendations for these kinds of consultations,
but the recommendations are almost always the
same, and there is little real change or progress
in implementation, despite good intentions and
consensus among stakeholders. Civil society
interviewees noted that the lack of effective
implementation is an issue of the government’s
political will and has consequently generated a level
of“fatigue of consultations.”As two scholars on CAR
noted:
“Throughout the decade of la Bozizie the country
went through a series of internationally-led
peacebuilding and state-building initiatives. The
government and rebel parties to these endeavors
generally endorsed them in form rather than in
spirit, and worked them to their own advantage.
The international actors funding the processes
were invested in presenting them as successful...
What all this meant was that grievances among
the population and among the growing ranks
of sidelined political elites grew in inverse
proportion to the official channels (national
dialogues, elections, etc.) to express them.”45
This illustrates a key point within the new paradigm of
a more people-centered approach to peacekeeping.
45 Carayannis, T. & Lombard, L. (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books, P6.
Under this paradigm, it is assumed that people are
eager to be engaged and consulted at every stage
of the peacekeeping process. However, to maintain
this desire for inclusivity, it is necessary to provide
proof that their voice has been heard and leads to
real change in the implementation of public policies.
Consultation should not be perceived as an end in
itself.
Among displaced communities, the most fragile
category of the population, the lack of access to basic
services and provisions has fostered strong feelings of
desperation and abandonment by the government.
During a visit to the internally displaced persons camp
at M’Poko in Bangui, the research team witnessed the
extremely difficult living conditions of residents at the
camp, including the lack of water, insufficient food
and little access to healthcare and education. Over
20,000 people, predominantly non-Muslims from the
central districts in Bangui, have settled in the camp,
and many have nowhere to return following the loss
or destruction of their homes. Many residents said
that the current security situation prevents them from
returning to their communities. Given their precarious
living situation, one of the women leaders at M’Poko
camp stated:“If the government and the international
community are not ready to do anything, we are
ready to be martyrs.”
At the time of field research, President Touadéra
was newly-inaugurated, and while the majority of
interviewees praised the legitimacy of the elections
process, most refrained from expressing strong
perceptions of the new government. They
The CAR research team meets with the Archbishop of Bangui along
the Oubangui River. The Archbishop is one of the main leaders of the
Inter-Religious Platform for peace and reconciliation in CAR.
Photo credit: CAR local photographer
The CAR research team meets with the Imam of Point Kilometre 5
(PK5), the main Muslim district in Bangui, at the Central Mosque of
PK5
Photo credit: CAR local photographer

22
emphasized that it needs more time to set its agenda
and implementation plan. At the same time, a high-
level government official underscored the importance
of national ownership – that international and
regional partners must recognize“the fact that there
are now legally elected authorities in the Central
African Republic… [and that] no action should be
taken without consulting the government as the main
interlocutor.”
Civil Society
There are currently over 230 civil society organizations
officially registered in CAR, which cover a wide
spectrum of local and national issues ranging
from environmental preservation to protection
of indigenous communities.46
The majority of
interviewees – from MINUSCA, the CAR government
and civil society – highlighted human rights, faith-
based and women’s organizations as the most
active and influential in CAR society. However, civil
society in CAR in general remains extremely weak
and constrained by several challenges, according to
virtually all interviewees. Many CSOs lack the financial
resources and institutional capacity to be effective
independent entities.
Therefore, many lack
autonomy and remain
tied to (and funded by)
international organizations
with varying agendas.
CSOs are also
predominantly
concentrated in
Bangui, leaving the
vast population outside
of the capital without
avenues for their voices
to be heard. Furthermore,
according to several
interviewees, powerful
individuals (mostly
lawyers) create these
CSOs with the support of
CAR’s small elite circle. The
development of larger,
national-level CSOs by
the country’s elites has
reinforced a general lack of
representativeness of the
46 MINUSCA Civil Affairs staff peg this number at around 400, based on frequent interaction with CSOs. [Source: “Répertoire des organisations membres de
la CIONGCA 2015.” Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique.]
country as a whole, according to a former high-level
CAR official. Moreover, the low level of education
and development in CAR has also prevented the
spread and development of CSOs in other parts of the
country. Therefore, civil society in CAR has largely and
historically been defined by CAR’s elite, reinforcing
exclusionary social dynamics and limiting what CSOs
can achieve for the wider population.
Based on several interviews with former and current
government officials – many of whom came from
leadership positions in civil society – it emerged
that leaders of civil society organizations have a
tendency to use their position to enter into politics.
This has had a detrimental effect on the credibility
of CSOs and discredits their role as an independent
counter-balance to political power. One high-level
government official noted that CAR’s civil society, in
its current configuration, retains neither legitimacy
nor credibility, explaining that it must refocus on
civic values if it is to regain its influence. Several
interviewees explained that, in this context, it is
difficult to institutionalize coordination mechanisms
without creating competition among civil society
actors, especially in a context where civil society
The CAR team meets with the Committee for Dialogue and Reconciliation at the MINUSCA field office
headquarters in Kaga Bandoro. The Committee works to strengthen social cohesion and mutual
understanding between local communities.
Photo credit: MINUSCA Staff

23
actors see every position as a means of gaining more
power and money, and such opportunities are rare.
As a general exception to some of the challenges
highlighted above, many interviewees noted that
religious leaders maintain a strong moral leadership
and play a critical role in social cohesion and conflict
resolution in CAR society. In particular, the Inter-
religious Platform for Reconciliation and National
Cohesion, consisting of the three main religions
in CAR (Catholic, Muslim and Protestant), was
instrumental in helping to curb violence during the
height of the conflict. According to leaders of the
platform, the platform sought to ease inter-communal
tensions by demonstrating that the conflict was not
religious, but rather a political manipulation of ethnic
and religious diversity for individual political gain.
For example, during the conflict, religious institutions
served as safe havens to protect all civilians
fleeing from inter-communal violence. Faith-based
organizations were also instrumental in facilitating
inter-faith dialogue among key stakeholders during
the country’s transitional government. Several
interviewees thus expressed support for the Platform
as a highly credible mechanism for the peacebuilding
process in CAR.
Armed Groups
Several armed groups still maintain control over large
swathes of the territory in CAR and have completely
taken over functions that would normally be carried
out by the government, including security (e.g. police
and gendarmerie), justice, and levying taxes. Armed
groups also maintain control of various sources of
wealth, including cattle and livestock, coffee, oil,
diamond and other natural resource mining, and
manning checkpoints. In practical terms, it is only in
the capital city of Bangui that the government fully
exercises its authority.
During the research mission, the team conducted a
visit to Kaga Bandoro, a town in northern region of
CAR, located 245 kilometers north of Bangui, and
witnessed the virtual absence of state authority.
In Kaga Bandoro, a prefect and sub-prefect were
symbolically named by the new CAR government, but
they do not exercise genuine authority, nor do they
have staff or other resources of support. As a result,
armed groups have divided the sovereign functions of
the state among themselves, and each group controls
a major stream of income. Based on interviews
conducted with representatives of these groups, it
was clear that each of these groups has a specific
agenda and respective claims to power. More
importantly, there is a strong level of distrust between
armed groups and between armed groups and the
new CAR government.
Based on interviews, members of one faction of
the ex-Séléka argue that the communities they
represent have historically been excluded and
marginalized both in terms of the governance of the
country, as well as the distribution of wealth and
allocation of development projects and resources
(i.e. roads, schools, hospitals, water, and electricity).
The leaders of ex-Séléka aspire to be officially
appointed to positions in the government or in the
apparatus of the CAR state, including the national
army, gendarmes, and police, in order to contribute
to the decisions that affect them and their people.
In addition, they would like to see a disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process led in
parallel to security sector reform that will allow their
qualified soldiers to integrate into the national army.
Until their demands are met, they will not concede,
and some members explained that the ex-Séléka are
in the process of forming a single chain of command
in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the new
government and to make their voice heard. MINUSCA
officials have emphasized that the“reunification of
the ex-Séléka factions would be a disaster”for the
country.
The Anti-balakas, from their perspective, feel their
group symbolizes the Central African liberation
struggle and as such, they deserve to be honored by
the President and his government. This is reflected
in their demand to be recognized and represented
in the government. They also believe that the
government is currently unable to protect them from
the repeated acts of aggression and destruction of
their farms. To give up their weapons, they demand
that the government meet two demands: formal roles
in government and property protection.
International Contact Group on CAR
The International Contact Group on CAR (ICG-CAR),
also known as the G8, was formed in 2013 upon the
initiative of the African Union to help the country
return to constitutional order. The G8 includes the
African Union, UN, European Union, France, United
States, Republic of Congo, Economic Community of

24
As discussed in the previous section, CAR has a
long history of staging national dialogues and
consultations between the government and civil
society. Nonetheless, the Bangui Forum, which took
place after the most devastating conflict the country
has ever seen, represented a critical milestone on
the path towards defining a collective vision for
the future of the country. In order to build a more
inclusive society in CAR, it is important to gain a
deeper understanding of what the Forum achieved
and the progress that has been made since. Based
on interviews and discussions with civil society,
government and international actors, this section
takes a closer look at the Bangui Forum and the
subsequent monitoring and implementation
mechanisms put in place.
The Bangui Forum
Organized by the transitional government under
interim President Samba-Panza, the Bangui Forum
for National Reconciliation, which took place from
May 4 to 11, 2015, convened nearly 700 leaders from
all sectors and geographic areas of CAR, including
the transitional government, political parties,
armed groups, the private sector, civil society,
community leaders and religious groups. Leading
up to the Forum, the transitional government also
organized nation-wide consultations, which were
unprecedented in scale and scope. The Forum was
hailed by the UN as a“historic and inclusive process
that amplified the voices of local representatives,
women, youth and civil society.”47
Key
recommendations were adopted in the Republican
Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and
Reconstruction regarding the country’s peacebuilding
agenda, including: 1) a disarmament agreement
between ex-Séléka and Anti-balaka; 2) the release of
child soldiers; 3) a timeline for elections; 4) national
and local mechanisms for reconciliation and justice;
and 5) social and economic development priorities.48
segments of the population, particularly outside of
Bangui.
CONSULTATIVE
MECHANISMS
47 Ban, K. (2015). Secretary-General Commends Central African Republic for Adopting Peace, Reconciliation Pact at Bangui National Forum. United
Nations, SG/SM/16739-AFR/3131.
48 Copley, A. & Amadou, S. (2015). Five Takeaways from the Bangui Forum for National Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. Brookings
Institution.
Central African States (ECCAS) and World Bank. Since
its establishment, the G8 has provided support to
the peace process, national consultations, and the
transition to democratic rule. It should be noted
that the initiatives and decisions taken by the G8 are
independent from the actions taken by individual
members of the Group on the basis of their bilateral
relations with CAR.
Members of the CAR government and civil society
acknowledged the invaluable contribution of the
G8 to the political process, which ultimately led to
the return to constitutional order. However, some
also noted that unilateral agendas and lack of
coordination within the G8, particularly regarding
next steps and priorities in the peacebuilding
process, has resulted in fragmented efforts. A senior
government official argued that the G8 would be
more effective if it harmonized its approach, noting
that the Group as a whole is greater than the sum of
its parts, so as to build a more resilient society in CAR.
Several local actors expressed a negative perception
of international partners in CAR, saying they are only
here to exploit natural resources.
It would also seem that the G8 as a whole has
not prioritized a more people-centered approach
in the peacekeeping process. A prominent local
civil society representative and member of the
Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee noted that
international partners were not in favor of the popular
consultations process leading up to the Bangui Forum
due to the financial resources it required. International
partners had initially refused to provide funding for
it, arguing that it would only prolong the transition.
The representative argued that international partners
often give the impression of supporting fragile
countries, but do not invest in long-term, sustainable
solutions to chronic challenges, partly because of
their own national interests. He noted that it took
the firm determination of the former transitional
President Samba-Panza to organize consultation
process prior to the Bangui Forum. However, it should
also be noted that certain individual members of the
G8, such as the U.S., provided technical and logistical
support during the popular consultations and the
Forum, and have also used their political leverage to
encourage the new President to consult with various

25
Virtually all interviewees acknowledged that the
Bangui Forum was a symbolic step in that it had broad
participation among national stakeholders across
the country, produced concrete and substantive
recommendations for a peaceful future for CAR, and
took place without violence. In an interview, a CAR
government official praised the Bangui Forum as
“the most inclusive consultation in the history of the
Central African Republic, which enabled all citizens
to express their views regarding the future of the
country.”Some interviewees noted that previous
initiatives to resolve the conflict (e.g. the peace
agreements signed in Nairobi and Brazzaville in
2013 and 2014, respectively) engaged only a limited
number of actors and mainly those directly involved
in the armed conflict; thus, the success of the Bangui
Forum was due to its broad participation.
However, the general consensus among interviewees
in civil society, government and the UN is that
progress towards implementing the Forum’s
recommendations has been very slow, and the
outcomes are not actively being endorsed or carried
forward by the new government. Many interviewees
explained that this is due to a lack of political will
at the national level, which has historically been a
major constraint to economic, political and social
development in the country. As one G8 government
official explained, the new government seems to
consider the Bangui Forum as an accomplishment
of the previous transitional government under
interim President Samba-Panza, noting that the new
President will seek to forge his own legacy.
Yet, even if the new government has not explicitly and
actively referred to the Bangui Forum, some MINUSCA
and G8 officials say the recommendations of the
Forum are, in fact, being prioritized and implemented
progressively. According to them, all of the priorities
President Touadéra has announced so far - namely,
security (including DDR and SSR), reconciliation
and economic development - seem to be in line
with the recommendations of the Forum and reflect
the major concerns of Central Africans.49
However,
according to a CAR government official, consultations
have not been held nor consultative mechanisms
put in place since the Bangui Forum because, from
the government’s view, this was already achieved
during the Forum. In other words, mechanisms for
community engagement and consultation post-
Bangui Forum have not been institutionalized
because the government does not appear to see an
added value. The general view among government
officials was that‘the box has been checked’with
regards to consultations with local communities
and civil society and that further consultation is not
currently necessary.
The Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee
Following the conclusion of the Forum, the Bangui
Forum Follow-Up Committee was created to
monitor the implementation progress of the Forum’s
recommendations. The Committee, composed of
24 members representing various sectors of CAR
society (i.e. government, political parties, civil society,
diaspora, youth, women, social minorities, trade
unions, employers, media, religious platform, politico-
military groups, etc.) and international partners, is a
separate entity from the government but depends
on the government for funding. The Chair of the
Committee, nominated by transitional President
Samba-Panza, is Joseph Bindoumi, a former Minister
of Defense during the transitional government
and former President of the Central African League
of Human Rights. During an interview, the Chair
clarified that the Committee is not responsible
for the implementation of recommendations but
rather serves to monitor the implementation of the
Forum’s recommendations by key stakeholders,
including the new CAR government. To carry this
out, the Committee sends reminders through various
channels (i.e. mail, courtesy visits, and meetings) to
the responsible parties and reports on progress to the
public.
Several actors among the G8 expressed the view
that the Follow-Up Committee does not appear to
have a clear added value. According to interviewees,
the Committee has failed to share its monitoring
reports with a wide range of stakeholders, including
international partners and local actors that took part
in the Forum’s consultations, which has contributed to
a lack of transparency regarding the implementation
process. Moreover, several international actors
expressed skepticism regarding the leadership of
the Committee under Joseph Bindoumi, given his
political ties as a former Defense Minister under the
transitional government. According to interviewees,
the Committee is working to expand into a larger
state institution with antennae offices around the
country. However, this would require substantial
49 Reuters. (2016). Central African Republic’s President Vows Peace, Reforms at Inauguration. Reuters.

26
critical role in the peacebuilding process in CAR, and
will serve as a transitional justice mechanism as part
of the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social
Affairs. Importantly, the Commission will also work
to facilitate the return of displaced communities
both within and outside of the country.50
According
to an interview with the Ministry, the success of the
Commission will require an inclusive process with
the participation of a broad range of stakeholders
through local peace committees, which are in the
process of being set up across the country. These
committees will be composed of diverse segments
of CAR society, including local authorities, religious
leaders, elders, youth and women, and will work to
promote social cohesion and reconciliation at the
local level. According to government officials, these
committees will be essential to translating the work
of the Commission at the local level and will require
substantial financial support.
According to interviews with government officials,
some governmental seminars have already
been organized about the functioning of the
Commission. However, it seems that the modalities
of operationalization have not yet been adopted,
particularly with regards to transitional justice. As
a recurring constraint, the government continues
to face financial difficulties to fully implement the
Commission.
Although community engagement and inclusivity
were not included in its initial mandate, MINUSCA
has employed a number of tools for community
engagement to foster a more consultative and
collaborative relationship with civil society and local
communities. Based on interviews and discussions
with local communities, civil society actors, and
MINUSCA officials, this section surveys the various
tools that the Mission has used to build more inclusive
national ownership in CAR.
MINUSCA Civil Affairs
The Civil Affairs Section of MINUSCA plays a critical
role in engaging civil society and local communities
TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT
50 More than 900,000 people, representing 20% of the total population, have been displaced by the conflict. The research team met with internally displaced
persons in M’Poko camp in Bangui as well as in Kaga Bandoro -- the majority of whom expressed the wish to return home but feared for their security. Simi-
lar concerns were echoed by displaced Muslims living in PK5, the main Muslim neighborhood in Bangui, which has been effectively enclaved. The majority of
those displaced have lost their homes, which have either been destroyed or taken over by new residents.
resources in a context where the Committee already
has very limited financial means to carry out its
work. As one civil society leader and member of the
Committee underscored, it will be critical to have a
functional committee that can monitor what has been
achieved, what hasn’t been achieved and why, and
plan strategically for the short- and long-term.
Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation
Commission
One of the significant outcomes of the Bangui Forum
consultation process was the concept of a Truth,
Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission.
During interviews, the majority of stakeholders
among civil society, local communities and national
and local government stressed that lasting peace
and reconciliation will not be possible in CAR without
equitable justice. They asserted that the lack of
accountability only serves to embolden perpetrators.
As the Archbishop of Bangui, one of the main leaders
of the Inter-Religious Platform for Reconciliation and
National Cohesion, stated:“Justice should be the first
priority in the Central African Republic, otherwise the
strongest will become ever stronger and the weakest
will become weaker. This would plunge the country
into disorder and injustice, which are the very source
of tension and conflict… Perpetrators of atrocities
must answer for their actions. This is the only way to
preserve future generations from war and crime.”
Drawing from a report on the nation-wide
consultation process that was held in advance of
the Bangui Forum, the purpose of the Truth, Justice,
Reparations and Reconciliation Commission is to
provide a channel to hear the voices of victims,
facilitate access to justice and provide a platform
for national reconciliation. According to the
Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation
and Reconstruction adopted at the conclusion of
the Bangui Forum, the Commission will identify
and examine crimes and atrocities that have been
committed in the country and classify them into two
categories: 1) crimes whose perpetrators must be
brought to justice, 2) crimes that may be addressed
through compensation or general interest work to
facilitate inter-communal reconciliation. According
to Ministers, members of the President’s cabinet and
other government officials, the Commission will play a

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