This document provides an introduction to security sector transformation processes in developing countries. It begins by making the case that security sector transformation is needed in Africa to place people at the center of security and protect them from violence. It defines security from a human security perspective that includes both national security and individual protection. The document discusses how transformation differs from and is more profound than reform. It outlines principles of democratic governance that should underlie security sector processes and discusses challenges that African countries face in implementing security sector transformation.

1. CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements
1. Introduction
1.1 The Case for Security Sector Transformation
1.2 Defining Security for Africa
1.3 Security Sector Transformation Processes in the
Developing World
1.3.1 Transformation versus Reform
1.3.2 Principles Underlying Sound Security Sector
Governance
1.3.3 The Centrality of the Policy Environment
1.3.4 The Policy Framework
1.3.5 Prioritizing Needs
1.3.6 Management Capacity
1.4 The Handbook
1.4.1 Audience
1.4.2 Content
1.4.3 Use
2. The Major Security Actors
2.1 Two Key Concepts: The Security Sector and the
Security Community
2.2 Organisations Legally Mandated to Use Force
2.3 Justice and Law Enforcement Organisations
2.4 Civil Management and Oversight Bodies
2.5 Other Members of the Security Community
2.5.1 Non-statutory Security Force Organisations
2.5.2 Civil Society
2.6 Regional and Multilateral Actors
3. Democratic Governance and the Security Sector
3.1 The Importance of Democratic Governance
3.2 The Legal Basis of the Security Sector
3.3 Transparency in the Security Sector
3.4 Security-Sector Accountability
3.5 Security-Sector Oversight

2. Page
4. Policy Development and Implementation
4.1 Why Policy is Important
4.2 The Politics of the Policy Process
4.3 The Policy Context
4.4 The Policy Management Process
4.4.1 The Importance of Adequate Human and
Institutional Capacity
4.4.2 Policy Communication, Dialogue and Debate
4.4.3 Policy Analysis
4.4.4 Initiating a Policy Process
4.4.5 Policy Development
4.4.6 Policy Implementation
4.4.6.1 Planning
4.4.6.2 Execution
4.4.7 Oversight
4.5 Key Considerations in Implementing New Policies
5. Managing Financial Resources
5.1 Incorporating the Security Sector into Government-Wide
Fiscal Management Processes
5.1.1 Sectoral Planning Process
5.1.2 Setting the Government-Wide Resource Envelope
5.1.3 Sectoral Allocation of Resources
5.1.4 Efficient and Effective Use of Resources
5.2 Key Considerations in Reforming Budgeting Systems
6. Managing the Defence Sector
6.1 Role of the Ministry of Defence
6.2 Assessing Needs
6.2.1 Rationale for the Defence Forces
6.2.2 Determining the Configuration of the Defence Forces
6.2.3 Defence Review Process
6.3 Defining Policies and Plans
6.3.1 Management of the Defence Review Process
6.4 Allocating Resources
ii

3. 7.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Workshop participants
Appendix 2:
iii

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The handbook has been produced by a collaborative effort among
researchers and practitioners across Africa. Core members of the writing team are:
Nicole Ball, ‘J. Kayode Fayemi, ‘Funmi Olonisakin, and Rocklyn Williams.
Contributors to the handbook are: Len LeRoux, Ntsiki Motumi, Janine Rausch, Mark
Shaw and [WHO ELSE?]. The handbook has also been the subject of consultations
during regional meetings held by affiliated research networks in Western and
Southern Africa during which researchers, policy makers and practitioners gave
generously of their time. The objective of these consultations was to obtain input
from a wide variety of local stakeholders on the draft handbook and to deepen the
authors’ understanding of good and bad practice. Information obtained through these
consultations has also been incorporated into ongoing research projects carried out
by the Centre for Democracy & Development (Lagos/London), the Center for
International Policy (Washington, DC) and the Security Sector Transformation
Project of the Institute of Security Studies (Pretoria).
The authors would also like to thank: Malcolm Holmes,
iv

5. 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE CASE FOR SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION
This handbook begins from the premise that people and states must be secure
from the fear of violence at the local, national, regional and international levels if an
enabling environment for sustainable political and economic development is to be
created. This means both that states must be adequate protected against aggression
and internal subversion and that the lives of ordinary citizens must not be crippled by
state repression, violent conflict, or rampant criminality.
Since the beginning of the colonial period, African security forces have frequently
been a cause of insecurity for both the state and its citizens, rather than a means of
guaranteeing individual and collective security. African governments have often failed
to abide by the rule of law in their relations with their neighbours or their own population.
Many of sub-Saharan Africa’s recent wars have their roots in élite attempts to protect
their privileged position domestically or to undermine other African governments whose
foreign policies are viewed as injurious to the ability of these élites to remain in power.
What is more, African historical experience demonstrates that if internal and
external security are not viewed as two sides of the same coin, it will be difficult to
create societies that function on the basis of the rule of law and protect individual
security. All too often, the armed forces and the police have been given – or have
appropriated – the responsibility for guaranteeing law and order. While there are
conditions under which the armed forces can provide aid to the civil power, domestic
policing is not a task for which they are well suited. It also can hamper their ability to
carry out other constitutionally mandated tasks, such as protecting the state. This
problem has been compounded by the failure to provide police and gendarmerie forces
and other portions of the public security/criminal justice system with the resources they
require to guarantee law and order. This handbook will describe how to develop a
process for allocating resources between the different security forces that protect both
the state and its population.
The inability of African security forces to provide a safe and secure environment
for economic and political development arises to a large degree out of poor governance
– both of the state in general and of the security sector in particular. This handbook is
concerned with democratic governance. While public-sector institutions will be a major
focus of the following chapters, democratic governance implies more than the effective
and efficient management of the public sector. It requires a legitimate, transparent, and
trusted state that is accountable to its citizens. Achieving democratic governance is a
deeply political undertaking.
1.2 DEFINING SECURITY FOR AFRICA
Since the end of the cold war, the desirability of shifting from a state- and élite-
focused view of security to one that places individuals at the centre of the security
1

6. equation has gained increasing acceptance in many parts of the world. The concept of
human security – which combines elements of national security, economic
development, and basic human rights with the objective of protecting people from the
fear of violence – is particularly relevant in Africa. While protecting the state and its
citizens from external aggression remains a consideration, the most serious threats
facing countries on the African continent at the beginning of the 21st century tend to be
those that either derive from internal causes or are transnational and collective in
nature.1
Security in Africa would undeniably be served by placing people at the centre for
the security equation and by finding non-violent solutions to disputes at the sub-
national, national, regional and international levels.2 A safe and secure environment is
a necessary condition for sustainable, poverty-reducing development. In the African
context, it is most constructive to speak of a peacebuilding approach to human security.
Such an approach imply that a country’s security forces would have as their main
objectives:
 protection against external aggression;
 maintenance of law and order;
 ability to counter internal threats to the constitutional order;
 ability to participate in regional defense;
 protection of borders and national waters;
 ability to use security forces to promote foreign policy objectives;
 ability to participate in peace operations;
 creation of an environment conducive to poverty-reducing, environmentally sound
development strategies; and
 attention to regional/subregional issues such as AIDS, allocation of water
resources, and citizenship that have the potential to undermine stability.
All of these activities should be carried out in a manner consistent with international
humanitarian law, respect for human rights, international standards of democratic
governance, and support for non-violent conflict resolution and societal reconciliation.
1
For an approach to human security that focuses on protecting people from the fear of violence, see, for
example, Human Security Network. “Report of a conference organized by the Programme for Strategic
and International Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, March 8-9, 2001,”
www.humansecuritynetwork.org/report_may2001_3-e.asp. For an approach that comes closer to
equating human security with human development, see the website of the Commission on Human
Security, www.humansecurity-chs.org.
2
For a comparison of the state-centric view of security and the “new thinking” on security in the
developing world that began to emerge in the late 1980s, see Gavin Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s
Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997, pp.
7-26.
2

7. Adopting a peacebuilding approach to national security implies a broadening of
the current security agenda in virtually every African country. It does not, however
broaden that agenda so much that the traditional security forces – the armed forces, the
police, paramilitary forces such as the gendarmerie and borders guards, and the
intelligence services – can justify violating one of the basic tenets of democratic
governance in the security sector, namely political non-partisanship. Nor does a
peacebuilding approach to human security justify security force involvement in the
economy.
Adopting a peacebuilding approach does, however, imply the need to assess
each country’s security environment, including regional and international considerations,
and to evaluate the structures, roles and missions of the different security forces in the
light of the primary objectives listed above. The outcome of such an assessment may
be to engage in a significant restructuring of the security sector in order to maximise its
capacity to protect the state and its citizens from the full range of threats identified and
integrate the security sector fully into a system of democratic governance. A
peacebuilding approach to human security simultaneously requires ensuring that the
civil authorities have the capacity to manage and oversee the security forces according
to the principles of democratic governance and that the various non-state actors play
their respective roles responsibly and in a manner consistent with democratic
governance.
1.3 SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
1.3.1 Transformation versus Reform
In both the literature and official discourse on improving security-sector
governance, the process of changing the security sector is described as “security-sector
reform.”3 However, reform processes tend to be incremental and relatively ineffective in
dealing with significant institutional weaknesses. Reforms may change the superficial
appearance of an organization without fundamentally altering its character, culture, or
the de facto balance of power within the organization, as the many attempts at
restructuring post-coup armed forces in Africa and Latin America have repeatedly
shown.
3
For example, see Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, “The Challenges of Security Sector
Reform’, pp. 175-201in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2002:
Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002; Dylan
Hendrickson et. al, Security Sector Reform and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for
Enhancing Policy Coherence, report to the OECD/DAC, Paris, 2000; UK Department for International
Development, Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for
Donors, High Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium, London: DFID, June
2000; Bonn International Center for Conversion, Security Sector Reform, Brief 15, Bonn, June 2000;
Malcolm Chalmers, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective, London:
Saferworld, January 2000; and Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy
Options for the British Government, London: Saferworld, December 1998.
3

8. What is more, the term “reform” has many negative political connotations in
democratically-inclined communities in the developing world, especially in Africa.
Politically it is often associated with the implementation of policy decisions by the
executive from above without any attempt to secure the broader participation of and
consultation with legislative or non-state actors. Many of the reform strategies adopted
in Africa have been undertaken to legitimize unpopular regimes and have failed to alter
the existing balance of power within the state or between the state and society to any
meaningful extent.
Transformation, in contrast, entails a more profound intent on behalf of elected
governments to ensure that the practices of the security forces are consistent with the
democracies that they serve. Countries with serious governance deficits may require a
fundamental transformation of relations between the civil authorities and civil society on
the one hand and the security forces on the other hand. Such transformations should
occur within a framework of democratic oversight and control (Box 1-1).
Box 1-1. Community Policing versus the Culture of Policing
In a number of countries, civilian oversight of and engagement with policing are viewed as two
methods of improving the democratic governance of the security sector. There are, however,
serious questions about the degree to which such mechanisms can foster democratic policing in a
political system characterised by a low level of overall democracy.
“It is unclear whether militarized police institutions characterized by high levels of hierarchy, top-
down command, strict internal discipline, low levels of education and use of discretion amongst
street cops are capable of implementing many aspects of community policing. It may be that police
must initiate processes of institutional reform and professionalization as a pre-requisite to
community policing rather than looking to community policing as a strategy to achieve this
transformation. It is also clear that community policing methods such as neighborhood watches and
community patrols have been used by communist governments and in counter-insurgency
campaigns as effective tools of social control.”
Source: Rachel Neild, “From National Security to Citizen Security: Civil Society and the Evolution
of Public Order Debates,” Report prepared by the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development, December 1999, www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/demDev/
CitizensSecurity.html
Equally important, transformation processes should be supportive of the roles
and tasks that the different security organizations are mandated to execute. They need
to address four institutional aspects of each of the security bodies: its organizational
character, its cultural make-up, its human resource practices and, critically, and its
political relationships with both the elected authorities and with the civil power. Failure
to address all four of these areas will invariably result in a failure to address the
fundamental character and purpose of the institution in question and thus reduce the
likelihood that the transformation process will succeed.
Transformation processes are highly complex and for that reason are often
viewed with trepidation. The restructuring of the security sectors of many African
countries, particularly those that are attempting to emerge from either an authoritarian
or a violent past, demands a visionary and integrated transformational strategy capable
4

9. of ensuring that the country’s security institutions do not regress into previous patterns
of behaviour. In practice, shifting political priorities, resource limitations, skills deficits,
weak leadership and the sheer novelty of the transformational terrain may bedevil such
initiatives.
For these reasons, the very prospect of a thoroughgoing transformation may
prove daunting to a country’s political leadership. This may be particularly true where
the security organizations have played an important political role in recent years and
their commitment to democratic governance is uncertain. Policy makers may thus opt
for reform processes.
However, one of the clearest lessons of the past is that when problems in the
security sector are approached in a piecemeal fashion, without reference to broad goals
and underlying structural problems, security-sector governance is generally not
improved significantly. Since the security forces have contributed in no small measure
to the decline of economic and political governance in much of Africa, it will not be
possible to strengthen African states without adequate attention to the security sector.
Moreover, the security-sector transformation agenda is very much a human and
institutional capacity-building agenda and, by definition, recognizes that states seeking
to implement the agenda do not have strong institutions. The challenge is to identify
priority activities and then to develop a step-by-step approach to the transformation
process that is consistent with local capabilities.
1.3.2 The Principles Underlying Sound Security Sector Governance
One of the key steps in setting in motion a process of transformation is the clear
and unambiguous statement of the key principles that will guide the management of the
security forces. Such principles should outline the roles and responsibilities of the
political actors, including the role of parliament; the oversight responsibilities of the
government; the chain of command within the different security forces; the roles and
tasks envisaged for each security force; and the broad democratic principles to which
the security forces should adhere in their conduct as professionals.
It is also necessary to set out the
government’s responsibilities toward the
security forces clearly and unambiguously. Box 1-2. The Preconditions for Sound
Security Sector Governance in Africa
Such principles should include the provision of
clear political leadership to the security forces; “Without rule of law, democratic
and the prevention of political interference in constitutions, a system of checks and
balances in government, or viable and
the chain of command by the political functioning institutions, sound security
leadership of the country concerned. It is also sector governance is impossible.”
important that government undertakes to
provide the security forces with adequate Source: Participants in the CDD-ISS-CIP
resources to accomplish their constitutionally Workshop on Security Sector
Transformation, Dakar, Senegal, October
designated missions. It is important, however, 18-19, 2001.
that this not prevent governments from
achieving a proper balance of resources
5

10. between various societal goals. Where resources are inadequate to enable one or
more of the security services to carry out all agreed activities, it will be necessary to
review the plans for the relevant service and adjust them accordingly. [Canadian
example??]
All of these principles should be outlined in the constitution, and can be further
elaborated in subordinate legislation, such as a defence act, police act or intelligence
act, and reinforced through strategic reviews, security assessments, and policy papers.
1.3.3 The Relevance of Good Practice
This paper focuses on good practice and identifies key principles of democratic
governance in the security sector. One might well question the relevance of dwelling on
good practice when dealing with an issue like security sector governance where actual
practice diverges significantly from good practice.
Governance in the security sector should be
approached as a three-level process (Box 1-3). The first Box 1-3. Three Levels of
level consists of relevant international law, norms and Policy
principles. The second level consists of national
legislation and policies. It is desirable for these to reflect Level 1: International norms,
principles, and law
international law, norms and principles to the greatest
degree possible. In developing national laws and
policies, however, it is important to recognize that there is
a wide range of ways to structure national law and
policies and that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Level 2: National legislation
and policies
The third level is that of national practice. National
practice may or may not reflect the two preceding levels.
Some of the deviations may constitute illegal practice but
much will not. Every country develops methods of Level 3: National practice
[legal, illegal]
addressing issues that reflect the spirit of the laws and
policies of that country but which may not follow exactly
the procedures specified in those laws and policies. That is true for OECD countries as
well as for non-OECD countries. This is what makes it challenging to decide exactly
how to affect policy in a given area and why a contextual approach is so important.
The purpose of starting with good practice is that it provides a clear vision of the
objectives of policy reform – in this case, a democratically governed security sector
under civilian leadership. Without such a vision, it is impossible to develop either a
strategy for reaching the ultimate objective or benchmarks to measure progress along
the way. It is also impossible to determine where the problems lie with existing policy
and practice. Thus, the handbook lays out a number of principles and ideal-type
processes for democratic, civil management and oversight of the security sector in order
to provide a point of reference against which actual practice can be measured.
6

11. 1.3.4 The Centrality of the Policy Environment
Policy is implemented in a specific context. Political, public, bureaucratic and
personal factors are critically important in the formulation and implementation of policy.
Any attempt to formulate new policy must take account of the environment into which
the policy is being introduced, for this
context will have a decisive bearing on the
Box 1-4. President of Namibia Accepts
success or failure of policy interventions. Constitutional Term Limitations
The degree to which the political In November 2001, Namibian President Sam
leadership and government bureaucrats Nujoma decided not to stand for re-election in
adhere to the fundamental tenets of 2004. Prior to his decision, there had been
considerable speculation whether the president
democratic governance defines the nature would seek to amend the Namibian
of the policy environment (Box 1-4). Heads constitution’s two-term limit. According to the
of state and government unquestionably set ruling party SWAPO’s secretary general,
the tone and ethical standards for those who Nujoma “wants to comply with the constitution.”
work in government and public service. It is As other presidential elections in Africa
not enough, however, for the head of state conducted during 2001 and 2002 demonstrated
(Madagascar, Uganda, Zambia, and
or government to support constitutional
Zimbabwe), institutionalizing the
processes and the rule of law. It is also democratization process requires the ruling
important that senior politicians ensure that party to accept not only elections but also
lower-ranking politicians and bureaucrats serious challenges to its continued tenure in the
are committed to creating effective state house. Nonetheless, the Nujoma’s
institutions that function according to decision to abide by constitutional provisions is
an important step in strengthening Namibia’s
democratic principles. The legislature and democratic institutions.
other oversight bodies must also be allowed
Source: “Namibia: Nujoma’s Departure a
and encouraged to play their constitutionally Challenge for SWAPO,” December 7, 2001,
assigned roles. Policy will be stronger and www.irrinnews.org.
enjoy more widespread support to the extent
that civil society is involved in the
formulation process.4
In the past, the policy environment in African countries has been non-transparent
and non-participatory. Leaders at all levels have been unaccountable and have
engaged in corrupt activities. Power has tended to be highly concentrated in the
executive, particularly the office of the president, and interest in reform has often
extended only to changes that have not threatened the executive’s grip on power.
Considerable progress has been made since the 1980s in strengthening the rule of law
and democratic governance in the continent, but considerable challenges continue to
exist.
It is equally important that the transformation process does not ignore the
balance of power within the security forces, particularly the armed forces. If it does so,
it will fail to produce significant change, regardless of the intentions and consultative
nature of this process or the quality of the policy products that result. It is imperative
that once a security sector transformation process is underway, the political leadership
4
Key principles of democratic governance in the security sector are discussed in Chapter 2.
7

12. of the country make every effort to understand both the de facto and the de jure balance
of power within the security services. Many African armed forces have been notoriously
factionalised, as witnessed by the innumerable coups and counter-coups experienced
by African countries. Many of these factions are, however, not necessarily anti-
democratic. Even those countries that have emerged from decades of praetorian rule
possess officers within the command echelons that are constitutionally inclined and
supportive of the non-partisan and professional role of the modern military. Ghana,
Lesotho, Nigeria, and South Africa provide interesting examples of this point.
The transformation of the security services needs to ensure that progressive and
constitutionally-inclined officers are deployed in those positions within the command and
staff hierarchy that are essential for long-term transformation of each institution. In the
short term, it will be particularly important to focus on such posts as:
 the chief of the defence force,
 the inspector general of police,
 the chief of the most influential military service (which in most African countries
tends to be the Army),
 the most senior intelligence officers in the various intelligence bodies,
 the key operational commanders (particularly at divisional and brigade level in the
armed forces), and
 the strategy and planning staffs of the various security forces.
In the medium to long-term it is important to ensure that constitutional and
professional officers control the key socializing institutions such as the planning,
personnel, education and training components of the various security bodies.
Transformation efforts should also ensure that the institutional capacity of the civilian
component of the head offices is strengthened and that supportive personnel from the
different security forces are seconded to the relevant ministries to assist civilian
managers with the formulation of realistic policy, planning and budgetary forecasts. In
some countries civil society organisations such as research institutes, universities or
non-governmental organizations may provide an additional source of the requisite
technical assistance.
1.3.5 The Policy Framework
Government must provide a clear policy framework within which the
transformation of the security sector will be managed.5 These generally include policy
statements, strategic defence and security reviews, concept documents, and
transformation strategies. There are a number of advantages to providing such a policy
framework for both the security forces and government.
 First, policy frameworks provide the security forces, the government, and the
population with a clear description of the purposes for which resources are being
5
The process of developing and implementing security-sector policy is discussed in Chapter 3.
8

13. allocated to the security forces. In turn, they afford the security forces a clear
understanding of their roles in providing the safe and secure environment necessary
for democratic development, poverty-reduction, and sustainable economic and
social development.
 Second, the process of setting government priorities both within the security sector
and between security and other sectors is dependent on well-articulated policies.
 Third, engaging in a participatory policy formulation process in the security sector
provides an opportunity to build confidence between the security forces and civilians.
A well-managed process can significantly defuse the often-adversarial relationship
between the civil authorities and the security forces by helping each side understand
the perspectives and needs of the other and by building personal and professional
relationships necessary for compromise to be achieved.
 Fourth, a participatory policy development process that includes a wide range of
non-security actors removes decision-making on the management and oversight of
this sector from the hands of a small group of technocrats, enabling the broader
implications of security sector policy to be given adequate weight.
 Fifth, if correctly managed, such processes can bestow considerable legitimacy on
both the security forces and the government in managing the country’s civil-security
sector relations.
 Finally, a well-managed policy development process can strengthen democratic
governance, by reaffirming democratic norms and principles such as the rule of law
and civil oversight and by helping to inculcate democratic behaviour.
1.3.6 Prioritizing Needs
Another central government responsibility involves identifying the key strategic
areas that require immediate attention during the security-sector transformation
process. Given the immensity of major transformational initiatives, the issues which
transformation processes are called upon to address, and the limited institutional
capacity to deal with these issues, it is imperative that realistic, and sustainable,
interventions are made. From a consideration of security-sector transformation
processes that are in various stages of completion in Africa (Mozambique, Namibia,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe for example) and those that are in the
process of being initiated (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Nigeria and,
possibly, Burundi), it is apparent that a generic set of issues present themselves for
immediate consideration in the management of such processes. These include:
 Creating the political will necessary to engage in significant transformation of the
security sector;
 Building capacity among parliamentary oversight committees and other civil
management and oversight actors such as the ministry of finance, the office of the
auditor general, and the ministry of defence;
 Developing a clear policy framework within which the relationship between the
security forces and the civil authorities can be both articulated and managed;
9

14.  Managing critical human resource issues confronting the security forces, such as
downsizing, institution of equity programmes in the recruitment and promotion
policies of the various security forces and transformation of the leadership,
command and management culture of those forces;
 Reprofessionalizing the security forces, including the separation of civil policing and
external defence functions and reorienting the intelligence services to protect the
state and its population rather than political élites; and
 Preparing the security forces for new roles and tasks (peace missions, military aid
to the civil community, or combating transnational crime, for example).
Prioritizing these issues is not intended to undervalue other pertinent
transformational issues such as the involvement of the security forces in truth and
reconciliation processes or the transformation of the education and training institutions.
Making progress in these priority areas will, however, create an enabling environment
within which the longer-term transformation of the institution can proceed.
1.3.7 Management Capacity
It is also necessary to undertake a realistic appraisal of the capacity of the
security forces and the civil authorities to manage and implement ambitious security-
sector transformation initiatives. Well-intentioned policy that has not taken into account
the resource constraints, institutional limitations, human-resource limitations and
political priorities of the country concerned will act as no more than visions with little
long-term, operational utility. Realistic plans need to be developed, issues need to be
prioritized, and a comprehensive “force-field analysis” of the capabilities of the institution
in question needs to be conducted if viable transformation strategies are to be
developed and implemented. As Box 1-5 suggests, the managerial capacity of the civil
authorities is quite weak in many parts of Africa.
Box 1-5. Civil-Military Imbalances in SADC Countries
“Comparative studies of the organizational structures of the ministries responsible for defence in
the [SADC] region show that some of them still have inadequate institutional arrangements for
stable civil-military relations. In some defence ministries, the military [are] dominant and civilians
hardly make any meaningful contribution to defence policy formulation and financial control. The
military principals, the chiefs of defence forces or force commanders, do not have civilian
counterparts or Principal Secretaries to jointly plan, coordinate and execute policy.”
Source: Erastus I. Negonga, “Namibian Civil-Military Relations in the New Millennium: Prospects
and Challenges,” Prepared for the ISS Security Sector Transformation Project, August 15, 2001.
10

15. 1.4 THE HANDBOOK
1.4.1 Audience
This handbook provides guidance on undertaking a process of security sector
transformation consistent with democratic governance principles and a human security
agenda. It is primarily intended for security sector practitioners both in the security
forces and among the civil authorities charged with managing and monitoring the
activities of the security forces. It is secondarily intended to assist policy makers, civil
society, and those agencies that provide financial and technical support to efforts to
strengthen security sector governance to understand the issues involved in a
transformation process.
1.4.2 Content
Chapter 2 defines the security sector and introduces the concept of the “security
community.”
Chapter 3 outlines the requirements of security in a democracy.
Chapter 4 discusses generic aspects of policy development and implementation.
Chapter 5 reviews the principles underlying financial management in the security
sector.
In Chapters 6-8, the handbook discusses key issues in the management each of
the main security forces: the armed forces. the police, and the intelligence services.
FINISH
1.4.3 Use
This handbook constitutes a first cut at documenting critical processes and
institutional relations that must come into being if the countries of sub-Saharan Africa
are to develop sound governance practices in the security sector and if external actors
are to provide meaningful support to these efforts. As such, it does not provide
definitive guidance on how best to approach security-sector transformation in sub-
Saharan Africa. Rather, it aims to be a tool for promoting dialogue within Africa –
nationally, regionally, and cross-regionally – as well as between external actors and
African governments and civil society on concrete ways to enhance good governance in
the security sector that are consistent with African traditions and experience. It is hoped
that the handbook will encourage similar efforts at the national level, tailored to meet the
specific needs of individual countries.
For these outcomes to occur, the handbook needs to be adopted for use as
broadly as possible. The handbook has been designed both as a tool for developing or
strengthening incipient transformation processes and as a training tool in environments
well committed to a process of transformation. It has therefore developed a multi-
pronged strategy for maximizing the adoption of the handbook. This strategy is
11

16. predicated on the belief that it is institutions, not individual leaders, that ultimately
matter. Thus it focuses on processes that can assist institutional development and
seeks to:
 develop linkages with reform-minded officials at all levels of government and
within all segments of political and civil society in sub-Saharan Africa, especially
West and Southern Africa;
 work to have the handbook adopted as a standard text in the security, defense
and police colleges in individual African countries;
 embed the work on the handbook in regional research and training initiatives
such as SACMRP, SADSEM, CDD’s West Africa network, and ACSS;
 work to have the handbook adopted as a standard training tool by these and
other civil society initiatives; and
 embed the handbook in the work of relevant subregional and regional
organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, the Conference on Security, Stability,
Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA), and the [Peace and Security cluster
of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development] Conflict Dimension of the
New Africa Initiative at the level of OAU. [Correct terms here.]
The processes which define sound governance in the security sector that are
discussed at length below should be seen as end product of a long period of
transformation. No country in the world currently fully implements all of the processes
that should, in principle, guide state actions in the security sector. These processes and
the institutional transformation objectives they imply should be seen as a set of goals
that governments and societies work to implement incrementally. As with all broad
policy objectives, it is necessary to identify reasonable steps along the way toward
achieving these goals. While reaching these goals may seem daunting in view of
actual practice in a country, it is nonetheless important to have them as an objective.
Problems in the security sector must be approached from the perspective of
broad goals and underlying structural weaknesses. A focus on short-term “fixes” in any
sector will fail to get at the core problems. Sometimes, technical solutions have
aggravated underlying structural weaknesses. The precise shape and pace of change
in each country will depend on a range of factors. This handbook seeks to assist its
users to develop a holistic view of the state of the security sector in their own countries
and to map out process for strengthening democratic governance of the security sector.
12

17. Do we want to include a summary box for this introductory section? I DON’T
THINK IT IS NECESSARY.
13

18. CHAPTER 2
THE MAJOR SECURITY ACTORS
AIM
This section identifies the potential security universe in a country and provides
brief descriptions of each main group of actors. Security sector transformation
processes often focus extensively on the security forces, secondarily on the civil
oversight actors, and only rarely on the other actors within the broad security
community. This chapter argues that all members of the security community need to be
engaged if sound governance of the security sector is to be achieved.
Section 2.1 discusses two key concepts: the security sector and the security
community. Section 2.2. discusses organisations legally mandated to use force.
Section 2.3 examines justice and law enforcement organisations. Section 2.4 looks at
the civil management and oversight bodies. Section 2.5 reviews the non-statutory
security force organisations and civil society actors. Section 2.6 considers regional and
multilateral actors.
2.1 KEY CONCEPTS: THE SECURITY SECTOR AND THE SECURITY COMMUNITY
The totality of actors that affect the security of the state and its population
constitutes the “security community.” The official actors within the security community
comprise the “security sector.”
The security sector can be divided into three main groups of actors:
 Organisations legally mandated to use force: armed forces; police;
gendarmeries and other paramilitary forces; coast guards; territorial border guards;
reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, presidential
guards, official militias); military and civilian intelligence services; customs and other
uniformed bodies such as secret services.
 Justice and law-enforcement organisations: judiciary; correctional services;
criminal investigation and prosecution services; customary and traditional justice
bodies.
 Civil management and oversight bodies: legislatures and legislative committees;
ministries of defense, internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs; office of the
president/prime minister; financial management bodies (ministries of finance,
budget offices, auditor’s general’s offices); national security advisory bodies;
relevant regional/provincial and local authorities, including customary and traditional
14

19. authorities; statutory civil society organizations such as such as human rights
ombudsmen, police commissions, public complaints commissions.6
In addition to these public sector actors who are mandated to use force to protect
the state and its citizens and the civil management and oversight bodies, there are a
number of additional actors who influence the content and implementation of security
policy in Africa. These can be divided into two main groups: non-statutory security
force organizations and non-statutory civil society bodies. Together with the security
sector, these actors comprise the security community.
 Non-statutory security force organizations: liberation armies; guerrilla armies;
traditional militias; political party militias; self-defense organizations, including those
based on regional, ethnic or religious affiliations; and private security companies.
 Non-statutory civil society bodies: professional organisations, including trade
unions; research/policy analysis organisations; advocacy organisations; the media;
religious organizations; membership organizations; other non-governmental
organizations; and the concerned public.
Figure 2-1. The Components of the Security Sector and the Security Community
 Organisations mandated  Non-statutory security
to use force force organisations
 Justice/law-enforcement Security  Non-statutory civil Security
organisations Sector society organisations Community
 Civil management and
oversight bodies
2.2 ORGANISATIONS LEGALLY MANDATED TO USE FORCE
Discussions about security tend to focus on the role of the military, which is
charged with protecting the state, and particularly the army. This reflects the
widespread, but by no means universal, tendency to favor the military, especially the
army, in resource allocation. It is also a manifestation of the direct and indirect
influence that the armed forces have often exerted over political life in African states.
A peacebuilding approach to security, however, draws attention to the fact that
achieving security for states and their populations is not a task that the army or even the
mlitary can accomplish by themselves. Other state bodies that are mandated to ensure
the safety of the state and its citizens such as the police, the gendarmerie, civilian and
military intelligence, border and coast guards, secret services and customs enforcement
6
For a slightly different formulation, see Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, “The Security Sector
and the Challenges of its Transformation,” Chapter 4 in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament
and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, 2002.
15

20. entities need to be part of the equation. In some countries, the influence, prestige, and
capabilities of paramilitary forces or intelligence services outweigh those of the military,
and one or more of them may receive the lion’s share of resources.
One security body that consistently receives little consideration and generally has
very low prestige is African police services. This is highly problematic, since an
effective police force capable of ensuring citizen security while respecting human rights
is an essential element of a peacebuilding approach to security. An additional problem
with policing in many African countries is the blurring of the distinctions between the
functions carried out by the military and other defence forces and those carried out by
the police. Defence forces have been tasked to carry out internal security-related
activities, and police services have been militarized or actually placed under the control
of the military. In most cases, the police have not received adequate resources to
enable them to carry out their public safety functions effectively and are only beginning
to develop a culture of service to the public and an understanding of the concept of
policing by consent of the people.
Failure to engage with the full range of defence and intelligence actors runs the
risk of jeopardizing efforts to strengthen overall governance, achieve human
development, and make the most effective and efficient use of state resources.
In order to maximize their ability to ensure state and individual security, the roles
that each of these security actors plays need to be well-defined and transparent. The
forces themselves need to be professional, to adhere to international law and
democratic governance practices, including their accountability to legitimate civil
authorities, and to eschew involvement in the economy or political life of the country.
2.3 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Efforts to reform police services in Africa and elsewhere during the 1990s led to
the realisation that public safety and security is dependent on the effective and efficient
functioning of the entire criminal justice system: the police, the prosectors, the judiciary
and the correction system. Strengthening the capacity of the police to carry out criminal
investigations, for example, is of little consequence if the accused are released from jail
for political reasons. If the judiciary does not itself abide by the rule of law, it is more
difficult to make the case that the police or prison officials need to protect the civil and
human rights of those suspected, accused, or found guilty of crimes.
It is therefore important to supplement efforts to strengthen the democratic
governance of the police service with parallel efforts to transform the judiciary and the
correction system. Different countries and jurisdictions structure these institutions in
different ways and, more importantly, there are very widely different policies, procedures
and practices that govern the judiciary and the correction system in across Africa.
African states also face the need to incorporate traditional systems of justice into their
formal legal systems, which essentially reflect European and international law. In
general, however, most criminal justice systems in Africa, and indeed around the world,
share four core objectives:
16

21.  Crime prevention
 Investigation and prosecution of crimes
 Adjudication of criminal cases, and
 Punishment and rehabilitation of offenders.
CONTINUE
2.4 CIVIL MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT BODIES
Just as it is insufficient to focus on the military to the exclusion of other
organizations legally mandated to use force or on the police to the exclusion of other
components of the criminal justice system, providing security for the state and its
population should not be the sole preserve of the security forces. Democratic
governance of the security sector requires an active role for the civil authorities that
manage and monitor the security forces. The security of both the state and its
population will be maximized to the extent that the security forces are under democratic,
civil control. One of the major constraints on achieving democratic security-sector
governance across the African continent have been restrictions on the ability of the civil
authorities to manage and oversee the activities of the organisations that are legally
mandated to use force to protect the state and its population. (Oversight is discussed in
more detail in sections 3.5 and 4.4.3.3.)
Both the executive branch and the legislature should be involved in the
formulation and implementation of security policy. In most African countries, formal
security policies are poorly developed or non-existent, as are the plans for implementing
security policies. Where formal policies and plans do exist, it is uncommon for the full
range of executive and legislative branch actors to have been involved in their
development and implementation is generally weak. Often, the security forces
themselves assume responsibility for developing policy. Financial management of the
security sector is another problem area, as it generally does not conform to international
practice. The central actors in policy development and management include the
ministries of defence, interior/home affairs, and foreign affairs; office of the
president/prime minister; cabinet office; and national security adviser. The ministry of
finance, the security forces, the legislature, and civil society have important consultative
roles. (Managing the policy process is discussed in Chapter 4; managing financial
resources is discussed in Chapter 5.)
The legislature is one of the most important oversight bodies and has several
important roles to play in monitoring the implementation of security policy. As members
of various oversight committees, legislators vet policies developed by the executive
branch and assess the way in which these policies are implemented. Legislators also
hold the power of the purse, and must approve budgets and monitor their
implementation. Additionally, the legislature exerts varying degrees of control over the
executive’s ability to wage war. The government’s auditor-general is another important
oversight actor, as are the public protector, constitutional courts, anti-corruption and
17

22. public accountability bodies. Auditors-general are often thought of in terms of financial
oversight, but they can also offer objective assessments of policy and its
implementation (Box 2-1).
Box 2-1. The Mission Statement of the United States General Accounting Office
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO), headed by the Comptroller General who
reports to the US Congress, is arguably the most highly developed public accountability office in the
world. While few countries anywhere can hope to allocate the resources necessary to establish and
maintain such an entity, there is much to be learned by examining its objectives and modes of
operation that can subsequently be modified to local conditions. The GAO describes itself in the
following terms:
“The General Accounting Office is the investigative arm of Congress. GAO exists to support the
Congress in meeting its Constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public
funds, evaluates federal programs and activities, and provides analyses, options, recommendations,
and other assistance to help the Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions. In
this context, GAO works to continuously improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the
federal government through financial audits, program reviews and evaluations, analyses, legal
opinions, investigations, and other services. GAO's activities are designed to ensure the executive
branch's accountability to the Congress under the Constitution and the government's accountability
to the American people. GAO is dedicated to good government through its commitment to the core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.”
Source: www.gao.gov
2.5 OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COMMUNITY
2.5.1 Non-statutory Security Force Organisations
While efforts to improve the governance of the security sector correctly focus on
official actors with the mandate to use force to protect the state and its population, the
role played by non-statutory security force organisations cannot be ignored.
The importance of non-state actors in Africa has been underscored by armed
conflicts such as those in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra
Leone where the ability to provide the safe and secure environment necessary for
human security and human development has been compromised by the activities of a
variety of non-statutory security actors such as armed opposition groups, other informal
security forces, and private commercial security firms. While domestic groups, often
backed by regional governments or financed through the sale of natural resources
facilitated by foreign middlemen and international companies, are responsible for most
of the actual fighting, private security firms have received considerable attention
because of human rights abuses and lucrative contracts which plunder the natural
18

23. resources in exchange for various security-related services. The South African firm
Executive Outcomes which gained notoriety because of its involvement in Sierra Leone,
is but one example of the international firms led by former military officers from a variety
of countries that have been involved in one way or another in African wars.
Domestically, the inability of the state to protect its population or segments of the
population against violence has led to the rise a wide variety of local militia-type groups
and private security firms. Criminal gangs are also growing in strength in many parts of
Africa. They are increasingly well armed and spreading beyond national boundaries
(Box 2-2). National governments are
increasingly hard-pressed to respond
effectively, and vigilantism is a not- Box 2-2. Regionalisation of Crime in
Southern Africa
uncommon response in communities that
feel they have no other means of “Not only are organised criminal groups
protection. The Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, engaged in a wide variety of criminal
for example, engages in extra-judicial activities, but the responses also indicate
killings of suspected criminals. It that crossborder criminal activities are
extensive…. For example, Botswana, a
reportedly has the backing of a number country with a relatively small population of
of state governments in southeastern 1,576,470, and a criminal investigation
Nigeria. [KF: WHY?] [BECAUSE THE department consisting of about 600
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES detectives during 2000, indicated that, of the
HAVE LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF 34 categories of crimes listed in the
THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE POLICE questionnaire, 20 involved crossborder or
IS OFTEN SEEN AS AGENTS OF transnational organised criminal activities.
INSECURITY. PLEASE SEE THE Politically and economically, Botswana has
ARTICLE ON BAKASSI BOYS IN THE been one of the most stable SADC countries
LAST EDITION OF DEMOCRACY & during the past two decades. It has been
better placed than most SADC countries to
DEVELOPMENT]
make resources available for combating
crime and has developed a good track
In some countries, privately-
record in this regard. However, even if it
employed security officers significantly was able to devote more resources towards
outnumber uniformed police officers. In the combating of organised crime, Botswana
2000, for example, South Africa counted will find it very difficult to curb organised
216,000 private security officers crime without the more extensive
compared with 90,000 uniformed involvement of other countries in the region.
members of the South African Police Peter Gastrow , Organised Crime in the SADC
Service.7 Private enterprise, wealthy Region: Police Perceptions, ISS Monograph no.
citizens, and the international community 60, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies,
are especially likely to purchase private August 2001, www.iss.co.za.
protection.
The desire of governments to remain in power has also often led to the use of
informal security bodies, including state-sponsored paramilitary groups and political
party security cells, to repress opponents and perceived opponents. Youth militias have
been a mainstay of ZANU’s campaign strategy in Zimbabwe since the first post-
7
Martin Schönteich, “Guarding the Guardians: New Regulations for the Private Security Industry,”
www.iss.co.za.
19

24. independence election. For the 2002 presidential election, they were supplemented by
gangs of “war veterans” who terrorised and forcibly displaced both white landowners
and their black farm workers. State repression and economic marginalisation all too
often result in the creation of informal armed groups seeking to protect the interests of
groups of citizens. Faced with a growing number of armed groups and at perhaps
10,000 deaths since the restoration of elected government in 1999, the Nigerian
government has sent “The Prohibition of Certain Associations Act 2002” to the
legislature. This bill would ban any "association of individuals or quasi-military groups"
formed "for the purpose of furthering the political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural or
social interests of a group" in a manner contrary to peace and order in the country.
In principle, some of these actors could strengthen state or individual security. If
the state is unable to ensure adequate policing capacity, individuals may be more
secure if they are able to call on the services of a private security company or an
informal, community-based group. Privatisation programs may also result in a greater
reliance on private security firms for a range of security-related activities, with private
firms taking responsibility for security at government facilities, guarding strategic assets,
assisting in recruiting and training security personnel, and patrolling public areas. To
the extent that these activities are carried out professionally and the companies are
regulated to ensure accountability to the state and the public, the chances that security
will be strengthened increase and the negative behaviors associated with non-statutory
security actors are minimised.
Such regulation is, however, difficult to achieve. Even the South African
government, which approved a law regulating “the rendering of foreign military
assistance by South African juristic persons, citizens, persons permanently resident
within the Republic and foreign citizens rendering such assistance from within the
borders of the Republic” in 1998, has not succeeded in preventing some South African
companies from continuing to engage in mercenary activities under the cover of
legitimate private security contracts.8 No other African country, however, has similar
legislation or regulatory capacity, making the potential for abuses that much greater
elsewhere on the African continent. The domestic activities of private security firms
may be easier to monitor, but most African countries lack the capacity to undertake
such monitoring.
Some actors are not amenable to regulation, however. Armed opposition groups
must either be defeated militarily or their grievances addressed through a political
process. Efforts to negotiate with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone
or UNITA in Angola were mostly unsuccessful, despite their signature on peace
agreements. While some members of both groups were willing to follow the political
path, it was still necessary to dominate UNITA and the RUF militarily. Private security
groups and local militias that are created to provide security in an environment where
the state is unable to do so will continue to exist, irrespective of state policy, until the
underlying problems such as weak state security institutions, state bias and preferential
treatment, and fiscal crisis are overcome. Paramilitary groups created by governments
8
Republic of South Africa, “No. 15 of 1998: Regulation of Foreign Ministry Assistance Act, 1998,”
Government Gazette, vol. 395, no. 18912, Cape Town, May 20, 1998, www.gov.za/acts/1998/a15-98.pdf.
20

25. or ruling parties to help strengthen their grasp on power will continue to exist until
significant political changes occur.
Whatever the situation in a particular country, informal actors need to be dealt
with. [CONCLUDING PARA]
2.5.2 Civil Society
Civil society consists of a broad range of non-state actors, including religious
groups, academics, policy researchers, the media, women’s groups, professional
associations such as the bar association, community-based organizations and
interested citizens. Civil society has three critical roles to play in increasing the
accountability of the security sector: demand change, act as watchdog, and provide
technical input.
Civil society can play an important role in monitoring the development and
application of security policy and the activities of the security forces. Such independent
analyses are meant not only to challenge government policies, but also to inform the
debate and provide useful input into the decision-making process. Civil society can also
act as an important resource for the security community in a more formal sense. Most
fundamentally, civil society can provide a pool of knowledgeable individuals to staff
government positions in relevant agencies. Civilians can staff review boards and other
oversight bodies and provide training to members of the security forces and civil
oversight bodies. Substantively, civil society can provide input on a broad range of
topics, ranging from overall defense policy, expenditure and procurement proposals to
the human rights record of the security forces.
While there is sometimes an assumption that, by definition, civil society
organizations support a peacebuilding approach to security, that is not always the case.
Opinions on security policy are as diverse within civil society as they are within
government circles. Civil society groups can become politicized and promote divisions
within society, rather than seeking ways of overcoming disagreements and disputes and
reaching compromise, or they can simply fail to accept the need for responsible
behavior. For example, the media can act both as a source of information and
disinformation and can foster productive national debate on security issues or
strengthen divisions within society.
Civil society can also consciously avoid addressing security-related issues,
because it would require them to interact directly with the security forces, which some
members of civil society find distasteful. For example, professional organizations, which
during the 1980s constituted the majority of civil society organizations in the Manu River
Union countries, especially Liberia, avoided dealing with governance problems of all
sorts because these were deemed “political” and thus off-limits for these groups.
Human-rights and other civil society groups in many parts of Africa remain highly
suspicious of government and the security forces and find it difficult to engage in
debates on security-related reforms and policies.
21

26. 2.6 REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL ACTORS
Although not part of the national security community, regional and multilateral
actors are part of the security landscape in Africa. As at the national level, the relevant
external actors include both official actors and civil society organizations. Among the
official actors there are both broad based organizations such as the United Nations, the
Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD and more narrowly focused
groups such as the Southern African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation
(SARPCO).
Regional actors have become increasingly important as the regional nature of
many of the security problems confronting Africa has become clearer. The wars in
Sierra Leone and the Congo will not be resolved without regional approaches. The land
crisis in Zimbabwe has potentially explosive implications for other countries in Southern
Africa such as Malawi and South Africa. Cross-border criminal activities – such as
smuggling vehicles, narcotics and firearms and illegal immigration – have grown in
magnitude through sub-Saharan Africa.
These growing regional problems have begun to produce regional responses.
Twelve Southern African countries created the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs
Co-operation Organisation in the mid-1990s to combat cross-border crime (Box 2-3). In
West Africa, a concern about the illegal
transfer of small arms and light weapons
Box 2-3. Mission and Objectives of
led the sixteen members of the Economic SARPCCO
Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) to
endorse a moratorium on the import, 1) promote and strengthen co-operation and
export and manufacture of light weapons to foster joint strategies for management of
all forms of cross-border and related crimes
in the region at the end of 1998. Not all
with regional implications;
initiatives to address regional problems 2) prepare and disseminate relevant
are appropriate vehicles for strengthening information on criminal activities to benefit
governance in the security sector. Efforts member countries to contain crime in the
should be made, however, to identify region;
3) carryout regular reviews of joint crime
those regional initiatives and activities
management strategies in the light of
that lend themselves to strengthening changing national and regional needs and
security sector governance. priorities;
4) maintain a system and structure to ensure
The program established to efficient operation and management of
implement the West African Small Arms criminal records and effective joint
monitoring of cross-border crime.
Moratorium, the Programme for
Coordination and Assistance for Security Source: “Combating Cross-border Crime - The
and Development or PCASED, envisions Southern African Experience,” Speech by Juan
training for military, security and police Kotze, Inspector, Interpol National Crime
forces of member states. Such training Bureau, Pretoria, South Africa, March 23, 2000,
could in principle offer an opportunity to at the Microsoft 'Combating Cross Border
Crime 2000' Conference, Cape Town, South
reinforce the importance of
Africa, http://www.microsoft.com/europe/
22 public_sector/Gov_Agencies/127.htm.

27. professionalization, human-rights protection, transparency and accountability.9
Similarly, SARPCCO could be used as a vehicle for strengthening aspects of sound
governance in the police sector. Regional and sub-regional political organizations such
as the Organization of American States, Southern African Development Community
(SADC), ECOWAS, and the Manu River Union (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) are
also organizations that can be encouraged to promote security sector transformation
among member states. At present, however, these organizations do not have the
capacity to undertake the necessary activities.
[WHERE DO DONORS COME INTO THIS??]
SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS
9
The fact that ECOWAS member governments need to apply for exemptions to import small arms, for
example for peacekeeping and training purposes, theoretically reinforces the concept of transparency. Of
course, despite the moratorium, weapons continued to flow into West Africa in a very non-transparent
manner to fuel the war in Sierra Leone, as well as to arm both the government of Liberia and Liberian
opposition groups. On the sources of arms available to both the government of Sierra Leone and the
RUF, see Eric G. Berman, Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Agreement,
Occasional Papers 1, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2000,
www.smallarmssurvey.org/OccasionalPapers.html.
23

28. CHAPTER 3
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND THE SECURITY SECTOR
AIM
The essence of the transformation of the security sector is the process of aligning
the sector with core values, principles and practices of democratic governance.
Section 3.1 explains the importance of democratic governance. Section 3.2
reviews the legal basis of the security sector. Section 3.3 discusses transparency in the
security sector. Section 3.4 reviews issues of accountability. Section 3.5 discusses
oversight of the security sector.
3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Democratic governance is a critical component of the stable and secure
environment necessary to promote human development and human security in Africa.
As the framers of the New Partnerships for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) have
explained,
It is now generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence
of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. With
the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Africa undertakes to respect the
global standards of democracy, which core components include political
pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers'
unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically organised to enable
the populace choose their leaders freely.10
Governance has received growing attention in Africa since the early 1990s.
Different actors have focused on different aspects of governance. Initially, the
emphasis was on economic governance – establishing a predictable regulatory
framework, an effective and transparent public administration, and an independent
judiciary capable of resolving disputes, particularly business disputes. While these are
important components of sound governance, it has become increasingly evident that
without attention to political governance, efforts to improve economic governance will be
undermined. Thus, attention must be given to establishing a legitimate, transparent,
and trusted state that is accountable to its citizens.
Legitimacy and trust are fostered by a state whose government is democratically
elected and operates on the basis of a constitution that is an expression of the general
will of the nation. Accountability involves the capacity, or the power, to require someone
(an individual or an organization) to justify behavior and/or the capacity to impose a
10
“The New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” Part V. Programme of Action: The Strategy for
Achieving Sustainable Development in the 21st Century, October 2001, para. 79.
24

29. sanction. Accountability depends crucially on the degree of transparency in society.
Participation requires due attention to the role of the legislature as the representatives
of the citizenry, as well as on other oversight bodies. Citizens must also be able to
express their concerns more directly to their elected representatives and to government
as a whole. Participation is one of the hallmarks of democratic governance, but non-
state actors can have both positive and negative effects on the quality of governance. It
is therefore important that non-state actors are also accountable for their actions.
Specifically with regard to the security sector, the security forces must be
accountable to democratic, civilian governments, but these governments must also fulfill
their responsibilities toward the security forces. Thus, it is important that the
government respect the professional autonomy of the security forces at the same time
as they expect the security forces to refrain from playing a direct political role in
government and to be subordinate to elected civilian officials and the civil authorities in
terms of policy making.
3.2 THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
The task of creating and maintaining a viable and legitimate state that is
accessible, efficient, accountable, transparent and equitable has been one of the most
critical and complicated challenges of the political transformation processes that African
countries are currently undergoing. Democratic governance requires that the efficient
and well-functioning institutions and infrastructures of government are legally backed
and socially coherent. The legal arrangements that guide governance of the security
sector are generally enshrined in the constitution, which, for all African countries, is a
written document. Sections of the constitution that are particularly important are those
Box 3-1. Constitutional Underpinnings of the Uganda Police Forces
“211(3) The Uganda Police Force shall be nationalistic, patriotic, professional, disciplined, competent
and productive; and its members shall be citizens of Uganda of good character.
“212. The functions of the Uganda Police Force shall include the following:
(e) to protect life and property;
(f) to preserve law and order;
(g) to prevent and detect crime; and
(h) to co-operate with the civil authority and other security organs established under this Constitution
and with the population general.
“213. (1) There shall be an Inspector-General of Police and Deputy Inspector-General of Police
(2) The Inspector-General and the Deputy Inspector General of Police shall be appointed by the
President with the approval of Parliament....
“214. Parliament shall make laws-
(a) providing for the organisation and administration of the Uganda Police Force;
(b) ensuring that members of the Uganda Police Force are recruited from every district of Uganda; and
(c) regulating generally the Uganda Police Force. “
Source: The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 12 “Defence & National Security,”,
www.parliament.go.ug/chapt12.htm
25

30. dealing with the armed forces, the police service, intelligence bodies, the penal system,
the role of the legislature, and the protection of human rights (Box 3-1). At a minimum,
the constitution should specify the lines of authority between all major stakeholders in
the security sector (both civil and security force), the basic responsibilities of each of
these actors, and the broad democratic principles to which the members of the security
sector should, in their conduct as professionals, adhere. Some constitutions have
included no guidance on or have been revised to eliminate important aspects of
democratic governance of the security forces. For example, Malawi’s independence
constitution was revised in 1966 to accommodate one-party authoritarian rule. It
contained no mention of the functions of the armed forces. Since there was no civilian
ministry of defence, the armed forces were managed through the Office of the President
and Cabinet and the 1966 constitution revoked all clauses pertaining to protection of
human rights, there were clear opportunities for using the armed forces for partisan
political purposes. In 1995 this situation was reversed as multiparty democracy
returned to Malawi. The new constitution contains an extensive chapter on the human
rights enjoyed by citizens of Malawi and clearly specifies the functions of the Defence
Forces of Malawi.11 (NB: The fact that many of Africa’s new democracies have
emerged from prolonged authoritarian settings may very well explain the
exclusion of security sector governance in the constitutions of many countries
since the security forces are deemed to be above the law and thus, not
answerable to the constitution. Increasingly though, several constitution making
initiatives on the continent now incorporate security sector governance as a
central requirement before the constitutions are deemed to be process driven.12
Additionally, regional bodies are also adopting regional constitutional principles
and protocols regulating the activities of member-states on issues pertaining to
security sector governance.13 In line with these regional initiatives, NEPAD’s
Africa Peer Review Mechanism include democratic control of the security
establishments as a benchmark for good governance in the approved action plan
for democracy and political governance.14
Important as the constitution and regional protocols are, additional legislation is
generally required to flesh out the details of governing the defence, police, and
intelligence services and the penal system.
In principle, many constitutions locate the powers of originating and
enforcing additional legislation in the parliament. A vigorous legislature is
therefore often a key requirement (or indicator) of democratic governance in the
11
Hawa O. Ndilowe, “Development of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: An Opportunity for
Democratic Defence Governance for Malawi,” Prepared for the ISS Program on Security Sector
Transformation, April 2000 and “Malawi’s Constitution: Final Draft, Act no. 20 of 1994,”
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Govern_Political/mlwi_const.html.
12
See Hassen Ebrahim, Kayode Fayemi & Stephanie Loomis, Principles and Mechanisms of Constution
Making in Commonwealth Africa, (Delhi: CHRI, 2000)
13
For example, The ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance which was
approved by the ECOWAS Heads of Government in December 2000.
14
See summary conclusions of the NEPAD’s Expert Workshop on Processes, Mechanisms, Benchmarks
and Indicators for APRM
26

31. security sector. Parliament often has the critical role of laying down the legal
framework of democratic security sector governance, of reviewing and approving
security establishments’ policies and budgets (and hence conditions of service),
and oversight of sectoral expenditure, procurement, operations, and deployment.
In some constitutions, the Parliament is also empowered to approve the
declaration of war. In addition, some (though not all) Parliaments have oversight
over intelligence and security agencies (other than the police).
Most African constitutions specifically provide for such legislation. The Uganda
Constitution, for example, specifies that
Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces,
and in particular, providing for:
(a) the organs and structures of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces
(b) recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of members
of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces and ensuring that members of
the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces are recruited from every district of
Uganda
(c) terms and conditions of service of members of the Uganda Peoples’
Defence forces; and
(d) the deployment of troops outside Uganda.15
[Can we say something generic about who makes this legislation? Does it originate
with the legislature or with the executive?] [NB: I have included a para above and
two paras below to take care of this:
To various degrees, the principle of parliamentary oversight is common to
African constitutions. However, constitutions are not always a reliable point of
reference when it comes to determining actual decision-making processes. Even
where they exist such as Uganda, the origin of these legislations is also
important, in terms of implementation and future management of the activities of
security establishments. The experience in Africa is that most legislation that
expatiate on broad constitutional principles regulating the security sector have
emanated from the colonial authorities, who, upon their departure bequeathed
such legislation to the executive branches of governments that replaced them.
These were largely rubber-stamped by the legislatures (where they exist) but the
driving force in many cases remains the executive branch.
There are also regional and contextual variations to this general pattern in post
cold war Africa. In countries where the post transition configuration has
produced ‘roots and branch’ transformation of the state in the direction of a
consolidating democratic order, the degree to which the legislature becomes a
serious actor in defining and enforcing subsidiary legislation is usually stronger.
Equally, states emerging from war to peace and democratic order often
demonstrate greater susceptibility to involving a wider array of stakeholders than
15
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 12, Section 210, www.parliament.go.ug/chapt12.
htm.
27

32. states where transitions have produced contradictory results or conquest states.
In the latter, the existence of broad constitutional parameters and detailed
procedural legislation for governing the security sector does not necessarily
imply the accountability of the executive branch on the governance of the
security sector.
Security Sector Governance is taking place in a diversity of terrains, and reflects
particular kinds of regimes and political transitions: consolidating democracies
(Senegal and Botswana), post-conflict peace-building (Sierra Leone,
Mozambique, South Africa), transitions from military rule (Nigeria, Ghana, Mali,
Benin) or single-party dispensations (Tanzania, Kenya, The Seychelles, Cape
Verde), conquest of the state (Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea), contested transitions
(Burundi, Rwanda, Cote d’Ivoire), and so forth. The nature of the terrain inevitably
affects the extent of progress possible.
[NB – I am of two minds as to whether the latter section should move to Section
3.5. or left here as an argument about the origin the legislation or moved to the
section on legislative oversight below. I leave it to your esteemed judgment to
decide where it best fits]
In practice, African legislatures are characterized by differences in the nature and
extent of their constitutional role and powers, as well as in their inclination to
exercise those powers. In terms of political will and muscle, they range from
‘activist’ or at least proactive (e.g. South Africa, Uganda and Mali) to moderate
(Ghana, Tanzania) to what can only be called ‘laid back’ (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia or
Cote d’Ivoire, where the parliament did not even have a defence committee). This
is in part a reflection of different constitutional legacies (for example, legislatures
tend to be weak in the defence and security arena in the French political tradition,
and strong in the case of the American congressional model, with the British
somewhere in between), but also testifies to differences in the nature and depth
of the political transitions occurring within the African countries as already
explained above.
It is clear, however, that African parliaments are weak overall, and operating
under a variety of constraints in their defence function, some inherent (George
and Graham 1994), but many specific to African (and to a degree, newly
democratizing) countries.
For instance, the role of many Parliaments relative to the military budget is often
no more than ‘decorative’ or a ‘rubber-stamp’; in many cases, ‘parliamentarians
seemed to exercise little genuine oversight of the military’, even though
appropriate committees existed for such oversight.16 Part of the problem is
16
NDI, The Role of the Defence & Security Committees in Franco-phone West Africa (NDI, 1997)
28

33. historical: in many African countries there was little opportunity to consolidate
early post-colonial institutional development in the area of civil-military relations
and security sector governance, in part because the area of defence was
particularly slow to decolonize (in some cases –such as francophone Africa--
national armies hardly yet existed), and because in many cases neither defence
nor the armed forces was considered a priority. What halting little steps may have
been taken toward institutionalizing civil-military relations were often terminated
(at an early stage) by the entry of the military into politics. Military coups not only
interrupted institutional development, but also distorted it in two important ways:
first, by enhancing the political and institutional autonomy of the armed forces;
and second, by shifting the balance of power between the executive and the
parliament, particularly where control over security was concerned.
However, many of the constraints are also contemporary. The first relates to
unclear constitutional roles and powers. Many constitutions are parsimonious or
even silent on how Parliament should go about exercising its power and
functions (indeed even the extent of those powers), and no parliamentary
traditions to guide them. By contrast, the functions and powers of the executive
are spelled out in much more specific detail. Also, many constitutions are silent
on oversight of Intelligence agencies—a crucial omission, given that heads of
Intelligence and their agencies may not only survive, but re-surface as
powerhouses in the new democratic dispensation. A second difficulty is lack of
resources: many parliamentary committees have limited funding, administrative
infrastructure and support (such as offices, secretaries, and equipment). Thirdly,
access to expertise (in-house or otherwise) is limited. In turn, this means low
capacity for policy development or budget and operational analysis.
In African Parliaments (as indeed in many elsewhere) the only in-house
‘expertise’ available usually comes from retired military officers turned
politicians, who can hardly be considered dispassionate sources of advice.
Access to outside expertise (realistically the more important source of expertise)
is limited by the absence of specialized researchers and research institutes in
many African countries. Fourth, Parliaments tend to have poor or non-existent
institutional links with the armed forces, and this makes it difficult to extract
information (most legislatures lack independent access to information). Finally,
most African countries have a tradition of executive dominance in the area of
security, perhaps most pronounced in the French system, where defence and
security are specified in the constitution as the ‘reserved domain’ of the
Presidency and parliaments often see no reason why they should interfere.
Most executives (particularly those who are ‘in’ with the military, and regard
control of the security services as their trump card) are reluctant to cede
appropriate control to their legislatures.17.
17
Disputes between the legislature and the executive over turf are not uncommon
(though less common than conflicts between government and opposition). An example
is the case of Kenya. In 1997, the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament sought
29

34. Even in countries where these difficulties have been overcome (perhaps only South
Africa,) provisions do not exist for separate legislation governing the different security
forces.
Yet, apart from the constitution and subsidiary legislation, there are traditional
and informal institutions that can contribute to a well-governed security sector. In many
societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, traditional leaders were allowed to continue to practice
customary law for issues pertaining to “private law” at the same time as they were
expected to dispense colonial law in the area of “public law.” Today, elements of
customary justice either co-exist with or have been incorporated into formal justice
systems in many countries. This is particularly important in rural areas, where formal
justice systems are often not present. Additionally, a range of informal justice
mechanisms has developed in urban areas. Some are based on modified traditional
law structures and procedures and focus on problem-solving or alternative dispute
resolutions. Others are established by non-governmental organisations and focus on
arbitration and conflict resolution.
These traditional and informal mechanisms are extremely important because of
numerous limitations on formal systems of justice in Africa. Inadequate resources
reduce the reach of the formal systems and limit severely access to justice. Formal
systems are also inaccessible to many Africans due to language problems, poverty and
the absence or inadequacy of legal aid. Another important factor has been the
disconnect between African cultural and social practices, which favour restorative and
compensatory justice, rather than the adversarial and retributory nature of formal
justice systems. In consequence, traditional and informal justice systems are receiving
renewed attention, especially ways of marrying them to formal systems. Some of the
mechanisms that are compatible with both formal systems of justice and customary
justice are: community service schemes, police-community liaison groups, community
safety forums (which extend beyond the police to other elements of the criminal justice
system and relevant local government bodies), and calculating fines according to an
individual’s capacity to pay. Box 3-2 describes the key characteristics of a system of
justice that is accessible for all citizens.
to investigate the disbursement and use of the armed forces budget, but was prevented
from doing so by the government. See also the recent (July 2000) debate in the Ghana
parliament on the regional composition of the armed forces. During the debate, on a
motion seeking to put in place guidelines on regional (ethnic) distribution of recruitment,
the Deputy Minister of Defence accused the legislature of trying to ‘hijack’ the powers
and functions of the executive---even though the proposals would have been a
legitimate aspect of the policy and oversight functions of the Parliament.
30

35. Box 3-2. Criteria for Accessible Justice
Justice is accessible when:
 It is dispensed in or close to the individual’s community.
 It is affordable for ordinary people.
 Procedures are simple but fair and consistent with cultural expectations.
 It is fair and perceived as such by disputants and their families, but does not reinforce historic
biases against traditionally marginalized groups such as women and youth.
 It is dispensed in the language of the disputants.
 It produces outcomes that emphasise community-building, skills transers, reconciliation,
restoration and compensation.
 It is dispenses rapidly, to avoid animosities becoming entrenched.
 The timing of judicial proceedings take into account the livelihood needs of disputants.
Source: Wilfried Schärf, “Report on the Proceedings of the Consultative Group Meeting on Access to
Justice and Penal Reform in Africa, 18 – 20 March 1999,”
Some customary law systems may, however, contain elements that are
incompatible with formal law, as well as with the principles and norms underlying
democratic governance. In March 2002, for example, the Nigerian minister of justice
expressed the opinion that some of the penalties imposed by strictly interpreted Sharia
may be unconstitutional. He urged governors of the twelve Nigerian states that have
adopted strict Sharia laws to revise them so that they are consistent with the Nigerian
constitution, which prohibit the institution of a state religion, the violation of fundamental
human rights through inhuman and degrading treatment, and contravention of the
equality of all before the constitution. The justice minister argued: "A Muslim should not
be subjected to a punishment more severe than would be imposed on other Nigerians
for the same offence. Equality before the law means that Muslims should not be
discriminated against." At independence, Nigeria’s legal system integrated Sharia,
customary and Western legal traditions, but the strict application of Sharia never gained
national acceptance. With the restoration of civil rule in 1999, that barrier has been
unilaterally broken by some state governments, setting the stage for disputes between
the states and the federal government as well as increased violence between different
religious groups.18
Implementing Legal Frameworks
Next to be considered are the structures that are in place to ensure the
implementation of the legal arrangements, and how strong the structures are to
withstand the pressures of reform. Again, in many developing societies, these structures
are the Law Courts. But as noted in the last section, the extent to which the courts are
to handle this important assignment is questionable. There must thus be efforts to
ensure the implementation of legal stipulations concerning the Security Sector and its
reform. However, as noted earlier, there are some legal arrangements that are based
18
United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional
Information Network (IRIN), “Nigeria: Focus on Constitutional Crisis Caused by Islamic Law,” April 3,
2002, www.reliefweb.int
31

36. on traditional institutions. Although in most cases there are already institutions to ensure
implementation, many of these had become weak. [NB: REWORK.]
3.3 TRANSPARENCY IN THE SECURITY SECTOR
Governments by nature prefer security sectors that are opaque to the general
public given the secrecy that often surround war and issues of security even in
peacetime. The narrow definition that restricts security to its military dimension
reinforces the notion that knowledge about security should be restricted and the
activities of the security sector should not be made transparent. The general public,
however, has not been the only group to feel this lack of transparency. Up to the 1990s,
African security services were widely considered an alternative and independent power
centre rarely subject to scrutiny by government and parliament. Information on security
policy, its implementation, and its financing has frequently been tightly held, with critical
information being kept from individuals and groups within government that, according to
principles of democratic governance in the security sector, would be expected to have
both the right and the need to be informed. This has prevented both the proper
management and the proper oversight of security agencies. [See below for discussion
of oversight in the security sector. The principles of democratic governance in the
security sector are found in Box 3-3.]
Transparency is, however, the fundamental ingredient in accountable
governance. Without access to information about the formulation and implementation of
laws and policies, it is impossible to hold any public servant to account. While it is true
that some degree of confidentiality is necessary in the area of national security,
problems arise when the need for confidentiality in some areas of the military sector is
used to justify a reduction in opportunities for scrutiny by appropriate management and
oversight bodies, as well as the population at large. National security-related issues –
especially those relating to military intelligence - are sensitive in all societies. Even
long-established democracies retain varying degrees of confidentiality in the realm of
national security. It is important to be clear, however, about the distinction between
confidentiality and the lack of public scrutiny. It is possible to retain a high degree of
confidentiality in highly sensitive areas without compromising the principle of public
accountability. [Accountability in the security sector is discussed below.]
32

37. Box 3-3. Key Principles of Democratic Governance in the Security Sector
Over the last two years, there has been an increasing effort on the part of African public sector
officials, scholars and civil society activists to begin to develop a set of principles of oversight and
governance in the security sector that are applicable across the board. Some of the key principles that
have become pivotal in the quest for effective oversight of the security sector can be summarized as
follows:
• Security sector organizations, particularly in the security forces must be accountable both to
elected civil authorities, established independent oversight agencies and to civil society;
• Security sector organizations must operate in accordance with the international law and domestic
constitutional law;
• Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely available, both within
government and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management
of security sector resources is adopted;
• Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between civil
authorities and the defence forces, and on a relationship with civil society that is based on the
respect for human rights and a culture of civility;
• Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and expenditure
of the security forces and civil society has the capacity to monitor the security forces and provide
constructive input to the political debate;
• An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on security
policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues;
• Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner
consistent with the requirements of democratic societies;
• Fostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high
priority for policy-makers.
Meeting these benchmarks poses a significant challenge to current African regimes. Divergent
trajectories of transition have produced a wide assortment of post-transition political configurations on
the continent – some complementary and progressive, others contradictory and worrisome. This
necessarily inhibits generalisation. Nevertheless, it is clear that most African countries are committed
to the development of best practice mechanisms to support sound security sector governance.
Source: These principles were first published in UK Department for International Development,
Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High
Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium Sponsored by the UK Department
for International Development, London, February 15-27, 2000,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/ssrmes_report.pdf, p. 46.
It is also important to be clear about what is being held in confidence and why it
is considered sensitive. War plans should be held in confidence. That the armed forces
are regularly exceeding their budget allocations, are purchasing expensive military
equipment with scant attention to need or ability to maintain this equipment, or are
engaged in illegal, off-budget activities are clearly sensitive matters, but should not be
held in confidence. A highly non-transparent security sector provides the perfect cover
for off-budget transactions and the diversion of resources into private hands. When a
significant portion of a country’s security expenditure occurs off-budget and is fed by off-
budget revenues, not only are core principals of fiscal accountability violated. It is also
highly likely that the operational capacity and readiness of the security forces will suffer
and that the security forces will not receive value for money.
33

38. Processes associated with governing the security sector need to be transparent
from start to finish. The manner in which the legal arrangements guiding the security
sector are arrived at is particularly important. That process can set the tone for the
subsequent implementation of those laws. In many African countries, constitutions do
not represent the will of the people and were not arrived at through popular consensus.
There are countries where the constitution was forced on the population by an outgoing
military administration, with minimal representation from the population (for example,
Nigeria). In other countries, the government in power has altered the constitution so
significantly that it no longer has a semblance of the people’s will (for example,
Zimbabwe).
It is equally important that legislation governing the different security bodies is
arrived at in a transparent and participatory fashion. Since constitutions typically only
outline the relationship between the civil authorities and the security forces, the many
details that govern the actual operation of the security sector must be hammered out
separately in national legislation approved by the parliament. Even the South African
constitution, which was created through a highly participatory process, only outlines the
core responsibilities of the civil authorities and specifies: “The security services must be
structured and regulated by national legislation.”19 South Africa has produced policy
papers, or “White Papers,” for defence, intelligence, safety and security, participation in
international peace missions, and defence-related industries since 1994. Non-
governmental experts have contributed to most of these, and several have been widely
consulted with all relevant stakeholders prior to being finalised. (See Box 3-4.) Such
consultation lengthens the process of producing legislation, but produces a stronger
product and greater buy-in on the part of key stakeholders. [RW: Additional
legislation? Defence Act? Police Act? etc. or do white papers cover this?]
Important as they are, consultative processes are only one part of the solution to
the problem of transparency. There needs to be a conscious effort to ensure as wide a
dissemination of basic legal documents governing the security sector as possible.
Neither constitutions nor subsidiary national legislation are properly disseminated
among the population. Very few African countries translate their national constitutions
into local languages. In situations where the population did not have much input in the
formulation of the constitution, they are further disadvantaged by not knowing what the
document says about how they are to be governed. Additionally, little or no effort is
made to ensure that sufficient copies of the constitution are produced for distribution to
the population. Copies of national constitutions, often printed by the Government Press,
are sold to the population instead of being distributed free. Members of the armed
forces often do not have access to the document that is supposed guide their role and
define their responsibilities. As a result, populations are not familiar with the legal
framework for the security sector – its roles, its responsibilities, remedies for
inappropriate actions on the part of security forces and so on. To ensure that sound
governance of the security sector develops, there should be effective processes of
disseminating the legal arrangements governing the process, and all the segments of
19
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 11, Section 199 (4),
http://www.concourt.gov.za/constitution/const11.html#199
34

39. the society, including school children, are properly informed. In this way, pressures will
build for accountable government, including effective oversight processes.
[THE BOX BELOW NEEDS TO BE RETYPED SO THAT IT CAN BE MOVED
WITHOUT COMPLETE LY DESTROYING THE PAGINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT.]
35

40. Box 3-4. Consultative Process for the South African White Paper on Safety and Security
“The Minister released the final Draft White Paper for public consultation after Cabinet approval in May
1998. Extensive consultation was undertaken with key stakeholders, role-players and civil society in the
following concurrent phases:
“1. Provincial public hearings
Public hearings were held in each of the provinces to ensure that the final policy recommendations
of the White Paper reflected the views of provincial stakeholders, role-players and the public.
“2. National hearing
rd th
A national hearing was held over the 3 to 5 August 1998 in Parliament. A number of submissions
were made, and provincial reports on the submissions received from the public hearing process
were presented. Joint meetings of the National Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security and the
National Council of Provinces Committee on Security and Justice deliberated on the issues raised
th st
through the public consultation process on the 18 and 21 of August. These deliberations informed
the final drafting of the White Paper.
“3. Consultation with critical audiences
Extensive consultation with critical audiences was undertaken as outlined below:
• A Local Government Conference was held on 24 July 1998 at which local government initiatives
related to crime prevention were reviewed, experiences on the safer cities projects shared and the
interventions outlined in the White Paper discussed.
• Meetings were held with most of the political parties in Cape Town to discuss relevant issues raised
by the White Paper.
• A workshop was held with the National Crime Prevention Strategy partners on issues relevant to
crime prevention as outlined in the White Paper.
“4. Internal consultation process
• The South African Police Service circulated the Draft White Paper extensively within their
structures, and received numerous submissions. A consolidated report on these submissions was
compiled by the Divisional Commissioner: National Management Services and sent to the
Secretariat.
• Valuable meetings were held with most of the national government departments.
• The key trade-unions relevant to safety and security were also consulted.
“The final White Paper was presented to the Cabinet Committee for Safety and Intelligence prior to the
Cabinet meeting of 9 September 1998 when the White Paper was approved. Parliamentary debates on
the White Paper were held during September 1998.
“A White Paper Conference was held on 11 September 1998 at which a report back on the submissions
and how they were incorporated was presented.
“A user friendly booklet is being developed which will explain the policy shifts contained in the White
Paper and what it means for the stakeholders and role-players in safety and security in South Africa.”
Source: South Africa, Department of Safety and Security, White Paper on Safety and Security, "In
Service of Safety," 1999 – 2004, September 1998, www.gov.za/whitepaper/1998/safety.htm#drafting.
36

41. 3.4 SECURITY-SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The process of accountability aims to ensure that public officials are responsible
for the exercise of the authority accorded to them through the constitution or other laws.
Accountability can be either direct or indirect. Direct accountability in the security sector
requires that members of the security forces answer directly to all or some portion of the
population of a country. Indirect accountability holds politicians and bureaucrats
accountable for the actions of the security forces by defining a set of democratic
governance criteria against which the security forces are to be measured. Most security
sector accountability is indirect. There is some direct accountability in the criminal
justice sector with police commissions, police monitoring groups, police-community
liaison groups, community safety fora and the like.
There are two components of accountability: answerability and enforceability.
The security forces must answer to those bodies legally mandated to oversee their
activities. However, unless there is some means to enforce breaches of behavior, the
simple fact of explaining their behavior does not mean that the security forces will
actually alter that behavior. In many African countries, the security forces do not feel
that they have to answer to any civilian – in or out of government – even when there is
legislation requiring them to do so. Their sense of impunity derives in large part from
the fact that they are not sanctioned when their actions contravene the law or if they
refused to explain their actions to the relevant civil authorities. Until there is society-
wide acceptance of the notion that the security forces are subordinate to the civil
authorities, are obliged to explain their actions to the civil authorities and civil society,
and are subject to sanctions for inappropriate actions or inadequately explaining their
actions, there will be no accountability in the security sector.
It is also important to consider the legal arrangement for punishing those who
commit offences relating to the security sector. Although there will be further discussion
of this in other sections of this handbook, it should be mentioned here that there must
be clearly laid-out procedures for
punishment. This will bring in other Box 12. Legal and Cultural Norms Relating
segments of the security community, to Security Sector Accountability
especially the police and the judiciary. The
Legal Norms
most important issue to note here is to
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
ensure that those accused for any-  International Covenant on Civil and Political
security related offence as indeed, any Rights
offence at all, is adequately represented  UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
and the trial open. This should not only Officials (UNGA Res 34/169, 1979)
 Geneva Conventions of 1949
be for the civilian population bur also for
the military. The practice in many Cultural Norms
 Separation of police and military functions
developing countries, especially in West  Principles of democratic governance in the
Africa, for members of the Armed Forces security sector (see Box 11)
accused of military-related offences to be  African Charter of Human & Peoples Rights
tried through special military laws will  ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance, 200
have to be examined. All those accused  OAU Resolution denying recognition to
governments coming to power through military
should be tried in open courts and they coups [FIND EXACT- Algiers Declaration]
should be allowed the freedom of
37

42. selecting their own lawyers from either the military or the civil population.
In order to strengthen the accountability of the security forces, it is necessary to
strengthen both norms and institutions. In doing so, it is important to distinguish among
different levels of accountability. First, there is ideal-type accountability, which is
enshrined in norms and principles (Box 12). Difficult to achieve in practice, ideal-type
accountability nonetheless establishes goals that every government should strive to
attain.
Second, there is legal accountability, where a country’s laws seek to translate
principles and norms into legally binding requirements for members of government, civil
servants, and members of the security forces. There are many paths to achieving the
objectives enshrined in norms and principles. The precise form that a country’s policies,
laws, and structures take must be rooted in that country’s history, culture, legal
framework and institutions. The key point is for national laws to reflect the norms and
principles.
Finally, there is operational accountability – accountability as it is actually
practiced. Operational accountability reflects a range of informal relationships and
methods of achieving goals, along with – it is hoped – international norms and principles
and national law. While informal relationships are and will remain important in all
environments, they must operate in
accordance with the country’s legal Box 13. US Congress Wary of “Blank Check”
framework and international law. Request from the President
“Congress is unlikely to write President Bush a
The challenge is to align national
blank check for $10 billion to help pay for the war
laws with basic principles and norms on terrorism, a leading lawmaker said Friday.
and to progressively adjust “The White House has asked Congress for a $10
“accountability on the ground” to the billion ‘war contingency’ to cover unspecified
national legal framework and the guiding Defense Department anti-terror efforts in fiscal
principles enshrined in the international 2003, part of a planned $48 billion increase to the
norms. As with all broad policy defense budget. To provide the funds without
stipulating how they would be spent would cede
objectives, it is necessary to identify some of Congress' power of the purse.
reasonable steps along the way toward “Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.), chairman of the
achieving these goals. While reaching House Appropriations defense panel, told a
these goals may seem daunting in view Defense Week Media Breakfast that he was
of actual practice in a country, it is willing to allow the administration flexibility in how
nonetheless important to have them as it spends the money—but not an open-ended
appropriation….
an objective. One of the clear lessons of
“Lewis said that without specific guidelines, the
the past is that when problems in the money could easily be siphoned off into other
security sector are approached in a areas of the Pentagon's budget.
piecemeal manner, without reference to "’Ten billion dollars just sitting there is a pretty
broad objectives or underlying structural ripe target,’ he said….”
weaknesses, accountability in the Source: Ron Laurenzo, “Top Legislator Wary of
security sector has generally not Contingency Fund,” Defense Week, February 11,
improved significantly. Indeed, a focus 2002, p. 1.
on short-term “solutions” that ignores the
core problems can actually aggravate
those problems.
38

43. It is also important to understand that even long-established democracies can
improve the amount of information that they provide to their citizens and need to be
constantly vigilant on issues of accountability (Box 13). Developing and protecting a
system of accountability is a continuous process.
Civil society can play an important role in promoting accountability of the security
sector. Groups such as the media, human rights organisations, and security policy
analysis organisations can track behavior, draw attention to deviations from national
and international law and international good practice, and make suggestions for ways of
improving accountability. Civilians also serve on police commissions, police-community
liaison committees, and other formal bodies. Non-governmental bodies, including
community groups, may monitor the activities of the police and other security forces. As
in all sectors of government, an engaged public can have a positive impact on the
quality of accountability. [CAN WE FIND NON-NIGERIAN, NON-SOUTH AFRICAN
EXAMPLES TO CITE?] I have inserted a Ghanaian example below
In Ghana, a policy and research institution has been central to the improvement
of governance in the security sector. The African Security Dialogue & Research
(ASDR) started in 2000 with the coordination of a series of dialogue on the security
sector, bringing together security sector practitioners, defence ministry bureaucrats,
parliamentarians and civil society actors. The Government of Ghana recently launched
two security sector governance initiatives: a National Police Reform Programme funded
by the UNDP; and a Performance Improvement Programme (PIP) for the Ministry of
Defence (funded by DFID. Both programmes are coordinated by ASDR with provision
for expanded dialogue between civil society, the security institutions, parliament and
other state agencies, and two, a South-South Dialogue on Defence Transformation
bringing in other perspectives from Africa.
[SOMETHING ON PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS]
Office of Public Protector
Auditor-General’s Office (the Nigerian example)
Anti-Corruption Commission
3.5 SECURITY SECTOR OVERSIGHT
The culture of secrecy that has traditionally surrounded security activities has
prevented the creation of civil oversight bodies in some countries and stymied the
efforts of existing oversight bodies to operate effectively in others. Consequently, civil
oversight of the security sector continues to be a work-in-progress throughout the world,
including in OECD countries.
39

44. During the 1990s, African governments and publics increasingly insisted on the
need for governments to be accountable to elected civil oversight actors and a range of
independent oversight agencies. Interest groups and citizens now strongly advocate
that constitutions must incorporate fundamental principles guaranteeing the creation,
existence and practice of oversight agencies that will safeguard the interests of the
people, mediate the excesses of the government, and help to enforce the law. Civil
oversight bodies can take a variety of forms: parliament as a whole; parliamentary
committees on defence, security, intelligence, police affairs, human rights, and public
accounts; auditors-general; constitutional courts; anti-corruption and public
accountability bodies; ombudspersons; and public protectors.
[NB: I THINK THIS IS WHERE THE CONFUSION CAME INTO THIS. I MAKE
A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS –
COMMITTEES ON DEFENCE, POLICE AFFAIRS AND INTELLIGENCE, FOR
INSTANCE AND PARLIAMENT EMPOWERED, INDEPENDENTLY APPOINTED
OVERSIGHT BODIES SUCH ASANTI-CORRUPTION BODIES, PUBLIC
PROTECTOR, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. USUALLY THE LATTER BODIES ARE
EITHER ADVERTISED OR APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT
ONLY ENDORSES THE APPOINTMENT. IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE, YOU HAVE
PUT THEM TOGETHER (SEE MY ITALICS ABOVE), HENCE THE REASON FOR
THE CONFUSION YOU HIGHLIGHTED BELOW. IN ADDITION, THE TWO ARE
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
AGENCIES SUCH AS BUDGET MONITORING UNITS, MINISTERIALCONTRACT
TENDER COMMITTEES OR DUE PROCESS/DILIGENCE INSTITUTIONS. I HOPE
THIS CLARIFIES THE ISSUE]
Important as these oversight bodies OF ELECTED MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT are, the value of complementary and sometimes parallel oversight
institutions cannot be over-emphasised. These institutions are seen, especially in civil
society, as having the potential of becoming the major pillars on which the very
foundations of good democratic practices rest when they are allowed to function
independently of influence from state organs and personalities for the benefit and the
cause of participation in governance by the citizenry. From South Africa to Ghana,
Uganda to Bénin Republic, the principle of independent commissions as mediators or
“honest brokers” occupying the realm between citizens and governments has been
central to recent constitution-making campaigns and it has enriched the debate about
the quality and character of governance in these countries. [KF: I NEED
CLARIFICATION. EXACTLY WHAT SORTS OF BODIES ARE YOU SPEAKING OF
HERE? CONCRETE EXAMPLE(S) PLEASE. IT’S NOT CLEAR TO ME IF YOU ARE
TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM, SAY, ANTI-CORRUPTION
BODIES OR OMBUDSPERSONS. THE SA CONSTITUTION CALLS THE AUDITOR-
GENERAL, THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
‘INDEPENDENT.’ I THINK THAT THESE ARE NOT THE BODIES YOU ARE
TALKING ABOUT.] [NB: PLEASE SEE MY COMMENTS ABOVE]
Governance structures and practices have traditionally been weakest and least
defined in the security sector. In the past, many African states were quick to rebuff any
effort to subject security sector affairs to public scrutiny as “undue interference in the
40

45. internal affairs of a sovereign state.” Consequently, in many states on the continent, the
security sector was not subject to oversight, even by the few elected parliaments in the
continent at the time. This was partly due to the culture of secrecy that surrounded
military and security activities, but more fundamentally to the lack of capacity to offer
effective civil oversight of security sector activities.
Although the relevance of oversight institutions is no longer in doubt –( for
example, the launch of the African Union in Durban in July 2002 witnessed the adoption
of the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate
Governance whose core principles promote transparency and accountability in
government through the African Peer Review Mechanism) , difficulties that stem from
institutional weaknesses pose a continuing challenge for effective governance in the
security sector. [USE INFO FROM NEPAD GOVERNANCE PROTOCOL IF
POSSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE “NO LONGER IN DOUBT.”] In many African
countries, this problem begins with the
constitution, which often offers only
sketchy information on the role of key Box 14. Zambian Constitutional Provisions
oversight actors. Even recently for Parliamentary Regulation of the Zimbabwe
Defence Force
promulgated constitutions are silent on
critical issues such as the role of the 102. [Parliament to regulate Defence Force]
legislature in national security policy Parliament shall make laws regulating the Zambia
formulation, especially in countries Defence Force, and in particular, providing for--
emerging from prolonged authoritarian • (a) the organs and structures of the Zambia
rule; powers to declare war; powers over Defence Force;
budget; powers of approval of senior • (b) the recruitment of persons into the Zambia
Defence Force from every district of Zambia;
security sector appointments; powers on
the declaration of emergency powers and • (c) the terms and conditions of service of
members of the Zambia Defence Force; and
how these affect non-derogable rights;
• (d) the deployment of troops outside of
professional autonomy of military and Zambia.
access to information on all security
sector issues and the provisions on Source: Constitution of Zambia - Part VII:
Defence and National Security, (As amended by
military interference in politics. [KF: Act No. 18 of 1996), http://zamlii.zamnet.zm/
Examples please.] const/1996/const91.htm
[The Nigerian constitution for
example is silent on rights that will be affected by declaration of emergency
powers and whether the parliament should merely be informed about external
deployment of troops or have its approval sought. Like the Zambian constitution
that you cited however, the SA constitution devotes four pages to address
conditions for emergency declaration primarily to ensure that the incumbent
authorities do not misuse these powers]
Some African constitutions do, however, specify at least some of the relations
between the legislature and the security forces. The Zambian Constitution defines the
laws that the Zambian Parliament is required to produce to regulate the Zambian
Defence Force (Box 14). The Ghanaian constitution clearly outlines the role of the
Ghanaian Parliament in raising revenue, preparing budgets, and tracking expenditure
for the public sector as a whole. [KF: YOU ALSO HAD INFORMATION ABOUT
41

46. GHANA AND MILITARY OVERTHROW OF GOVT AND BENIN. IT WASN’T CLEAR
TO ME IF ALL OF THIS WAS IN THE CONSTITUTION. NEED MORE INFORMATION
ON THOSE POINTS.] [NB: THE INFORMATION ON MILITARY OVERTHROW CAME
FROM THE GHANAIAN CONSTITUTION – ALL OF IT)
To be effective, oversight institutions must be able to operate without fear or
favour in their promotion and protection of transparency, accountability, integrity and the
free and fair dispensation of justice and administration. They must not be subject to the
whims or pressure of those who appointed them, even if the president and/or legislature
wield enormous power over their tenure in office. Once the autonomy of oversight
bodies is in doubt, their legitimacy is also severely affected. Thus, mechanisms must
exist that provide oversight agencies with access to adequate resources for operations
so that they do not become beholden to governmental institutions under their purview in
order to be able to fulfil their mandate. The functions and powers of each oversight
body must also be clearly delineated and recognised, ideally in the constitution or
secondarily in subordinate national legislation.
One means of enhancing the autonomy of oversight bodies would be for the
constitution to guarantee adequate funding through the consolidated fund. In many
African countries where provisions for independent agencies exist, constitutions do not
give a constitutional guarantee on the funding of these institutions. The South African
constitution, for example, is silent on financing independent bodies such as the Human
Rights Commission, the Auditor-General, and the Public Protector. In contrast, the
Ghanaian Constitution prescribes how the Ghanaian Auditor-General and his staff are
to be financed (Box 15). The failure to specify how such independent bodies are to be
financed places them potentially at the mercy of the executive branch. In many
countries, the risk is that they will be treated like state-controlled commissions. [KF:
AGAIN, WHICH OVERSIGHT BODIES ARE WE TALKING OF HERE? AND HOW
CAN THE CONSTITUTION FORESEE ALL OVERSIGHT BODIES THAT WILL BE
CREATED? WHAT WOULD A BLANKET CLAUSE FOR OVERSIGHT BODIES
LOOK LIKE? WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE NEW OVERSIGHT BODIES
THROUGH NATIONAL LEGISLATION RATHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT?]
[NB: PLS REFER TO MY COMMENTS ABOVE ON THE DISTINCTION.
REGARDING YOUR SECOND ISSUE, YOU HAVE ADDRESSED IT ADEQUATELY
BY MAKING A REFERENCE TO THE PROVISION IN THE GHANAIAN
CONSTITUTION IN BOX 15. THE CONSTITUTION COULD STATE IN THE SECTION
ON SUCH COMMISSIONS THAT
THEIR FUNDING WILL COME FROM Box 15. Financing Ghana’s Auditor-
THE CONSOLIDATED FUND WHICH General
IS STATUTORY, NOT WHIMSICAL] “187 (11) The salary and allowances payable
to the Auditor-General shall be a charge on the
In practice, however, it is unlikely consolidated Fund….
that the complete need for oversight “187 (14) The administrative expenses of the
bodies can be foreseen at the time that office of the Auditor-General including all
constitutions are drafted. salaries, allowances, gratuities and pensions
payable to or in respect of persons serving in
Consequently, some oversight bodies the Audit Service shall be a charge on the
may be created through national consolidated Fund.”
42
Source: Parliament of Ghana, “The
Constitution,” www.parliament.gh/hmeP/
lawsproPag/theConst.htm.

47. legislation [See my point above]. For example, the Zambian constitution gives the
legislature the power to create commissions and to determine their functions and
powers. While the constitution may appear less open to being side-stepped that
subordinate national legislation, oversight bodies that are established through the
constitution can and have been rendered ineffective by a determined executive or by
the security forces. The Constitution of Sierra Leone, for example, very clearly states
that “The public accounts of Sierra Leone and all public offices…shall be audited and
reported on by or on behalf of the Auditor-General, and for that purpose the Auditor-
General shall have access to all books, records, returns and other documents relating
or relevant to those accounts.”20 For many years, the Sierra Leone military was not
audited. What is more, senior military officers regularly bypassed the ministry of
defense and the entire budgeting process by demanding cash directly from the treasury.
Although the armed forces is now subject to audit, inculcating new patterns of behaviour
and expectations on the part of the armed forces will take some time and require
vigilance on the part of the country’s elected officials. [DOUBLE CHECK WHO
DEMANDED FROM WHOM.]
As the case of Sierra Leone demonstrates, the problem is often not with the
provisions of the constitution or national legislation but with the failure of government
and/or the security forces to accept and internalise the principles of democratic
governance. This raises the question of leadership. The quality of leadership is crucial
for effective oversight. Heads of state and government unquestionably set the tone and
ethical standards for those who work in government and the public service. If the head
of state chooses, for example, to undermine the judiciary, subvert the electoral process,
or engage the armed forces in partisan political activities in order to remain in power, it
indicates to less senior leaders that similar deviations from democratic practice may be
acceptable. If, on the other hand, the head of state tolerates responsible political
discourse even when it is at variance with his/her policies, accepts constitutional limits
on terms in office, and refrains from politicizing the armed forces, police and other
security services, the norms and practices of democracy are reinforced. Yet, important
as the head of state and government are, adherence to the norms and practices of
democratic governance is required from a whole range of leaders: lower-ranking
politicians and bureaucrats; legislators; civil society; and security force personnel. The
problem of leadership is well-known in Africa and is receiving increasing attention. It is
extremely important for democratic governance of the security sector that any efforts to
strengthen the quality of leadership tackle the question of the security sector.
The general weakness of civil oversight of the security sector in Africa derives to
a large extent from the tradition of secrecy that has protected the security sector from
scrutiny for decades. (See the section on “Transparency in the Security Sector earlier
in this chapter.) The restrictions that have existed and continue to exist on access to
information on the development and implementation of security sector budgets and
policies both within government and more broadly to society at large means that civilian
expertise in security matters is woefully inadequate throughout Africa. This enables
20
The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 (Act No. 6 of 1991), “Chapter VI. The Legislature, Part VI –
Finance,” para 119 (2), http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution.html. The responsibilities of the Auditor
General are laid out in more detail in “The Public Budgeting and Accounting Act, 1992,” Supplement to
the Sierra Leone Gazette, vol CXXIII, no. 16, March 5, 1992, Part VI, Sections 63–69.
43

48. members of the security elite to argue that civilians are not sufficiently knowledgeable
about security issues to participate fully in security-sector decision-making.
Breaking through the barriers to greater transparency in the security sector is
extremely difficult. Civilians have not acquired expertise in security issues because they
have long been told that security is a matter for the security professionals, because
there are few opportunities for training on security-related subjects within Africa, and
because there have more often than not been clear disincentives in terms of personal
security to civilian involvement in security matters throughout the African continent. In
some places, these disincentives continue into the 21st century (Box 16). Yet, without
civilians who are knowledgeable about security matters, it will be impossible to have
effective civil oversight of the security sector. [This has now been put into section 4.4.]
Box 16. Liberian Security Forces Silence Human Rights Activist
At the end of April 2002, one of Liberia’s most prominent human rights lawyers and a well-
known critic of security force violations of human rights, Tiawan Gongloe, was brutalized in
police custody. Detained for questioning about a speech he gave in Guinea in March 2002,
Mr. Gongloe was stripped nude and placed in a police cell where two plainclothes police
officers severely beat and kicked him and threatened to kill him.
Mr. Gongloe’s “crime” was to have condemned the use of violence as a means to state
power during his speech outlining ways in which civil society groups could support the
attainment of peace in the Mano River Union.
Source: www.hrw.org/press/2002/04/liberia0426.htm and www.newdemocrat.org/other/
Gonloecivilsociety.htm
Even where expertise does exist within civil society, it can be difficult for those in
public life to benefit from it. For example, few legislators have the resources to engage
in-house professionals or outside consultants, and apart from South Africa, African
countries do not have many civilians who are sufficiently knowledgeable and in a
position to provide advice free of charge. As civil society organisations begin to address
security issues and as training programmes for civilians expand, informal linkages are
being developed in a number of African countries, especially in Southern and West
Africa, between officials in both the executive and legislative branches and civilian
experts, but the numbers are still very low. Lack of contact between civilians and
security force personnel contributes to this problem. Again, there have been efforts to
develop relationships between civilians (both in and out of government) and security
force personnel, but these should be expanded and institutionalised to the extent
possible. (Appendix 2 provides information on groups within civil society that provide
training and otherwise encourage contacts between civilians and security force
personnel.)
Oversight capacity is limited not only by inadequate knowledge of security
issues, but also of inadequate knowledge of governing processes. For example,
legislators frequently do not understand how to use the committee system effectively,
44

49. lack experience in drafting legislation, and are uncertain about the role and functioning
of legislative oversight bodies.
Finally, an additional means of strengthening the legitimacy of oversight is for
oversight bodies themselves to be transparent. Constant engagement with the public is
key to their success. In a situation where oversight actors lack the capacity or the
desire to publicise their work, they expose themselves to the same accusations of self-
importance and arrogance that often create ill-will between government and the public.
By publicizing their findings, oversight bodies can make an important contribution to
public debate on fundamental issues of democratic governance.
The inquiry into the South African government’s decision to purchase certain
military equipment carried out by the Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the
National Director of Public Prosecutions described in Box 17 quite clearly distinguishes
between the government’s responsibilities in the areas of defence procurement and
sound procurement practice. For example, Cabinet makes the final decision on
procurement based on a variety of considerations, including relative cost and the ability
of the equipment procured to meet South Africa’s defence needs. However, as the
Joint Investigation Report notes: “Ultimately, the decision about what the country can
and cannot afford is one of political choice” (para 14.1.12). The choice made by the
Cabinet may not be popular with certain segments of the population, and they should
have the right to express their views on the decision. It remains the Cabinet’s
responsibility to make the decision. What is not acceptable is deviations from
international good practice in the area of procurement such as bending procurement
rules to give preference to particular contractors, for decision makers to profit from the
procurement process or inadequate needs assessments. In the case of the Strategic
Defence Procurement process, none of these problems were found to have influenced
the final outcome of the process. It is nonetheless important for problems such as these
to be recognised and addressed. It is also important for the public at large to
understand that these problems exist, so that they can press the government for greater
accountability in subsequent procurement exercises.
45

50. Box 17. Overseeing the South African Strategic Defence Procurement Process
One outcome of the South Africa Defence Review was the decision to procure a sizable amount of
new military equipment. The procurement process was completed in July 1999. Due to the
complexity of the procurement process, the Defence Audit Centre of the Office of the Auditor-
General decided that a special review should be carried out, rather than a standard audit. Once
completed in September 2000, this special review was the subject of hearings and other discussions
within the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). SCOPA subsequently
suggested a joint review of a number of issues relating to the procurement process by the Auditor-
General, Public Protector, National Director of Public Prosecutions. This joint investigation was
carried out between November 2000 and November 2001.
The joint investigation concluded: “No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by
the Government.” At the same time, it did identify a number of “irregularities and improprieties” in the
process. For example:
• “In view of the magnitude and extent of the SDP procurement, the time allocated for each
evaluation and execution was insufficient to ensure that it was done properly and efficiently”
(para 14.1.5).
• “The decision to allow bidders for the Corvette programme to supply information after the offers
were submitted constituted a deviation from properly procurement practice” (para 14.1.11).
• “Proper evaluation procedures were not consistently and diligently applied and a proper audit
trail was not established throughout the procurement process” (para 14.1.16).
2 2
• “ADS was given the opportunity to lower its inflated tender … to just below that of C I over a
2 2
period of more than a month. C I was given a maximum of four days to submit its tender (para
14.1.20).”
The report concluded with a series of recommendations designed to overcome these and other
problems identified in the course of the joint investigation. The entire report and the executive
branch response are available to the public.
Source: “Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Package,” www.gov.za/
Projects/procurement/invesigationreport.htm.
[KF: I AM A LITTLE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. ONE
PROBLEM IS THAT I STILL NEED TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT YOU
DEFINE AS ‘INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS.’ I ASSUME THEY ARE NOT THE
BODIES REFERRED TO IN THE SA EXAMPLE ABOVE, SINCE THESE CLEARLY
ARE MANDATED AND EMPOWERED TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF BOTH THE
LEGISLATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE. THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE
PRESIDENT BASED ON RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE LEGISLATURE. THUS,
YOUR COMMENTS IN THE 4TH PARA BELOW ON BODIES THAT ARE NOT
‘LEGISLATIVE’ BODIES BEING PARTICULARLY PROBLEMATIC DOESN’T SEEM
TO HOLD HERE.
PERHAPS THERE IS A POINT TO BE MADE ABOUT ABOUT EXECUTIVE
CONTROL, BUT I THINK THAT IT MUST BE MUCH SHARPER AND LINKED
DIRECTLY TO SECURITY SECTOR ISSUES. MOSTLY, HOWEVER I THINK THAT
46

51. THE PROBLEMS YOU ARE DESCRIBING ARE PROBLEMS THAT WILL NOT BE
ELIMINATED BY WRITING BETTER LAWS OR PUTTING CLAUSES IN
CONSTITUTIONS. I THINK THAT THEY ARE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL
CULTURE, AND THAT ALL COUNTRIES FACE THESE PROBLEMS TO GREATER
OR LESSER DEGREE. MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES OBVIOUSLY FACE THEM TO
A GREATER DEGREE. WE HAVE TO BE QUITE CLEAR ABOUT WHERE THE
PRIMARY PROBLEM LIES, IN MY VIEW.
[NB: FROM THE EXPLANATIONS I HAVE NOW GIVEN ABOVE, I AM SURE MY
POINT IS CLEAR. I DO NOT HOWEVER DISAGREE THAT WE SHOULD RELATE
THIS TO THE SECURITY SECTOR MORE SPECIFICALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS, NIGERIA’S ACCOUNTS WERE AUDITED AND
RELEASED TO THE PRESS AND THIS GENERATED SO MUCH FURORE IN THE
COUNTRY BECAUSE THE GOVT. SAID THE AUDITOR GENERAL OUGHT NOT TO
HAVE MADE THE REPORT PUBLIC. WHAT WAS INTERESTING WITH THE
EXTENSIVE REPORT IS THE FACT THAT IT ASKED QUESTIONS THAT
NIGERIANS NEVER BELIEVED ANYONE COULD ASK OF GOVT– INCLUDING
QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND THE GOVT WAS PRAISED
FOR MAKING THIS POSSIBLE, BUT IT WAS ALSO ATTACKED IN THE MEDIA
FOR THE ATTEMPT TO GAG THE AUDITOR-GENERAL. SHOULD WE INCLUDE
THIS EXAMPLE AS WELL AS THE DUE PROCESS CHECK IN THE BUDGET
MONITORING OFFICE. THESE ARE TWO GOOD EXAMPLES THAT I HAVE SEEN
AROUND HERE IN RECENT TIMES. PLEASE REWORK SECTION TO SUIT
PURPOSE]
The fundamental concept of independent commissions is that they will act as
society's watchdogs in seeking information, justification for government actions,
oversight and enforcement. Although their right to get an answer is not often
questioned by those in authority, that right does not always extend to the right to make
the answer public. Neither are oversight agencies empowered to act independently of
the executive arm of the state, of the legislature or other sectoral interests that might
exist and to seek the enforcement of the law since they often lack prosecutorial
authority.
Typifying this negation of a fundamental principle of such oversight institutions of
accountability is the elaborate provision on the Code of Conduct Bureau, which has
been in Nigeria’s 1999 constitution. This provision empowers the Bureau to demand
declaration of assets by public officials elected or appointed to office. It is the
responsibility of the Bureau to ascertain the veracity of the claims made in these
declarations. An enforcement institution with prosecutorial authority, the Code of
Conduct Tribunal, is also entrenched in the constitution with the powers to punish. The
irony is that the assets declared cannot be made public unless the declarant chose to
voluntarily make public, hence the opportunity to expose known cases of corruption is
limited. A recent attempt by a civil society organisation, the Media Rights Agenda, to
challenge the secrecy surrounding asset declaration was dismissed by a High Court
judge in June 2001. Ironically, in order to tackle the inability of the Code of Conduct
Bureau to address the unrelenting problem of corruption in government and seeing the
futility of using the constitutional provisions, the civilian government set up an Anti
47

52. Corruption and Public Accountability Commission with extensive powers outside of the
Constitution and often in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau.
Instead of reinforcing the Constitutional provisions, the new body has rendered it largely
moribund and the two are now engaged in an unnecessary turf battle. Meanwhile the
asymmetry between the extent of corruption in the polity and the culprits brought to
book continue to be disproportionate and this is one reason why clarity is necessary in
the role and functioning of oversight agencies.
Oversight Institutions and the Challenge of Independence
While Oversight Institutions are gaining greater prominence in countries like
South Africa, Botswana and Uganda – where some landmark cases have promoted
public interest law and judicial activism and led to changes in the Constitution, others
reflect a more precarious situation. Indeed, oversight agencies face a serious challenge
of relevance and legitimacy in many countries where they are in operation – primarily
because they are not even constitutional bodies.
The challenge of legitimacy is not just one of operations and legal jurisdiction, but
also one of conceptualisation. Conceptually, oversight agencies, especially where they
are not ‘constitutionally entrenched’, would appear to constitute a contradiction in
terms of the accountability of elected authorities and personalities to all powerful
oversight institutions with appointed officials tasked with ‘supervising’, ‘monitoring’
and/or ‘regulating’ their powers is inherently seen to be ‘undemocratic’. This is more so
in situations where the extra-parliamentary oversight institutions are not accountable to
parliament and do not derive their legitimacy from the parliamentary branch of
government. The executive branch sometimes utilises the establishment of special
commissions that are not accountable to parliament as a means of dodging
parliamentary scrutiny especially in the security sector. Even where such oversight
institutions account to parliament, politicians have argued that it is a surreptitious way of
power brokerage by those who could not face the heat of electoral politics. In many of
the countries in question, the view that the checks and balances provided by the
creative tension among the three branches of government – the executive, legislature
and the judiciary - is adequate is prevalent even though many executive branches of
governments in Africa do not always recognise the powers of elected representatives
nor the judiciary to regulate their power or question their actions as already indicated
above.
Hence – the question of “who guards the guardians” is very central to the
relationship between elected officials and members of oversight agencies. In some
countries, appointed members of oversight agencies have political party affiliation and
this casts doubt on their independence and objectivity. It is not uncommon for oversight
institutions to be used in the pursuit of personal agenda and therefore overstep their
bounds, promote political viewpoints or seek to embarrass elected authorities through
biased and partial judgments.
While there may be objective reasons for party political affiliation in say electoral
commissions, reasons largely informed by the need to reflect the various tendencies in
places where trust has completely broken down – often the practice in post conflict
settlement agreements, this shouldn’t result in the paralysis of such oversight
48

53. institutions if the terms and conditions for such arrangements are clearly worked out
before hand and shared with the public. Transparency therefore holds the key to
ensuring that the actions of such a body are not perceived to favour one party to the
detriment of the others.
Partisan political or ethnic affiliations become an issue when accountability
agencies confuse their roles and responsibilities with that of the executive branch or
legislative committees. This encroachment into jurisdiction that is often undefined but
which appears outside of the realm of these institutions has been a key source of
problems especially in maturing democracies with a great deal of potential for reversals.
Yet, holding power accountable should not imply determining the way it is exercised;
neither should it aim at eliminating discretion through stringent bureaucratic regulation.
One way of addressing these institutional challenges is by defining different
levels of accountability – governmental, legislative, bureaucratic, judicial, electoral and
international and deciding early a clear code of conduct or behaviour for those involved
in independent oversight institutions that are constitutionally entrenched and ensure that
they are placed to some degree within the parliamentary oversight system, that the
appointment process is transparent and/or that some members be elected from the
public. In addition, members of oversight institutions, for example, should at the
minimum be expected to:
• promote the principles of natural justice; promote and protect human rights;
• act in an unbiased and impartial manner; not unfairly discriminate against any
member of the public on account of race, gender, ethnic or social origin, colour, age,
disability, religion, political persuasion, conscience, belief, culture or language;
• avoid the use of the oversight institution to which s/he belongs to unfairly promote or
prejudice the interests of any person, political party or interest group;
• avoid the use of such bodies to persecute individuals on the basis of political
persuasion;
• promote sound, efficient, effective, transparent and accountable administration in the
course of his/her official duties shall report to the appropriate authorities, fraud,
corruption, nepotism, maladministration and any other act which constitutes an
offence, or which is prejudicial to the public interest
• avoid the use of or disclose any official information for personal gain or the gain of
others;
• execute his/her duty in a transparent and accountable manner;
• uphold the integrity of the constitution.(In a number of cases, many of these
institutions actually contradict, rather than reinforce the fundamental tenets of the
constitution.)
[KF: SOME OF THESE ARE IN SOME CONSTITUTIONS. WE NEED TO THINK
HOW TO PRESENT THIS.] [NB: MY SUGGESTION IS THAT WE BOX THEM SINCE
WE NEED TO HIGHLIGHT GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLES AND PRINCIPLES]
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54. Summary of Main Points
[NB: PLEASE LOOK AT WHAT I HAVE DONE BELOW. INSTEAD OF
CAPTURING THE ARGUMENTS HERE, I HAVE PROVIDED A MATRIX BELOW
HIGHL;IGHTING WHAT WE ALREADY HAVE IN THE NARRATIVE, BUT WITH
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF WHAT WE MEAN. OTHERWISE, IF YOU
DON’T THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE HERE, WE CAN USE IT AS A SEPARATE
APPENDIX AND STILL SUMMARISE THE CHAPTERS.]
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