Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
The objective of the research is to evaluate the outputs and outcomes of the “Don’t Give AIDS a Chance!” campaign: induced changes, measuring HIV and AIDS-related knowledge, behaviour, and attitudes in Ukraine.
Objective: to identify the attitude of citizens of Ukraine to the socio-political and economic situation in the country, to determine the electoral preferences and level of confidence towards the civil and public institutions, as well as to form an estimate of judgments of the situation in the Donbas, e-declaration and other high-profile events
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
The objective of the research is to evaluate the outputs and outcomes of the “Don’t Give AIDS a Chance!” campaign: induced changes, measuring HIV and AIDS-related knowledge, behaviour, and attitudes in Ukraine.
Objective: to identify the attitude of citizens of Ukraine to the socio-political and economic situation in the country, to determine the electoral preferences and level of confidence towards the civil and public institutions, as well as to form an estimate of judgments of the situation in the Donbas, e-declaration and other high-profile events
FUTURE AND THE ASSESSMENT OF HIGH-PROFILE EVENTSUIFuture
In anticipation of 2017 respondents pondered over events that might happen next year. 37.2% don't expect any fundamental changes, but 23.9% believe that next year early parliamentary elections will be held, and 17.2% think that there will be early presidential election, whereas 7.6% predict a violent overthrow of Poroshenko. One in ten anticipates that in 2017 Russia will begin a new military advance in Ukraine. Comfortingly, there is a part of the respondents optimistic about the next year: 21.6% expect the emergence of new political leaders who will change the country for the better, and 12.1% expect that there will be stabilization and economic growth in Ukraine.
Newsbud Exclusive – “From the Atlantic to the Pacific”: Vladimir Putin & the ...Chris Helweg
During the Beijing summit, Putin intentionally contrasted the positive prospects of Eurasian integrations “to promote steady development, increase citizens’ incomes and improve education and health care” with the instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in other regions of the world, including the EU and the U.S. He stated that in the U.S. “an intense internal political struggle continues, creating a nervous atmosphere in both politics and the economy,” while in Europe,
Ukrainian Municipal Survey, 20 January – 8 February, 2016Dmytro Lysiuk
Ukrainian Municipal Survey
20 January – 8 February, 2016
This annual survey provides an unprecedented
window into citizen attitudes about local governance
and municipal services.
Methodology 5
Concern About Corruption and Nepotism 6
Moods and Attitudes 18
Commitment to Move Ukraine towards the West 26
Approval of and Satisfaction with Officials and Institutions 32
Assessment of the Quality of Public Goods and Services 52
Citizen Participation in Local Governance 81
Municipal Authorities’ Performance 95
Interaction with Local Authorities 108
Accessibility of Information on City Authorities and Institutions 113
Electoral Moods 124
Local or National Responsibility 132
Demographics 146
Results of the research conducted by the Gorshenin Institute with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Edited by Matthes Buhbe, director of FES for Ukraine? Belarus and Moldova.
Russia Direct is an analytical outlet of Russia Beyond the Headlines launched in June 2013 with prominent visibility on Foreign Policy magazine’s website.
Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?Russian Council
There are more issues that divide Russia and the EU than that unite them. Although both sides support the fundamentals of the current world-order (especially when confronted with a challenge like IS), Russia believes that the current arrangement does not grant equality and is asymmetrically patterned after the West. While civil societies on both sides believe that sanctions should be ended and relations strengthened, and while both have incurred losses as a result of restrictive measures, they diverge on the conditions of relaunching economic relations, on the feasibility of technical cooperation in the absence of political convergence, and on what EU – Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) cooperation could look like. While the EU and Russia feel the need to cooperate on a settlement in Ukraine, on stabilisation in the Middle East, on the fi ght against terrorism, they diverge over what should be done, over whether human rights / democracy or security / stability should prevail, and over how international organisations should be used.
In this context two parallel tracks should be promoted. The fi rst one is ad hoc cooperation on burning common threats (the settlement in Ukraine and the fi ght against IS and terrorism), or economic issues of immediate mutual benefi t (aviation, the space, medicine, and gas). Various international fora as well as bilateral EU-Russia arrangements should be open for this cooperation. At the same time, sustainable long-term cooperation depends on conceptual discussions over the future set-up, which would guarantee that the preferences of both sides are taken into consideration and neither feels discriminated or betrayed. Mutual understanding is essential for these discussions, it can be cultivated through wider civil society dialogue, more balanced media coverage, the preservation of existing economic links and expert discussions. Only this conceptual settlement will reverse the current ‘divide-unite’ split in favour of more unity.
The USAID-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.
Highway to hell? European Union‘s Eastern Policy from a Civilian power persp...Adam Mickiewicz University
Jarosław Jańczak, Michael Meimeth, 2015, Highway to hell? – European Union’s Eastern Policy from a civilizing power perspective, “Centre international de formation européenne CIFE Policy Paper”, No. 7, pp. 10.
FUTURE AND THE ASSESSMENT OF HIGH-PROFILE EVENTSUIFuture
In anticipation of 2017 respondents pondered over events that might happen next year. 37.2% don't expect any fundamental changes, but 23.9% believe that next year early parliamentary elections will be held, and 17.2% think that there will be early presidential election, whereas 7.6% predict a violent overthrow of Poroshenko. One in ten anticipates that in 2017 Russia will begin a new military advance in Ukraine. Comfortingly, there is a part of the respondents optimistic about the next year: 21.6% expect the emergence of new political leaders who will change the country for the better, and 12.1% expect that there will be stabilization and economic growth in Ukraine.
Newsbud Exclusive – “From the Atlantic to the Pacific”: Vladimir Putin & the ...Chris Helweg
During the Beijing summit, Putin intentionally contrasted the positive prospects of Eurasian integrations “to promote steady development, increase citizens’ incomes and improve education and health care” with the instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in other regions of the world, including the EU and the U.S. He stated that in the U.S. “an intense internal political struggle continues, creating a nervous atmosphere in both politics and the economy,” while in Europe,
Ukrainian Municipal Survey, 20 January – 8 February, 2016Dmytro Lysiuk
Ukrainian Municipal Survey
20 January – 8 February, 2016
This annual survey provides an unprecedented
window into citizen attitudes about local governance
and municipal services.
Methodology 5
Concern About Corruption and Nepotism 6
Moods and Attitudes 18
Commitment to Move Ukraine towards the West 26
Approval of and Satisfaction with Officials and Institutions 32
Assessment of the Quality of Public Goods and Services 52
Citizen Participation in Local Governance 81
Municipal Authorities’ Performance 95
Interaction with Local Authorities 108
Accessibility of Information on City Authorities and Institutions 113
Electoral Moods 124
Local or National Responsibility 132
Demographics 146
Results of the research conducted by the Gorshenin Institute with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Edited by Matthes Buhbe, director of FES for Ukraine? Belarus and Moldova.
Russia Direct is an analytical outlet of Russia Beyond the Headlines launched in June 2013 with prominent visibility on Foreign Policy magazine’s website.
Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?Russian Council
There are more issues that divide Russia and the EU than that unite them. Although both sides support the fundamentals of the current world-order (especially when confronted with a challenge like IS), Russia believes that the current arrangement does not grant equality and is asymmetrically patterned after the West. While civil societies on both sides believe that sanctions should be ended and relations strengthened, and while both have incurred losses as a result of restrictive measures, they diverge on the conditions of relaunching economic relations, on the feasibility of technical cooperation in the absence of political convergence, and on what EU – Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) cooperation could look like. While the EU and Russia feel the need to cooperate on a settlement in Ukraine, on stabilisation in the Middle East, on the fi ght against terrorism, they diverge over what should be done, over whether human rights / democracy or security / stability should prevail, and over how international organisations should be used.
In this context two parallel tracks should be promoted. The fi rst one is ad hoc cooperation on burning common threats (the settlement in Ukraine and the fi ght against IS and terrorism), or economic issues of immediate mutual benefi t (aviation, the space, medicine, and gas). Various international fora as well as bilateral EU-Russia arrangements should be open for this cooperation. At the same time, sustainable long-term cooperation depends on conceptual discussions over the future set-up, which would guarantee that the preferences of both sides are taken into consideration and neither feels discriminated or betrayed. Mutual understanding is essential for these discussions, it can be cultivated through wider civil society dialogue, more balanced media coverage, the preservation of existing economic links and expert discussions. Only this conceptual settlement will reverse the current ‘divide-unite’ split in favour of more unity.
The USAID-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.
Highway to hell? European Union‘s Eastern Policy from a Civilian power persp...Adam Mickiewicz University
Jarosław Jańczak, Michael Meimeth, 2015, Highway to hell? – European Union’s Eastern Policy from a civilizing power perspective, “Centre international de formation européenne CIFE Policy Paper”, No. 7, pp. 10.
Russia and the Visegrad Group: The Ukrainian ChallengeRussian Council
The Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has provided ample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluating cooperation between Russia and the Visegrad Group countries (also called the Visegrad Four or V4). The Visegrad Four have taken on responsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having become its members.
This article addresses relations between Europe and the countries of the Middle East and the
implications of these relationships over the past two decades, through an examination of the events of
the ‘Arab Spring.’ The Arab Spring refers to a chain of events that swept through the Arab countries
from late 2010, characterized by demonstrations, violence, and civil war. This was sparked by resistance to tyrannical regimes and led to the fall of the rulers of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. However,
Islamists were able to utilize the protesters, who sought democracy, an equal economy, and the elimination of governmental corruption, to further their ambitions. At that time, it was not clear what the new
regimes would look like, but it was widely expected that Islamist elements would gain power. Europe
responded positively to these events, in terms of declarations, policy, and physical involvement, from
the fear that Islamist forces would take advantage of the outcomes of the protests, despite the fact that,
for decades, there had been collaboration and friendly relations between Western nations and many of
the overthrown tyrants. This policy of turning a blind eye to the lack of democracy and human rights
violations in these countries, however, had been perceived by many as contrary to European values. On
May 25, 2011, the European Union published a document admitting their failure to achieve political
reforms in the neighboring Arab countries. Following the events of the Arab Spring, a new approach
to strengthening the partnership between Europe and the Arab world was needed. The objectives of
European policy towards the Muslim world include halting massive Muslim migration, reducing the
influence of fundamentalist and radical Islam in the Middle East and among Muslims in Europe, and
ensuring a supply of energy resources obtained from these countries. Meeting these challenges will be
a significant step in the right direction.
Internews Annual Survey: Media Consumption in Ukraine 2016DonbassFullAccess
The Internews annual media consumption survey shows more Ukrainians searching for news online and fewer getting their news from television. Trust in Ukrainian online media is also up, matching the trend in greater consumption. The survey also shows that Ukrainians are consuming Russian media far less than they did last year, and that trust in Russian media continues to decline.
Internet use in general, including news sites and social networks, is up. Around 67% of respondents said they use the web to get news, compared to 64% in 2015. Television is still the main source of news for Ukrainians, but it is continuing a downward slide in popularity. The number of Ukrainians reporting they watch TV news has declined from 89% in 2014, to 81% in 2015, and 79% in 2016.
Nevertheless, television remains the most popular means for people to get information, chiefly due to its traditional hold over audiences older than 35. Ukrainians’ favorite three TV channels are 1+1, Inter and STB.
The poll was conducted in May-June 2016 for Internews by the InMind market research company, with a sample size of 4,048, including 300 respondents or more in each of 12 oblasts – Kyiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Poltava, Sumy, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv. A smaller number of respondents in the remaining regions were added to provide a national picture. Donetsk and Luhansk interviews were held in areas under the control of the Ukrainian government.
USAID U-Media annual media consumption survey 2016 (ENG)Irina Negreyeva
The poll was conducted in May-June 2016 for USAID U-Media by the InMind market research company, with a sample size of 4,048, including 300 respondents or more in each of 12 oblasts – Kyiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Poltava, Sumy, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv. A smaller number of respondents in the remaining regions were added to provide a national picture. Donetsk and Luhansk interviews were held in areas under the control of the Ukrainian government.
The comparisons of 2014 with 2015 and 2016 results are restricted to the 10 control regions surveyed in all years - Kyiv, Vinnytsa, Donetsk (under control of Ukrainian government), Lviv, Mikolaiv, Odesa, Zakarpattya, Sumy, Kharkov, and Cherkasy.
This research is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The research findings are the sole responsibility of Internews and InMind and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID and the United States government.
Migration Crisis: International Cooperation and National StrategiesRussian Council
Migration has moved to the top of the global political agenda in recent times. The unprecedented influx of
refugees to Europe, on the one hand, and the high rate of South–North economic migration on the other,
have led to sharp political and public opinion divisions.
Over the last year-and-a-half, the expressions “migration crisis” and “refugee crisis” have become firmly
lodged in the political and journalist discourse. However, to what extent does the term “crisis” reflect the
real state of affairs? And to what extent does it reflect the way it is perceived? What can be done at the
national and international levels to change the situation? What is the current state of international cooperation on migration regulation? What is the outlook for this cooperation in the foreseeable future? And
what is Russia’s place in this cooperation?
The abovementioned issues were discussed during the II International conference “Migration crisis:
international cooperation and national strategies”, that was held on September 22-23, 2016 in Moscow
and organized by Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and The Russian Presidental Academy of
National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). The paper presents the key results of the discussion of the following questions: (1) an analysis of the international migration system over the past half a century; (2) an examination of the demographic, economic, political and humanitarian aspects of the
crisis; (3) a look at the phenomenon of migration in reference to security problems; (4) a review of the state
of international cooperation in migration regulation.
Russia–European Union: Potential for PartnershipRussian Council
The report analyses the development of Russia–European Union Relations. In the authors’
opinion the high level of economic interdependence between Russia and the European
Union, their geographic proximity and the nature of international relations in a globalized
world make it imperative that the parties continue to build and develop their relations.
The key issue is to give this cooperation a new impetus and increase the level of trust. The
report outlines recommended steps to make relations as good as possible.
In the spring of 2017 there was a sharp growth of protest activity of the population in Russsia, which became the larest outbreak of civic activity after the "swamp" rallies in 2011-2012. This study is an analysis of the features of a new wave of Russian protest and potential in terms of impact on the political system in the country.
Memorandum of the 4th Section of the International Security Forum - "MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY IN CEE– SEARCHING FOR COMMON ANSWERS", April 16, 2010, Lviv, Ukraine
Similar to THE EUROPEAN IDEA UNITES UKRAINIANS (20)
Презентація результатів соціологічного дослідження щодо перспектив деокупації...Майдан Закордонних Справ
Соціологічне опитування було здійснено компанією «Социс» 18-21 березня 2016
рокуна замовлення телеканалу «1+1». Результати щодо перспектив деокупації
Криму та ставлення до Мінських домовленостей оприлюднюються в рамках
спільного проекту «Майдану закордонних справ» та «1+1» для дослідження
громадської думки стосовно Криму та Донбасу.
Опитано 1486 респондентів у віці 18 років і старше.Вибірка репрезентативна
щодо населення України за віком, статтю, розміром населеного пункту та ре-
гіоном проживання (за даними Державної служби статистки України станом
на 01.01.2015).
Метод опитування – особисте інтерв’ю на дому у респондента за допомогою
планшетів (ComputerAssistedPersonalInterview, CAPI). Максимальна похибка
вибірки не перевищує 2.6%.
В соціологічному дослідженні та в цій презентації використаний такий регіо-
нальний поділ:
Київ;
Східний регіон (Дніпропетровська, Харківська та Запорізька області, а та-
кож неокуповані території Донецької та Луганської областей);
Південний регіон (Одеська, Миколаївська та Херсонська області);
Західний регіон (Волинська, Закарпатська, Івано-Франківська, Львівська,
Рівненська Тернопільська, Хмельницька та Чернівецька області);
Північний регіон(Житомирська, Київська, Сумська та Чернігівська облас-
ті);
Центральний регіон(Вінницька, Кіровоградська, Полтавська та Черкаська
області).
Аналіз результатів дослідження підготовлений експертами «Майдану закор-
донних справ»
ВІДОЗВА учасників експертної конференції “Мінські домовленості - шлях вирішен...Майдан Закордонних Справ
ВІДОЗВА
учасників експертної конференції “Мінські домовленості - шлях вирішення конфлікту чи рецепт катастрофи”
щодо неприйнятності нав’язування Україні обмеженого суверенітету шляхом реалізації «Мінських домовленостей»
Серед численних причин того, що «Мінські домовленості» не
The Annual Report Overview
The Situation in the Annexed Crimea and the De-Occupation Strategy
The Situation in the Temporarily Occupied Areas of Ukraine –
Crimea and Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions
Основні тези щорічної доповіді "Ситуація в анексованому Криму і стратегія йо...Майдан Закордонних Справ
Основні тези щорічної доповіді
Фонду Майдан закордонних справ
Ситуація в анексованому Криму
і стратегія його деокупації
Ситуація на тимчасово окупованих територіях України –
в Автономній Республіці Крим
та в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей
Генеральною прокуратурою України проводиться досудове розслідування у кримінальному провадженні, внесеному до Єдиного реєстру досудових розслідувань 15.08.2014 за № 12014040670002852, за ознаками кримінальних правопорушень, передбачених ст. ст. 255 ч.1; 28 ч.4, 27 ч. 3, 191 ч.5; 28 ч.4, 27 ч.3, 349; 28 ч.4, 27 ч.3, 289; 28 ч.4, 27 ч.3, 157 ч.3 КК України.
Досудове розслідування зазначеного провадження проводиться з чисельними порушеннями національного та міжнародного законодавства.
В мае-июне 2014 «Майдан Иностранных Дел» впервые в Украине сформулировал основные принципы Стратегии возвращения Крыма. Они многократно публиковались и комментировались в украинских и зарубежных СМИ и социальных сетях, а в ноябре-декабре 2014 были изданы и презентованы в книге «Стратегия возвращения Крыма».
Некоторые итоги и выводы за начальный период оккупации Крыма – с февраля по декабрь 2014 – были опубликованы в докладе, представленном в Вашингтоне 6 марта 2015 (7).
Первый вариант «Стратегии возвращения Крыма» (далее – Стратегия) разрабатывался в расчете на ее использование высшими органами государственной власти Украины. Однако, этот расчет не оправдался или оправдался фрагментарно и в очень малой степени.
У травні-червні 2014 «Майдан Закор-донних Справ» вперше в Україні сфор-мулював основні принципи Стратегії повернення Криму . Вони багаторазово публікувалися і коментувалися в українських і зарубіжних ЗМІ та соціальних мережах, а в листопаді-грудні 2014 року їх було видано й презентовано у книзі «Стратегія повернення Криму».
Певні підсумки і висновки за початковий період окупації Криму - з лютого по грудень 2014 року - публікувалися в доповіді, що була представлена у Вашингтоні 6 березня 2015 року.
Перший варіант «Стратегії повернення Кри-му» (далі - Стратегія) розроблявся з розрахунком на її використання вищими органами державної влади України. Однак, цей розрахунок не було виправдано або виправдано фрагментарно і в дуже малій частці.
In May-June 2014 the “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” Foundation was the first in Ukraine to formulate the basic principles of the Crimea Regain Strategy (1,2,3,4,5). Those principles have been publicized many times and commented on in Ukrainian and foreign media and social networks. In November-December 2014 they were published and presented in the book A Strategy for Regaining Crimea.
Some conclusions concerning the initial period of the Crimea occupation, from February to December 2014, were published in a report presented in Washington on March 6, 2015 .
The first version of “The Strategy for Regaining the Crimea” (henceforth referred to as 'Strategy') was formulated on the assumption that it would be used by top-level agencies in the national government of Ukraine; however, these expectations were not fulfilled, or else they were only partially realized and to a very small degree.
In "The Militarization of Crimea under Russian Occupation," Crimean activist, expert of the Maidan of Foreign Affaires Andrii Klymenko explains how the Kremlin has moved to tighten its grip on Crimea as the world turns its focus toward Syria. Indeed, Russia has proven itself to be settling in for the long haul in Crimea, with mass relocations of Russian military servicemen to the peninsula spurring housing shortages and massive infrastructure projects.
Ескалація ядерного протистояння США та Росії у контексті російсько- українськ...Майдан Закордонних Справ
Повний текст доповіді "Ескалація ядерного протистояння США та Росії у контексті російсько- української війни"
Автор: Олексій Куроп'ятник, експерт фонду "Майдан закордонних справ
Ескалація ядерного протистояння США та Росії у контексті російсько- українсь...Майдан Закордонних Справ
"Ескалація ядерного протистояння США та Росії
у контексті російсько- української війни"
Автор: Олексій Куроп'ятник, експерт фонду "Майдан закордонних справ"
The regain of the ARC (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) to Ukraine will commence with
Ukrainian troops entering the peninsula. No referendums to confirm the mandate of Ukraine for
the return of Crimea are needed because Ukraine did not recognize any illegal referendum on its
separation.
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
1. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Mr. Poroshenko
Mr. Yanukovych (average)
Mr. Yuschenko (average)
The Europeanvectorsupportunderthe
lastthree presidents
Integration to CU Integration into the EU
THE EUROPEAN IDEA UNITES UKRAINIANS
June 2014 set two records: one in the considerable growth of the attractiveness of the
European integration vectorin the short term (up to 52.7%) and the other in the ultimate
collapse of the opposite idea – that of joining the Customs Union (up to 16.6%). Paradoxically,
the peak of the wish to join the Eurasian project (52.5%) fell on the final months of the
presidential term of the “pro-Western” V.Yushenko (average for the RF support – 31.5%, EU
support – 43.4%) and steadily declined during the term of V.Yanukovych (average for the
support of both vectors – at 36.6%).
Сlearly, the political blackmail and economic pressure from Russia on the eve of the Vilnius
summit where the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was
planned, caused a further increase of the pro-European attitudes of the citizens. And after the
Kremlin’s support of the bloody crackdown on Maidan and later of the Crimean and
intervention in Donbas, they have completely turned away almost a third of the supporters of
the so-called "Russian World".
62.3% believe that Russia is more
interested in Ukraine's integration into
the CU than our country, 19.6% agree
with the idea of the mutual benefit, and
only 3.4% believe that it is beneficial
primarily to Ukraine. By comparison, the
majority of the respondents (37.2%)
described integration with the EU as mutually beneficial, and almost an equal number -- as
being beneficial to both Ukraine (27%) and the EU (28.6%). Thus, Ukrainians are well aware of
who initiates and gets dividends from the Eurasian project and prefer the European prospects.
The greatest support (the wish to strengthen the integration or to leave the cooperation at
the same level) to the European integration has received in the Western and Central regions,
96.8% and 93.1%, respectively, followed by the Southern (65.8%) and Eastern (62.5%) regions.
Only in the Eastern region, due to Donbas, we can see a certain anomaly when the numberof
the EU opponents (wanting to reduce or discontinue cooperation) is almost one-third - 29.9%.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Feb-02
Jul-02
Dec-02
May-03
Oct-03
Mar-04
Aug-04
Jan-05
Jun-05
Nov-05
Apr-06
Sep-06
Feb-07
Jul-07
Dec-07
May-08
Oct-08
Mar-09
Aug-09
Jan-10
Jun-10
Nov-10
Apr-11
Sep-11
Feb-12
Jul-12
Dec-12
May-13
Oct-13
Mar-14
In your opinion,which processwould be more beneficial forUkraine?
Integration into the EU Integration to CU
2. Wherein the negative attitude towards the European integration is ten times less in the Central
region (3.1%) and twenty-five times less in the Western region (1.2%) comparing to the
"eastern indicator" (29.9%).
However, the comparison of data for the Eastern region has uncovered an interesting
phenomenon - its division into Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and, conditionally, the
New East (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhia regions). The number of supporters of the
European integration in the New East is twice (56.5%) that in Donbas (28%) while the ratio of
those wanting to curtail it is inversely proportional (12.2% vs. 28.6%). Given the similarity of
these areas’ historical backgrounds, it would be reasonable to believe that under the normal
conditions the index of support to the European integration would have shown minor
variations at the rate of a statistical error.
It is clear that the survey results were largely influenced by the monopolistic presence in the
region of the Russian media propaganda, as well as by the reality of the antiterrorist campaign.
For obvious reasons, the latter is negatively perceived by the population residing in the zone of
the active combat operations. It can be assumed with certainty that the attitude of the vast
majority of the euro-skeptics in the area of the ATO will begin changing as soon as the new
realities start sinking in. Among those are: the new understanding of the "advantages" of living
in the self-proclaimed "republics" led by armed terrorists, the disillusionment of the Crimeans
56.5%
28.0%
22.4%
15.4%
12.2%
28.6%
1.9%
19.5%
7.0%
8.5%
New East
Region
Donbass
Region
Comparisonto the EU integration support inDonbas and the NewEast
Unsure Discontinue cooperation Decrease Do not change the pace Strengthen cooperation
W ES T
C EN TER
S O U TH
EAS T
S HOULD THE EU-COOPERATION BE DEEPENED OR REDUCED
UN DER THE CURREN T CON DITION S?
Strengthen cooperation Do not change the pace Decrease Discontinue cooperation Unsure
3. in Russia's "paradise", a balanced information stream, the stabilization of the situation in other
regions of Ukraine and return to normalcy in the Eastern regions of Ukraine liberated from
terrorists.
An additional confirmation of the aberrative nature of this situation may be found in the ratios
of the international vector support and public attitude to Maidan and anti-Maidan. The data
shows that the level of public activity during the conflict earlier this year in the East and South
was significantly lower than in the West and Center. I.e., in the South and East 54% and 43%,
respectively supported anti-Maidan, while the number of Maidan supporters in the Center and
the West was much higher - 63% and 80%, respectively.
The analysis of the available data allows us to conclude that the narrow marginal dominance of
the integration with Russia over the European integration (4.5%) in the East is related to the
above-mentioned factors, rather than reflects a consolidated publicopinion, and thus, is
likely temporary. For instance, in the South, where anti-Maidan was supported by a record
number of the population (54%), the idea of the European prospect currently dominates over
the Eurasian one (8.5%) and obviously, as the security situation improves, that gap will grow
not in favor of the Asian expanse.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
West
Center
South
East
Which process will benefit Ukraine more?
EU integration Integration with Russia and former USSR republics Both processes Neither of them Unsure
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
West Center East South
Relatonship of the integration vector preference to the Maidan//Anti-
Maidan factor
Strenghten or keep on current level with the EU Strenghten or keep on current level with Russia
Support of Maidan Support of anti-Maidan
4. Quite expectedly, the most interest to deepening the relations with Russia or maintain them at
current levels are demonstrated by the Eastern (53.9% and 13.1%, respectively) and Southern
regions (39.9% and 17.4%, respectively). The trend to reduce or stop such cooperation is visible
in the Western (41.8% and 31.5% respectively) and Central (29.3 and 32.6% respectively)
regions.
At the same time, while giving preference to the integration with Russia in the next 5-10
years (32%), 23.6% in the East support the European integration intentions, and another
26.4% consider it beneficial to deepen relations with both the East and the West. The
Southern region is almost equally divided between the integration with Russia and the EU
(27.2% and 26.8% respectively), and 19.2% sympathize to both vectors. The Western and
Central regions show a definite orientation for Europe (90.6% and 65.2%).
According to the survey, the most beneficial areas of cooperation with the EU include the legal
(59.8%), technological (52.6%), investment and security (52.1%), with Russia - energy (27.4%),
trade (21.3% ), economic (18.7%) and cultural (18.1%). Equally beneficial are considered such
areas as science (28.6%), trade (35.3%) and energy (28.4%).
Spheres of cooperation EU Russia Equally beneficial
Politics 51,3 14 25,3
Rule of law 59,8 11,7 19
Security 52,1 15,9 23,7
Economy 46,5 18,7 28,5
Trade 38 21,3 35,3
Energy 36,1 27,4 28,4
Technology 52,6 13 24,6
Investments 57,9 10,2 23,7
Science 49,6 12,6 28,6
Culture 43,9 18,1 30,2
Ecology 47,2 12,6 31,7
0
20
40
60
Politics
Rule of law
Security
Economy
Trade
EnergyTechnology
Investments
Science
Culture
Ecology
In what areas is the cooperation with the EU more beneficialthan with
Russia and vice versa?
EU Russia Equally beneficial
5. It is very telling that while comparing the advantages of Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU
and Russia, the respondents not only preferred the EU, but also, that the numbers
supporting the most promising areas of cooperation with Moscow are 1.5-2 times lower than
even the lowest “European” numbers on the list.
That certainly suggests that if the respondents evaluate the pros and cons objectively and
without undue politicization, European civilizationary expanse receives an unequivocal
support.
Even in the humanitarian spheres (language, literature, history, religion, etc.) that are
traditionally considered as strongly bonding Ukraine and Russia, Europe is more than twice as
attractive as the Russian Federation (43.9% vs. 18.1% respectively), and 13, 7% more desirable
than equal movement in both directions.
The interest level in cooperating with the EU in the fields of science and technology rather than
with Russia, actually destroys the traditional myth of the Russian science and technology’s
capabilities and prospects. Surprisingly, that assessment coincides with a number of the
international rankings and studies that do not speak in favor of the Russian scientific and
technological potential. In particular, among the 3215 scientists in the world whose research is
being actively cited in the scientific community, there are only 8 Russian (3 of whom work
abroad); a Russian University first appears on the list of the best in the 226th place; even
among the BRIC and developing countries, the MSU occupies the 10th place after four Chinese,
three Turkish, one South African and one Taiwanese school; in the amount of the scientific
export Russia holds the 30thplace (Ukraine holds the 39th).
Despite the number of those who believe the cooperation with Russia and the EU is equally
beneficial, the vast majority (62.9%) agree that Ukraine cannot maintain an equal distance
with both. Only 18.1% believe that such an approach is possible.
The greatest threats to Ukraine, so to speak, in the case of joining the EU are perceived to be
the illegal migration across the Ukrainian territory (14%), goods smuggling (12.7%) and drug
trafficking (12.3%), while a much larger number of the respondents, 43.5%, 45% and 41%,
respectively, to the contrary, see that these problems will decrease. According to the poll, the
European integration would reduce the threat of terrorism (52.5%) and of arms trafficking
(51.1%). Obviously, the latter values are caused by the terrorist and separatist activity in certain
areas of Donbas.
A third of the respondents are confident that joining the CU will mean the increase in the
threat of goods smuggling (33.7%), illegal weapons (33.4%), illegal immigration (33.2%), drug
trafficking (30.9%) and terrorism (30 7%). The advantages of MS as seen by the respondents
are incomparable in numbers: those who believe that the threats of terrorism, illegal weapons
and human trafficking account for 20.7%, 17.4% and 14.5% respectively.
6. If Ukraine joins the EU If Ukraine Joins the CU
Will
decrease
Will
remain
unchanged
Will
increase
Unsure
Will
decrease
Will remain
unchanged
Will increase Unsure
Terrorist threat (terrorism) 52,5 18,3 9,8 19,5 20,7 27,6 30,7 21
Spread of illegal arms within Ukraine or
their trafficking via Ukraine to other
countries
51,1 19,4 12,1 17,5 17,4 32 33,4 17,2
Spread of illegal drugs within Ukraine or
their trafficking via Ukraine to other
countries
41 27,6 12,3 19,2 13,4 37,7 30,9 18
Spread of mass diseases/pandemics
within Ukraine or their trafficking
(spreading) via Ukraine to other
countries
37,1 30,8 9,8 22,3 12,3 40,9 24,4 22,4
Spread of goods smuggling within
Ukraine or their trafficking via Ukraine to
other countries
45 23,4 12,7 18,9 13,2 33,9 33,7 19,2
Spread of illegal drugs within Ukraine or
their trafficking via Ukraine to other
countries
43,5 23,3 14 19,3 14,5 32,3 33,2 20
7. The practically mirror evaluation of the absence of threats to Ukraine from the EU (72.7%)
and their presence from the RF (73%) speaks volumes. 59.3% and 60.9% respectively agree
that NATO and the United States do not pose a threat to our country.
50.1% of the respondents consider the open information stream a threat. However, the
threat is seen as the greatest from the side of Russia - 69.3%. With a large follow those who
see the informational influence of the US (30.6%) and the EU (26.1%) as a threat.
A quarter of the respondents (24.5%) believe that the strengthening of relations with Russia
will improve Ukraine's security, while 42.7% strongly disagree. Almost twice as many
respondents (47%) are in favor of intensifying the security part of the relationship with the
EU, while 13.6% are against it. Even strengthening the relations in this area with the United
States (39.6%) shows significantly higher numbers than the same relationship with Russia, only
20.8% believe that it would not contribute to our national security.
Answer given in each column
Will contribute
considerably
Will
contribute
somewhat
Will not
contribute
Unsure
Strengthening relations with
Russia
24.5 21.9 42.7 10.9
Strengthening relations with
the EU
47 30.9 13.6 8.5
Strengthening relations with
the US
39.6 29 20.8 10.6
Strengthening relations with
China
17.6 32.2 21 29.3
Joining the CSTO (the Tashkent
Treaty)
11.4 16 35.3 37.3
Joining NATO 29.5 23 29.1 18.4
The measures that would contribute the most to our national security are deepening
relations with the EU (47%) and the USA (39.6%). Even joining NATO (29.5%) exceeds support
0
10
20
30
40
50
Will contribute considerably
Will contribute somewhat
Will not contribute
Unsure
To what extent will the following measures contribute to Ukraine's
security?
Strengthening relations with Russia Strengthening relations with the EU
Strengthening relations with the US
8. to deepening cooperation in the area of security with the Russian Federation (24.5%), and
that is even without including the 23% of respondents who believe that NATO membership will
contribute to the Ukrainian security to a certain extent. Wherein the level of rejection of the
military-political bloc is at the level of 29.1%.
Responding to a separate question regarding the usefulness of Ukraine’s joining NATO, the
vast majority (54%) agree with that with 27.8% of those considering that the application
should be submitted immediately. Only 32.2% believe that Ukraine does not need join the
alliance, and 13.8% are unsure.
Is there a so-called alternative to strengthening relations with the EU? Very telling is the answer
to the question: "In the current environment, should we increase or decrease cooperation with
the following states/unions: the need to deepen relations with the United States - more than
half, while with Russia - almost one third. Thus, the need to reduce the level of relations with
Russia insists more than a quarter of respondents, and the USA - only 13.8%.
Deepen
Leave at the
same level
Decrease
Stop
cooperation
Unsure
EU 64.2 16.2 9.9 4.3 5.4
Russia 29.6 12.5 26.5 21.3 10.1
US 51.7 20.7 13.8 5.9 7.9
Under the conditions of Russian aggression against Ukraine, it is the U.S. and not the major
European states that are seen as those whose help our nation can really count on. 39.6%
believe that strengthening relations with Washington will strengthen our security considerably
and 29% - to a certain extent, while in regard to Russia the figure much lower - 24.5% and
21.9%, respectively.
The help of what countries can Ukraine count on in confrontation with Russia?
US 41,9
Poland 39,5
Germany 36,3
UK 23,5
France 18,6
China 3,7
Japan 6,2
Other 2,9
Can’t count on any country 24,7
Do not believe that there is a confrontation between Ukraine and Russia 6,8
Unsure 13,9
Russia is seen as a threat to Ukraine three times (73%) as much as the U.S. (23.1%). At the same
time, 60.9% are confident that the U.S. is not a threat to our country - 60.9%, while only 17.8%
believe the same about Russia.
Summary
The survey results give grounds to state that Ukrainians, who consider themselves an integral
part of the European civilization, have clearly made their choice as to the country’s strategic
9. vector of development. The preference of the European integration in the short run is proved
not only by the considerable -- a record for the last 12 years--support of the respondents
(52.7%), but also by the further drop of the already low level of support for the Russian
projects (16.6%), together with an awareness that the entry of Ukraine into the Customs Union
would benefit Russia a lot more (62.3%) than Ukraine (3.4%).
The evidence that the European choice is primarily a choice of values, lies in the number of
the respondents who expect the most benefits from cooperating with the EU to be in the
legal area (59.8%). That is not surprising since the idea of the rule of law clearly resonates
with the values of "The Revolution of Dignity" that can be formulated as freedom, justice and
prosperity, and precisely in that order. Other areas of greatest interest are investment (57.9%)
and technology (52.6%).
The Western and Central regions lead in support to joining the EU (96.8% and 93.1%,
respectively). Only "thanks" to Donbas in the East we can observe a certain anomaly when
the number of skeptical attitudes to the EU comprises almost a third (29.9%). However, the
analysis of the Eastern region data has uncovered an interesting phenomenon -- its division into
Donbas and conditionally, the New East. The number of supporters to the European integration
in the New East is twice as high (56.5%) that in Donbas (28%), while the ratio of those wishing
to curtail it is inversely proportionate (12.2% vs. 28.6%, respectively). Given the historic
commonality of these areas of the East, it is logical to assume that under normal circumstances,
the support to the European integration would have minor fluctuations around a statistical
error rate.
What proves that is the evidence that when the respondents evaluate the pros and cons of the
EU integration without undue politicization, the European civilizationary expanse undoubtedly
wins. It is further confirmed by the fact that when comparing the advantages of cooperation
with the EU and the RF, the respondents not only preferred the EU, but also demonstrated the
numbers of those supporting the most promising areas of cooperation with Moscow to be 1.5-2
times lower than even the lowest “pro-European” numbers on that list.
Excluding the temporary "eastern anomaly", the Eurointegration idea is supported by the
overwhelming majority of the citizens. The gives reasons to claimwith certainty that the
European perspective plays a consolidating role. Ukraine is united both in its desire to return
to the European family and in its rejection of the Eurasian project, in other words, Ukraine is
a united country!
Ukrainian estimate the level of threats from the EU as considerably low, while a third of the
respondents is confident that joining the CU would increase the threats of goods smuggling
(33.7%), illegal weapons (33.4%), human trafficking (33.2%), drug trafficking (30.9%) and
terrorism (30.7%).
The practically mirror evaluation of the absence of threats to Ukraine from the EU (72.7%)
and their presence from the RF (73%) speaks for itself. 59.3% and 60.9% respectively agree
that NATO and the United States do not pose a threat to our country. And under the conditions
of Russian aggression against Ukraine, 41.9% count on the help from Washington, while 39.6%
are certain that strengthening relations with the US will strengthen our security considerably
and 29% - to a certain extent. Thus, the United States is regarded as an extremely important
and reliable partner, as well as a significant security factorfor the Ukrainian state, possibly as
an alternative to the EU in this area.
10. A quarter of the respondents (24.5%) believe that strengthening the relations with the RF will
improve Ukraine's security, while 42.7% strongly disagree. Almost twice as many respondents
(47%) are in favor of intensifying the security part of the relationship with the EU. Even joining
NATO (29.5%) exceeds the support to deepening cooperation in the area of security with the
Russian Federation (24.5%), and that is even without including the 23% of respondents who
believe that NATO membership will contribute to the Ukrainian security to a certain extent.
Ukrainians are fairly pragmatic in their attitude to the EU, and see the European integration
more as a useful tool for change life for the better, than the strategic goal of the national
policy. However, a significant support level for such a direction implies the willingness of
people to undergo urgent and radical, and therefore painful, reforms. So, the Ukrainian political
elite that has filled the power vacuum in the country rather than gained victory in a struggle,
has yet to meet the high public expectations regarding changes in the key areas of life. As of
now, it has received a mandate of trust for the radical of the whole system of the social and
political relations, economics and so on.
Signing the agreements with the EU is already a historical fact; from now on, only the concrete
steps for their implementation and the changes of life for the better will meet the
expectations of the people. Otherwise, a disappointment both in authorities and the
direction itself will have disastrous consequences.
In other words, the society must obtain a clear integration strategy. In addition to that, it is
necessary to create the appropriate institutional mechanisms of implementing the agreements,
provide the necessary human and other resources, as well as the wide coverage of the
integration process itself. That information component is exceptionally important since besides
simply updating the people on the course of the agreement implementation, it is crucial to
advocate the European vector and thus, counter the massive Russian propaganda aimed at
creating a self-serving picture of the world and keeping Ukraine within its geopolitical orbit. A
separate task is lobbying the idea of rationality of Ukraine's membership in the EU with the
member states of the union, especially those skeptical of the idea.
All social groups have to be well-informed of the integration and the reforms, and feel the
results even better. The introduction of a visa-free regime should become an important step in
this direction.
In order to maintain a high level of “Euro-enthusiasm”, the authorities, together with the help
of the public sector, should include into the strategy targeted at an "average Ukrainian" the
following measures:
• development of the cross-border transport infrastructure
• improving the conditions of the border entry,
• liberalization of the airline market (budget flights)
• promotion of the bus connections,
• exchange programs, especially for pupils and students,
• creation of the information resources on the possibilities that exist for Ukrainian citizens in
the EU
• tourism support and so on.
11. At present, the Ukrainian state is at a bifurcation point, and largely depending on the actions of
the current government, it will either the transition onto a qualitatively new level of existence,
or else ...