Results of the research conducted by the Gorshenin Institute with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Edited by Matthes Buhbe, director of FES for Ukraine? Belarus and Moldova.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
. Introduction
The Definition and Scope of International Relations.
The Nation-State System
Evolution of International Society
II. Theories and Approaches
The Classical Approaches-Realism and idealism
The Scientific Revolution-Behavioral Approach, System Approach,
Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism.
Post-modernism, Critical Theory, Feminism, Constructivism
III. International Political Security.
Conceptualization of security in the twenty-first century
Power. Elements of National Power
Balance of Power
Foreign Policy: Determinants, Decision making and analysis
Sovereignty
National Interest
IV. Strategic Approach to International Relation.
War: Causation of War, Total War, Limited War, Asymmetric Warfare, civil war,
Guerilla war
Strategic Culture: Determinants of Pakistani Strategic Culture.
Deterrence: Theory and practice with special reference to Nuclear India and
Pakistan
V. International Political Economy.
Theories in IPE: Mercantilism, Economic Liberalism, and neo- Marxism
Theories of Imperialism, Dependence and Interdependence
VI. International political community.
Nationalism
Internationalism
Globalization
94
Revised Scheme and Syllabus for CSS Competitive Examination-2016
VII. Approaches to Peace
Diplomacy
International Law
Arms Control /Disarmament and Nuclear Non proliferation Regime
VIII. International Political Institution
United Nations
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
World Bank
International Court of Justice
Migrant Integration: The European Experience and Prospects for RussiaRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s project International Migration Processes: Trends, Challenges and Prospects. Whereas Europe has dealt with mass influxes of immigrants since the 1950s, Russia only encountered this phenomenon relatively recently. Europe’s experience with migrant integration, which will be considered in this working paper, might be useful to Russia in resolving similar issues. The author identifies a range of specific programmes and measures to ease the process of including immigrants and their descendants into the host country’s social institutions, and he offers several recommendations regarding the prospects for integrating migrants in Russia.
Russia–European Union: Potential for PartnershipRussian Council
The report analyses the development of Russia–European Union Relations. In the authors’
opinion the high level of economic interdependence between Russia and the European
Union, their geographic proximity and the nature of international relations in a globalized
world make it imperative that the parties continue to build and develop their relations.
The key issue is to give this cooperation a new impetus and increase the level of trust. The
report outlines recommended steps to make relations as good as possible.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
. Introduction
The Definition and Scope of International Relations.
The Nation-State System
Evolution of International Society
II. Theories and Approaches
The Classical Approaches-Realism and idealism
The Scientific Revolution-Behavioral Approach, System Approach,
Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism.
Post-modernism, Critical Theory, Feminism, Constructivism
III. International Political Security.
Conceptualization of security in the twenty-first century
Power. Elements of National Power
Balance of Power
Foreign Policy: Determinants, Decision making and analysis
Sovereignty
National Interest
IV. Strategic Approach to International Relation.
War: Causation of War, Total War, Limited War, Asymmetric Warfare, civil war,
Guerilla war
Strategic Culture: Determinants of Pakistani Strategic Culture.
Deterrence: Theory and practice with special reference to Nuclear India and
Pakistan
V. International Political Economy.
Theories in IPE: Mercantilism, Economic Liberalism, and neo- Marxism
Theories of Imperialism, Dependence and Interdependence
VI. International political community.
Nationalism
Internationalism
Globalization
94
Revised Scheme and Syllabus for CSS Competitive Examination-2016
VII. Approaches to Peace
Diplomacy
International Law
Arms Control /Disarmament and Nuclear Non proliferation Regime
VIII. International Political Institution
United Nations
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
World Bank
International Court of Justice
Migrant Integration: The European Experience and Prospects for RussiaRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s project International Migration Processes: Trends, Challenges and Prospects. Whereas Europe has dealt with mass influxes of immigrants since the 1950s, Russia only encountered this phenomenon relatively recently. Europe’s experience with migrant integration, which will be considered in this working paper, might be useful to Russia in resolving similar issues. The author identifies a range of specific programmes and measures to ease the process of including immigrants and their descendants into the host country’s social institutions, and he offers several recommendations regarding the prospects for integrating migrants in Russia.
Russia–European Union: Potential for PartnershipRussian Council
The report analyses the development of Russia–European Union Relations. In the authors’
opinion the high level of economic interdependence between Russia and the European
Union, their geographic proximity and the nature of international relations in a globalized
world make it imperative that the parties continue to build and develop their relations.
The key issue is to give this cooperation a new impetus and increase the level of trust. The
report outlines recommended steps to make relations as good as possible.
Russia Direct is an analytical outlet of Russia Beyond the Headlines launched in June 2013 with prominent visibility on Foreign Policy magazine’s website.
The Origin of the non-governmental sector in Russia during the presidencies o...Maciej Behnke
Apart from the public (first) and business (second) sectors, the third sector is one
of the pillars constituting the modern democratic society. All the social interests
are concentrated within the third sector and they are being implemented by the
numerous non-governmental organizations cooperating with the state as well
as business world. The birth of the third sector in Russia can be associated with
the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev reforms called the perestroika. The mental
changes that the Russian society underwent influenced by the policy of glasnost
led to the origin of public involvement into the social and political life, taking
upon the role of the often ineffective state. The degree to which the citizens were
involved in the activity of the NGOs was first of all associated with their quality
of life and it depended on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the idea
of social organizations. The time of Boris Yeltsin presidency was characterized
by two phenomena: a drop in the standard of living accompanied by the
intensification of criminalization within the public life and the positive attitude
towards the introduction of the third sector. After the new president assumed
the post, the approach of the new authority changed in a negative way and
the politics implemented led to gaining full control over public associations.
The so-called liberalization of the law in respect to the third sector was only
a display of Kremlin’s political will and did not signify serious treatment of the
principles of the democratic and civic society. The third sector, one of the pillars
supporting the civil society is at present in the state of consolidation, dealing
with numerous amendments of legal norms. After the period of mimicking
western solutions, the Russian NGOs became a power that must be taken into
account by the Russian decision-makers.
In the spring of 2017 there was a sharp growth of protest activity of the population in Russsia, which became the larest outbreak of civic activity after the "swamp" rallies in 2011-2012. This study is an analysis of the features of a new wave of Russian protest and potential in terms of impact on the political system in the country.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?Russian Council
There are more issues that divide Russia and the EU than that unite them. Although both sides support the fundamentals of the current world-order (especially when confronted with a challenge like IS), Russia believes that the current arrangement does not grant equality and is asymmetrically patterned after the West. While civil societies on both sides believe that sanctions should be ended and relations strengthened, and while both have incurred losses as a result of restrictive measures, they diverge on the conditions of relaunching economic relations, on the feasibility of technical cooperation in the absence of political convergence, and on what EU – Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) cooperation could look like. While the EU and Russia feel the need to cooperate on a settlement in Ukraine, on stabilisation in the Middle East, on the fi ght against terrorism, they diverge over what should be done, over whether human rights / democracy or security / stability should prevail, and over how international organisations should be used.
In this context two parallel tracks should be promoted. The fi rst one is ad hoc cooperation on burning common threats (the settlement in Ukraine and the fi ght against IS and terrorism), or economic issues of immediate mutual benefi t (aviation, the space, medicine, and gas). Various international fora as well as bilateral EU-Russia arrangements should be open for this cooperation. At the same time, sustainable long-term cooperation depends on conceptual discussions over the future set-up, which would guarantee that the preferences of both sides are taken into consideration and neither feels discriminated or betrayed. Mutual understanding is essential for these discussions, it can be cultivated through wider civil society dialogue, more balanced media coverage, the preservation of existing economic links and expert discussions. Only this conceptual settlement will reverse the current ‘divide-unite’ split in favour of more unity.
In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
The paper presents the contemporary information policy implemented by
the Ukrainian government. The survey answers the question about the new role of information policy in the state authorities’ activities. The research focuses on the executive branch of power, due to its impact on the internal and external image of Ukraine.
The analysis was conducted at the strategic, institutional and operational levels, and
concerned the content of messages.
Direct democratic choices have been of great importance in Central and
Eastern European countries since they have marked the key steps on those states’
paths to democracy. Direct democracy – particularly referenda – is arousing increasing interest among politicians and the electorate, which is manifested in the ongoing
public debate on the role of civil participation in decision-making processes, as well
as in the increase in the number of national referenda held in Europe and worldwide.
Hence, studies on referenda in Central and Eastern Europe seem to be a very interesting and academically important task worthy of further exploration. The main research
aim of this paper is to answer the question of the role of nationwide referenda in the
political practice of Central and Eastern European states, as well as the question of
the future prospects for the use of referenda. More emphasis is placed on referenda
conducted after 1989. On the basis of these research results, referenda are divided
into three categories: independence referenda, so called “deepening” referenda and
accession referenda.
The author analyzes how the concept of “traditional values” is used in the political discourse
of the Russian authorities. Since the third term of Vladimir Putin, there has been a noticeable
neo-conservative turn in Russian politics, expressed both in the strengthening of the influence
of religion and in the tightening of legislation. An active role in this is played by the leadership
of the Russian Orthodox Church, which openly supports the current regime and strengthens
its own influence on public life, regardless of the absence of direct religious demands of Russian society. The concept of “traditional values” is thus politically motivated, interpreted as an
opposition to liberal values (an example is the homophobic policy of the Russian authorities)
and is aimed at contrasting Russian values with Western ones. The author describes how this
discourse is aimed, principally, at consolidating the conservative electorate within the country
and spreading Russian influence on “conservatives” from other countries. This reflects the need
to search for effective ways to counter populist rhetoric.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Overcoming Barriers: Media in Covering Conflict-Sensitive IssuesDonbassFullAccess
The Special Reports is prepared by within “Supporting Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Ukraine” project under financial support of Embassy of Great Britain in Ukraine. Opinions reflected in the Report may not correlate with those of the Government of Great Britain or OSCE PCU.
The Special Report consists of:
the Report on the results of monitoring of TV content in November 2015 due to conflict sensitivity;
the Report on the results of research among the journalists in February-March 2016 that clarifies the roots and causes of the detected problems;
the review of the international practices of involvement of media into reconciliation in the societies, and recommendations regarding their possible implementation (adaptation) in Ukraine. For journalists, editors, representatives of educational establishments and technical assistance projects, media experts and other persons searching for the better solutions to increase the role of Ukrainian media in reconciliation and challenge the social barriers caused by the military conflict.
Russia Direct is an analytical outlet of Russia Beyond the Headlines launched in June 2013 with prominent visibility on Foreign Policy magazine’s website.
The Origin of the non-governmental sector in Russia during the presidencies o...Maciej Behnke
Apart from the public (first) and business (second) sectors, the third sector is one
of the pillars constituting the modern democratic society. All the social interests
are concentrated within the third sector and they are being implemented by the
numerous non-governmental organizations cooperating with the state as well
as business world. The birth of the third sector in Russia can be associated with
the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev reforms called the perestroika. The mental
changes that the Russian society underwent influenced by the policy of glasnost
led to the origin of public involvement into the social and political life, taking
upon the role of the often ineffective state. The degree to which the citizens were
involved in the activity of the NGOs was first of all associated with their quality
of life and it depended on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the idea
of social organizations. The time of Boris Yeltsin presidency was characterized
by two phenomena: a drop in the standard of living accompanied by the
intensification of criminalization within the public life and the positive attitude
towards the introduction of the third sector. After the new president assumed
the post, the approach of the new authority changed in a negative way and
the politics implemented led to gaining full control over public associations.
The so-called liberalization of the law in respect to the third sector was only
a display of Kremlin’s political will and did not signify serious treatment of the
principles of the democratic and civic society. The third sector, one of the pillars
supporting the civil society is at present in the state of consolidation, dealing
with numerous amendments of legal norms. After the period of mimicking
western solutions, the Russian NGOs became a power that must be taken into
account by the Russian decision-makers.
In the spring of 2017 there was a sharp growth of protest activity of the population in Russsia, which became the larest outbreak of civic activity after the "swamp" rallies in 2011-2012. This study is an analysis of the features of a new wave of Russian protest and potential in terms of impact on the political system in the country.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?Russian Council
There are more issues that divide Russia and the EU than that unite them. Although both sides support the fundamentals of the current world-order (especially when confronted with a challenge like IS), Russia believes that the current arrangement does not grant equality and is asymmetrically patterned after the West. While civil societies on both sides believe that sanctions should be ended and relations strengthened, and while both have incurred losses as a result of restrictive measures, they diverge on the conditions of relaunching economic relations, on the feasibility of technical cooperation in the absence of political convergence, and on what EU – Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) cooperation could look like. While the EU and Russia feel the need to cooperate on a settlement in Ukraine, on stabilisation in the Middle East, on the fi ght against terrorism, they diverge over what should be done, over whether human rights / democracy or security / stability should prevail, and over how international organisations should be used.
In this context two parallel tracks should be promoted. The fi rst one is ad hoc cooperation on burning common threats (the settlement in Ukraine and the fi ght against IS and terrorism), or economic issues of immediate mutual benefi t (aviation, the space, medicine, and gas). Various international fora as well as bilateral EU-Russia arrangements should be open for this cooperation. At the same time, sustainable long-term cooperation depends on conceptual discussions over the future set-up, which would guarantee that the preferences of both sides are taken into consideration and neither feels discriminated or betrayed. Mutual understanding is essential for these discussions, it can be cultivated through wider civil society dialogue, more balanced media coverage, the preservation of existing economic links and expert discussions. Only this conceptual settlement will reverse the current ‘divide-unite’ split in favour of more unity.
In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
The paper presents the contemporary information policy implemented by
the Ukrainian government. The survey answers the question about the new role of information policy in the state authorities’ activities. The research focuses on the executive branch of power, due to its impact on the internal and external image of Ukraine.
The analysis was conducted at the strategic, institutional and operational levels, and
concerned the content of messages.
Direct democratic choices have been of great importance in Central and
Eastern European countries since they have marked the key steps on those states’
paths to democracy. Direct democracy – particularly referenda – is arousing increasing interest among politicians and the electorate, which is manifested in the ongoing
public debate on the role of civil participation in decision-making processes, as well
as in the increase in the number of national referenda held in Europe and worldwide.
Hence, studies on referenda in Central and Eastern Europe seem to be a very interesting and academically important task worthy of further exploration. The main research
aim of this paper is to answer the question of the role of nationwide referenda in the
political practice of Central and Eastern European states, as well as the question of
the future prospects for the use of referenda. More emphasis is placed on referenda
conducted after 1989. On the basis of these research results, referenda are divided
into three categories: independence referenda, so called “deepening” referenda and
accession referenda.
The author analyzes how the concept of “traditional values” is used in the political discourse
of the Russian authorities. Since the third term of Vladimir Putin, there has been a noticeable
neo-conservative turn in Russian politics, expressed both in the strengthening of the influence
of religion and in the tightening of legislation. An active role in this is played by the leadership
of the Russian Orthodox Church, which openly supports the current regime and strengthens
its own influence on public life, regardless of the absence of direct religious demands of Russian society. The concept of “traditional values” is thus politically motivated, interpreted as an
opposition to liberal values (an example is the homophobic policy of the Russian authorities)
and is aimed at contrasting Russian values with Western ones. The author describes how this
discourse is aimed, principally, at consolidating the conservative electorate within the country
and spreading Russian influence on “conservatives” from other countries. This reflects the need
to search for effective ways to counter populist rhetoric.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Overcoming Barriers: Media in Covering Conflict-Sensitive IssuesDonbassFullAccess
The Special Reports is prepared by within “Supporting Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Ukraine” project under financial support of Embassy of Great Britain in Ukraine. Opinions reflected in the Report may not correlate with those of the Government of Great Britain or OSCE PCU.
The Special Report consists of:
the Report on the results of monitoring of TV content in November 2015 due to conflict sensitivity;
the Report on the results of research among the journalists in February-March 2016 that clarifies the roots and causes of the detected problems;
the review of the international practices of involvement of media into reconciliation in the societies, and recommendations regarding their possible implementation (adaptation) in Ukraine. For journalists, editors, representatives of educational establishments and technical assistance projects, media experts and other persons searching for the better solutions to increase the role of Ukrainian media in reconciliation and challenge the social barriers caused by the military conflict.
This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions between American, Russian, and European
experts funded by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
The Atlantic Council is grateful for the leadership of the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Minister Igor Ivanov,
who led the team in an effort to keep the dialogue open and frank at a challenging time for European
security, as 2014 events in Ukraine unravelled the post-Cold War security order. The Council wishes to
acknowledge the contributions of American experts: Walter Slocombe, Hans Binnendijk, Paul Fritch, and
those who have wished to remain unnamed, as well as the European experts: Lukasz Kulesa, Markus Kaim,
and Paal Hilde, who worked under the leadership of Ian Kearns and the European Leadership Network
(ELN). The Council also thanks the group of Russian experts: Andrey Kortunov, Andrei Zagorski, and Irina
Busygina, who worked under the leadership of the Russian International Affairs Council to contribute
the Russian perspective; and, fially, the Director and coordinator of the project, Isabelle François, for the
diffiult task of bringing diverging views together into one fial publication.
The Atlantic Council offered a platform to keep channels of communication open and for different
views to be expressed. Not surprisingly, in the months that followed events in Ukraine, it proved
impossible to narrow the differences and develop a common, action-oriented approach to the challenge
of rebuilding the European security order. We aimed instead for a necessary fist step of listening to each
other and reflcting on the signifiant differences in the Western and Russian approaches. Our debates
focused on a possible way forward by gaining clarity on the interests at stake, from the US, European,
and Russian perspectives, in order to better defie whether and where common interests may still lie
and how best to advance them. The need for managing our differences in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis
will continue to require signifiant efforts on the part of decision-makers, experts, offiials, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, and will likely take time and strategic patience.
We hope that this report will contribute to a better understanding and appreciation for the differences
in terms of the respective US, European, and Russian positions, in order to better prepare, when the time
comes, for bridging the gap and bring back stability, security, and prosperity to the whole of Europe.
This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions that took place between the summer of 2013 and the winter of 2014-2015, and between American, Russian, and European experts. The teams were led by Ellen Tauscher, the Vice Chair of the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security and the former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and Igor Ivanov, the president of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and former Foreign Minister of Russia, in an effort to keep the dialogue open and frank at a challenging time for European security. Not surprisingly, as events in Ukraine unravelled the post-Cold War security order, it proved impossible to narrow the differences and develop a common, action-oriented approach to the challenge of rebuilding the European security order. The report, a project of the Atlantic Council, the European Leadership Network (ELN), and RIAC is focused instead on the necessary first step of listening to each other and reflecting on the significant differences in the Western and Russian approaches. Discussions focused on gaining clarity on the interests at stake, from the US, European, and Russian perspectives, in order to better define whether and where common interests may still lie and how best to advance them. The report clearly points to the fact that managing the differences in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis will continue to require significant efforts on the part of decision-makers, experts, officials, international organizations, and will take time and strategic patience.
The enlargement of the EU to include the ten new member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the two Mediterranean islands on 1 May 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 was the result of a tremendous effort to reconfigure not only the frontiers of Europe, but also the concept of what Europe is. Enlargements in 2004 and 2007 did not end the debate about where Europe begins and ends, however. Rather it fuelled the discussion, as neighbouring countries continue to express interest in joining the EU. At the moment it seems that enlargement will continue in the short term to include the remaining Balkan states and Turkey. This process is expected to continue well into the second decade of this millennium. But what then? The borders of the EU have been highly unstable since its inception. The possibility, desirability or inevitability of enlargement has become part of the discourse of the EU. Certain practical and institutional problems, however, are increasingly apparent. Physically can the EU institutions cope with endless enlargement? Psychologically can we cope with a ‘Europe’ that is not constrained by any physically finite framework? Theoretically, is it possible to incorporate the inherently unstable into a constitutional framework?
Authored by: Elspeth Guild, Viktoriya Khasson, Miriam Mir
Published in 2007
In recent years, the EU has assumed a greater role in dealing with security concerns
within the EU. In response to nation states’ decreasing capabilities to deal effectively
with problems at the national level, domestic policy fields such as asylum and migration
have been at least partially transferred to supranational responsibility (Scharpf, 2003;
Zürn, 2000). One of the issues that receives increasing attention at the supranational
level is irregular migration. Every year, an estimated 30 million people cross an
international border irregularly, of which, according to Europol, between 400,000 and
500,000 enter the EU. The stock of irregular residents in the EU is currently estimated
to be around three million (Council of Europe, 2003). In recent years, EU members
have come to the conclusion that they are no longer able to properly react to the
phenomenon of irregular migration on the domestic level and instead need to combine
their efforts regarding return policies on the European level. Measures against irregular
immigration thus became a focal point in the EU’s efforts to establish an ‘area of
freedom, security and justice’.
At the same time, the EU’s role in the outside world has changed. With the Eastern
enlargement, new regions and countries became neighbours of the EU. New
frameworks of cooperation, such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were set in motion to closely affiliate
neighbouring states with the EU (Emerson, 2005; Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005;
Emerson et al., 2007; Landaburu, 2006; Tassinari, 2006). The EU tried to assume a
greater responsibility in the stabilisation of the neighbourhood and sought to “promote a
ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders
of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”
(European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 8). A major challenge in the EU’s efforts to
stabilise the neighbourhood was to find a proper balance with the internal security
concerns. Whereas the EU’s foreign and security policy was interested in advancing
regional integration and good neighbourly relations, the EU justice and home affairs
ministers were primarily guided by their interest in keeping problems out and the
external border closed.
This paper is concerned with an EU foreign policy instrument that is a case in point for
this struggle: EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. These agreements aim
at fostering good neighbourly relations by easing the tight visa regime with
neighbouring countries in order to externalise a restrictive migration policy. By
elaborating on the EU’s strategy on visa facilitation and readmission, this paper aims at
offering a first systematic analysis of the objective, substance, and political implications
of these agreements. When was the link between visa facilitation and readmission
made? What are the target
Labor migration from Eastern Europe and the member countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the Western countries became an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the nature of border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very complex and unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the region specific actors, practices and policies of migration in the Eastern countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of the future migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the complexities of labor migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.
Authored by: Xavier Chojnicki, Ainura Uzagalieva
Published in 2008
Labor migration from Eastern Europe and the member countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the Western countries became an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the nature of border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very complex and unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the region specific actors, practices and policies of migration in the Eastern countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of the future migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the complexities of labor migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.
Authored by: Xavier Chojnicki, Ainura Uzagalieva
Published in 2008
The appeal is created by representatives of civil society, scientific and cultural communities in Ukraine and in EU countries.
To gain Ukraine as a candidate would be to rejuvenate the entire EU project.
The paper discusses the issues of identity and collective memory in the
process of Europeanization. These issues have long been the subject of lively debates
among scholars and politicians because for the integration process to succeed it is
necessary to construct a European identity and collective memory which are indispensable in order to legitimize this process. The paper presents considerations pertaining
to the definition and scope of such notions as Europeanization, European identity
and collective memory and seeks to answer the question whether it is conceivable to
develop a European identity and collective memory of EU citizens. The author concludes by saying that despite the European Union’s long-lasting efforts, it has failed
to form a collective European identity even though certain types of this identity have
found expression through EU institutions and community laws. Collective memory
formation is a difficult task since collective memory is divided as it is a confluence
of different perspectives and versions. A shared or dialogical memory is what the Old
Continent may hope to develop: an agreed memory which transcends respective national horizons. Both European identity and collective memory are still being forged.
Their formation is a complex process that has to be designed from scratch. It is a deliberate and planned process focused on maintaining peace and generating prosperity
by enhancing economy.
Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation - Final Version - 5.23...John Andrews
SlideShare Description for "Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation"
Title: Chatty Kathy: Enhancing Physical Activity Among Older Adults
Description:
Discover how Chatty Kathy, an innovative project developed at the UNC Bootcamp, aims to tackle the challenge of low physical activity among older adults. Our AI-driven solution uses peer interaction to boost and sustain exercise levels, significantly improving health outcomes. This presentation covers our problem statement, the rationale behind Chatty Kathy, synthetic data and persona creation, model performance metrics, a visual demonstration of the project, and potential future developments. Join us for an insightful Q&A session to explore the potential of this groundbreaking project.
Project Team: Jay Requarth, Jana Avery, John Andrews, Dr. Dick Davis II, Nee Buntoum, Nam Yeongjin & Mat Nicholas
Levelwise PageRank with Loop-Based Dead End Handling Strategy : SHORT REPORT ...Subhajit Sahu
Abstract — Levelwise PageRank is an alternative method of PageRank computation which decomposes the input graph into a directed acyclic block-graph of strongly connected components, and processes them in topological order, one level at a time. This enables calculation for ranks in a distributed fashion without per-iteration communication, unlike the standard method where all vertices are processed in each iteration. It however comes with a precondition of the absence of dead ends in the input graph. Here, the native non-distributed performance of Levelwise PageRank was compared against Monolithic PageRank on a CPU as well as a GPU. To ensure a fair comparison, Monolithic PageRank was also performed on a graph where vertices were split by components. Results indicate that Levelwise PageRank is about as fast as Monolithic PageRank on the CPU, but quite a bit slower on the GPU. Slowdown on the GPU is likely caused by a large submission of small workloads, and expected to be non-issue when the computation is performed on massive graphs.
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
Opendatabay - Open Data Marketplace.pptxOpendatabay
Opendatabay.com unlocks the power of data for everyone. Open Data Marketplace fosters a collaborative hub for data enthusiasts to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets.
First ever open hub for data enthusiasts to collaborate and innovate. A platform to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets. Through robust quality control and innovative technologies like blockchain verification, opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of datasets, empowering users to make data-driven decisions with confidence. Leverage cutting-edge AI technologies to enhance the data exploration, analysis, and discovery experience.
From intelligent search and recommendations to automated data productisation and quotation, Opendatabay AI-driven features streamline the data workflow. Finding the data you need shouldn't be a complex. Opendatabay simplifies the data acquisition process with an intuitive interface and robust search tools. Effortlessly explore, discover, and access the data you need, allowing you to focus on extracting valuable insights. Opendatabay breaks new ground with a dedicated, AI-generated, synthetic datasets.
Leverage these privacy-preserving datasets for training and testing AI models without compromising sensitive information. Opendatabay prioritizes transparency by providing detailed metadata, provenance information, and usage guidelines for each dataset, ensuring users have a comprehensive understanding of the data they're working with. By leveraging a powerful combination of distributed ledger technology and rigorous third-party audits Opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of every dataset. Security is at the core of Opendatabay. Marketplace implements stringent security measures, including encryption, access controls, and regular vulnerability assessments, to safeguard your data and protect your privacy.
1. STUDY
MATTHES BUHBE (ED.)
September 2017
How Ukrainians Perceive
European Values
Main Results of an Empirical Survey
Ukraine’s »Revolution of Dignity« led to a pro-European government. In this context,
Europe is viewed not only as a geographic area, but above all as a value space.
Both supporters of Ukraine’s European integration and many of its opponents be-
lieve that European values serve as a foundation for a successful society. However,
»Euro-sceptics« consider it impossible to build a Ukrainian society on the same foun-
dation.
Ukrainians in the east are more inclined to believe that European values shared by
Ukrainians should be »implemented from the outside« and »installed by the state«.
Respondents in the west believe that they should be practised by each citizen and
the state alike.
»Euro-optimists« often have a more coherent and consistent view of European val-
ues, whilst Euro-sceptics tend to have a more fragmented perception of these values.
The majority of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should integrate into Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Nonetheless, there is a rising attitude that Ukraine should be neither a
member of the European Union nor of the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia.
Gaining knowledge about European values is not a systemic process. Ukrainian TV
and social media dominate, and talks with relatives and friends are also important.
The respondents probably underestimate the issue of manipulation through Russian
media.
n
n
n
n
n
n
3. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
2
Why an Inquiry into
European Values 2017?
During winter 2013–2014 a second Maidan uprising
took place, which Ukrainians call the »Revolution of Dig-
nity«. The »European Choice« was seen as an irrevers-
ible political decision supported by the majority of the
Ukrainian citizens. In this context, Europe is viewed not
only as a geographic area, but above all as a value space.
In June 2017, the pro-European government finally
achieved visa-free travel to Europe’s Schengen Area. At
the same time, Ukrainian society’s value choice has al-
ways been accompanied by heated debates inside the
country. Ukrainians’ ideas about European values often
comprise stereotypes and erroneous beliefs rooted in
propaganda, manipulation by political forces, or other
external factors.
So, what do Ukrainians believe about European values?
Do they share the basic principles of the European insti-
tutions? What is the relationship between region or age
to views on European values? Is a person’s idea of Euro-
pean values linked to the type of international relations
this person supports? What are the sources that shape
Ukrainians’ ideas about European values? Has there
been an increase or decrease in supporting the Europe-
an Choice in the last three years?
To answer these and other questions, the Gorshenin In-
stitute – in partnership with the Kyiv Office of the Frie-
drich-Ebert-Stiftung – conducted a nationwide opinion
poll during spring 2017. The main results are presented
in this paper. A more complete Ukrainian version is also
available.
Methodology
In April 2017, Ukrainians aged 18–65 were invited to
participate in six focus groups. Each group consisted
equally of men and women. Two groups – those in fa-
vour of European integration and those opposing it –
were invited in each of the three cities: Kyiv, Lviv, and
Dnipro. The results were used in the development of a
questionnaire for the nationwide Ukrainian poll.
From May 26 to June 6, 2,000 respondents aged 18–65
were interviewed by quotas in all regions of Ukraine ex-
cept the occupied territories – the Crimean, Donetsk,
and Luhansk oblasts. A macro-region quota was first de-
veloped based on state statistics (Central, Eastern, West-
ern, Southern, Northern), then on administrative units,
and in the last stage on villages. The quota also took into
account the gender and age of the respondents. The
error of representativeness of the study does not exceed
+/– 2.2 per cent.
During the analysis of the survey results, the surveyors
conducted a cluster analysis. Two clusters were obtained
with »Euro-optimists« and »Euro-sceptics«. Some of the
data from this analysis can be found in the annex.
Main Findings
The survey, which was prepared with focus group dis-
cussions and carried out with 2,000 face-to-face inter-
views, shows that Ukrainian citizens who have positive
attitudes towards European integration are more likely
to have more coherent and consistent ideas about Euro-
pean values than those who are sceptical about Europe-
an integration.
The latter are more inclined to fragment values and fo-
cus on those aspects that cause controversy in Ukrainian
society. A typical example is equating support for human
rights with the view that values such as tolerance for
other cultures and social minorities, and the protection
of convicts’ rights are not inherent in Ukrainian society.
At the same time, there is a significant share of respon-
dents in both groups who focus mainly on personal
well-being. Consequently, they selectively choose values
from opposite national development models – e. g. a pa-
ternalistic (state-led) model or one aimed at developing
an independent personality (liberal model) – depending
on which ones seems to offer more beneficial outcomes.
Both supporters of Ukraine’s European integration (Eu-
ro-optimists) and many of its opponents (Euro-sceptics)
believe that European values serve as a foundation for
a successful society, and thus perceive them as wor-
thy guiding principles. However, Euro-sceptics consider
it impossible to build a Ukrainian society on the same
foundation and do not believe that these principles
could be applied in their country. Typically, they claim
that it is impossible to overcome corruption and nepo-
tism, or to have a tolerant attitude towards homosexual
4. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
3
marriages in Ukraine. They believe that in the face of
high poverty, corruption in the central and local author-
ities, and the disappointing results of the Revolution of
Dignity, Ukraine has acquired an imitation democracy
that is ill-suited for Ukrainian society.
In general, integration with the European Union (EU)
is supported by an absolute majority (51.6 per cent). In
view of former studies, however, it is noteworthy that
the share of people who do not want their country to
integrate – either with the EU or the Eurasian Econom-
ic Union (EAEU) – has increased from 7.2 per cent in
2014 to 25.4 per cent in 2017. The respective surveys
show that the largest number of such respondents live
in Southern Ukraine (33.9 per cent). In addition, roughly
30 per cent of those surveyed in the Central, Northern,
and Eastern Ukraine gave the same answer. Possible ex-
planations include the following:
(i) the inability of political leaders – both those who
share Western-oriented views as well as those who
support Ukraine’s eastern integration – to overcome
social and economic misery;
(ii) the belief that the question of close integration with
Europe (EU) or Russia (EAEU) splits the country and
increases hostility;
(iii) disappointment with the EU’s reaction to Ukraine’s
European Choice, including delays in the ratification
of the association agreement and granting of vi-
sa-free travel – which was actually granted after this
survey was completed on 11 June 2017 – and the re-
fusal to voice EU membership prospects for Ukraine
(the spread of sentiments such as »we are not want-
ed in Europe« is successfully used by Russian media);
(iv) rejection of European values that presume the aban-
donment of extreme nationalist views (no entry into
EU with Ukraine’s national hero Bandera);
(v) conflict with nationalist groups of neighbouring EU
member states – such as Hungary or Poland – as well
as increased distance to Russia’s ongoing aggression
and propaganda (русский мир).
Four hypotheses were put forward during the course
of forming the focus groups and shaping the question-
naire. In particular, Hypothesis No. 1 states that Ukrai-
nians’ ideas about European values are fragmentary and
contradictory, although Ukrainians largely share the ba-
sic values of European institutions. This hypothesis has
been fully confirmed.
Focus group participants and face-to-face respondents
said that Europeans share values that serve as the basis
for the well-being of European residents. Both support-
ers and opponents of European integration as a whole
share European values – such as freedom of religion,
the rule of law, democracy, personal freedom, peace,
human rights, equality, self-realization, solidarity, toler-
ance, and the value of human life. There were no cases
in which researchers encountered respondents who re-
jected these values.
At the same time, there is a somewhat paternalistic
attitude towards these values in Central and especially
Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The respondents often
claimed that it is the government that must ensure hu-
man rights, everyone’s equality before the law, possibili-
ties for self-realization, etc. Thus, respondents in Eastern
Ukraine are more inclined to believe that values shared
by EU-Europeans and most Ukrainians should be »imple-
mented from the outside« and »installed by the state«.
Respondents in Western Ukraine have a more complete
picture of the values shared by the EU-Europeans and
believe that they should be taken seriously and practised
by citizens and the state alike.
Hence, the majority of respondents from Southern and
Eastern Ukraine have a distorted perception of values,
which makes them believe that democracy and tol-
erance are more applicable to EU-Europeans than to
Ukrainians. Although these people do not personal-
ly reject tolerance or the rule of law, they believe that
EU-Europeans consider these values more important
than Ukrainians.
Opponents of European integration believe that the EU
is wiping out national peculiarities of its member states,
thus fulfilling the total unification of socio-political, eco-
nomic, and national aspects of life. According to these
respondents, the dominance of a single set of European
values will not be adopted in Ukraine, where there are
strong nationalist currents and traditions.
Thus, it follows that if a person has a controversial per-
ception of European values, there are opportunities for
5. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
4
manipulation. According to previous studies by Gorsh-
enin Institute, residents of Eastern and Southern Ukraine
are more vulnerable to political populism, which in fact
has a manipulative base.
Hypothesis No. 2, which states that Ukrainians’ ideas
about European values depend on the region of res-
idence and age, has also been confirmed. European
values are most significant to respondents in Western
Ukraine. Those in Eastern and Southern Ukraine men-
tion these values less often, with a smaller set of such
values. Instead, there is an increased inclination to-
wards paternalism and nostalgia for the certainty and
benefits that existed in the Soviet Union. Apart from
twentieth-century history – Western Ukraine became
part of the Soviet Union two decades later than its
eastern territories – this difference may also be due to
the type of employment: there are much larger enter-
prises in industry, mining, and agriculture in Eastern
Ukraine and they used to ensure the existence of en-
tire population centres. This creates the feeling that
a person’s well-being depends on external factors.
The share of self-employed citizens and small entre-
preneurs who rely more on themselves than on the
government or owners of enterprises is still relatively
small.
According to Hypothesis No. 3, the perception of
European values is linked to whether or not a person
supports Ukraine’s European integration. This hypothe-
sis has been partially confirmed. On the one hand, as
noted previously, Euro-optimists often have a more co-
herent and consistent view of European values, while Eu-
ro-sceptics tend to have a more fragmented perception
of these values. On the other hand, a significant number
of Euro-sceptics recognize the civilizing role of Europe-
an values and their positive contribution to building a
successful state. In addition, both Euro-optimists and
Euro-sceptics largely share these values, as long as they
ensure prosperity and comfortable existence as quickly
as possible. With regard to many phenomena, this »op-
portunist« attitude does not require a significant change
in world or traditional views.
Finally, Hypothesis No. 4 states that the process used
by Ukrainians to gain knowledge about European values
is not systemic. Although the hypothesis has been con-
firmed, additional studies may be required for further
qualitative verification.
According to survey respondents, perceptions of Euro-
pean values are formed through social networks, per-
sonal experience, the experiences of relatives and friends
when travelling to EU countries, as well as from tradi-
tional media, such as newspapers, radio, and television.
The researchers did not find any sources of information
that systematically and in a first-hand manner shape be-
liefs about how people in the EU live and what values
they hold. Many Ukrainian citizens form their own no-
tions about the EU indirectly – e. g. through the prism
of Russian media or Russian social networking websites.
This reality opens up wide opportunities for manipula-
tion of individuals with unstable and controversial ideas
about European values. In any case, it remains to be
seen which information channels are opened to Ukrai-
nians with visa-free travel and what benefits Ukrainians
receive from the association agreement with the EU.
Some Values of Ukrainian Society
with Relevance to European Values
How do Ukrainians see their national identity, their level
of tolerance, or their ecological culture? Which geopolit-
ical choices do Ukrainians favour? What role do Europe-
an values play in Ukraine’s value system?
Nine out of ten respondents (92.6 per cent) consider
themselves Ukrainians, one in 20 (5.5 per cent) consider
themselves Russian (see Chart 1). This marks a consider-
able increase in Ukrainian national identity: during the
2001 census, 77.8 per cent of Ukrainian citizens identi-
fied themselves as Ukrainians and 17.3 per cent as Rus-
sians.
In the Western region, Ukrainian national identity is de-
clared by 98.3 per cent, in the Northern region 94.8 per
cent, in the Central region 94.2 per cent, in the Southern
region 87.5 per cent, and in the Eastern region 84.6 per
cent. The younger the respondents, the more like they
are to identify themselves as Ukrainians.
More than half of respondents declaring Russian nation-
ality speak of themselves as citizens of Ukraine (55 per
cent). Almost a quarter of them identified themselves as
citizens of the former USSR (24.8 per cent); they live pri-
marily in Eastern Ukraine (12 per cent of the inhabitants
of the region) and are 60 years of age and older (10.5
per cent of the representatives of this age group).
6. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
5
Chart 1: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»Which nationality do you consider yourself to be?«
Chart 2: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»What language do you primarily speak at home?«
92,6%
5,5%
1,7% 0,3%
Ukrainian
Russian
Other
Refused to answer
60,4%
37,8%
1,6% 0,2%
Ukrainian
Russian
Other
Refused to answer
7. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
6
60.4 per cent of Ukrainians said that they primarily commu-
nicate in Ukrainian at home, while 37.8 per cent speak Rus-
sian, and 1.6 per cent other languages (see Chart 2). How-
ever, the fact that the inhabitants of the occupied territories
in the east did not participate in the study, might have a sig-
nificant impact on this indicator. In Eastern Ukraine, three
out of four speak Russian at home (see Table 1).
The majority of Ukrainians (51.6 per cent) believe that
Ukraine should integrate into the EU, whilst 10.2 per
cent favour close cooperation with the Customs Union
of the EAEU. At the same time, 25.4 per cent of respon-
dents opposed integration with the EU and the EAEU
and 12.8 per cent failed to answer the question (see
Chart 3).
Table 1: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»What language do you primarily speak at home?« (based on region of residence)
Region
Northern Central Eastern Western Southern
Ukrainian 51.1 % 87.4 % 23.4 % 96.5 % 25.8 %
Russian 43.7 % 12.2 % 74.7 % 3.1 % 73.4 %
Other 4.5 % 0.3 % 1.8 % 0.3 % 0.8 %
Refused to answer 0.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Note: 100 % in column
Chart 3: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»Which direction of integration should Ukraine choose?«
51,6%
10,2%
25,4%
12,8%
European Union
Customs Union (Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic
and Armenia
Neither EU nor CU
Difficult to answer
8. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
7
Whilst in Western Ukraine, the course of rapprochement
with the EU is supported by the vast majority of respon-
dents (77.9 per cent), in Northern Ukraine the figure is
50.5 per cent and in other regions between 33 and 38
per cent. However, as illustrated in Chart 4, according
to data collected by the Gorshenin Institute for almost
ten years, in recent years more Ukrainians have been op-
posed to any integration. This is obvious with regard to
Russia, even before 2014. At the same time, during the
reporting period, the number of EU supporters signifi-
cantly increased from 28.4 per cent to 51.6 per cent,
but also dropped from its peak in 2014 (63.6 per cent).
Since then, the overall number of those who oppose any
foreign policy integration processes has increased from
7.2 to 25.4 per cent.
A somewhat geopolitical question is NATO membership.
Chart 5 illustrates how Ukrainians would vote in a mem-
bership referendum: 46.1 per cent of Ukrainians would
vote for Ukraine’s accession to NATO and 33.4 per cent
would vote against; 14.1 per cent of the respondents
found it difficult to answer, others would not vote in
such a referendum (6.4 per cent). Looking at the data
by regions, the vast majority of the inhabitants of the
Western region (76.5 per cent) favour Ukraine’s acces-
sion to NATO, while 60.5 per cent of the residents in the
Southern region oppose it. To a lesser extent, Eastern
Ukraine also opposes NATO membership, whilst North-
ern Ukraine tends to favour it.
Comparing the results of the research conducted by the
Gorshenin Institute for almost ten years on Ukraine’s ac-
cession to NATO, Chart 6 shows that this indicator has
not changed significantly over the past three years. The
enormous rise in support for NATO membership took
place until 2014 and has dropped slightly since then.
All of the focus groups conducted began with a discus-
sion of the value benchmarks of the discussion partici-
pants. Taking first place in the value system of Ukrainians
are the values of personal well-being, such as health,
success, prosperity, happy family, lack of stress, while
intellectual and personal development are less import-
ant. Paternalistic values took second place and include
Chart 4: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»Which direction of integration should Ukraine choose?« (dynamics for 2008–2017)
* Except for the occupied territories of the Crimean, Sevastopol, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.
28,4%
41,6%
47,2%
59,7%
63,6%
62,2%
55,2%
51,6%
54,2%
34,7%
32,4%
18,8%
13,8% 13,5%
12,7%
10,2%
7,2%
15,0%
11,3%
9,7%
14,6% 14,2%
23,3% 25,4%
10,2%
8,7%
9,1%
11,8%
8,1%
10,1%
8,8%
12,8%
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
30,0%
40,0%
50,0%
60,0%
70,0%
February 2008 May 2013 October 2013 June 2014* October 2014* February 2015* February 2016* June 2017*
European Union Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Neither EU nor Customs Union Difficult to answer
9. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
8
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
30,0%
40,0%
50,0%
60,0%
February 2008 May 2013 June 2014* October 2014* February 2015* February 2016* June 2017*
Difficult to answer Would not vote Against joining NATO For joining NATO
Chart 5: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held today, how would you vote?«
Chart 6: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question: »If a referendum took place in the near
future on Ukraine joining NATO, how would you vote?« (dynamics for 2008–2017)
* Except for the occupied territories of the Crimean, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
46,1%
33,4%
6,4%
14,1%
For accession to NATO
Against accession to NATO
Would not vote
Difficult to answer
10. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
9
qualitative and free education and medicine, decent
pensions, social benefits, job security, prices commensu-
rate with incomes, and stability. And last but not least,
the focus group members mention the values that reg-
ulate coexistence in society, the conditional European
values: the rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech,
honesty / transparency, the desire to provide equal op-
portunities for all citizens, etc.
European values were mentioned in the list of the most
important values mainly in Kyiv and Lviv, whereas in Dni-
pro the two focus groups articulated them less clearly.
In Eastern Ukraine, there is a narrowing of the palette
of the European values mentioned and a less frequent
articulation. Instead, the slope towards paternalism in-
creases, nostalgia for the certainty, and benefits of the
Soviet Union.
The Euro-optimists – the participants of the focus
groups who are adherents of the European integration –
mention European values amongst the most important
in their lives, more often than their opponents. Most of
them associate these values with potential changes in
overcoming corruption and the growth of the economy.
They position European values as the foundation upon
which the welfare of the West grows. At the same time,
the Euro-sceptics – opponents of the European integra-
tion as the main driver of public welfare – emphasize
the socially-oriented state, the high moral and personal
qualities of its citizens.
»Tolerance« was identified as one of the important val-
ues to study. When elaborating questions about the lev-
el of Ukrainian tolerance, the Bogardus social distance
scale was used as a basis for judging how much people
are prepared for different forms of contacts with repre-
sentatives of other social groups.
The data reveal that the highest level of tolerance is
observed in relation to people of another nationality
and those who speak different language – Ukrainians
are mostly willing to perceive representatives of these
groups of people as close friends (see Table 2).
At the same time, the level of tolerance to the LGBT
community is the lowest in Ukrainian society. Two out of
five Ukrainians (39.3 per cent) would not accept sexual
minorities in any way. For comparison, the respondents’
attitudes towards people who have committed criminal
offences are somewhat higher – in particular, 36.9 per
cent said they were ready to accept them as citizens of
their country.
Table 2: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»In what way are you ready to accept a person … as a …?«
Family
member
Close
friend
Neighbour
Colleague
at work
Citizen of
my country
Tourist in
my country
Not in any
capacity
Speaking a different
language
12.9 % 23.0 % 17.9 % 9.4 % 15.4 % 20.6 % 0.9 %
Of a different
nationality
14.3 % 23.6 % 19.6 % 8.3 % 16.2 % 16.7 % 1.3 %
With disabilities 12.0 % 25.1 % 25.1 % 8.3 % 23.5 % 3.2 % 2.8 %
Of a different faith 9.1 % 18.7 % 22.3 % 12.0 % 25.6 % 10.0 % 2.3 %
Of a different race 5.3 % 12.4 % 18.2 % 11.2 % 21.6 % 28.1 % 3.3 %
With HIV-infection 4.8 % 8.5 % 14.5 % 7.8 % 37.0 % 8.1 % 19.2 %
Being a former
criminal convict
5.2 % 4.6 % 9.0 % 5.4 % 36.9 % 8.1 % 30.8 %
Of a sexual minority 2.8 % 3.8 % 7.7 % 6.8 % 27.4 % 12.2 % 39.3 %
Note: 100 % in row.
11. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
10
Another important value is connected to »environmen-
tal concerns«. All members of the focus groups agreed
on the importance of this issue. At the same time, they
admitted that Ukrainians in general still do not show suf-
ficient levels of concern about the environment. More-
over, almost all participants in the discussion on the
willingness to contribute to the care of the environment
shifted the conversation from their own activity to the
obligations of the state or the younger generation.
In addition, respondents admitted that environmental
issues fade into the background when there is a financial
benefit. In Ukraine, there is still uncontrolled deforesta-
tion, poaching, contamination of rivers through industri-
al production, as well as deterioration of forests through
illegal mining of amber; moreover, the problem of recy-
cling has not yet been solved.
At the same time, as illustrated in Chart 7, more than
half of respondents (52.1 per cent) said that as a fac-
tor of economic growth, industrial development cannot
prevail over concern for the environment (rather or defi-
nitely not). Nevertheless, almost a third of respondents
expressed the opposite opinion: 9.5 per cent believe that
as a factor of economic growth, industrial development
definitely can prevail over concern for the environment,
while another 22.5 per cent admitted that it »probably
can«. The regional spread is remarkable. While 68 per
cent of respondents in the Central Ukraine think that
industrial development cannot prevail, the majority of
respondents (50.8 per cent) in the Southern Ukraine
admit that as a factor of economic growth, industrial
development can prevail over environmental care.
How Ukrainians Perceive European
Values (Qualitative Measurement)
Turning to the focus group discussions, survey respon-
dents consider European values to be the quintessence
of the European way of life. Often, the centre of this
category is respect for the law and human rights. How-
ever, at almost every group discussion, it was also men-
tioned that the main values of Europe are the wealth
Chart 7: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question: »Do you think industrial development
can prevail over environmental concerns as a factor in economic growth?«
9,5%
22,5%
25,8%
26,3%
15,8%
Definitely yes
Rather yes
Rather no
Definitely no
Difficult to answer
12. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
11
and well-being of the local population, stability, and lack
of economic upheaval.
European values are quite attractive to Ukrainians and
the need for their implementation finds unanimous sup-
port – both among supporters as well as opponents of
joining the EU. The most cherished value is the »rule
of law«; it was spontaneously mentioned in all of the
groups. Interpretation of this term is very broad. In this
context, focus group participants often talked about Eu-
ropeans’ respect for the law. Another important aspect
of this value is equality before the law, which primarily
refers to the inevitability of punishment for offences, re-
gardless of position, social class, or wealth.
At the same time, all focus group members said that
the path to implementation of these values will be
long, because they believe that there are no fair courts
in Ukraine; corruption is widespread and has covered
virtually all spheres of life; the legislative system is ex-
tremely imperfect; and citizens neither respect nor fear
of the law. A good illustration of the last point is the
widespread bribery of law enforcement officers in the
case of traffic violations; these incidents are so routine
that they are not even considered to be a crime in the
public consciousness. Moreover, from the results of the
groups it can be assumed that the lack of rule of law
in Ukraine is due not only to the will of the elites – for
whom it is advantageous to maintain manual control of
the system – but also to the unwillingness of citizens to
restrict their freedom for the sake of law.
Next, in the associative series of European values, »hu-
man rights« appear. Here, most often the focus group
participants mention the rights of children – specifically,
banning physical and mental violence against them. In-
terestingly, the high degree of protection of children’s
rights in Europe has a mixed perception. On the one
hand, everyone maintains the importance of observing
these rights; on the other hand, there is no agreement on
the extent to which it should take place. European juve-
nile justice system and its rules are perceived very critical-
ly by Ukrainians, because its powers are considered ex-
cessive. In Dnipro, for example, a debate rose regarding
the lawfulness of using corporal punishment for children.
Closely associated with European values and the issue of
human rights are women’s rights. Women in Europe are
believed to be more protected from domestic violence,
property discrimination, and sexual harassment. It is also
believed that the rights of people with disabilities are not
protected in Ukraine up to European standards. When
the focus groups were asked to pay attention to the
rights of imprisoned persons – decent retention in plac-
es of detention and access to the justice system – they
were mostly not inclined to demand observance of these
rights. By illustrating the value of human rights, respon-
dents also mentioned the right to demonstrate, the right
to decent pay, as well as the right to health and pensions.
The focus group participants consider the third pillar of
European society to be democracy. Quite often, they as-
sociate democracy with freedom of speech and the right
to protest. In Lviv, they mentioned the activity of public
associations/organizations in defending the rights and
interests of certain groups of citizens.
The perception of democracy in Ukraine is very ambig-
uous. On the one hand, respondents – even those who
are not adherents of European integration – understand
the importance of a democratic social system. Accord-
ing to the participants of various groups, democratic
elections with the accountability of the authorities and
instruments of influence on the officials contribute to
the reduction of corruption, increase of the efficiency
of the authorities, and, consequently, the growth of the
welfare of the population. On the other hand, people
do not believe in the validity of these principles in the
territory of their own state and point out the collapse
of the democratic system in Ukraine, which has reached
such a level that it is only possible to achieve something
from the authorities through the revolution. Thus, the
participants of all groups theoretically support the intro-
duction of democracy, and are not against building a Eu-
ropean democracy in Ukraine. However, in conditions of
total poverty of the population, corruption in the bodies
of local and state power, disappointment after the last
revolution, there is a certain simulacrum of democracy,
which is ill-suited for Ukrainian society.
In general, the European mindset and values are recog-
nized by the respondents as a worthy ideal for imitation.
In almost all of the groups, participants said that they
are a prerequisite for the normal functioning of society.
»Peace« was also mentioned in all of the groups, which
once again underlines dissatisfaction among Ukrainians
of different regions with basic values and needs, such as
13. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
12
the need for physical security. Given the country’s mili-
tary situation, the value of peace is particularly relevant
and important and requires special attention from the
state and supranational entities.
»Fairness« as a European value was mentioned in more
than half of the groups. Its perception is also extremely
versatile and often includes various forms of “equality”
such as the absence of discrimination based on gender
or race, equality of all before the law, and equal oppor-
tunities for people with disabilities. Fairness does not
stir any criticism. Moreover, the current stratification of
Ukrainian society – in terms of property status, access to
power, and positions – is rather painful for those deriv-
ing their identity from the former USSR, where relative
equality prevailed.
Furthermore, half of the discussion participants noted
that there are no European values that they completely
reject; all of the above are important and acceptable.
At the same time, the other half of the respondents
mentioned »tolerance« as a value that is unacceptable
to them and should not to be respected in Ukrainian
society, because it is alien and contrary to Ukrainians’
traditional values. Respondents noted that in this con-
text Ukrainian citizens are too conservative and unpre-
pared to accept people with less traditional religions,
or to communicate more closely with representatives
of other nationalities or sexual minorities. At the same
time, respondents do not primarily evaluate such a re-
jection as »bad« or »good«, they only state what they
perceive as fact.
Extremely close to tolerance is the value of »respect«
for other cultures, which was spontaneously mentioned
in Lviv and the Dnipro. The EU’s »multiculturalism« –
the peaceful coexistence of representatives of differ-
ent nationalities, cultures, religions, interpenetration of
cultures and mutual support based on universal values,
rather than opposition on a certain basis – was men-
tioned in this context. Despite the general enthusiasm
for the policy of multiculturalism, the group in Kyiv not-
ed its shortcomings in the form of a coming to the brink
of EU terrorism. Similar tendencies are also typical for
the value of »freedom of religion«, which was sponta-
neously mentioned in Lviv and Kyiv. In the opinion of
group members, this refers to tolerance for different re-
ligions, the right to choose a faith and no discrimination
based on religious grounds.
However, Europe is associated not only with the values
that regulate society, but also with completely individu-
alistic ones. Among them is »personal freedom«. It was
spontaneously named in all groups that supported Eu-
ropean integration, as well as its opponents in Lviv. In-
terpretation of this value is very diverse. In essence, ev-
ery person perceives it in his or her own way – ranging
from freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom
to choose a partner (including same-sex), respect for
the personal space of the person, freedom of choice of
the profession, and freedom of movement in the EU. All
of these possibilities include the absence of interference
in your personal environment or the condemnation of
your choice.
Another important European value is »individual self-re-
alization«. Participants in all groups noted that such a
need is not only acceptable but necessary. Respondents
believe that conditions should be created in the state for
its realization. Group members believe that such con-
ditions are absent in Ukraine today and that this is an
extremely important problem, especially for young and
middle-aged people.
Thus, a number of basic European values are perceived
by Ukrainians as a benefit to which one must strive and
which in the long run can have a positive impact on so-
cial trends. Nevertheless, it is characteristic for Ukraini-
ans that while they are inclined to support these values
hypothetically, in their everyday practice they are imple-
mented selectively.
How Ukrainians Perceive European
Values (Quantitative Measurement)
Respondents were asked to indicate which three Euro-
pean values are most important to them personally. At
the same time, they had to answer which of the list of
values, in their personal opinion, are the most important
for Ukrainians and Europeans. The survey used a list of
values, developed within the framework of the »Euroba-
rometer« of the European Commission.
For the respondents themselves, »peace« (56.6 per cent)
and »value of human life« (42.7 per cent) are at the top
of the list. The least valuable for them is »respect for
other cultures« (5.4 per cent), and »tolerance« (9 per
cent) (see Table 3).
14. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
13
An even higher majority of respondents (61.2 per cent)
believe that for Ukrainians as a whole, today the most
important is »peace«, while »respect for human life«
takes second place. This position is quite understand-
able against the background of Russian aggression and
the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation in Donbas.
The respondents’ perception of the European value sys-
tem is quite different. They believe that »democracy«
(34.7 per cent), »the rule of law« (28.9 per cent), and
»human rights« (28.1 per cent) are the top priorities for
Europeans; least important for Europeans, in their opin-
ion, is »solidarity, support for others« (8.1 per cent).
At the same time, the annual survey within the frame-
work of the »Eurobarometer« project suggests that the
Europeans themselves attribute »peace« to their core
values (2014, 44 per cent; 2015, 45 per cent), followed
by »human rights« (2014–2015, 40 per cent), and »re-
spect for human life« (2014, 34 per cent; 2015, 35 per
cent). Europeans do not place »solidarity/support for
neighbours« at the lower end of the list, but »religion«
(2014, 6 per cent; 2015, 5 per cent) and »self-realiza-
tion« (2014–2015, 9 per cent).
The war in Eastern Ukraine seems to distort the percep-
tion of values. Apart from »peace« and »value of human
life«, »democracy« (27.4 per cent) and »human rights«
(23.2 per cent) are most important for Ukrainians. To-
gether with the »rule of law«, these are the top values
that Ukrainians associate with Europeans.
The next block of questions was constructed using a
comparative approach to European and Ukrainian quali-
ties. The vast majority of respondents agreed that com-
pared with Ukrainians, Europeans are more caring about
the environment: 82.6 per cent answered this question
affirmatively (see Table 4). Europeans are seen to be more
inclined to maintain order in public places (81.3 per cent);
more concerned about vulnerable categories of citizens
(79.6 per cent); law-abiding (75.4 per cent); care more
about animals (74.8 per cent); more inclined to plan their
Table 3: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question: »Please indicate which of the following
values are the most important values for …?« (respondents could specify no more than three answers)
Most important values are … (%) Personal View Ukrainians Europeans
Peace 56.6 61.2 22.4
Respect for human life 42.7 29.2 19.4
Human rights 33.3 23.2 28.1
Individual freedom 28.2 19.2 19.4
Self-realization 20.8 12.3 12.3
Solidarity (support for others) 16.1 16.4 8.1
Democracy 14.5 27.4 34.7
Equality 13.1 12.4 11.0
Rule of law 11.7 18.2 28.9
Freedom of religion 10.6 10.7 11.6
Tolerance 9.0 10.2 13.3
Respect for other cultures 5.4 6.2 11.8
None of the above 1.1 0.9 1.0
Difficult to say 3.2 6.5 15.3
15. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
14
lives (71.7 per cent); more careful about their culture and
history (69.9 per cent); more cultured, well-bred, and dip-
lomatic (68.3 per cent); lead a healthy lifestyle (61.9 per
cent); more focused on material goods (61.6 per cent).
At the same time, respondents do not believe that Eu-
ropeans are more hospitable and more affable; 56.2 per
cent oppose this assessment (see Table 4). They almost
equally evaluated the educational and intellectual level
of Europeans and Ukrainians: 42 per cent supported the
view that Europeans are more intellectually developed,
41.2 per cent opposed it. There is also a relatively large
group of respondents who do not believe that Europe-
ans are more tolerant (35.4 per cent) and more religious-
ly devout (36.7 per cent).
During the analysis of the survey results, the survey-
ors conducted a cluster analysis. Two clusters were ob-
tained: Euro-optimists (44.9 per cent) and Euro-scep-
tics (55.1 per cent). The clusters were built on the
basis of answers to questions from the questionnaire
on education, gender, marital status, work, region of
residence, the direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy in-
tegration, the referendum on joining NATO, visits to
Europe and plans for a trip to European countries in
the near future, participation in the socio-political life
of the settlement, the dependence of the quality of life
on election voting.
Almost every Euro-optimist sees the right direction for
Ukraine’s integration into the European Union (93 per
cent) and NATO (90.6 per cent), while Euro-sceptics, in
the relative majority, believe that Ukraine should go its
own way and not join either the EU or EAEU and oppose
the country’s entry into NATO.
The characteristics of these two groups differ in many
ways, not only in the context of the support or non-sup-
Table 4: Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question:
»Do you agree or disagree with such statements … compared to Ukrainians, Europeans …?«
Europeans are definitely or rather more
(in parentheses: no answer) …
Respective Ukrainian figures
… caring about the environment 82.6 % (9.3 %) 10.9 %
… inclined to keep order in public places 81.3 % (8.9 %) 9.8 %
… caring about vulnerable groups 79.6 % (10.8 %) 9.6 %
… law abiding 75.4 % (11.3 %) 13.3 %
… caring about animals 74.8 % (14.9 %) 10.3 %
… inclined to plan their lives 71.7 % (12.9 %) 15.4 %
… caring about their culture and history 69.9 % (10.7 %) 19.3 %
… cultured, educated and diplomatic 68.3 % (10.4 %) 21.3 %
… keeping a healthier lifestyle 61.9 % (16.2 %) 21.9 %
… focused on material goods 61.6 % (13.6 %) 24.7 %
… tolerant 48.3 % (16.3 %) 35.4 %
… religiously devout 43.3 % (20.1 %) 36.7 %
… educated and intellectual 41.3 % (16.8 %) 42.0 %
… hospitable and friendly 27.5 % (16.3 %) 56.2 %
16. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
15
port for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, the
vast majority of Euro-optimists (88.5 per cent) have vis-
ited European countries and 63.6 per cent plan to visit
them in the next twelve months. This is not the case
with Euro-sceptics.
At the same time, Euro-optimists are on average young-
er: 64.6 per cent are between 30 and 59 years of age.
Among Euro-sceptics, 38.4 per cent are pensioners.
Euro-optimists mostly have higher education (56.3 per
cent) as compared to 31,8 per cent of Euro-sceptics.
More than half of Euro-sceptics (58.4 per cent) do not
participate in the socio-political life of their community.
Among Euro-optimists 70.3 per cent actively take part
in the socio-political life of their community. Almost half
of Euro-optimists (47.7 per cent) believe that their quality
of life depends on how they vote in elections, while Eu-
ro-sceptics have a fundamentally opposing view (66.4 per
cent). Some of these figures are contained in the annex.
Formation of Perceptions
about European Values
Ukrainians obtain information about European values
from a wide variety of sources. First and foremost is per-
sonal experience. About half of the members of each
group have visited EU countries: for work, on business,
as guests, on holiday. Interestingly, the frequency of visits
to Europe does not depend on the region. In the groups
in the Dnipro, the number of those who have travelled to
the EU was the same as in Lviv.
A great deal of information on lifestyle and values in
Europe comes to respondents through social networks:
friends and relatives. Respondents have brothers, sisters,
children, and friends who have been to the EU.
The most popular source of information remains tele-
vision. Most respondents receive information from the
news. In addition, people younger than 45 actively read
news sites on the Internet, those younger than 40 use
various social networks. Generation 45+ occasionally
appeals to sources of information such as films, press,
historical literature, and fiction.
In any case, more than half of Ukrainians (57.1 per cent)
have never been abroad, while 42.9 per cent have visited
at least one foreign country. An absolute majority (70.3
per cent) of those who have ever been abroad have trav-
elled to European countries.
Amongst those who do not plan to travel to Europe, the
vast majority (76.9 per cent) responded that they cannot
afford it. In addition, 15.4 per cent of them said that
they did not want to visit Europe. Most of these respon-
dents live in Southern and Central Ukraine, fewer in the
Eastern and Northern regions. Almost none of Western
Ukrainians responded that they did not want to visit Eu-
rope. Every second inhabitant there (54.4 per cent) has
relatives or friends living in European countries, while in
Central Ukraine just over a quarter (26.2 per cent) have
foreign relatives or friends.
As can be seen from the numbers in the annex, for the
vast majority of respondents (74.8 per cent) Ukrainian
television is the main source of information on events in
European countries. Every fourth respondent receives in-
formation on events in European countries from conver-
sations with relatives and friends living in Ukraine (26.9
per cent), social networks (26.4 per cent), and Ukrainian
news websites (24.7 per cent).
There seems to be an underrepresentation of Russian
media as a source of information. Despite the fact that
Russian TV and websites are quite popular for entertain-
ment and business, the figures in the annex show a level
as low as the Western media concerning news items.
Further research might be needed to find out more
about the often-cited high influence of Russian propa-
ganda in the sphere of information.
Recommendations to Foster
European Integration
Given Ukrainians’ positive attitude to European values,
the benefits of an association with the EU are obvious.
In this regard, the following points should be taken into
account:
n According to Chart 3, the answers »against integra-
tion with both the EU and the EAEU« (25.4 per cent)
and »difficult to answer« (12.8 per cent) represent
two out of five Ukrainians. They will be receptive
about the positive aspects of cooperation with the
EU. These two groups represent the largest untapped
potential of EU supporters in Ukraine.
17. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
16
n 51.6 per cent of the respondents are supporters of
integration with the EU. Most likely they will be the
driving force behind the reforms and the implemen-
tation of the principles and values of the European
institutions. The majority of this group primarily have
secondary and higher education and are the most
economically and politically active Ukrainian citizens.
Representatives of this group should be made »mes-
sengers« of the EU in all spheres of social, economic,
and political life.
n The supporters of the Eurasian Economic Union (10.2
per cent) consist mainly of elderly people (60+). In
comparison with other groups, most of these re-
spondents consider themselves citizens of the former
USSR, and most of this group believe that the quality
of their lives does not depend on how they vote in
the elections. Thus, this group is most difficult to con-
vince of the advantages of association with the EU.
Any efforts will be disproportionately high compared
to the expected results.
18. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
17
Cluster
Euro-optimists Euro-sceptics
Have you ever visited
European countries?
Yes 88.5 % 55.4 %
No 11.5 % 44.6 %
Why are you not planning a trip to
Europe during next 12 months?
Poor health 9.3 % 15.1 %
There is no possibility to travel due
to care of children or close relatives
17.1 % 8.7 %
There is no time for travelling due to
a busy schedule
10.7 % 6.1 %
Cannot afford it 56.4 % 72.1 %
Do not want to visit Europe 5.7 % 14.3 %
I do not plan trips for year 15.0 % 6.6 %
Other 3.6 % 4.6 %
Hard to answer 5.7 % 3.3 %
Which of the stated values are
important to you?
Religion (freedom of religion) 13.5 % 10.6 %
Rule of Law 17.2 % 11.5 %
Democracy 17.7 % 15.3 %
Personal freedom 33.1 % 25.5 %
Peace 51.3 % 52.0 %
Human Rights 29.9 % 35.5 %
Equality 10.9 % 15.3 %
Self-realization 30.5 % 18.9 %
Solidarity, support of others 10.7 % 17.8 %
Tolerance 13.5 % 8.1 %
Respect for other cultures 4.4 % 6.4 %
The value of human life 40.1 % 38.4 %
Neither of them 0.5 % 1.5 %
Hard to answer 1.0 % 4.5 %
Which of the stated values are
important for Ukrainians?
Religion (freedom of religion) 16.9 % 9.6 %
Rule of Law 22.7 % 18.3 %
Democracy 32.3 % 25.5 %
Personal freedom 21.9 % 20.8 %
Peace 64.6 % 57.5 %
Human Rights 22.1 % 22.9 %
Equality 12.5 % 12.1 %
Self-realization 10.2 % 15.1 %
Solidarity, support of others 11.5 % 12.7 %
Tolerance 9.9 % 9.3 %
Respect for other cultures 5.7 % 4.0 %
The value of human life 29.9 % 24.4 %
Neither of them 1.0 % 1.3 %
Hard to answer 3.1 % 9.8 %
Annex
19. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
18
Which of the stated values are
important to Europeans?
Religion (freedom of religion) 8.6 % 12.5 %
Rule of Law 35.7 % 28.2 %
Democracy 41.4 % 34.0 %
Personal freedom 22.9 % 16.6 %
Peace 26.6 % 18.7 %
Human Rights 38.3 % 26.5 %
Equality 10.9 % 10.4 %
Self-realization 14.8 % 12.3 %
Solidarity, support of others 8.9 % 6.4 %
Tolerance 11.5 % 14.2 %
Respect for other cultures 11.2 % 13.6 %
The value of human life 22.1 % 18.5 %
Neither of them 0.0 % 1.3 %
Hard to answer 8.1 % 16.1 %
In comparison to Ukrainians, Europeans
are: more focused on material goods
Definitely yes 29.2 % 32.5 %
Rather yes 29.7 % 31.4 %
Rather no 24.0 % 15.5 %
Definitely not 6.8 % 7.9 %
Hard to answer 10.4 % 12.7 %
In comparison to Ukrainians, Europeans
are: hospitable, friendly
Definitely yes 10.9 % 14.6 %
Rather yes 19.3 % 15.5 %
Rather no 34.4 % 33.8 %
Definitely not 27.1 % 23.4 %
Hard to answer 8.3 % 12.7 %
In comparison to Ukrainians, Europeans
are: more tolerant
Definitely yes 19.0 % 20.4 %
Rather yes 27.6 % 28.5 %
Rather no 30.7 % 24.8 %
Definitely not 13.8 % 11.0 %
Hard to answer 8.9 % 15.3 %
In comparison to Ukrainians, Europeans
are: more religious
Definitely yes 15.1 % 21.0 %
Rather yes 20.6 % 25.3 %
Rather no 31.5 % 24.0 %
Definitely not 20.1 % 12.5 %
Hard to answer 12.8 % 17.2 %
Do you participate in the soci-political
life of your settlement?
Yes, active 15.6 % 10.8 %
As much as I can 54.7 % 30.8 %
No, I am not interested 29.7 % 58.4 %
When elections in Ukraine are held,
do you vote?
Always 54.9 % 45.4 %
Almost always 25.8 % 21.4 %
In most cases 8.9 % 8.5 %
Sometimes 4.9 % 9.1 %
Almost never 2.6 % 4.7 %
Never 2.9 % 10.8 %
20. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
19
Do you think the quality of your
life depends on how you vote
in the elections?
Definitely depends 17.2 % 10.4 %
Rather depends 30.5 % 14.6 %
Rather does not depend 24.2 % 19.3 %
Does not depend at all 22.7 % 47.1 %
Hard to answer 5.5 % 8.5 %
Would you be willing to go to the
maidan in case of inactivity of
authorities, failure to fullfill their
promises, absence of refroms?
Definitely yes 19.8 % 17.2 %
Rather yes 28.6 % 12.7 %
Rather no 23.2 % 15.7 %
Definitely not 19.8 % 42.5 %
Hard to answer 8.6 % 11.9 %
How are you ready to perceive:
representative of sexual minorities
As a member of my family 2.3 % 3.4 %
As a close friend 4.7 % 4.0 %
As a neighbour 9.4 % 8.5 %
As a colleague at work 4.9 % 8.3 %
As a citizen of my country 26.0 % 22.9 %
As a tourist in my country 14.6 % 11.3 %
Do not agree to accept 38.0 % 41.6 %
How are you ready to perceive: a person
who has served a criminal sentence
As a member of my family 5.2 % 7.9 %
As a close friend 2.3 % 6.8 %
As a neighbour 7.0 % 11.5 %
As a colleague at work 4.4 % 4.7 %
As a citizen of my country 37.0 % 33.8 %
As a tourist in my country 8.6 % 7.2 %
Do not agree to accept 35.4 % 28.2 %
Do you have relatives or friends living
in European countries?
Yes 70.3 % 42.9 %
No 29.7 % 57.1 %
From what sources do you most
often receive information on events
in European countries?
Ukrainian TV channels 77.1 % 71.8 %
Russian TV channels 2.3 % 5.5 %
Western TV channels 6.0 % 2.3 %
Ukrainian news websites 37.5 % 25.9 %
Russian news websites 1.6 % 3.6 %
Western news websites 8.6 % 5.1 %
Social networks 39.6 % 24.6 %
Ukrainian print media 12.0 % 9.1 %
Radio 10.2 % 11.5 %
Talks with relatives, friends who live
in Ukraine
24.5 % 23.8 %
Talks with relatives, friends who live
in European countries
26.3 % 14.2 %
Other sources 2.3 % 2.1 %
I am not interested in the news on
events in the European countries
1.8 % 5.9 %
21. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES
20
What integration directions should
Ukraine choose?
European Union 93.0 % 31.4 %
Customs Union (Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia)
Вірменія
1.0 % 13.2 %
Neither EU, nor CU 5.7 % 35.9 %
Hard to answer 0.3 % 19.5 %
If there were a referendum today
on Ukraine joining NATO, how would
you vote?
For joining NATO 90.6 % 28.7 %
Against joining NATO 5.7 % 40.8 %
Would not vote 0.8 % 10.0 %
Hard to answer 2.9 % 20.6 %
Your gender Male 46.4 % 52.7 %
Female 53.6 % 47.3 %
How old are you? 18–29 18.0 % 17.2 %
30–44 32.3 % 21.4 %
45–59 31.3 % 22.9 %
60 and more 18.5 % 38.4 %
What language do you prefer
to speak at home?
Ukrainian 78.4 % 43.5 %
Russian 20.8 % 53.5 %
Tatar 0.5 % 0.6 %
Hungarian 0.0 % 0.0 %
Polish 0.0 % 0.0 %
Romanian 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other 0.3 % 1.9 %
Refused to answer 0.0 % 0.4 %
Do you believe in god? Yes 90.6 % 78.6 %
No 8.1 % 19.5 %
Refused to answer 1.3 % 1.9 %
Which of the following is the best that
characterizes your occupation?
Head of the organization / company
(deputy)
1.6 % 0.4 %
Owner / co-owner of a large or
medium-sized private company
0.8 % 0.4 %
Private entrepreneur 8.9 % 4.2 %
Head of unit, department, sector,
etc. / manager
4.2 % 2.1 %
Specialist, but not manager (doctor,
lawyer, accountant, engineer)
15.1 % 8.3 %
Specialist in the field of science,
culture, health, education
14.6 % 4.2 %
Official (secretary, cashier, typist,
lower part of the apparatus
8.1 % 5.1 %
Creative field (artist, writer, etc.) 2.3 % 0.0 %
A skilled worker 13.3 % 15.7 %
Unskilled worker 2.9 % 1.5 %
Pupil, student 1.8 % 4.9 %
Unemployed, housewife 8.9 % 11.5 %
Pensioner 14.8 % 39.1 %
Other 2.1 % 1.3 %
Refused to answer 0.8 % 1.3 %
22. About the author
Dr Matthes Buhbe is Head of the Regional Office of Ukraine
and Belarus of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. His edition is an ab-
breviated version of the Ukrainian original study of Gorshenin-
Institute.
Imprint
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Dept. of Central and Eastern Europe
Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany
Responsible:
Matthias Jobelius, Head, Dept. of Central and Eastern Europe
Phone: +49-30-269-35-7726 | Fax: +49-30-269-35-9250
http://www.fes.de/international/moe
Order / Contact:
info.moe@fes.de
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of
the FES.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those
of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
This publication is printed on paper from sustainable forestry.
ISBN
978-3-95861-947-0