This document addresses questions about the future of methanol and BP's methanol strategy in light of traditional and emerging methanol markets. It summarizes that traditional methanol markets are oversupplied and growth is slowing, while emerging technologies like methanol-to-olefins and new fuel applications may significantly expand methanol demand if production costs fall further. The Atlas project aims to be the lowest cost methanol producer and help develop these new markets by making methanol competitively priced for these applications.

1. SUPPLEMENT TO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE
TRINIDAD EAST BU - ATLAS PROJECT
This document is a supplement to the Atlas megamethanol Authority to Negotiate submission. There are
several BPA Group strategic issues that arise from executing Atlas. We have been asked to address those
issues within a broader context. The primary objective of this document is to answer the questions in order
to fulfill the requirements for Authority to Negotiate. It may well also serve later as a template to formulate
a more comprehensive Group strategy for methanol.
Methanol/Atlas AtN Questions
1) What is the future of methanol?
a) Traditional markets?
b) Emerging markets? New technologies?
2) What is BPA's methanol strategy in light of the future described above?
a) Should we invest in methanol production?
b) Do we have the skills, knowledge, and technologies to compete?
c) Do we have a competitive advantage and can it be sustained?
d) What would it take to acquire a leadership position?
3) How does an investment in Atlas fit with BPA's methanol strategy/upstreamstrategy?
a) Is methanol aligned with our core business strategies?
b) What are the alignment/coordination issues along the value chain?
c) What are the value chain economics for Atlas specifically?
4) Is Atlas a good investment? What are its returns and risks?
a) Why is it project financed?
b) Who are our partners? What are their strengths/weaknesses?
c) Who is the technology provider? Who will build it?
d) Are we sending the right signals to the industry?
e) What are our options to exit?
f) What are our options to expand?
g) What happens if the methanol market falls apart? Does Atlas survive? Does Trinidad as a
methanol producing country survive?
h) How does megamethanol compare with LNG?
i) How does methanol compare with LNG as a power fuel in conventionalturbines?
1. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF METHANOL?
The methanol industry is in the initial stages of a radical restructuring process.There has been much faster
growth in global supply than demand. This trend has been accelerated by projects built to monetise
associated or stranded gas. The traditional markets for methanol are oversupplied and will not support all
of the capacity that is in place and coming on line in the next few years.
It is possible today to build 5000 ton/day single train megamethanol plants (2 times current world scale)
that can profitably produce methanol at about $90 (flat MOD) per ton (using $0.85 (flat MOD) per mmbtu).
These types of plants combined with efficient transportation are setting a new cost standard for methanol.
Older, smaller plants operating on higher cost gas are not competitive and will fall by the wayside.
The new lower cost structure for methanol is also driving anotherchange in the industry. It is providing the
opportunity to open very large new markets.

2. Several technologies have been developed over the years for converting methanol to higher value
chemicals or fuels. Methanol can be used to produce light olefins (ethylene/propylene). It can be used as a
feedstockfor specialty fuel components (e.g., triptane, poly DMM) in gasoline or diesel. Methanolis also
emerging as a candidate for several applications as a fuel cell fuel. Many of these applications have the
potential to grow well beyond the size of today’s totalmethanol business.
The drop in the cost of methanol production is stimulating the interest of new players that have the skills
and the size to develop these new markets. Their drivers include gas monetization, clean fuels and possible
feedstockor strategic advantage in producing base chemicals. Depending on the relative success and speed
of introduction of new markets based on low cost methanol, aggressive new players will create a new
structure for the methanol industry in the medium term and become the new leaders.
Capital Costs
These are the results of a CMAI benchmarking study of methanol construction costs. The Titan plant
in Trinidad is nearing completion and is on budget to come in around $275 per ton capacity. The
Atlas megamethanol plant (at twice the capacity) has been bid at about $175 per ton capacity.
World Methanol Plants
EPC Cost Comparison
(by CMAI/Amoco, 8Sept.98)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Atlas
Titan
ChileII
IbnSina
II
ChileIII
Qatar
Arkangel
Qafac
AMPCO
TTMCII
Metor
CMC
Statoil
$/TPACapacity
Industry Standard
Capital Cost

3. Cash Costs
The cash cost curve from a recent CMAI study on the global methanol industry illustrates the significant
operating cost advantage ofthe new plants once they are built. These are the cash costs of operating the
plant to produce methanol (feedstock, operating costs). The Trinidad plants are shown with circles on the
lower part of the curve. Titan is the newest and most advantaged of the Trinidad plants.Once Atlas is built,
its cash costs will be slightly lower than Titan. Those plants with a lower cash cost than Atlas/Titan pay
less for their gas.
1a) TRADITIONALMARKETS
Current methanol demand is about 27 MM tons peryear and has shown a steady growth rate of 5% since
the mid 80s. The overall growth rate of demand in traditional methanol uses is projected to slow to 2.8%
through 2003. It may even decline over the next few years depending on MTBE. Slower growth in Asia
and decline in MTBE use are two of the major factors contributing to the lower expectations.
The three major existing markets for methanol are formaldehyde, acetic acid and MTBE. Together,they
comprise about 70% of today’s market. Formaldehyde is the largest (9.5 MM tons per year) and is growing
at about 2-3% per year. Acetic acid requires about 2 MM tons peryear. Methanol use for acetic acid is
growing at about 5% per year. BP Amoco is one of the two largest players in this application.
MTBE is the most uncertain of the traditional markets. It currently consumes about 7.5 MM tons per year
of methanol (3.5 MM tons per year in the U.S.). It has recently been under attack in California for ground
water contamination issues. In June, the California government announced their intention to phase out
MTBE use in reformulated gasoline by end of 2002. In July, the EPA announced a new MTBE policy.
Although there will not be a ban on MTBE, EPA will encourage “prompt and substantial” reduction in the
use of MTBE in gasoline and they will work with Congress to change the Clean Air Act to facilitate this
reduction. There is uncertainty over how fast this might happen,the eventualloss of US market and what
effects this will have on other MTBE markets. Outside the US, the octane value of MTBE is more
important than any regulated clean air mandate, so this will tend to support continued use at some price as
the cost of methanol falls. However, one likely scenario for MTBE is that the US market will dramatically

4. shrink over the next three years and the rest of world will be flat or declining. Developments are occurring
at such a pace that the range of scenarios and their relative likelihood will become clearer during the next
few months as the Atlas project is progressed. However, the potential effects of such a substantialloss of
market is one of the risk factors for the Atlas project. This will be addressed clearly in the Atlas marketing
strategy and revenue projections.
The outlook for the current players in the methanol industry is gloomy. The negative shift in perspective
during the last year is reflected in the change of price projections by CMAI shown on the graph below.
Slower growth in Asia, potential loss of MTBE market and excess capacity from new low cost plants are all
factors that are driving down the floor price and the expected mid-cycle price.
Capacity utilization is projected to sink to the mid 70% range during the next few years. Prices will almost
certainly reside in the lower end of the historical range ($100 - $200 per ton) during this period. This will
force shutdown ofolder plants high on the cost curve (a process which has already begun,as the gas supply
to many of these plants has alternative uses). Where high cost plants are fed by gas without ready
alternative uses,there will be pressure on resource owners to reduce the price of gas.
Even the strongest playersare likely to suffer a period of low profitability during this shakeout.The
winners will be those that combine a low cost manufacturing position with advantaged logistics and
commercial excellence.
World Methanol Demand
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
MethanolDemand,MMTA
Methanol Uses by Product
Formaldehyde
36%
Acetic Acid
7%
Other
19%
DMT 1%
Solvents 4%
Gasoline/Fuel
1%
Methyl
Methacrylate 3%
MTBE
29%

5. 1b) EMERGINGMARKETS/NEWTECHNOLOGIES
METHANOL TO OLEFINS (MTO)
Technology to produce ethylene and propylene from methanol has been developed over the past 20 years.
It is claimed that methanol-to-olefins (MTO) becomes economically attractive at methanol prices $100 per
ton or below. This hypothesis will probably be tested within the next few years as methanol projects are
built that will meet that standard.
If MTO technology is commercialized, it has several attractive characteristics. It allows production of
olefins directly from natural gas without necessity for NGL recovery or large associated markets for
methane (a problem that may exist in Trinidad). It is possible to swing the ratio of ethylene to propylene
over a fairly wide range (allowing flexible response to market conditions or different relative growth rates).
From wellhead to product, it produces less CO2 and NOx than current olefin production technology.
Methanol Prices - CMAI
$-
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
1986
1990
1995
2000
2005
YEAR
SPOTMETHANOLPRICE($/Mt)
July 1999 Actual
1998 Projection
1999 Projection
Global Methanol Operating Rate - CMAI
60
70
80
90
100
1986
1990
1995
2000
2005
OPERATINGRATE,%

6. We have developed a consensusviewon the probable near term future of MTO with the technology groups
from both of our Olefins BU’s. Key points from this overall perspective are:
 MTO will probably work. It is likely to be commercially proven at some site in the next 3-5 years.
Over the ensuing 5-10 years, it will probably capture some increment of global growth of olefins .
(Note that one world scale cracker would require feed from about 2 projects the size of Atlas.)
 The fraction of growth captured by MTO will probably be more dependent on low cost methanol than
on the capital costs of MTO technology,per se. The necessity for low cost methanol, in turn, will
increase price competition among stranded gas resource owners.
 Based on our current understanding ofthe technology,greenfield MTO plants will not be competitive
in Europe or North America. The markets are already well served from large ideal sites that have
established economy of scale, advantaged logistics and access to feedstocks for existing technology.
 MTO may be attractive where insufficient quantities of ethane exist or gas is distress priced, as long as
the othervalue drivers are available: (a) “Atlas” type plant economies of scale, both in capital and
production costs; (b) effectively zero methanol freight costs,with methanol consumed directly across
the fence in a dedicated MTO complex; (c) a co-located world scale olefins complex; and (d) co-
located world scale olefins derivatives . The Middle East, Asia, Australia, South America and Africa
might provide attractive sites,but further market analysis is necessary.Since the investment across this
chain of projects would be multiple billions of dollars, a firm understanding ofpolitical risk in the
location is also essential.
 MTO could pose a threat to Middle East and other remote location ethane-based projects by offering
propylene derivative(s) in addition to ethylene derivative(s).
 There are a wide range of opinions on the eventualimportance of this technology as an advantaged
source of petrochemical feedstocks and as a gas-to-markets route. Dialogue across the Group has
started to identify and evaluate the portfolio of opportunities from the combined perspectives of gas
resources,technology and markets across the whole value chain.
There are two major technologies underdevelopment as far as we know.
Exxon is moving toward commercializing their own technology. They are building a demonstration plant in
Baytown that is scheduled for startup in August. If this is successful,their current plan is to construct a full
size unit (over 2000 tons per day) in Baytown by 2003 (this project was the original motivation for the
Atlas megamethanol project). Following the Baytown full-scale project, Exxon/Mobil will be prepared to
construct complete gas-to-olefins complexes. They are doing paid engineering studies with at least two
leading contractors for methanol production as high as 5 MM tons per year (equivalent to about 1/6 of
current world capacity). Their target for a first site is Saudi Arabia.
Recent information is that Exxon is evaluating the possibility of going directly from their demonstration
plant to a full scale project in Saudi Arabia (skipping the larger Baytown project). They reportedly will
make that decision in the first half of next year based on the results from the demo plant. This would
eliminate a primary source of the potential demand for Atlas methanol.
UOP and Norsk Hydro have jointly developed a MTO process that has been available for license since late
1995. It was not commercialized then because methanol prices had just hit all time highs (up to $500 per
ton) in the previous year. In the current environment of low cost expectations for methanol, interest has
revived, but most of the current players in methanol are not willing to lock in long term contracts for
methanol at $100 per ton. Current competitors find it more desirable to shut down plants and wait for
improved prices, than to lock in such low prices long term. Commercialization of this technology will
require a player (or an alliance) with very low cost methane, and the ability to make methane into olefins
and derivatives without concern for “protecting” the historical price of methanol in the traditional chemical
markets. In addition to our own investigation of this technology with Norsk Hydro, we are aware of studies
ongoing for commercialization of MTO in West Australia (Gorgon), Egypt and Trinidad (associated with
the ethylene/PE project being pursued by Nova and Equistar).

7. Comparative Size of Ethylene and Methanol Markets
Current global ethylene capacity is about 85 MM tons per year. Growth is projected to be at least
4% per year (about 3.5 MM tons per year). Production of 3.5 MM tons of ethylene (one year’s
growth increment) would require 14 MM tons of methanol (which is about half of current world
methanol capacity). Obviously, this will not happen within one year. But, if MTO does become an
important commercial process and start to capture a substantial fraction of global olefin growth, it
could double the volume of the “methanol business” within a few years.
TRANSPORTATION FUELS - “DESIGNER” FUELS
There are at least two active R&D programs in BP Amoco that might lead to specialty fuel components
using low cost methanol as a feedstock. Triptane is a highly branched molecule with very high octane that
might be used as a premium aviation gas. Poly-DMM is essentially a chain of 4-8 methanol monomer
units. Blends of 10-20 wt% poly-DMM into diesel are projected to be a cost effective means to reduce
particulates and other diesel emissions. Both of these projects are considering low cost methanol as a
strong candidate from which to manufacture the product at reasonable cost.
Although both of these products are in an early phase of R&D with issues to work out on
technology/catalysis and product development/acceptance,they are real world examples of the type of new
uses that may open up for gas/methanolat the lower cost structure to be demonstrated by the Atlas project.
If poly-DMM is successfuleconomically in the high value use to which it is targeted, the size of its relevant
markets is more than 10 times larger than today’s methanol market. One of the biggest advantages that
these types of fuel products have is that they can be introduced gradually to the market within the existing
distribution infrastructure at the rate that product becomes available.
25
50
75
100
85
30
14
MMTonne/yr
2
MeOH req’d
to produce
the world’s
Ethylene
World
Ethylene
Capacity
World
MeOH
Capacity
MeOH to
produce 3.5
MM tons of
Ethylene
Atlas
Capacity
340

8. TRANSPORTATION FUELS - FUEL CELLS
Methanolis mentioned often these days as a preferred fuel for fuel cells in transportation uses.The car
companies are spending several hundreds ofmillion dollars developing fuel cell cars for introduction in
about 5 years. Many of them are currently focusing their near term efforts for introduction of this
technology on methanol as the fuel. The primary reason is that it is easier to produce hydrogen from
methanol than any of the other commonly available liquid fuels. It is even possible to produce electricity
directly from methanol in a fuel cell without having to react it in a separate reformer to produce the
hydrogen. The early versions of these so-called “direct methanol fuel cells” will probably be
commercialized in small applications in the next few years.
There are several issues that will have to be resolved if methanol is to be used in large scale for
transportation fuel cells. The first is the macro issue of whether fuel cell cars ever do actually develop to
the point that they can take large market share away from internal combustion technology. If that does
occur, then a fueling infrastructure for the chosen fuel will have to develop in parallel with creation of the
market for the cars. A fueling infrastructure for methanol would almost certainly be more expensive than
for a hydrocarbon more closely related to gasoline (although both would be much less expensive than a
hydrogen distribution system). Methanol also has some issues to resolve with regard to flame
luminescence, water solubility and toxicity.
The perspective from BP Amoco’s downstream experts is that methanol is currently in the lead in the
minds of the car companies, but it is too early to tell whether fuel cell cars will be fueled with methanol or
some hydrocarbon similar to a very low sulfur gasoline. It will take a couple more years to prove whether
or not it will be possible to produce clean hydrogen from hydrocarbons using an onboard reactor. Unless it
is proven that naphtha conversion is not practical, it is considered unlikely that any of the major oils will
commit to building a substantialinfrastructure to supply methanol.
Fuel cells could obviously be a huge market for methanol if these developments occur. Every 2 million
fuel cell cars on the road would use the equivalent of one world scale plant (2500 tons per day). If this does
develop in the 5 - 20 year time frame into a major methanol market, it is clear that the companies or
alliances with experience in megamethanol technology will have a clear advantage in figuring out how to
produce and deliver the fuel into the industry.
2) WHAT IS BPA'S METHANOLSTRATEGYIN LIGHT OF THE
FUTURE DESCRIBEDABOVE?
At present,there is no formal Group strategy for methanol. Tactically, we are making limited investment
to stimulate profitable gas sales and preserve options for expansion into new markets. This approach has
allowed us to build knowledge and capability in critical areas of emerging technology with modest
investment and commitment. As developments occur over the next several years,we are positioned to
either divest or to expand more aggressively into market development or additional manufacturing. In
either case,the profitable gas sales contracts from the original projects will remain with us.
This approach is the result of simply aligning our strengths in Trinidad. We are the largest gas supplier at a
time when Trinidad is the most advantaged location in the world for production of methanol (in terms of
balance of gas price, local government support for industrial development, logistics, etc.) into the US or
European markets. Methanol production then becomes an obvious way of commercializing our resources.
These developments have been reviewed periodically between Chemicals and E&P. The traditional
markets for methanol have never been attractive from a Chemical stream strategic perspective,so the
market development for these plants has been left to external partners already in the traditional methanol
business.
If we elect to develop a more active Group strategy for methanol, some of the near term tactical options to
be considered are:
 Develop a more coordinated approach across the BPA Group for creating methanol markets to our own
advantage

9.  Strengthen relationships with the companies that we believe will carry the industry across the transition
to low cost production
 Define the portfolio of opportunities that exist around the world for methanol to olefins (modeled after
our existing portfolio of potential ethane cracker projects.)
 Incorporate methanol, MTO and production of other derivatives into the Group Ideal Site model to
allow us to develop opportunities for integrated sites and determine the capital and operating cost
advantages
2a) SHOULD WE INVEST IN METHANOL PRODUCTION?
Investment in megamethanol production provides us with the following:
 Profitable gas monetization in a gas surplus area.
 Understanding of methanol cost structures and low cost technology.
 A hedge against price spikes for our acetic acid business.
 Critical knowledge required to create integrated methanol/derivatives complexes (e.g. MTO or
methanol to poly DMM)
 Part ownership and control of the world’s first megamethanol plant in the event that methanol does
become an important fuel in the emerging hydrogen economy.
Based on the above benefits an investment in methanol production in Trinidad provides not only a gas
commercialization route in the short term but also potential options and positioning for the future in MTO
and fuels.
2b) DO WE HAVE THE SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, AND
TECHNOLOGIES TO COMPETE?
We currently participate in the methanol business (at the Texas City Sterling facility). Our competitive
position is not very strong due to feedstockand scale disadvantage. We do, however, have excellent skills
and knowledge of the current technology and the business in the traditional markets. This will be very
important to us if we decide to expand our participation into the much larger markets that may develop for
low cost methanol.
A primary objective we have for our Titan/Atlas partnership with Saturn is to enhance our skills and
knowledge as we create a low cost,advantaged position from which to build future options. Due to our
strategy of providing the minimum resources necessary to facilitate the methanol projects, our involvement
has been limited to a strong representation on the Boards of the partnerships.If we choose to pursue a more
aggressive strategy on methanol, we have the option to place some of our personneldirectly into key
positions in Atlas. These people could later be moved out to implement ideal site opportunities.
2c) DO WE HAVE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND CAN IT
BE SUSTAINED?
Compared to current methanol players we have a competitive advantage (as do several otherbig oil
companies). The competitive advantage is our ability to integrate the value chain upstreamand
downstream of the methanol plant.
Upstream:
 Gas development and long term project expertise
 Gas monetization drives
Markets:
 Knowledge and capabilities in the fuel and petrochemical businesses that represent the new markets for
low cost methanol.
 Widely based technology and R&D community to apply to new technology routes and products (for
development, evaluation/acquisition and commercialization)
 We are currently one of the largest purchasers ofmethanol in the world and we understand the
business

10. General:
 Ability to coordinate projects that span the value chain from gas to chemical or fuel products
 Global presence and credibility
 Financial strength
Compared to our big oil competitors, we have the opportunity to develop competitive advantage through
participation in Atlas and a proactive approach to developing the new markets that Atlas might open up.
Areas in which we could develop advantage if we choose to pursue them are:
 Superior knowledge of the new markets and how to build a value chain to serve them
 Faster to identify opportunities
 Better at capturing synergies
 More successfulnegotiation to capture value for BP Amoco
 More efficient project execution
 New country entry based on attractive “integrated offer” for producing chemicals and clean fuels from
methane
 Know how developed from implementing megamethanol or derivative technologies such as MTO
 Lower capital costs for subsequent projects
 Possible patents for enhancements and next generation technology (including use of some of
our own developing technologies such as the KPT/BPA Compact Reformer)
 More efficient operation of plants (ahead on the “learning curve”)
 Better design of integrated complexes incorporating combinations of these technologies (integration
synergies,infrastructure and utilities savings,joint operations)
(NOTE: these are also areas in which we could find ourselves at a disadvantage. Exxon is apparently
already ahead of us on MTO.)
2d) WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO ACQUIRE A LEADERSHIP
POSITION?
In the traditional markets:
 Low cost delivery to the major world markets
 Gas price
 Transportation cost
 Capital cost
In the new markets that could emerge:
 Ability to offer packaged energy or feedstocksolutions for a country (“integrated offer”), although the
size of the in-country market will be critical to the economics
 Ability to capture value in building the larger markets
 Larger, lower cost facilities
 Long term relationships with partners and customers
 Logistics for intermediate products can be optimized for dedicated service
 Access to low cost methanol production technology
 Proven technology for conversion of methanol to chemicals or fuels
 Lower emissions vs conventional processes
 Develop credibility with host governments,potential customers, regulatory agencies and othercrucial
stakeholders
3) HOW DOES AN INVESTMENT IN ATLAS FIT WITH BPA'S
METHANOL STRATEGY/UPSTREAM STRATEGY?

11. As mentioned we have no formal methanol strategy,thus we looked at methanol’s alignment with our core
businesses and the potentialvalue chains methanol supports.
3a) IS METHANOLALIGNED WITH OUR CORE BUSINESS
STRATEGIES?
The evolution of the methanol business to a lower cost structure and broader markets can support severalof
BPA’s strategic imperatives.
Monetizing gas - To the extent we are able to create large new markets for methanol, we have succeeded in
providing new routes to take gas to the market. If we are able to direct where these new markets will locate
we will have created an important, distinctive advantage.
Clean fuels and new hydrocarbon based fuels and products - Methanol is a simple building block from
which it is possible to create high value fuel components with desired attributes. Triptane and poly-DMM
are just two examples. The flexibility to design specific molecules for fuel blending will become
increasingly important as the constraints on standard fuels are tightened in the future.
Methanolis also a very good candidate for several niche applications as a liquid hydrogen carrier for the
early stages ofthe Hydrogen Economy.
Green agenda - To the extent that methanol facilitates the implementation of more efficient power
generation (such as fuel cells) or more selective catalytic processes to produce chemicals, it can be utilized
to reduce emissions including CO2. For instance, the MTO process can be a significantly lower CO2
emitter (and much lower NOx) than furnace cracking.
Syngas to chemicals - MTO has the potential to change the competitive dynamic for the petrochemical
business in growth areas of the world that require new infrastructure for feedstocks and conversion to
chemicals. If methane can be converted to olefins via methanol, there are several new regions in the world
that will have a viable feedstock source to support world scale polyolefin complexes (subject to market
conditions). Large scale implementation of megamethanol and MTO technology is likely to stimulate
catalyst and process development to produce additional chemical products from syngas and/ormethanol.
3b) WHAT ARE THE ALIGNMENT/COORDINATIONISSUES
ALONG THE VALUE CHAIN?
The value chain from gas field through megamethanol to olefins and derivatives will be very complex to
build up and to manage. Each step involves large capital outlays, significant risk (whether exploration /
production,technology or commodity market cycles) and differing cultures and business models. Due to
the scale of the methanol and chemicals investments required for economic projects, each step will tend be
closely coupled to the others for its ability to operate and generate return.
The Atlas value chain is a good specific example of the diversity of interests, economic expectations and
strategic drivers. Upstream has established a gas sales project with a very attractive 28% IRR with the
primary exposure being default of the Atlas project. Atlas itself is a highly leveraged and complex
partnership led by an entrepreneurseeking to establish a new set of rules in the methanol business. Atlas
will probably accept nominal cost-of-capital returns across the cycle but will be vulnerable to prolonged
negative market conditions or difficulties with a large contract buyer (such as for MTO). This can bring
pressure to bear on the gas sales contract. The largest portion of the Atlas output will go to establish a new
technology for producing commodity chemicals into very competitive markets. The MTO player (whether
Exxon or another)will probably have to set up their project as a “stretch” project that is justified on
marginal returns plus option value from establishing the technology. However, once in operation, it will be
managed in an organization that is used to optimizing returns partly by balancing feedstockslates and
prices at the expense of suppliers.
Consequently,we believe there is significant potential in these projects for miscommunication and
strategic alignment problems with the multiple external partners, but also internally. Even in established
cross-streamoperations which have liquid markets and transparent prices (refinery aromatics to PX to PTA

12. for example), it is sometimes difficult to agree how to optimize the system. This will be even more
complicated in a “change the rules” value chain such as Atlas with new business interfaces,new external
partners for various parts of the business and evolving expectations of value of the intermediate products.
We think that one of the potential advantages that a company of our size and breadth can bring to this
opportunity is cross streamunderstanding and optimization of the entire value chain as a system. We
propose to use our dialogue on this subject for the Atlas project as a prototype for more general
mechanisms that might be used for similar projects.
The first step in this dialogue is understanding the totalvalue creation potential from methane to olefins,
without looking at interim prices. This will help us understand the total opportunity that will be divided
between the national resource owner, investors/financiers in methanol and olefins, and the BPA Group.
Assuming that there is a strong value opportunity in the entire chain, we then need to understand the
potential risk/rewards available for given segments of the chain and the various players in each segment in
order to optimize how the Group participates.
For an olefins producer, that risk/reward tradeoff has the following elements:
 commercially unproven technology,rationally requiring a premium investment return
 potential for the technology to unlock a sustainable lower cost feedstockthan naphtha or E/P, which
would generate higher returns but also results in a higher sensitivity to feedstockprice risk.
Chemicals has been considering how we might participate in off-take from Atlas for a MTO project in
Chocolate Bayou (both as a way to support the Atlas project and a means to commercialize the technology
in a location where we have expertise and infrastructure to support the development). Early on in that
process,we would like to have a discussion with the Upstream about how the other players in the Trinidad
value chain (Government of Trinidad, Saturn, Atlas financiers, etc.) might agree to deal with the olefins
risk/reward tradeoffs we face (as does Exxon Chemical).
We may or may not be able to make a Chocolate Bayou MTO project work in the Atlas time frame, but this
type of dialogue will almost certainly generate new knowledge about the value chain and begin the process
to establish the common mental models between the businesses about this set ofopportunities.
3c) WHAT ARE THE VALUE CHAIN ECONOMICSFOR ATLAS
SPECIFICALLY?
For purposes ofevaluating the dynamics and the robustness ofthe overall value chain specifically for the
Atlas project, we have calculated value chain returns from gas through to olefins for two situations - an
Exxon case (prototype of Exxon Baytown MTO demo plant) and a Norway case (prototype of Norsk Hydro
demo plant). For the Norway case, we have used two sets of price sets for olefins. The high case is based
on price expectations from our Olefins group in early summer when negotiations were opened with Norsk
Hydro. At the time of these negotiations,this seemed to be in line with the expectations that Norsk Hydro
had. They have not indicated a change in their expectations, so we are using that as the base case. Since
that time, BP Amoco has lowered expectations for olefins prices in Northwest Europe, so we present that as
the low case.
These overall calculations are based on E&P’s direct, specific knowledge of the economics and the capital
costs ofthe upstreamand megamethanol links in the value chain added to reasonable assumptions of the
economics and capital costs ofMTO based on non-confidential information obtained from UOP and
Saturn’s initial negotiations with Exxon and Norsk Hydro. The basis of these models as well as access to
sensitivity studies can be obtained from the Atlas team.
It should be noted that these cases do not represent the economics of large integrated projects that are being
considered for use of this technology in other regions of the world outside the USGC and NWE. Since
Atlas would be a first implementation of MTO technology,the Atlas value chain will have the following
primary impediments compared to integrated gas-to-olefins/derivatives projects in the future:

13. - Purification, shipping and receiving costs associated with shipping the methanol to anothersite
- Lack of site integration between gas processing,raw methanol production and olefin/derivatives plant
- Olefins price expectations based on the most efficient and competitive olefin market environments in the
world (USGC and NWE)
Upstream Megamethanol MTO Total
IRR (Exxon) 28% 15% 3% 14%
capex (Exxon) $191 MM $310 MM $125 MM $626 MM
PV10 $85 MM $86 MM -$47 MM $124 MM
IRR (Norway base) 28% 15% 10% 15%
Capex (Norway base) $191 MM $310 MM $175 MM $676 MM
PV10 $85 MM $86 MM $8 MM $179 MM
IRR (Norway low) 28% 15% 0 12%
Capex (Norway low) $191 MM $310 MM $175 MM $676 MM
PV10 $85 MM $86 MM -$114 MM $57 MM
(note: economics are run on a methanol sales price to Norway of $110/ton and to Exxon at $105/ton
representing the difference in logistics)
Atlas megamethanol to MTO, if it happens,will be a first commercial demonstration of MTO technology
and will be partly (if not wholly) justified by the MTO player (Exxon, Norsk Hydro or another) on that
basis. Since Atlas is an E&P project, the returns for this specific project have been naturally weighted to
high returns in the Upstream. The low (or zero) returns associated with our model of the MTO link in the
chain reflect the market price for methanol that the MTO players (Exxon and Norsk Hydro) are negotiating
with Saturn (raising the possibility of future price re-negotiation), our relative lack of understanding ofthe
MTO technology and the additional drivers that those players may have for commercializing this
technology.
4) IS ATLAS A GOOD INVESTMENT?WHAT ARE ITS RETURNS
AND RISKS?
The Atlas project is both an economic venture and a platform for growth consistent with our strategic
direction . The upstreameconomics show an IRR of 28% with $85MM of PV10. The methanol plant
economics have a 15% IRR and over $30 MM of PV10 from our 35% interest. On a combined basis the
project will have an IRR in the low 20s by virtue of our 100% interest in the upstream. In addition to the
financial value, the project provides us an opportunity to participate in the demonstration of two key
technologies that support the strategic imperatives discussed earlier.
 Megamethanol - low capital cost
 First commercialization of MTO technology (although our ability to capture this in a timely manner is
constrained)
The greatest risk to the project prior to sanctioning is securing the targeted markets. A substantialfraction
of the output of the plant must be committed to a MTO facility (Norsk Hydro, Exxon or some alternative)
to minimize the impact of the plant on the existing methanol market. In addition, we must get the
traditional markets to accept pricing scenarios similar to those outlined in our economics (fixed prices or
floor pricing near $110/mt (MOD)). These would be historically low offers for long term contracts for
methanol, but closure could be difficult if methanol prices return to the low levels reached in the first
quarter of 1999.
Once the project is in place, the primary risk shifts to the possibility of default on take or pay contracts for
offtake. The project might be particularly exposed to volume risk from a large contract for MTO that
represents more than half of the production from the plant. Although preliminary analysis can be done at
this point, this risk can best be defined and ameliorated once the negotiation of these contracts is initiated
following approval of the Authority to Negotiate.
4a) WHY IS IT PROJECTFINANCED?

14. Our current plan is to project finance on a non recourse basis. The project’s original promoter and the
majority partner is Saturn Methanol. Saturn has a thin balance sheet and needs non-recourse financing to
make the project work for them. Project financing maintains alignment with the majority owner. We have
accepted minority ownership to minimize costs and the perceived role we play in the eyes of the Trinidad
government. Our size has made us a target of the government for extracting value and by maintaining a
lower profile we hope the project will achieve quicker acceptance (similar to Titan).
4b) WHO ARE OUR PARTNERS? WHAT ARE THEIR
STRENGTHS/WEAKNESSES?
Our partner is Saturn MethanolCompany of Houston,Texas. Saturn was formed in 1994 when Deo Van
Wijk, the head of marketing at Methanex, left Methanex to form his own company. Mr. Van Wijk was
one of three directors of Methanex who built it to be the world’s leading methanol producer and marketer.
Saturn’s management team averages over 15 years experience in the methanol business. Saturn also has
experience in Trinidad as Mr. Van Wijk was a prior director of Caribbean Methanol Company in Trinidad
during its development and early years of operation.
Saturn’s first project was the Titan Project (in partnership with Amoco and the Beacon Group). Saturn is
the sole marketer for Titan and was successfulin preselling 80% of the output prior to closing under terms
sufficient to cover the 10 year financing period. Saturn’s strengths in methanol are sales and marketing,
logistics and strong relationships/knowledge of the business. Saturn also has a small but technically
proficient engineering staff. It is a credit to Saturn’s staff and their relationship with Lurgi that the Titan
project is 95% complete with no change orders.
Saturn’s weakness is its balance sheet. As a new start-up company, they have little capital. Saturn has
used their relationship in the industry to raise capital for Titan and Atlas. The Atlas project is set up with
the banks to ensure that sufficient contract security is established to ensure Saturn has the capital for Atlas
and that “firewalls” are set up to guarantee its use and to prevent any weaknesses in Saturn’s financial
position from affecting the financial position of Atlas.
4c) WHO IS THE TECHNOLOGYPROVIDER? WHO WILL
BUILD IT?
Lurgi Ol Gas Chemie, a subsidiary of MG is the technology provider and EPC contractor. Lurgi has built
40% of the world’s capacity in methanol (a total of 34 methanol plants). They are the technology and EPC
contractorfor the Titan project in Trinidad. Titan is scheduled to start up ahead of schedule, with no
change orders to the lump sumprice, and has an excellent safety record with no fatalities and only 1 Lost
Time Accident for over 3 million man-hours worked. If we can proceed quickly enough Lurgi will keep
their Titan management team togetherfor Atlas
Lurgi, also, is a joint technology developer and EPC contractorfor our BDO plant in Lima, Ohio.
4d) ARE WE SENDING THE RIGHT SIGNALS TO THE
INDUSTRY?
We will send signals to the industry and the world if we proceed with Atlas. The industry is watching to
see what we will do following our participation in Titan. Atlas is twice the capacity of Titan and has much
lower capital costs perton of methanol capacity than any plant every built. It is very visible as a step
change in capital costs for a product that has received a lot of press as the front running candidate fuel for
the next generation of car technology (i.e., fuel cells).
Here are some of the things people might speculate about.(We should be alert and shape our answers and
advocacy to fit our strategies).
 BP Amoco has decided that methanol is likely to be the fuel of choice for fuel cells. BP Amoco is
positioning to take a leadership role for methanol as a fuel cell fuel.

15.  To the extent that Atlas is identified as a base from which MTO will be commercialized, there will be
speculation in the petrochemical industry about how the introduction of MTO might change th e
dynamics in olefin/polyolefins (particularly in Asia, Middle East and South America).
 BP Amoco is pushing the new markets for methanol based on gas monetization and nothing more.
4e) WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS TO EXIT?
We have no barriers to exit at this time. No contractual obligations have been made and we have
repeatedly told our partners and others in the value chain that we are seeking management authority to
negotiate. They are aware that this level of commitment is not binding until we receive final internal
approval after the project is fully developed. (Exxon or Enron are the most likely replacements for us in
Atlas if we decline to participate.)
We do not foresee any shareholder restraints on our ability to exit the project at any time after closure. In
the Titan project the ECAs placed some restrictions on our ability to exit prior to their approval. It is
possible the lenders for Atlas may try to restrain our ability to reduce our interest below a threshold without
their approval (not to be unreasonably withheld).
4f) WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS TO EXPAND?
Expansion of Titan or Atlas via debottlenecking is considered unlikely. Experience indicates Lurgi plants
may reach as high as 105% of capacity but there is little over-design to allow for this. It is usually cheaper
to build a new train for expansion.
Additional acreage exists at the site (controlled by Saturn), to build anothermethanol plant. If we were to
build an integrated facility (e.g., MTO) on Trinidad, this would most likely be at the Point Lisas Industrial
Estate, but we would need to secure additional acreage to what Saturn already can access.
4g) WHAT HAPPENS IF THE METHANOL MARKET FALLS
APART? DOES ATLAS SURVIVE? DOES TRINIDAD AS A
METHANOL PRODUCING COUNTRYSURVIVE?
Atlas has been designed to be one of the world’s lowest cost producers. The marketing strategy has been
developed to mitigate downside price risk (while sacrificing upside potential). Except for a few places
where gas prices are considerably cheaper than that expected for Atlas (average gas price floor over 20
years is $1.12/mmbtu) Atlas will be the lowest cost plant on a cash basis. When combined with its capital
cost advantage and close proximity to markets, it will be more profitable than others at a fixed methanol
price. The graph below indicates if Atlas were to receive an average methanol price of only $100/mt
(MOD) delivered for the next 20 years we would still earn a 6% return. Methanolprices have only
averaged less than $100/mt for 9 quarters in the last 20 years, and have averaged less than $100/mt for an
entire year only once (1986/87).

16. To protect against this extreme downside we have developed a marketing plan to sell approximately 60%
of the plant’s output into a MTO market to minimize the impact on the already saturated traditional
markets. Early discussions with MTO developers have indicated they desire a fixed price or a floating
price tied to ethylene with price floors and caps . We also expect to sell an additional 10% at fixed prices
under long term contracts into the traditional markets at target prices of $116/mt (a 19% discount off the
historical average of $143/mt). These fixed price deals or floor price deals leave only about 30% of the
output subject to market level pricing, mitigating the downside risk.
We believe Atlas can survive any realistic worst case pricing scenario.
Atlas Methanol IRR%
Unleveraged and No Tax Holiday
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35
Methanol Prices $/Gal.
IRR%

17. The other methanol plants in Trinidad are positioned well to survive the long term. They are positioned in
the lower ½ of the cost curve. However, there is pressure from the othermethanol plants to reduce their
gas price. Some of these plants are paying in excess of $1.20/mmbtu. They see that some of their
competitors have lower feedstockprices and methanol prices are in a trough. This pressure will continue
regardless of whether BP Amoco or some other party supplies the gas to the Atlas project.
Besides gas pricing, there are several opportunities for cost reduction in the Trinidad methanol industry that
are being explored. Atlas has proposed a consolidation of shipping and terminal facilities with the other
producers in Trinidad. Acceptance of this proposalwould save the existing methanol producers $2.40/mt
or the equivalent of 7.3 cents/mmbtu on their gas price.
We believe the existing methanol producers in Trinidad will survive, but the pressure for gas price
reduction will continue regardlessof whether we participate in Atlas.
4h) HOW DOES MEGAMETHANOLCOMPAREWITH LNG?
Megamethanol and LNG target distinct and separate markets. A decision on which to pursue should be
based on customer needs and profiles. Use of both LNG and megamethanol for gas monetization allows
BPA to capture a larger market and spread downstream risk.
To illustrate the comparative economics of megamethanol and LNG we developed cases assuming 100%
ownership by BPA, no financing, and identical gas inlet volumes of 425 MMCFD at a price of
$0.85/mmbtu (real). Using these assumptions the upstreameconomics are identical. Thus the comparison
isolates the LNG and megamethanol facilities and seeks the methanol price necessary for a megamethanol
plant to equal the IRR of a LNG facility. Capital and development costs for LNG were based on Atlantic
LNG Train 1 ($700 million) to simulate a greenfield project located in the Atlantic Basin. Costs for
megamethanol were based on Atlas costs. Results are for FOB the plant (no shipping to simulate an
integrated site). LNG economics assume sales into the Spanish power market similar to Atlantic LNG
Train 2. The volumes of LNG and methanol produced were assumed not to affect the markets into which
they were sold.
A methanol sales price of slightly less than $80 /mt is needed to compare favorably to LNG in our
hypotheticalcase. Preliminary calculations for a MTO facility performed by our European/Asian olefins
team indicate strong economics for methanol delivered to the olefin plant at $80/mt. The economic
comparison contained herein, does not reflect improved capital costs that can be expected from either an
Atlantic LNG expansion or an Atlas type plant expansion. Additional refinements to the capital costs are
needed to capture the synergies from integrating a methanol plant with a MTO plant and polyolefin plants
at a single site. The ideal site model appears to be the next step in advancing the comparison.
Methanol Vs. LNGMethanol Vs. LNG
IRR%IRR%
0
5
10
15
20
60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Methanol Prices $/Ton.
IRR%
Methanol LNG ($14 Brent) LNG ($16 Brent)

18. 4i) HOW DOES METHANOL COMPARE WITHLNG AS A POWER
FUEL IN CONVENTIONALTURBINES?
Information from General Electric (GE) using LNG, methanol as a liquid and methanol as a vapor in a
General Electric (GE) 109FA Combined Cycle machine illustrates that methanol used as a turbine fuel in
both the vaporand liquid phases out perform LNG on an efficiency basis by 4.2% and 7.9% respectively .
LNG Liq MeOH Vap MeOH
Comb. Cycle Net Out - kWe 343,300 370,550 357,720
Net Improvement over LNG - kWe Base 27,250 14,420
Net Improvement over LNG - Base +7.9% +4.2%
The GE information was produced in a methanol-to-power study for Exxon. Engineering contractors and
firms such as General Electric and FosterWheeler have teamed up to promote methanol as a power fuel
option. These results are consistent with earlier test results using DME as a power fuel. Oxygenates
(methanol and DME) are now considered technically acceptable alternatives to natural gas and liquid fuels
in turbines used for electric power generation.
The chart on the left illustrates the relative busbarcost produced for various size power plants using
methanol and LNG. The results show that methanol produces a lower busbarcost than LNG where the
aggregate demand is less than 800 megawatts, and is cost competitive between 800 and 1400 megawatts,
assuming a methanol FOB price of $75/ton, and a LNG FOB price of $2.35/mmbtu. Based on what we
have learned from Atlas these methanol prices can be achieved today with gas prices of $0.50/mmbtu.
Shell International Gas has also done some work which illustrates the relative cost effectiveness of gas by
pipeline, gas via LNG, gas via oxygenates, GTL via syncrude and gas by wire on a volume versus distance
basis. As illustrated in the chart to the right, methanol can be cost effective in smaller quantities over a
wide range of shipping distances versus LNG. Methanolshould not be viewed as a competitor of LNG but
as complementary to LNG by bringing a clean fuel to a set of customers not economically reachable with
LNG.
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
400 800 1200 1600
Power Plant Size, Megawatts
BusbarCost,$/MWhr
MeOH
LNG
LNG FOB Price: $2.35/mmbtu
MeOH FOB Price: $75/ton
20
10
5
2
1
0.5
0.2
0.1
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
DISTANCE, km
VOLUME,GSm3/Annum
Electricity
Pipeline
LNG
Methanol
SYNCRUDE

19. Those who have provided input.
Olefins North America
Dennis Seith
John Blieszner
Dan Marsh
Brian Bahr
Gil Harris
Mike Nagle
Olefins Europe/Asia
Rob Anderson
Barry Maunders
Chris Eccles
Chris Astbury
Group Ideal Site
Peter Nuttall
Peter Morris
Chemical Strategy/Technology
Jay Kouba
Rob Peabody
Geoff Chapman
Steve Hardman
Steve Wittrig
Chemical Commercial Development
Ada Nielsen
Gas to Market
Theo Fleisch
Richard Jones
Mike Gradassi
Ron Sills
Gas and Power Stream
Van Whitfield
Acetyls
Robin Duggan
Peter Grant
Bob Neidzielski
Paul Turner
Phil Howard
GTU (poly DMM)
Dave Redeker
Downstream
Betty Anthony
Bernie Bulkin
Peter Histon
Andrew Armstrong
Atlas Team
Nigel Preece
Scott Charpentier
Norm Christie
Darrell Stucky
Janet Nussbaum
Fred Crowder
Brad Hubbard
Nagy Iskander
Technology
Steve Souders