The 1-hour Guide to Stuxnet.ppt

The 1-hour Guide to Stuxnet
Carey Nachenberg
Vice President, Symantec Fellow
Symantec Corporation
The 1-hour Guide to Stuxnet 1

2
This is Natanz, Iran

3
And these are Natanz’s Centrifuges

4
And this is how they’re controlled
Programmable
Logic Controller
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Communications
Processors (Routers)
Frequency
Converters
Centrifuges
Windows
PC
Communications
Processors route
commands from the PLC
to groups of mechanical
devices.
Frequency Converters are
responsible for converting
AC frequencies to either
higher-or lower frequencies
to operate motors.
Centrifuges enrich Uranium
so it can be used to power
nuclear plants or weapons.
The PLC is a specialized
piece of hardware that
orchestrates control of
multiple connected
mechanical devices.
Industrial control systems are
typically controlled by a
standard PC running
industrial control software
like STEP7 from Siemens.

5
And this is how they’re isolated
Programmable
Logic Controller
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Communications
Processors (Routers)
Frequency
Converters
Centrifuges
Windows
PC
Research Network

6
And this is (probably)
an Israeli Mossad Programmer
Who wants
to introduce
onto this
computer
right here 

7
So how exactly
does this:
Get onto an
“air-gapped”
network to
disrupt these:
It’s got to spread on its own…
All while evading detection.
Until it discovers the proper computers…
Where it can disrupt the centrifuges…

Stuxnet uses seven distinct mechanisms to spread to new computers.
Six of these attacks targeted flaws (back doors) that were
unknown to the security industry and software vendors!
It copies itself to
open file-shares.
It attacks a hole
in Windows’ print
spooler.
It attacks a hole
in Windows RPC.
It password-cracks
SIEMENS DB software.
It infects SIEMENS
PLC data files.
Peers update other
peers directly.
Stuxnet uses thumb
drives to bridge the gap!
Usually we’re surprised
when we see a threat
targeting one flaw...
But if the centrifuges are
air-gapped from the ‘net,
how can Stuxnet jump to
the enrichment network?
USB drives!

Spreading – A Sidebar
Task #1:
Job: Delete temp files
Run as: Root user
Run at: 10pm
Windows Tasks
Task #2:
Job: Clean registry
Run as: Jim (non-root)
Run at: 6pm
Task #3:
Job: Print receipts
Run as: Ted (non-root)
Run at: 2am
Windows has a built-in task scheduler system.
Each user can add new tasks to be run at a certain
time and with a certain permission level.
(Regular users can’t add “root” level jobs)
To prevent tampering, windows computes
a CRC32 hash for each task record and stores this in
a protected area of the computer.
Task1 hash: 9B7CC653
Task2 hash: 11090343
(the tasks themselves
are stored as globally
readable/writable XML files)

When it arrives on a machine, Stuxnet starts
running with non-administrator privileges.
But to do its mischief, Stuxnet needs to
run with “root” privileges.
Task #1:
Run as: Root user
Run at: 10pm
Windows Tasks
Task #2:
Job: Clean registry
Run at: 6pm
Task #3:
Job: Print receipts
Run at: 2am
So first, Stuxnet creates a new task,
using the permissions of the current user.
Task #4:
Job: Run stuxnet.dll
Run at: 2pm
And of course, once Windows verifies that the job is
legitimate (the user hasn’t tried to create a root-
level job), it calculates the job’s hash and adds it to
the security store.
Task4 hash: DE9DBA76

Task #1:
Run as: Root user
Run at: 10pm
Windows Tasks
Task #2:
Job: Clean registry
Run at: 6pm
Task #3:
Job: Print receipts
Run at: 2am
Task4 hash: DE9DBA76
Task #4:
Job: Run stuxnet.dll
Run at: 2pm
Next Stuxnet modifies the XML job file it just
added, changing its permission to “root”!
(Remember, the XML files are writable)
Ted (non-root)
Root user
But wait! The updated job
file hash no longer matches
the protected hash stored by
Windows!
If Windows were to process
the updated job file, it would
detect this and reject it!
New hash: 66C35150
Ah, but Stuxnet is more clever than that.
Stuxnet knows how to forge a CRC - it computes a set
of values which, if appended to the file, will result in
its CRC matching the original! And then it appends
these bytes to the file!
XQ
New hash: DE9DBA76
And Windows will happily run the updated job,
giving Stuxnet root-level privileges!

Stuxnet is extremely picky and only activates
its payload when it’s found an exact match.
The targeted computer must be running
STEP7 software from Siemens.
The targeted computer must be directly connected to
an S7-315 Programmable Logic Controller from Siemens.
The PLC must further be connected to at least six
CP-342-5 Network Modules from Siemens.
Each Network Module must be connected to ~31
Fararo Paya or Vacon NX frequency converters.
…

Stuxnet is extremely picky and only activates
its payload when it’s found an exact match.
…
Now if you do the math….
Stuxnet verifies that the discovered
Programmable Logic Controller…
Is controlling at least
155 total frequency converters…
And recently we learned that Iran’s
Uranium enrichment “cascade” just happens
to use exactly 160 centrifuges.
What a coincidence!
The creators of
Stuxnet must have
guessed all of these
details.

Now Stuxnet gets down to business…
Stuxnet starts by downloading
malicious logic onto the PLC hardware.
What you (probably) didn’t
realize is that the PLC uses a
totally different microchip &
computer language than
Windows PCs.
Stuxnet is the first known
threat to target an industrial
control microchip!
14

Next, Stuxnet measures the operating speed of
the frequency converters during their normal
operation for 13 days!
And makes sure the motors are running between 807Hz and 1210Hz.
(This is coincidentally
the frequency range
required to run
centrifuges.)
(After all, whoever wrote
Stuxnet wouldn’t want it
to take out a roller
coaster or something.)

Once it’s sure, the malicious PLC logic begins its mischief!
Then sleeps for 27 days.
Then slows the spin rate
to 2Hz for 50 mins.
Then sleeps for 27 days.
Stuxnet repeats this
process over and over.
0Hz 1500Hz
Stuxnet raises the spin rate
to 1410Hz for 15 mins.

Why push the motors up to 1410Hz?
0Hz 1500Hz
Well, ~1380Hz is a resonance frequency.
It is believed that operation at this frequency for even a
few seconds will result in disintegration of the enrichment tubes!
Why reduce the motors to 2Hz?
At such a low rotation rate, the vertical enrichment tubes
will begin wobbling like a top (also causing damage).
17

What about Iranian failsafe systems?
(Surely by now you’re thinking that alarm
bells should have been blaring at the
enrichment plant, right?)
Maybe Stuxnet pulled a mission impossible?!?

And in fact, that’s exactly what Stuxnet did!
Well, in fact, these
facilities typically do
have fail-safe controls.
They trigger a shutdown
if the frequency goes out
of the acceptable range.
But worry not…
Stuxnet takes care of
this too.
Stuxnet records telemetry
readings while the
centrifuges are operating
normally.
0Hz 1500Hz
And when it launches its
attack, it sends this
recorded data to fool the
fail-safe systems!
And Stuxnet disables
the emergency kill switch
on the PLC as well…
Just in case someone tries
to be a hero.

All while evading detection…
Stuxnet uses five distinct mechanisms to conceal itself.
#5
Stuxnet hides its own files on infected thumb drives using 2 “rootkits.”
21

#4
Stuxnet inhibits different behaviors in the presence of different
security products to avoid detection.
Launch Attack A
Launch Attack B
Launch Attack C
Launch Attack D
Launch Attack A
Launch Attack B
Launch Attack C
Launch Attack D
Launch Attack A
Launch Attack B
Launch Attack C
Launch Attack D

#3
Stuxnet completely deletes itself from USB keys after it has
spread to exactly three new machines.

#2
Stuxnet’s authors “digitally signed” it with stolen digital certificates
to make it look like it was created by well-known companies.
Realtek
The two certificates
were stolen from
RealTek and Jmicron…
…as it turns out, both
companies are located
less than 1km apart in
the same Taiwanese
business park.

#1
Stuxnet conceals its malicious “code” changes to the PLC
from operational personnel (It hides its injected logic)!
Instructions to the Centrifuges
During normal operation:
Spin at 1410hz
In case of emergency:
IGNORE OPERATOR COMMANDS
PLC
(To centrifuges)

Stuxnet Epidemiology

Did It Succeed?
Well, based on some clever
Symantec engineering, we’ve
got some interesting data.
Fact: As Stuxnet spreads between
computers, it keeps an internal log
of every computer it’s visited.
Fact: Stuxnet contacts two
command-and-control servers
every time it runs to report its
status and check for commands.
www.mypremierfutbol.com
www.todaysfutbol.com
Working with registrars,
Symantec took control of these
domains, forwarding all traffic
to our Symantec data centers.

Stuxnet Bookkeeping
151.21.32.19 151.21.32.21
27.42.97.152
93.154.11.42 93.154.12.78
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.21
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.21
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.21
27.42.97.152
93.154.11.42
93.154.12.78
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.21
151.21.32.19
151.21.32.21
93.154.11.42
Stuxnet embeds its “visited list” inside its own body as it
spreads, enabling detailed forensics!

Here’s What We Found

(These graphs show how the discovered samples spread)
30

31
Data at time of discovery (July, 2010)

67.60
8.10 4.98 2.18 2.18 1.56 1.25
12.15
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
IRAN
SOUTH
KOREA
USA
GREAT
BRITAIN
INDONESIA
TAIWAN
INDIA
OTHERS
Distribution of InfectedSystemswith SiemensSoftware
Data at time of discovery (July, 2010)

Did It Succeed?
Indications are that it did!
The Institute for Science and International Security writes:
“It is increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010,
Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about
9,000 deployed at the site.”
Symantec telemetry indicates that rather than directly
trying to infiltrate Natanz…
These companies (likely) then unknowingly ferried the infection
into Natanz’s research and enrichment networks.
The attackers infected five industrial companies with
potential subcontracting relationships with the plant.
33

Whodunit?
19790509
According to Wikipedia, On May 9th, 1979 “Habib
Elghanian was executed by a firing squad in Tehran
sending shock waves through the closely knit Iranian
Jewish community. He was the first Jew and one of the
first civilians to be executed by the new Islamic
government. This prompted the mass exodus of the
once 100,000 member strong Jewish community of
Iran which continues to this day.”
June 22, 2009 4:31:47pm GMT
June 22, 2009 6:31:47pm Local
GMT + 2

To Conclude
Stuxnet proves cyber-warfare against
physical infrastructure is feasible.
Unfortunately, the same techniques can be used to
attack other physical and virtual systems.
Stuxnet has signaled a fundamental
shift in the malware space.

Thank you!
Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in
the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied,
are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice.
Thank you!
36

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