Download as PDF, PPTX
Uploaded byBusiness incubator HSE
Что-то там про Сторителлинг
The document discusses storytelling techniques and their importance in various contexts, including filmmaking and marketing. It emphasizes the need for engaging presentations that capture attention and convey messages effectively, citing examples from influential figures such as Alfred Hitchcock and Steve Jobs. Additionally, it touches on the dynamics of storytelling in military operations and the impact of economic investment on societal stability.
More Related Content
![Extreme Pitch [UPDATED]](https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/extremepitchstartupweekendhecparis-121118155250-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=640&height=640&fit=bounds)
Similar to Что-то там про Сторителлинг
More from Business incubator HSE
Что-то там про Сторителлинг
- 1. Что-то там про СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ АлексейКаптерев @kapterev
- 3.
- 4.
- 6. СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ storytelling, «рассказывание историй» 1.Жанрискусства 2.Иллюстрация кейсами
- 8. СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ storytelling, «рассказывание историй» 1.Жанрискусства 2.Иллюстрация байками 3.Нарративная структура
- 9.
- 10.
- 11. Чтобы сделать хорошее кино,нужны всего 3 вещи: хороший сценарий, хороший сценарий и хороший сценарий. АЛЬФРЕД ХИЧКОК Режиссер
- 13.
- 15. ? НУ И ЧТО Вамже платят деньги!
- 17. Инвесторы могут бытьпотрясающими людьми с впечатляющим технологическим бэкграундом, но они к тому же очень занятые люди… Представьте, что вы произносите речь передумеренно способными девятиклассниками, чье внимание можно удерживать только очень короткое время, и у которых нет ни глубоких знаний, ни интуиции, чтобы понять вашу идею. ПИТЕР ТИЛЬ Основатель PayPal
- 18. ! ВНИМАНИЕ ОЧЕ НЬ легко ПОТЕРЯТЬ и всеостальное уже не важно
- 19.
- 20.
- 22. После презентации инженера: Зачем ты тратишь мою жизнь?! ДЖЕФФ БЕЗОС CEO Amazon.com
- 23. В ИСТОРИИ ЕСТЬ ДИНА М И К А
- 24.
- 25.
- 27.
- 72. УМЕР МЕЛЬНИК 1-й СЫН 2-йСЫН 3-й СЫН / КОТ РУКАВИЦЫ КОРОЛЬ КРОЛИК КУРОПАТКА ОПЕРАЦИЯ «МК» «ВОРЫ» ПРИНЦЕССА ЖНЕЦЫ КОСЦЫ ЛЮДОЕД ЗАМОК ЛЕВ МЫШЬ КОРОЛЬ 3-Й СЫН+ПРИНЦЕССА=$ КОТ
- 73. iTunes music store presentation SteveJobs, 2003
- 74.
- 76. The most strikingthing about the 17-inch PowerBook, after the screen itself, is how brilliantly Apple managed to shrink the size of the machine built around that big display. Sure, the PowerBook is an unusually wide 15.4 inches, but itis only one inch thick. Yet, it feels solid as a rock. Itis just 10.2 inches deep and weighs only 6.8 pounds. To get an idea of how sleek those dimensions are, compare the new PowerBook with another brand-new laptop, Dell’s Latitude D800. This model also boasts a widescreen display, measuring 15.4 inches diagonally. But, even though the Dell has a significantly smaller screen, it looks like a whale next to the 17-inch PowerBook. — Walt Mossberg, the Wall Street Journal
- 77.
- 80.
- 81.
- 88.
- 89.
- 90.
- 92.
- 93.
- 94. Can anyone topthat?
- 95.
- 97. 10Gb 15Gb 30Gb 2500 songs 3700 songs 7500songs Dock, Case, Remote 299 $ 399 $ 499 $
- 98.
- 100.
- 101.
- 103.
- 104.
- 105. 1 Vast selection 2Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players 4 Unlimited computers 5 Free
- 106. 6 Unreliable downloads 7Unreliable encoding 8 No previews 9 No album cover art 10 It’s stealing
- 107.
- 108.
- 109. PressPlay “You can playyour downloaded songs as long as your membership is active.”
- 110. RHAPSODY “Only subscribers tothe All Access subscription plan at $9.99 per month will get the ability to burn tracks for an additional fee per track.”
- 112.
- 116. Buy downloads Just likeLP’s, cassettes & CDs
- 117. Own music Broad setof personal rights
- 118. Music Store Music downloadsdone right
- 119. 1 Vast selection 2Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players 4 Unlimited computers 5 Free
- 120.
- 122. " The musicbusiness is a cruel and shallow money trench, a long plastic hallway where thieves and pimps run free, and good men die like dogs. There's also a negative side." — Hunter S. Thompson
- 124. Landmark Deals with allBig Five
- 125.
- 126. Unlimited CD burns Forpersonal use
- 127. Unlimited iPods Past, present& future models
- 128. Play on 3Macs We download to one you do the rest
- 129. Use in applications Soundtrackof your life
- 130.
- 131.
- 132.
- 133. 1 Vast selection 200,000songs 2 Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players iPod 4 Unlimited computers Up to 3 Macs 5 Freeper song 99¢
- 134. 6 Unreliable downloads 7Unreliable encoding 8 No previews 9 No album cover art 10 It’s stealing
- 135. You never findone song – you find 50 or 60 songs
- 136. The download isslow as paralysis, then it just craps out halfway through
- 137. After 15 minutesyou finally succeed in getting a clean version of the song
- 138. You spend anhour to get 4 songs that cost $3.96 from Apple
- 139. You’re working for under minimum wage
- 140. You’re stealing – it’sbest not to mess with Karma
- 141. 6 Unreliable downloads 7Unreliable encoding 8 No previews 9 No album cover art 10 It’s stealing
- 143.
- 144. AAC at 128kbps
- 145.
- 146.
- 147. 6 Unreliable downloads Fast,reliable downloads 7 Unreliable encoding Pristine encoding 8 No previews Preview for every song 9 No album cover art Album cover art 10 It’s stealing Good Karma
- 148. 1 200,000 songs 2Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited iPods players 4 Up to 3 Macs 5 99¢ per song
- 149.
- 151.
- 152.
- 153.
- 154.
- 155.
- 156.
- 157.
- 158.
- 160.
- 161.
- 162.
- 163.
- 164. Play on 3Macs
- 165.
- 166.
- 167.
- 168.
- 170. Deliver oceans ofbits fast and reliably Process millions 1-Click of transactions Integrate with popular jukebox Work seamlessly with iPods
- 171.
- 172. U.S. Only To startwith…
- 173.
- 174.
- 175.
- 176.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179. End of theyear
- 180. Video & TVads 15 minutes
- 181.
- 183. UNNOVATIONS POWERBOOK SOFTWARE MUSIC RIP.MIX.BURN ITUNES IPOD GRAMMY LISTEN IPOD CAN ANYONE TOPTHAT? PRICES MANAGE ITUNES 4 THINGS ACQUIRE NAPSTER 5 GOOD THINGS 5 BAD THINGS ITUNES STORE 4+ GOOD THINGS 5 EVEN BETTER THINGS 4 THINGS BETTER STILL ONLY APPLE TODAY ETC
- 185.
- 186.
- 187. МОРАЛЬ Если вы сделаетеХ то будет Y иначе будет Z
- 188. The U.S. Army Afghanistan& Iraq 2009
- 189. Dynamic Planning forCOIN in Afghanistan
- 190. Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace COINoperations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. • Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. • Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents • This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams Support for HN Government
- 191. • An increasein Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development. Coalition Funding • A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Economic Investment Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Economic Development Support for HN Government
- 192. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdownof Essential Services Essential Services Coalition Funding Satisfaction with Essential Services Economic Investment Expectations for Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency • An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. • Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Neutral Populace Economic Development Support for HN Government
- 193. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdownof Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Satisfaction with Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Support for Insurgency Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society • Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. • Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. • Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters. Economic Investment Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to Time to Develop Governance Coalition Funding External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence
- 194. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdownof Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Insurgent to Force Density Ratio significant impacts on • The Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic Investment Essential Services Governance • The populace’s perception of security. Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Time to Develop Essential Services tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Support for Insurgency • The Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density
- 195. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Timeto Develop Essential Services Satisfaction with Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Insurgent to Force Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Time to Develop Governance Economic Investment Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Coalition Funding External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24 Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density
- 196. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdownof Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Insurgent to Force Density Ratio Satisfaction with Essential Services Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Time to Develop Governance Economic Investment Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density The Basic Information Ops Loop Coalition Funding Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density
- 197. Popular Support –Sympathizers and Active Supporters Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR SUPPORT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9 Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Insurgency
- 198. Population Conditions, Beliefs,& Structures Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Perceived Security Page 10 Expectations for Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment
- 199. Population Conditions, Beliefs,& Structures Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perceived Security Page 11 Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Insurgency
- 200. Insurgent Capacity, OutsideSupport/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Insurgent Damages & Casualties Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions Territory Not Under Gov’t Control Havens / Ability to 1 Operate Insurgent Insurgent Coordination Leadership Offensives & Among Ins Factions Training, Skill Presence & Exper (Clear & Hold) Ins Provision of Gov’t & Services Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12 Outside Support / Enablement of Ins. 2 Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Insurgent Terrain Advantage Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower, & ISR Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/ Ins Support for Payment Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth
- 201. Insurgent Capacity, OutsideSupport/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security Page 13 Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Terrain Harshness & Breadth NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment
- 202. Infrastructure, Services, &Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) Legit Agric Production 2 Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Fraction of Workforce and Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit vs Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity 1 Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment & Spending Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Page 14 Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 203. Infrastructure, Services, &Economy Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15 INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 204. Governance – CentralGovernment Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov’t Funding Adequacy Gov’t Training, Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov’t Workforce Skill & Avail Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality & Fairness Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins ’ ’ Overall Gov’t Reach, Execution, Capacity & Investment Gov’t/Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Relative Message Quality Gov’t vs Ins Tax Revenues Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures & Beliefs Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop) © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16
- 205. Governance – CentralGovernment Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Tax Revenues POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17 INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 206. Coalition Resources, Actions,& Impacts and Homeland Support Coalition Knowledge & Understanding of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels) Coalition StratComm/IO US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Gov’t Support for Breadth of Operation Coalition & Support Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory & Aid Coalition Visibility to Population Western Affiliation Backlash Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Coalition Dev. OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid Page 18 Provide Humanitarian Relief
- 207. Coalition Resources, Actions,& Impacts and Homeland Support Ins. Damages & Casualties Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy COALITION Media Sensationalism Bias DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Perceived Security Page 19 Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Coalition Visibility to Population Gov't Funding Adequacy Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coalition Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES US Gov't Support for Operation Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels) OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 208. ANSF Development, Capacity& Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops ANSF & Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Capacity 1 ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Funding Adequacy 2 1 Total Security Force Capacity & focus ANSF Unit Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline & Morale ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time. © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20 Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops
- 209. ANSF Development, Capacity& Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ANSF TACTICAL Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan COALITION COALITION CAPACITY & CAPACITY & PRIORITIES PRIORITIES Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Gov't Funding Adequacy Breadth of Coalition & Support Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Infrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring Targeted Strikes ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Perceived Security Page 21 Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness OUTSIDE SUPPORT OUTSIDE SUPPORT TOTO INSURGENT INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF INSTITUTIONAL Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment COALITION DOMESTIC Gov't/ Contractor SUPPORT Corruption & Coalition SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism Dev.Ops- Media Sensationalism Bias ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ISR / Open Source Ops Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 210. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics = ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ANSF TACTICAL Coalition Knowledge & Underst . of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition ‘COIN Support ’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels) ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population CENTRAL Gov't GOV’T Funding Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail COALITION Media Sensationalism Bias DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force Ins. Targeted by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ TRIBAL Engagement to Integrate Rivalry GOVERNANCE Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Structures& Beliefs Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Tax Revenues Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov vs ’t Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR SUPPORT Neutral/On the Fence NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov vs. ’t Insurgent Path Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Population Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Provide Humanitarian Relief Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Average Connectedness of Population Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF INSTITUTIONAL ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Gov't Support for Operation ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities ISR / Open Source Ops Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment Significant Delay Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT – V3 © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22
- 211. Key Feedback Loop:Securing and Empowering the Population ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops 1 2 ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population alition Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of ov’t visory Afghan Methods Aid Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Policing & Security Ops (Hold) Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov ’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF supporting the actively Strategic Central Gov't Commun/ Government. Institutional & IO Execution Relative WOM Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce Capacity Message Relative t Amplification insurgent ability to target and intimidateMessagepopulation such the ng Gov’t vs Ins Impact Gov’t Gov't acy that Gov’t sympathizersofare willing to be vs Ins active supporters. Integration Gov't Training Western Local Tribal Mentoring, HUMINT: The population will beAffiliation willing to provide intel more Structures Gov't Perception of Vetting, and Backlash Workforce Coalition Intent Hiring if they Skill ¬ fear insurgent repercussions. do Avail & Commitment ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development sparency Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't facilitated Reach,the expansion Strength of by of secure regions. (ANA and cesses & isProfessionalism Religious stments ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or Policy Quality Execution Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Tribal overrun. Investment Ability to Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’vs Ins. Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Reconcile Page 23 Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence S w Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security Services Infrastructure Dev Adequacy Private Workf Skill &
- 212. Key Feedback Loop:Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance han ANSF Institutional & Execution tion Capacity OpsSF sory Aid Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Training, Skill & Experience & Pakistan) Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Critical for the Government to recognize andPerceived the make Gov't Damages/Use of effort toSecurity engage existing tribal Relative structures andForce by Policy Gov’ t & Coalition Perception of Quality & Message Insurgent Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Investment Quality Strength & alition/Homeland Gov’t ’vs Ins. Acceptance of Ties to local governance can gain popular support and Intent fghan Methods rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and Gov't/ANSF Strategic ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability Central Gov't Commun/ Institutional & IO to engage the population. Execution Fear of Ins. Relative WOM ANSF Coalition Funding sibility to Adequacy opulation Capacity Training oring, g, and ring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs v't/ ractor ption & avoritism Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Attack/ Repercussions Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Page 24 Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly N & Illegit A Produc Trad Employ Terrain Harshness & Breadth Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov ’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Retention, Manpower & ISR Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs Rela Econo Opport Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 213. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – SECURITY Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Ins. Damages & Casualties ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26
- 214. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail WORKING DRAFT Ins. Damages & Casualties Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Tax Revenues Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Page 27 Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Reconciliation Effectiveness © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
- 215. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Breadth of Coalition & Support Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28
- 216. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Counter- Narcotics/ Targeted Crime Strikes tends to Damages negative messages more strongly than positive, but also Ops tends to Ins. amplify Fear of Sweep Ops & Casualties Gov’ t/ANSF/ (Clear) be biased towards current sentiments. Coalition ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Repercussions Outside Havens / Government Support/ “Western affiliation backlash” may undermineAbility to Enablement messages if they are Operate of Ins. seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Coordination Ins. Among Ins. Offensives & Insurgent overly Western Not Territory posture Factions Presence Terrain Ins. Insurgent Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) (Clear & Hold) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perceived Security Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief = Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Capacity & Priorities ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT Significant Delay Page 29
- 217. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative & Morale h n ANSF Institutional & Execution n Capacity s- ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism y ANSF alition Funding bility to Adequacy ulation on/Homeland ceptance of an Methods Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Provide Humanitarian Relief Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Fun Ma Sup Insu Popu Sympa w/ Insu T Ha & Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment tor on & oritism Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity ining ng, and g ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and Private Sector Satisfaction availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing Workforce w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail the population. Government message quality has been Security, Services Dev. Adequacy & relative strongerEmploymentto Visible Gains factions (who have typically not insurgent & Sustainment In Security, made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian Services & Employment beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message Expectations Civilia Legit Other credibility. for Security, Servic Production Services, & & Services (SWE Employment Non- Agric Message availability is constrained by low “average Healthc Perceived Educat Security connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most to Private Sector Ability message propagation Capital Move / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to Management, People Infr., Services, Econ. negative messages more strongly than positive, but amplify & Goods Investment & Spending Policy & Execution Rapidly /Perceivedalso tends to be biased towards current sentiments. Fairness “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture Page 30
- 218. Afghanistan Stability /COIN Dynamics – Population Security p cal ty ANSF Capacity & Priorities ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism g Security Ops (Hold) p Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness ty y & ent Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition forces impact perceived security. Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strength of to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active Religious Ideology & supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force Tribal individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural Erosion/ Structures fear this Displacement generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. ecognition/ gagement to In addition to near term security concerns, the population is Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry assessing ‘who will win’ over the Integrate long term by comparing Tribal tructures& perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government Beliefs strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations. Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Page 31 Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Perceived Security I f © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Potential Attractivenes of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Pa Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions Gov't vs Ins and also perception of ‘who will win’tegrationlonger term: Western over of ocal Tribal Affiliation Structures Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Outsid Suppor Enablem of Ins. S i E Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Priv W Ski Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Ability to Move People Private Se Capita Managem Investme
- 219. How to winin Al Anbar
- 220. How to Winthe War in Al Anbar by CPT Trav HI! This is an American Soldier. We'll call him Joe. Joe wants to win in Al Anbar But sometimes it seems like other people don't share that idea. How can Joe win in Al Anbar? By fighting the insurgents?
- 238.
- 239. Debugging UIWebViews and Websiteson iOS Session 600 Timothy Hatcher Safari and WebKit Engineer These are confidential sessions—please refrain from streaming, blogging, or taking pictures
- 241.
- 244.
- 247.
- 248.
- 254. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 255. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 256.
- 258.
- 259.
- 261. Resource Navigator (⌃1) •Frames and resources • Extra scripts • Anonymous scripts
- 263. Storage Navigator (⌃2) •Cookies • Local and session storage • Databases and tables • Application cache
- 265. Instrument Navigator (⌃3) •Timelines Network Requests ■ Layout and Rendering ■ JavaScript and Events • JavaScript profiles ■ • CSS selector profiles
- 267. Search Navigator (⌃4) •Full text resource search • DOM tree search
- 269. Issue Navigator (⌃5) •JavaScript exceptions • Console API errors and warnings • HTML and XML parsing issues • Network errors
- 271. Debug Navigator (⌃6) •Current call stack when paused
- 273. Breakpoint Navigator (⌃7) •Special exception breakpoints • Current resource breakpoints
- 275. Log Navigator (⌃8) •Current log with JavaScript console • Previous logs on reload
- 276.
- 277. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 278. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 279. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 280. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 281. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 282.
- 283. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons
- 284. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons
- 285. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path
- 286. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector
- 287. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector
- 288. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector
- 289. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector • Selection path
- 290. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector • Selection path
- 291. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector • Selection path
- 292. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector • Selection path • DOM node locator button
- 293. Navigation Bar • Sidebartoggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path • Content view selector • Selection path • DOM node locator button
- 294. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 295. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 296.
- 297. Quick Console • Autoexpanding JavaScript console • Object property completion • Debugger controls
- 298. Content Browser andQuick Console
- 299.
- 300.
- 302. Resource Details (⌃⇧1) •MIME-type and resource type • Full URL and components • Query parameters • Request and response headers
- 304. Node Details (⌃⇧2) •Type, name and value • Attributes • DOM properties • Event listeners
- 306. Style Details (⌃⇧3) •Computed style • Style attribute • HTML attributes • Style rules • Base style rules
- 308. Appearance Details (⌃⇧4) •Box model Position ■ Margin ■ Border ■ Padding ■ Content ■
- 310. Application Cache Details •Manifest and frame URLs • Online status
- 312. Scope Chain Details(⌃⇧5) • Local variables • Closure variables • Catch variables • With properties • Global variables
- 313.
- 315. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 316. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 317.
- 321.
- 326.
- 327.
- 328.
- 329.
- 330.
- 331.
- 332.
- 334.
- 335.
- 336.
- 337. Inspection and Tweaking Summary •Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more!
- 338. Inspection and Tweaking Summary •Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more! • Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle
- 339. Inspection and Tweaking Summary •Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more! • Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle • Hover DOM nodes to highlight the CSS boxes
- 340. Inspection and Tweaking Summary •Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more! • Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle • Hover DOM nodes to highlight the CSS boxes • Double-click to edit CSS and DOM nodes
- 341. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 342. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 343.
- 345.
- 346.
- 347.
- 348.
- 349.
- 354.
- 355.
- 356. Performance Analysis Summary • Alwaystest cell network performance
- 357. Performance Analysis Summary • Alwaystest cell network performance • Minimize the number of resources and large resources
- 358. Performance Analysis Summary • Alwaystest cell network performance • Minimize the number of resources and large resources • Minify JavaScript and avoid large libraries
- 359. Performance Analysis Summary • Alwaystest cell network performance • Minimize the number of resources and large resources • Minify JavaScript and avoid large libraries • Use asynchronous or deferred script loading
- 360. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 361. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 362.
- 366.
- 369.
- 370.
- 371.
- 372. Debugging Issues Summary • Nolonger is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box
- 373. Debugging Issues Summary • Nolonger is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box • Call functions instead of passing large scripts
- 374. Debugging Issues Summary • Nolonger is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box • Call functions instead of passing large scripts • Evaluate in the Quick Console using the current scope
- 375. What You’ll Learn •Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues
- 376. More Information Vicki Murley SafariTechnologies Evangelist vicki@apple.com Safari Dev Center http://developer.apple.com/safari Apple Developer Forums http://devforums.apple.com
- 377. Related Sessions Optimizing WebContent in UIWebViews and Websites on iOS Marina Tuesday 4:30PM Delivering Web Content on High Resolution Displays Nob Hill Wednesday 11:30AM Advanced Effects with HTML5 Media Technologies Marina Thursday 2:00PM
- 378. Labs Safari and WebTools Lab Safari & Web Lab Wednesday 2:00PM Web Content Optimization Lab Safari & Web Lab Wednesday 3:15PM Safari and WebKit Open Lab Safari & Web Lab Thursday 3:15PM
- 379.
- 380. Summary • Web Inspectoris now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app
- 381. Summary • Web Inspectoris now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app • Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS
- 382. Summary • Web Inspectoris now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app • Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS • Web Inspector has a new streamlined user interface
- 383. Summary • Web Inspectoris now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app • Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS • Web Inspector has a new streamlined user interface • Be informed when debugging your site and app’s web content
- 384.
- 386.
- 387. МОРАЛЬ Если вы сделаетеХ то будет Y иначе будет Z
- 388. Герой Цель Проблема Злодей Решение Цена Мораль Я сам? Клиент?Клиент клиента? Чего хочет герой? Почему он не может без этого жить? Кто ему мешает? В чем инсайт? Какова цена решения? В чем призыв к действию?
- 389.
- 390. История — путешествие в поискахистины. ПИТЕР ДАНН Сценарист и писатель
- 391.
- 392.
- 393.
- 394.
- 395.
- 396. Вообще говоря, сценаристы должныписать то, что их «зажигает», а не то что кажется им коммерческим сейчас. ДЭВИД ФРЕНДЛИ Продюсер
- 397. K ALEXEI KAPTEREV www.kapterev.com License: CC,Attribution, Share Alike | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/