This document discusses how the prisoner's dilemma challenges global cooperation on net-zero emissions transitions. It argues that international collaboration can help establish incentives that encourage long-term sustainability and competitiveness. Broad collaboration across finance, trade, and development policies could help overcome short-term thinking by creating new incentives that make continued cooperation more beneficial than defection. This would support establishing a new equilibrium where whole-system decision-making drives synergistic climate action globally.

1. Bangkok, Thailand / Page 1 (2) Edition: April 18, 2022
Solving Dilemma of Global Net-Zero Transition
Prisoner's Dilemma and Implications to Net-Zero Transition on the
Premise of International Collaboration
Siripong Treetasanatavorn
Sloan Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Solving Net-Zero's Prisoner's Dilemma:
• Challenges: Establishment of Nash equilibrium substantive to constructive
climate action is a key imperative of global climate negotiation by all in the
international community. But practical challenge on the ground is oftentimes
characterized by suboptimal short-run payoff values that in turn complicate
international negotiation processes, despite perspective of stronger forward-
looking outlook beyond the business-as-usual scenario (top-left quadrant¹).
• Pathways Forward: But factor conditions quality infrastructure and structural
reform, particularly with the economies of scale and scope from broad-based,
international collaboration are indispensable in shifting and transforming the
negotiation dynamics,² notably on the premise of structural efficiency gain in
shared dialog of long-run sustainability and competitiveness, thereby mutually
reinforcing incentive that engages and transforms net-zero mitigation payoff
to the benefit of reciprocal international climate action (bottom-right quadrant).

2. S. Treetasanatavorn. Solving Dilemma of Global Net-Zero Transition
Edition: April 18, 2022 Bangkok, Thailand / Page 2 (2)
• Governance Highgrounds: Prisoner's dilemma after all can be overcome at
outstanding causes once collaboration takes place in broadest-possible terms
(considering globally orchestrated choices of finance, trade and development)
especially across short- and long-run views, thereby disincentivizing reneging
or walk-away, considering notably in establishment of a new Nash equilibrium
that wins global synergic action with integrated whole-of-ecosystem decision³.
References (in appearance order):
1. See the relevance of prisoner's dilemma in greater climate negotiation context from
the Financial Times (2020): https://www.ft.com/content/5312691c-3d3c-11ea-b232-
000f4477fbca
2. See substantive roles of development and finance in the negotiation at COP26
(2021): https://unfccc.int/news/cop26-reaches-consensus-on-key-actions-to-address-
climate-change
3. See discussion of carbon pricing and the implications of climate mitigation with
sense-making views of international collaboration at the IMF (2021):
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications /fandd/issues/2021/09
(Inspired by Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University)