Hardware trojan detection technique using side channel analysis for hardware security

Detection of Hardware Trojans using Side Channel
Analysis
Presented by
Ashish Maurya
(2015vlsi-13)
ABV-Indian Institute of Information Technology and Management Gwalior,
Morena Link Road, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, INDIA - 474015.
January 7, 2016
Presented by Ashish Maurya(2015vlsi-13) ABV-IIITM January 7, 2016 1 / 32

Contents
1 Introduction
2 Detection Techniques
3 Conclusion
4 References

Introduction
Electronic systems available in today’s commercial, industrial and military sectors are
massive networks of ICs.
A part or whole of the IC supply chain is situated on diﬀerent land, which is not
under surveillance.
This provides an opportunity for an adversary to embed functionality not stated in
the speciﬁcation of the device.
With HT an adversary can extract the secret information by exploiting a physical
modality i.e.
- Power consumption,
- Delay,
- Electromagnetic emission
of the hardware that executes the target application.

Introduction(contd.)
Figure: General structure of Hardware Trojan
The trigger acts like a sensing circuitry, which activates a Trojan to perform a
speciﬁc task.
The payload is responsible for the malicious activity of the Trojan or eﬀect of the
Trojan.

Figure: Diﬀerent Payload insertion approaches

Figure: Trojans with capability of leaking secret information from inside a crypto chip through
power side channels
MOLES circuit is designed to consume data-dependent power as a power
side-channel to leak multi-bit secret keys.

Side-channels are the inherent physical properties of a running IC, including timing,
power consumption, electromagnetic radiation and even sound wave.
During testing or normal operation, for a very brief period of time the Trojan circuit
may receive input patterns which activate some of its gates.
Occurrence of signal transition at the input of the Trojan gates is very likely to cause
power or delay variation.
Side channel analysis though promising, must deal with major challenges due to rare
activating nets in the circuit, process variations, and measurement noise.

To improve the eﬀectiveness of these detection methods, ICs must be designed with
some detection strategies in mind.
Trust must be considered as an important design criterion in the design ﬂow of
modern ICs instead of being an afterthought.
A golden or Trojan free IC signature is required for comparison purpose in many of
these side channel analysis.
Such signature might be obtained by destructive reverse engineering approach or
from the software simulation of the original design.

Detection Techniques
DETECTION USING POWER ANALYSIS
Source: Assessment of NAND based ring oscillator for hardware Trojan detection,
IEEE 58th International Midwest Symposium 2015 Circuits and Systems
(MWSCAS), 2015
DETECTION USING ACTIVE CURRENT SENSING CIRCUIT
Source: A Cluster-Based Distributed Active Current Sensing Circuit for Hardware
Trojan Detection, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, VOL. 9,
NO. 12, DECEMBER 2014

Detection using Power Analysis
Assuming..
- All ICs can be tested under the same temperature,
- The environmental variation will not be considered in this work.
The detection of Trojans using power based analysis, NOT and NAND gate based
ring oscillator (RO) network models are used.
Figure: NOT gate based RO

Detection using Power Analysis(contd.)
NAND gate based RO as a power monitor which is more sensitive to voltage
ﬂuctuation shows that the impact of Trojans on the frequency of nearby ROs is
noticeably larger,which is helpful in detection of the Trojan.
If two gates share the same VDD line, transition induced noise in one gate impacts
the supply voltage of the other gate .
Taking advantage of this behavior, it was surmised that any addition or removal of
gates should impact the nearby RO which is sourced by the VDD line connected to
the tempered area of the IC.
Figure: NAND gate based RO

Detection using Power Analysis (contd.)
The delay of each gate varies according to parameters such as temperature, supply
voltage (VDD), load capacitance (CL), threshold voltage (Vth),channel length (L),
oxide thickness (Tox), and transistor channel width (W).
Power suppy noise which is also called voltage drop impacts the delay of gates.
f =
1
2 ∗ n ∗ td
(1)
The delay of the gates will change when voltage fluctuate.
This change in delay results some effect on oscillation frequency.
So for same input pattern, power supply noise will affect differently to Trojan free IC
and having Trojan IC.

Adopted Trojan circuit for analysis
Figure: Single stage of trojan design
Four similar stages constitute the Trojan design, these 20 Trojan gates are placed in
the 10 empty slices that were kept empty in the Trojan Free version of CUA.
The ﬁrst stage of the Trojan obtains input from the LFSR and the rest of the stages
are supplied by the output of the previous stage.
Such design of Trojan guarantees partial activation during the circuit operation
which should impact the nearby ROs.

Experimental Setup and RO controller
Figure: Experimental Setup
Figure: RO controller

Ring Oscillator Network
Figure: RO network implemented over CUA on FPGA

Ring Oscillator Network(contd.)
Figure: NOT gate RO network
RO is inserted in every grid surrounded by power straps.
Each RO stage can be implemented between the VDD and VSS line.
A decoder and multiplexer are used to select which ring oscillator is measured.

Ring Oscillator Network(contd.)
RON is developed with the ability to detect Trojans that cause power fluctuations,
thereby uncovering the malicious inclusion.
A number of ring oscillators (ROs) acting as power monitors, distributed across the
entire IC.
The output of each ring oscillator represents one part of the power signature of the
entire IC.
The number of ring oscillators, N-RO, could be adjusted according to the size of the
IC and sensitivity to Trojans.
The output of RON in Trojan-free ICs generates a power signature.
Data analysis is used to effectively distinguish the power differences caused by
Trojans from those of process variations, and identifies hardware Trojans inserted
into the IC.

HT detection Flow
Figure: Flow Graph

Result
Figure: Comparison of trojan impact on NAND and NOT gate based RO
The results indicate the eﬀectiveness of the NAND gate based RO network when
ring oscillators located closer to the Trojan undergo a higher percentage of variation
in frequency, compared to the NOT gate based RO.

DETECTION USING ACTIVE CURRENT SENSING CIRCUIT
Source: A Cluster-Based Distributed Active Current Sensing Circuit for Hardware Trojan
Detection, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, VOL. 9, NO. 12,
DECEMBER 2014

Detection using Active Current Sensing Circuit
Figure: HT with no delay impact
The main challenge encountered by delay-based side channel analysis is the Trojan
can be inserted in such a manner that there is no diﬀerence in external delay
measurement.
Since the Trojan logics are embedded along the path in parallel, it is unlikely that
the delay-based side channel analysis will pick up any anomaly in timing path from
the primary input PI1 or PI2 to primary output PO.

Detection using Active Current Sensing Circuit(contd.)
Figure: HT with no switching power impact
Figure shows an AND gate whose inputs are from the most signiﬁcant bits of a
counter.
The Trojan can be triggered only after the counter has run for a much longer time
than any standard test time.
To realize the triggering mechanism, the inputs of the Trojan are connected to some
existing logic nodes of the original design.
It increase the path delay and switching activity duration even if the Trojan remains
dormant, this can be considered as a special case of Trojan with low switching
activity.

Current Sensing Circuit
Active current sensing circuit is used to extract a signature that encapsulates both
the timing and amplitude of switching activity from the transient power supply
current for HT detection.
Figure: Schematic of the current sensing to path delay monitoring circuit

Current Sensing Circuit(contd.)
The current sensing detector is built with a calibrator to adjust the current
comparator threshold against process variations.
When the current sensing HT is activated during normal circuit operation, the
measured characteristics of the power trace will change dramatically to alert for
anomalies.

Current Sensing Circuit(contd.)
The dynamic IR-drop across the on-resistance R(on) of the sleep transistor M(sleep)
can be sensed to provide the visibility of the active current for the CUT.
The dynamic current is mirrored to a current comparator to produce two voltage
transitions that will mark the path delay.
The comparator output is latched into a scannable flip-flop.
The latched output is propagated to an external output pin by daisy chaining the
scan flip-flops of all detectors.
The delay transition of the comparator output from each detector can be determined
from the corresponding scanned output by varying the phase shift between the
system clock and the sampling clock of the scan chain in the detectors.

Current mirror
When the sleep transistor M(sleep) is turned on initially, the gate voltage V(sleep)
will be 0.
When there is no current drawn by the CUT, the gate-source voltages of the
transistor pair (M1-M2) are equal.
The mirrored current is given by:
Im ≈ Ron(2µpCox
W
L
I1
3
)
1
2 (1 +
Icut
I1
) (1)
The on-resistance Formula for an NMOS transistor is given by:
Ron = 1/(µnCOX W /L)(VGS − Vt ) (2)

Current comparator
The current comparator compares the mirrored current against the quiescent current
comparator threshold to produce a high output voltage level.
The response time is improved at the expense of a reduced output voltage swing.
Therefore, an inverting stage is needed to restore its rail-to-rail output.
Figure: Schematic of the current comparator circuit

HT detection flow
Figure: HT detection ﬂow

General view of HT detector
Six virtual power clusters are considered in simulation.
The proposed detector is added into the CUT of each cluster.
Figure: HT detector with six virtual-power clusters

Conclusion
It is inherently diﬃcult for an attacker to remove the ring oscillator network, due to
(i) Its distributed placement throughout the entire IC and
(ii) The expected measurement results from each ring oscillator.
One major advantage of side channel analysis is the Trojans can be detected without
being fully triggered.
The circuit containing large no. of paths, trojan cannot be detected by these
detectors.
One of the critical issues regarding the side channel analysis method is the eﬀect of
process and environmental variation and measurement noise.

References
Y. Cao, C.-H. Chang, and S. Chen, “A cluster-based distributed active current
sensing circuit for hardware trojan detection,” Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, no. 12, pp. 2220–2231, Dec 2014.
T. Hoque, M. Mustapa, F. Amsaad, and M. Niamat, “Assessment of nand based
ring oscillator for hardware trojan detection,” in Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS),
2015 IEEE 58th International Midwest Symposium on, Aug 2015, pp. 1–4.
A. Ferraiuolo, X. Zhang, and M. Tehranipoor, “Experimental analysis of a ring
oscillator network for hardware trojan detection in a 90nm asic,” in Computer-Aided
Design (ICCAD), 2012 IEEE/ACM International Conference on, Nov 2012, pp.
37–42.
S. K. Haider, C. Jin, M. Ahmad, D. M. Shila, O. Khan, and M. van Dijk, “Hatch: A
formal framework of hardware trojan design and detection,” Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2014/943, 2014, http://eprint.iacr.org/.

Thank You

Hardware trojan detection technique using side channel analysis for hardware security

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