Session 10: Better biosecurity risk management through collaborative planning and shared decision making
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Planning and decision making to manage plant biosecurity risks is inherently complex, often contentious, involves unknowns and uncertainty, and needs to be adaptable to rapidly changing situations. The aim of this project is to develop a collaborative planning and shared decision making framework that will result in better and faster decisions to respond more quickly to plant biosecurity risks, resulting in reduced impacts and costs, and more equitable and favourable outcomes for stakeholders and affected parties.
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Session 10: Better biosecurity risk management through collaborative planning and shared decision making
- 1. biosecurity built on science Better plant biosecurity risk management through collaborative planning and shared decision making Suzy Perry and Rebecca Laws Principal Scientist and Research Scientist Plant Biosecurity, Biosecurity Queensland Plant Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre PBCRC 4115
- 2. biosecurity built on science For more information, please email suzy.perry@daf.qld.gov.au or rebecca.laws@daf.qld.gov.au Suzy Perry (DAF)^ Rebecca Laws (DAF)@ Mike Ashton (DAF)* Kim Ritman (DAWR)* Rodney Turner (PHA)* Craig Jennings (DAF) Jim Pekin (ABGC)* Michelle McKinlay (ABGC)* Andrew Bishop (DPIPWE)* PBCRC4115 Project team Darren Phillips (DPIPWE) Lois Ransom (DAWR)* Rebecca Sapuppo (DAF) Ceri Pearce(DAF) John McDonald (NGIA)* Fiona Macbeth* (Blackwoodkemp) David Teulon (PFRNZ)* Garry Hill (PFRNZ) Ken Pegg (DAF) Lindy Coates (DAF) Cathy Robinson (CSIRO) Wendy Coombs (DEDJTR) Gabrielle Vivian-Smith (DEDJTR)*# ^ Project leader @ Postdoctoral research scientist * Project mentor network # Project end-user advocate
- 3. biosecurity built on science Biosecurity planning and decision making: - Is inherently complex - Is often contentious - Is affected by competing priorities - Involves unknowns and uncertainty - Involves consideration of a large amount of diverse information - Needs to be adaptable to rapidly changing situations - Is subject to considerable time pressure Required by international standards to be 'science-based’ and informed by risk analysis Inevitably also influenced by other factors such as political or social pressures; or operational or legal constraints Biosecurity decision making is complex
- 4. biosecurity built on science A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager Dr Kim Ritman (ACPPO) and Mike Ashton (CPHM, Qld) at the Panama disease TR4 emergency response Local Control Centre (LCC) (April 2015)
- 5. biosecurity built on science A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager Prevention Preparedness Diagnostics Ongoing management Market access Surveillance Response Control & containment
- 6. biosecurity built on science A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager Prevention Preparedness Diagnostics Ongoing management Market access Surveillance Response Control & containment Planning and decision makingPlanning and decision making
- 7. biosecurity built on science analyse large amounts of diverse scientific, technical and practical information and account for information gaps and unknowns deal with high levels of uncertainty, competing priorities, and potentially conflicting interests amongst stakeholders take an iterative approach to adapt and respond to a dynamic and often rapidly changing situation ensure that plans and decisions can be implemented from a policy, operational, logistical, legal and social perspective ensure plans align with relevant legal requirements, national and international obligations, policies, standards etc. develop and implement the plans and decisions under considerable time pressure and within significant resource constraints ensure that plans are comprehensively, recorded, documented and reviewed Plant biosecurity decision makers must be able to:
- 8. biosecurity built on science analyse large amounts of diverse scientific, technical and practical information and account for information gaps and unknowns deal with high levels of uncertainty, competing priorities, and potentially conflicting interests amongst stakeholders take an iterative approach to adapt and respond to a dynamic and often rapidly changing situation ensure that plans and decisions can be implemented from a policy, operational, logistical, legal and social perspective ensure plans align with relevant legal requirements, national and international obligations, policies, standards etc. develop and implement the plans and decisions under considerable time pressure and within significant resource constraints ensure that plans are comprehensively, recorded, documented and reviewed Plant biosecurity decision makers must be able to: There is rarely an ‘ideal’ plan or decision option, so decision makers must be able to analyse and evaluate all of the risk management options; and often have to then make trade-offs in determining the most appropriate course of action.
- 9. biosecurity built on science An integrated planning and decision making system for plant biosecurity risk management
- 10. biosecurity built on science Panama disease is one of the most destructive plant diseases ever recorded In Australia, Panama disease TR4 was first detected in the NT in 1997, and then in north Qld in 2015 No effective disease control measures No immediate replacements for Cavendish Affects all commercial cultivars of banana Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
- 11. biosecurity built on science Decision criteria and management options identified Decision tools developed (argument tree and decision tree) and evaluated by decision makers through scenario workshops Multiple meetings with policy, scientific, technical and operational staff, to gather input Decision criteria refined and updated Tool helped decision makers identify true decision criteria Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
- 12. biosecurity built on science Factors influencing the spread of Panama TR4 from an infested site Number of diseased plants detected at the infested site Density of plants at the infested site Location of diseased plants in the landscape Position of infected plants within block Direction of rows across block Rainfall events Irrigation Factors influencing the spread from an infested block to the wider farm Number of diseased plants previously found on the property Quarantine and disinfection procedures in place between blocks within the farm Irrigation Factors influencing the likelihood that the disease will spread to other farms Distance from boundary of adjoining banana farm Slope gradient and direction in relation to adjoining farms or shared irrigation channels Distance from public or shared private road Factors influencing the impact of the protocol on the grower Size of the block and the farm Continuing impact of biosecurity activities on farm Factors influencing the ability for Biosecurity Queensland to implement and enforce the strategy Legal and regulatory ability to enforce the destruction protocol Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
- 13. biosecurity built on science Factors influencing the spread of Panama TR4 from an infested site Number of diseased plants detected at the infested site Density of plants at the infested site Location of diseased plants in the landscape Position of infected plants within block Direction of rows across block Rainfall events Irrigation Factors influencing the spread from an infested block to the wider farm Number of diseased plants previously found on the property Quarantine and disinfection procedures in place between blocks within the farm Irrigation Factors influencing the likelihood that the disease will spread to other farms Distance from boundary of adjoining banana farm Slope gradient and direction in relation to adjoining farms or shared irrigation channels Distance from public or shared private road Factors influencing the impact of the protocol on the grower Size of the block and the farm Continuing impact of biosecurity activities on farm Factors influencing implementation and enforcement the strategy Legal and regulatory ability to enforce the destruction protocol Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response Only 3 Key Factors Number of diseased plants on the block Size of the block Ability of BQ to implement and enforce destruction area
- 14. biosecurity built on science Five possible disease management options were evaluated: 1. Destruction of the entire farm 2. Destruction of the whole block 3. Destruction of part of a block 4. Destruction of banana plants within a 10 m radius 5. No destruction of banana plants Only two disease management options were considered: • Destruction of the whole block • Destruction of banana plants within a 10 m radius 2. Considered the importance of allowing the grower to maintain a livelihood, when more extensive destruction was unlikely to impact on the build up of disease inoculum 3. Strategies were based on known disease epidemiology Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
- 15. biosecurity built on science Arguments Sub-arguments Evidence Source of Evidence The low inoculum load on the block doesn’t require destruction of the whole block to prevent high inoculum loads on the whole farm Sub argument – The are insufficient clusters of infected plants (six or more plants all of which are within 20 m of at least one other plant in the group) to indicate that the level of inoculum on the block is high In a block smaller than 10 hectares there is no more than one cluster Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4 In a block 10-20 hectares there are no more than two clusters In a block larger than 20 hectares there are no more than three clusters Sub argument – There are insufficient individual infected plants in the block to indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are fewer than 15 infected plants Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4 In a block 10-20 hectares there are fewer than 30 infected plants In a block larger than 20 hectares there are fewer than 60 infected plants High inoculum load in the block means that the whole block should be destroyed to prevent the inoculum from spreading and infecting more plants. Sub-argument - The number of clusters of infected plants (six or more plants all of which are within 20 m of at least one other plant in the group) indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high. In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are two or more clusters Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4In a block 10-20 hectares there are three or more clusters In a block 20 or more hectares there are four or more clusters Sub-argument – The number of individual infected plants in the block indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high Evidence - In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are 15 or more infected plants Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4 In a block 10-20 hectares there are 30 or more infected plants In a block larger than 20 hectares there are 60 or more infected plants BQ has the ability to enforce the destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants Evidence - BQ has the legal and regulatory authority to enforce destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants Evaluation of the situation against the provisions of the current legislation Evidence - BQ has the resourcing to enforce and oversee the destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant Evaluation of the logistical requirements of the destruction BQ doesn’t have the ability to enforce the destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants Evidence - BQ doesn’t have the legal and regulatory authority to enforce destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant Evaluation of the situation against the provisions of the current legislation Evidence - BQ doesn’t have the resourcing to enforce and oversee the destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant Evaluation of the logistical requirements of the destruction Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
- 16. biosecurity built on science PBCRC4115 project outcomes More informed decision making that integrates scientific, technical and practical knowledge Better decision making that factors in political, social and economic values More likely acceptance of the decision making outcomes Adaptation towards shared responsibility in plant biosecurity risk management Improved risk management practices and strategies
- 17. biosecurity built on science End-users and beneficiaries National and state plant health managers Government agricultural and environmental agencies Plant industry leaders and managers, and growers End-users will be able to better manage plant biosecurity risks, with a logical and analytical planning and decision mass.
- 18. biosecurity built on science “In our multi-disciplinary team, the development of the argument trees (and the associated discussion during their development) provided a valuable interface between science, policy and regulatory views. In a fast-paced regulatory environment, it is not only important to arrive at a decision point, but to ensure that you consider each question in a way that is flexible, relevant, documented and defensible.” End-user’s perspective Rebecca Sapuppo (Program leader, Panama TR4 Program)
Editor's Notes
- Plant Biosecurity CRC project 4115 ‘Collaborative planning and shared decision making amongst stakeholders in plant biosecurity risk management’.
- PBCRC project team A network of project mentors has been formed to lead the development and adoption of the collaborative planning and shared decision making framework. This mentor network was designed to include (i) end-users; (ii) senior managers with a high level of interest and influence in plant biosecurity; and (iii) representatives of different plant biosecurity stakeholder groups. The mentor network includes Australia’s Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPO), Dr Kim Ritman, who is the primary representative and advisor to the Australian Government on all matters relating to plant health and plant biosecurity in Australia. Several members of the mentor network also fulfil the role of Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) for their state or territory and have the responsibility for plant biosecurity planning and decision making on a day to day basis, across a broad range of issues. Other members of the mentor network are in senior management roles and responsible for coordinating government and industry plant health and biosecurity activities at the national or state level.
- Planning and decision making to manage plant biosecurity risks is inherently complex, often contentious, involves unknowns and uncertainty, and needs to be adaptable to rapidly changing situations. International obligations as a member of the WTO and a signatory to the SPS Agreement International standards for risk management in plant health developed through the IPPC Australia’s biosecurity system Plant health legislation at the national and state levels Roles and responsibilities of governments and industry Biosecurity reform initiatives, such as the IGAB which aims to develop a national risk-based decision making and investment framework based on risk return, transparent and objective decision making procedures, and joint decision making and co-investment
- Dr Kim Ritman, is Australia’s Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACCPO) and is primary representative and advisor to the Australian Government on all matters relating to plant health and plant biosecurity in Australia. Mike Ashton is General Manager for Plant Biosecurity (and Product Integrity) in Biosecurity Queensland (DAF) and also in this role is the Chief Plant Health Manager for Queensland.
- Leading and managing specialised plant health and biosecurity services at the state and national levels Ensuring that appropriate risk management strategies are in place to effectively respond to plant biosecurity incidents Prioritising resources and activities to mitigate high risk plant biosecurity threats Ensuring that appropriate policy frameworks are in place to effectively manage the prevention, preparedness, surveillance, diagnostics, emergency response and ongoing management relating to plant biosecurity threats Developing and maintaining productive relationships, networks and partnerships with stakeholders, including government, community and industry leaders to facilitate effective plant health and biosecurity outcomes
- Scalable to different levels of strategic, contingency, operational, tactical planning and decision making
- The key requirements for the collaborative planning and shared decision making framework must align with the operating environment for plant biosecurity i.e. the international agreements and standards for risk management and within the context of the national biosecurity system. The framework will be developed based on the evaluation and adaptation of existing frameworks for risk analysis, risk management, planning and decision making, stakeholder engagement, and risk governance; and to meet end-user requirements. Scientific and risk based (or risk informed) Considers the potential economic, social, and environmental impacts Properly aligned with policies, practices, standards and procedures Aligned with relevant legal requirements, and national and international obligations Flexible enough to be used in a wide range of different circumstances Simple and able to be applied quickly Robust even when little information is available well informed by all relevant knowledge and information well informed by professional judgement robust even when little information is available applied in a timely manner necessary and proportionate to the risk technically feasible cost beneficial considers the potential economic, social, and environmental impacts properly aligned with policies, practices, standards and procedures aligned with relevant legal requirements, and national and international obligations flexible enough to be used in a wide range of different circumstances based on an open and consultative process well communicated and include meaningful engagement with stakeholders sound administrative decisions resource efficient comprehensively documented and recorded in accordance with any conflict of interest
- The two remaining disease management options that were considered, and used to evaluate the decision tools were: 2. Destruction of the whole block on which an infected plant/s is/are detected Destruction of banana plants within a 10m radius around infected plant/s These two remaining levels of plant destruction that were considered as possible disease management options were based on Panama disease management strategies carried out historically, and founded on the biology and epidemiology of the disease.
- Who will benefit from your research? Who will directly use your research? National and state plant health managers Agricultural, environmental and other government agencies Plant industry leaders and managers, and growers How will you deliver it to end-users? End-users have been involved in the project since its inception, to determine the project objectives, deliverables and outcomes They also oversight the project through the mentor network The project will be delivered to end-users as a ‘decision making handbook for plant biosecurity’, and through workshops and training in the framework and decision making tools How will they use your research? End-users will be able to better manage plant biosecurity risks, with a logical and analytical planning and decision making process.