Sensor Networks or Smart Artifacts?
An Exploration of Organizational Issues of an
Industrial Health and Safety Monitoring System


Gerd Kortuem
David Alford
Linden Ball
Jerry Busby                          Computing Department
Nigel Davies                         Psychology Department
Christos Efstratiou                     Management School
Joe Finney
Marian Iszatt White
Katharina Kinder                 Lancaster University
What role can Ubiquitous Computing play?
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Designing for People and Organizations                              The NEMO Project
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Shareholders /
                   Legal & Government Agencies                                                Society
                                                                     Clients



              Health & Safety          Health & Safety              Business                  Social
               Regulations              Compliance                  pressure                 pressure


             Organization



                 Health and Safety System


                                                                   Actors
                        Policies &          Assessment
                         Rules              Procedures


                                                                               Management
                            Training        Surveilance



                                              Data
                        Equipment
                                             Records                    Operative      Supervisor




    Designing for People and Organizations                                                          The NEMO Project
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Shareholders /
                   Legal & Government Agencies                                                Society
                                                                     Clients



              Health & Safety          Health & Safety              Business                  Social
               Regulations              Compliance                  pressure                 pressure


             Organization



                 Health and Safety System


                                                                   Actors
                        Policies &          Assessment
                         Rules              Procedures


                                                                               Management
                            Training        Surveilance



                                              Data
                        Equipment
                                             Records                    Operative      Supervisor




    Designing for People and Organizations                                                          The NEMO Project
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Technology
                   Design process
                   Challenges & lessons




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
NEMO Drill                                                          NEMO Dosimeter
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
all daily trigger tim
                                                                short-term exposu
                                                                 Duration of use
                                                                exposure action).
                                                                        (measured)


                                                                average daily expo
                                                                 Vibration characteristics
                                                                        (known for each equipment,
                                                                        measured by manufacturer)



                                                                            • Daily exposu
                                                                        Soil condition
                                                                        (assumed)


                                                                            •Exposure exposu
                                                                        Actual
                                                                               Daily
                                                                                     ?
                                                                A(8) is defined as
                                                                        Maximum Legal Exposure

Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk                ahv = actual
Drill-Dosimeter pairing determined by proximity



Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Network node
                      Sensor component
                      Actuator component
                      ( including displays)

                                                           Enterprise
                                                            System




                                              In-Vehicle                     Intermittent
                                                System                     communication




                               Figure 2: HAV monitoring system                                            Figur


Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - the NEMO system is to
                       A key issue for kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk         ensure that vibra-   on user input makes
Technology
               ‣ Design process
                   Challenges & lessons




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Design process




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Design process




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Design process




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Design process




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Technology
                   Design process
               ‣ Challenges & lessons




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Invisible Risks
                                              Risk perception is poor




               Lesson 1: Shift from H&S compliance to increasing awareness
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Self-Image and Social Pressure
                                    Safety equipment often not used




         Lesson 2: Personal and social “invisibility” becomes key design goal
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Past Experiences & Narratives
                      GPS had been experienced as surveillance technology




                Lesson 3: Technology narrative should be part of the design
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Developers’ Blind-spot


      (a) Wider organizational aspects are perceived to be of low importance
             (organizational culture, re-distribution of power, organizational disruption,
             societal issues, privacy and security concerns)

      (b) Even organizational issues that are considered to be of importance
          often do not actually influence the design process




 Günter, H., Grote, G. & Boos, D. (2006): Organizational issues in ubiquitous computing, Paper presented at 22nd EGOS
 Colloquium, Bergen, July 06-08.
 Boos, D., Günter., H., & Grote, G. (2007): Organizational issues, technological frames and the development of a new
 ubiquitous computing prototype, Paper presented at 23nd EGOS Colloquium, Vienna, Austria, July 05-07.
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Technology Archetypes
            Developers view problem in light of well-known system models




                   Sensor network                                       Smart artifacts
                   (sensing + data)                                      (interaction)
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Technology Archetypes
                      Different system models imply different H&S solutions


             Enterprise
                                              Management
              System



                                                                                      Personal
                                Exception                                             Health &
                                 reports                                               Safety
                                                                                       Record
                   Health &
                 Safety Rules

                                Data logs                  Feedback

                                                                        Operative's              Context-sensitive
               Automatic                                                 behavior                    notices
              data capture      Operatives'
                                 behavior




                                              Operatives




                   Sensor-network                                          Smart-artifact
                 inspired H&S system                                    inspired H&S system
                      (top-down)                                            (bottom-up)
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Sensor Network      Smart Artifact


            Risk perception                            unchanged          increased


              Trust in rules                           unchanged          increased

            Intelligibility
                                                            low             high
      (information awareness)

              Surveillance                              increased        unchanged


         Provable compliance                            supported       not supported

        Well intentioned rule
                                                      more difficult     unchanged
              violations

           Rule formulation                             more rigid        more rigid


        Behavior-based safety                        not supported        supported

Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Display Matters
                    Unit w/o display was perceived as surveillance technology




                     Sensor-network                                        Smart-artifact
                   inspired H&S system                                  inspired H&S system
Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Behavior-based Safety
                     Operatives as source of expertise and behavioral change




                      Personal
                                                                                      Personal
                      Health &
                                                                                      Health &
                       Safety
                                                                                       Safety
                       Record
                                                                                       Record



       Operative's               Context-sensitive
                                                                        Operative's              Context-sensitive
        behavior                     notices
                                                                         behavior                    notices




                                                 Collaborative safety

Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Points to Take Home




               •   Industrial workplace is opportunity for ubicomp
               •   Design process must investigate organizational context
               •   Architecture is not neutral




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Thank You
                                                     Gerd Kortuem
                                          kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
                                    http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/nemo




Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
•   James Brown, Joe Finney, Christos Efstratiou, Ben Green, Nigel Davies,
                   Mark Lowton and Gerd Kortuem. Network Interrupts: Supporting Delay
                   Sensitive Applications in Low Power Wireless Control Networks. CHANTS
                   2007.
               •   Efstratiou, C., Davies, N., Kortuem, G. Finney, J., Hooper, R., and Lowton,
                   M. Experiences of Designing and Deploying Intellignent Sensor Nodes to
                   Monitor Hand-Arm Vibrations in the Field. Proceedings of MobiSys 2007,
                   San Juan, Puerto Rico, June, 2007
               •   Iszatt White, M. Catching Them At It? An Ethnography of Rule Violation.
                   Symposium on Current Developments in Ethnographic Research in the
                   Social and Management Sciences. 13th-14th September 2006. Liverpool,
                   UK.
               •   Busby, J. and Iszatt-White, M. Pushing the Boundaries of HRO. Thinking:
                   Non-complex and Uncoupled but still Deadly. SRA Annual Meeting - Risk
                   Analysis in a Dynamic World: Making a Difference, 3rd-4th December
                   2006. Baltimore, Maryland
               •   Davies, N., Efstratiou, C., Finney, J., Hooper, R., Kortuem G., Lowton, M.
                   Sensing Danger – Challenges in Supporting Compliance in the Field. 8th
                   IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
                   (HotMobile 2007), Tucson, Arizona, February, 2007
               •   Lowton M. and Finney, J. Finding NEMO: On the Accuracy of Inferring
                   Location in IEEE 802.15.4 Networks. Proceedings Workshop on Real-World
                   Wireless Sensor Networks (RealWSN 2006), Uppsala, Sweden June 2006.

Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk

Sensor Networks or Smart Artifacts? - Ubicomp 2007

  • 1.
    Sensor Networks orSmart Artifacts? An Exploration of Organizational Issues of an Industrial Health and Safety Monitoring System Gerd Kortuem David Alford Linden Ball Jerry Busby Computing Department Nigel Davies Psychology Department Christos Efstratiou Management School Joe Finney Marian Iszatt White Katharina Kinder Lancaster University
  • 2.
    What role canUbiquitous Computing play? Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 3.
    Designing for Peopleand Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 4.
    Shareholders / Legal & Government Agencies Society Clients Health & Safety Health & Safety Business Social Regulations Compliance pressure pressure Organization Health and Safety System Actors Policies & Assessment Rules Procedures Management Training Surveilance Data Equipment Records Operative Supervisor Designing for People and Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 5.
    Shareholders / Legal & Government Agencies Society Clients Health & Safety Health & Safety Business Social Regulations Compliance pressure pressure Organization Health and Safety System Actors Policies & Assessment Rules Procedures Management Training Surveilance Data Equipment Records Operative Supervisor Designing for People and Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 6.
    Technology Design process Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 7.
    NEMO Drill NEMO Dosimeter Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 8.
    all daily triggertim short-term exposu Duration of use exposure action). (measured) average daily expo Vibration characteristics (known for each equipment, measured by manufacturer) • Daily exposu Soil condition (assumed) •Exposure exposu Actual Daily ? A(8) is defined as Maximum Legal Exposure Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk ahv = actual
  • 9.
    Drill-Dosimeter pairing determinedby proximity Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 10.
    Network node Sensor component Actuator component ( including displays) Enterprise System In-Vehicle Intermittent System communication Figure 2: HAV monitoring system Figur Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - the NEMO system is to A key issue for kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk ensure that vibra- on user input makes
  • 11.
    Technology ‣ Design process Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 12.
    Design process Gerd Kortuem- Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 13.
    Design process Gerd Kortuem- Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 14.
    Design process Gerd Kortuem- Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 15.
    Design process Gerd Kortuem- Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 16.
    Technology Design process ‣ Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 17.
    Invisible Risks Risk perception is poor Lesson 1: Shift from H&S compliance to increasing awareness Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 18.
    Self-Image and SocialPressure Safety equipment often not used Lesson 2: Personal and social “invisibility” becomes key design goal Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 19.
    Past Experiences &Narratives GPS had been experienced as surveillance technology Lesson 3: Technology narrative should be part of the design Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 20.
    Developers’ Blind-spot (a) Wider organizational aspects are perceived to be of low importance (organizational culture, re-distribution of power, organizational disruption, societal issues, privacy and security concerns) (b) Even organizational issues that are considered to be of importance often do not actually influence the design process Günter, H., Grote, G. & Boos, D. (2006): Organizational issues in ubiquitous computing, Paper presented at 22nd EGOS Colloquium, Bergen, July 06-08. Boos, D., Günter., H., & Grote, G. (2007): Organizational issues, technological frames and the development of a new ubiquitous computing prototype, Paper presented at 23nd EGOS Colloquium, Vienna, Austria, July 05-07. Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 21.
    Technology Archetypes Developers view problem in light of well-known system models Sensor network Smart artifacts (sensing + data) (interaction) Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 22.
    Technology Archetypes Different system models imply different H&S solutions Enterprise Management System Personal Exception Health & reports Safety Record Health & Safety Rules Data logs Feedback Operative's Context-sensitive Automatic behavior notices data capture Operatives' behavior Operatives Sensor-network Smart-artifact inspired H&S system inspired H&S system (top-down) (bottom-up) Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 23.
    Sensor Network Smart Artifact Risk perception unchanged increased Trust in rules unchanged increased Intelligibility low high (information awareness) Surveillance increased unchanged Provable compliance supported not supported Well intentioned rule more difficult unchanged violations Rule formulation more rigid more rigid Behavior-based safety not supported supported Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 24.
    Display Matters Unit w/o display was perceived as surveillance technology Sensor-network Smart-artifact inspired H&S system inspired H&S system Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 25.
    Behavior-based Safety Operatives as source of expertise and behavioral change Personal Personal Health & Health & Safety Safety Record Record Operative's Context-sensitive Operative's Context-sensitive behavior notices behavior notices Collaborative safety Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 26.
    Points to TakeHome • Industrial workplace is opportunity for ubicomp • Design process must investigate organizational context • Architecture is not neutral Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 27.
    Thank You Gerd Kortuem kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/nemo Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
  • 28.
    James Brown, Joe Finney, Christos Efstratiou, Ben Green, Nigel Davies, Mark Lowton and Gerd Kortuem. Network Interrupts: Supporting Delay Sensitive Applications in Low Power Wireless Control Networks. CHANTS 2007. • Efstratiou, C., Davies, N., Kortuem, G. Finney, J., Hooper, R., and Lowton, M. Experiences of Designing and Deploying Intellignent Sensor Nodes to Monitor Hand-Arm Vibrations in the Field. Proceedings of MobiSys 2007, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June, 2007 • Iszatt White, M. Catching Them At It? An Ethnography of Rule Violation. Symposium on Current Developments in Ethnographic Research in the Social and Management Sciences. 13th-14th September 2006. Liverpool, UK. • Busby, J. and Iszatt-White, M. Pushing the Boundaries of HRO. Thinking: Non-complex and Uncoupled but still Deadly. SRA Annual Meeting - Risk Analysis in a Dynamic World: Making a Difference, 3rd-4th December 2006. Baltimore, Maryland • Davies, N., Efstratiou, C., Finney, J., Hooper, R., Kortuem G., Lowton, M. Sensing Danger – Challenges in Supporting Compliance in the Field. 8th IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (HotMobile 2007), Tucson, Arizona, February, 2007 • Lowton M. and Finney, J. Finding NEMO: On the Accuracy of Inferring Location in IEEE 802.15.4 Networks. Proceedings Workshop on Real-World Wireless Sensor Networks (RealWSN 2006), Uppsala, Sweden June 2006. Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk