The document discusses Russian involvement in influencing the 2016 US election and issues surrounding Russian mass media and intelligence. It notes that while Russia likely attempted to influence the election through state-run media organizations like RT and non-state actors, the actual impact or effect of these attempts is difficult to measure and claims of widespread influence through social media contradict established theories of media effects. It concludes that inflating Russia's role in the election serves Putin's interests in bolstering his domestic authority rather than democratic virtues, and that further study of Russia is still needed to understand its foreign policy and relationship with the West.

1. Russian Mass Media
and Intelligence
THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE IN THE 2016 US ELECTION
(ACTUALLY, MUCH MORE THAN THAT)
VASILY V. GATOV
Visiting Fellow, USC Annenberg

2. OBITUARY
Friends and relatives need to inform you that
Russian journalism and media business are both
officially dead as of 2013.
May them rest in peace.

3. WARNING!
Russian propaganda, yet officially declared dead,
possess a grave danger as it exerts massive
subversion operations and influences elections!
BEWARE OF ZOMBIES!

4. THREAT!
Evil Soviet Russian espionage grandmasters
conduct (classified) operations in (classified)
cases of meddling in (classified) D.C. locations,
and worldwide.
LED BY KGB & PUTIN!

5. Simplicity & Conspiracy.
Mental imprint of the Russian Scare.
Russia as a necessary Alien,
complimenting Paranoid Style
of American Politics.
Putin’s “non-ideology”:
Nothing is True and Everything is Possible.
Weaponization of Information, amplified by Social Media.

6. COMPLEX AND MURKY PICTURE
 While Russia is a non-democracy, it is not a fully vertically
integrated totalitarian state, not Putin’s dictatorship, not even a
Putin-led junta of friends and business partners;
 Russian domestic policy is dominated by “counterintelligence
state” – a cacophony of Putin’s own power hold interests, security
services omnipotence and constantly induced feeling of “besieged
fortress” but not Putin himself;
 Russian foreign policy is the only focus of Vladimir Putin today;
the President is not interested in national economy, public
discourse or social development;
 Putin’s current worldview is reactive: it is being formed by
Russian propaganda as well as intelligence and “sanctioned
corporations”

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STATE
 The term was suggested by Robert Pringle in 2000, in his
article “Andropov’s counterintelligence state”.
 Counterintelligence state is a (natural) mutation of any
type of government that handles too much unhinged
power to a security apparatus – under the circumstance of
real or imaginary threat
 Unrestricted and freed from criticism, counterintelligence
“coverts” massive parts of government, society and
even media into a network of agents, chasing real or
imaginary foreign spies/agents of influence.

8. WHO ARE THE ACTORS?
WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING?
STATE MEDIA
Knows of Putin’s fixations and
plays/strengthens them;
criticism of the West mixes
with domestic propaganda
tones and provides “out of this
world” thinking
SECURITY & SPIES
Need constant “approval” of
their importance; inflate real
risks and design imaginary
ones. Ministry of defense also
conducts devastating (for
state finances) re-armament
STATE CORP’S
Sanctions controversy: while
suffering from sanctions
abroad, state industry giants
(and their bosses) benefit
domestically, ravaging budget,
receiving defense contracts

9. “MAIN ADVERSARY”
THINKING
 During Yuri Andropov’s years in head of KGB and the Communist
Party, every foreign or even domestic problem USSR faced was
interpreted as “the main adversary” (USA) plot;
 Within this “thinking”, US Intelligence and foreign policy institutions
are considered “obsessed” with an idea to defeat and destroy
USSR by any means; true or false, this “thinking” empowers “the
main adversary” while despises his goals;
 “The Main Adversary” cannot be ignored, therefore it should be
ritually mentioned on any occasion; even against the logic and
history, it should be “connected” with the worst evil (blaming US in
1960-80s in harboring Nazi criminals)
 … etc

10. ROLE OF MASS
MEDIA
TOOL OF THE STATE PROPAGANDA OR
A FREE AGENT/USEFUL IDIOT?

11. CURRENT STATE OF RUSSIAN MEDIA
 Russian mass media still inherits some elements of the
Soviet Press model (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm,1956) but
post-1991 development enriched the system with
Putinesque novels (Oates, 2007)
 State-owned TV broadcasters, state-owned news agencies
and high influence of the state budget subsidies (even
compared with ad market) are characteristically important
features of the system; they account to 60+% of the
media market by consumption and revenues
 Instead of formal censorship (banned by 1993’
Constitution and 1991 Media Law), Russian state relies on
self-censorship by journalists and editors, and “agenda
recommendations”

12. CURRENT STATE OF RUSSIAN MEDIA-2
 Independent media and journalism account for a small
portion of Russian legacy press: only 2 news national TV
channels (of 11), two national newspapers (Novaya Gazeta
and Sobesednik) of 31. Free and uncontrolled web media is
more abundant, yet it also faces pressure, including ban by
RosKomNadzor
 Commercial censorship (by advertisers) and hostile
takeovers of independent press (by Kremlin loyalist
businessmen) are common
 Kremlin and the state TV constantly demonize independent
media, journalists, foreign press – treating them as a part of
“the Main Adversary” scheme to “put Russia on knees again”

13. CURRENT STATE OF RUSSIAN
MEDIA-3
 State Duma repeatedly expands Chapter 4 of Russian Media Law (inadmissibility of
abuse of freedom of mass media). In 1991, Ch.4 consisted of 62 word altogether. In
November 2017, the text of the chapter is over 800 words (and new restrictions are due
to go in effect in February 2018), with prohibition to report on “methods of suicide”
and a ban on “gay propaganda”. Other restrictions cover factual ban for foreigners,
double citizenship holders to establish or own or edit mass media.
 Journalists, foreign news organizations and even political bloggers and media activists
are the targets of recently adopted bill that expands “foreign agent status” to press.
 Meanwhile, RT, Sputnik and other siblings that target foreign audiences, receive over
USD 400 million annual funding and are praised by Putin for “effectiveness” in
“protecting Russian national interests”.

15. EXPORTING ALL THIS WAS EASY…
Russian national media suffers
“fake news” (and supporting
diseases like botnet
amplification, digital agenda
setting, “white noise
jamming”) at least since 2011;
01
Russian domestic propaganda
channels borrows a lot from
FOXNEWS (infotainment,
aggressive messaging,
opinions replacing news) as
well as Breitbart;
02
“Post-truth” (alternative
fact) is an integral component
of Putinesque thinking;
conspiracy theory has more
weight than Occam Razor;
03
Since 2011, Russian state
media operators became
proficient in social and
political divisions use in
propaganda
04

16. FACT IS NOT EQUAL TO AN EFFECT
 Both RT (and siblings), Russian Intelligence (possibly under orders from Putin)
and Russian non-state actors (“The Agency”) exerted to influence US
elections in 2016. This could be accepted as a fact.
 But what was the effect of these attempts? How can we assess it and
measure?
 Media effects studies unequivocally exclude a capacity of minor messaging
actor to avert political opinions regardless of methods of influence (agenda
setting, priming, framing). Not only known measurable media effects require
far larger exposure to “messages of influence”, they also never work rapidly.
 Preventing figure-mongering: no, 126 000 000 “Russian Facebook ads” is not a
number of Americans influenced; reach is not equal to consumption. No,
2016 Buzzfeed report that “fake news” overperformed “real news” during the
election campaign does not imply that “Russians did it”; also, the report only
analyzed social traffic – intentionally discarding other media consumption
(i.e. television and radio)

17. SECTION NOTES
 Russian state-owned mass media organizations are neither legacy
press/editorial entities, nor “front organizations” of security
apparatus; they are in reality GR/PR agencies that serve the
interests of their bosses who want to delve even further into a
state budget coffins
 RT and other Russian state media parasite on fears and
obsessions of the Putin’s state, not serve the national interest.
Internationally (and in the USA), these organizations target fringe,
marginal groups and enhance existing political divisions.
 The only “power” RT & siblings have are organizational opacity
and lack of accountability; FARA requirement to disclose
operational budgets is what really hurts RT – not anything else

18. ROLE OF
SPOOKS
RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE, INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
ACTIVE MEASURES

19. DIGITAL SHIELD
& TWITTER
SWORD
 Infamous “Agency” –
Ol’gino Troll Factory,
connected with Evgeny
Prigozhin (so-called
“Putin’s Chef”) has
become a centerpiece of
“New Russian Scare”.
Truly disgusting
organization, “The
Agency” is as inflated as
“Russian threat”

20. SPY LAIRS
 Russian spy agencies inherited the estates
and image of their Soviet predecessors
but not the political weight in Kremlin’s
equation.
 Similar to Russian defense industry, SVR
and GRU reside on the foundation
developed in Soviet time (both in
HUMINT and SIGNIT); cyber capabilities
started to grow after 2007 and still
inferior to the Western counterparts
 Freed from public control and scrutiny,
SVR and GRU may develop new
technologies much more aggressively
than CIA, NSA or GSHQ
GRU HQ in Moscow
SVR HQ near Moscow

21. RESEARCH QUESTION
ORDERS
RUSSIAN SPY AGENCIES… …AND TROLL FACTORY
… TO
CONSPIRE TO
USE
SOCIAL MEDIA
TO PRODUCE
THIS RESULT
?
…AND RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

22. THE ANSWER IS “LIKELY NO”
AND THAT’S WHY
 The scheme from previous slide may look as classic ACTIVE
MEASURES operation from the Soviet past, but…
 From strategic espionage perspective, the risks of negative outcome
far outweighs subtle benefits;
 From organizational perspective, the operation has no damage
control options (risks of exposure, loss of assets, retaliation, etc.)
 From operational perspective, Russian intelligence faces much
harder conditions abroad (already) and will suffer even more without
any clear benefits;
 Operation lacks plausible deniability as required by the tradition of
a spycraft

23. MAY BE…
 “The Agency” activity (amateurish and badly camouflaged) was
“experimental”, and perpetrators never expected any meaningful
results?
 As Associated Press investigation on spear phishing shows,
DNC/Podesta hacks were likely to be a “collateral damage” within a
broader SIGNIT operation; and the decision to leak compromising
emails was opportunistic but not strategic?
 While Russia/Kremlin undeniably support divisive, nationalistic, anti-EU
forces in Europe, it usually preferred relatively predictable US
leaders. Betting on Trump is decisively opposite to a tradition.
 Putin may have liked Donald Trump’s election-time courting (better
relations with Russia, deranging of NATO and other US treaties) but is
his personal sympathy enough to override political calculations?

24. SOME
GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS
NOTHING IS TRUE AND
EVERYTHING IS
POSSIBLE

25. TOP LEVEL TAKEAWAYS
 2016’ “elections operation” (especially if it is fully proven – with
forensic, technical arguments and documents) opens a new
chapter in the history of influence campaigns: foreign power
exerted, at least partially, detectable shift in major democracy and
its institutions.
 While blended with other domestic reasons for Trump’s victory, this
“operation” employed innovative social media use; yet, it is
premature to conclude that social media played any significant
role (if any) as it contradicts all known media effects theories
 In the West, inflating an effect of Russian media/intelligence
“operations” serves Putin’s interests, not virtues of democracy. It
provides Russian president and his clique with reasons for
aggrandizement, imperial resurgence and additional arguments on
toughening the domestic policy.

26. RUSSIA & THE WEST
 Since 2007’ München Security Conference speech, Vladimir Putin maintains
anti-Western, anti-democratic and anti-liberal rhetoric; in 2014, he
converted rhetoric into international political action with Crimea land grab,
“hybrid” intervention in Donbass and military expedition to Syria. In 2016,
Russian regime supposedly conducted major influence operation,
reaching the sovereign soil of “the Main Adversary”.
 Russia continues to develop as a counterintelligence state, suppressing
free speech and expression, political opposition, independent media. The
reasoning for further tightening of screws repeatedly cites “foreign
meddling in Russian domestic affairs” – while Russia itself indulges every
form of its own aggressive foreign policy.
 And this is a perfect reason to maintain and expand Russian studies, both
contemporary and historical, political and cultural.

27. Thank you for your interest!
Vasily V. Gatov
Visiting fellow, Center of Communication Leadership and Policy
Annenberg School of Communication & Journalism, University of Southern California
facebook.com/prinzip @vassgatov www.postjournalist.org
vasily.gatov@usc.edu