Resilience to Disinformation_0401.pdf

December 2022
This report has been produced with support
of Open Information Partnership.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 opened a new
chapter for Russian propaganda and disinformation targeting Lublin Triangle
countries. Ukraine is at the epicentre of Russian disinformation and propaganda
that directly supports the events on the battlefield. Lithuania and Poland sup-
porting Ukraine politically and militarily, are also under constant information at-
tacks from Kremlin. Despite that, all three countries are showing vital signs of re-
silience to Russian propaganda.
Despite that, all three countries are showing vital signs of resilience to Russian
propaganda. Thus, the Civic Resilience Initiative, Detector Media and Kosciuszko
Institute joint efforts to identify the building blocks of resilience to Russian disin-
formation in Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. To outline the best case practices in
combating disinformation, first, they looked into the similarities and differences
of the main narratives and messages targeting Lublin Triangle countries. Second,
they explore the main sources of disinformation and its patterns. Third, they eval-
uate measures taken to combat disinformation.

Executive Summary 4
Recommendations 7
For all stakeholders: 7
For governments and public institutions: 7
For international organisations and donors: 9
For civil society: 10
For media: 10
Introduction 11
Methodology 13
Narratives and messages of Russian propaganda and
disinformation aiming at Lublin Triangle Countries
15
Propaganda and disinformation targeting belief and trust of
citizens
16
Propaganda and disinformation targeting international
cooperation and unity
20
Russian propaganda and disinformation targeting inter and
intragroup relationships
22
Historical narratives and messages exploited by Russian
propaganda
26
Sources of Russian disinformation and propaganda targeting
Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine
29
Measures to build resilience to Russian propaganda and disinformation 34
State institutions, agencies and their policies 34
Bans and regulations of those spreading propaganda and
disinformation
40
Civil society initiatives 42
Big Tech measures to combat Russian propaganda and
disinformation
44
Annex A. Media and actors spreading pro-Russian rhetoric in
Lublin Triangle countries
46
Media spreading pro-Russian rhetoric 46
Parties and public figures spreading pro-Russian rhetoric 50
Annex B. Reading list 55

4
Executive Summary
Russian propaganda and disinfor-
mation are neither new nor unique.
Analysing it from the perspective of
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, we
see the same narratives, messages
and tactics exploited by the Russian
propaganda machine. Within the
analysis, we identify several goals of
mation in the Lublin Triangle: target
citizens’ beliefs in future, undermine
trust within groups and between
groups, and discredit international
cooperation.
• To target citizens’ beliefs in fu-
ture, the Russian propaganda ma-
chine undermines the state’s ca-
pacity to function, claiming that
the “country is not a sovereign
state”, “government is unstable
and incompetent”, and “country
is struggling economically”. It ex-
plains it by saying that “Lithuania/
Poland/Ukraine is under exter-
nal governance” allegedly “be-
ing used by the West/elites/world
secret government” with “CSOs,
independent media and their rep-
resentative being puppets of So-
ros/ “the West”. Along this, Russian
propaganda tried to persuade
citizens that they have no pros-
pects in their country: “people are
fleeing the country looking for a
better life”, “most citizens believe
that the situation in the country
is deteriorating”, “the amount of
population is constantly decreas-
ing”. Starting with full-scale inva-
sion, Lublin Triangle countries are
targeted with a narrative about
“governments being incapable of
providing citizens with accessible
energy resources”. Russian ener-
gy blackmail is being converted
by Russian propaganda in claims
that “the inflation & energy cri-
ses are caused by the West’s mis-
guided political approach” and
that “citizens are the one paying
for mistakes of the government”.
While overall spreading panic and
threatening Europeans with “cold
and hunger during upcoming win-
ter”.
• The second goal of Russian in-
formation manipulations is to de-
stroy intergroup and intragroup
relations. Overall, Russian informa-
tion manipulations are effective at
targeting communities. Thus, in all
three countries, they are identify-
ing different communities (based
on language, sexuality, religion
etc.) and pushing narratives, bring-
ing distrust within the community
and pitting communities against
each other. For instance, blaming
countries for being Russophobic.
In particular, Russian propaganda
claims that Lublin Triangle coun-
tries “discriminate against/terror-
ise Russian speakers”, “attack Rus-
sian culture”, and “ignore the voice
of those with pro-Russian views in
the debate, imposing the censor-
ship of political correctness”. Rus-
sian propaganda tries to position
so-called “Russophobia” as Na-
zism, claiming that Lithuania, Po-
land and Ukraine “persecute peo-
ple for their political views” and
“control the information environ-
ment”. Thus any decommunisation
is considered “an act of Nazism
and/or Russophobia’’.

5
Refugees are also being weap-
onisedbyRussianpropagandaand
disinformation to undermine in-
tergroup and intragroup relations.
Russia is behind such messages as
“refugees are spoiled/ungrateful”,
“refugees are prioritised over the
host country citizens/inhabitants”,
“refugees destroy the national
identity”, “refugees pose an epi-
demic danger”, “white/“European
looking” refugees are prioritized
over others”.
For the same goals, Russia weap-
onizes history to pit one communi-
tyagainst each other. Forinstance,
in Poland, it heavily exploits the
Volhynia Massacre (ethnic Poles
being murdered in Nazi-occupied
parts of eastern Poland (now part
of Ukraine) by Ukrainian national-
ists). This troubled history between
Poland and Ukraine has been part
of anti-Ukrainian disinformation in
Poland since 2014. Currently, Rus-
sian propaganda is exploiting it
trying to persuade Polish society
that “Ukrainian refugees do not
deserve help as they allegedly
support the Massacre”.
• The third goal of Russian informa-
tion manipulations and interfer-
ence is undermining internation-
al cooperation and unity. Most of
the efforts are targeting NATO and
the EU with Russian propaganda
claiming that they “are weak and
are going to collapse”. It persis-
tently fuels the message of “NATO/
EU membership is not beneficial
for the country”. Russian propa-
ganda tries to claim that overall
international organisations are
powerless. For instance, it heavily
promotes the narrative of “sanc-
tions on Russia being ineffec-
tive”. In particular, “sanctions hurt
the West more than Russia”, “the
West is secretly trading with Rus-
sia”, “sanctions are making Rus-
sia stronger”, “European citizens
do not support sanctions against
Russia” and “sanctions are being
imposed on innocent people”.
Amid Russia’s full-scale invasion
of Ukraine, Russian propagan-
da and disinformation intensified
the narrative about “the West”/
NATO being at war with Russia”.
Noteworthy, Russian propaganda
claims that “the West” is weak and
at the same time explains its fail-
ures in Ukraine by saying that “the
West is the one at war with Russia”
spreading stories about “foreign
mercenaries”. Also, claiming that,
“supplying weapons means direct
involvement in the war”.
mation tries to depict “The West”
as hypocritical for caring about
Ukraine so much and at the same
time blames it for “causing the
global food crisis”. Using informa-
tion manipulations and interfer-
ence, Russia tries to discredit dem-
ocratic societies at all costs. For
instance, weaponize gender and
sexuality to justify its war against
Ukraine and the whole democratic
world1
.
When it comes to sources of Russian
propaganda and disinformation in
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, there
are a lot of similarities as well. Parties
and personas spreading pro-Russian
rhetoric, YouTube bloggers sharing
1
Detector Media, “«You Are Either Russian or Gay.» Exploring Russian LGBTIQ+ Disinformation on
Social Media” (Kyiv: Detector Media NGO, November 2022).

6
conspiracies, coordinated cam-
paigns on Facebook and anony-
mous Telegram channels. However,
some slight differences in quality
and diversity are dictated by media
consumption in the country.
Not only does disinformation share a
lot of similarities attacking the coun-
tries. Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine
have several things in common that
contributed largely to their resilience
to malign information campaigns.
First, there is a clear understand-
ing that Russian malign information
activity threatens national security.
Understanding, acknowledging and
analysing the threat worked as the
first shield against Russian informa-
tion manipulations and interference.
Thus, mapping the sources and their
connection to the Kremlin is crucial.
Moreover, holding those responsible
to account sends a clear signal that
no one has the right to exploit the
freedom of speech to incite hatred,
call for violence or spread genocidal
rhetoric.
Second, a multi-dimensional ap-
proach when it comes to combating
mation is highly practised within Lu-
blin Triangle countries. Countering
disinformation is a complex process
that should not be limited to only in-
formation and communication chal-
lenges. It is essential to view disinfor-
mation from the standpoint of cyber
and digital security, information and
communication, and cognitive secu-
rity.
Third, multi-stakeholder perspec-
tives. Lublin Triangle countries have
some outstanding cooperation
practices between the state, busi-
ness, media, and civil society. It
showcases how essential synergy
and multi-stakeholder perspective is
when solving complex crises enabled
by propaganda and disinformation.
Synergy should reside simultaneous-
ly on several levels and within sever-
al topics: horizontal, cross-sectoral
and cross-institutional cooperation.
The more multifaceted the measures
are, the higher their effectiveness in
building resilience to Russia’s hostile
information operations.
Fourth, if we focus only on the anal-
ysis of Russian propaganda and dis-
information targeting Lithuania, Po-
land and Ukraine, the quantity and
diversity of it may be impossible to
address. Therefore, it is more effec-
tive to become more engaged with
a problem than a solution. However,
it is essential to view disinformation
from the perspective of actual im-
pact on citizens’ decision-making.
Russian propaganda is indeed dan-
gerous, but not almighty. There are
numerous examples of when it failed
in L3 countries. Thus, it is crucial to
have measurable indicators to eval-
uate whether the specific propaganda
messages could make it to discourse
and must be addressed. At the same
time, incorporate measurable indica-
tors of societal resilience that will show
the overall dynamic and provide a da-
ta-driven understanding of the actual
effectiveness of Russian propaganda.

7
Recommendations
Based on the analysis, the following
suggestions are proposed to various
stakeholders at the international, na-
tional and local levels.
For all
stakeholders:
• Threat awareness is
the cornerstone of resilience to Rus-
sian malign information campaigns.
It is crucial to understand the source
of the threat and its peculiarities
and clearly facilitate and address it.
Therefore, further strengthening situ-
ational awareness is vital.
• Combatting disinformation is a
complex phenomenon that should
not be limited to only information and
communication challenges (meaning
the sources and messages of malign
information campaigns), a holistic
approach addressing the threat is
needed. It is essential to view disin-
formation from the standpoint of cy-
ber and digital security, information
and communication, and cognitive
security.
• Information manipulation and in-
terference are becoming increas-
ingly complex, thus, synergy and
multi-stakeholder perspective are
needed in the work of all stakehold-
ers: international partners, govern-
ment institutions, business, media
and civil society organisations. Syn-
ergy should reside simultaneously
on several levels and within sever-
al topics: horizontal, cross-sectoral
and cross-institutional cooperation.
The more multifaceted the measures
are, the higher their effectiveness in
building resilience to Russia’s hostile
information manipulation and inter-
ference.
• Make a shift from a problem to a
solution. There are numerous studies
on the diversity of disinformation and
its techniques, which are of utmost
importance. At the same time, there
is a substantial lack of analysis show-
casing the effectiveness of measures
to combat disinformation. It is vital in
terms of allocating resources to com-
bat it, as not all disinformation is ef-
fective. However, deciding whether to
react to a specific message is chal-
lenging without this knowledge.
• View the information environment
comprehensively by looking at dis-
informations and truthful narratives
and messages. Most efforts focus on
combating disinformation by flag-
ging and debunking it. However, var-
ious productive messages, tactics
and formats naturally emerge in the
information environment. Thus, one
can amplify them by increasing their
share in the information environment.
For governments
and public
institutions:
• Nominate a critical coordinating
body responsible for strategic com-
munication both in the country and
abroad. The practice here varies as it
could be one body with several man-
dates or two bodies cooperating. The
responsible body must establish syn-
ergies within public institutions, co-
ordinating efforts to build resilience
and align the long-term vision. Be-
sides, most of the measures in terms

8
of coordination are focused on the
national level. However, with decen-
tralisation and the nature of Russia’s
malign information campaign, the
same level of coordination is needed
from the regional and local perspec-
tives (depending on the country’s ad-
ministrative structure).
•Develop or strengthen a comprehen-
sive real-time monitoring system. It is
often the case that each institution
has its own monitoring system, some
use ready-on-the-market solutions,
and some use custom ones. However,
lack of synergy, protocols on data ex-
change and often complicated out-
put format decrease the capacity to
react and, more importantly, to fore-
cast information attacks.
• Implement and practice a protocol
for cooperation between the various
authority bodies involved in counter-
ing disinformation domestically and
internationally.
• Develop or apply legislative meas-
ures to punish those violating na-
tional legislation regarding spread-
ing propaganda and disinformation.
Imposing costs on perpetrators is an
important step to deter, prevent or/
and disrupt information manipulation
and interference. However, it is essen-
tial to develop mechanisms based on
the rule of law. Civil society acting as
a watchdog is essential for observing
and safeguarding such processes in-
dependent of the state.
•Design a measurable, result-oriented
system for evaluating efforts to com-
bat disinformation and build societal
resilience.
• Design a methodology for collecting
systematic evidence of foreign infor-
mation manipulation and interference
in the country’s information space.
• Establish and facilitate an ongo-
ing dialogue with civil society, inde-
pendent media, business represent-
atives, online platforms and other
stakeholders to monitor and counter
hybrid threats. Utilise their expertise
and stimulate with grants the devel-
opment of expertise within academia
and civil society. The state needs to be
able to delegate some scope of tasks
to civil society and academia about
combating disinformation.
• Foster media and information litera-
cy skills through formal and non-for-
mal education. Strengthen resilience
to disinformation by raising aware-
ness and increasing media literacy
through encouraging and facilitating
educational events accessible to the
broader public.
• Imbed result-oriented training (from
the perspective of cyber, digital, in-
formation, communication and cog-
nitive security) for public servants. As
well as adapt the education system to
the current challenges understanding
the need for flexibility and readiness
for constant self-improvement.
• Use legislation and tax instruments
when advocating measures to com-
bat disinformation to Big Tech com-
panies. Create regional and multi-
stakeholder platforms to advocate
profound changes in content moder-
ation and algorithms. Together with
civil society and academia, advocate
for data access to enable exploration
of algorithms to formulate policy to-
wards them.
• Start adapting the EU’s Digital Mar-
kets Act that will enter into force from
1 January 2024 and substantially
change how the online environment
works regarding combating prop-
aganda and disinformation. Even
though the EU’s Digital Markets Act

9
is compulsory for EU member states,
it is a valuable document outlining
powerful tools for combating dis-
information that can be applied by
other countries.
• Engage in practice and know-how
sharing with other countries and
partners that are highly exposed to
Russian disinformation and need ca-
pacity-building to counter foreign in-
formation manipulation and interfer-
ence.
For international
organisations and
donors:
• Increase the visibility of the threat,
keeping the topic of countering disin-
formation high on the agenda.
• Encourage international and multi-
lateral political dialogue on uniting
efforts to combat disinformation and
protect information space from ma-
lign information manipulation and in-
terference.
• Elaborate on relevant internation-
al rules, norms and regulations for
countering disinformation and pro-
tecting democratic processes.
•Constantly synchronise understand-
ing of the challenges posed by prop-
aganda and disinformation and a
vision to combat them using local
knowledge of various stakeholders in
the field. It is necessary to avoid du-
plication.
• Support the capacity building of the
authorities, independent media and
civil society to detect and respond to
disinformation and foreign influence
operations.
• Provide institutional support to in-
dependent media and NGOs to
strengthen their capacity to be flex-
ible, which is essential in combat-
ing disinformation. Second, produce
content that is challenging in terms
of monetisation (analytical reports,
investigations). Continue grant sup-
port for testing new business models,
digitalisation of newsrooms’ work,
development of editorial standards,
training and mobility of professionals
and exchange of best practices.
• Provide institutional and finan-
cial support to the creative industry
products to combat disinformation
and increase media and information
literacy worldwide.
• Encourage participant-driven mul-
ti-stakeholder and multi-country net-
works, platforms and forums (events)
• Allocate budgets for comprehen-
sive and ongoing evaluation of the
effectiveness of the measures taken
to combat disinformation by grant-
ees.
• Support innovative projects aimed
at combating disinformation and
projects initiated by civil society or-
ganisations and educational institu-
tions.
• Foster initiatives of civil society or-
ganisations, governmental institu-
tions and creative industry aimed
at increasing citizens’ media and in-
formation literacy and helping them
understand the existence of disinfor-
mation and develop skills to distin-
guish it.
• Support the strengthening of inde-
pendent media and quality journalism.
• Help production companies, TV
channels, and independent online
media to produce socially important
entertainment content.

10
For civil society:
• Continue monitoring
disinformation’s impact,
prebunk and debunk it,
create and disseminate explanato-
ry materials, and implement media
and information literacy projects
targeting average citizens.
• Continue cooperation with various
stakeholders: from state to business.
The more horizontal connections es-
tablished, the more effective coordi-
nation, particularly in times of crisis.
• Work on reducing economic incen-
tives to spread disinformation, as
well as help with developing con-
taining measures by shifting costs to
actors involved in influence and for-
eign interference operations.
• Amplify the productive discussions
and voices in the information envi-
ronment through projects based on
multi-stakeholder cooperation.
• Imply a transparent and measur-
able evaluation system to track the
effectiveness of the efforts to build
resilience to disinformation.
• Engage in a dialogue with the Big
Tech companies, advocating for
changes and more transparency in
the Big Tech companies` approach
towards combating disinformation
and misinformation and seeking ef-
ficient solutions in cooperation with
the governments and public institu-
tions. Advocate for data access for
research purposes.
For media:
• Foster media self- and
co-regulation to pre-
vent the manipulative
distribution of malicious content by
increasing transparency and devel-
oping common rules and regulations.
Advertisers should also be involved in
the dialogue on self- and co-regula-
tion to reduce economic incentives
to spread disinformation.
• Preserve the notion and status of
independent media and journalism.
Be the ones who name and shame
those exploiting freedom of speech
to spread propaganda and disinfor-
mation.
• Raise public awareness about the
principles and ethics of quality jour-
nalism and the role of independent
media in democratic societies.
• Include the dimension of propa-
ganda and disinformation into dai-
ly work: have regular briefings on
the latest narratives, messages and
tactics of disinformation and propa-
ganda; plan content that will not un-
intentionally amplify propaganda or
actor spreading it.
• Support government and civil so-
ciety-led initiatives in disseminat-
ing media and information literacy
campaigns, stories about positive
change, success in reforms, etc. Also,
to join efforts in equipping citizens
with tools to identify manipulations.
• Increase attention to coverage of
regional and local events, and devel-
op regional offices.
• Invest in the digitalisation of the
newsroom from one side and human
capital from another one.

11
Introduction
Propaganda and disinformation are
instrumental for Russia to achieve
its goals, both in the domestic and
foreign domains. They are essential
tools for Russia to promote its vision
of the world, which contradicts the
values and principles of democracy
worldwide. Potential consequenc-
es of limited awareness about and
under-reaction to such foreign-led
information manipulation and inter-
ference include the projected supe-
riority of Russia in the public sphere,
on the media landscape and in the
cognitive domain of the targeted
countries in the long term. It is of ut-
most importance to acknowledge
the threat and improve countries’
capabilities to identify, expose and
mitigate Russian malign information
campaigns. Thus, on 28 July 2020, the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Poland, and Lithuania, Dmytro Kule-
ba, Jacek Czaputowicz, and Linas
Linkevičius, established the Lublin Tri-
angle as a format, one of the goals
of which was precise to counter the
threats emanating from Russia2
. The
tripartite format is based on the tra-
ditions and historical ties of the three
countries. It is an essential mecha-
nism for strengthening Central Eu-
rope and promoting Ukraine’s Euro-
pean and Euroatlantic integration.
Moreover, the countries have joined
efforts in building resilience to malign
information campaigns. Lithuania,
Ukraine, and Poland confirmed these
intentions by signing a Roadmap
for development that points out the
main directions of expanding trilater-
al cooperation, including the present,
current, and future initiatives of Lith-
uania, Ukraine, and Poland aimed at
strategic activities to counteract hy-
brid threats and disinformation3
.
The consequence of these agree-
ments was the signing in December
2021 by the Deputy Ministers of For-
eign Affairs of Lithuania, Poland, and
Ukraine of the Plan of Joint Actions of
the L3 Countries to Combat Disinfor-
mation for 2022-2023, which provides
for joint actions by Lithuania, Poland,
and Ukraine — aimed at strength-
ening their resilience and ensuring
a common response to the threats
posed by disinformation4
. Thus, coun-
tering disinformation and hybrid
threats was identified as one of the
priorities in the format of the Lublin
Triangle.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
on the 24th of February 2022 opened
a new chapter for Russian propa-
ganda and disinformation targeting
Lublin Triangle countries. The quanti-
2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Kuleba, Czaputowicz and Linkevičius launched the Lublin
Triangle - a new format of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania” (Kyiv: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine, July 2020).
3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, “Declaration of the Lublin Triangle Foreign Ministers of joint
European heritage and common values” (Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, July 2021).
4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, “Representatives of the Lublin Triangle
agree to strengthen cooperation to tackle disinformation” (Lutsk: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Lithuania, December 2021).

12
ty and diversity of disinformation are
striving: in the first weeks of Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Detec-
tor Media NGO (Ukraine) was identi-
fying over 30 unique pieces of disin-
formation targeting Ukrainians in the
Ukrainian information environment
per day. Ukraine is at the epicentre
of Russian disinformation and prop-
aganda that directly supports the
events on the battlefield. Lithuania
and Poland supporting Ukraine po-
litically and militarily, are also under
constant information attacks from
Kremlin. Despite that, all three coun-
tries are showing vital signs of resil-
ience to Russian propaganda. Ac-
cording to nationwide polling as of
August 2022, 93% of Ukrainians believe
in Ukraine’s victory; 74% support the
country’s course5
. 72% of Lithuanians
are satisfied with the government’s
response to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine6
. As of April 2022, 59% of Lith-
uanians believe Ukraine will win the
ongoing Russia-launched war, ac-
cording to a new Kantar survey, “War
Barometer”7
. The same study states
that 95% of Poles think that Russia’s
current attack against Ukraine can-
not be justified.
Thus, the main objective of the pol-
icy paper is to identify the building
blocks of resilience to Russian disin-
formation in Lithuania, Poland and
Ukraine. To outline the best case
practices in combating disinforma-
tion, first, we look into the similarities
and differences of the main narra-
tives and messages targeting Lublin
Triangle countries. Second, we ex-
plore the main sources of disinfor-
mation and its patterns. Third, we
evaluate measures taken to combat
disinformation.
5
Sociological Group “Rating”, “Seventeenth National Survey: Identity. Patriotism. Values (August
17-18, 2022)” (Kyiv: Sociological Group “Rating”, August 2022).
6
Augustas Stankevičius and BNS, “Fewer Lithuanians satisfied with response to Russia’s war in
Ukraine – survey” (Vilnius: Lithuanian National Radio and Television, September 2022).
7
Austėja Masiokaitė-Liubinienė and BNS, “Most Lithuanians believe Ukraine will win war – survey”
(Vilnius: Lithuanian National Radio and Television, April 2022).

13
Methodology
There are three pillars of the paper:
narratives and messages targeting
Lublin Triangle countries; key actors
and sources of Russian propagan-
da and disinformation; measures (in-
cluding legislative, industry, and civil-
ian responses to these phenomena)
contributing to building resilience to
malign information operations.
While the paper focuses on the most
recent developments in the context
of Russian information influence, the
analysis encompasses the period of
January 2021-August 2022. It is desk
research that implies collecting and
systemising knowledge of civil soci-
ety organizations analysing disinfor-
mation campaigns in Lithuania, Po-
land, and Ukraine. Mainly providing
insights from analysis of propaganda
and disinformation within the coun-
try’s information environment:
• nationwide online media;
• nationwide online versions of
printed media and websites of TV
channels;
• nationwide TV channels;
• regional and local online media;
• regional TV channels;
• public pages, groups and/or
channels on Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, Telegram, Instagram, Viber.
How do we identify
hostile information
activity?
Approach 1. Comparing messages to
sound in accord with/similar to the
Kremlin’s propaganda disinformation
narratives.
Approach 2. Establishing the rela-
tionship and connection analysis be-
tween actors, media, social media us-
ers, groups, and channels.
Approach 3. Labelling sources. For ex-
ample, the Security Service of Ukraine
has published a list of Telegram chan-
nels administered by the General Di-
rectorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion.
Approach 4. Verifying the allegations
for veracity.
Approach 5. Detecting the activity
of inauthentic coordinated behav-
iour, i.e., bots that promote consonant
messages.
Such approaches are not mutually
exclusive but rather complementary.
The combination of approaches helps
us more effectively to identify Russian
disinformation in the information en-
vironment.
Key terms
Within the policy paper,
the term “propaganda”
is mainly used to de-
scribe strategic information cam-
paigns organised by the Kremlin to
influence and disrupt democratic
procedures8
. It is a set of manipula-
8
Judit Bayer et al., “Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law
in the EU and its Member States” (Brussels: European Parliament, February 2019).

14
9
Ilan Manor, “NATO’S Digital Narrative- “What We Are”, Not “Who We Are”” (Tel Aviv: Exploring Digital
Diplomacy, October 2018).
tive actions that aim at cultivating
a set of beliefs shaping the behav-
iour of target groups. Disinformation
could reside within propaganda. It
is a set of false and/or manipulative
information characterised by ma-
lign intent and systematic execution.
Within the policy paper, there are
terms like malign information cam-
paigns or influence operation. Both
could imply propaganda and disin-
formation but are not limited to them
as they also utilise other illegitimate
and deceptive means, in support of
the objectives of an adversary.
When describing the content of
propaganda and disinformation,
policy paper utilizes terms such as
narrative, message, fake and manip-
ulation. Narratives are compelling
stories through which state and non-
state actors explain specific events
and processes9
. They operate stra-
tegically and require resources to be
formulated, shaped and maintained.
Messages fuel narratives as they are
points targeting specific audienc-
es. Fakes and manipulations fuel the
messages. They refer to not genuine
or manipulated pieces of content.

15
Narratives and messages
of Russian propaganda
and disinformation aiming
at Lublin Triangle Countries
Common narratives and messages of Russian propaganda and disinformation
in information space of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine
BELIEVES
AND
TRUST OF
CITIZENS
State
capacity
Citizens’
prospects
Energy crisis
and inflation
TARGET CLUSTER NARRATIVES AND MESSAGES
Country is a failed state
• Country is not a sovereign state
• Government is unstable and incompetent
• Country is struggling economically
Country is under the external governance
• Country is being used by the West/elites/world
secret government
• CSOs, independent media and their
representative are puppets of Soros/ “the West”
• Country will be sacrificed if the war spills over
Country is a failed state
• People are fleeing the country looking for a
better life
• Most citizens believe that the situation in the
country is deteriorating
• The amount of population is constantly
decreasing
The government is incapable of providing
citizens with accessible resources
• Citizens will die of cold and hunger during
upcoming winter
• Citizens are the one paying for mistakes of the
government
• The inflation & energy crises are caused by the
West’s misguided political approach

16
INTERGROUP
AND
INTRAGROUP
RELATIONS
Russophobia
Nazism
Refugees
Country is a Nazi state
• People are being persecuted for their political
views
• Information environment is being controlled by
the state
• Any decommunisation is an act of Nazism and/
or Russophobia
Country is Russophobic
• Country discriminate against/terrorize Russian-
speakers
• Russian culture is being attacked
• Country ignores the voice of those with pro-
Russian views in the debate, imposing the
censorship of political correctness
• Refugees undermine host countries’ internal
stability
• Refugees are spoiled/ungrateful
• Refugees are prioritized over the host country
citizens/inhabitants
• Refugees destroy the national identity
• Refugees pose an epidemic danger
• White/“European looking” refugees are
prioritized over others
One of the critical building blocks
of Russian propaganda in foreign
states is the narrative of the “coun-
try being a failed state”. This nar-
rative aims to undermine citizens’
trust in their state, its leaders and
national and personal prospects
within the country. In Lithuania and
Ukraine, the narrative is primarily
built on Russian imperialism, claim-
ing that the Soviet Union was the
“only legitimate state” and that all
state entities after it is allegedly ille-
gal, incapable, ineffective etc10
.
Propaganda and disinformation targeting belief
and trust of citizens
10
Novaya Gazeta, “Песков назвал Украину «несамостоятельным» государством” (Moscow:
Novaya Gazeta, June 2021).

17
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
AND UNITY
NATO
and EU
Historical
past
Sanctions
on Russia
Countries should not cooperate because of their
historical past
NATO and EU are weak and are going to collapse
• NATO/EU membership is not beneficial for the
country
“The West”/NATO is at war with Russia
• “The West” forced Russia to attack Ukraine
• “The West” is using Ukraine to wage war against
Russia
• Supplying weapons means direct involvement
in the war
• “The West” is hypocritical for caring about
Ukraine so much
• “The West” is causing the global food crisis
Sanctions are not effective:
• Sanctions hurt “the West” more than Russia
• The West is secretly trading with Russia
• Sanctions are making Russia stronger
• European citizens do not support sanctions
against Russia
• Sanctions are being imposed on innocent
people
Since Poland has never been a part
of the Soviet Union, disinformation
and propaganda activities in that
area are focused on a different set
of narratives and tools. From at least
mid-2021, the emails of Polish politi-
cians, mainly of Michał Dworczyk,
former head of the Chancellery of
the Prime Minister of Poland, began
to leak. They have consisted of politi-
cally sensitive information which has
been used to undermine the Polish
Government and manipulate public
opinion. As proven by at least two
digital investigations, this leak was
a part of a more extensive operation
dubbed Ghostwriter, a cyber-ena-
bled influence campaign targeting
audiences in Poland, Lithuania and
Latvia, aimed at promoting anti-NA-
TO sentiments and undermining gov-
ernments. The campaign has been
attributed by Mandiant to Belaru-
sian and Russian services, including
11
Zosia Wanat, “Leaked email scandal engulfs Poland’s political elite” (Brussels: POLITICO, June
2021).

18
the KGB11
. One of the meta-goals of
this campaign was to present Poland
as a failed state and the Polish Gov-
ernment as non-functioning.
Discrediting political leadership is
typical for Russian propaganda and
disinformation in all three countries.
Mainly claiming that “governments
are unstable and incompetent”. While
in Poland and Lithuania, it focuses
more on their activities as officials, in
Ukraine, Russian disinformation of-
ten attacks officials as personalities.
For instance, Russian propagandists
spread various fakes about Ukrainian
president Volodymyr Zelenskyy being
a drug addict12
.
Along with discrediting the country’s
leaders, the Russian propaganda
and disinformation machine focuses
on discrediting any positive develop-
ments in the country. It claims that
countries are suffering in most areas.
For instance, in Lithuania, the peculi-
arities of this narrative are the sharp-
ening of attention to what is alleged
“Lithuania is leading in suicide and
emigration rates due to poor living
conditions” and “most citizens alleg-
edly believe that the situation in the
country is deteriorating”.
In Lithuania and Poland, authorities
were heavily attacked by propagan-
da regarding COVID-19. For example,
in August 2021, there was an informa-
tion attack launched against Lithu-
ania, trying to emphasise the mes-
sage that the government is hiding
the actual situation about COVID-19 in
Lithuania. In Poland, Kremlin-aligned
institutions and media pushed mes-
sages that, because of the pandem-
ic, Poland has abandoned the devel-
opment of nuclear energy and the
country is in chaos, which has caused,
among other things, the cancellation
of the visit of the Polish delegation to
Katyn in 2020. These messages also
accused the Polish government of us-
ing the pandemic to introduce dicta-
torship. According to these narratives,
the political processes and the rule
of law are fully controlled by the EU,
weakening Poland’s position on the
international stage.
The narrative about a “failed state”
reinforces the narrative about “ex-
ternal governance” in Lublin Triangle
countries. Propagandists claim that
the “collective West” governs in these
countries through its “agents”. Russian
propaganda machine uses an ex-
tensive list of actors that embody the
idea of the “collective West”: from the
US to businessman and philanthro-
pist George Soros. In Ukraine, the fig-
ure of George Soros is heavily exploit-
ed in Russian information activities.
Civil society and independent media
that are crucial for democratic devel-
opment are often attacked by Krem-
lin propaganda and disinformation
within the “external governance” nar-
rative, claiming them to be “executors
of West’s interests”. Various labels are
applied by propaganda to discred-
it them: “clientele”, “foreign agents”,
“Western agencies”, “foreign agen-
cies”, “Western reptiloids”, “grant
suckers”, and “grant eaters”. However,
the most popular of them are still de-
rived from the name of George Soros:
“sorosMedia”, “sorosyata”, “proteges
of Soros”, “adherents of Soros”, “sect
of Soros witnesses”, “mouthpieces of
Soros”, “sorosobots”. Noteworthy, the
“Soros” messages have almost van-
ished from Ukraine’s information envi-
ronment as of August 2022.
12
Marina Sovina, “Зеленского заподозрили в употреблении наркотиков” (Moscow: Lenta.ru).

19
For Lithuanian and Polish citizens,
Russian propaganda claims that the
“country is an American/NATO pup-
pet state”. It has various dimensions,
but all with the goal of making citizens
feel powerless, fooled and exploited
by “western elites”. For example, in Po-
land, there is a disinformation mes-
sage that “Poland is “covering up”
facts about the work of US research-
ers on biological weapons on Ukraini-
an territory”.
Overall, various conspiracies with-
in “external governance” and war in
Ukraine are shared in all three coun-
tries. In particular, messages about
“NATO provoking Russia into at-
tacking Ukraine”. In Ukraine, Russian
propaganda claims that “the West
is using Ukraine to destroy Russia”. It
means allegedly, all the decisions of
the Ukrainian authorities are dictated
by the leaders of Western countries,
and Ukraine is used exclusively as a
bridgehead for the war between Rus-
sia and the West. In this way, Russia’s
propaganda machine reiterates that
Ukraine is allegedly not an independ-
ent actor but rather a pawn.
Narratives on “external governance”
and “country being a failed state”
blended in for numerous messag-
es concerning the upcoming winter
of 2022 and potential issues about
energy and prices. Russia has been
using power to blackmail Europe-
an countries. However, amid Russia’s
war against Ukraine, the blackmail
worsens, being amplified by Kremlin
propaganda threatening citizens with
cold and hunger. It claims that “the in-
flation and energy crises are caused
by the West’s misguided political ap-
proach” and that “average citizens
now are forced to pay for it out of
their own pockets”.
13
https://www.iri.org/news/iri-ukraine-poll-shows-strong-confidence-in-victory-over-russia-
overwhelming-approval-for-zelensky-little-desire-for-territorial-concessions-and-a-spike-for-
nato-membership/
Claims that Ukraine
is failed state or a
Nazi state are just
one of the Kremlin’s
most common disin-
formation narratives
to justify its aggression against
Ukraine and to undermine Ky-
iv’s credibility. In reality, Ukraine is
not a Nazi state and has no Nazi
ruling elite, and Nazism is not
Ukraine’s ideology. Claims about
Ukraine’s financing support and
“puppet-like statehood” are in-
tended to question the viability of
Ukrainian state. Whereas in reali-
ty, Ukrainian people demonstrate
strong support for Ukrainian state-
hood and a resolute will to defend
it (91% approval rate for president
Zelenskyy in June 202213
). Needless
to say that since 1991 Ukraine has
had six presidents and numerous
prime ministers from different par-
ties, and the continuity of power
has been preserved even during
political and economic hardships.
Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania are
sovereign and independent states
with democratically-elected pres-
idents and parliaments. Narratives
on external governance tend to
ignore this fact to discredit target-
ed countries, offering no evidence
to back these false claims.

20
Discrediting any format of produc-
tive cooperation between other
democratic countries is typical be-
haviour for Russian propaganda
and disinformation. Expectedly, the
EU and NATO are targeted by most
of the attacks. In the case of Lithu-
ania and Poland, it focuses on cre-
ating an illusion of membership be-
ing counterproductive. For instance,
Kremlin-aligned media were spread-
ing messages allegedly proving that
Poland is losing financially from its
membership of the European Union
and is being exploited by “Eurocrats
from Brussels”, by whom the con-
servative and Catholic values held
by Polish society and “Slavic identi-
ty” are also being suppressed. This
was backed by Polish pro-Kremlin
sources and channels, promoting
the idea of “Polexit – Poland leaving
the EU”. The message that “Lithua-
nia is an instigator of strife in the EU
and/or NATO” was widely spread in
Lithuania.
In Ukraine, as a country on its way
to Euroatlantic integration, messag-
es are quite similar, but in the for-
mat of a warning. Any kind of sup-
port from the EU or NATO has been
heavily criticised by propagandists
claiming that either the help is fake
or that it makes Ukraine “a slave to
Westerners”. Also, numerous alle-
gations about support being “sto-
len by corrupt politicians in Ukraine”
were shared. When Ukraine got the
official status of the candidate to
the European Union on the 23rd of
June, Russian propaganda specu-
lated that “candidacy has no real
impact”, referring to Turkey being a
candidate for over 20 years. At the
same time, pro-Russian anonymous
Telegram channels promoted a con-
spiracy about “Ukraine giving part
of its territory to Russia in exchange
for candidacy status”.
Mostly, both the EU and NATO are of-
ten portrayed by Russian propagan-
da as weak and about to collapse.
For instance, in Poland, messages fo-
cused on highlighting the disagree-
ments between the European Union
and Western countries, presenting
Poland as an isolated country on
the European stage and attacked in
particular by Germany and France.
Overall, the EU and NATO are often
portrayed as rivals. For instance,
propagandists claim that “Europe
has become a battleground for the
US power game”.
However, at the same time, Russian
propaganda portrays “the West” as
strong and cruel. In particular, “NATO
being a threat to Russia”. Russian
propaganda spreads the narrative
that “The West”/NATO is at war with
Russia”. The more success Ukraine
had on the battlefield, the more
propagandists explained it with the
alleged involvement of NATO in the
war. In all three countries, propa-
ganda claims that Ukrainian Armed
Forces are destroyed and now “for-
eign mercenaries/NATO/USA army is
fighting in Ukraine against Russia”.
There are various fakes about Eng-
Propaganda and disinformation targeting
international cooperation and unity

21
lish-speaking militants liberating
the territories from Russia. In Poland,
propagandists claim that “there are
foreign mercenaries as all Ukrainian
escape to Poland”. Also, pro-Russian
sources manipulate old photos, for
example, of the US plane as alleged
proof of “Americans being directly
at war with Russia”.
Spreading the narrative that the
“country is abandoned by its allies”,
Russian propaganda uses “divide et
impera” (divide and conquer) ap-
proach. The main purpose of this
narrative is to raise doubts about
the integrity and unity of partner
countries in countering Russian ag-
gression. In Ukraine, this narrative is
mostly connected with military aid
and Ukrainian refugees. Propagan-
dists share rumours that “Western
countries are tired of Ukraine” and
“don’t want to give more weapons
to Ukraine”. Also, they write that
the West “is no longer welcoming
Ukrainian refugees”.
Since Russia fully invaded Ukraine
and as a response to Lithuanian and
Polish support of Ukraine, Russia fo-
cused on claiming that “military aid
to Ukraine weakens the state that
provides this aid”. Not all foreign citi-
zens may support their government’s
aid to Ukraine. Therefore, Russian
propaganda tries to reinforce these
sentiments with such messages. In
Ukraine, it is mirrored in the message
that “foreign countries will eventu-
ally stop helping Ukraine at the cost
of their own security”. This is how the
propagandists incite that Ukrainians
must prepare fora significant reduc-
tion in military aid or perhaps even a
complete absence of help from in-
ternational partners. If one looks at
the overall context, this message is
combined with threats of future Rus-
sian attacks on other countries, so
the effect of fear is amplified. Prop-
agandists also appealed to the eth-
ics of Lithuanians, saying that “do-
nating for military aid is immoral” or
“those who help Ukraine are ridicu-
lous”. For Polish people, propaganda
appeals to history, claiming that Po-
land should not help Ukraine due to
its historical past.
The longer Ukraine resists Russia, the
more it damages Russia’s image as
an “invincible country.” Therefore,
Russian agitprop spreads the mes-
sage that “military aid prolongs the
war”. The longer Ukraine fights, the
greater the losses among its military
and civilians, losses in the economy
and infrastructure, and so on. Thus,
Russia is manipulating the thesis
that it is worth stopping providing
weapons to Ukraine - and then the
war will quickly end. These messages
are reinforced by statements about
the “uselessness of aid”, meaning
that Russia will win sooner or later
anyway.
Russian propaganda works to de-
value, discredit, and stop the world’s
aid to Ukraine and, to achieve this,
propagandists spread the message
that “Western military aid is being
stolen” or is not being used for the
intended purposes. It is also one of
the most significant messages by
its number. In Ukraine, propagan-
dists are trying to convince that
“the West gives Ukraine bad weap-
ons”, “the Ukrainian military refuses
to fight with it”, and that the “West
uses Ukraine as a testing ground for
developing the latest weapons”.

22
While Russia uses
narratives portray-
ing EU and NATO as
quarrelling and thus
internally unstable
and weak, dialogue is a normal
practice within these organisa-
tions and is the only way to reach
a compromise. The Kremlin is try-
ing to convince the wider public
that NATO is threatening its secu-
rity by initiating a military build-
up. In reality, NATO only merely
responded to aggressive steps
taken by Russia. Its intention was
never to carry out an aggressive
policy against other countries, as
it is a solely defensive alliance.
Russian propaganda pushed nar-
ratives claiming the EU’s volatility,
such as false claims that Poland
is preparing to leave the bloc.
This topic was never on the po-
litical agenda of any ruling par-
ty since Poland’s EU accession in
2004. Polexit was never more than
a false narrative intended to sow
discord within the EU.
Despite Russia’s propaganda nar-
ratives that the West is support-
ing Kyiv with somehow “flawed”
military equipment and that sup-
port for such deliveries is melting,
the support for sending military
equipment to Ukraine is steadi-
ly growing. At the same time, Kyiv
obtains new types of modern
weapons, which help it to roll the
Russian territorial advances back.
Russian propaganda and disinformation
targeting inter and intragroup relationships
Russian disinformation is hyperlo-
cal14
. It manages to exploit all the so-
cial cracks it can find. Some of these
cracks had been discovered by Rus-
sia a long time ago, so it was regular-
ly investing resources to expand and
deepen them. In other words, Krem-
lin propaganda is trying to divide
communities. It pits one community
against another and simultaneously
makes communities fall apart.
The most dominant narrative con-
cerns so-called “Russophobia”, when
Russia is trying to pit, for instance,
Russian-speaking citizens of the
country against national language
speakers. Accusations of Russopho-
bia are common not only for Lublin
Triangle countries. Propagandists
claim that “the West and its proteges
are inciting Russophobia” practically
worldwide. They claim that “Russians
are discriminated against”, “Russian
culture/sports are being discriminat-
ed”, and that it is a part of a global
14
Iryna Riaboshtan et al., “Ukrainian Nazis for the Czech Republic, bio laboratories for North
Macedonia, and Russophobia for Georgia. Analysis of Russian propaganda in 11 European
countries” (Kyiv: Detector Media, September 2022).

23
conspiracy to defeat Russia. In Lith-
uania, citizens are threatened with
consequences for “Russophobia”: the
rising cost of living is due to Lithua-
nia’s anti-Russian policies15
.
According to Russian propaganda,
all Lublin Triangle countries “are Rus-
sophobic”. In fact, Russia used the
propaganda narrative of “Ukraini-
ans discriminate/terrorise Russian
speakers” as a pretext to occupy
Crimea and invade Ukraine in 2014. In
February 2022, the Russian president
mentioned it, among other reasons,
“justifying” the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine.
In all three countries, Russian propa-
ganda claims that “every sign of Rus-
sia is demolished and suppressed,”:
from the toppling of monuments to
the Red Army to the closing of Rus-
sian-language schools. Propaganda
also claims that pro-Russian voices
of those with ‘politically incorrect
views on the “Ukraine issue” are ig-
nored.
Another group that is being pitted
against countries’ citizens are refu-
gees. Anti-immigrant and anti-Mus-
lim rhetoric in Poland was fueled by
Russian propaganda in 2015 when the
migration crisis hit the EU’s external
borders. One of the biggest malign
information campaigns that target-
ed Poland and also Lithuania was
around the crisis on the Polish-Bela-
rusian border - a state-sponsored hy-
brid operation against the EU which
resulted in almost 40,000 attempts to
illegally cross the Polish border in 2021
alone (300 times more than in 2020).
This narrative has been created and
promoted by government-aligned
media from Belarus and Russia. Then,
crafted information was distributed
and amplified in different languages,
including Polish, using Russian disin-
formation media and websites (RT,
Sputnik Polska, RuBaltic, BaltNews).
To magnify propaganda, the Belaru-
sian regime invited western media to
the border, including American and
British TV, to present Minsk’s point of
view and manipulate the situation on
the border. Then, the western cover-
age was manipulated and used by
Belarusian media to attack Poland.
The narrative included many differ-
ent disinformation messages accus-
ing the polish military and authorities
of atrocities against migrants. The
Belarusian services (KGB) disinforma-
tion activities on this subject have
also been confirmed. In one of its
quarterly reports on disinformation,
Meta confirmed the identification
and removal of a Belarusian informa-
tion operation on Facebook directed
against Poland, which had focused
on disinformation on the migration
crisis orchestrated by the Belarusian
regime before changing its focus to
pro-Russian content after Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine16
.
Lithuania in this situation was at-
tacked by Russian propaganda and
disinformation as a country that al-
legedly “violates human rights at
their border”. This message tries to
show alleged Lithuania’s inhumane
attitude towards migrants near
the Lithuanian border. At first, only
stories appeared about alleged-
ly beaten Iraqi migrants who were
chased away to the Belarusian side
by Lithuanian officials. Finally, the
15
RuBaltic.Ru, “Политолог рассказал, что ждет Литву в случае отключения от БРЭЛЛ” (Kaliningrad:
RuBaltic.Ru, June 2022).
16
Ben Nimmo et al., “Adversarial Threat Report” (Menlo Park: Meta, April 2022).

24
ANTI-POLISH NARRATIVES REGARDING THE BELARUSIAN STATE-
SPONSORED MIGRATION CRISIS ON THE POLISH BORDER
Polish soldiers have
committed atrocities
and genocide on middle-
eastern refuges on the
Polish-Belarusian border
Western countries are
responsible for bringing
immigrants on the Polish-
Belarusian border
Poland is responsible for
instrumentalising and
using immigrants against
Belarus
Polish soldiers are forcing
immigrants back onto
Belarusian soil, after they
crossed the Polish border
Polish authorities and Poles
are racists, and because
of that they refuse entry
to Poland for the middle-
eastern migrants
Poland is bringing
immigrants to the border
and artificially creating
the crisis
Accusing Poland of
not complying with
international law and
of not being humane
Polish services and
the army are blocking
humanitarian aid for
immigrants
news about an Iraqi migrant who
allegedly died in the vicinity of the
Benekainai settlement on the bor-
der with Lithuania was spread -
Minsk quickly reclassified this story
into the incident of a “brutally mur-
dered Iraqi” and organised a picket
at the Lithuanian Embassy in Minsk17
.
The rhetoric in these disinformation
messages aims at calling Lithuani-
ans, brutal fascists. The propagan-
da channels’ news feeds are being
filled up with regular posts or arti-
cles about how Lithuanian border
police allegedly beat up migrants
at the border.
Russian propaganda heavily focus-
es on discrediting Ukrainian refu-
gees fleeing Russia’s full-scale inva-
sion. Since 24 February, more than 8.1
million refugees from Ukraine have
crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border,
they are mainlywomen and children.
Meanwhile, at the same time, a total
of more than 6.1 million people have
returned to Ukraine. It means that
at the moment, more than 2 million
Ukrainian refugees live in Poland.
According to the OECD, the cost of
Polish help in 2022 alone will exceed
€8.36 billion (almost 1% of the total
GDP) - the highest in Europe.
17
Vaidas Saldžiūnas, “Kiek toli gali žengti Lukašenka: po kraupių vaizdų iš pasienio laukia nauja
provokacijų banga” (Vilnius: Delfi, August 2021).

25
Most propaganda efforts were aimed
at convincing Lithuanians and Poles
that “Ukrainian refugees are under-
mining the internal stability of the
host countries”. Here, various cases of
gender disinformation were recorded,
claiming that “all Ukrainian women
enteringforeigncountrieswillbecome
prostitutes there” and “will spread
infectious diseases”. Propagandists
are also trying to persuade citizens of
other countries that “for their govern-
ments helping Ukrainians is a higher
priority than helping the vulnerable
population of their own countries.”
The largest number of such messages
was recorded in the Polish infospace.
The third most widely used message
concerning Ukrainian refugees was
that “Ukrainian refugees are corrupt
and ungrateful”. Additionally, Ukrain-
ians were targeted with the message
that “they are no longer welcomed
abroad” and it is time to return home.
Hence, according to Russian propa-
ganda and disinformation to “stim-
ulate” Ukrainians to return to their
homeland, “it is necessary to reduce
the aid for Ukrainian refugees.” One
more important disinformation mes-
sage is that “Ukrainians started the
Ukrainization of Poland”.
In the Ukrainian segment, propagan-
da claimed that “the rights of Ukrain-
ians abroad are being violated.”
Probably, such tactics were used so
that Ukrainians would not seek help
abroad. Propagandists mentioned
that reportedly Ukrainian women
were forced to provide sex services
abroad as there was no other ac-
ceptable work for them.
Russophobia
The Kremlin is try-
ing hard to convince
the rest of the world
that Lublin Triangle
countries are Russophobic and
discriminative against Russian
minorities, language and culture.
The truth is that Poland, Lithua-
nia and Ukraine are democratic
countries which respect the rights
of minorities and human rights
and do not discriminate or op-
press any individuals because of
their citizenship, political opinions
or mother tongue.
It is also true that Lublin Triangle
countries have clear security con-
cerns linked to Russia. The source
of concern is Russia’s aggression
toward neighbouring countries,
first of all against Ukraine – one
of the countries within the format.
Given how it affected the security
situation in the region in general,
one could hardly describe it as
“Russophobia”.
In the context of false accusa-
tions of Russophobia, it is also
worth mentioning that the West
has been trying to establish
good-neighbourly relations with
Moscow since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, but Russia’s increas-
ingly hostile policy has made a
continuation of such efforts im-
possible.

26
Hybrid operation
on the Polish-Be-
larussian border
While accusing Po-
land of curbing allegedly spon-
taneous migrant inflow from the
Middle East to the EU, Belarus
employed a new concept of im-
porting people to create a se-
curity and humanitarian crisis.
Minsk went as far as resorting to
the instrumentalisation of inno-
cent third-country migrants to
achieve political goals by delib-
erately luring potential migrants
to Minsk and promising them an
easy passage to Europe.
Historical narratives and messages exploited by
Russian propaganda
History have been weaponised by
mation. By rewriting and reconcep-
tualising the past, Russia justifies
the present. To give sense to Rus-
sian aggressive claims and actions
and make them understandable,
the Kremlin tells those people stories
about history. Being the one who re-
writes history, Russian propaganda
claims that it is preserving history
that the so-called “West” wants to
change. In 2015, Russia’s National Se-
curity Strategy contended that one
of the threats to national security
within the cultural sphere is the “at-
tempt to falsify Russian and World
history”. Kremlin propaganda and
disinformation used history to ma-
nipulate people into believing that
Ukraine has no historical background
as an independent state, that alleg-
edly it was created as an artificial
project with Ukrainian language and
culture mimicking and shadowing
Russia and that Donbas and Crimea
have always been Russian. All these
statements have nothing to do with
history; however, they continue be-
ing pushed by Kremlin sources. Ma-
nipulating history, Kremlin spread the
narrative about “Poland planning to
invade Ukraine to take over its his-
torical territories”. In this way, prop-
agandists fueled the narrative of
“Ukraine being a failed state”, mean-
ing that historically it is not a country
as it was divided among many other
countries, so it is time for Poland and
other neighbours to take what is “his-
torically theirs”.
Lithuania’s statehood is also at-
tacked by Russian propaganda and
disinformation. The regime of Belarus,
amplified by Kremlin media outlets,
spread some disinformation messag-
es about “the exclusivity to the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania’s history” 18
. This
propaganda message implies po-
tential territorial claims on Vilnius by
Belarus.
18
Dmitri Teperik et al., “Resilience Against Disinformation: A New Baltic Way to Follow?” (Tallinn:
International Centre for Defence and Security, October 2022).

27
One of the most frequent narratives
about Nazism weaponises histo-
ry and distorts the present. Russian
propaganda and disinformation
claim that all “countries of Lublin Tri-
angle are Nazis”. The narrative ex-
ploits the events of World War II. First,
it claims that Russia is the sole victor
of World War II. Second, claiming that
country nationalists were collaborat-
ing with Nazis, thus countries alleged-
ly preserved it and reinforced it in the
current. Third, it discredits any an-
ti-Soviet resistance during that time.
For instance, demonising Ukrainian
and Lithuanian partisans. The latter,
the Freedom Fighters, were the long-
est resistance movement in Europe19
.
Interestingly, that “nazism” and “fas-
cism” are quite interchangeable con-
cepts for Kremlin’s hostile information
campaigns. Moreover, propagandists
portray any type of patriotism as na-
tionalism which in the Russian propa-
ganda language means “Nazism”. In
the case of Ukraine, the disinforma-
tion narrative of Nazism was used by
Russia as one of the key reasons for
waging the full-scale war. Allegedly,
Ukraine needed to be denazified in
the eyes of the Russian propaganda
machine, which continues fueling the
“Nazism narrative”. Before that, Russia
has investedvast resources inthis nar-
rative, especially for foreign audienc-
es. It exploited the images of Ukrain-
ian nationalists fighting for Ukraine’s
independence during the Second
World War as the faces of alleged Na-
zism in Ukraine20
. Russian propagan-
dists were rewriting history so vigor-
ously that some Russians thought that
Ukrainian nationalists who fought for
Ukraine’s independence during the
SecondWorldWarwerealiveandwere
the ones in power in Ukraine. Ramzan
Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Re-
public, even announced a cash prize
for Bandera’s head, who, according to
Russian propaganda, is the essence
of “Ukrainian neonazism”21
. However,
Stepan Bandera died in 1959. With-
in the narrative, propagandists also
promote messages about “Russian
forces saving Ukrainian kids from Na-
zis”, “protecting the Russian-speak-
ing population of Ukraine”, and “de-
fending traditional and conservative
values that are under attack from the
“rotten west”. During the full-scale in-
vasion of Ukraine, Kremlin continued
claiming that “Ukrainians attack ci-
vilians and commit other war crimes”,
“Ukraine commits terrorist attacks
against peaceful Russians”, “Ukraine
is preparing a nuclear strike” to fuel
narrative on Nazism and overall de-
monise Ukrainians.
In Poland and Lithuania, alleged Na-
zism is often combined with Russo-
phobia. In Lithuania, Kremlin con-
tinuously spreads the message that
“people are being persecuted for
their political views”. In fact, any de-
cisions that are not in the interests of
Russia are framed as “political per-
secution as an indicator of Nazism”.
Using the Volhynia Massacre (ethnic
Poles being murdered in Nazi-occu-
pied parts of eastern Poland (now
part of Ukraine) by Ukrainian nation-
alists) and the troubled history be-
tween Poland and Ukraine has been
19
20
Gala Skiarevska, “Why Azov is not a “neo-nazi battalion” (Kyiv: Detector Media, June 2022).
21
5.ua, “Степан Бандера не проти зустрітися з Кадировим – ВРУ” (Kyiv: 5.ua, March 2022).

28
part of anti-Ukrainian disinforma-
tion in Poland since 2014. According
to them, the Russian invasion con-
stitutes ‘avenging’ the victims of the
Volhynia Massacre or has been pro-
voked by crimes of “modern Bander-
ists” against Russia. But most of the
messages using the Volhynia Mas-
sacre are targeted against Ukrain-
ian refugees in Poland. Ukrainian
refugees are portrayed as Bander-
ists that are celebrating murders
of poles. Also, Russian propaganda
claims that Ukrainians do not want to
acknowledge the crimes perpetrated
by Ukrainians against Polish people.
Therefore, according to the pushed
messages, Ukrainian refugees are
not worthy of the help that they are
getting from the Polish society and
the Polish government. This narra-
tive is disseminated and amplified
by right-wing extremist politicians,
pro-Kremlin activists and bloggers.
The aim is to create a negative senti-
ment towards Ukrainians. In extreme
cases, the disinformation pieces,
based on this narrative, are advocat-
ing for a closing of the Polish border
for Ukrainians and for stopping any
help towards Kyiv. But the meta-ob-
jective here remains to create a neg-
ative image of Ukrainians and to un-
dermine the support for the Polish
government in its proactive attitude
towards Ukraine.
22
Yaroslav Hrytsak et al., “Re-Vision of history. Russian historical propaganda and Ukraine” (Kyiv:
UkraineWorld, October 2019).
Russian propaganda
tries to promote the
theory that Ukraine
is an artificially es-
tablished coun-
try. The truth is that Ukraine is a
well-defined nation with a long
history and its own strong identi-
ty. The history of Ukrainian state-
hood dates back to the era of the
Kyivan Rus’ in the Middle Ages. A
fully independent contemporary
Ukrainian state emerged in the
20th century. More on Russian
historical propaganda about
Ukraine can be found in “Re-vi-
sion of history. Russian Historical
Propaganda and Ukraine”22
.
By promoting its imperial ideolo-
gy of the “all-Russian big nation”,
the Kremlin intends to weaken
the national identity of Ukrain-
ians and undermine Ukraine’s
state sovereignty.
At the same time, Russian prop-
aganda is trying to convince the
world that Poland has territorial
claims on Ukraine. Still, the fact
is that it was historically the first
country in the world to recognise
Ukraine’s independence in 1991.
Since then, Warsaw has been
one of the strongest advocates
of Ukrainian sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity.
As far as false accusations of
Nazism are concerned it is worth
remembering that all three Lu-
blin Triangle countries prohibit
the use of Nazi symbols and are
dedicated to the promotion of
historical remembrance of WWII
and condemnation of totalitari-
an ideologies.

29
ropaganda and disinformation are
neither new nor unique. However,
technological developments create
new opportunities and formats for
information manipulations to spread.
mation proved to be very effective
in terms of following its audience.
The core of Russian propaganda
and disinformation still comes from
a wide network of TV channels and
media outlets. They mimic the media,
but there is no journalism, but rath-
er channels for Kremlin-controlled
propaganda and disinformation. As
of August 2022, key TV channels and
media outlets controlled by Krem-
lin are blocked in the Lublin Triangle
countries.
Broadcasting of Russian media on
the territory of Ukraine was already
blocked in 201723
. The National Security
and Defense Council of Ukraine intro-
duced sanctions against 468 legal en-
tities and 1,228 persons, including Rus-
sian media, Crimean Russian media
companies, and media representa-
tives. Among those sanctioned: Russia
Today, NTV-Plus, Ren TV, RTR-Planet,
Russia-24, NTV, TRC of the Armed Forc-
es of the Russian Federation “Zvezda/
Звезда”, MIA “Rossiya Segodnya”, RBC,
VGTRK, NTV-Plus, TNT-teleset, Mos-
cow Media, Nashe Radio, “Promedia”
and others. These sanctions include
restriction or termination of the pro-
vision of telecommunication services
and use of public telecommunication
networks, blocking of assets, and sus-
pension of economic and financial
obligations. At the same time, Inter-
net providers in Ukraine were prohib-
ited from providing users with access
to the domains and subdomains of
these mass media.
In March 2022, the EU imposed sanc-
tions and suspended the broad-
casting activities of Sputnik’ and RT/
Russia Today (RT English, RT UK, RT
Germany, RT France, and RT Spanish)
in the EU, or directed at the EU as a
response to Russia’s full-scale inva-
sion of Ukraine and the instrumental-
ised role of these channels used as a
weapon of aggression. Later in June
2022, the broadcasting activities of
other three Russian state-controlled
outlets (RTR Planeta, Russia 24 and TV
Centre International) were suspend-
ed by the EU.
In Poland, however, Russian state me-
dia like Sputnik were not specifically
popular, Even the ones in the Polish
Sources of Russian
disinformation and
propaganda targeting
Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine
23
Petro Poroshenko, “Указ Президента України Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і обо-
рони України від 28 квітня 2017 року «Про застосування персональних спеціальних економіч-
них та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)»” (Kyiv: Uryadovy Kuryer, May 2017).

30
language. Thus, Kremlin-owned me-
dia outlets have never been the key
sources of Russian propaganda and
disinformation in Poland.
However, in Lithuania, the case is dif-
ferent as there is a significant part
of the Russian-speaking population.
Regarding the most popular Rus-
sian language social media outlets
which are orientated towards the
Baltic region the top 5 most popu-
lar are: Baltnews, Tribaltic Extinc-
tions (Трибалтийские Вымираты),
RuBaltic, Russian Lithuania (РУССКАЯ
ЛИТВА), Latvijas balzams. The most
popular of them all is Baltnews – it
averages around 3600-3800 interac-
tions per post. According to a study
made by the Lithuanian “Market re-
search center”, which was conducted
in 2021, 29.4% of the survey’s respond-
ents stated that they use Russian me-
dia24
. While among representatives of
Lithuanian national minorities, about
70% used Russian-language media.
Russian-speaking minorities also
watch channels from Belarus that
heavily spread Russian propagan-
da and disinformation. Besides, they
follow pro-Russian state entertain-
ment25
. The most popular news out-
let in the Russian language, which is
orientated towards the Baltic region,
is RuBaltic. According to media mon-
itoring research done by CRI, 520 of
RuBaltic’s articles which contained
propaganda gathered 354 420 views
on Telegram from the 13th of June un-
til the 28th of August26
.
Overall, the amount of those watch-
ing television has been decreasing
in all 3 countries, while online is be-
coming the primary source where cit-
izens find disinformation. Analysing
different reports and disinformation
trends we can observe that social
media platforms serve as primary
channels to spread disinformation
and propaganda in all three coun-
tries. In Poland, most of the malign
information resides on Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube. This is mainly an
effect of their popularity in Poland or
the characteristics of their users and
the topics they cover. In Poland, with
a population of over 37 million, the
most popular digital platform is You-
Tube, with 27.2 million users, followed
by Facebook (17.65 million users), Mes-
senger (15.8 million users), Instagram
(10.7 million users) and TikTok (7.7 mil-
lion users)27
. Twitter is generally less
popular, with 2.05 million users, but
gathers an audience more focused
on political affairs, geopolitics etc.,
which creates a great target audi-
ence for disinformation. For example,
on the Polish segment of Facebook,
there are groups like Ukrainiec NIE
jest moim bratem (over 50 000 fol-
lowers). Its name can be translated
as “Ukrainian is NOT my brother”. It
disseminates anti-Ukrainian and an-
ti-refugees content, including disin-
formation, misinformation etc., often
using disinformation content from
other websites. The page was cre-
ated in March 2014, shortly after the
Russian invasion of East Ukraine.
24
Austėja Masiokaitė, “Lietuviai svarbiausiu informacijos šaltiniu laiko internetą” (Vilnius: Delfi.lt,
October 2021).
25
26
Laisvūnas Čekavičius et al., “Media monitoring report: Anti-Ukrainian war Propaganda in the
Baltic states” (Vilnius: Civic Resilience Initiative, September 2022).
27
Simon Kemp, “Digital 2022: Poland” (DataReportal, February 2022).

31
A similar situation is in Lithuania,
where among 2.6 million residents,
YouTube has 2.08 million users in Lith-
uania; 1.70 million users use Face-
book, Facebook Messenger reached
1.50 million users; Instagram has 854.0
thousand users; Twitter has 255.9
thousand users28
. For instance, Ateitį
kuriame dabar - a YouTube channel
in which pro-Russian propaganda
against Ukranians is being shared
and anti-Lithuanian content is be-
ing produced. Būkime vieningi and
Būkime vieningi - NAUJAS YouTube
page, owned by Vaidas Zemaitis Lek-
stutis, in which Russia, V. Putin, the
former Soviet Union, and Stalin have
been praised for many years. At the
same time, Lithuania, Western coun-
tries, the European Union and NATO
are despised. Ekspertai.eu is a You-
Tube channel with over 15700 sub-
scribers and over a million views. It is
linked to PressJazz TV. Uploads Rus-
sian propaganda themed content at
least once a week.
However, in all 3 countries, new plat-
forms are rising. Specifically Tele-
gram and TikTok. While TikTok has a
predominantly young audience, Tele-
gram that emerged as a messenger
is more diverse in its users. TikTok is
mostly referred to as an entertain-
ing platform, however, socio-politi-
cal content is heavily present on the
platform as well. Detector Media, for
instance, analysed how the Russian
propaganda machine used TikTok to
spread disinformation about Nord
Stream 229
. However, we know very lit-
tle about TikTok and how information
manipulations are spread there. We
can mostly navigate it through hash-
tags and captions, however, they are
often missing.
Telegram, presenting itself as a secure
platform, became a breeding ground
for information manipulations. This is
an effect of a less strict moderation
approach and the lack of anti-disin-
formation policies at Telegram, espe-
cially when compared to the three big
platforms mentioned at the begin-
ning. It attracts far-right groups and
serves as a safe haven for conspira-
cies. On the eve of and after the full-
scale invasion of the Russian army to
Ukraine, public figures who promoted
the slogans of Russian propaganda
faced issues: some of their Facebook
pages or YouTube channels were
blocked, where they had gathered
an audience for years30
. Some have
received criminal cases or ended up
in custody31
. However, Telegram re-
mained a safe haven where Russian
lovers could spread Russian propa-
ganda without hindrance. Through
the years, the service administration
has done almost nothing to stop the
spread of disinformation32
. In this cosy
ecosystem, pro-Russian channels
create a parallel reality, spread prop-
aganda, convey the words of collab-
orators and propagandists as truth,
and quote each other.
28
Simon Kemp, “Digital 2022: Lithu ania” (DataReportal, February 2022).
29
Ksenia Iliuk, “Пропагандисти танцюють? Моніторинг російської дезінформації про «Північний
потік-2» у тіктоку” (Kyiv: Detector Media, November 2021).
30
MediaSapiens, “YouTube заблокував в Україні канал Анатолія Шарія” (Kyiv: Detector Media,
March 2022).
31
Detector Media, “На Волині оголосили підозру пропагандисту, який вже отримав вирок за
антиукраїнську діяльність” (Kyiv: Detector Media, September 2022).
32
Iryna Riaboshtan et al., “From «Trukha» to Gordon: the most popular channels of the Ukrainian
Telegram” (Kyiv: Detector Media, September 2022).

32
When it comes to Ukraine, Telegram
is the main source of disinformation
in terms of quantity and diversity. It is
also one of the most popular sources
for Ukrainians to get information from,
especially since Russia’s full-scale
invasion33
. However, YouTube, Insta-
gram and Facebook have the high-
est amount of users in Ukraine (28, 16
and15 million users respectively)34
.
Among the hundred most popular
Telegram channels aimed at Ukrain-
ians, there are ten openly pro-Rus-
sian Telegram channels: pro-Rus-
sian bloggers; anonymous channels
publishing manipulative analytics
and fabricated insiders; channels
that pretend to be media and pub-
lish news under the pretext of Russian
propaganda; pro-Russian media. In
this top list: channels of Olga and
Anatoliy Shariy and Tetyana Mont-
yan (described earlier as a pro-Rus-
sian public person). Also, in the top
100 are two channels run by Russian
intelligence: Legitimny (675,000 sub-
scribers) and Resident (601,000 sub-
scribers).
Detector Media started research-
ing anonymous Telegram channels
back in 202035
. It was already then
that a number of anonymous Tele-
gram channels stood out in terms of
their rhetoric favouring Russia. The
frequency with which these chan-
nels quote each other, as well as the
simultaneous promotion of the same
messages by them, indicates close
links between them, as well as their
centralized management36
.
In February 2021, cyber specialists at
the Security Service of Ukraine un-
covered a large-scale agent net-
work working for Russia’s intelligence
agencies37
. It claims that over a dozen
anonymous Telegram channels fo-
cusing on politics in Ukraine are work-
ing for Russian military intelligence.
Such channels may be roughly divid-
ed into national (since they focus on
the national agenda with an empha-
sis on central authorities) and region-
al ones (these mainly focus on cer-
tain cities, although from time to time
they cover the national political situ-
ation, too). The first of these catego-
ries includes such popular channels
as Legitimnyi, Resident, Cartel, Splen-
titsa, Chornyi Kvartal and Politiches-
kiy Rasklad. The second one includes
Netipichnoye Zaporozhye, Trempel
Kharkov, Odeskiy frayer, Dnepr Live,
Nikolaev Live and Kherson Live.
However, a preliminary analysis of
Russian disinformation in Telegram
indicatesthatthe network ofpro-Rus-
sian channels is much more exten-
sive. For example, such channels as
the ZeRada (271 000 subscribers) and
First (481 000 subscribers) channels
can also be traced to this network.
Typically these channels try to hide
33
Diana Krechetova, “Телебачення поступається соцмережам: де українці дізнаються новини
під час війни. Опитування” (Kyiv: Ukrainska Pravda, August 2022).
34
Simon Kemp, “Digital 2022: Ukraine” (DataReportal, February 2022).
35
Detector Media, “Моніторинг (про)російської дезінформації в регіональних медіа за 7–13 ве-
ресня 2020 року” (Kyiv: Detector Media, September 2020).
36
Detector Media, “On the other side of the screen: An analysis of media consumption and
disinformation in the Ukraine’s information environment” (Kyiv: Detector Media, May 2021).
37
MediaSapiens, “СБУ заявила, що викрила мережу Telegram-каналів, які курують у ГРУ РФ. Се-
ред них - «Легитимный» та «Резидент»” (Kyiv: Detector Media, February 2021).

33
their pro-Russian position, but Detec-
tor Media has been tracking over 500
channels that spread Russian prop-
aganda and disinformation targeted
at Ukrainians38
.
The tactics of propagandists on Tel-
egram in all 3 countries are very sim-
ilar. It seems like Russian propagan-
da launched and tested them in the
Ukrainian information environment
and now is transferring it to other
countries. In particular, Lithuania and
Poland. For instance, Ldiena is a Tele-
gram channel in which Russian prop-
aganda and anti-Lithuanian narra-
tives are shared. Strażnicy Wolności
is aTelegram channel gathering more
than 18 000 members. Focused on
anti-mainstream and anti-establish-
ment news, spreading disinformation,
before war focused on COVID-19 and
vaccines, currently openly pro-Rus-
sian and anti-Ukrainian. Highly ac-
tive as it is open, what means any-
one can post. Other pro-Russian and
anti-Ukrainian Telegram channels in
Poland are “Kanał Informacyjny KJU”,
“Ktoś”, “Oko Cyklonu”, “Olej w głowie”,
“Ukraina w Ogniu”, “Ciężka Artyleria”,
“Ruch Oporu”, “Niezależny Dziennik
Polityczny”, “Nwk24.pl – kanał ofic-
jalny”, “NewsFactoryPL”, “Antyprop-
aganda”, “Qanon Polska”, “Zbrodeni,
Polityka, Afery”, “RuskiStatek”, “Ciężka
Artyleria - kanał”, “Ruch Oporu”, “Nwk-
24pl”, “NiezależnyM1”, “swiatinformac-
ji”, “ndp_pl”.
38
Iryna Riaboshtan, “«Телеграмна імперія» розвідки Росії під час великої війни” (Kyiv: Detector
Media, June 2022).

34
In Lublin Triangle countries, tasks in
the field of committing disinforma-
tion and strategic communication
are carried out by various units work-
ing independently within specific de-
partments. Most often, they reside
between foreign affairs and security,
particularly the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of National
Defense. However, there is still room
for improvement in cooperating effi-
ciently and achieving synergies.
In March 2021, Ukraine created two
state bodies responsible for coun-
tering disinformation: the Centre for
Strategic Communication and Infor-
mation Security under the Ministry
of Culture and Information Policy of
Ukraine and the Centre for Counter-
ing Disinformation under the Nation-
al Security and Defence Council of
Ukraine39
. The creation of a body re-
sponsible for combatting disinforma-
tion and conducting strategic com-
municationwas considered a positive
development in Ukraine. However,
their mandates seem to overlap and
duplicate each other. Besides, var-
ious strategic communication units
reside within other state institutions,
which poses an additional challenge
for synergy and one voice policy as
there is no mechanism on how they
should cooperate. Since the start of
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
Centers have focused on informing
Ukrainians about the development of
the events as well as raising aware-
ness about disinformation tactics.
Measures to build resilience
to Russian propaganda and
disinformation
39
Government Portal, “Презентовано Центр стратегічних комунікацій та інформаційної безпе-
ки” (Kyiv: Government Portal, April 2021); Internet Freedom, “Центр протидії дезінформації на базі
РНБО: що відомо про новостворений орган” (Kyiv: Internet Freedom, April 2021).
Each Lublin Triangle country has a
unique experience in measures to
build resilience to Russian propa-
ganda and disinformation. The policy
paper focuses on those in place from
January 2021 to August 2022. Thus, it
is not a comprehensive analysis of
measures that have ever been taken
in the countries, but rather key meas-
ures and responses within the legis-
lation, policy, and education taken
by state institutions, civil society or-
ganisations and businesses.
State institutions, agencies and their policies

35
In Lithuania, there are also sever-
al bodies responsible for strategic
communication. However, they have
the format of departments that are
logically assigned to ministries, for in-
stance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
or other governmental structures -
Armed Forces of Lithuania.
In Poland, in September 2022, a new
position was created within the Chan-
cellery of the Prime Minister - Govern-
ment Plenipotentiary for the Secu-
rity of the Information Space of the
Republic of Poland. His tasks include
identifying and analysing information
activities against the security, inter-
ests and image of Poland, identifying
entities, especially foreign entities,
undertaking and conducting infor-
mation activities against the interests
of Poland, identifying manifestations
of information operations conducted
in the information space, and con-
ducting activities aimed at neutralis-
ing identified threats to the security.
Also, Academic Centre for Strategic
Communication40
was established
after the War Studies University had
been tasked with conducting training
and analyses in this area. The Centre’s
mission is to improve the Polish Armed
Forces’s communication system, raise
society’s awareness of threats com-
ing from the information environment,
initiate public debate on strategic
communication, and counteract dis-
information. The Center signed also
an agreement on cooperation with
the Territorial Defence Forces. The
main objective of the agreement is
to combat disinformation jointly. This
includes the exchange of informa-
tion and good practices in the field of
strategic communication, particularly
in combating disinformation.
There is also a growing number of
initiatives for media education. One
example is the “Media Education”
(pl. Edukacja Medialna) project, run
by the Fundacja Nowoczesna Pols-
ka, under the honorary patronage of
the Ministry of National Education,
the Ministry of Culture and National
Heritage and the Ministry of Admin-
istration and Digitization.The project
offers scenarios, exercises and mate-
rials for teaching in schools, commu-
nity centres and libraries.
Cross-organisational contacts are
facilitated by the presence of subject
matter experts and analysts from re-
nowned research centres, such as
NASK National Research Institute.
NASK National Research Institute is a
state-owned institute whose mission
is to search for and implement solu-
tions for the development of ICT net-
works in Poland. It conducts research,
works and operational activities for
the security of Polish cyberspace.
Communications efforts with regards
to Ukraine are coordinated and con-
sulted with the Government Commu-
nications Centre – this allows for a
coherent and coordinated response.
Simultaneously to all of that activity,
hybrid threats are being monitored
regularly by the Government Crisis
Management Team (RZZK). The group
meets on a regular basis to discuss
current challenges, including expo-
sure to disinformation.
Both domestic and international
trends are closely observed with for-
eign disinformation as the primary
concern of a dedicated StratCom
team operating within Polish MFA.
MFA StratCom team monitors disin-
40
Academic Centre for Strategic Communication.

36
formation targeting Poland spread
internationally, carries out interna-
tional campaigns which are aimed
at countering disinformation and in-
oculating international audiences
to false claims, and cooperates with
international partners on topics of
strategic communication and coun-
tering disinformation.
In 2021, Lithuanian Ministry of National
Defence prepared a national action
plan for combating disinformation. In
Poland, NASK (a Polish research and
development organization and data
networks operator) and 11 other ex-
pert organisations created of a Code
of Good Practice in the area of com-
bating disinformation. In Ukraine, on
October 15th of the same year, the
National Security and Defense Coun-
cil heard and adopted the Informa-
tion Security Strategy of Ukraine. The
document is designed for the peri-
od up to 2025 and defines existing
and potential threats to Ukraine’s
state security and policy in this area.
Among the global challenges and
threats to information security is
mentioned in particular “the informa-
tion policy of the Russian Federation”.
In Ukraine, In October 2021, National
Security and Defence Council, the
Ministry of Culture and Information
Policy of Ukraine, and The Center for
Countering Disinformation created a
“Glossary of names, terms and phras-
es recommended for use in connec-
tion with the Russian Federation’s
temporary occupation of the Auton-
omous Republic of Crimea and cer-
tain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions”.
All the abovementioned state agen-
cies and institutions actively partic-
ipate in disinformation monitoring,
detecting, and raising awareness
activities. Since May 2022, in Poland,
the Government Security Center and
the Government Commissioner for
the Security of the Information Space
of the Republic of Poland have been
informing about propaganda nar-
ratives and exposing fakes. After the
full-scale invasion State Security Ser-
vice of Ukraine, the Main Directorate
of Intelligence of the Ministry of De-
fence of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine, the Centre for Strategic
Communication and Information
Security, the Centre for Countering
Disinformation regularly informed
about propaganda narratives and
fakes exposures in different messen-
gers as a part of state security and
informational policy. Also, The Center
for Countering Disinformation de-
veloped a chatbot where users can
check information as well as send
disinformation pieces for the Centre
for StratCom to review it.
In 2021, the National Media Literacy
Project Filter was launched in Ukraine
bytheMinistryofCultureandInforma-
tion Policy of Ukraine. The project was
launched with the financial support
of the OSCE. The goal of the project
is to increase the level of awareness
of the population of Ukraine regard-
ing the relevance of the problems of
disinformation and the importance
of the ability to detect manipulation,
to improve the level of media literacy
of Ukrainians ultimately.
In 2022, the Academy of Military
Sciences and the Ministry of National
Defense also launched a similar initi-
ative in Poland. The national informa-
tion campaign in Poland, “Fejkood-
porni” also aims to raise awareness
about what disinformation and fake
news are, how dangerous they are,
how to protect yourself from them,
and how to protect yourself and your
loved ones.

37
All three countries aim at incorpo-
rating cyber and digital dimensions
into resilience to disinformation, in
particular, on the state level. Lithua-
nia, with its score of 97.3, is sixth in the
world and fourth in Europe accord-
ing to the Global Cybersecurity Index
(GCI) published by the ITU on 29 June
202141
. Lithuania received the highest
assessment in the areas of legal reg-
ulation and the development of cy-
bersecurity facilities.
In Lithuania, the National cyber se-
curity centre (The Ministry of Nation-
al Defence) conducts cyber security
training for public sector companies.
More than 2,000 public sector em-
ployees from morethan 20 institutions
attended the training in 2021. It helps
public sector companies identify and
withstand potential cyber-attacks.
Throughout 2021, the Secure State
Data Transmission Network was
strengthened. Around 130 sites were
started to be protected by additional
collective security measures. In inven-
torying all the information resources
of the Secure Network, about 230 un-
safe resources that worked but are no
longer relevant were disabled.
In 2021, to increase the effectiveness
of the management of cyber inci-
dents directed against the Lithuani-
an national defence system and to
carry out systematic prevention of
cyber incidents, established sectoral
cyber incident management centre
Mil-CERT. In 2021 Mil-CERT recorded
and contained 365 cyber incidents.
Special attention in Mil-CERT is also
dedicated to strengthening the cyber
resilience of national defence system
users by periodically organising so-
cial media engineering exercises.
Also, in 2021, The Lithuanian Ministry
of National Defence carried out pro-
curement supervision of critical infor-
mation infrastructure managers. That
year they rated about 200 submitted
procurement objects and issued rea-
soned recommendations regarding
the contract technological risks and
requirements related to national se-
curity that may arise during execu-
tion and appropriateness of determi-
nation in purchase documents.
Throughout this period, Lithuania‘s
strategic communication bodies in
key institutions (MFA StratCom, Gov-
ernment Office) were empowered
– in 2020, a mechanism for strategic
communication coordination on na-
tional security matters was created.
The key objectives were to increase
information sharing, build working
relationships between the govern-
mental institutions and media that
could be used to counter foreign dis-
information campaigns swiftly and
integrate strategic communication
across government on national secu-
rity matters (speak with ‘one voice’).
The coordination mechanism works
in this way. First, having identified a
possible information incident, the in-
stitution, guided by information inci-
dent evaluation criteria, conducts a
primary evaluation of the incident.
Second, based on the evaluation,
they determine the incident’s threat
level using set criteria. Third, after the
Government Office receives this infor-
mation, they must, within an hour, ini-
tiate consultations regarding the pri-
mary evaluation and the institution’s
offered response. After the meeting is
finished, the Government Office must
inform the institution that sent them
the primary evaluation about either
41
Global Cybersecurity Index (Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 2021)

38
(a) approval of the information inci-
dent threat level determined by the
institution, the response method and
communication messages proposed
by the institution; (b) their recommen-
dation to revise the threat level and
response method; (c) their recom-
mendation to change the threat level
and response method or (d) express
the need to discuss in more detail the
threat level and response method.
Moreover, this mechanism defines
clear methods of responding to infor-
mation incidents. Two different meth-
ods are singled out – the prompt
and the continuous response. The
prompt response works in such a
manner – after determining the first
(high) threat level of an information
incident, the Government office pre-
pares and submits the information
and proposed communication plan
regarding the incident directly to the
Prime Minister. If the second (medi-
um) threat level is determined. In that
case, the response to the incident is
carried out through public informa-
tion by the institution whose field
of activity this incident is directed
against. If the third (low) threat level
is determined, the institution whose
field of activity this incident is direct-
ed against informs the public infor-
mation agents about this incident.
If the fourth (lowest) threat level is
identified. In that case, the institution
whose field of activity this incident is
directed against informs the public
information agents about this inci-
dent only if those agents ask for it.
All ofthese measures helped to create
a shared understanding of the base-
line threat landscape in the informa-
tion domain across government.
Poland, with a score of 93.86, is in 30th
place in the world according to Glob-
alCybersecurityIndex(GCI)published
by the ITU on 29 June 202142
. In Febru-
ary, the government raised the alert
level regarding threats in cyberspace
from ALFA-CRP to CHARLIE-CRP – the
third on the four-level scale43
. The
main reason was cyber attacks on
government servers in Ukraine, Prime
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said at
the time. In early 2022, the Israeli com-
pany Check Point Research informed
us about a sharp increase in cyber
attacks in 2021. Poland was among
the countries particularly hit by the
rising number of attacks on govern-
ment institutions and, according to
Microsoft, became a priority target
outside of Ukraine for hostile Russian
cyber-activities, with the only United
States attacked more frequently44
.
In Poland, there are currently Cyber-
space Defense Forces whose tasks
include the “detection, recognition
and prevention of cyber threats, pro-
tection of ICT networks and support
of military operations conducted by
the Polish Armed Forces within cy-
berspace.” According to current re-
ports45
, the formation of these troops
is expected to end in 2024. The Min-
istry of Digitization is also active in
this field, an example of which is the
promotion of the European Month of
42
Global Cybersecurity Index (Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 2021)
43
Dziennik.Pl “Premier podwyższył stopień alarmowy z ALFA-CRP do CHARLIE-CRP” (Dziennik.Pl
Media, February 2022)
44
GeekWeek “Jak się walczy w Polsce z rosyjskimi atakami cybernetycznymi?” (GeekWeek, May
2022)
45
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND: COMPARISON OF PERSPECTIVES
AND PRACTICES (Prague Security Studies Institute)

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