A presentation about the scope of footfall analysis is shown under SCI P354. In tandem with the theory, a case study example of a very thin slab (i.e. Comflor 60 130mm) is also examined on Robot Structural Analysis 2015 under four (4) different structural arrangements. Through the FE approach, the Resonant Response Factors are presented for each case, providing a good reflection of the solution and the mitigation measured that should be sought for slab vibrations under walking load.
Abstract (Dutch)
Samengestelde betonnen liggers vervaardigd van prefab voorgespannen- en/of gewapende elementen zijn zeer populair in de huidige praktijk van de civiele techniek. Twee betonnen, samengestelde delen van de ligger worden gestort op verschillende tijdstippen. Verschillende elasticiteitsmoduli, opeenvolgende belastingaanbrenging, en verschillend krimp en kruip veroorzaken een herverdeling van de normaalspanning en ongelijke rekken en spanningen in twee aansluitende vezels in het aansluitvlak.
Dit seminar richt zich op de berekening volgens de EN 1992-1-1 en EN 1992-2. De aannames met betrekking tot de berekening en de controle van de gewapende en/of voorgespannen samengestelde liggers en doorsnedes zal worden toegelicht.
Ook wordt er ingegaan op:
• De spanning/rek respons van de doorsnede belast door normaalkracht en buigende momenten,
• De principes van het gebruik van de “initiële toestand” in berekeningen van de uiterste grenstoestand en de bruikbaarheidsgrenstoestand,
• De controle van dwarskracht en wringing,
• De interactie tussen alle snedekrachten,
• De principes van de controles van de spanningbeperking,
• De achtergrond van de scheurwijdtecontrole
Speciale aandacht zal er worden gegeven aan de berekening van de schuifspanning in het aansluitvlak, en de beschouwing van de invloed van de verschillende leeftijd van de betonnen delen met betrekking tot de schuifspanningen. Een alternatieve berekeningsmethode ten opzichte van de Eurocode 2 zal worden voorgesteld en worden getest.
De praktische voorbeelden volgens de Eurocode 2 zullen worden uitgevoerd met behulp van de IDEA StatiCa software.
A presentation about the scope of footfall analysis is shown under SCI P354. In tandem with the theory, a case study example of a very thin slab (i.e. Comflor 60 130mm) is also examined on Robot Structural Analysis 2015 under four (4) different structural arrangements. Through the FE approach, the Resonant Response Factors are presented for each case, providing a good reflection of the solution and the mitigation measured that should be sought for slab vibrations under walking load.
Abstract (Dutch)
Samengestelde betonnen liggers vervaardigd van prefab voorgespannen- en/of gewapende elementen zijn zeer populair in de huidige praktijk van de civiele techniek. Twee betonnen, samengestelde delen van de ligger worden gestort op verschillende tijdstippen. Verschillende elasticiteitsmoduli, opeenvolgende belastingaanbrenging, en verschillend krimp en kruip veroorzaken een herverdeling van de normaalspanning en ongelijke rekken en spanningen in twee aansluitende vezels in het aansluitvlak.
Dit seminar richt zich op de berekening volgens de EN 1992-1-1 en EN 1992-2. De aannames met betrekking tot de berekening en de controle van de gewapende en/of voorgespannen samengestelde liggers en doorsnedes zal worden toegelicht.
Ook wordt er ingegaan op:
• De spanning/rek respons van de doorsnede belast door normaalkracht en buigende momenten,
• De principes van het gebruik van de “initiële toestand” in berekeningen van de uiterste grenstoestand en de bruikbaarheidsgrenstoestand,
• De controle van dwarskracht en wringing,
• De interactie tussen alle snedekrachten,
• De principes van de controles van de spanningbeperking,
• De achtergrond van de scheurwijdtecontrole
Speciale aandacht zal er worden gegeven aan de berekening van de schuifspanning in het aansluitvlak, en de beschouwing van de invloed van de verschillende leeftijd van de betonnen delen met betrekking tot de schuifspanningen. Een alternatieve berekeningsmethode ten opzichte van de Eurocode 2 zal worden voorgesteld en worden getest.
De praktische voorbeelden volgens de Eurocode 2 zullen worden uitgevoerd met behulp van de IDEA StatiCa software.
Presentación de negocio oficial AirBit Club ® en Español
El AirBit Club se destaca en el mercado por ser la primera empresa en cercana colaboración con el minero más grande del mundo de Bitcoins. La empresa utiliza la mayor parte de los fondos recaudados en más de 180 países para ampliar el número de máquinas con capacidad de alta minería y así a convertirse en el mayor Club de Bitcoins.
Los paquetes de remuneración basan en la cantidad de Bitcoins extraídos diariamente, lo que significa que obtendrá BTC cada día, los pagos se hizo con Bitcoins real y pagados directamente a la billetera Bitcoin de su elección. A diferencia de otros, AirBit paga y no Bitcoin puntos en BackOffice.
----------------------------------------------------------
ÚNETE AL CLUB DE AIRBIT DE LA PRIMERA Y MÁS GRANDE GRUPO DE BRASIL:
----------------------------------------------------------
Disfrute de la página de Brasil Club de AirBit en Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1KEcLY2
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Youtube AitBit Club: http://bit.ly/1RafkDE
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Vimeo de Club AitBit: http://bit.ly/1FwzXc3
Ser un amigo del grupo AirBit Club Brasil en Facebook: http://bit.ly/1FBZ0tK
Seguir Brasil AirBit en Twitter: http://bit.ly/1iDpjVY
Únete a nuestro grupo de Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1P0lCGE
Lea nuestras publicaciones en Slideshare: http://bit.ly/1KKuqKz
----------------------------------------------------------
AirBit club, Club al aire, AirBitBrasil pedacito de AirBit Club Brasil, aire, Club, Bitcoin, bitcoin, MMN, multinivel marketing, pago, BTC, Brasil, la presentación, catastro, BTC, cartera, cifrado, minería, p2p, hash, lanzamiento, mundial, negocios, primera, gana, diarios, legal, moneda, pagos, intercambio, virtual
Esa presentación apunta a mostrar que Bitcoin, más que una forma de enviar y recibir dinero, es un ecosistema entero y global que esta cambiando nuestras vidas.
AirBit Club Espanol Presentacion y Plan de compensacionairbitclub
AirBit Club EspanolMás información sobre el mercado de divisas más seguro: Bitcoin. ==> http://bit.ly/bitcoinrev
Aprende a hacer tu billetera virtual y recibir dinero en cuestión de minutos en su cuenta bancaria.
Obtener indicación directa del 20%, binario y residual.
Construir su red con seguridad porque Bitcoin es la moneda segura.
Trabajar y firmar con nuestro equipo, con los líderes de todo el mundo.
Ven con nosotros hoy.
Presentación de negocio oficial en Español - AirBit Club ® Airbitclub Brasil
AirBit Club de Brasil-® oficial
El AirBit Club se destaca en el mercado por ser la primera empresa en cercana colaboración con el minero más grande del mundo de Bitcoins. La empresa utiliza la mayor parte de los fondos recaudados en más de 180 países para ampliar el número de máquinas con capacidad de alta minería y así a convertirse en el mayor Club de Bitcoins.
Los paquetes de remuneración basan en la cantidad de Bitcoins extraídos diariamente, lo que significa que obtendrá BTC cada día, los pagos se hizo con Bitcoins real y pagados directamente a la billetera Bitcoin de su elección. A diferencia de otros, AirBit paga y no Bitcoin puntos en BackOffice.
----------------------------------------------------------
ÚNETE AL CLUB DE AIRBIT DE LA PRIMERA Y MÁS GRANDE GRUPO DE BRASIL:
----------------------------------------------------------
Disfrute de la página de Brasil Club de AirBit en Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1KEcLY2
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Youtube AitBit Club: http://bit.ly/1RafkDE
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Vimeo de Club AitBit: http://bit.ly/1FwzXc3
Ser un amigo del grupo AirBit Club Brasil en Facebook: http://bit.ly/1FBZ0tK
Seguir Brasil AirBit en Twitter: http://bit.ly/1iDpjVY
Únete a nuestro grupo de Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1P0lCGE
Lea nuestras publicaciones en Slideshare: http://bit.ly/1KKuqKz
----------------------------------------------------------
AirBit club, Club al aire, AirBitBrasil pedacito de AirBit Club Brasil, aire, Club, Bitcoin, bitcoin, MMN, multinivel marketing, pago, BTC, Brasil, la presentación, catastro, BTC, cartera, cifrado, minería, p2p, hash, lanzamiento, mundial, negocios, primera, gana, diarios, legal, moneda, pagos, intercambio, virtual
La presentación tiene como objetivo acercar Bitcoin al público desde distintos ángulos:
1) Como tecnología
2) Como moneda aceptada en muchos comercios
3) Como potencial cambio de paradigma en muchos ámbitos
4) Como ideología y como fenómeno social
5) Como instrumento financiero
A New Key Agreement Protocol Using BDP and CSP in Non Commutative GroupsEswar Publications
The available key agreement schemes using number theoretic, elliptic curves etc are common for cryptanalysts and associated security is vulnerable. This vulnerability further increases when we talk about modern efficient computers. So there is a need of providing new mechanism for key agreement with different properties so intruders get surprised and communication scenarios becomes stronger than before. In this paper, we propose a key agreement protocol which works in a non commutative group. We prove that our protocol meets the desired security attributes under the assumption that Conjugacy Search Problem and Decomposition Problem are hard in non commutative groups.
The presentation describes the basic error control techniques used in video compression and the various approaches used on the basis of literature survey.
LDPC Encoding and Hamming Encoding using MATLAB.
An LDPC code is a linear block code characterised by a very sparse parity-check matrix. This means that the parity check matrix has a very low concentration of 1’s in it, hence the name is “low-density parity-check” code. The sparseness of LDPC codes is what as it can lead to excellent performance in terms of bit error rates.
Survey on Error Control Coding TechniquesIJTET Journal
Abstract - Error Control Coding techniques used to ensure that the information received is correct and has not been corrupted, owing to the environmental defects and noises occurring during transmission or the data read operation from Memory. Environmental interference and physical effects defects in the communication medium can cause random bit errors during data transmission. While, data corruption means that the detection and correction of bytes by applying modern coding techniques. Error control coding divided into automatic repeat request (ARQ) and forward error correction (FEC).First of all, In ARQ, when the receiver detects an error in the receiver; it requests back the sender to retransmit the data. Second, FEC deals with system of adding redundant data in a message and also it can be recovered by a receiver even when a number of errors were introduce either during the process of data transmission, or on the storage. Therefore, error detection and correction of burst errors can be obtained by Reed-Solomon code. Moreover, the Low-Density Parity Check code furnishes outstanding performance that sparingly near to the Shannon limit.
One of the main problems with C++ is having a huge number of constructions whose behavior is undefined, or is just unexpected for a programmer. We often come across them when using our static analyzer on various projects. But, as we all know, the best thing is to detect errors at the compilation stage. Let's see which techniques in modern C++ help writing not only simple and clear code, but make it safer and more reliable.
Presentación de negocio oficial AirBit Club ® en Español
El AirBit Club se destaca en el mercado por ser la primera empresa en cercana colaboración con el minero más grande del mundo de Bitcoins. La empresa utiliza la mayor parte de los fondos recaudados en más de 180 países para ampliar el número de máquinas con capacidad de alta minería y así a convertirse en el mayor Club de Bitcoins.
Los paquetes de remuneración basan en la cantidad de Bitcoins extraídos diariamente, lo que significa que obtendrá BTC cada día, los pagos se hizo con Bitcoins real y pagados directamente a la billetera Bitcoin de su elección. A diferencia de otros, AirBit paga y no Bitcoin puntos en BackOffice.
----------------------------------------------------------
ÚNETE AL CLUB DE AIRBIT DE LA PRIMERA Y MÁS GRANDE GRUPO DE BRASIL:
----------------------------------------------------------
Disfrute de la página de Brasil Club de AirBit en Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1KEcLY2
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Youtube AitBit Club: http://bit.ly/1RafkDE
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Vimeo de Club AitBit: http://bit.ly/1FwzXc3
Ser un amigo del grupo AirBit Club Brasil en Facebook: http://bit.ly/1FBZ0tK
Seguir Brasil AirBit en Twitter: http://bit.ly/1iDpjVY
Únete a nuestro grupo de Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1P0lCGE
Lea nuestras publicaciones en Slideshare: http://bit.ly/1KKuqKz
----------------------------------------------------------
AirBit club, Club al aire, AirBitBrasil pedacito de AirBit Club Brasil, aire, Club, Bitcoin, bitcoin, MMN, multinivel marketing, pago, BTC, Brasil, la presentación, catastro, BTC, cartera, cifrado, minería, p2p, hash, lanzamiento, mundial, negocios, primera, gana, diarios, legal, moneda, pagos, intercambio, virtual
Esa presentación apunta a mostrar que Bitcoin, más que una forma de enviar y recibir dinero, es un ecosistema entero y global que esta cambiando nuestras vidas.
AirBit Club Espanol Presentacion y Plan de compensacionairbitclub
AirBit Club EspanolMás información sobre el mercado de divisas más seguro: Bitcoin. ==> http://bit.ly/bitcoinrev
Aprende a hacer tu billetera virtual y recibir dinero en cuestión de minutos en su cuenta bancaria.
Obtener indicación directa del 20%, binario y residual.
Construir su red con seguridad porque Bitcoin es la moneda segura.
Trabajar y firmar con nuestro equipo, con los líderes de todo el mundo.
Ven con nosotros hoy.
Presentación de negocio oficial en Español - AirBit Club ® Airbitclub Brasil
AirBit Club de Brasil-® oficial
El AirBit Club se destaca en el mercado por ser la primera empresa en cercana colaboración con el minero más grande del mundo de Bitcoins. La empresa utiliza la mayor parte de los fondos recaudados en más de 180 países para ampliar el número de máquinas con capacidad de alta minería y así a convertirse en el mayor Club de Bitcoins.
Los paquetes de remuneración basan en la cantidad de Bitcoins extraídos diariamente, lo que significa que obtendrá BTC cada día, los pagos se hizo con Bitcoins real y pagados directamente a la billetera Bitcoin de su elección. A diferencia de otros, AirBit paga y no Bitcoin puntos en BackOffice.
----------------------------------------------------------
ÚNETE AL CLUB DE AIRBIT DE LA PRIMERA Y MÁS GRANDE GRUPO DE BRASIL:
----------------------------------------------------------
Disfrute de la página de Brasil Club de AirBit en Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1KEcLY2
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Youtube AitBit Club: http://bit.ly/1RafkDE
Suscríbete a nuestro canal de Vimeo de Club AitBit: http://bit.ly/1FwzXc3
Ser un amigo del grupo AirBit Club Brasil en Facebook: http://bit.ly/1FBZ0tK
Seguir Brasil AirBit en Twitter: http://bit.ly/1iDpjVY
Únete a nuestro grupo de Facebook: http://on.fb.me/1P0lCGE
Lea nuestras publicaciones en Slideshare: http://bit.ly/1KKuqKz
----------------------------------------------------------
AirBit club, Club al aire, AirBitBrasil pedacito de AirBit Club Brasil, aire, Club, Bitcoin, bitcoin, MMN, multinivel marketing, pago, BTC, Brasil, la presentación, catastro, BTC, cartera, cifrado, minería, p2p, hash, lanzamiento, mundial, negocios, primera, gana, diarios, legal, moneda, pagos, intercambio, virtual
La presentación tiene como objetivo acercar Bitcoin al público desde distintos ángulos:
1) Como tecnología
2) Como moneda aceptada en muchos comercios
3) Como potencial cambio de paradigma en muchos ámbitos
4) Como ideología y como fenómeno social
5) Como instrumento financiero
A New Key Agreement Protocol Using BDP and CSP in Non Commutative GroupsEswar Publications
The available key agreement schemes using number theoretic, elliptic curves etc are common for cryptanalysts and associated security is vulnerable. This vulnerability further increases when we talk about modern efficient computers. So there is a need of providing new mechanism for key agreement with different properties so intruders get surprised and communication scenarios becomes stronger than before. In this paper, we propose a key agreement protocol which works in a non commutative group. We prove that our protocol meets the desired security attributes under the assumption that Conjugacy Search Problem and Decomposition Problem are hard in non commutative groups.
The presentation describes the basic error control techniques used in video compression and the various approaches used on the basis of literature survey.
LDPC Encoding and Hamming Encoding using MATLAB.
An LDPC code is a linear block code characterised by a very sparse parity-check matrix. This means that the parity check matrix has a very low concentration of 1’s in it, hence the name is “low-density parity-check” code. The sparseness of LDPC codes is what as it can lead to excellent performance in terms of bit error rates.
Survey on Error Control Coding TechniquesIJTET Journal
Abstract - Error Control Coding techniques used to ensure that the information received is correct and has not been corrupted, owing to the environmental defects and noises occurring during transmission or the data read operation from Memory. Environmental interference and physical effects defects in the communication medium can cause random bit errors during data transmission. While, data corruption means that the detection and correction of bytes by applying modern coding techniques. Error control coding divided into automatic repeat request (ARQ) and forward error correction (FEC).First of all, In ARQ, when the receiver detects an error in the receiver; it requests back the sender to retransmit the data. Second, FEC deals with system of adding redundant data in a message and also it can be recovered by a receiver even when a number of errors were introduce either during the process of data transmission, or on the storage. Therefore, error detection and correction of burst errors can be obtained by Reed-Solomon code. Moreover, the Low-Density Parity Check code furnishes outstanding performance that sparingly near to the Shannon limit.
One of the main problems with C++ is having a huge number of constructions whose behavior is undefined, or is just unexpected for a programmer. We often come across them when using our static analyzer on various projects. But, as we all know, the best thing is to detect errors at the compilation stage. Let's see which techniques in modern C++ help writing not only simple and clear code, but make it safer and more reliable.
We shortly go through bitcoin/blockchain history before trying to guess how our economy/society will be impacted by this technology in the near future.
Bitcoin partió a principios de 2009 como un simple proyecto de código abierto cuyo objetivo era crear un banco descentralizado. Sin embargo en apenas 7 años se ha transformado en un ecosistema que involucra millones de usuarios, cientos de millones de dólares en capital de riesgo y está forzando gobiernos a repensar la definición del dinero.
Durante los años 2015 y 2016 la tecnología detrás de bitcoin, también llamada "Blockchain", ha atraído el interés de numerosas instituciones financieras prestigiosas (bancos centrales al rededor del mundo, Ernst & Young, Goldman Sachs, ... ). Si bien las promesas de esa tecnología son alentadoras, los riesgos (seguridad, cibercrimen, problemas de gobernanza) y las dificultades para regular hacen que la transición hacia este nuevo paradigma del dinero se deba hacer con preparación y precaución.
La industria de la auditoria esta en crisis. Madoff, Enron, Subprimes,...: no son pocos los escándalos financieros que han involucrado empresas auditoras prestigiosas. Afortunadamente desde el 2009 tenemos una alternativa. Bitcoin y la tecnología de la cadena de bloques han abierto la puerta para implementar sistemas financieros de un nuevo tipo. Se pueden auditar en tiempo real, sin intermediarios de confianza y su estado se verificar de forma publica. En esa charla presentaremos las técnicas actuales para lograr este objetivo y los desafíos pendientes, poniendo un énfasis especial sobre el balance entre privacidad y transparencia.
Presentation of the paper "Fair Exchange of Short Signatures without a Trusted Third Party" at CT-RSA 2013. Full version paper at http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/288
THE IMPORTANCE OF MARTIAN ATMOSPHERE SAMPLE RETURN.Sérgio Sacani
The return of a sample of near-surface atmosphere from Mars would facilitate answers to several first-order science questions surrounding the formation and evolution of the planet. One of the important aspects of terrestrial planet formation in general is the role that primary atmospheres played in influencing the chemistry and structure of the planets and their antecedents. Studies of the martian atmosphere can be used to investigate the role of a primary atmosphere in its history. Atmosphere samples would also inform our understanding of the near-surface chemistry of the planet, and ultimately the prospects for life. High-precision isotopic analyses of constituent gases are needed to address these questions, requiring that the analyses are made on returned samples rather than in situ.
Salas, V. (2024) "John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on the Science of Sacred Theol...Studia Poinsotiana
I Introduction
II Subalternation and Theology
III Theology and Dogmatic Declarations
IV The Mixed Principles of Theology
V Virtual Revelation: The Unity of Theology
VI Theology as a Natural Science
VII Theology’s Certitude
VIII Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
All the contents are fully attributable to the author, Doctor Victor Salas. Should you wish to get this text republished, get in touch with the author or the editorial committee of the Studia Poinsotiana. Insofar as possible, we will be happy to broker your contact.
Comparing Evolved Extractive Text Summary Scores of Bidirectional Encoder Rep...University of Maribor
Slides from:
11th International Conference on Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering (IcETRAN), Niš, 3-6 June 2024
Track: Artificial Intelligence
https://www.etran.rs/2024/en/home-english/
This presentation explores a brief idea about the structural and functional attributes of nucleotides, the structure and function of genetic materials along with the impact of UV rays and pH upon them.
Slide 1: Title Slide
Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Slide 2: Introduction to Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Definition: Extrachromosomal inheritance refers to the transmission of genetic material that is not found within the nucleus.
Key Components: Involves genes located in mitochondria, chloroplasts, and plasmids.
Slide 3: Mitochondrial Inheritance
Mitochondria: Organelles responsible for energy production.
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA): Circular DNA molecule found in mitochondria.
Inheritance Pattern: Maternally inherited, meaning it is passed from mothers to all their offspring.
Diseases: Examples include Leber’s hereditary optic neuropathy (LHON) and mitochondrial myopathy.
Slide 4: Chloroplast Inheritance
Chloroplasts: Organelles responsible for photosynthesis in plants.
Chloroplast DNA (cpDNA): Circular DNA molecule found in chloroplasts.
Inheritance Pattern: Often maternally inherited in most plants, but can vary in some species.
Examples: Variegation in plants, where leaf color patterns are determined by chloroplast DNA.
Slide 5: Plasmid Inheritance
Plasmids: Small, circular DNA molecules found in bacteria and some eukaryotes.
Features: Can carry antibiotic resistance genes and can be transferred between cells through processes like conjugation.
Significance: Important in biotechnology for gene cloning and genetic engineering.
Slide 6: Mechanisms of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Non-Mendelian Patterns: Do not follow Mendel’s laws of inheritance.
Cytoplasmic Segregation: During cell division, organelles like mitochondria and chloroplasts are randomly distributed to daughter cells.
Heteroplasmy: Presence of more than one type of organellar genome within a cell, leading to variation in expression.
Slide 7: Examples of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Four O’clock Plant (Mirabilis jalapa): Shows variegated leaves due to different cpDNA in leaf cells.
Petite Mutants in Yeast: Result from mutations in mitochondrial DNA affecting respiration.
Slide 8: Importance of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Evolution: Provides insight into the evolution of eukaryotic cells.
Medicine: Understanding mitochondrial inheritance helps in diagnosing and treating mitochondrial diseases.
Agriculture: Chloroplast inheritance can be used in plant breeding and genetic modification.
Slide 9: Recent Research and Advances
Gene Editing: Techniques like CRISPR-Cas9 are being used to edit mitochondrial and chloroplast DNA.
Therapies: Development of mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) for preventing mitochondrial diseases.
Slide 10: Conclusion
Summary: Extrachromosomal inheritance involves the transmission of genetic material outside the nucleus and plays a crucial role in genetics, medicine, and biotechnology.
Future Directions: Continued research and technological advancements hold promise for new treatments and applications.
Slide 11: Questions and Discussion
Invite Audience: Open the floor for any questions or further discussion on the topic.
The ability to recreate computational results with minimal effort and actionable metrics provides a solid foundation for scientific research and software development. When people can replicate an analysis at the touch of a button using open-source software, open data, and methods to assess and compare proposals, it significantly eases verification of results, engagement with a diverse range of contributors, and progress. However, we have yet to fully achieve this; there are still many sociotechnical frictions.
Inspired by David Donoho's vision, this talk aims to revisit the three crucial pillars of frictionless reproducibility (data sharing, code sharing, and competitive challenges) with the perspective of deep software variability.
Our observation is that multiple layers — hardware, operating systems, third-party libraries, software versions, input data, compile-time options, and parameters — are subject to variability that exacerbates frictions but is also essential for achieving robust, generalizable results and fostering innovation. I will first review the literature, providing evidence of how the complex variability interactions across these layers affect qualitative and quantitative software properties, thereby complicating the reproduction and replication of scientific studies in various fields.
I will then present some software engineering and AI techniques that can support the strategic exploration of variability spaces. These include the use of abstractions and models (e.g., feature models), sampling strategies (e.g., uniform, random), cost-effective measurements (e.g., incremental build of software configurations), and dimensionality reduction methods (e.g., transfer learning, feature selection, software debloating).
I will finally argue that deep variability is both the problem and solution of frictionless reproducibility, calling the software science community to develop new methods and tools to manage variability and foster reproducibility in software systems.
Exposé invité Journées Nationales du GDR GPL 2024
Deep Behavioral Phenotyping in Systems Neuroscience for Functional Atlasing a...Ana Luísa Pinho
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) provides means to characterize brain activations in response to behavior. However, cognitive neuroscience has been limited to group-level effects referring to the performance of specific tasks. To obtain the functional profile of elementary cognitive mechanisms, the combination of brain responses to many tasks is required. Yet, to date, both structural atlases and parcellation-based activations do not fully account for cognitive function and still present several limitations. Further, they do not adapt overall to individual characteristics. In this talk, I will give an account of deep-behavioral phenotyping strategies, namely data-driven methods in large task-fMRI datasets, to optimize functional brain-data collection and improve inference of effects-of-interest related to mental processes. Key to this approach is the employment of fast multi-functional paradigms rich on features that can be well parametrized and, consequently, facilitate the creation of psycho-physiological constructs to be modelled with imaging data. Particular emphasis will be given to music stimuli when studying high-order cognitive mechanisms, due to their ecological nature and quality to enable complex behavior compounded by discrete entities. I will also discuss how deep-behavioral phenotyping and individualized models applied to neuroimaging data can better account for the subject-specific organization of domain-general cognitive systems in the human brain. Finally, the accumulation of functional brain signatures brings the possibility to clarify relationships among tasks and create a univocal link between brain systems and mental functions through: (1) the development of ontologies proposing an organization of cognitive processes; and (2) brain-network taxonomies describing functional specialization. To this end, tools to improve commensurability in cognitive science are necessary, such as public repositories, ontology-based platforms and automated meta-analysis tools. I will thus discuss some brain-atlasing resources currently under development, and their applicability in cognitive as well as clinical neuroscience.
Lateral Ventricles.pdf very easy good diagrams comprehensive
Protocols for Provable Solvency
1. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency v0.5
Philippe Camacho (philippe.camacho@gmail.com)
Coin4ce.com
June 16th, 2014
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
2. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Who am I?
PhD en Cryptology, University of Chile, Chile. Worked on cryptographic hash
functions with special properties, in particular cryptographic accumulators.
Phd Thesis :
http://users.dcc.uchile.cl/˜pcamacho/papers/phdthesis.pdf
List of publications
http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/˜ley/pers/hd/c/Camacho:Philippe
Slideshare presentations:
http://www.slideshare.net/philippecamacho/presentations
CTO of Coin4ce.com since mid 2013.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
3. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
This work has been made while being at Coin4ce.com / Comprabitcoin.com.
I owe many thanks to Darren Camas, Austin Delonge and Adam Stradling for
their support and feedback.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
4. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Motivation
Catastrophic events like the MtGox bankruptcy have raised the need for an
automated, fully transparent and externally verifiable way to check the solvency
of financial institutions.
This presentation introduces an overview of previously proposed protocols that
can help to automate part of the process of auditing the solvency of financial
institutions.
We show that it is possible in practice to maintain the business data (amounts
owed/owned) private while still allowing to verify the solvency of some financial
institution. For this purpose we use two main cryptographic tools: commitments
and zero-knowledge proofs.
Feedback and questions welcome at philippe.camacho@gmail.com.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
5. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
The Problem
A Financial Institution (FI) usually keeps its database private.
Its database might not reflect the reality of its assets anyway.
In this situation, manual auditing is the only option. However it’s slow and
implies trusting the entity performing the audit.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
6. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Why Bitcoin changes the Scenario
With Bitcoin it’s simple to prove you own a given amount of coins:
1 Pick the address you claim to own.
2 Get a random (not controlled by you) message: data from the blockchain can
serve this purpose.
3 Sign this message with the private key corresponding to your bitcoin address.
4 The amount of BTC for this address is available in the blockchain.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
7. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Building Blocks
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
8. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Merkle Trees [9]
g = H(e||f )
e = H(a||b)
a b
f = H(c||d)
c d
Figure 1 : Merkle tree for sequence (a, b, c, d). The hash function induced by the tree and a collision-resistant hash function H
takes the set (a, b, c, d) as input and returns the root hash value g as output. A proof that a belongs to the sequence is composed by
the nodes containing values (b, f ) (underlined) which are the siblings of the nodes on the path from a to the root g. Checking the proof
consists of computing e′ = H(a||b), then computing g′ = H(e′||f ) and finally checking that g = g′.
A Merkle Tree [9] is a cryptographic data-structure that enables to
Hash a sequence of values.
Prove that a specific value belongs to this sequence by giving the hash of this sequence and a short cryptographic proof.
It works as follows:
Put the values of the sequence at the leaves of a balanced binary tree.
Compute each internal node value by hashing the value of the left child concatenated with the right child.
The value at the root is the hash of the sequence.
To prove that an element at a leaf belongs to the sequence:
Provide the siblings of the nodes on the path from this leaf to the root.
Using these nodes recompute the hash value at the root and check it is the same as the one provided initially (see
Figure 1).
Efficiency: The size and the time to check the cryptographic proof is logarithmic in the size of the set.
Security: If the hash function used is collision-resistant, then it is hard to compute a fake cryptographic proof for an element that
does not belong to the sequence.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
9. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Secure Broadcast Channel
A Secure Broadcast Channel (SBC) guarantees the following:
One can post messages.
Everyone sees exactly the same messages in the same order.
No one can delete messages.
Hey! Bitcoin is a SBC :)
It’s quite an important tool, it can be used for example in electronic-voting
protocols [5].
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
10. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Commitments
A commitment is a tool that allows to delay the disclosure of some information.
It works basically as follows:
Alice chooses some message M and computes a commitment C = Comm(M, r), where
r, the randomness is used to hide the information of M. When the context is clear we
will write C = Comm(M) instead of C = Comm(M, r).
Alice sends C to Bob.
Then Bob can tell Alice to open the commitment C.
Alice will give the message M and r to Bob
Bob can check that indeed C = Comm(M, r).
There are two main security properties for commitments
Given only C = Comm(M, r) one does not learn anything about M.
It’s impossible for Alice to open the commitment C to another message M′
= M.
Commitments are useful to implement apparently contradictory requirements
where one needs to prove something about some value, but wants to keep this
value secret at the same time.
Some commitments [10] have interesting algebraic properties that we will exploit
for the protocol described in section 3 (see next slide).
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
11. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Pedersen Commitments[10]
Their security relies on the discrete logarithm problem. Intuitively this means that given some group element X = gd where g is
some generator, it is hard to compute d, the discrete logarithm.
Operations
Setup: consider a group G and two random elements g, h ∈ G
Comm(M, r) = CM = gM hr where M is the message and r the randomness of the commitment.
Open(CM , M, r): returns (M, r).
Verify(CM , M, r): checks that CM = gM hr .
Security (intuition)
The commitment CM = Comm(M, r) does not leak any information about M as it’s indistinguishable from a random
message (due to the randomness r).
It’s hard to open CM = Comm(M, r) to (M′, r′) where M′ = M because due to the discrete logarithm problem the
messages in exponents M, r are somehow “locked” in their respective base g, h.
For rigorous definitions and proofs see http://bit.ly/1e4gSxu
Homomorphic property
Given CM = Comm(M, r) and CN = Comm(N, r′) whe have that
CM · CN = gM hr · gN hr′
= gM+N hr+r′
= Comm(M + N, r + r′)
Basically, multiplying the commitments relative to messages M, N one obtains the commitment of message M + N.
We use this trick in order to compute the sum of owed/owned amounts without disclosing these amounts.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
12. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Proving two Commitments Encode the same Value with ZKPoK
In our construction we need to do the following: Given Comm(M, r) and
Comm(M′, r′) prove that M = M′ without opening the commitments.
For this we need another tool, Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (ZKPoK).
This consists of letting the prover convince a verifier that he knows (M, r) such
that CM = Comm(M, r) = gM hr .
Using ZKPoK proving our statement can be done as follows:
Compute V = Comm(M,r)
Comm(M,r′)
= gM−M
hr−r′
= hr−r′
Compute a ZKPoK of the discrete logarithm of V with respect to the base h.
See [4] for references on ZKPoK and techniques to prove more involved statements.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
13. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Merkle Trees
Secure Broadcast Channel
Commitments
Proving a Commitment Encodes a Value in a Specific Range
A simple technique [7] (see also [2] Section 1.2.1) does the trick:
Decompose the committed number in a product of k commitments where each
commitment corresponds to a bit.
Then prove each commitment encodes a bit.
Multiply these commitments together and check you obtain a commitment of the
number you want to test.
It’s not optimal but when the range is short, as in our case, it is efficient enough.
The size of the proof is proportional to the number of bits required to encode the
range (51 in our case). More sophisticated and efficient proofs have been
proposed [3].
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
14. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Preliminaries
All the information produced by FI is published on a secure broadcast channel
SBC. This information may be signed by FI in case the SBC is shared with other
participants.
We consider two types of protocols
Accounting Declaration protocols: the FI declares how much money it owes to its
customers.
Asset Declaration protocols: the FI declares how much money it owns.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
15. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Todd Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Improving the Privacy of Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Maxwell-Todd Protocol [12],[8]
Description1:
Periodically (once a day, week or month for example) the FI publishes a value that
represents the list of accounts with their respective balances for each client.
The value is computed by using a Merkle-Tree where
Each leaf contains a pair (id, X) where id is the identifier of the customer and X the current
balance for his account.
Each internal node value N is computed recursively as follows N = H(X + Y ||L||R) where X is
the amount of the left child, Y the amount of the right child, L the (hash) value of the left
child and R the (hash) value of the right child.
The hash value for the root node is the one that is published.
It is the responsibility of the Customer to check that his account balance belongs to the
tree by asking for the corresponding cryptographic proof (siblings node from the leaf to
the root) to the FI.
Discussion:
User must check his account for each update of the root value.
However it is risky in practice for the FI to try to lie on some user’s account balance as
it might be detected.
The amount in each node must be positive. It is the responsibility of the user to check
that as well.
The total amount owed is public.
The root hash value must be published in the SBC otherwise different hash values (and
thus user’s account declaration) could be published to different groups of people.
1
A more detailed description is available at [14].
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
16. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Todd Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Improving the Privacy of Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Privacy-Protecting Proof of Reserves without the Moon-Math and without
the backup angst [13]
Peter Todd addresses the problem of privacy (for user and FI) with the following
idea
The FI commits2
each deposit address to a domain name and the nonce relative to the
user
This technique allows to
Keep FI’s and user’s respective balance private
Avoid the key reuse attack (assign same bitcoin addresses to different users)
Some practical challenges arise
This solution forces a specific administration of bitcoin addresses for the FI.
Also this solution depends on the specific implementation of Bitcoin (in particular the
way Bitcoin addresses are computed).
2
In this case hash functions are used, not commitments.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
17. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Todd Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Improving the Privacy of Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Adding privacy to Maxwell-Todd’s protocol
One of the limitations of Maxwell-Todd’s protocol is that it forces the FI to reveal
the total amount it owes to its customers.
We show (see [11] for a generalization of this technique.) here how to allow this
amount to be kept private while at the same time enabling the users to check
that their account is present in the Merkle-Tree.
Idea:
Replace the amount X stored in each node by the commitment of this amount
Comm(X)
Instead of computing Z = X + Y the amount of the parent node, multiply the
commitments of the left child and right child. That is compute
Comm(Z) = Comm(X) · Comm(Y ).
The homomorphic property ensures that indeed Z = X + Y .
Check using ZKP that each amount is in the range [0, Z] where Z = 21 · 106
· 108
is
the total amount of satoshis.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
18. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Todd Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Improving the Privacy of Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Example
A = H(B||C||Comm(65));
Comm(65)
B = H(D||E||Comm(30));
Comm(30)
D = ID1||Comm(10) E = ID2||Comm(20)
C = H(F||G||Comm(35));
Comm(35)
F = ID3||Comm(15) G = ID4||Comm(20)
Figure 2 : Providing privacy to Maxwell-Todd’s tree using commitments: Here we replace the
amounts by the commitments of the amounts. For a node N, given the commitments
CL = Comm(X) and CR = Comm(Y ) of the left and right child respectively, computing the
commitment of the node consists of multiplying these commitments. That is
CN = CL · CR = Comm(X) · Comm(Y ) = Comm(X + Y ).
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
19. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Todd Privacy-Preserving Protocol
Improving the Privacy of Maxwell-Todd Protocol
Discussion
The commitments do not leak any information about the amounts.
Yet all the necessary relationships can be checked.
Now what do we do with this commitment?
We can compare it to another commitment that will contain for example the total asset
of the FI.
For example, in case of fiat money, the bank could compute another commitment
containing the FI’s balance in USD and sign it so that people can check the information
is legitimate. Then the FI can prove with ZKP that the two amounts included in each
commitment are equal.
In the case when the FI needs to prove the size of its assets in bitcoins we will use the
protocol described in section 2 to compute this commitment.
Compared to Todd’s solution [13] our solution allows to have two separate
protocols for Accounting and Asset declaration. This can be useful for example in
the case where assets are in fiat money. On the other side Todd’s solution offers
better privacy than our protocol related to asset declaration (see next: section 2).
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
20. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Basic Coin Ownership Protocol
Towards more privacy: random sampling
Coin Ownership Protocol
Already mentioned in the introduction. An implementation can be found at [6].
COIN OWNERSHIP
1 Pick the address you claim to own
2 Get a random (not controlled by you) message: data from the blockchain can
serve this purpose
3 Sign this message with the private key corresponding to your bitcoin address
4 The amount of BTC for this address is available in the Blockchain
By being able to compute a signature on a random message the owner of the bitcoin
address proves he is able to transfer funds from this address to another.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
21. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Basic Coin Ownership Protocol
Towards more privacy: random sampling
Adding privacy
How do you prove you have a given amount of bitcoins without leaking this
amount?
Initial Idea3
Use a private Maxwell-Todd tree where the leaves are composed by
The bitcoin addresses the FI claims to own.
The amount available at these addresses.
The Merkle-tree must be such that the addresses are ordered in ascending order so that
no address is duplicated (that would inflate artificially the total value of the assets).
Users must check that the neighbour leaf (can be on the left or on the right) satisfies the
condition.
This might create the need to compute two branches of the Merkle tree.
Again the FI could lie (by duplicating some bitcoin addresses) but it exposes itself to be
detected in case of fraud.
Choose a random leaf and ask the FI to open the commitment containing the address A
and the balance B at the leaf.
Run COIN OWNERSHIP on address A.
Check on the Blockchain that the amount B is correct.
3
This is only an idea. As mentioned next it needs to be refined in order to work.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
22. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Basic Coin Ownership Protocol
Towards more privacy: random sampling
Example
A = H(B||C||Comm(65));
Comm(65)
B = H(D||E||Comm(30));
Comm(30)
D = BTC1||Comm(10) E = BTC2||Comm(20)
C = H(F||G||Comm(35));
Comm(35)
F = BTC3||Comm(15) G = BTC4||Comm(20)
Figure 3 : Proving the size of assets with random sampling. This is the same construction as in
Figure 2 but we replace the user ID by the bitcoin address BTC1, BTC2, .... Note that we must
have BTC1 < BTC2 < BTC3 in order to avoid the duplication of bitcoin addresses.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
23. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Basic Coin Ownership Protocol
Towards more privacy: random sampling
Discussion
The main problem of this solution is that the more checks we do, the more we
reveal about the bitcoin addresses owned by FI and thus the total amount of
bitcoins owed. So we need somehow to choose between privacy (of the FI) and
increasing the odds to catch a malicious FI.
Some ideas for future research
Use zk-SNARKS as in Zerocash [1] to prove (without revealing it!) that a bitcoin
address is controlled by the FI.
The we also need to prove that this address has the right amount of BTC binded to it.
This could be done using accumulators that would store the list of pairs
(address,balance) of the blockchain and then checking in zero-knowledge that this
address belongs to the table represented by the accumulator.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
24. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Open problems
Privacy for asset declaration without imposing any condition on bitcoin address
management like in [13]. Our solution is only partial as it is based on statistical
sampling.
Key rental attack. In [13] is proposed a way to prevent reusing keys internally or
between institutions, yet nothing prevent anyone to rent addresses to others in
order to simulate solvency.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
25. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
Thank you!
Please send me feedback, questions at
philippe.camacho@gmail.com
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
26. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
[1] Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer, and Madars Virza.
Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin.
2014.
[2] Fabrice Boudot.
Efficient Proofs that a Committed Number Lies in an Interval.
In Bart Preneel, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Berlin, Heidelberg, May 2000. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
[3] Jan Camenisch, Rafik Chaabouni, and Abhi Shelat.
Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs.
In ASIACRYPT ’08: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information
Security, pages 234–252, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[4] Jan Camenisch and Markus Stadler.
Proof Systems for General Statements about Discrete Logarithms.
Technical report, 1997.
[5] Ronald Cramer, Rosario Gennaro, and Berry Schoenmakers.
A Secure and Optimally Efficient Multi-Authority Election Scheme.
In Walter Fumy, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 1233 of LNCS, pages 103–118. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, July 1997.
[6] Olivier Lalonde.
bitcoin-asset-proof.
https://github.com/olalonde/bitcoin-asset-proof, 2014.
[7] Wenbo Mao.
Guaranteed correct sharing of integer factorization with off-line shareholders.
In Hideki Imai and Yuliang Zheng, editors, Public Key Cryptography, volume 1431 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Berlin/Heidelberg, 1998. Springer-Verlag.
[8] Greg Maxwell.
IRC transcript of gmaxwell describing his prove-how-(non)-fractional-your-Bitcoin-reserves-are scheme.
https://iwilcox.me.uk/2014/nofrac-orig, 2014.
[9] Ralph C. Merkle.
A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency
27. Introduction
The Problem
Building blocks
Preliminaries
Protocols for Accounting Declaration
Protocols for Asset Declaration
Open problems
Conclusion
In Carl Pomerance, editor, CRYPTO, volume 293 of LNCS, pages 369–378. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, August 1987.
[10] Torben Pedersen.
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing.
In J. Feigenbaum, editor, CRYPTO, volume 576 of LNCS, pages 129–140. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1991.
[11] Brian Thompson, Stuart Haber, William G. Horne, Tomas Sander, and Danfeng Yao.
Privacy-Preserving Computation and Verification of Aggregate Queries on Outsourced Databases.
In Ian Goldberg and Mikhail J. Atallah, editors, Privacy Enhancing Technologies, volume 5672 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009.
[12] Peter Todd.
Peter Todd’s talk (Bitcoin Conference).
http://youtu.be/4d3LA8KpdMQ?t=6m33s, 2013.
[13] Peter Todd.
Privacy-Protecting Proof of Reserves without the Moon-Math and without the backup angst.
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/bitcoin-development/thread/20140325220507.GB4846@tilt/,
2014.
[14] Zak Wilcox.
Proving your Bitcoin reserves.
https://iwilcox.me.uk/2014/proving-bitcoin-reserves, 2014.
Philippe Camacho Secure Protocols for Provable Solvency