The document summarizes the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes in South Korea in the 1970s. It analyzes how South Korea's economic development through export-oriented industrialization led to conflicts between political and social classes. As labor protests increased in 1971 due to suppressed wages, President Park Chung-hee chose to repress democratic forces and instituted a BA regime through the Yushin constitution in 1972 to prioritize economic growth over political participation. The BA regime politically and economically excluded the popular sector to maintain stability for international capital and industrial development.

1. The Rise of Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism in South Korea
Quan Luu, Daniel Maddock

2. In the article
 Investigate the reasons for the emergence of the BA regimes in South
Korea
 Outcome of conflicts among key political factors.
 Change in South Korean’s economic structure.
=> Outcome of strategic choices made by key political actors that satisfied
the structural constraints.

3. Why South Korea?
Dynamic relation between economic structure and political regime change.
Similar BA model: Brazil, Chile, Argentina?
No compromise between key political actors => structurally created constraints => political crises.
Authoritarian regime transition depends on the outcome of class conflict.

4. Analysis of the author
 Theoretical limitations of the BA model.
 Analytical framework based on class conflict in distributional struggle.
 Apply it to South Korean experience of regime transition.

5. BA model
 Counter the belief that economic development as preconditions for
democracy.
 Exception: South Korea; Brazil; Argentina; Chile.
 Why?
 Economic development and industrialization not necessarily a condition for
democracy.

6. Relation between economic
development and political change
- Main ideas:
 Guillermo O’ Donnell: large-scale heavy industrialization and economic
development => military takeovers and the rise of BA.
 Deepening of productive structure => Required state and international
capital =>BA regimes emerged as the solution.
 BA regimes provide more safety to economic growth than populism.
 “Guaranteeing social peace necessary for these faltering capitalism to
obtain new transfusions of international capital”

7. Criticism of Guillermo’s theory
Presupposition of “political regimes is determined by structural changes in economic system” – Does not
necessarily right.
Colombia and Venezuela case: No compromise solution between class => No BA regimes.
State’s role in guaranteeing stability and predictability.
In some cases, this happen as a consequence rather than a cause.
Colombia’s National Front

8. Jose Serra
 Counters that BA is not the MOST rational and efficient political regime to
increase economic development.
 BA regimes tend to stay even without economic growth as top priority =>
O’Donnell theory is questionable.

9. Alternative Analytical Framework
 Definitions of “Political regime”:
 Cardoso: “political regimes” as the formal rules that link the ruling power bloc
and the popular masses within the principal political institution.”
 “Political regimes change”: “the change in procedural rules and institutions
that result from the conflict among classes and groups about defining,
making and revising those rules.”

10. Democratic institutions vs. BA regimes
Rights to participate in political conflict and competition:
- Democratic institutions: Yes
- BA regimes: No
Economic exclusion happens as a result of industrialization, not the determinant
=> One cannot simply attribute a regime with economic exclusion to be a BA regime.

11. Relationship between economic
system and regime change
 Regime changes when there is an unbalance of power in class forces
lead to conflict
 Perceiving economic system as an “Object of conflict between classes
and groups”
 Economic system changes relate to regime change

12. Authoritarian transition in Dependent
Capitalism
 BA regimes in advanced dependent capitalist countries? (International based)
 Security needs for the flow of finance and technology of international capital.
 However, BA is not the only choice.
 Situation where BA regimes emerge: No compromise between
classes and interest groups
 Democratic institution’s policy no longer attracts international capital.
 Interests no longer satisfy the industrial bourgeoisie.
 Democracy is rare in dependent capitalist countries due to weak industrial
bourgeois classes.

13. Crises
Economic crises often create difficulties to the
compromise-making process.
However, economic crises do not always create political ones,
since political crises are mostly based on the outcome of the
class conflict.

14. Restricted democracy
 Democracy as “an instrument of clientlistic or populistic control of the
popular masses.”
 Restricted democracy:
 “A regime which has competitive, formally democratic institutions, but in
which power apparatus retains the capacity to intervene to correct an
undesirable state of affairs.”
 Popular masses are exclude economically but not politically.
 Ruling power has the political power to have an authoritarian solution
without little resistance from the masses.

15. Transition to BA regime
in South Korea
 BA regime appeared in 1971,
Yushin constitution written in
late 1972
 Popular sector were both
politically and economically
excluded.
 Main focus on economic
growth, not on in standard of
living for the middle and lower
classes.
 “Depoliticize” social issues.
Park Chunghee and his 4th Republic

16. Similar but different
 Portray similar traits to other BA regimes (Brazil, Argentina, Chile…)
 However, it developed in a different way:
 Not happened because of an economic crisis.
 No transitional states of ISI to deepening.
 No serious threaten from the previous regime to provoke the creation of the
BA regime.
 Strong state apparatus even before the BA regime
 No BA coup coalition existed

17. Park’s reign
• High rate of economic growth after the
replacement of the military junta.
• First 5-years plan: 1962-1966 – initially
emphasis on rural development, heavy capital-
goods industry and ISI
• Revised plan in 1963: Change to a labor-
intensive, EOI economy
• Achieving spectacular success with EOI
economy:
1961 – 1972: Exports increase for 40 times, manufactured export
expanded 170 times
Create major powerful industries, such as steel, shipbuilding…
POSCO Steel – the world 4th largest
steelmaker

18. How was EOI successful in South
Korea?
 Between 1963 – 1972:
 Economic growth reaches 9.6% per year, creating 2.9 million new jobs
 Changing economic structure, with export sector takes about 40% of the total
GNP growth compared to 4.5% before 1963
 Increases in industrial sector, while decreases in the agriculture sector.

19. Why was EOI successful in South Korea?
• Change from “Classical international division of labor” (agriculture and mineral export) to “New
international division of labor (market-oriented manufacturing)
• South Korea’s special situation contributes to the success.
• State played an important role in the story.
Hyundai Shipbuilding, the world’s largest shipbuilding
company

20. Changes in the Configuration of
Classes
 International Capital
 Local bourgeois
 Peasants and working class
 The state and the classes

21. Restricted democracy
in S.Korea
• 1963 – 1972: The Third Republic
Restricted democracy as a solution to secure legitimacy and
easy to retain power
However, it is always unstable due to potential of turning into
authoritarian regime.
• EOI economy built a strong material base for
the government; this allows Park to increase
his popularity among the voters
Park during his 3rd Republic rule.

22. Crises in Restricted Democracy
 Labor-surplus model of development: wages are much lower than
productivity (up to 1965)
 After 1965, there are increasing in wages equally between both the
agriculture and the industrial sector.
 Interfering with the low-labor cost advantage
 Small increasing in wages, but within a frame to keep the advantage in
the export platform.
 The rise of the union worker.

23. Institutional Crisis of
1971
• Suppression of labor in order to maintain the
export platform comes into conflict with the
framework of restricted democracy
• 1971’s elections see the rising of popular
democratic forces
• Later, major protests demanding for
organizational autonomy from the state
intervention.
• Park chooses to continue on the labor-
intensive platform, repressing the mass
=> Starting of the BA regime with the Yushin
constitution.
Kim Dae-Jung and his presidential-
election poster

24. Conclusion
 Necessary harmony between groups in order to maintain democracy and
to avoid having BA regime.
 Alternative solutions to the BA regime:
 Having developmental strategy that recognizes some more interests of the
masses
 Reorganization of the export platform itself (technology-intensive industry)
 Still, the power bloc opted for the authoritarianism since it was a shorter
way to economic growth and political controls.