This document provides a summary and analysis of the relationship between democracy and development. It argues that democracy can hinder development in "strong states" but not in "weak states."
The first part examines authoritarian "developmental states" like South Korea in the 1960s-1980s and finds they achieved rapid economic growth through undemocratic institutions. The second part argues "weak states" benefit more from decentralized, participatory development that promotes economic democracy. The document concludes that while democracy may hinder development in strong, centralized states, it does not necessarily do so in weaker, more decentralized states.
This document discusses issues and problems with defining and measuring democracy, particularly in developing nations. It argues that while many definitions of democracy exist, in practice there is a dominant form - liberal democracy - that is used to evaluate developing nations. This risks oversimplifying other regime types and excluding important contextual factors. Measuring democracy is difficult due to many complex variables, so the focus should be on reducing barriers like international influence that push developing nations towards the dominant model for political and economic reasons rather than democratic progress.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-reports/dj-vu-in-myanmar.html - Over the past two months, Myanmar has plunged into a political crisis. Myanmar’s tentative political transition towards democracy, which started in 2010 and gained momentum after the 2015 elections, has been reversed. The military (Tatmadaw) has staged a coup d’état and arrested democratically elected leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The document summarizes and critiques the Puno ConCom constitution proposal. It argues that the proposal is objectionable due to the current populist context in the Philippines and some concerning content changes. Specifically, it argues that the proposal would further concentrate power in the presidency and weaken checks on executive authority. Additionally, it questions whether federalism is actually the best means to address poverty and inequality in the country based on empirical studies. The document raises doubts about the transition process and risks of political dynasties gaining more regional control under the proposed federal system.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
Letters 1-11 from Whitaker_BioregionalState2005_bookMark Whitaker
This document is a foreword to a series of letters proposing a framework called the "bioregional state" aimed at achieving environmentally sustainable democracy. The letters argue that current democratic frameworks are leading to environmental degradation and unsustainability. They propose structural changes to states to link democracy and sustainability, including:
1. Proportional representation in Congress with the potential for a majority of votes to allot all seats, to maximize party competition for all voters.
2. Removing gerrymandered districts to make districts more bioregionally sensitive and competitive for multiple parties.
3. Additional checks and balances between informal local coalitions and external ideological parties.
The letters build on each other to present
Political Science 2 – Comparative Politics - Power Point #5John Paul Tabakian
This document summarizes the key topics and readings for Dr. Tabakian's Political Science 2 course on modern world governments. The topics covered in the upcoming lectures include defining democracy, direct democracy, democratic transition, five generalizations about democracy, democratic peace theory, republican forms of government, and the similarities between democracy and capitalism. The reading assignments examine paradoxes of contemporary democracy and reflections on the end of history.
When are international organisations effective in international politicsAmougou Aristide Agbor
International organizations can be effective when their leadership is able to:
1) Consolidate the trust of member states by sustaining political commitment to shared values and curtailing the "Frankenstein syndrome" where organizations act against state interests.
2) Secure sufficient resources from member states by building efficient agency relationships and avoiding mission creep beyond their intended mandates.
3) Rely on credible policy persuasion given their limited enforcement powers compared to states.
This document discusses issues and problems with defining and measuring democracy, particularly in developing nations. It argues that while many definitions of democracy exist, in practice there is a dominant form - liberal democracy - that is used to evaluate developing nations. This risks oversimplifying other regime types and excluding important contextual factors. Measuring democracy is difficult due to many complex variables, so the focus should be on reducing barriers like international influence that push developing nations towards the dominant model for political and economic reasons rather than democratic progress.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-reports/dj-vu-in-myanmar.html - Over the past two months, Myanmar has plunged into a political crisis. Myanmar’s tentative political transition towards democracy, which started in 2010 and gained momentum after the 2015 elections, has been reversed. The military (Tatmadaw) has staged a coup d’état and arrested democratically elected leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The document summarizes and critiques the Puno ConCom constitution proposal. It argues that the proposal is objectionable due to the current populist context in the Philippines and some concerning content changes. Specifically, it argues that the proposal would further concentrate power in the presidency and weaken checks on executive authority. Additionally, it questions whether federalism is actually the best means to address poverty and inequality in the country based on empirical studies. The document raises doubts about the transition process and risks of political dynasties gaining more regional control under the proposed federal system.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
Letters 1-11 from Whitaker_BioregionalState2005_bookMark Whitaker
This document is a foreword to a series of letters proposing a framework called the "bioregional state" aimed at achieving environmentally sustainable democracy. The letters argue that current democratic frameworks are leading to environmental degradation and unsustainability. They propose structural changes to states to link democracy and sustainability, including:
1. Proportional representation in Congress with the potential for a majority of votes to allot all seats, to maximize party competition for all voters.
2. Removing gerrymandered districts to make districts more bioregionally sensitive and competitive for multiple parties.
3. Additional checks and balances between informal local coalitions and external ideological parties.
The letters build on each other to present
Political Science 2 – Comparative Politics - Power Point #5John Paul Tabakian
This document summarizes the key topics and readings for Dr. Tabakian's Political Science 2 course on modern world governments. The topics covered in the upcoming lectures include defining democracy, direct democracy, democratic transition, five generalizations about democracy, democratic peace theory, republican forms of government, and the similarities between democracy and capitalism. The reading assignments examine paradoxes of contemporary democracy and reflections on the end of history.
When are international organisations effective in international politicsAmougou Aristide Agbor
International organizations can be effective when their leadership is able to:
1) Consolidate the trust of member states by sustaining political commitment to shared values and curtailing the "Frankenstein syndrome" where organizations act against state interests.
2) Secure sufficient resources from member states by building efficient agency relationships and avoiding mission creep beyond their intended mandates.
3) Rely on credible policy persuasion given their limited enforcement powers compared to states.
Power theory in politics discusses who has the power to create political change. There are multiple theories of power, including Marxist theories, which argue that economic power translates directly into political power. The Marxist theories include the instrumental model, where those with wealth can directly influence politics, the arbiter model, where the working class has some power despite the interests of the wealthy classes, and the functionalist model, where the state and political institutions serve the economic interests of the wealthy class. The document uses these Marxist theories to analyze how Rupert Murdoch's media empire wields political power through biased news coverage in favor of issues supporting Murdoch's economic interests.
This document provides an overview and analysis of one-party and military regimes in Ghana from the 1960s to 1990s. It discusses how these authoritarian systems disrupted democracy and damaged political stability. One-party rule under the CPP banned diversity and conformity, while military regimes like the NLC halted politics. However, the establishment of one-party rule was initially supported by many Ghanaians. The document concludes that while democracy is ideal, its feasibility in Africa is debated, and one-party and military rule had negative economic and social impacts on Ghana.
An Appraisal Of Nigeria’s Democratic Consolidation And Economic Development: ...inventionjournals
After years of military and authoritarian rule, great expectations accompanied the resumption of
civilian rule in Nigeria in May 1999. For a country that has suffered severe deterioration in its economy and
politics over the fifty years of military rule, the assumption that a civilian rule would herald a dawn of peace
and a deepening of democratic values and norms in the society was understandable. This paper sets out to
analytically x-ray the country’s political cum economic penchant and to ascertain to what degree its democratic
principles have been consolidated upon from the inception of its democratic rule. The paper finds that
consolidating democracy in Nigeria is tough and challenging but not entirely hopeless. Nigeria is a country with
thriving democratic spirit but is ruled by tyrants and despots who have both the inclination and resources to
scupper agitations for democratic reforms. Nigeria’s, like citizens in established democracies, want
constitutional democracy and all the rights, privileges and benefits associated with democracy
Dis is307 alternatives to developmentalist approach corporatism and othersHelen Sakhan
The document discusses the concept of corporatism as an alternative to developmentalism in comparative politics. Corporatism studies the relations between business, labor, and the state, with the state playing a mediating role. It emerged in the 1960s-1970s as traditional theories struggled to explain political phenomena. Corporatism is defined as major societal units being integrated into and subordinated to the state. It is distinct from pluralism and Marxism. While sometimes associated with fascism, corporatism generally emphasizes social harmony over class struggle. It proliferated after WWII but took different forms like statist versus societal corporatism depending on a country's history and institutions.
This document summarizes a paper examining the role of interest groups in Canadian politics. It argues that interest groups can play a positive role due to Canada's political environment and lobbying regulations. Specifically:
1) Interest groups have an inherently neutral role, being potentially positive or negative depending on the political system.
2) Canada's culture of compromise and multiculturalism nudges interest groups to seek balanced policies.
3) Canada's Lobbying Act regulates lobbying, increasing transparency and preventing corruption, allowing interest groups to contribute expertise without undue influence.
4) Examples like mercury regulations show interest groups achieving balanced policies through open consultation. In contrast, Italy's lack of lobbying rules allows negative influence.
Social justice and development by behrooz morvaridiTalew GUALU
This document provides an introduction to the book "Social Justice and Development" which examines whether social justice can be achieved through a development approach given the dominance of powerful states over global institutions. It discusses key concepts of social justice, inequality between nations, and the right to development. It also introduces theories of global justice and cosmopolitanism which argue that global institutions need to play a larger role in development and addressing inequality. However, it notes that global justice theories pay little attention to power imbalances that sustain inequality. While global cooperation is needed, reforming institutions alone will not be enough without addressing the disproportionate influence that powerful states and corporations have over these institutions to promote their own agendas.
This document summarizes the impact of the book "The Calculus of Consent" by Buchanan and Tullock. It had a big impact on the authors, but wider impact is difficult to assess. While it challenged dominant views of its time, its impact was limited among political scientists and economists. It also likely had indirect influence on public opinion. The book's impact on economics education and research has been disappointing, with market failures receiving more attention than government failures. Coverage of public choice theory remains limited in economic textbooks and courses.
Oligarchy rules democracy: Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Int...Sadanand Patwardhan
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. The study is by Martin Gilens, Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page, Northwestern University.
This document discusses different approaches to defining and measuring what constitutes a "good society". It examines Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross National Happiness (GNH) as two potential measures and identifies flaws in both. Specifically, GNP fails to consider how wealth is distributed or non-monetary activities, while GNH overlooks cultural differences in what satisfies individuals. The document argues capabilities approach, focusing on physical well-being, personal safety, informed decision-making and civil/political rights, provides a better standard for evaluating societies by allowing people freedom to live as they choose. It gives infant mortality rates as an example for measuring physical well-being capabilities across countries.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
This chapter discusses three main approaches to studying political culture: social character, congruence, and social capital. It also examines the role of identity in politics, focusing on ethnicity, nationalism, and religion. Political culture can affect citizens' capabilities by constructing identities that privilege some groups over others, or by promoting high or low levels of generalized trust. Political scientists believe constructivism best explains violence related to identities, viewing them as socially constructed rather than innate or purely manipulated.
This chapter discusses the linkages between states and societies through various forms of political participation such as political parties, interest groups, social movements, and patron-client relations. It argues that some states can effectively govern despite these demands placed on them, while others experience a crisis of governability in which they struggle to govern effectively. Strong states are generally better able to respond to societal demands and transform them into policy, while weak states become overwhelmed by these demands.
This document discusses democracy, factors in democratic transitions, and definitions of democracy. It defines democracy as having free and fair elections, strong institutions that balance executive power, and respect for civil and political freedoms. Transitions are influenced by both international factors like the end of the Cold War and domestic forces such as economic crises, rising education levels, and civil society groups challenging authoritarian rule. Defining democracy precisely is challenging, and systems vary in how fully they meet democratic standards.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Using individual data on voting and political parties manifestos in European coun- tries, we empirically characterize the drivers of voting for populist parties (the demand side) as well as the presence of populist parties (the supply side). We show that the economic insecurity drivers of the demand of populism are significant, especially when considering the key interactions with turnout incentives, neglected in previous studies. Once turnout effects are taken into account, economic insecurity drives consensus to populist policies directly and through indirect negative effects on trust and attitudes towards immigrants. On the supply side, populist parties are more likely to emerge when countries are faced with a systemic crisis of economic security. The orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they arise on left or right of the political spec- trum, is determined by the availability of political space. The typical mainstream parties response is to reduce the distance of their platform from that of successful populist entrants, amplifying the aggregate supply of populist policies.
This document summarizes Thomas Dye's book "Who's Running America: The Obama Reign, Eighth Edition". The book outlines Dye's theory of an oligarchic model of policymaking in the US, where corporations and wealthy individuals establish foundations and policy planning groups that influence policy recommendations to the government. The document summarizes each chapter, with Chapter 7 focusing on how elites influence the policy agenda through funding research and Chapter 8 exploring whether elite power is hierarchical or polyarchical. Dye concludes the elite structure exhibits aspects of both models, with various paths to influence and approximately 4,000 total elite positions.
The document discusses the lack of global democracy and democratic representation in international institutions like the UN Security Council and IMF. It outlines the implications this has, such as powerful countries being able to force their will on others. Several proposals for increasing global democracy are presented, including establishing a UN Parliamentary Assembly, facilitating global referendums, creating an electronic global square for coordination, and a campaign to allow people to pledge their votes across borders.
This document discusses political innovation in the UK, including:
1) Recent innovations include increasing transparency through websites like TheyWorkForYou that provide information on MPs, greater use of online tools by some MPs, and petition sites like 38 Degrees that allow citizens to email campaigns targeting politicians.
2) However, political culture in the UK remains relatively centralized and incremental in reform. Elected representatives are often resistant to online activity and transparency efforts are sometimes used more as political tools than for genuine democratic participation.
3) Future opportunities for innovation include open data initiatives that crowdsource analysis, co-design of policy, and using gaming and data analytics to better understand citizens' perspectives. However, democratic implications of new approaches
Power theory in politics discusses who has the power to create political change. There are multiple theories of power, including Marxist theories, which argue that economic power translates directly into political power. The Marxist theories include the instrumental model, where those with wealth can directly influence politics, the arbiter model, where the working class has some power despite the interests of the wealthy classes, and the functionalist model, where the state and political institutions serve the economic interests of the wealthy class. The document uses these Marxist theories to analyze how Rupert Murdoch's media empire wields political power through biased news coverage in favor of issues supporting Murdoch's economic interests.
This document provides an overview and analysis of one-party and military regimes in Ghana from the 1960s to 1990s. It discusses how these authoritarian systems disrupted democracy and damaged political stability. One-party rule under the CPP banned diversity and conformity, while military regimes like the NLC halted politics. However, the establishment of one-party rule was initially supported by many Ghanaians. The document concludes that while democracy is ideal, its feasibility in Africa is debated, and one-party and military rule had negative economic and social impacts on Ghana.
An Appraisal Of Nigeria’s Democratic Consolidation And Economic Development: ...inventionjournals
After years of military and authoritarian rule, great expectations accompanied the resumption of
civilian rule in Nigeria in May 1999. For a country that has suffered severe deterioration in its economy and
politics over the fifty years of military rule, the assumption that a civilian rule would herald a dawn of peace
and a deepening of democratic values and norms in the society was understandable. This paper sets out to
analytically x-ray the country’s political cum economic penchant and to ascertain to what degree its democratic
principles have been consolidated upon from the inception of its democratic rule. The paper finds that
consolidating democracy in Nigeria is tough and challenging but not entirely hopeless. Nigeria is a country with
thriving democratic spirit but is ruled by tyrants and despots who have both the inclination and resources to
scupper agitations for democratic reforms. Nigeria’s, like citizens in established democracies, want
constitutional democracy and all the rights, privileges and benefits associated with democracy
Dis is307 alternatives to developmentalist approach corporatism and othersHelen Sakhan
The document discusses the concept of corporatism as an alternative to developmentalism in comparative politics. Corporatism studies the relations between business, labor, and the state, with the state playing a mediating role. It emerged in the 1960s-1970s as traditional theories struggled to explain political phenomena. Corporatism is defined as major societal units being integrated into and subordinated to the state. It is distinct from pluralism and Marxism. While sometimes associated with fascism, corporatism generally emphasizes social harmony over class struggle. It proliferated after WWII but took different forms like statist versus societal corporatism depending on a country's history and institutions.
This document summarizes a paper examining the role of interest groups in Canadian politics. It argues that interest groups can play a positive role due to Canada's political environment and lobbying regulations. Specifically:
1) Interest groups have an inherently neutral role, being potentially positive or negative depending on the political system.
2) Canada's culture of compromise and multiculturalism nudges interest groups to seek balanced policies.
3) Canada's Lobbying Act regulates lobbying, increasing transparency and preventing corruption, allowing interest groups to contribute expertise without undue influence.
4) Examples like mercury regulations show interest groups achieving balanced policies through open consultation. In contrast, Italy's lack of lobbying rules allows negative influence.
Social justice and development by behrooz morvaridiTalew GUALU
This document provides an introduction to the book "Social Justice and Development" which examines whether social justice can be achieved through a development approach given the dominance of powerful states over global institutions. It discusses key concepts of social justice, inequality between nations, and the right to development. It also introduces theories of global justice and cosmopolitanism which argue that global institutions need to play a larger role in development and addressing inequality. However, it notes that global justice theories pay little attention to power imbalances that sustain inequality. While global cooperation is needed, reforming institutions alone will not be enough without addressing the disproportionate influence that powerful states and corporations have over these institutions to promote their own agendas.
This document summarizes the impact of the book "The Calculus of Consent" by Buchanan and Tullock. It had a big impact on the authors, but wider impact is difficult to assess. While it challenged dominant views of its time, its impact was limited among political scientists and economists. It also likely had indirect influence on public opinion. The book's impact on economics education and research has been disappointing, with market failures receiving more attention than government failures. Coverage of public choice theory remains limited in economic textbooks and courses.
Oligarchy rules democracy: Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Int...Sadanand Patwardhan
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. The study is by Martin Gilens, Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page, Northwestern University.
This document discusses different approaches to defining and measuring what constitutes a "good society". It examines Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross National Happiness (GNH) as two potential measures and identifies flaws in both. Specifically, GNP fails to consider how wealth is distributed or non-monetary activities, while GNH overlooks cultural differences in what satisfies individuals. The document argues capabilities approach, focusing on physical well-being, personal safety, informed decision-making and civil/political rights, provides a better standard for evaluating societies by allowing people freedom to live as they choose. It gives infant mortality rates as an example for measuring physical well-being capabilities across countries.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
This chapter discusses three main approaches to studying political culture: social character, congruence, and social capital. It also examines the role of identity in politics, focusing on ethnicity, nationalism, and religion. Political culture can affect citizens' capabilities by constructing identities that privilege some groups over others, or by promoting high or low levels of generalized trust. Political scientists believe constructivism best explains violence related to identities, viewing them as socially constructed rather than innate or purely manipulated.
This chapter discusses the linkages between states and societies through various forms of political participation such as political parties, interest groups, social movements, and patron-client relations. It argues that some states can effectively govern despite these demands placed on them, while others experience a crisis of governability in which they struggle to govern effectively. Strong states are generally better able to respond to societal demands and transform them into policy, while weak states become overwhelmed by these demands.
This document discusses democracy, factors in democratic transitions, and definitions of democracy. It defines democracy as having free and fair elections, strong institutions that balance executive power, and respect for civil and political freedoms. Transitions are influenced by both international factors like the end of the Cold War and domestic forces such as economic crises, rising education levels, and civil society groups challenging authoritarian rule. Defining democracy precisely is challenging, and systems vary in how fully they meet democratic standards.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Using individual data on voting and political parties manifestos in European coun- tries, we empirically characterize the drivers of voting for populist parties (the demand side) as well as the presence of populist parties (the supply side). We show that the economic insecurity drivers of the demand of populism are significant, especially when considering the key interactions with turnout incentives, neglected in previous studies. Once turnout effects are taken into account, economic insecurity drives consensus to populist policies directly and through indirect negative effects on trust and attitudes towards immigrants. On the supply side, populist parties are more likely to emerge when countries are faced with a systemic crisis of economic security. The orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they arise on left or right of the political spec- trum, is determined by the availability of political space. The typical mainstream parties response is to reduce the distance of their platform from that of successful populist entrants, amplifying the aggregate supply of populist policies.
This document summarizes Thomas Dye's book "Who's Running America: The Obama Reign, Eighth Edition". The book outlines Dye's theory of an oligarchic model of policymaking in the US, where corporations and wealthy individuals establish foundations and policy planning groups that influence policy recommendations to the government. The document summarizes each chapter, with Chapter 7 focusing on how elites influence the policy agenda through funding research and Chapter 8 exploring whether elite power is hierarchical or polyarchical. Dye concludes the elite structure exhibits aspects of both models, with various paths to influence and approximately 4,000 total elite positions.
The document discusses the lack of global democracy and democratic representation in international institutions like the UN Security Council and IMF. It outlines the implications this has, such as powerful countries being able to force their will on others. Several proposals for increasing global democracy are presented, including establishing a UN Parliamentary Assembly, facilitating global referendums, creating an electronic global square for coordination, and a campaign to allow people to pledge their votes across borders.
This document discusses political innovation in the UK, including:
1) Recent innovations include increasing transparency through websites like TheyWorkForYou that provide information on MPs, greater use of online tools by some MPs, and petition sites like 38 Degrees that allow citizens to email campaigns targeting politicians.
2) However, political culture in the UK remains relatively centralized and incremental in reform. Elected representatives are often resistant to online activity and transparency efforts are sometimes used more as political tools than for genuine democratic participation.
3) Future opportunities for innovation include open data initiatives that crowdsource analysis, co-design of policy, and using gaming and data analytics to better understand citizens' perspectives. However, democratic implications of new approaches
This document is a dissertation that examines the rise of single-issue parties in UK politics and whether they represent a new direction for representative democracy.
The introduction provides background on declining voter turnout and the emergence of new parties like UKIP, the Green Party, and NHAP. The literature review discusses the Power Inquiry report on declining political participation.
Chapter 2 discusses the UK's system of representative liberal democracy and how it has evolved from theories like Hobbes' social contract. It also examines the traditional two-party system and role of political parties in the Westminster model.
SMART World State
World Government
Intelligent State
Smart Government
Plutocracy, Bureaucracy, Kleptocracy, Corporatocracy, Bankocracy, and False Democracy
City Montessori School in Mahanagar has implemented an inclusive education model where students with special needs spend most of their time learning with non-disabled students. The school has incorporated about 30 disabled students into their mainstream education, providing them support through special classes and resources like computers. An event called Innerscape is organized annually for mentally, physically, and visually challenged children from around the world to participate in activities together and feel special.
The dilemmas of the developmental state: democracy and economic development i...FGV Brazil
Is it possible to reconcile one of the institutional strategies to promote development, known in the literature as “the developmental state”, with contemporary democratic systems of government? If so, what are the challenges, trade-offs and potential gains that such an effort may entail? The vast literature on “the developmental state” claims that it is more likely to succeed under autocratic regimes. While a “democratic developmental state” seems possible in theory, there is very little empirical evidence to show how it would work in practice. This article tries to contribute to this debate by analyzing the case of Brazil, a country that transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and has been moving towards increasing state interventionism since 2002. While the policies implemented by the “New Developmental State” in Brazil have been explored in the academic literature, their democratic dimensions remain unchartered.
Date: 2015
Authors:
Prado, Mariana Mota
Schapiro, Mario Gomes
Coutinho, Diogo R.
The chapter discusses states and democracy. It covers why states should be studied despite their declining power relative to other actors. States remain the dominant form of political organization globally. The chapter also examines the rise of democratic states and their relationship to citizenship rights, elections, and accountability. Finally, it analyzes theories about the relationship between states and society, including state supremacy, dependency, interdependency, and separation of the two.
Reagan's image as a likable president helped him politically. He was nicknamed the "Teflon president" as bad press did not stick to him. On domestic policy, Reagan cut taxes and regulations for businesses but faced pushback trying to cut welfare programs. His economic policies increased budget deficits. His focus was more on foreign policy where he took a hardline anti-communist stance against the Soviet Union.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTRY CATEGORIZATION AND THE LOOPHOLES OF DEFINING DEMOCRACY: Freedom House
The aim of this study is three-fold: First, it aims to evaluate how Freedom House defines democracy and whether the critics make valid points regarding potential score implications on ‘different’ democratic structures. Second, the study will review the instrumental players who use the scores, and repercussions regarding aid, policy, trade, or investment for the country. And thirdly, the study will look into the impact of Freedom House scores; the actions a country takes as a result and whether there are positive measureable impacts that can substantiate the consequences of the scores.
This document summarizes various scholars' definitions and benchmarks for democratic consolidation. It discusses Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's five conditions for a consolidated democracy: a free civil society, autonomous political society, rule of law, functioning state bureaucracy, and institutionalized mixed economy. It also reviews other theorists' works analyzing factors like institutionalized party systems, labor relations, social rights, and relationships between elites, parties, and civil society. While Samuel Huntington argued democratic consolidation is achieved through two electoral turnovers, this document notes other scholars argue elections alone are insufficient and democratic institutions and values must also be consolidated.
The document discusses different approaches to democratic institutions in divided societies, specifically comparing the views of Lijphart and Horowitz. Lijphart focuses on inclusion through consociational democracy, while Horowitz advocates for moderation through incentives-based approaches. The author argues that both inclusion and moderation are needed to address the fundamental issue of representation. Pure deliberative democracy may not be practical or inclusive enough in deeply divided post-conflict societies.
The document provides an overview of the Japanese political system from the Meiji Restoration period onwards. It discusses how a bicameral legislature and local assemblies were created based on the Prussian model, with absolute power given to the monarch. Bureaucrats played an important role in policymaking and implementation. Over time, politicians gained more influence in policymaking, though bureaucrats still wield significant power. The system remains highly specialized and segmented.
1. Democracy is a hindrance to development
A Comparative Study about the Effects of Democracy to Development
in ‘Strong States’ and ‘Weak States’
Gergely Kristof Gulyas
Global Development Politics
Word Count: 3,938
2. Table of Contents
Introduction.........................................................................................................................3
Anti-democratic development in ‘strong states’: The Developmental State ......................4
Authoritarian vs Democratic: Development in South Korea and Argentina ......................7
Economic Democracy: Micro-level development in ‘weak states’ via participation.......10
Democratic transition and Development in Bangladesh ..................................................13
Conclusion........................................................................................................................16
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................18
3. Introduction
Democracy is a fundamental value of Western societies and it has been linked, in one
way or another, to the processes of development. There is a consensus in the literature about
the need for individual freedom, which is granted by a democratic state. However, the
relationship between democratisation and development is highly debated; some scholars argue
that economic development is the foundation of successful democratisation, while others say
democracy promotes efficient economic growth, therefore it must be the first step of
development.1 This dichotomy gets more complex, when the power of a given state is taken
into account.
For the analysis of this paper, the terms ‘strong state’ and ‘weak state’ will be used to
differentiate between states based on their power to implement policy. The definition of the
term ‘weak state’ –as it is defined by Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick– “countries that lack
the essential capacity and/or will to fulfil four sets of critical government responsibilities:
fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing
and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their
populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human
needs of their population.”2 Subsequently, ‘strong states’ are countries, which have the capacity
and will to fulfil the criteria above. The question whether democracy is a hindrance to
development must be answered separately to both ‘weak states’ and ‘strong states’.
This two-level analysis will argue that the role of democracy in development is highly
dependent on the status of the state. The first part will look at the more traditional, state centric
approach, when ‘strong states’ aim to promote development. By using the frameworks of the
1 For the former argument, see in World Bank, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis To Sustainable Growth’,1989;
for the latter argument, see in Seymour Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy’, The American Political Review, vol. 53(1)
2 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, ‘Index of State Weakness in the Developing World’ (Washington DC: The
Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 3
4. Developmental State and the Developmental Regime, it will demonstrate that theoretically as
well as empirically successful development is achieved via undemocratic institutions – analysis
of authoritarian state led development in South Korea between 1960s and 1980s and the
development in the democratic Argentinian state in the twenty-first century. The second part
will argue that decentralised, ‘weak states’ benefit more from the promotion of micro-level
economic democracy via participatory development. The argument is based on the
developmental processes of Bangladesh. The paper as a whole, therefore, argues that
democracy is a hindrance to development in ‘strong states’, but not in ‘weak states’.
Anti-democratic development in ‘strong states’: The Developmental State
The most common form of democratic control over the political sphere in the world is
liberal democracy. By definition, “democracy is a system of government with the following
attributes: (a) There are institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective
preferences about alternative policies at the national level and there are institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive (competition); (b) There exists inclusive
suffrage and a right of participation in the selection of national leaders and policies
(inclusiveness/participation).”3 Liberal democracies use this political structure to achieve
liberalist values of individual freedoms. The definition of development itself is equally
important. The Developmental State (DS) literature dominantly identify economic growth and
industrialisation with development. Hence this section will carry on with this narrow
understanding of development and evaluate the role of democracy on this ground.
Subsequently, this section is aiming to prove that democracy is a hindrance to economic growth
and that the most efficient approach, empirically, to successful catch-up development is the DS.
3 Ole Elgstrom and Goran Hyden, ‘Development and Democracy: What have we Learned and How?’ (London:
Routledge, 2002) cited in United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Definition of basic concepts and
terminologies in governance and public administration’, 27-31 March 2006, p. 6
5. This conclusion does not suggest that development can only be achieved via autocratic states,
but it emphasises that the most important state institution is a technocratic and politically
independent bureaucracy. This body in cooperation with a state, which can force politically
unpopular policies on the population in the name of a ‘national interest’-empirically
authoritarian-is the key for successful development in ‘strong states’.
The concept of the DS emerged from the critiques of the neoliberal understanding of
the role of the state in development. The roots of developmentalism date back to the pre-
neoliberal era of mercantilism. The conflict between the national interest and the individual
interest of the ruling elite was the main reason why List argued that development requires a
strong state, which is able to prioritise the national interest.4 The theoretical argument for the
DS is built on the same premise that development can only be achieved via pursuing the national
interest.5 This model, therefore, rejects the neoliberal claim that the market is the most efficient
allocator of resources and development can be achieved the most sufficiently via free market
and a minimal state.
This view over the role of state in development determines the kind of state, which is
desired by the theory. Empirical examples suggest that the DS requires a strong, centralised
state, which is authoritarian. Starting with the rapid development of Japan through the
successful catch-up development of the NICs (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and
Taiwan) the role of authoritarian governments were essential.6 This rejects the neoliberalist
claim that democracy and democratisation of domestic politics is the best form of governance
for development. However, Johnson argues that although there is no necessary connection
4 Friedrich List, ‘The National Systemof Political Economy’,(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909), pp.132-
141
5 Chalmers Johnson, ‘MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975’, (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 36
6 Bruce Cunning, ‘Webs With No Spiders, Spiders With No Webs:The Genealogy Of The Developmental State’
in Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.), ‘The Developmental State’, (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 69-
70
6. between authoritarianism and the DS, it “acknowledge[s] that authoritarianism can sometimes
inadvertently solve the main political problem of economic development using market forces-
namely, how to mobilize the overwhelming majority of the population to work and sacrifice for
developmental projects.”7 Despite Johnson’s hesitant claim about the role of authoritarianism
in the DS, historic experience shows that this form of development has been tied to strong states
led by military dictatorships in which the rationale to develop was provided by a politically
independent bureaucracy.8
It is important to mention, however, that the absolute control of an authoritarian state is
equally disruptive for development as the individual freedom of democracy. The DS literature
emphasised the significance of the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’. The DS is embedded in
the national interest via close public-private cooperation, but this national interest is
autonomous from politics as a result of a ‘Weberian’, meritocratic bureaucracy. While the setup
of a well-functioning state-business relationship is a matter of policy and independent from the
nature of the state, the creation of a meritocratic bureaucracy can be highly problematic in
democracies and its technocratic nature undermines the democratic nature of the state.
As this technocratic bureaucracy –which by its nature undemocratic– was identified as
the most important institution to facilitate economic development in ‘strong states’, the question
remains the same: does it work more efficiently under an authoritarian leadership or in
democracy? It was discussed above that empirical examples suggest a strong relationship
between the DS and centralised, undemocratic leadership. However, the rise of the
Developmental Regime (DR) concept and its practical applications in Latin America calls for
a comparative approach to determine which form of governance is more effective to promote
7 Chalmers Johnson,‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’ in Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.), ‘The
Developmental State’, (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 52
8 Bruce Cunning, ‘Webs With No Spiders, Spiders With No Webs:The Genealogy Of The Developmental State’,
p. 69
7. economic development. This analysis uses the cases of South Korea (DS) and Argentina (DR)
to determine whether democracy is a hindrance to development.
Authoritarian vs Democratic: Development in South Korea and Argentina
For the success of the DS and the DR, the literature identifies two key requirements,
which are related to the political nature of the state; a meritocratic bureaucracy and a strong
state-business relation both acting in the name of the ‘national interest’. Therefore, the
development of South Korea and Argentina will be evaluated on the basis of these factors in
relation to their (non-)democratic governance.
Although every ‘strong state’ has a well-functioning bureaucracy, the nature and
structure of it influences the outcome of state-led development. The South Korean
administration has the features of a meritocratic or ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy, which assures that
the state is ‘autonomous’. This style requires a set of career civil servants, who are the “best
and brightest” of the society.9 This civil service is not a democratic, but a technocratic
institution; despite their involvement in political decision-making, they are neither elected nor
appointed, as a result not responsible to the people, but hired based on their expertise. It is
demonstrated by the very strict entry requirements to any job in the bureaucracy.10 Moreover,
Korea assured to make jobs in the civil service desirable by providing higher salaries than the
private sector. It has been achieved by a complex system of salary complements and allowances
to encourage efficiency.11
9 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 34(6), p. 71
10 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, p. 71
11 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, pp. 71-72
8. In contrast, the Argentinian system during Kirchnerismo lacked this technocratic feature
of a meritocratic bureaucracy. There are several examples when the political leadership
interfered in the affairs of the civil service.12 The government manipulated official inflation
statistics, directly appointed people into key positions for political reasons and so on.13 While
bureaucracies in DS are so apolitical and powerful that “central administrative structures…
[were] powerful enough to impeach even Chiang Kai-shek’s nephew.”14 This demonstrates the
lack of technocratic, thus undemocratic, bureaucracy, which theoretically had a negative effect
on Argentinian development.
The other crucial element to successful development according to the DS and DR
theories is a strong public-private relationship, which assures the ‘embeddedness’ of the state.
In South Korea, this state-business dichotomy was built on an unequal power structure. The
authoritarian state, despite its need for the private sector, had total control over political and
economic conditions in this relation.15 The state targeted national firms as partners for this
cooperation. These chosen ‘national champions’ were in constant interaction with the
bureaucracy, which enabled flexible and apolitical policy outcomes.16 The South Korean
government specifically targeted electronic and telecommunication sector. There were specific
R&D projects financed by the state, which increased the competitiveness of the sector
internationally.17 This competitiveness was utilised in the form of export oriented
industrialisation (EOI), in contrast to the previous practices of import substitution
12 Christopher Wylde, ‘The developmental state is dead, long live the developmental regime! Interpreting Néstor
Kirchner's Argentina 2003–2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 17(2), p. 203
13 Christopher Wylde, ‘The developmental state is dead, long live the developmental regime! Interpreting Néstor
Kirchner's Argentina 2003–2007’, p. 203
14 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, pp. 72-73
15 Richard Doner, Bryan Ritchie and Dan Slater, ‘Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States:
Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective’, International Organization, vol. 59(2), p. 344
16 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, p. 76
17 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, p. 77
9. industrialisation, which dominated Latin American practices, before the debt crisis. It shows –
in the case of Latin America– that an authoritarian government and strong state-business
relations cannot promote development. However, if it incorporates the meritocratic bureaucracy
of South Korea, despotic states stimulate growth.
In contrast, the example of post-2002 Argentina demonstrates that these strong state-
business relations are more disruptive due to the more equal power relations. The era of
Kirchnerismo can be characterised as an era of populist control. Populism led to the destruction
of long term plans to have immediate gains and results, which is often exploited by big
corporations. This creates an incentive for corporate interest to manipulate policy decisions.18
Corruption has been a general characteristic of Argentinian politics since Menemismo.19
Although the achievements of Kirchnerismo in post-crisis recovery are undisputable, the style
of governance of the era contributed to the great level of corruption in the country. Kirchner
strengthen the state’s relation with private enterprises, but to do so, it had to make “deliberate
effort to act unilaterally by emasculating the institutions of horizontal accountability.”20 This
case reveals that, since strong public-private cooperation is an unpopular concept, democratic
states have to use semi-authoritarian tools to effectively build up a state-business cooperation.
This mixture of authoritarianism and democracy increases the level of corruption in the state,
which has a disruptive effect on the power relation between the actors.
To evaluate on the findings, it is important to determine which country is more
developed. South Korea is four times wealthier than Argentina based on latest GDP data. This
difference is not only a result of the Korea’s bigger population, because the GDP per capita in
Argentina has been only a third of the South Korean in the 21st century, it is currently $ 7,737.7
18 Luigi Manzetti, ‘Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era’, Latin American
Research Review, vol. 49(2), p.176
19 Luigi Manzetti, ‘Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era’, p. 177
20 Luigi Manzetti, ‘Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era’, p. 193
10. compared to $ 24,565.6.21 This wealth is also distributed more equally in Korea than in
Argentina based on their Gini Coefficient.22 In terms of economic development, therefore,
South Korea is unarguable more developed than Argentina. Consequently, democracy appears
to be a hindrance to development in ‘strong states’ compared to authoritarianism.
Economic Democracy: Micro-level development in ‘weak states’ via participation
The creation of a DS or a DR in ‘weak states’ is not a feasible option for development,
therefore their case must be examined separately. The main reason for this division between
‘strong’ and ‘weak states’ is based on the high need of both economic and political resources
to set up a meritocratic bureaucracy.23 Therefore, ‘weak states’ –by definition– have neither the
capabilities nor the will to create or maintain such an institution, hence they cannot follow the
arguably most efficient path of development. This difference, however, provides radical
alternative approaches, which can be built on democratic processes.
The rise of participatory development as a concept opened up a new dimension in the
debate over the role of democratisation in development. The debate had traditionally been
focused on the political system of the state, which promotes a top-down development
domestically. However, in countries, where the state is ‘weak’, these approaches appears to be
equally problematic. The political structure of the state has little effect on development if it has
no power to implement policies on a local level. Micro-level participatory development, on the
other hand, aims directly the local communities, therefore bypasses the issues related to the
characteristics of the ‘weak state’. However, it raises the question whether a decentralised
democratisation on the local level is a hindrance to development as it may have been seen in
21 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’, 2014
22 South Korea: 0.3 in OECD, ‘OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, poverty, income, Methods and
Concepts’, 2013; Argentina: 0.42 calculated based on its Gini Idex in World Bank, ‘World Development
Indicators’, 2013
23 Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re‐examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic
policies’, p.79
11. the case of strong states? Despite the relatively few available empirical cases, the effectiveness
of micro-level democratisation –especially promoting economic democracy– appears to be
greater than reinforcement of existing political hierarchies to promote participatory
development.
There are several attempts to theoretically justify this empirical claim. Most famously
Sen’s capabilities approach links development together with democratisation. He, by his
definition of development, rejects the DS as the best practice of development. It is not only built
upon the deprivation of fundamental political freedoms, but it limits other forms of freedoms
(mainly economic and social) as well, hence it does not promote development.24 In a Senian
understanding of development, it is important, therefore, to broaden the definition of democracy
from the political dimension. Promoters of participatory development emphasis the significance
of the concept of economic democracy. This term incorporates the previous definition of
democracy into the structure of owner- and leadership of private enterprises. By the definition
of Dahl, economic democracy is “an alternative structure that would…help to strengthen
political equality and democracy by reducing inequalities originating in the ownership and
control of firms in a system like…corporate capitalism.”25 Consequently, economic democracy
is equally a mean and end of development.
In the modern, post-communist era, economic democracy moved from a state-led
process to a workers-led one. As one of the key elements in participatory development is to
share best practices, the Global South may look at the existing worker cooperatives in Western
states. This new form of ownership structure exploits the blessings of the market society, but
eliminates the downsides of capitalism. This distinction between capitalism and free market is
essential to understand the role of workers cooperatives in economic democracy. Worker
24 Amartya Sen, ‘Development as Freedom’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 38
25 Robert Alan Dahl, ‘A Preface to Economic Democracy’ (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 4
12. cooperatives are owned and controlled by its workers, following the principle of ‘one worker,
one vote’.26 As a result, it not only increases the transparency and democratic nature of life on
the micro-level, but it strengthens the culture of democracy in developing countries as well.
Following Sen’s definition of development, the promotion of micro-level economic democracy
via worker cooperatives can be a possible way to promote participatory development and
democracy simultaneously.
Participatory development is the most important tool to promote development and
economic democracy in ‘weak states’. The main tool of participatory development is Rapid
Rural Appraisal (RRA). Arguably, it has become the most cost-effective method to promote
effective development in rural areas, if it is done properly.27 However, the methods of RRA,
where the ideal objective was to share best-practices aiming local issues, must be complemented
by the most radical tool of Participatory Rural Appraise (PRA) to be able to focus on sustainable
local development focused on the empowerment of local people.28 The promotion of economic
democracy need both methods. On one hand, it aims to promote development by increasing the
freedom of local individuals via an originally Western practice and reform existing social
hierarchies. On the other hand, this radical practice must to be customised to meet the needs of
the local community. These methods has been creating a positive developmental outcome in
Bangladesh, where economic democratisation has slowly, but steadily improving the life of
rural communities and transforming the political landscape of the country.
26 US Federation of Worker Cooperatives, ‘What Is a Worker Cooperative?’, 2007
27 Robert Chambers, ‘The Origins and Practices of Participatory Rural Appraisal’, World Development, vol. 22(7),
p. 956
28 Robert Chambers, ‘The Origins and Practices of Participatory Rural Appraisal’, p. 958
13. Democratic transition and Development in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is often used as a positive example to demonstrate the effectiveness of
participatory development. Despite the poor macro-level development of the country, the
quality of life of the poor, rural population has increased significantly. The annual GDP growth
per capita was vacillating between 7.7% and -15.5% in the examined time period (1960-2015).29
It shows the lack of consistent developmental policy promoted by the state. Bangladesh has the
48th weakest state in the world based on the research of Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick.30
Hence, it is surprising, that the country has the same or even better results in raising the quality
of life and reducing poverty than India or other more economically developed states. Average
life expectancy has risen by 10 years since 1990 for both genders, which was 4 years longer
than Indians.31 Moreover, the enrolment rate of girls in primary education doubled between
2000 and 2005 and reached 90%, while female literacy rate rose to 77% by 2009.32 These
achievements reflect on the local efforts by NGOs and other agents of participatory
development via the promotion of cooperative and other good practices. It also shows how
micro-level economic democracy promotes significant economic and social development on
the short- and medium-term.
Cooperative production and the seeds of economic democracy have been present in
Bangladesh since 1904.33 By the time, when participatory development emerged as an
approach, Bangladesh had a well-functioning, two-level cooperative system, linking local
cooperatives to a federal level organisation called Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development
(BARD).34 The role of participatory agent, therefore, was not to build a system of cooperatives,
29 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’
30 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, ‘Index of State Weakness in the Developing World’, p. 11
31 ‘The path through the fields’, The Economist, 3 November 2012
32 ‘The path through the fields’, The Economist, 3 November 2012
33 Mizanur Rahman and Asikha Aktar, ‘People's Participation in Development Interventions through Co -
operatives: A View from Grass- root’, Journal of Co-operative Sector, July-December 2014, p. 47
34 Mizanur Rahman and Asikha Aktar, ‘People's Participation in Development Interventions through Co-
operatives: A View from Grass- root: A View from Grass- root’, p. 47
14. but to share best practices, empower minorities in the existing power-structure and to widen
this cooperative sector on the local level. One of the most significant force in this process has
been the fair trade movement. Several NGOs, including Serrv and the Fair Trade Group,
provide sustainable economic opportunities to local entrepreneurs mainly as secondary
income.35 This movement helps to eliminate poverty as well as to empower women in rural
areas.
The effects of PRA reflect on the emergence of the Comprehensive Village
Development Program (CVDP). It involved a much broader part of local communities,
including “[f]armers, landless day laborers, fishermen, small traders, transport workers, service
holders, youth, women, etc., were also included as member of the village co-operative
society.”36 This program also opened up cooperative approaches from traditional agricultural
fields to “poultry, livestock, fishery, health, nutrition and sanitation, family planning, education,
environment, social welfare programs and other income generating activities”.37 This
participatory work gave a more democratic nature to the cooperative movement, which provides
the foundations of the bottom-up democratisation process of Bangladesh. As this case shows,
promoting economic democracy via cooperatives has a long-term effect on the political culture
of a state.
Promotion of cooperatives and economic democracy create the culture of political
democracy in local communities. Cooperatives in Bangladesh are controlled democratically by
a one member, one vote system.38 This system increases the incentive of the local population
to participate in the decision making process. This attitude transferred into a high voter turnout
35 Serrv, ‘Bangladesh’
36 Mizanur Rahman and Asikha Aktar, ‘People's Participation in Development Interventions
through Co-operatives: A View from Grass- root’, p. 47
37 Mizanur Rahman and Asikha Aktar, ‘People's Participation in Development Interventions
through Co-operatives: A View from Grass- root’, p. 47
38 Mahbubur Rahman, ‘Social protection and Economic Development Through Co-operative’, Journal of Co-
operative Sector, July-December 2014, p. 38
15. in federal elections. Between 1973 and 2014, turnout was constantly higher than 50% –in 2008
it reached a record of 85.26%– that is significantly greater than in Western democracies.39 The
cooperative movement in Bangladesh also put a great emphasis on the democratic
empowerment of women. Based on the significant developmental achievements in education,
as it was discussed earlier, “there are 27,873 women's cooperative facilitated 1 million women's
member for their better livelihood.”40 This empowerment of women on the local level, by itself
is a significant developmental achievement, but the fact that female are important political
figures on the federal level as well shows the real volume of the social change led by the
participatory work via cooperatives. Since the first elections of the new democratic era of
Bangladesh, the county was led by only female prime ministers.41 Overall, the democracy of
Bangladesh is well-functioning; it respects and guarantees human rights, have an autonomous
judiciary and active civil society and provides relatively equal opportunities bases on gender,
religion and race.42 These characteristics emerged from the economic democracy promoted by
cooperatives-led development. It still has crucial areas to develop including the freedom of
media, strengthening local political democracy and decreasing the level of corruption.43
However, these are issues, which cannot be influenced by the processes of economic
democracy. The case of Bangladesh, therefore, shows how the promotion of economic
democracy via participatory development and cooperatives have a positive developmental
outcome. Consequently, in the case of ‘weak states’, democracy is not necessarily a hindrance
to development.
39 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, ‘Voter turnout data for Bangladesh’, 2014
40 Mahbubur Rahman, ‘Social protection and Economic Development Through Co-operative’, p. 39
41 The Prime Minister’s Office – Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ‘Sheikh Hasina: Hon'ble
Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh’
42 Dalem Barman, Golam Rahman and Tasneem Siddiqui, ‘Democracy Report for Bangladesh’, International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, p. 77
43 Dalem Barman, Golam Rahman and TasneemSiddiqui, ‘Democracy Report for Bangladesh’, pp. 77-78
16. Conclusion
The claim, ‘Democracy is a hindrance to development’ has been evaluated on two
levels; firstly in ‘strong states’ and secondly in ‘weak states’. The analysis of the former
scenario builds on the approaches used in DSs and DRs. In this study, these approaches are
assumed to be the most effective ways of late development, based on a general consensus in the
literature. The examination of the theories of these approaches identified two key elements,
based on the slogan of ‘embedded autonomy’, which are reliant on the nature of the state. The
first one is the need of a well-functioning, preferably meritocratic bureaucracy. This gives the
apolitical, autonomous element that enables states to focus on a ‘national interest’ rather that
corporate or individual interests. The second was the presence of a strong state-business
cooperation. This provides the embeddedness of the state in the current challenges of the
industry and guides policy to solve those issues. The case studies of 1960s-1980s South Korea
and post-2001 Argentina were chosen, because they used DS/DR approaches in practice. The
research recognises the concerns over the differences in domestic and international environment
due to the distance between the cases both in time and space. However, it believes that the
generalised findings are not significantly impacted by these differences. The comparative
analysis suggests, that democracy, indeed, is a hindrance to development in ‘strong states’.
The second part of the research examines the statement from the perspective of ‘weak
states’. This section uses a broader definition of both development and democracy. This is
justified by the ineffectiveness of the traditional, state-centric definitions in micro-level
development. The participatory approach was also chosen to target this localised nature of the
issue. The new definition of democracy was built around the concept of economic democracy,
which, based on the findings of the research, promotes economic, social and political
development simultaneously. The best form of practical implication of this concept was found
to be a cooperativist organisation of the local economy. The effectiveness of this approach was
17. demonstrated via the case of Bangladesh. The promotion of economic democracy by
cooperatives did not lead to significant growth in macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, but
successfully reduced poverty and inequalities in capabilities and gender. On the long run, it also
led to the creation of a culture of democracy, which explains the state’s effective
democratisation and democratic functioning. Democracy, therefore, is not a hindrance to
development in ‘weak states’ if it is properly implemented on the local level in the form of
economic democracy.
The overall conclusion of the paper is that the evaluation of the role of democracy in
development is highly dependent on the definition of both democracy and development as well
as the centralisation and power of the state. Consequently, there is no general argument for or
against democracy in development, but every case must be evaluated separately.
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Dahl, Robert Alan, ‘A Preface to Economic Democracy’ (Berkley: University of California
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