The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The report outlines main trends in the coverage of socio-political news by Ukrainian TV-channels, including those undergoing the reform into public broadcasters, along with the impact on the newsroom editorial policy by the political environment and interests of media owners. Special attention was paid to the assessment of Russian propaganda media and main trends in their reporting about the events in Ukraine.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The report outlines main trends in the coverage of socio-political news by Ukrainian TV-channels, including those undergoing the reform into public broadcasters, along with the impact on the newsroom editorial policy by the political environment and interests of media owners. Special attention was paid to the assessment of Russian propaganda media and main trends in their reporting about the events in Ukraine.
Implementation of the Quota System in the Regional Assembly Elections: the An...Przegląd Politologiczny
The following article concerns selected aspects of the implementation of the quota system in
elections to the regional assemblies (Sejmik wojewódzki) in Poland. This comparative analysis concerns
two elections: in 2010 (before the quota system was introduced) and in 2014 (after its introduction). The
key questions the authors would like to address involve the number of women represented on the electoral lists in 2010 and 2014 respectively, and the number of mandates in regional assemblies awarded
to women before and after the quota system was introduced, as well as the relationship between the
position on the electoral list and mandates awarded to female candidates. The authors also focus on
the personnel policies of political parties. Out of all regional elections, the regional assembly elections
were characterized by the highest level of party dependency.
Introducing the quota system resulted in an increase in the number of women represented on electoral
lists, yet it did not help increase the number of mandates awarded to female candidates. One of the reasons for this situation was the strategy adopted when the positions on the electoral lists were awarded
by the parties with the largest political support. The representation of women on the upper positions of
the electoral lists is smaller than the quota of female representatives imposed by the electoral law, and
the larger number of women on the positions further below on the electoral lists translates into smaller
chances of these candidates gaining a mandate. The source data for this research analysis comes from
the National Electoral Commission.
Presidential elections-2015 will direct all political processes in Ukraine for next 2 years. As Ukraine moves toward presidential elections in 2015, the media is still a long way from providing good quality objective, balanced and varied information to help voters make an informed choice.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. Signe Burgstaller: The systemic high level corruption is a major obstacle for the political and economic development
2. Nicu Popescu: Brexit - any internal weakening of the EU has a negative effect on the Eastern European geopolitics
3. Iulian Groza: The current political climate is not favouring an advancement in the relations with the EU
The results of the first decade of economic transition are very uneven and are distributed according to a sub-regional pattern. The group of "leading reformers" consists of middle-income countries of democratic capitalism of the Central Europe and Baltic region (CEB). The second group of less advanced reformers includes mainly lower- and lower-middle-income countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where both capitalism and democracy are still immature and sometimes heavily distorted.
This differentiation can be explained mainly by the adopted transition strategies and political factors determining them. Also the perspective of the European integration has played an important leveraging role. Fast reforms allowed for shortening the period of a temporary system vacuum, breaking down the inertia of the old system, and exploiting maximally the initial political window of opportunity.
The ability of individual countries to follow the effective (i.e. fast) reform strategy was determined by the scale of the initial political changes and further developments in the sphere of institutional and political reform. Generally, a very strong correlation between the progress in political and economic reforms could be observed.
Looking at the role of specific institutional solutions one must underline the advantage of the parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential regime over the presidential or presidential-parliamentary system. The former helped to build the transparent and relatively stable system of the political parties while the latter contributed to political fragmentation, irresponsible legislature and oligarchic capitalism.
Authored by: Marek Dabrowski, Radzislawa Gortat
Published in 2002
Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin and Putin. Comparative analysisValeriia Didkovska
Domestic Regime, its interests and External Actions.
State vs. Oligarchs, shifts in FP from Yeltsin's to Putin's era, regime type in modern Russia, corporatist-kleptocratic influence on FP
Migrant Integration: The European Experience and Prospects for RussiaRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s project International Migration Processes: Trends, Challenges and Prospects. Whereas Europe has dealt with mass influxes of immigrants since the 1950s, Russia only encountered this phenomenon relatively recently. Europe’s experience with migrant integration, which will be considered in this working paper, might be useful to Russia in resolving similar issues. The author identifies a range of specific programmes and measures to ease the process of including immigrants and their descendants into the host country’s social institutions, and he offers several recommendations regarding the prospects for integrating migrants in Russia.
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew WilsonEuropean Choice
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
“political technology” and a change in the voting system
that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
authorities were confident they would win.
An overview of occurrences of violence against women and their children, and implemented measures in the countries of Russia, Armenia, and Uzbekhistan.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
Implementation of the Quota System in the Regional Assembly Elections: the An...Przegląd Politologiczny
The following article concerns selected aspects of the implementation of the quota system in
elections to the regional assemblies (Sejmik wojewódzki) in Poland. This comparative analysis concerns
two elections: in 2010 (before the quota system was introduced) and in 2014 (after its introduction). The
key questions the authors would like to address involve the number of women represented on the electoral lists in 2010 and 2014 respectively, and the number of mandates in regional assemblies awarded
to women before and after the quota system was introduced, as well as the relationship between the
position on the electoral list and mandates awarded to female candidates. The authors also focus on
the personnel policies of political parties. Out of all regional elections, the regional assembly elections
were characterized by the highest level of party dependency.
Introducing the quota system resulted in an increase in the number of women represented on electoral
lists, yet it did not help increase the number of mandates awarded to female candidates. One of the reasons for this situation was the strategy adopted when the positions on the electoral lists were awarded
by the parties with the largest political support. The representation of women on the upper positions of
the electoral lists is smaller than the quota of female representatives imposed by the electoral law, and
the larger number of women on the positions further below on the electoral lists translates into smaller
chances of these candidates gaining a mandate. The source data for this research analysis comes from
the National Electoral Commission.
Presidential elections-2015 will direct all political processes in Ukraine for next 2 years. As Ukraine moves toward presidential elections in 2015, the media is still a long way from providing good quality objective, balanced and varied information to help voters make an informed choice.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. Signe Burgstaller: The systemic high level corruption is a major obstacle for the political and economic development
2. Nicu Popescu: Brexit - any internal weakening of the EU has a negative effect on the Eastern European geopolitics
3. Iulian Groza: The current political climate is not favouring an advancement in the relations with the EU
The results of the first decade of economic transition are very uneven and are distributed according to a sub-regional pattern. The group of "leading reformers" consists of middle-income countries of democratic capitalism of the Central Europe and Baltic region (CEB). The second group of less advanced reformers includes mainly lower- and lower-middle-income countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where both capitalism and democracy are still immature and sometimes heavily distorted.
This differentiation can be explained mainly by the adopted transition strategies and political factors determining them. Also the perspective of the European integration has played an important leveraging role. Fast reforms allowed for shortening the period of a temporary system vacuum, breaking down the inertia of the old system, and exploiting maximally the initial political window of opportunity.
The ability of individual countries to follow the effective (i.e. fast) reform strategy was determined by the scale of the initial political changes and further developments in the sphere of institutional and political reform. Generally, a very strong correlation between the progress in political and economic reforms could be observed.
Looking at the role of specific institutional solutions one must underline the advantage of the parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential regime over the presidential or presidential-parliamentary system. The former helped to build the transparent and relatively stable system of the political parties while the latter contributed to political fragmentation, irresponsible legislature and oligarchic capitalism.
Authored by: Marek Dabrowski, Radzislawa Gortat
Published in 2002
Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin and Putin. Comparative analysisValeriia Didkovska
Domestic Regime, its interests and External Actions.
State vs. Oligarchs, shifts in FP from Yeltsin's to Putin's era, regime type in modern Russia, corporatist-kleptocratic influence on FP
Migrant Integration: The European Experience and Prospects for RussiaRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s project International Migration Processes: Trends, Challenges and Prospects. Whereas Europe has dealt with mass influxes of immigrants since the 1950s, Russia only encountered this phenomenon relatively recently. Europe’s experience with migrant integration, which will be considered in this working paper, might be useful to Russia in resolving similar issues. The author identifies a range of specific programmes and measures to ease the process of including immigrants and their descendants into the host country’s social institutions, and he offers several recommendations regarding the prospects for integrating migrants in Russia.
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew WilsonEuropean Choice
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
“political technology” and a change in the voting system
that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
authorities were confident they would win.
An overview of occurrences of violence against women and their children, and implemented measures in the countries of Russia, Armenia, and Uzbekhistan.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
071214 i vox_express political survey_v1iVOX Ukraine
Express survey of Ukrainian public opinion upon the most loud recent political events in Ukraine and around it. Done at 04-06 th of Dec.2014 by iVOX Ukraine.
The Origin of the non-governmental sector in Russia during the presidencies o...Maciej Behnke
Apart from the public (first) and business (second) sectors, the third sector is one
of the pillars constituting the modern democratic society. All the social interests
are concentrated within the third sector and they are being implemented by the
numerous non-governmental organizations cooperating with the state as well
as business world. The birth of the third sector in Russia can be associated with
the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev reforms called the perestroika. The mental
changes that the Russian society underwent influenced by the policy of glasnost
led to the origin of public involvement into the social and political life, taking
upon the role of the often ineffective state. The degree to which the citizens were
involved in the activity of the NGOs was first of all associated with their quality
of life and it depended on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the idea
of social organizations. The time of Boris Yeltsin presidency was characterized
by two phenomena: a drop in the standard of living accompanied by the
intensification of criminalization within the public life and the positive attitude
towards the introduction of the third sector. After the new president assumed
the post, the approach of the new authority changed in a negative way and
the politics implemented led to gaining full control over public associations.
The so-called liberalization of the law in respect to the third sector was only
a display of Kremlin’s political will and did not signify serious treatment of the
principles of the democratic and civic society. The third sector, one of the pillars
supporting the civil society is at present in the state of consolidation, dealing
with numerous amendments of legal norms. After the period of mimicking
western solutions, the Russian NGOs became a power that must be taken into
account by the Russian decision-makers.
Social Media Potential in Forecasting Presidential Election Results in Poland...Pawel Kuczma
Presentation describing results of Pawel Kuczma, and Wlodzimierz Gogolek, Institute of Journalism, University of Warsaw presented on General Online Research Conference - GOR 11, March 14-16, 2011, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany
Trends in 2017 in districts of donetsk and luhansk regions. overview of major...DonbassFullAccess
The Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in Donbas has been going on for more than three years and is a major factor affecting the lives of people in the uncontrolled territory of Donetsk region.
Everyday life of Ukrainian citizens and social processes in this territory require careful study to form relevant state policy that would help to preserve ties with of uncontrolled territories
residents and facilitate their future integration into Ukrainian common political, informational, cultural, economic, and historical space. An analytical group of the NGO “Donetsk Institute of
Information” (hereinafter - DII) summed up the results of 2017 for the territories which are under the “DPR” control.
Report Scenarios Moldova Ukraine 2024.pdfPRDepartment
This paper assesses potential outcomes of the 2024 presidential and 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova, focusing on government formation for 2025-2029. It critically examines the performance of potential coalition governments concerning their Euro- Atlantic stance, especially regarding key bilateral issues in security, economy, diplomacy, and social matters amid the ongoing phase of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
Доклад «Минченко консалтинг»: «Политбюро 2.0: реновация вместо демонтажа»Елена Волковская
Этот юбилейный доклад из серии «Политбюро 2.0» ставит своей целью дать ретроспективу внутренних процессов в российской элите за последние 5 лет, в течение третьего президентского срока Владимира Путина и в преддверии его возможного четвертого
Технологические уроки выборов президента франции для россииЕлена Волковская
Данный доклад не ставит целью детальное описание избирательной кампании во Франции. В фокусе внимания нашего исследования технологические приемы, которые могут быть использованы в российском контексте.
14 апреля Президент коммуникационного холдинга «Минченко консалтинг» Евгений Минченко выступил на Конгрессе РАПК с темой «Кто боится политического лоббиста? Чего боится политический лоббист?"
Брекзит-эффект в российской политической системе?Елена Волковская
До РФ докатилась антиэлитистская волна, которая в последние годы проявила себя в крупнейших западных демократиях. Неожиданным образом это подтверждает тот факт, что Россия, несмотря на санкции, - часть глобального мира.
Наиболее яркие примеры успешного протеста против истеблишмента - это сенсационные итоги референдума по выходу Великобритании из Евросоюза (Brexit) и победа Дональда Трампа на выборах президента США.
Политическая премия Российской Ассоциации по связям с общественностью (РАСО) "Гамбургский счет" присуждается политикам, партиям, политическим группам и кандидатам в России и за рубежом, которые в ходе конкурентных политических кампаний продемонстрировали при соблюдении демократических процедур результативность, технологичность и креативность
Данный доклад основан на анализе открытых данных (материалов СМИ, аккаунтов американских политиков в социальных сетях, агитационных материалов партий и кандидатов), включенном наблюдении в избирательные кампании в США, начиная с 2012 года, и серии экспертных интервью с американскими политиками и политконсультантами (всего более 200 интервью).
Данное исследование проведено в апреле-июне 2016 г.
Цель исследования: анализ политических технологий, используемых во время проведения референдума о выходе Великобритании из Европейского Союза, оценка возможных сценариев развития событий в Соединенном Королевстве и ЕС после данного референдума.
Комитет по политтехнологиям РАСО провел экспертное исследование ресурсов и оц...Елена Волковская
Комитет по политтехнологиям РАСО провел экспертное исследование ресурсов и оценил шансы партий на старте выборов в Госдуму:
исследование проводилось с 6 по 11 июля 2016 г.;
опрошено 60 политологов и политконсультантов, членов Комитета по политическим технологиям РАСО;
онлайн-опрос через сервис SurveyMonkey и очное анкетирование.
Russia’s policy towards arctic territories 21.05Елена Волковская
Official paper «Fundamentals of the Russian Federation's state policy in the Arctic for the period till 2020 and Beyond» (2008) establishes the following key features of the Arctic Region:
-remoteness from the main industrial centers;
-high resource consumption and the dependence of economic activities and livelihoods of the population from fuel supplies, food and essential goods from other Russia’s regions;
-low stability of ecological systems and their dependence even from minor anthropogenic effects.
Official paper «Fundamentals of the Russian Federation's state policy in the Arctic for the period till 2020 and Beyond» (2008) establishes the following key features of the Arctic Region:
remoteness from the main industrial centers;
high resource consumption and the dependence of economic activities and livelihoods of the population from fuel supplies, food and essential goods from other Russia’s regions;
low stability of ecological systems and their dependence even from minor anthropogenic effects.
Donate to charity during this holiday seasonSERUDS INDIA
For people who have money and are philanthropic, there are infinite opportunities to gift a needy person or child a Merry Christmas. Even if you are living on a shoestring budget, you will be surprised at how much you can do.
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-to-donate-to-charity-during-this-holiday-season/
#charityforchildren, #donateforchildren, #donateclothesforchildren, #donatebooksforchildren, #donatetoysforchildren, #sponsorforchildren, #sponsorclothesforchildren, #sponsorbooksforchildren, #sponsortoysforchildren, #seruds, #kurnool
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
Monitoring Health for the SDGs - Global Health Statistics 2024 - WHOChristina Parmionova
The 2024 World Health Statistics edition reviews more than 50 health-related indicators from the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Thirteenth General Programme of Work. It also highlights the findings from the Global health estimates 2021, notably the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
2. Politburo 2.0
Politburo 2.0 works as a network
structure. It is an informal agency
and there is no formalization of its
functions such as general
meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed
among its members and they offer
their management schemes within
their competence.
3. This is the model of resource
redistribution and preservation of stable
elite groups and the future consolidation
of these groups governance system.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members
- do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These
people remain as the key decision
makers in the Government. There is staff
turnover in the Government so as in the
regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers
of control tightly.
Politburo 2.0
4. MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO 2.0 OCTOBER 2014
I. Sechin D. Medvedev
S. Chemezov G. S. Shoygu V. Volodin S. Ivanov Timchenko Y. Kovalchuk S. Sobyanin
Candidates for Politburo 2.0 members
The Political Block
V. Putin
System opposition
Regional Leaders
The Power Block
The Technical Block (Central
Committee Secretary)
Business
G. Gref
P. Abramovich
V. Yakunin
А. Miller
V. Potanin
О. Deripaska
М. Fridman
А. Usmanov
V. Vekselberg
V. Alekperov
А. Mordashev
А. Kostin
О. Sienko
А. Gromov
D. Peskov
Patriarch Kirill
V. Surkov
А. Kudrin
А. Voloshin
А. Chubaic
A. Bortnikov
V. Kolokolcev
Y. Chaika
E. Shkolov
A. Bastrikin
V. Ivanov
Е. Murov
V. Zolotova
N. Patrushev
M. Fradkov
V. Lebedev
I. Shuvalov
E. Nabiullina
V. Kozhin
D. Kozak
S. Lavrov
A. Vaino
А. Belousov
V. Khristenko
S. Narishkin
V. Matvienko
R. Kadirov
V. Zhirinovsky
G. Zuganov
М. Prokhorov
S. Mironov
A. Rotenberg
A. Beglov R. Minnikhanov A. Khloponin Y. Trutnev
5. Alfa
Group
V. Vekselberg
Old Family
Group
V. Putin
D. Rogozin
С. Чемезов
В. Володин
С. Иванов
А.Voloshin
A. Novak
R. Abramovich
A. Kudrin
M. Prokhorov
С. Шойгу
A. Siluanov
О.Deripaska
Orbits of Power in Russia
M. Fridman
И. Сечин
«Krasnoyarsk
Group»
V. Matvienko
D. Medvedev
S. Shoygu
S. Sobyanin
Y. Kovalchuk
G. Timchenko
V. Volodin
S. Ivanov
I. Sechin
S. Chemezov
Y. Trutnev
А. Rotenberg
V. Puchkov
А. Dvorkovich
А. Khloponin
G. Poltavchenko
R. Minikhanov
M. Fradkov
V. Ivanov
A. Bastrykin
A. Bortnikov
E. Shkolov
V. Kolokolcev
E. Murov
V. Kozhin
R. Kadyrov
D. Kozak
S. Naryshkin
D. Peskov
A. Gromov
В.Yakunin
A. Mordashov
A. Chubais
V. Potanin
А.Beglov
A. Usmanov
G. Zuganov
V. Zhirinovskiy
Y. Chaika
I. Shuvalov
А. Belousov
Patriarch
А. Miller
V. Khristenko
Т. Golikova
V. Surkov
S. Kirienko
А. Nikitin
А. Vorobev
O. Sienko
S. Lavrov
«Keynesian
Group»
S. Neverov
N. Merkhushkin
М. Men
А. Vaino
V. Rashnikov
«Monetarism
Group»
А. Yakushev
V. Basargin Е. Kuivashev
E. Nabiullina
A. Kostin G. Gref
N. Patrushev
O. Golodetc
Y. Ushakov
V. Zolotov
V. Mutko
October 2014
6. If in previous "Politburo 2.0" reports the
Russian authorities orbits were represented
in the bipolar coordinate system with two
poles of elites attraction (the leader of
conditional government hardliners so called
"siloviki" Igor Sechin and Dmitry Medvedev
as the leader of "system liberals”), then now
in the current realities due to significant
weakening of the liberal authorities positions
seems to be more adequate sectoral view
(see below pie chart "Orbits of the Russian
authorities”).
From poles to sectors
7. Orbits of Power in Russia 2014
Lukashenko Nazarbaev
Kovalchuk
Timchenko
Khristenko
Bortnikov
Bastyrkin
Shkolov
Rotenberg
Infrastucture
projects
Yakunin
Lavrov
Trutnev
Fridman
Kudrin
Patriarch
Alekperov
Rogozin
Miller
Naryshkin
Surkov
Sienko
Chaika
V.Putin
Medvedev
Matvienko
Media,
communication,
IT
Kolokolcev
Murov
Patrushev
Chubaits
Manturov
Golodets
Kirienko
Siluanov
Khloponin
Zubkov
Zolotov
Beglov
Ushakov
Peskov
Golikova
Dmitriev
Kozak
8. In the area of President Vladimir
Putin special personal control
remains energy sectors, foreign
policy, defense and the defense
industry, law enforcement agencies.
Responsibility for domestic politics,
social policy, the financial sector and
infrastructure projects distributed
among the Politburo 2.0 members.
Pie chart
9. Inside «Politburo 2.0»
From poles to sectors
The dismantling process of the duumvirate elements from the period of
Medvedev's presidency in 2008-2012 is completed;
Ex-President by 2013 finally became a technical prime minister with
limited terms of reference primarily centered around the social unit;
Alternative to the new position of Dmitry Medvedev has publicly
delineated - the transition into the "experts" category;
The new position as noted in our last year reports "On the eve of elite
groups reboot" and "Year of the Medvedev Government" facilitates his
survival as Prime Minister;
It is important to note that the influence of his apparatus key opponent
for many years Igor Sechin diminished in the symmetric manner , his
role as the counterweight for strong figure Dmitry Medvedev is no longer
in demand.
10. Resource potential reduction of
the groups who tried to to
position themselves as
communicators with the West
elites and supporters of the
"liberal" ideology.
New types of resources
requested by Putin:
o Symbolic image;
o Contacts with alternative to the
West foreign players.
General trends
11. Elite coalitions and their influence
dynamics
Level SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF
INFLUENCE
STABILITY DECREASE IN INFLUENCE
Politburo 2.0
members
S. Shoygu
S. Ivanov-С. Chemezov
G. Timchenko-Y. Kovalchuk
V. Volodin
I. Sechin
D. Medvedev
S. Sobyanin
Rotenbergs
Candidates to
the Politburo 2.0
members
Power block (as a
corporation)
Financial triangle «Nabiullina-
Gref-Kostin»
А. Bortnikov
R. Kadyrov
Federal Protective Service
(FSO)
«Krasnoyarsk Group»
R. Minnikhanov
The Old Family
«System Liberal Group»
А. Kudrin
12. General trends
Putin has created the checks and balances system among the elite within
the key areas and industries. In fact encouraged conflict pairs:
In economics
• Sechin-Timchenko
(energetics)
• Kovalchuks-
Rotenbergs
(infrastructure)
• Keynesian Group-
Monetarism Group
• Triumvirate
«Nabiullina-Gref-
Kostin»-Belousov
In the Power area:
• Kolokolcev-Shkolov
• Bastrykin-Chaika
• Patrushev-Bortnikov
Foreign Policy:
• Lavrov-Ushakov
13. Stable position of business that is
close to Putin;
All the sanction victims received and
will receive compensation in the form
of new orders and direct financial
support in the banking sector;
In essence we have a new
legitimation model of resource
redistribution from one elite groups to
the benefit of others.
General trends
14. ELITE CONFLICTS in 2013-2014
Power in Moscow. Participants: S. Sobyanin and his team against Elite
Coalition. Winner: Elite Coalition;
RAS. Participants: Chemezov, Medvedev, Kovalchuks. Winner:
Kovalchuks;
Power in Saint-Petersburg. Participants: Kovalchuks, Rotenbergs.
Winner: Rotenbergs;
Bridge to Crimea. Participants: Timchenko, Rotenberg.
Winner: 50/50.
19. Position distribution dynamics within
«Politburo 2.0»
Politburo 2.0
member
August 2012: position in
the Politburo 2.0
January 2013: position in
the Politburo 2.0
January 2014: position in
the Politburo 2.0
October 2014: position in
the Politburo 2.0
Medvedev 1 1
7-9 9-10
Sechin 2 9
7-9 7
Ivanov 3 2
1 1
Chemezov 4 3
4-6 4-5
Volodin 5 4
2-3 3
Kovalchuk 6 7-8
4-6 6
Timchenko 7-8 6
4-6 4-5
Sobyanin 7-8 7-8
10 9-10
Shoygu n/a 5
2-3 2
Rotenberg n/a n/a
7- 9 8
20. Sergey Ivanov
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
21. Dmitriy Medvedev
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Symbolic & Image resources
External resources
Media
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
22. Igor Sechin
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
23. Sergey Chemezov
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
24. Vyacheslav Volodin
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
25. Yury Kovalchuk
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
26. Gennadiy Timchenko
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
27. Sergey Sobyanin
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
28. Arkadiy Rotenberg
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
29. Sergey Shoygu
Closeness to Putin
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
External resources
Law enforcement resources
Political & party resources
Symbolic & Image resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
30. We can observe overheating inside
the Politburo 2.0;
Resource amount concentrated in
the hands of Politburo members is
increasing. This includes both the
power resource and the economic;
At the same time the amount of
distributable resource is decreasing;
In this regard cleaning inside the
Politburo 2.0 (at least at the
candidates level) is inevitable. The
situation with Evtushenkov
demonstrates that.
General Trends
31. Communication Group
«Minchenko Consulting»
Companies of the holding:
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GR Consalting». Since 2007
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