MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-2017

SPECIALREPORT•2017
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-2017
(based on NGO Detector Media’s monitoring results)
11
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA
COVERAGE OF SOCIO-
POLITICAL PROCESSES IN
UKRAINE IN 2014-2017
NGO Detector Media Kyiv 2017
S P E C I A L R E P O R T

2
NGO · D e t e c t o r M e d i a ·
Kyiv - 2017

33N G O D e t e c t o r M e d i a • 2 0 1 7
Over the years, NGO Detector Media has been monitoring the quality of
the news broadcast by central and regional TV-channels. Our organization
considers monitoring not only as a tool for the news content quality
improvement but also as a means of promoting media literacy among
population, which is aimed at increasing its ability to resist media manipulations
and impacts. Since only the demanding audience is able to inspire TV-channels
to consider the interests of the owners along with the interests of society.
After all, the constant political and informational turbulence, in which Ukraine
appears to find itself in the past few years, raises new challenges and imposes
additional responsibilities on the media.
This analytical report presents the 2014-2017 monitoring results of central
private TV-channels; former state-owned TV-channels being crystallised into
public broadcasters; a snapshot of Russian propaganda. A several years
overlook gives a more extensive and clear picture of the media. There are
several key factors that can significantly influence the format of the news aired
by the Ukrainian TV-channels. These are the political environment that defines
the position of media owners, the Russian propaganda that often brings
transformation to the information field (regardless of the ability of Ukrainian
journalists to resist this scenario) and the indulgent audience. Moreover, when
interpreting the same facts in different ways, Ukrainian TV-channels create
various realities, and this in no way assists the Ukrainian society to overcome
the today conflicts.
These media issues are likely to be addressed by the Ukrainian community
in the years to come. They require complex solutions and cannot be fought
with efforts of an organization or a responsible media outlet.

4 N G O D e t e c t o r M e d i a • 2 0 1 7
Main trends in media coverage of socio-political processes
in Ukraine in 2014-2017 (based on NGO Detector Media’s
monitoring results).
Special Report. – Kyiv: Detector Media, 2017. - 42 pages.
© NGO Detector Media, 2017
© Yana Dobrianska – design and layout, 2017Photo by: Pixabay
NGO Detector Media has prepared a special final report based
on the Ukrainian TV and radio channels monitoring results. The
report outlines main trends in the coverage of socio-political news
by Ukrainian TV-channels, including those undergoing the reform
into public broadcasters, along with the impact on the newsroom
editorial policy by the political environment and interests of media
owners. Special attention was paid to the assessment of Russian
propaganda media and main trends in their reporting about the
events in Ukraine.
Authors:
Diana Dutsyk
Antonina Mnikh
Petro Burkovskyi
General editorship:
Diana Dutsyk
Design and layout:
Yana Dobrianska
The special report was prepared by NGO Detector Media supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Germany. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of NGO Detector Media; the
conclusions and views expressed in this report might not reflect the official standpoint of the German
Government.

TABLEOFCONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Impact of political environment on the socio-political news
reporting policy of Ukrainian TV-channels in 2014-2017.
(Diana Dutsyk)
Information content of TV and radio channels involved in the
Public Broadcasting System: 2014-2016 trends.
(Diana Dutsyk, Antonina Mnikh)
Russian propaganda about events in Ukraine: 2014-2016 trends.
(Petro Burkovskyi)
6
20
28

IMPACTOFPOLITICALENVIRONMENT
For many years, the political standpoint of
private central TV-channels in Ukraine has
been and is currently being defined by the
interests of their owners, regardless of who
is in power. There is a lack of high-quality
and unbiased news.

IMPACT OF POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT ON THE
SOCIO-POLITICAL NEWS
REPORTING POLICY OF
UKRAINIAN TV-CHANNELS
IN 2014-2017.
Diana Dutsyk
On 3 September 2012, when inaugurating the 64th World Newspaper
Congress and the 19th World Forum of Editors, the then President of Ukraine
Viktor Yanukovych made a revealing slip of the tongue in his speech. "I urge
journalists to maintain high ethical standards, adhere to the principles
of objectivity and political prejudice." – he said [1]. This lapsus linguae
demonstrates the way in which for many years the media’s role has been
treated and understood not only by Viktor Yanukovych and his entourage, but
in a broad sense by the Ukrainian political establishment, regardless of the party
identification.
The Ukrainian media system was formed under the pressure of permanent
political transformations. The establishment of the leading TV-channels in
Ukraine, as well as large media holding companies, took place in the mid-1990s
of the last century when the financial-industrial groups (named as oligarchic
ones today), which accumulated their primary capital in a way often far from
honest, were legitimized. Over the years of independence, these groups have
matured and grown starting to influence lots of processes in the country;
in effect, the business has merged with the politics. Those media that were
bought or created by the mentioned oligarchic groups turned out to be a tool
in the political struggles: in order to protect/hold power, to fight opponents/
competitors, or to blackmail each other and state authorities [2].
Some Western experts come up with false conclusions assuming that the main
bulk of pressure on the media and their editorial policy in Ukraine comes from the
public authorities (no matter what political period is referred to). However, they
discount the fact that the key mediaholdings comprising the largest TV-channels
(according to all sociological surveys, television still remains the main source of
socio-political news for Ukrainian citizens) are owned by oligarchs with their
business-political interests, often competing with themselves, simultaneously
adapting to and shaping the current political environment. As such, including
media world, we observe the creation of conditional pluralism, or, according
to Carothers, "formless pluralism" where "the competition between politico-
economic groups and their political superstructures exists not exactly as a form
of a widely recognized game, but as a survival strategy in a certain environment.
In addition, several existing centers of power competing with themselves for
authority and influence produce constant tension and confrontation" [3].
BACKGROUND

Actually, this did not allow any of the state authorities to build a rigid vertical of
media resources management in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovych and his immediate
entourage failed in their attempt to monopolize the media space in the period
from 2010 to 2014, with the onset of the Revolution of Dignity.
Thus, Ukraine entered 2014, the year of the Revolution of Dignity, the year
of the Crimea annexation by Russia and the beginning of the Russian war
against Ukraine in Donbas, with a mixed (by type of ownership) media system.
On the one hand, these are several large oligarchic media groups that have
numerous audiences, and thus define the Ukrainian media market trends. On
the other hand, it is a rotten system of the national media. The third player can
be presented as a combination of small media (both traditional and on-line)
belonging to small owners or editorial teams, who due to their limited audience,
often poor quality and general inconsistency are unable to have a significant
impact on the change of this environment as a whole.
For over three years, from 2014 to 2017, there have been serious changes
in the national media market: actually, the state waived its media ownership.
In 2014, following the adoption of the Law "On Public Television and Radio
Broadcasting", the National Television Company of Ukraine (NTCU) (with all its
affiliates) started its transformation into a public broadcaster. Also, in 2015,
the adopted Law "On Reforming State and Municipal Print Media" envisaged
denationalization of this type of media (currently, the first stage of the reform
is under way).
However, the oligarchic media system and the key oligarchic media groups
remained unchanged. Specifically, the largest of them are (June 2017 update) [4, 5]:
Inter Media Group (the ultimate owner is Dmytro Firtash, Valeriy
Khoroshkovskyi keeps a substantial shareholding, despite the announced sales
agreement, Serhii Liovochkin has only 9% of the shares);
1+1 media (the ultimate owner is Ihor Kolomoiskyi, Ihor Surkis also keeps
a substantial shareholding);
Media Group Ukraina (the owner is Rinat Akhmetov);
Star Light Media including STB, ICTV and Novyi TV-channels (the
owners are Viktor Pinchuk and Olena Pinchuk);
UMH group has the largest portfolio of print media and radio channels (the
owner is the declared wanted oligarch Serhii Kurchenko).
Besides that, a few TV-channels should not be left unmentioned, since they in
one way or another influence the political discourse in the country: Channel 5
still owned by Petro Poroshenko, the current President of Ukraine; 112 Ukraine
channel which did not disclose its ultimate owner, and therefore has been the
subject of intense speculation who it could belong to [6].
Recently founded by journalists and supported by Western donors Hromadske
TV and Hromadske Radio do not fit into this oligarchic coordinate system.
Though, they are not strong enough to compete with the oligarchic media.
Despite the adopted in 2015 law on media ownership transparency, the real
owners of some media have remained shadowed so far.
As such, in the conditions of the oligarchic media system and the absence of
a strong public broadcaster, on the one hand; the hybrid Russian war against
Ukraine, on the other hand, having control over the quality of news broadcast
by the central TV-channels is a crucial issue. Since, as mentioned above,
television remains the main source of socio-political news for the citizens of
Ukraine: according to the findings of the sociological survey conducted by Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from 3 December to 12 December, 2016
at the request of NGO Detector Media, 87.1% of the respondents mentioned the
central Ukrainian TV-channels as the main source of news covering the state of
affairs in the country, the online media are in the second place - 40.7% which
is a significant margin [7]. To influence the society, the politicians and state
authorities often turn to the power of TV-channels.

Impact of political environment on the socio-political news reporting policy of Ukrainian TV-channels in 2014-2017.
THE WAYS STANDARDS
ARE VIOLATED AND TOPICS
SUPPRESSED IN THE NEWS
PROFESSIONAL
COMPONENT:
For many years, NGO Detector Media has been monitoring the quality of
the news broadcast by central and regional TV-channels. Our organization
considers monitoring not only as a news content quality improving tool but also
as a means of media literacy promotion among population, thus developing its
ability to resist media manipulations and impacts.
Methodology
The monitoring survey is carried out on the basis of the transcribed texts
from the newscasts. The main (final) prime-time newscasts are evaluated
(the unprimed newscasts – morning, noon or night – do not reach the widest
audience).
The monitoring survey tracks:
1) materials featuring invited materials (censorship),
2) important topics suppressed in the newscasts,
3) information journalism standards observance by TV-channels: balance
of views, efficiency, reliability, separating facts from opinions, accuracy
and completeness of the information presented.
A detailed description of the methodology can be found on the
MediaSapiensweb-platform(osvita.mediasapiens.ua)intheMethodology
Section (available at: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/methodology/).
Key Trends of 2014-2017
This report is a summary of the monitoring results obtained from daily
TV news broadcast by central TV-channels with the largest audience over
the period from 2014 to May 2017: 1+1, Inter, Ukraina, ICTV, STB, Channel 5.
The infographics contain the data on UA:Pershyi (for details on the public
broadcaster’s content quality, see the next section of this analytical report) for
comparison.
The events of late 2013 – early 2014 is the starting point for this report. On 21
November, 2013 the Ukrainian government headed by Mykola Azarov decided
to suspend the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement preparation process. This led
to protests on Maidan in Kyiv, and later in other cities. On 29 November, the

Channel
name
MAY
2017
February
2017
July
2016
March
2016
October
2015
July
2015
Channel
name
MAY
2017
February
2017
July
2016
March
2016
October
2015
July
2015
3743
4234
1817
1311
124
42
1712
Overall number of piece shaving the professional standards
violation at may feature invited (or censored) materials:
108
123
143 138
94
110
50
75
100
125
150
200
175
210
Inter
Ukraina
ICTV
Channel 5
1+1
SТB
UА:Pershyi
(before 2015–Pershyi
Channel)

April
2015
January
2015
October
2014
September
2014
July
2014
May
2014
March
2014
January
2014
April
2015
January
2015
October
2014
September
2014
July
2014
May
2014
March
2014
January
2014
65 53
48 29
39 27
21 31
13 12
10 6
11 13
105 93
207
74 81
52
78
171
50
75
100
125
150
200
175
210

then President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the Agreement at the Vilnius
summit. This decision fueled public protests. However, the point of no-return
was crossed when the protesting activists and students had been severely
beaten by the Berkut, the special squadron of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on
the night of 30 November – 01 December, leading thousands of people to take
to the Kyiv streets. The three-month confrontation with the acting authorities
ended with Viktor Yanukovych runaway to Russia and the change of presidential
and parliamentary power. The role of the media (both negative and positive) in
this dramatic period of Ukraine’s history has not been sufficiently evaluated and
analyzed yet.
Consequently, the monitorings by NGO Detector Media in 2014-2017
show the following trends:
In 2013, prior to the Maidan events, the state-owned Pershyi Natsionalnyi
channel was the first violator of professional standards; the experts reported
this channel to have the largest number of materials with the signs of being
invited ("jeansa"). Channel 5 had the best performance, owned then as well as
now by Petro Poroshenko [8].
The largest number of professional violations were recorded during the
periods of highest political activity:
January-2014 (this period is remarkable for the shootings on Maidan in Kyiv
during the Revolution of Dignity; the Verkhovna Rada, materially breaching
the parliamentary procedure, adopts the dictatorial "Laws of 19 January" that
restrict the freedom of speech, introduce such notions as "foreign agent",
"extremist activity," etc.);
October-2014 (the country goes through the extraordinary parliamentary
election; traditionally, during the election period, the media increase the number
of custom-made materials ("jeansa") promoting certain political parties and
politicians);
October-2015 (the country goes through the local elections);
February-2017 (an exception to the rules, since this month did not any notable
political events, TV-channels owned by the representatives of the former Viktor
Yanukovych team widely "tackled" the issue of the Parliament’s incapacity,
imposing on the society an idea of possible early elections).
Inter and Ukraina channels owned by the former Viktor Yanukovych
team members were anti-rating leaders (i.e. the worst standards violators)
during the entire period indicated. In the Maidan protests period, only Pershyi
Natsionalnyi channel, state-owned at that time, was ahead of the above noted
ones, but when its transformation into the public broadcaster started with the
change of power in 2014, its news became more qualitative and almost free of
custom-made materials.
The largest number of manipulations and violations relate to the coverage
of Maidan protests in 2014. Pershyi Natsionalnyi channel (state-owned),
Inter (owned by Dmytro Firtash/Serhii Liovochkin), Ukraina (owned by
Rinat Akhmetov) presented information in a harsh unbalanced manner, in favor
of the then government and President Yanukovych. Quite the opposite, 1+1
(owned by Ihor Kolomoiskyi) and Channel 5 (owned by Petro Poroshenko)
openly took up the protesters’ positions, so the misbalance here was falling to
the other side, though not so frankly and not as much as the pro-government
TV-channels [9, 10]. The editorial policy of these TV-channels was completely in
line with the political views of their owners. Firtash, Liovochkin, Akhmetov are
former members of Yanukovych team, whilst Kolomoiskyi and Poroshenko were
in opposition to the then President.
The rhetoric of Pershyi Natsionalnyi, Inter and Ukraina channels changed to
neutral in a few days literally after the Yanukovych runaway from the country
and appointment of Oleksandr Turchynov as the acting President. This fact only
reaffirms the thesis on the ability of the political establishment (including media
owning oligarchs) to mimic and quickly adapt to the political environment in
order to survive [11].

THE WAY EDITORIAL POLICY IS
CORRELATED WITH CHANNEL
OWNER’S INTERESTS
POLITICAL
COMPONENT:
Manuel Castells, a well-known sociologist and developer of the theory of
information (network) society, in his work Communication Power, noted that
the most important source of influence today is transformation of human
consciousness. And these are media, the main suppliers of messages and symbols,
that have the greatest influence on people's consciousness. This fact is actively
used by politicians and oligarchs around the world. Ukraine is not an exception.
However, in the absence of powerful, popular alternative sources of information
such as public broadcasting and the main TV-channels of the country often
form an irrelevant picture of reality. Interpretation of events gains in importance
compared with the event itself, thus formatting a society's idea about this event
or person. Channel owners are constantly taking advantage of media power when
defending their businesses and political interests, imposing a corresponding vision
of events and processes, and society has not yet learned to offset this process.
The monitorings by the experts of NGO Detector Media show clear correlation
between the interests of large media owners-oligarchs and the editorial policy
pursued by their channels. We will demonstrate this on the examples of four
major media groups.
The presidential election 2014 was the only election over the last decade
when the TV-channels kept apart from "jeansa" stories in nobody’s favor.
Although, the analysis of the newscasts of that period demonstrated the
journalists’ sympathy to Petro Poroshenko [12].
At the outset of the Crimea annexation, Ukrainian channels unknowingly
followed the lead of Russian propaganda when calling Russian militaries
as "unknown", or "green men", or "self-defense of the Crimea", in fact using
manipulative terms imposed by Russia.
With developments being unfolded in the east, TV-channels kept on
repeating the mistakes made when covering the Crimea annexation issue, by
using neutral terminology towards separatists.
Strong overall criticism of the government, and at the same time, absolute-
ly uncritical coverage of the activities of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime
Minister Groisman, become trends of 2016-2017 [13, 14]. This gives grounds to
assume that these persons might be in agreement with large media owners in
return for certain preferences.
Throughout the whole period, the TV-channel owners use newscasts to
settle accounts with political opponents or business competitors. The war
between the Firtash/Liovochkin and Kolomoiskyi groups sorting out their
relationship directly in the newscasts of their TV-channels, either because of the
conflict around Ukratransnafta company, or the one related to PrivatBank, was
a showcase event [15, 16]..
Following the ban of Russian TV-channels, the Ukrainian TV-channels often
turned out to be the broadcasters of Russian propaganda messages. Inter
channel was a leader here. The pro-Russian position was most apparent in
coverage of decommunization related topics, the Donbas events and Russia’s
viewpoint. Thus, Inter broadcasts the most the pro-Russian messages about
the damage caused by the economic "blockade of Donbas". The channel is
also having a targeted campaign (like the Russian media) for accusing the
Ukrainian leaders in corruption, whereas staying silent about Putin's corruptive
environment or its owners, since one of them – Dmytro Firtash – was arrested
in Austria for corruption charges; in the United States he has been accused of
attempting to obtain permits for titanium extraction in India with the bribes for
a total amount of $ 18.5 million [17, 18].

Inter Group and its owners
Dmytro Firtash and Serhii Liovochkin
Dmytro Firtash, one of the richest oligarchs in Ukraine, the co-founder of
RosUkrEnergo, a scandalous gas distribution company, is currently under arrest
in Austria on corruption charges. His partner Serhii Liovochkin, an ex-member
of the Party of Regions, former head of the administration of President Viktor
Yanukovych, is presently a member of the Opposition Bloc.
TV-channel Inter was in the lead as to the political standpoint of the Opposition
Bloc since it was founded following the Yanukovych's runaway. Deputies of this
political force commenting all events in Ukraine were shown almost on a daily
basis in the channel newscasts; in particular, Yuriy Boiko and Oleksandr Vilkul paid
frequent visits as commentators [19, 20]. For example, in May 2017, the Opposition
Bloc was on the PR top list among other political forces: 41 pieces (34 of them
on Inter channel, 7 - on Ukraina channel). Any other political force is not so much
broadcast by Inter. In addition, in certain periods the channel's news contained
items aimed at promoting new political projects created by Serhii Liovochkin – the
Party of Development and the Institute New Ukraine.
The on-air visits by the channel’s owner, Dmytro Firtash, (Serhii Liovochkin is
a rear guest) are frequently observed. His arrest in Austria was described as a
matter of political nature. The TV-channel has by no means ever revealed the
wealth of its owner, as well as the corruption charges against him in the USA.
Inter, together with TV-channels belonging to Viktor Pinchuk and Rinat
Akhmetov, makes up a conditional coalition opposing another oligarch, Ihor
Kolomoiskyi. The newscasts of this TV-channel often suggested pieces targeted
either directly against Kolomoiskyi and his people or against his business (against
the Privat group before the PrivatBank nationalization, or against Ukrnafta). These
materials, being of a frankly accusatory nature, completely lacked the balance of
views, had numerous harsh journalistic conclusions and evaluations along with a
large number of facts from unproven sources [21, 22]. "Oligarch wars" had also a
political component. After all, during the Maidan events, or the Crimea annexation,
and from the start of the Russian aggression in Donbas, Kolomoiskyi took a
frankly patriotic position, unlike, for example, Rinat Akhmetov who cozied up to
separatists, or the Opposition Bloc representatives who had to justify their actions
connected with Maidan shootings.
AnotherconstanttargetofcriticismatInterchannelwasNarodnyiFront(People’s
Front Party), and above all else, Arsenii Yatsenyuk, the ex-Prime Minister, and Arsen
Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs [23]. Thus, in May 2017, this TV-channel
broadcast 16 news pieces against this political force, with 12 pieces broadcast
every month of April and March. The channel owners and the aforementioned
politicians repeatedly exchanged accusations against each other in the public
spotlight. Specifically, Firtash believed that the channel suffered intimidation from
the Minister of Internal Affairs Avakov, they did not broadcast any pro-Russian
news, and he himself had no influence on the editorial policy. Nevertheless, the tone
and presentation of Narodnyi Front in Inter newscasts were absolutely correlated
with the standpoint of its owner.

1+1 media
and іts owner Ihor Kolomoiskyi
Starting from 2014, Ihor Kolomoiskyi took a proactive, patriotic,
sometimes even radical position, and this was followed by the newscasts
of his TV-channel 1+1. Following his appointment as the governor of
Dnipropetrovsk oblast in March 2014 (he held this position for a year - until
March 2015), the Kolomoiskyi’s media actively promoted his activities as
a governor. He also became the character of Russian as the epitome of
"radical Uke" who swept into power.
Consequently, both Kolomoiskyi and 1+1 blamed other oligarchs, in
particular Rinat Akhmetov and his people, for the Donbas war.
Kolomoiskyi also actively used his media to promote his political
interests or protect business.
For example, 1+1 extensively defended Kolomoiskyi's partner and
companion, businessman Henadii Korban, arrested for the alleged creation
of an organized criminal group and the kidnapped chairman of the State
Land Agency Serhii Rudyk. On 31 October 2016, the TV-channel devoted
almost the entire news release to this event, which included comments
supported with Petro Poroshenko’s critical judgments concerning the said
arrest and in favor of Korban himself [24, 25].
Kolomoiskyi’s resignation from the governor’s post, Korban’s arrest –
these events changed the initial channel's loyalty the current government
to the critical approach. In fact, with his media Kolomoiskyi ran a war on
several fronts, in such a way protecting his business and own interests –
against the government and a number of other oligarchs, first of all against
the Firtash-Boiko-Liovochkin group.
In 2016, due to the nationalization of PrivatBank, which belonged to
Ihor Kolomoiskyi, these trends were only reinforced in 1+1 releases. When
covering this topic, the channel omitted the reasons for nationalization
associated with the bank’s position, focusing on the infowar and pressure
put upon the group [26]. The TV-channel also criticized Valeria Hontarieva,
the then head of the NBU [27]. Traditionally, 1+1 newscasts produced
pieces aimed at protecting its owner’s business interests, for example,
in the air transportation market: the channel disputed the introduced in
Ukraine cheap low-costers obviously because of the fact that Kolomoiskyi
is the owner of UIA – the monopolist in the Ukrainian air transportation
market [28].

Star Light Media
and іts owner Viktor Pinchuk
In recent years, the oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, who is the son-in-law of
the former President Leonid Kuchma, tried to refuse from being so frankly
opposed to the acting government, unlike the owners of Inter and Ukraina.
As such, this position was represented in the newscasts of the three
TV-channels comprising the group: ICTV, SТB and Novyi. They were also
trying to maintain neutrality, and, in comparison with Inter and Ukraina,
were better at complying with professional journalistic standards, though
in particular periods ICTV-channel used excessive PR practices in favor of
individual political forces or politicians, such as the Opposition bloc [29], or
the Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman [30].
To this end, whenever possible, these TV-channels appear to have
advertised Pinchuk and his family, including all his projects, political and
cultural. The example is the Davos Ukrainian breakfast. Though, this 2017
year, following Viktor Pinchuk's controversial column in The Wall Street
Journal where he proposed to compromise with Russia, in particular, to
hold elections in the ORDLO area [Separate Districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts] and abandon the idea of joining EU and NATO, this event
was ignored by the top Ukrainian politicians. However, Pinchuk’s channels
forgot to report this fact [31].
Pinchuk’s channels extensively cover the activities of his father-in-law,
Leonid Kuchma, who is the member of the Minsk negotiation group. In
fact, he often provides comments on the events related to the situation in
eastern Ukraine, even if there are no serious reasons to do so.
At some points, there were some situational overlaps of Viktor
Pinchuk’s and Rinat Akhmetov’s positions, namely, in the confrontation with
Ihor Kolomoiskyi. Then ICTV and Ukraina TV-channels would unanimously
criticize the latter, as in the case with blocking volunteer transport
battalions carrying humanitarian aid provided by the Akhmetov Foundation
in 2014 [32].

The monitorings of the main national TV-channels carried out by NGO Media Detector on a regular basis
clearly demonstrate that private TV-channels disregard the interests of society and give the first place to the
interests of their owners, thus, leading to a distorted presentation of reality. For the very reason, this situation
in combination with the news quality decrease has led to a significant decline of confidence in the central
Ukrainian TV-channels in recent years, as confirmed by various sociological studies. So, according to the results
of the sociological survey carried out by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the dynamics of
confidence in the Ukrainian media is negative, showing a drop: from +26% in 2010 to +2% in 2015.
Apparently, in the context of aggressive informational space Ukraine has been experiencing recently and with
the dominance of oligarchic media in the market, there is a great need to expedite the reforming process of
the public broadcasting system channels. In parallel, media literacy among various social status groups should
be actively promoted. It would raise the society's demand for the high-quality content, thus encouraging TV-
channels to cater to the needs of the audience rather than just to their owners.
CONCLUSIONS
TV-channel Ukraina
and its owner Rinat Akhmetov
Being nearly the richest Ukrainian oligarch with an odious reputation,
having the status of the "master" of Donbas, Rinat Akhmetov belonged to
the main sponsors of the Party of Regions, and was the one who had a great
influence on Viktor Yanukovych. Following the latter's escape, Akhmetov
found himself in a very uncomfortable position, but he made a number of
false decisions which cost him personally as well as the whole country.
At the beginning of the war in Donbas, the political standpoint of Rinat
Akhmetov, who effectively supported separatists and urged "to hear
Donbas", was also expressed in the newscasts of the TV-channel Ukraina.
The bulk of manipulations and interpretations (which were also correlated
with the messages of Russian propaganda) were broadcast by this channel
in 2014, from the beginning of the Crimea annexation, and later – Russian
aggression in the eastern Ukraine. Specifically, the on-air broadcasts
repeatedly hosted the participants of separatist meetings with Russian
flags, the journalists called for "establishing a dialogue with South-East",
even fake news were spread about the "burned alive Berkut officer" in Lviv,
together with other Russian mythologemes [33].
Today, TV-channel Ukraina, as well as Inter, actively promotes the
interests of the Opposition Bloc and the representatives of the former Party
of Regions on the whole.
Every day, the channel’s newscasts have one or even few (with the record
of 9 pieces in one issue) pieces advertising Rinat Akhmetov’s Foundation and
the humanitarian aid brought by the Foundation to the regions in war [34,
35, 36]. However, not even once did the channel’s journalists say on air that
part of responsibility for the dramatic events unfolded in the east of the
country lies also with their owner.

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ovue_povinnist_pered_akhmetovim/

INFORMATIONCONTENT
With the change of power in 2014, after the Revolution
of Dignity, new opportunities opened up in Ukraine
for the establishment of a public broadcaster being
derived from the system of state-owned broadcasters.
This reform had no success in the Viktor Yushchenko
years, due to the lack of sufficient political will, and
in principle was impossible to be implemented under
the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych whose people
considered the media as a tool for holding power
and, therefore, made a lot of effort to monopolize the
Ukrainian media.
The need for stablishing an independent and efficient
Public Broadcaster in Ukraine has become particularly
relevant. Amid the oligarchized media market
and the information product quality degradation,
aggressive Russian propaganda, it is up to the Public
Broadcaster to be a model for observing professional
standards, objective reflection of reality and – just as
importantly – consolidation of the Ukrainian society
around common values.
INFORMATION CONTENT OF TV
AND RADIO CHANNELS IN THE
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM:
2014-2016 TRENDS

INFORMATIONCONTENT
Information Content of TV and Radio Channels in the Public Broadcasting System: 2014-2016 trends
Diana Dutsyk
Antonina Mnikh
Public Broadcasting Reform:
How It Started
The regulatory framework for the establishment of public television in
Ukraine was set up by the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] with the adoption of
the Law "On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine" on 17 April
2014. According to this law, the Public Broadcaster (formally – the Public Joint
Stock Company "National Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine", or
PJSC NPTRCU) evolved from a number of state-owned TV and radio companies,
both central and regional. At present, PJSC NPTRCU includes: central TV-
channels UA:Pershyi and Kultura, 26 regional affiliates, and the radio channels
of Pershyi, Promin and Kultura. In addition, SE Studia Ukrtelefilm, in accordance
with amendments to the law on public broadcasting added in May 2016, shall be
transformed into a public joint stock company and merged with PJSC National
Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine.
The Law "On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine" was
amended in 2015/2016. These amendments regulated the issues of property,
advertising, legal status, etc. of the Public Broadcaster.
On 7 April 2015, the Public Broadcaster was presented to the public. A new
brand UA:Suspilne was introduced then, the TV-channel’s logo was changed live
to UA:Pershyi as well the Ukrainske Radio’s call sign.
During this presentation, Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine,
signed the Law "On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine on Public Television and
Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine" (Draft law No. 1357) which in fact enabled the
establishment of PJSC NPTRCU [1].
"Ukraine has been waiting for this law for 23 years. Either the government
lacked the will or there was almost always no desire to deal with this issue,
since the government has always sought for control over the media world
and thought that introducing the public television simply meant releasing the
genie out of the bottle. This is the price that the government has to pay for the
democracy", the President said.
Furthermore, Petro Poroshenko mentioned: "Now we are starting a very
promising road from Pershyi Natsionalnyi to BBC. Hopefully, the news will also
be professional and objective" [2].
The news: how broadcasting of the TV
and radio channels undergoing the reform
changed over the period from 2014 to 2016
During the specified period of time, the non-governmental organization
Detector Media (formerly Telekritika) had regular monitorings of the news
broadcast on the TV and radio channels to be reformed into the public
broadcasting system.
As of today (at the time of drafting this report), there are no uniform formal
requirements to the quality of the information content produced by a public
broadcaster. The elaboration of guides for the journalists intended to work in
a public broadcaster’s system is one of the challenges to be met by a new
team headed by Zurab Alasania, the elected chairman of PJSC NPTRCU (on 10
April 2017, the Supervisory Board of PJSC NPTRCU based on the contest results
elected Zurab Alasania a Chairman – author’s note).
However, the evaluation of the news quality was carried out in line with
the methodology developed by the experts of NGO Detector Media. The key
evaluation criteria are:
adherence to the professional standards (accuracy, efficiency, completeness,
balance of views, separating facts from opinions, reliability);
absence of suppressed topics;

INFORMATIONCONTENT
absence of materials featuring invited materials ("jeansa").
Before the change of power in Ukraine in 2014 following the escape of
President Viktor Yanukovych to Russia, the national broadcasters were totally
controlled by the government and the president. The local (regional) state-
owned television and radio broadcasters were also influenced by regional
leaders (governors). Hence, this approach determined their editorial policy and
the way of reporting about the key socio-political events of the country. The
situation altered after the change of power: the state-owned channels entered
the process of reformation into the public broadcasters. The approaches to the
news coverage were some way revised.
UA:Pershyi
Pershyi Natsionalnyi (since 7 April 2015 – UA:Pershyi) had a symptomatic
reporting of the Maidan protests in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity. This
TV-channel appeared to choose topics, facts and comments in such a way that
they would not contradict the official version of the events presented by the
authorities in the person of Viktor Yanukovych. In their newscasts, the journalists
of Pershyi Natsionalnyi completely or almost completely hid the facts showing
the excessive use of force against protesters by the government (from the facts
of using fire-arms and unjustified violence against those detained by security
forces to the judicial prosecution of the wounded and often simply random
people). The confrontation chronicles focused more on the death toll among the
security forces rather than among the protesters. Also, during the whole period
of protests, Pershyi Natsionalnyi uncritically (in particular, in an unbalanced
way) presented various statements by the authorities members, whereas
the responses from the opposition or representatives of the protesters were
principally or completely suppressed. When covering the reaction of western
countries to the Ukrainian situation, the journalists of Pershyi Natsionalnyi used
only those expressing extremely mild and diplomatic assessments of the then
Ukrainian government [3].
Although, in March 2014, it took the national TV-channel a few days to
completely change its position heading towards the new power as represented
by the acting President Oleksandr Turchynov (whom they recently biased
when he was in opposition). Pershyi Natsionalnyi started producing materials
predominantly containing opinions of new officials, and the standard of balance of
views tilted to their side. However, at that time Pershyi Natsionalnyi suppressed
lots of topics revealing the offences committed by the previous government [4].
It is therefore evident that the TV-channel journalists who were accustomed to
working under the "official discourse" always imposed by the government in
previous periods, even in the absence of pressure could not change their attitude
to work, since the new government took power after the Revolution of Dignity.
The events of the winter of 2014 were covered in the same way by the
majority of state-owned TV and radio broadcasting companies in the regions
(in particular, being described as rebellions attended by a radical marginal
contingent) [5].
On 25 March 2014, Zurab Alasania, who was greatly supported by the public
and media community, was appointed to the post of Director General of the
National Television Company of Ukraine by the new government headed by
Arsenii Yatseniuk (elected as Prime Minister on 27 February 2014).
NGO Detector Media’s experts started tracking positive changes in the
newscasts produced by Pershyi Natsionalnyi. As such, during the presidential
election campaign of April-May 2014, Pershyi Natsionalnyi, unlike the oligarchic
TV-channels, completely refused to accept invited stories ("jeansa"), as well as
"black PR" to be used against certain candidates. When releasing newscasts at
this TV-channel, the journalists also tried to adhere to professional standards,
although the complaints about the quality of news were still observed [6, 7].
Finally, Pershyi Natsionalnyi, and later on UA:Pershyi, managed to stick to this
line in 2015 and 2016: the air was fully cleared from custom-made materials, the
number of suppressed topics reduced, the channel improved its news quality.
However, the adherence to standards was still in question, and from time to time
ПЕРШИЙ

INFORMATIONCONTENT
experts noticed the so-called "parquet" in the newscasts (uncritical coverage
of the activities of the President, the Prime Minister or other high officials). As
an example, in 2015, the monitoring conducted by NGO Detector Media noted
that the poorest compliance with the standard of completeness of information,
as well as separation of facts from opinions, was in the newscasts produced
by the journalists of UA:Pershyi. At the press conference held on 22 October
2015, when sharing thoughts about the process of raising standards, Daria
Yurovska, Deputy Director General of UA:Pershyi, said that it was quite easy
to get rid of "jeansa": "To get rid of "jeansa", you should simply not produce it".
However, she explained that it appeared difficult to comply with the standards
of completeness and balance because it took time to collect all viewpoints,
though she believed this should not be an excuse, since "if we want to build a
public broadcaster that would lead the way in the media environment, we must
set the highest standards for ourselves" [8].
As such, over a three-year period the following changes have taken place
at UA:Pershyi:
the relations with the authorities underwent changes: despite the inertial
desire of representatives of the government or political forces to influence the
content of UA:Pershyi, the journalists of this TV-channel managed to maintain
the distance remaining relatively neutral in coverage of the socio-political news;
placement of invited materials of political or commercial nature ("jeansa")
was abandoned;
the number of suppressed topics gradually reduced every year, the TV-
channel presented a really complete news picture of the day in 2016;
however, experts record the so-called "parquet" in the newscasts (uncritical
coverage of the activities of the President, the Prime Minister or other high
officials);;
improvements in the standards observance, though the failure to comply
with the completeness of information (this commonly relates to the lack of
details and facts about a particular event) and the reliability (a large number of
fuzzy or overgeneralized references to information sources) standards remains
a crucial issue;
on the whole, the TV-channel still demonstrates the insufficient quality of its
information content.
Regional affiliates (formerly – RNTRC [Region-
al National Television and Radio Companies]
As already noted, the majority of local state-owned television and radio
companies reported about the events of the winter 2014 in the same light as
the central channel Pershyi Natsionalnyi, playing nice with the then regime of
Viktor Yanukovych. Even upon the end of the Maidan protests, the state-owned
television and radio companies in the east and south of the country continued
presenting these events as a rebellion calling their participants a radical marginal
contingent; this could not but affect the public mood in the concerned regions
having inspired the Russian Federation to fuel the anti-Ukrainian sentiments and
support (the military as well) to separatists in the eastern Ukraine.
It is much harder for the regional broadcasters, unlike UA:Pershyi, to go
through reforms, and thus to change approaches to working with news content.
The main reasons for that are:
insufficient professional level of local journalists, which can partly be
attributed to extremely low wages (with the lowest rate of salaries in the media
market which in the dollar equivalent varies from $ 100 to $ 200 per month);;
the lack of positive team competition (because of low wages, hardly anybody
wants to work in this system, the staff normally retained is either of pre-
retirement age or inexperienced youth);

INFORMATIONCONTENT
the need to survive in the conditions of long-term political pressure put by
local and central governmental bodies (this leads to the self-censorship, and the
lack of critical coverage of the authorities’ actions);
"jeansa" practices (producing custom-made content that brings additional
revenues to local broadcasters, which allows to meet certain extra-budget
needs of local editors offices), and the local broadcasters see no harm in that.
So the experts of NGO Detector Media have more comments to the news
broadcast by the regional affiliates rather than to the newscasts of UA:Pershyi.
Experts record that during the period from 2014 to 2016 the outright "jeansa"
materials promoting the top public officials and local influential politicians were
repeatedly observed in the news of local broadcasters.
For a little while, the situation was improved due to the events of February
2014 and aggressive public refusal to accept the pro-government "jeansa"
stories, and even the presidential campaign 2014 could not increase the
number of custom-made materials. They reduced by half (up to 5-16% on
different channels), though for a short while. Within a few coming months,
having recovered from social upheavals, the state-owned broadcasters
being accustomed to working with playbooks, reversed to thoughtless direct
broadcasting of pieces devoted to the activities of the top officials. These
newscasts were usually incomplete, unbalanced, irrelevant to the local audience
and provided no valuable information for the residents of certain localities.
As such, the political "jeansa" returned to the screens of regional state-
owned broadcasters a few months after the Revolution of Dignity – with the
names of politicians, political flags and centers of influence changed.
However, this time the regional broadcasters prioritized the interests of their
local officials. We therefore note the mimicry in the news production with the
signs of invited materials: now these pieces presented the leaders of a specific
region or city, accompanied in their trips by journalists from the regional
affiliates, and instead of covering the issue addressed in a respective meeting,
just mentioned its subject, etc.
For instance, according to the monitoring results of October, 2014, only
one of the five assessed regional state-owned TV-companies – Sumy RNTRC
- did not use "jeansa" at all. The rest of the RNTRCs produced "jeansa" issues
mostly of a "parquet" type [9]. The channels broadcast "parachute" scenes
beamed down. They showed (as a rule, without any reference to a specific
region) Petro Poroshenko, his wife visiting the ATO zone, the ministers of the
Yatseniuk government and the Prime Minister himself. Volodymyr Groisman also
featured, this time on the background of a banner with the symbols of the Petro
Poroshenko Bloc when presenting the Presidential Strategy-2020 in Vinnytsia.
On the whole, from 19 to 25% of the news broadcast on the four regional TV
and radio companies covered by the monitoring in the reporting period were of
a "jeansa" type.
The monitoring of the last week’s news of the then parliamentary campaign

INFORMATIONCONTENT
(the early parliamentary election in Ukraine was held in the autumn of 2014 –
ed.) had symptomatic findings about five regional state-owned TV and radio
companies: Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Vinnytsia. Despite the
regional specifics, all these channels had several trends in common. First of all,
this is a strict self-censorship applied to all issues concerning the coverage of
the authority’s actions. The RNTRC journalists often practiced the "parquet"
format of reporting about the officials of all ranks. Moreover, such information
was brought to the level of official statements made by the authorities, or
broadcasts from numerous meetings. Normally, they have one speaker who
actually is the main truth holder: i.e., the Mayor, the Governor, the Prime Minister
or the President.
The tendencies of late 2014 prevailed also in 2015. When analyzing the
January news content of the regional television companies in Odesa, Kharkiv,
Kherson, Cherkasy and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, the experts noted no changes
in their information policy: the recorded previous year’s rate of 10-25% of
custom-made materials kept in 2015. The pro-government "parquet", especially
the news related to the central authorities, became even less motivated and
meaningful. "Reporting" pieces covering the meetings attended by officials in
the format of "it (i.e. the authority) works" migrate from month to month [10].
It was also evident that the government had no intention to lose its influence
over the RNTRC resource just before the local elections in October 2015. So,
depending on the extent of influence the governors had in the regions, the
state-owned broadcasters explicitly made it clear who was master in the house.
The newscasts promoted officials as well as close to them people's deputies.
Whereas right after the Revolution of Dignity the RNTRC’s newscasts
presented almost no stories aimed at promoting the interests of certain political
forces, in 2015 the experts noted more pieces in favor of the pro-government
party – the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”.
However, in 2016 gradual changes were under way. When considering the
news content they created, we see two remarkable tendencies: the materials
with the signs of an invitation hardly vanished, but they were mostly of a
"parquet" nature. And during some months, the experts noted the "jeansa" free
news produced by the Do TeBe channel from Donetsk and OTB channel from
Kharkiv; the unbiased content was constantly broadcast by UA:Sumy with their
Khmelnytskyi colleagues showing similar results, etc.
Nevertheless, the share of "parquet" materials was still critical. However, the
experts of NGO Detector Media noted that the materials of this kind came out
not because of the apparent intention of journalists to please the officials, but
because of lack of professionalism in the news preparation along with neglect
of information journalism standards, in particular, ensuring a balance of opinions
and viewpoints and completeness of information.
As for the "jeansa" content which could promote somebody's commercial
interests, such stories were almost in low regard among the NTRC regional
affiliates.
Despite the progress demonstrated by regional broadcasters in the gradual
abandonment of the custom-made content, there was no progress in compliance
with the standards of information journalism, the experts say.
The 2014-2016 news monitoring results showed that the professional
standards compliance level had not significantly improved, ranging from
1.7 to 5.2 (out of six possible points) with averages of 3.9-4.4 points. These
TV-companies demonstrated the growing awareness of journalists about
the criteria of information journalism per se, but they lacked efficiency and
commitment from the management staff of regional companies requiring strict
compliance at the local level.
Consequently, the main trends of 2014-2016 are:
A decrease in custom-made content and a change of its nature: the outright
political "jeansa" replaced with the pro-government "parquet", mostly for the
benefit of local authorities representatives.
1

INFORMATIONCONTENT
A decrease in the number news pieces about the top public officials irrelevant
to the local audience.
Insignificant volume of "jeansa" in the NTRC regional affiliates’ newscasts.
The regional broadcasters’ information policy and the TV-companies
management position as to custom-made content broadcasting are not
homogeneous, have regional peculiarities and range from total rejection of
"jeansa" to tolerance and friendship with the government.
No progress in the professional standards observance, the news are still of low
quality.
Only one of the local companies – the Sumy affiliate of the National Television
Company of Ukraine – began broadcasting under the logo "UA:Sumy" since
1 January 2016 (the main requirement for obtaining such a logo by a local
broadcaster is the news quality standard observance). The rest of the companies
did not receive this logo during the specified period
Ukrainske Radio
In 2016, NGO Detector Media, for the first time in 25 years, monitored the
news produced by Ukrainske Radio. The experts noted the incompliance with
the standard of balance and completeness of information as the main problem
in the news content on the radio station. In addition to the balance violations
(normally, in favor of the authorities), the monitoring recorded a large number
of evaluative judgments used by the journalists in their newscasts [11, 12].
Having analyzed the broadcast schedule of Ukrainske Radio, the NGO
Detector Media experts made a number of comments to the line of information
programs [13].
The main comments are:
the most of the news pieces have violations of the basic technological
principle of the news presentation, being the imitation of the spoken language
structure. It was apparent that radio presenters borrow event coverages
from information agencies, web-sites, press-releases, etc., they are copied
into a newscast without any adaptation, so such news resemble an expanded
newspaper article or a web-site post rather than radio news;
there is a disproportion in reporting about the most crucial social pieces
both on domestic and foreign subjects. 80-90% of airtime is allocated to the
events in Ukraine while the share of international events is only 10-20%;;
the journalists prefer two genres: an information message and a
correspondent’s narration combined with some interview elements. Sometimes
they have an archaic genre of a speech in front of a microphone (a monologue
presentation of an expert opinion about a certain event, phenomenon, process,
etc.). The newscasts are lacking for such genres as reportages and interviews
which by no means would add some dynamism, vitality and dialogueness.
CONCLUSIONS
From 2014 to 2016, the reformed NTCU and its regional branches were progressively approaching the public
broadcaster format. The newsrooms made some positive progress in introducing the news reporting standards,
the conditionally invited content are being gradually abandoned.
However, the pace of these changes is extremely slow, and the results achieved are unstable.
Therefore, quite evident is a need for further monitoring of the content of channels within the public
broadcaster system, a meticulous analysis and public coverage of achievements and shortcomings in their
work as well as methodological assistance, trainings, professional master-classes, etc., in order to establish
professional approaches in the formation of information content common for the public service television.
2
3
4
5
6

INFORMATIONCONTENT
REFERENCE LIST:
1. Law "On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine on Public Television and Radio
Broadcasting of Ukraine" (Draft law No. 1357) //
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52822
2.Poroshenkotelevisedlivesigningamendmentstothelawonpublicbroadcasting
// Public broadcasting. – 7 April 2015 –
http://stv.detector.media/zakonodavstvo/zminy/poroshenko_pidpisav_u_pryamomu_
efiri_zmini_do_zakonu_pro_suspilne_movlennya/
3. Pershyi Natsionalnyi was silent about forceful assault on Maidan and snipers’
exercises // MediaSapiens. – 12 March 2014 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/pershiy_natsionalniy_
movchav_pro_siloviy_shturm_maydanu_ta_dii_snayperiv/
4. Pershyi Natsionalnyi promptly "reoriented" after the change of power //
MediaSapiens. – 17 March 2014 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/pershiy_natsionalniy_
shvidko_pereorientuvavsya_pislya_zmini_vladi/
5. Sokolenko N. February messages against Maidan // MediaSapiens. – 12 April 2014 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/regional_news/lyutnevi_tezi_proti_
maydanu/
6. Everybody is running "jeansa". Except Pershyi Natsionalnyi // MediaSapiens.
– 2 May 2014 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/dzhinsuyut_vse_krome_
pervogo_natsionalnogo/
7. Pershyi Natsionalnyi improved in observance of journalism standards //
MediaSapiens. – 6 May 2014 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/pershiy_natsionalniy_stav_
menshe_porushuvati_zhurnalictski_standarti/
8. Incompliance with the standards of balance and completeness of information
is the main problem of central state-owned television and radio channels: NGO
Telekritika’s monitoring (VIDEO) // MediaSapiens. – 22 October 2015 –
http://www.osvita.mediasapiens.ua/ethics/standards/porushennya_standartu_
balansu_ta_povnoti_informatsii_golovna_problema_tsentralnikh_derzhavnikh_
teleradiokanaliv_monitoring_go_telekritika_video/
9. Regional TV "jeansa" in October: comeback to the times of Yanukovych? //
MediaSapiens. – 15 November 2014. –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/regional_news/regionalna_
teledzhinsa_u_zhovtni_kambek_u_chasi_yanukovicha/
10. The to-be public broadcasters espoused the authorities // MediaSapiens. – 20
February 2015 –
http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/regional_news/maybutni_suspilni_
movniki_viddalis_vladi/
11. Quasi-references, evaluative judgments, absence of backgrounds - the main
drawbacks of Ukrainske Radio in September // Public broadcasting. – 13 October
2016. –
http://stv.detector.media/kontent/monitoryng/psevdoposilannya_otsinni_
sudzhennya_vidsutnist_bekraundiv_osnovni_vadi_novin_ukrainskogo_radio_u_
veresni/
12. For the journalists of Ukrainske Radio and an internet source // Public
broadcasting. – 21 November 2016. –
http://stv.detector.media/kontent/monitoryng/dlya_zhurnalistiv_ukrainskogo_
radio_y_internet_dzherelo/
13. UR-1 broadcasting network: the concept of information broadcasting requires
reviewing // Public broadcasting. – 05 December 2016. –
http://stv.detector.media/kontent/monitoryng/sitka_movlennya_ur1_kontseptsiya_
informatsiynogo_movlennya_potrebue_pereglyadu/

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
Propaganda efforts of the Russia-controlled media
(printed and online) in terms of reporting about the
events in Ukraine during 2014-2016 were an important
tool for legitimizing and implementing of Russian
plans to undermine the unity of Ukrainian society and
destroy the Ukrainian state. In some cases, the political
impact of such propaganda was as important as the
Kremlin's military decisions. This is especially true for
the Crimea annexation period. At the same time, without
a clear strategy from the Russian decision-makers, the
manipulations were becoming less acute and turned
into the routine, ritual practice of naming "friends" and
"foes" of Russia, "opportunities" and "threats" that arise
in Ukraine against the RF. The propaganda nature of the
Russian media efforts over these years has two distinctive
features: the monotony of messages and synchronous
spread of messages through all available channels.
RUSSIAN
PROPAGANDA
ABOUT EVENTS
IN UKRAINE:
2014-2016
TRENDS

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
Russian propaganda about events in Ukraine: 2014-2016 trends
In terms of chronology, we can see several major phases of Kremlin’s
information attacks against Ukraine:
December 2013-February 2014: major efforts are aimed at discrediting
the protest movement and inciting hostility between locals of different
Ukrainian regions. For internal and international audiences, they repeat almost
every day the messages about the presence and later the predominance of
"fascist ideology" and "fascist methods" supporters among the EuroMaidan’s
protesters. The identification and support of the pro-Russian forces and
politicians go along with the stigmatization and humiliation of anything that
opposes Russia.
The pro-Russian orientation are compared to the forces of law, rule of
law and development (special ops unit Berkut, the industrial, highly developed
regions and cities in the east and south of Ukraine), and the protest forces
are chaotic and decaying, depending on anonymous EU and the USA
"puppeteers". Since then and till the end of 2016, they are constantly citing
the "examples", "evidences", "proofs" of various forms and scale of Western
interference in the Ukraine’s internal affairs. For example, the official information
from the US Department of State on the amount of US aid for the development
of democracy in Ukraine of $ 5 billion over the whole period of Ukraine’s
independence is repeated. Russian mass media use this figure without mentioning
the time frame of assistance, calling this assistance a Maidan prerequisite.
Petro
Burkovskyi
A screenshot of the Argumenty i Fakty newspaper’s web-site. A part of the article by Andrey Sidorchyk dated January 20,
2014 under the title "The Brown" rebellion in Ukraine. The article compares the Ukrainian protesters with the fascists ("fascists
roared in the Kyiv streets"), and the representative of the US National Security Council Kathleen Heyden is compared with
the “SS Standartanführer".
For the full version of the article please follow the link: www.aif.ru/euromaidan/opinion/korichnevyy_myatezh_na_ukraine.
December 2013 - February 20141

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
Late February–March 2014: information special operation
accompanying the military operation of the Crimea occupation. The major
difference from the previous stage: massive release of fake news about the
deadly threat by the Maidan victors to all those who identify themselves with
Russia.
At the same time, the servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and
their families serving in the Crimea suffer the informational pressure:
there are news of the Crimea’s massive and "popular" resistance to the new
Ukrainian authorities; there are multiple traitor declarations calling the military
to "stand with the people"; the aggressive actions of the RF’s special forces
are being disguised and, at the same time, the stabilizing role of the Black
Sea Fleet, who can count on the support from compatriots" in Sevastopol
and Crimea, is being underlined; the crucial role of "volunteers" (Cossacks,
bikers, anti-Maidan people, former Berkut officers, self-defense activists)
in defense of the Crimea and victory over the "Kyiv junta" is being
emphasized. The RF President decision regarding possible use of the Armed
Forces in the territory of Ukraine is mentioned solely in the context of a possible
response to Western interference in the Ukrainian events.
This kind of a struggle against the "fascist forces" in the Russian
media’s version becomes the main factor distinguishing the Crimea locals
from the rest of Ukrainian citizens. Media build a separate identity of the
"Crimeans" as a part of the "Russian people" as opposed to the "Ukrainian
people." This operation produces an alternative elite from minor, little-known
pro-Russian leaders in Crimea (Aksyonov, Chalyi). They are given the right to
speak on behalf of the "Crimeans", to express the will of the "whole people," to
justify this "will" through the referendum and the "reunification" of the Crimea
and Russia.
April-June 2014: the information special operation covering the
interference of Russian special services and special-purpose units in civil
unrest in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Having a successful
example of the separate "Crimean identity" construction, the media efforts
set to the creation of a separate "Novorossian identity." Such actions are
authorized by Vladimir Putin directly who at the press-conference in April 2014
outlines the imaginary boundaries of "Novorossia" – from the Kharkiv oblast in
the east to Odessa oblast in the south.
The already mentioned "law-abiding" and "hard-working" features are
accompanied by such identity traits of command and constant use of Russian
language, cultural and social integration into the "Russia’s space", the Orthodox
faith and the commitment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow
Patriarchate. With the protest intensification and first violence escalations and
armed clashes, the carriers of this new "Novorossian identity" are characterized
as more humane, having better mental and physical development, deeper
loyalty to traditional family values (love for children, long life, respect for the
elderly people, and heterosexual orientation), greater honesty and peaceful
disposition compared with representatives of other regions of Ukraine and
EuroMaydan participants.
As the Russian TV-channels at that time were well-represented in the
cable networks of the eastern and southern regions, it is fair to say that the
broadcasting of such messages was intended to encourage citizens to get
mobilized against the new Ukrainian authorities, to convince them of the threats
Late February–March 2014
April-June 2014
2
3

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
to their identity from the citizens of other regions, and to seek for protection
either in violent actions or in assisting to the RF representatives.
LikeintheCrimea,theRussianpropagandastartspromotingalternative
"public opinion" leaders who should lead the pro-Russian movements.
At first, former members of the Party of Regions, its representatives in local
councils, mayors, directors of enterprises are in focus. But their constant
hesitation and persecution of their own interests force Russia to resort to new
methods of "elite cultivation."
At this time, they revive the term "insurgents" that has clear connotations
of the heroic struggle of the "Soviet people" against the German aggression
during the Second World War, so that to mark and at the same time to justify
the rebellion against the Ukrainian state. They introduce a meaningful marker of
“insurgents” – the St. George Ribbon that since the mid-2000s has been actively
used by the Russian authorities to popularize their version of the Second World
A screenshot from the web-site of the Expert Russian business magazine. The magazine issue No. 24 (9 June -16 July,
2014) had an article that became the topic of the issue "Donbass is the heart of Russia"; it presented a detailed plan to
destabilize the Donbas situation and ways of joining Russia (the authors of the article suggest the scenario that was actually
implemented by the Russian authorities later, in particular, the organization of the “insurgents”, Russia’s humanitarian aid to
the local population, the establishment of “DPR/LPR" financial system, etc.). The authors also persuaded their audience that
"the question should be about the actual re-establishment of the state of Ukraine."
For the full version of the article please follow the link: http://expert.ru/expert/2014/24/myi-ih-ne-brosim/.

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
War events in the former USSR territory. From now on, this ribbon is getting a
new meaning: a symbol of the new struggle of the Russian people against the
allegedly real "fascists" in Ukraine. The actions of the "insurgents" are presented
as "exploits" following the feats of Soviet soldiers and partisans; such stories
are widely circulated and used to recruit volunteers and to provide with the
ideological justification of the "voluntary" presence of Russian servicemen in
Ukraine.
It is from the ‘insurgent’ leaders, the citizens of Russia, the Kremlin
propaganda begins shaping the "Novorossia" leaders (Igor Strelkov, Igor
Bezler, Nikolay Kozitsyn); they are entrusted to vocalize the goals and objectives
among the Russia supporters in Ukraine: from federalization to the establishment
of a new state in the Donbas area. They are legitimized, in particular, for contacts
with foreign media and for mentioning in Russian media (RussiaToday, Sputnik)
for foreign audiences. They launch the process of "bottom-up" establishment of
A screenshot of the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" web-site, the article of 8 June titled "Inauguration of the Future Dictatorship" (by
Tymofey Sergeytsev). The periodical manipulates the photo, as this is a wangled shot from a video where the newly-elected
President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko is congratulating the servicemen during his inauguration. The photo is accompanied
by an appropriate headline and inset: "The military operation against the locals of the South-East is merely one of the elements
of the new system of government that will soon reveal the nationalist dictatorship traits."
For the full version of the article please follow the link: http://www.crimea.kp.ru/daily/26241.5/3122552/.

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
"public authorities" and disreputably "democratic" procedures of will-expression
in the form of "referendums" for self-determination of "peoples" of Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts. It is worth noting that these "referendums" are targeted at
the inhabitants of the Ukraine’s administrative-territorial units and not to the
media-invented construction of "Novorossia". It is obvious that the informational
and ideological coverage of the rebellion outpaced significantly the information
situation on site so the Kremlin curators had to make adjustments along the
way and, at the same time, to spread messages understandable both for the
Russians and for the Donbas Ukrainians through the same channels.
The term "insurgents" also served to legitimize the guerrilla tactics
against the Ukrainian troops and, at the same time, to disguise
professional sabotage methods of the special units of the RF Armed
Forces, in particular, the Russia’s military intelligence service. They are
hiding in all possible ways the facts of captured Russian servicemen, agents
and deep-cover agents of Russian special services or of recently produced
Russian weapons as confiscated by Ukrainian law-enforcement officers from the
"insurgents".
At the same time, they are demonizing the new Ukrainian authorities,
enlists and volunteers who begin fighting the separatists in the east and
south of Ukraine. To this end, they turn to hyperbolizing of the influence and
significance of right-wing radical organizations like “Svoboda” ("Liberty") and
“Pravyi Sector” ("Right Sector") that have allegedly taken control over the public
authorities. The Russian media even compare “Pravyi Sector” to the Nazi special
unit SS, scaring with mass repressions and massacres against the Russian-
speaking population. Subsequently, the very mention of ‘pravosek’ (right-
sector member) in the information pieces or news reports becomes a sufficient
evidence of the involvement and responsibility of the Ukrainian authorities in the
most incredible crimes and incidents.
The Odessa tragedy on 2nd May 2014 becomes a turning point for the
establishment of the image of ultra-right organizations. The fatalities in Odessa
House of Trade Unions are used to level the fire and death toll in the Kyiv House
of Trade Unions on 18-19 February 2014.
This is a period when the Russia media start making active use of
mistakes and errors of new authorities. For example, the most popular
stories of that period are: no sure information about the investigation of Maidan
crimes, incompetence and faulty economic and social decisions, exaggeration of
radical nationalists’ intentions to have forced Ukrainization under the pretext of
decommunization (mentions of Lenin monuments dismantling), new authority
corruption.
There is another direction of such information efforts: reports about
mass war crimes committed by Ukrainian servicemen. To make this task
easier another World War II term is reconstructed – the "punisher" (castigator).
This is an umbrella concept used to denote the Nazi war crimes against the
USSR’s peaceful people; now it is used to describe any real or fake facts about
actions. At the same time, the term "punisher" is used the most often about
Ukrainian volunteer squads that were officially integrated in the National Guard
of Ukraine. As a result, by late 2014, new clichés “punisher”, “pravosek”
(right-sector member) and “national guard” are used almost as synonyms,
complementing and substituting each other regardless of the content of
messages.
Even more, the Kremlin directs personal information attacks against
some Ukrainian politicians seen as its most fierce opponents. To this end,
they use negative clichés and stereotypes of the Russian mass consciousness: a
bias against representatives of the newest Protestant churches and cults that
brainwash the population (against Oleksandr Turchynov acting President of
Ukraine from 23 February till 7 June); traumatic memory of the first Chechen
war (against the leaders of “Svoboda” , UNSO, "Parvyi Sector"); anti-Semitism
(against Igor Kolomoiskyi, Ukrainian oligarch, owner of 1+1 Media Holding);
hostility against the rich (against Igor Kolomoiskyi, Petro Poroshenko). Since
then such techniques of humiliation, demonization of certain representatives
of the Ukrainian establishment become a permanent element of the Russian
information space.

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
July 2014 - February 2015: suppression and denial of the facts of armed
aggression against Ukraine and the support to separatists, information
support to favorable for Russia conditions of putting an end to the
Donbas conflict. During this time, the Russian authorities had to respond to the
unexpectedly high level of mobilization and resistance from the Ukrainian people
and troops, and to go more intense to earn the loyalty of the Donbas locals. The
most difficult and most important task is to conceal the use of regular military
units of the Armed Forces of Russia against the Ukrainian troops, the provision
of large-scale military, technical, consulting and training assistance to the rebels.
On the other hand, the Kremlin uses mobilization, patriotic messages to prepare
its people for an open war with Ukraine scenario.
This period is marked with the most reports by the RF central
periodicals and TV-channels correspondents from the territory controlled
by separatists and Russian troops. One of the main goals is to show
the aftermath of shelling, tremendous details of the civilian deaths,
harsh living conditions of citizens blocked by the Ukrainian forces, the
"evidence" of mass executions of "insurgents" and "civilians" by Ukrainian
"punishers". The Russian mass media simultaneously with the Kremlin (the
President Vladimir Putin, the Prime-Minister Dmitry Medvedev, the RF Security
Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, the Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Ivanov,
the Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov) begin describing and identifying
the situation in Ukraine as a "genocide", in particular, against the "Russian-
speaking population". The permanent repetition of this term in central periodicals
and on TV, on the one hand, justifies the Russia's support and condolences to
people as about the rebels and, on the other hand, serves as a potential
justification of open Russian armed intervention in the Donbas developments in
the eyes of the Western audience.
The names of Ukrainian volunteer squadrons: Donbas, Aidar, Azov, Shakhtarsk
(Tornado) become new anchor symbols of the "genocide" policy. It is worth
noting that after the Ilovaisk mousetrap the Donbas squadron mentions vanish.
The most attention is focused on the units with foreign citizens sharing the ultra-
right, xenophobic views (Azov), or fighters accused of crimes and tortures of
Donbas civilians (Aidar, Tornado).
Along with repeating of the hidden threat of open force, the RF is trying
to avoid the public outcry about the events and facts confirming the
involvement of the Russian regular troops in battles against the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and volunteer battalions. So they turn to the methods
of information blockade and "plausible denial" are predominantly used (e.g.,
when over ten paratroopers were captured during the Ilovaisk mousetrap, they
spread the version that the paratroopers "got lost" during the military training
exercises in the Rostov oblast).
The involvement of Russian citizens as volunteers must be explained by
their participation in multinational volunteer squadrons along with the Serb,
Czech, Spanish, French, and even American people, or membership in so-called
paramilitary "non-governmental" movements or radical parties such as the Don
Cossacks or the "international detachments" of the former national-bolshevik
party of Eduard Limonov beyond the control the Russian officials.
Further, the Kremlin starts reducing the information activity of the first
"Novorossia leaders" associated with the RF special services in favor of
local rebel leaders (Aleksandr Khodakovsky, Yevgeny Kononov, Aleksandr
Zakharchenko, Alexei Mozgovy, Igor Plotnytsky, Aleksandr Bednov,
Pavlo Dryomov) who were citizens of Ukraine. These "speakers" are used
to spread messages that "insurgents" seized all the weapons of the Ukrainian
army; about successful military operations against the larger but demoralized
Ukrainian army; about the importance of "humanitarian aid" and the participation
of "Russian volunteers" in the battles on the side of "insurgents"; about the re-
establishment of peaceful life in the settlements "liberated from Ukraine". On
July 2014 - February 20154

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
March-August 2015: information pressure on Ukraine and Europe
regarding the full satisfaction of Minsk agreements conditions.
This is a kind of transition period when the attention is getting shifted
from the situation in the Donbas region to the international and Ukraine’s
internal context of the war. At the same time, the Ukrainian topic in the RF
information space is becoming a part of a wider campaign – getting the Russia’s
population prepared to a long confrontation with the West, regardless of the
Crimea issue and Donbas situation.
On the one hand, Russia is shown as the only consistent participant in the
peace process doing its best to persuade other Normandy Format participants –
Germany and France – to take the US independent stand and to force Ukraine to
adhere to the terms of peace. There are more reports about European politicians
and political forces who advocate lifting of sanctions against Russia and resuming
of cooperation; the impact influence of Russian counter-sanctions against the EU
is exaggerated. The propagandists artificially promote the interpretation of the
peaceful Minsk process time frame: either by the end of 2015 Ukraine fulfills the
political requirements and implements a constitutional reform that recognizes
the "special status" of the Donbas, or "self-proclaimed republics" are going to
take action. And they consider the options of "liberation" of the whole territory
of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts from the Ukrainian troops and the independent
existence line.
March-August 20155
several occasions, the propaganda revealed true intentions of the aggressor:
after the Malaysian Boeing shot-down and during the shelling of Mariupol on 24
January 2015, a number of Russian information sources (LifeNews and TV Center)
reported a "DPR" offensive on Mariupol. Later on this information was removed
or substantially corrected by means of dissemination of unconfirmed facts about
the involvement of the Ukrainian military in these incidents [1].
At the same time, there is a clear identification of the Ukraine’s events as a
"civil war" that was provoked by the Western intervention during the Maidan
and keeps being stirred up with the US and EU support to the new Ukrainian
authorities. They are forcing the idea that the "Ukrainian scenario" is an
illustrative example of the West's intentions regarding Russia in case of
internal problems or riots against the authorities. These are mainstream
messages in late 2014 – early 2015, when the Russian population starts feeling
the economic recession. In this context, the Kremlin, and Putin personally,
imposes on the audience a causal link between the Russia's attempts to have
an independent policy and protect its interests in the former Soviet Union area
and the West's desire to "dissolve Russia" following the example of Yugoslavia
and to immerse the country in economic depression through the sanctions
(Vladimir Putin's press-conference of 18 December 2014) [2]. From the point of
the Kremlin’s view, such behavior of the West confirms that the charted course,
regarding Ukraine in particular, is correct.
Meanwhile, in order to distract attention, the TV, press and the Internet start
spreading information about the economic crisis in Ukraine (energy, food and
banking) and growing chances of a "nationalist third Maidan" so Ukraine as a
state might disappear. Such a fake comparison effect is used by propaganda to
present the Russian reality as much better, more stable, and more predictable.
In addition, the Russian media are intensely pointing at the RF leaders as the
main peacekeeper and initiator of realistic peace plans. They are claiming that it
is Putin who managed to conclude the first and second Minsk agreements that
stopped the bloodshed and shelling of the Donbas settlements. Whereas the
main blame for the cease-fire breaking and combat actions provoking is put on
the Ukrainian side: the national radicals and politicians seeking for making use of
the war to seize the power or to win the parliamentary election.

RUSSIANPROPAGANDA
On the other hand, since March 2015 and later on, they keep on
discrediting the Ukrainian president as a member of the Normandy
Four and a party to peace negotiations. For example, in light of the clash
of the "Pravyi Sector" fighters with an armed group of the people's deputy in
Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia), Russian mass media are predicting a rapid armed
coup in Kyiv, and separatist leaders urge the Right-Sector members to agree
upon peace and spheres of influence in Ukraine. This campaign reached its climax
with a bloody clash near the Verkhovna Rada on 31 August during voting in
the first reading of the amendments to the Constitution on a special status for
certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Even more, Putin interpreted
the 31 August events as the Ukraine's inability to comply with the Minsk
agreements; this point is picked up by all central Russian-TV channels and
periodicals, and it was being repeated by March 2017. For example, Channel
One the evening news on September 6, 2015 gives the following Putin’s quote:
"If we are talking about the Minsk agreements implementation – I would like
to remind that the Constitution amendments must be coordinated with the
Donbas; the law on elections to local authorities must be coordinated with the
A screenshot of the Moskovsky Komsomolets web-site. The text is rich in phrases “Kyiv orange squash”, "maidanned up beau
monde", etc. An article by Aleksei Chesnakov of 6 October 2015 says: "Yes, Ukraine is a defective state Russia will still have to
deal with. You can’t pick and choose neighbors. Yes, Poroshenko is a liar but he is not the worst option against his competitors.
Ukrainian society has fallen into such decay that it is easy to imagine Turchynov or even Lyashko at this post. The Ukrainian game
for Russia is a long game where every step has many dimensions. Moreover, now this game is in full swing."
For the full version of the article please follow the link: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/10/06/u-poroshenko-otobran-posledniy-
argument.html

MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-2017

MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-2017

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MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-2017