The relations between the EU and Ukraine have reached a stalemate following the 2012 parliamentary elections due to issues like the selective prosecution of political opponents and increasing authoritarianism in Ukraine. The EU must find creative solutions to move beyond this impasse, focusing on defining conditionality in key areas and engaging with the deteriorating democratic landscape. The opposition is fragmented and financially dependent on oligarchs, leaving the authorities in a position to manipulate the political system further and consolidate power.

1. MEMO
POLICY
THE EU AND UKRAINE
AFTER THE 2012
ELECTIONS
Andrew Wilson
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
impasse after two years dominated by rows over selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
the selective prosecution of regime opponents, conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in particular the conviction of former Prime in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in October 2011,
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
and authoritarianism and corruption in Ukraine.
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
However, the real danger following the elections on
28 October is not electoral fraud but the way that October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
the authorities are now entrenching themselves in bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
power by every possible means. Members of the authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
literal and metaphorical “family” around President was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
Yanukovych are using their power to enrich constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
themselves on an unprecedented scale. The EU rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
cannot afford to simply wait until the next contest “political technology” and a change in the voting system
in 2015. that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
The EU must think creatively to find a way to
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
move beyond this impasse. It should better define
authorities were confident they would win.
conditionality in the three key areas of selective
prosecutions, the conduct of elections and “reform”.
It should apply the Association Agreement and The recent focus on the elections has broadened the European
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement view from the Tymoshenko case to look at how things have
with Ukraine that have been on hold since last deteriorated across the board. But there is also a danger
December, if necessary selectively or provisionally, that the EU will move the goalposts and make the conduct
but take a tougher line in other areas, for example by of the elections the only criterion for deciding whether or
imposing a visa ban on leading figures in the regime not it should restart relations with Ukraine, or judge the
and auditing suspect “family” companies in the EU. authorities more on past than on present behaviour and
At the same time, the EU should liberalise visas, use a critique of the elections to move towards a de facto
encourage educational exchanges and support the
1 The Ukrainian parliament has 450 MPs. After the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, it was
emergence of new independent actors in Ukraine thought better that all of them should be elected by proportional representation. But in
who are worried by the rise of the “family”. 2011 the government forced through a return to the earlier system, under which half of
MPs would be elected by PR, and the other half in territorial constituencies, where so-
called administrative resources (that is, state-directed fraud) had more weight.

2. isolation policy. In November the Foreign Affairs Council the other of acting as a Trojan horse and secretly planning
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS
will decide whether to move forward with the Association to ally with the Party of Regions after the elections. Divisions
Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade within the main parties are manifold, and where they do not
Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine that have been on hold exist they are created by the authorities’ malign influence.
since last December. The annual EU-Ukraine summit is still The opposition shouldn’t even be the opposition in the
scheduled for some time before the end of this year, though outgoing parliament, as it won the last elections in 2007.
neither side is particularly enthusiastic. Some in the EU are But disunity in its ranks has repeatedly led to defections
minded to sign the agreements, in part because the process and failure to block or effectively resist key measures like
of ratification by member states is likely to get bogged down the election law itself in November 2011 or the new Law on
anyway. Others want to use the agreements to enforce red Languages in July 2012.
lines on political prosecutions or democratic deterioration.
The position of the opposition is being further weakened
However, neither approach will help transform Ukraine by the revival of so-called “political technology” (the local
into the kind of society the EU would like to see. Signing the black arts of covert manipulation). Many of the “opposition”
agreements prematurely would undermine conditionality; parties running in the election were in reality covert projects
leaving them on ice leaves the EU without leverage. The of the authorities. Forward Ukraine! and its leader Nataliya
EU therefore needs to think of creative ways of regaining Korolevska act like radical opposition forces, but are in
influence while maintaining red lines on values – not least reality what is known locally as “clones” – that is, copies
because the political situation in Ukraine could easily of other parties financed by leading oligarchs that try to
deteriorate further. A tightening of the screws on independent take the place of the old opposition – hence the choice of
media and on the still strong independent NGO sector is a young, glamorous female leader to compete with Yuliya
possible after the elections. The row over the Tymoshenko Tymoshenko. The authorities prevented some opposition
case was bad enough. But unless the EU regains traction, parties such as UDAR from campaigning in eastern Ukraine,
there will be worse to come. The authorities are entrenching where the Party of Regions is relatively sanguine about
themselves in power by every possible means, and members losing votes to other parties such as the Communists, as it
of the literal and metaphorical “family” around President knows the Communists will be a reliable part of any future
Yanukovych are using that power to enrich themselves on an super-majority.
unprecedented scale. The EU cannot afford to wait until the
next contest in 2015. Even the genuine opposition parties are now all financially
dependent on oligarchic sponsors, often even from the
authorities’ own ranks. Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat
The return of “political technology” Akhmetov, supposedly spent $80 million on Forward
Ukraine! – though he allegedly cut funding because the
There were some encouraging signs of democratic vitality in project was threatening to take votes off the Party of
the October elections. The mass media opened up a little, if Regions. The Communists are sponsored to the tune of $25
only temporarily. The authorities were unable to prevail in million by Ihor Koletnik, the head of the Customs Service.2
several key hotly contested constituency races. The United This financing illustrates how threatened some Ukrainian
Opposition coalition built around Tymoshenko’s Fatherland oligarchs feel by the rise of Yanukovch’s “family”. At the same
party came second, even though she was not allowed to stand. time, however, such funding reduces the real independence
But while the EU has tended to focus on election fraud and of the “opposition”.
the selective prosecution of political opponents, democracy
in Ukraine is now being undermined in many other ways. The opposition parties have also been seeded with so-called
The judicial “reform” pushed through in 2010 now gives the tushki – individuals who are known to be easily bribeable
state the power to put anyone it wants in prison. The legal and are pre-programmed to defect after the election3. The
system has become totally politicised; conviction rates are problem of bribery and the defection of MPs has been
over 99 percent. The judiciary is used to silence enemies around for a long time. In 2004, changes to the constitution
www.ecfr.eu
and to legitimise the increasing problem of raidertsvo, or the were agreed that required MPs to stay in the parties they
theft by oligarchs of each others’ businesses. Even the release were elected to serve and to ensure that the government
of Tymoshenko would not solve this more fundamental “majority” was made up of parties rather than individuals.
problem. But in a blatantly partial ruling in 2010 the constitutional
court reversed that decision. At least 80 percent of
November 2012
Where the opposition did well, it was despite its own “independent” MPs will be persuaded to join the authorities’
weaknesses. Many of its leading figures played safe and stood camp by the same means. Thus even though the Party of
on party lists rather than take on the ruling Party of Regions Regions did not win the headline vote, together with the fake
directly in the constituencies. The three main opposition opposition, “independents” and tushki, it still has a majority
parties – Fatherland, UDAR (known as “Punch” because it is and is within reach of the 300 out of 450 seats in the new
ECFR/65
led by the boxer Vitaliy Klichko) and the far-right Freedom parliament it needs to change the constitution. The three
Party – could only reach a partial agreement on withdrawing 2 Author interview with leading local political technologist Taras Berezovets, 20
in each others’ favour in the constituencies. Each suspects September 2012.
2 3 Tushka means the corpse of a small animal – something like “roadkill”.

3. main opposition parties will have to show an uncharacteristic Fragile pluralism
level of solidarity to prevent this happening.
The authorities are not far short of a two-thirds majority
in the new parliament that would allow them to change
The rise of the “family” the constitution. For example, they could decide to allow
Yanukovych to be “re-elected” by parliament in 2015 rather
Corruption has also increased substantially since the 2010 than directly by the people. Alternatively, as the authorities
elections. Yanukovych has increasingly vested power and now control almost all political branches of state, they could
wealth in a literal and metaphorical “family”. The president’s target remaining independent centres of power before any
oldest son Oleksandr Yanukovych and his associates have taken such challenges arise. Since 2010, the authorities have
over the central bank and tax, finance and law enforcement been gradually tightening control over independent media,
agencies, and used that power to take over rival businesses.4 not by restoring direct censorship, but by challenging
This began with businesses owned by supporters of the losing and redistributing oligarchic control. As Serhiy Kudelya
side in 2010 and Ukraine’s vulnerable SME sector. Now the puts it, “control over the leading television channels by
“family” has shifted to targeting major oligarchs. “Grabbing oligarchic moguls close to Yanukovych has produced a
property started with the supporters of the orange elite, but more decentralized system of self-censorship”.7 The new
now it is danger of spreading to the relatively loyal guys,” preference is for so-called usnyky, or verbal instructions
says leading Ukrainian analyst Mykhailo Honchar.5 Over from the presidential administration to TV owners in
the last year, the “family” has begun moving into the coal person. Thus the media remains pluralistic but is highly
business, electricity, telecommunications and agriculture. corrupt. According to one UDAR adviser, “all media is now
Land privatisation is scheduled finally to move forward after paid for, and we have to play that game”.8
the elections, but amendments to the law recently created a
new state land bank that would have first right of purchase The authorities may drop their relatively hands-off approach
if peasant farmers chose to sell their land, leading to fears to the media once the vote is over, just as they did once the
that “family” businesses will quickly accumulate the largest Euro 2012 final in Kyiv was out of the way, in part so that
parcels of Ukraine’s rich farm land. the “family” can muscle in on the local media market. The
campaign that began in the summer against Ukraine’s last
Ukraine’s co-hosting of the Euro 2012 football championship remaining TV channels like TVi and independent outlets
finals was marred by controversies over the privileged role like the paper and popular web site Left Bank, as well as
of shadowy contractor companies linked to the “family” like sites modelled on Alexey Navalny’s campaigns in Russia like
Altcom. Rake-offs and over-payments cost the Ukrainian parklikeidiot.com.ua and nashigroshi.org (“Our Money”),
taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. In August 2012, which looks at corruption in public contracts, may well be
Yanukovych signed a law cancelling the obligation of state resumed.
companies to hold tenders for the purchase of goods and
services when they use their own funds. Yuliya Mostova, Meanwhile Ukraine’s relatively free NGO sector looks
the editor of Ukraine’s main independent paper Mirror like an increasing anomaly. The number of registered
of the Week, argues that Yanukovych’s goal is simple. “He NGOs has actually grown in recent years. Ukraine has not
wants to be the richest man in Eastern Europe”, she says. yet followed Russia by forcing out “foreign” NGOs and
“Yanukovych is the first president of Ukraine who needs a substituting them with Kremlin-friendly “government-
controlling share not only of all power in the country but of organised NGOs” or GONGOs (Russia’s own measures
all its business too.”6 were ironically a reaction to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution
in 2004). But the Ukrainian authorities are now setting up
The power of the “family” is likely to grow further after the “clone” NGOs such as For Fair Elections, which predictably
elections as Serhiy Arbuzov, the current head of the central gave the October elections a clean bill of health.9 Ironically
bank and “curator” of the many “family” businesses, moves to and sadly for the country that staged famous mass protests
become first deputy prime minister or even prime minister. against the last rigged elections in 2004, the organisation of
Because the interests of the “family” are currently all within crowds and demonstrations is now a professional business
Ukraine, its members are immune to the argument that – demonstrators, often students, are paid to turn up.10
Ukraine needs the agreements with the EU. However, other Precisely because many NGOs played a key role in election
oligarchs who trade or invest abroad are deeply worried monitoring, a “final front” against them
about the threat to their business interests. could be opened after the elections.
7 Serhiy Kudelya, “Politics and Democracy in Ukraine”, in Taras Kuzio and Daniel
Hamilton (eds.), Open Ukraine: Changing Course Towards a European Future
(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), pp. 1-20 and pp. 10-11.
8 Author interview, 19 September 2012.
9 “The observers from For Fair Elections saw no serious violations and talk about the
4 See the analysis of his expanding empire by Sevgil Musaeva, “How the Business of the
‘new developments’ in the upcoming elections in Ukraine”, Komsomolskaya Pravda in
President’s Elder Son Works”, Forbes Ukraine, 3 September 2012, at http://forbes.ua/
Ukraine, 25 October 2012, available at http://kp.ua/daily/251012/362845/
magazine/forbes/1336398-kak-rabotaet-biznes-starshego-syna-prezidenta
10 Yegor Vasylyev, “The Funny Business of Ukrainian Political Rallies”, Transitions
5 Author interview, 8 November 2011.
Online , 9 February 2012, available at www.tol.org/client/article/22988-the-funny-
6 Author interview with Yuliya Mostova, 8 November 2011; Yuliia Mostova, “Semostiinyi
business-of-ukrainian-political-rallies.html; Richard Boudreaux, “Bucks Populi: Making
Yanukovych”, Dzerkalo tyzhnia , 1 June 2012, available at http://dt.ua/POLITICS/
Democracy a Going Concern in Kiev”, The Wall Street Journal , 5 February 2010.
semostiyniy_yanukovich-103152.html. 3

4. On the other hand, the opposition has a strong defensive areas, particularly on the Tymoshenko case: some EU leaders
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS
position in the new parliament and there are signs of have asked for her release; others have complained at new
dissatisfaction and division within the ruling elite. The EU charges being laid against her; and others have criticised
should support political and economic pluralism wherever the conditions in which she is held. The EU therefore needs
it can. to agree a standard that is both substantive and actionable:
asking the Ukrainian authorities to comply fully with any
ruling of the European Court on Human Rights is one
The customs union bluff possibility. On elections, the final OSCE-ODIHR report
should be as rounded as possible, looking at “political
Even before the AA and the DCFTA were frozen in December technology” as well as simple fraud, but also noting areas in
2011, the EU was not good at explaining the benefit of them to which the authorities’ will or schemes did not prevail. The
Ukrainians. Since the agreements were frozen, the Ukrainian EU should press for “reform” in areas that enable progress
media has been increasingly stressing their downside – on other fronts, such as dropping the provisions in the anti-
which is not insignificant, given the cost of implementing discrimination legislation that are incompatible with visa
such a large proportion of the acquis communautaire,11 This liberalisation.
argument has particular traction with hard-pressed SMEs,
which are suffering as the Ukrainian economy seems to be The second step should be provisional application of the
going into another recession. Ukraine’s SME sector was agreements with the EU. If necessary, the AA could be
already too small for an economy of its size, but has actually split to allow the DCFTA and sectoral parts to be enacted
shrunk in recent years to less than 20 percent of GDP. on their own without the “political” and justice sections.
Banks have virtually stopped lending to SMEs, particularly Alternatively, the agreements could remain in deep freeze,
because they have been renationalised since 2008 – the but the EU could continue with sectoral integration on the
share of banking assets owned by Western banks has fallen basis of parallel sectoral agreements. Defining a dividing
from a peak of 42 percent in early 2009 to 25 percent in the line between what is EU competence (most of the DCFTA)
first half of 2012.12 The new owners favour lending to big and what is member-state competence will be difficult but
oligarchs – which often means themselves. not impossible.
The Ukrainian authorities intend to use the elections to There was always a strong case both for the agreements,
restore their legitimacy in the West. If it is not forthcoming, which will help transform Ukrainian society in the long
they will blackmail the West by threatening to join the run, and for red lines. But it makes little sense to block the
Russia-led customs union. But this is a bluff. In fact, only a agreements to punish Ukraine. Rather, the EU should take a
handful of oligarchs, mainly the so-called gas lobby, would tougher line in other areas in order to allow the agreements
see gains in such a union. Ironically, it is the hard-pressed to be revived. The advocates of a tougher approach will
SME sector, rather than the oligarchs, that may be tempted hopefully feel happier about the agreements going forward
by the idea of a customs union with Russia. Even more if they can see that action is being taken elsewhere. The
ironically, the “family” would not gain at all if Ukraine were resolution on Ukraine passed by the US Senate in September
more open to Russian capital. is the beginning of a trend towards the construction of
a Ukrainian equivalent of the “Magnitsky List”. 13 The
European Commission is investigating Gazprom. The EU
Policy recommendations should start with a visa ban on Renat Kuzmin, the deputy
prosecutor responsible for the trials of Tymoshenko and
The current impasse means that doing nothing will simply former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko.
allow these worrisome trends to get worse. The mooted
solution of signing the agreements if the elections are deemed The EU should also audit the activities of suspect “family”
“not too bad” is just as dangerous. It would completely companies in Austria, Cyprus and Luxembourg (and in
undermine conditionality, which was originally applied over Liechtenstein and Switzerland), which break existing EU law.
www.ecfr.eu
selective prosecutions, and deepen the regime’s current This need not be formal “sanctions”; it can be undertaken
sense of impunity. Creative thinking is therefore needed by national financial security agencies. The US is currently
in order to get round the impasse and move relations onto taking a tougher line, but most of the Ukrainian elite’s
another page. The Tymoshenko case is only one of many financial malfeasance is within the EU and dependencies
problems. Her release should be an ultimate goal but not like the British Virgin Islands. For example, the Activ Solar
November 2012
the only immediate goal. company, which is based in Vienna, allegedly acts as a front
for government circles that are siphoning off budget money
The first step is to better define conditionality in the three and circulating it back home tax free.14 In this sense, the lack
key areas of selective prosecutions, the conduct of elections of Western interest would be fatal for Ukraine.
and “reform”. There are too many EU voices in all three
ECFR/65
11 See Rafał Sadowski, “The Prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement”, Centre 13 The text can be found at http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index.
for Eastern Studies, 18 October 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=26d65aab-4ed1-4173-8f61-c05809c5b0ac.
commentary/2012-10-18/prospects-euukraine-free-trade-agreement 14 See the article by Serhiy Leshchenko “Tax Haven of Yanukovych and Kluyev”, 22
12 Yevhen Hrebenyuk, “Foreign Banks Flee Ukraine”, Ukrainian Week , 23 October January 2012, translated at http://eastbook.eu/en/2012/01/material-en/news-en/
4 2012, http://ukrainianweek.com/Economics/63007. serhyi-leshchenko-tax-haven-of-yanukovych-and-kluyev/

5. The third step should be to press ahead with parallel
measures. The authorities’ propaganda relies heavily on the
argument that the EU cares only about Tymoshenko and
not about ordinary Ukrainians. Visa liberalisation should
therefore be a part of any scenario. Ratification by the
European Parliament of the new amended Visa Facilitation
Agreement signed in July has also been blocked because of
the Tymoshenko affair, but should now move forward. Now
that Ukraine has introduced biometric passports it should
be within sight of the second, post-legislative stage of its
Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Wider travel will liberalise
Ukraine in the long run. So would easier internal travel, if
budget airlines could be attracted to Ukraine as a result of
an Open Skies Agreement.
Changes to the Erasmus education exchange programme
will also benefit Ukraine, but the EU needs to be wary of
encouraging a “brain drain” from Ukraine and should instead
encourage a two-way process with schemes to encourage
visiting students and experts from the West.
The EU should also be much more proactive about advertising
the economic and social benefits of the agreements. It should
develop a positive communication strategy, involving local
NGOs, to sell the agreements to local stakeholders.
The EU should also support the emergence of new
independent actors in Ukraine. Western loans and
investments, for example, help protect business against
raidertsvo. The EU should help revive lending schemes
for SMEs, which are not working as they might – from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the World Bank.
Finally, the EU should open other channels to circumvent
the current dialogue of the deaf. The European Parliament’s
Kwasniewski/Cox mission to monitor selective prosecutions,
which is currently suspended for the duration of the
elections, can be replicated and expanded. The EU should
give a voice to business circles that are worried by the rise
of the “family”.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s leaders behave like they have immunity and
impunity, as if Ukraine were a vital raw material supplier
or possessed of other geopolitical importance. In reality,
they only have power in isolation. The EU should not fear
continuing to apply tough standards to Ukraine. But the EU
needs leverage and should also work harder to show it is on
the side of Ukraine’s beleaguered democratic, liberal and
economically constructive forces. Once Ukraine develops
proper relations with Europe appropriate to its size, location
and economic potential, the EU’s leverage will be much
higher. It’s time to show Ukraine some tough love.
5

6. About the author Acknowledgements
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS
Andrew Wilson is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European The author would like to acknowledge the help of Jana
Council on Foreign Relations and a reader in Ukrainian Kobzova for her useful advice and Hans Kundnani for
Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies his excellent and speedy editing, as well as the following
(SSEES) at University College London. He has previously interviewees in Ukraine: Olexiy Haran, Rostyslav Pavlenko,
held academic positions at the London School of Economics Taras Berezovets, Yuliya Mostova, Alyona Getmanchuk,
and Cambridge. His most recent books are Belarus: The Mykhailo Honchar, Oleksandr Lytvynenko and members of
Last European Dictatorship (2011) and The Ukrainians: the EU delegation in Kiev.
Unexpected Nations (third edition, 2009). His publications
for ECFR include Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict
(2011) and Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the
Eastern Neighbourhood (with Nicu Popescu).
www.ecfr.eu
November 2012
ECFR/65
6

7. Among members of the European
Council on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dogan Boyner
˘ Heidi Hautala (Finland)
Former European Commission (Turkey) Minister for International Development
former prime ministers, presidents, Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Chair, Dog Gazetecilik and Dog
˘an ˘an
European commissioners, current Minister (Taoiseach) On-line Sasha Havlicek (United
and former parliamentarians and Kingdom)
ministers, public intellectuals, Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) Executive Director, Institute for Strategic
business leaders, activists and Writer and academic Member of the European Parliament Dialogue (ISD)
cultural figures from the EU member Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) Connie Hedegaard (Denmark)
states and candidate countries. Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister
Danube and Central Europe Commissionr for Climate Change
Hans Eichel (Germany)
Asger Aamund (Denmark) Former Finance Minister Steven Heinz (Austria)
President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman,
and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Member of the European Parliament; Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Lansdowne Partners Ltd
Former Executive Chairman, United
Urban Ahlin (Sweden) former President of the European Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Annette Heuser (Germany)
Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Parliament; former Prime Minister former OSCE High Commissioner on Executive Director, Bertelsmann
Affairs Committee and foreign Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) National Minorities; former Chairman Foundation Washington DC
policy spokesperson for the Social Minister for International Development Stockholm International Peace
Democratic Party Cooperation Research Institute, SIPRI Diego Hidalgo (Spain)
Co-founder of Spanish newspaper
Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) El País; President, FRIDE
Chairman of the Board, Crisis Chairman, Baltic Development Forum;
Management Initiative; former (Switzerland) former Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (The
President Former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Netherlands)
Giuliano Amato (Italy) Adviser to the Vice President of the Former NATO Secretary General
Former Prime Minister and vice Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) European Commission and EU High
President of the European Convention; Director of Melak Investments/ Danuta Hübner (Poland)
Representative for Foreign and Security Member of the European Parliament;
Chairman, Centre for American Journalist Policy
Studies; Chairman, Enciclopedia former European Commissioner
Treccani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Tanja Fajon (Slovenia)
Former Minister of Defence Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden)
Member of the European Parliament Member of the European Parliament
Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Charles Clarke (United
Member of Parliament Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland)
Kingdom) President, Chamber of Deputies; Former Ambassador and former
Viveca Ax:son Jonhson Visiting Professor of Politics, University former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Crisis Management
(Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary
Joschka Fischer (Germany) Initiative
Chairman of Nordstjernan AB
Nicola Clase (Sweden) Former Foreign Minister and vice- Toomas Ilves (Estonia)
Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Chancellor President
Former Prime Minister former State Secretary
Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)
Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Chairman, Munich Security
Member of Parliament; former Foreign Member of the European Parliament
Lykke Friis (Denmark) Conference; Global Head of
Minister Government Affairs Allianz SE
Robert Cooper (United Member of Parliament; former Minister
Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Kingdom) for Climate, Energy and Gender Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US)
Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Counsellor of the European External Equality International Advocacy Director, Open
School of Economics; former Deputy Action Service Society Foundation
Prime Minister Jaime Gama (Portugal)
Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Former Speaker of the Parliament; Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)
Lluís Bassets (Spain) Chairman of the Supervisory Board of former Foreign Minister Professor, London School of Economics
Deputy Director, El País the ThyssenKrupp
Timothy Garton Ash Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey)
Marek Belka (Poland) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) (United Kingdom) Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister
Governor, National Bank of Poland; Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Professor of European Studies, of Turkey on foreign policy and public
former Prime Minister Oxford University diplomacy
Daniel Daianu (Romania)
Roland Berger (Germany) Professor of Economics, National Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Sylvie Kauffmann (France)
Founder and Honorary Chairman, School of Political and Administrative Chairman of the Portuguese Institute Editorial Director, Le Monde
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Studies (SNSPA); former Finance of International Relations (IPRI)
GmbH Minister Olli Kivinen (Finland)
Teresa Patricio Gouveia Writer and columnist
Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Massimo D’Alema (Italy) (Portugal)
Chief Economist, European Bank for President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Ben Knapen (The Netherlands)
Reconstruction and Development President, Foundation for European Gulbenkian Foundation; former Minister for European Affairs and
Progressive Studies; former Prime Foreign Minister International Cooperation
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Minister and Foreign Minister
Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Heather Grabbe (United Gerald Knaus (Austria)
Council; former Prime Minister Marta Dassù (Italy) Chairman of the European Stability
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Kingdom) Initiative and Carr Center Fellow
Carl Bildt (Sweden) Affairs Executive Director, Open Society
Foreign Minister Institute – Brussels Caio Koch-Weser (Germany)
Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group;
Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister Charles Grant (United Kingdom) former State Secretary
President, Polish Confederation of Director, Centre for European Reform
Private Employers – Lewiatan Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Bassma Kodmani (France)
Poet and Cultural Critic Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Executive Director of the Arab Reform
Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the Initiative
Founder, Communitas Foundation and Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) United Nations and the League of
President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Member of the European Parliament; Arab States on Syria Rem Koolhaas (The
Ltd. former Prime Minister Netherlands)
Elisabeth Guigou (France)
Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Architect and urbanist; Professor at the
Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) Member of Parliament and President
Graduate School of Design, Harvard
CFO & Deputy CEO, Vaffenfall AB Director, Confederation of Italian of the Foreign Affairs Committee
University
Industry (Confindustria) - Brussels
Emma Bonino (Italy) office; former Member of the European David Koranyi (Hungary)
Vice President of the Senate; former EU Parliament Fernando Andresen Guimarães
Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia
Commissioner (Portugal) Center of the Atlantic Council of the
Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Head of the US and Canada Division,
Stine Bosse (Denmark) Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German United States
Chairman and Non-Executive Board European External Action Service
Marshall Fund of the United States Bernard Kouchner (France)
Member (Bratislava) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (Germany) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria)
Han ten Broeke Vice-President and Director of Global Former Defence Minister Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal
(The Netherlands) Economy and Development
István Gyarmati (Hungary) Strategies
Member of Parliament and President and CEO, International
spokesperson for foreign affairs Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Aleksander Kwasniewski
´
President, DEMOS Hungary Centre for Democratic Transition
and defence (Poland)
Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Former President
Former Chairman, Defence
Commission; former Defence Minister Mart Laar (Estonia)
Minister of Defence; former Prime 7

8. Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Marietje Schaake Stelios Zavvos (Greece)
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS
Former Foreign Minister (The Netherlands) CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd
Miroslav Lajc (Slovakia)
ˇák
Member of the European Parliament
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia)
Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Klaus Scharioth (Germany) EU Representative to Kosovo; Former
Relations; former Europe Director, Dean of the Mercator Fellowship foreign Minister
Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Amnesty International on International Affairs; former
(Germany) Ambassador of the Federal Republic of
Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje (The Germany to the US
Netherlands)
Pascal Lamy (France) Senior Adviser, The Elders Pierre Schori (Sweden)
Honorary President, Notre Europe and Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund;
Director-General of WTO; former EU Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) former Director General, FRIDE; former
Commissioner Member of the Board, Fomento de SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire
Construcciones y Contratas; former EU
Bruno Le Maire (France) Commissioner Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria)
Member of Parliament; Former Minister Member of Parliament; former
for Food, Agriculture & Fishing Monica Oriol (Spain) Chancellor
Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) CEO, Seguriber
Karel Schwarzenberg
Director, European Council on Foreign Cem Özdemir (Germany)
Relations Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green (Czech Republic)
Party) Foreign Minister
Jean-David Levitte (France)
Ana Palacio (Spain) Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy)
Former Sherpa to the President of the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Executive Vice President, Head of Public
French Republic; former Ambassador to President and General Counsel of the Affairs, UniCredit Spa
the United States World Bank Group Narcís Serra (Spain)
Sonia Licht (Serbia) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice
President, Belgrade Fund for Political Chairman, People in Need Foundation President of the Spanish Government
Excellence
Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Radosław Sikorski (Poland)
Juan Fernando López Aguilar Foreign Minister
Chancellor of Oxford University and co-
(Spain) chair of the International Crisis Group;
former EU Commissioner Aleksander Smolar (Poland)
Member of the European Parliament; Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory
former Minister of Justice Foundation
Diana Pinto (France)
Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Historian and author Javier Solana (Spain)
CEO, Menemsha Ltd Former EU High Representative for the
Jean Pisani-Ferry (France)
Monica Macovei (Romania) Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Common Foreign and Security Policy &
Member ot the European Parliament Paris-Dauphine Secretary-General of the Council of the
EU; former Secretary General of NATO
Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Ruprecht Polenz (Germany)
CEO of Marcegaglia S.p.A; former Member of Parliament; Chairman of the George Soros (Hungary/USA)
President, Confindustria Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Founder and Chairman, Open Society
Foundations
Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Teresa de Sousa (Portugal)
Senior Adviser, World Bank Member of Parliament; former Foreign
Minister Journalist
Inigo Mendez de Vigo (Spain) Charles Powell Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia)
Secretary of State for the European Playwright and Academic
(Spain/United Kingdom)
Union Director, Real Instituto Elcano Rory Stewart (United Kingdom)
Member of Parliament
David Miliband (United Andrew Puddephatt
Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Alexander Stubb (Finland)
Director, Global Partners & Associated Minister for Foreign Trade and
Member of Parliament; Former European Affairs; former Foreign
Secretary of State for Foreign and Ltd.
Minister
Commonwealth Affairs Vesna Pusic (Croatia)
´
Alain Minc (France) Foreign Minister Michael Stürmer (Germany)
Chief Correspondent, Die Welt
President of AM Conseil; former Robert Reibestein
chairman, Le Monde Ion Sturza (Romania)
(The Netherlands)
Director, McKinsey & Company President, GreenLight Invest; former
Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) Prime Minister of the Republic of
Foreign Minister; former Defence
Minister; former Member of the George Robertson Moldova
European Parliament (United Kingdom) ´
Paweł Swieboda (Poland)
Former Secretary General of NATO President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for
Dominique Moïsi (France) European Strategy
Senior Adviser, IFRI Albert Rohan (Austria)
Former Secretary General for Foreign Teija Tiilikainen (Finland)
Pierre Moscovici (France) Affairs Director, Finnish Institute for
Finance Minister; former Minister for International Relations
European Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland)
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Luisa Todini (Italy)
Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group
Council of Europe Commissioner for on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A
www.ecfr.eu
Human Rights Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative
Hildegard Müller (Germany) Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece)
Norbert Röttgen (Germany) Professor, University of Athens and
Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Minister for the Environment,
der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft President, ELIAMEP
Conservation and Nuclear Safety
Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Erkki Tuomioja (Finland)
Olivier Roy (France) Foreign Minister
President, Eurointelligence ASBL Professor, European University Institute,
Florence Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria)
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania)
November 2012
Former Deputy PM and Minister of
Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Education
School of Governance CEO, Proventus
Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia)
Kalypso Nicolaïdis Pasquale Salzano (Italy) Former President
Vice President, International Institutional
(Greece/France) Affairs, ENI Antonio Vitorino (Portugal)
Professor of International Relations,
Lawyer; former EU Commissioner
University of Oxford Stefano Sannino (Italy)
Director General for Enlargement, Andre Wilkens (Germany)
Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) European Commission
ECFR/65
Director-General, Institute of Director Mercator Centre Berlin and
Director Strategy, Mercator Haus
International and European Affairs Javier Santiso (Spain)
Director, Office of the CEO of Telefonica Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain)
Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Former Ambassador to Brazil
Editorialist Europe
8

9. Also available Supporting Moldova’s Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: European Foreign Policy
from ECFR Democratic Transition a Bolder EU Approach Scorecard 2012, February 2012
Nicu Popescu, October 2009 Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski (ECFR/48)
New World Order: The Balance (ECFR/17) and Nick Witney, May 2011
of Soft Power and the Rise of (ECFR/32) The long shadow of
Herbivorous Powers Can the EU rebuild failing Ordoliberalism: Germany’s
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, states? A review of Europe’s A Chance to Reform: How the Approach to the Euro crisis
October 2007 (ECFR/01) Civilian Capacities EU can support Democratic Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike
Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Evolution in Morocco Guérot, February 2012 (ECFR/49)
A Power Audit of EU-Russia October 2009 (ECFR/18) Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu
Relations and José Ignacio Torreblanca, The end of the Putin consensus
Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Towards a Post-American May 2011 (ECFR/33) Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson,
November 2007 (ECFR/02) Europe: A Power Audit of March 2012 (ECFR/50)
EU-US Relations China’s Janus-faced Response
Poland’s second return to Europe? Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, to the Arab Revolutions Syria: Towards a Political
Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 October 2009 (ECFR/19) Jonas Parello-Plesner and Solution
(ECFR/03) Raffaello Pantucci, June 2011 Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012
Dealing with Yanukovych’s (ECFR/34) (ECFR/51)
Afghanistan: Europe’s Ukraine
forgotten war Andrew Wilson, March 2010 What does Turkey think? How the EU can support
Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/20) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June reform in Burma
(ECFR/04) 2011 (ECFR/35) Jonas Parello-Plesner, March
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Meeting Medvedev: The Politics The Way Forward for What does Germany think
of the Putin Succession EU Balkan Policy about Europe? China at the crossroads
Andrew Wilson, February 2008 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus Edited by Ulrike Guérot and François Godement, April 2012
(ECFR/05) and Daniel Korski, May 2010 Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 (ECFR/53)
(ECFR/21) (ECFR/36)
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and Defence Policy A Global China Policy The Scramble for Europe before it’s too late
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(ECFR/22) Parello-Plesner with Alice (ECFR/54)
Can the EU win the Peace in Richard, July 2011 (ECFR/37)
Georgia? Towards an EU Human Rights China and Germany: Why the
Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Strategy for a Post-Western Palestinian Statehood at the emerging special relationship
Andrew Wilson, August 2008 World UN: Why Europeans Should matters for Europe
(ECFR/07) Susi Dennison and Anthony Vote “Yes” Hans Kundnani and Jonas
Dworkin, September 2010 Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, Parello-Plesner, May 2012
A Global Force for Human (ECFR/23) September 2011 (ECFR/38) (ECFR/55)
Rights? An Audit of European
Power at the UN The EU and Human Rights The EU and Human Rights at After Merkozy: How France
Richard Gowan and Franziska at the UN: 2010 Review the UN: 2011 Review and Germany can make
Brantner, September 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska Richard Gowan and Franziska Europe work
(ECFR/08) Brantner, September 2010 Brantner, September 2011 Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau,
(ECFR/24) (ECFR/39) May 2012 (ECFR/56)
Beyond Dependence: How to
deal with Russian Gas The Spectre of a Multipolar How to Stop the The EU and Azerbaijan:
Pierre Noel, November 2008 Europe Demilitarisation of Europe Beyond Oil
(ECFR/09) Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard Nick Witney, November 2011 Jana Kobzova, May 2012
with Dimitar Bechev, Jana (ECFR/40) (ECFR/57)
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Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and October 2010 (ECFR/25) Europe and the Arab A Europe of Incentives: How to
Mark Leonard, December 2008 Revolutions: A New Vision for regain the trust of citizens and
(ECFR/10) Beyond Maastricht: a New Democracy and Human Rights markets
Deal for the Eurozone Susi Dennison and Anthony Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka,
Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Thomas Klau and François Dworkin, November 2011 June 2012 (ECFR/58)
Daniel Korski, March 2009 Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/41)
(ECFR/11) (ECFR/26) The Case for Co-operation in
Spain after the Elections: the Crisis Management
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Relations the Election José Ignacio Torreblanca and (ECFR/59)
John Fox and Francois Godement, Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Mark Leonard, November 2011
April 2009 (ECFR/12) and Andrew Wilson, January (ECFR/42) The Periphery of the Periphery:
2011 (ECFR/27) The Western Balkans and the
Beyond the “War on Terror”: Four Scenarios for the Euro Crisis
Towards a New Transatlantic After the Revolution: Europe Reinvention of Europe Dimitar Bechev, August 2012
Framework for Counterterrorism and the Transition in Tunisia Mark Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/60)
Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/43)
(ECFR/13) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, Lebanon: Containing Spillover
March 2011 (ECFR/28) Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia from Syria
The Limits of Enlargement-lite: Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Julien Barnes-Dacey, September
European and Russian Power in European Foreign Policy Nicu Popescu, November 2011 2012 (ECFR/61)
the Troubled Neighbourhood Scorecard 2010 (ECFR/44)
Nicu Popescu and Andrew March 2011 (ECFR/29) A Power Audit of EU-North
Wilson, June 2009 (ECFR/14) Rescuing the euro: what is Africa Relations
The New German Question: China’s price? Nick Witney and Anthony
The EU and human rights at the How Europe can get the François Godement, November Dworkin, September 2012
UN: 2009 annual review Germany it needs 2011 (ECFR/45) (ECFR/62)
Richard Gowan and Franziska Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard,
Brantner, September 2009 April 2011 (ECFR/30) A “Reset” with Algeria: The Transnistria: A bottom-up
(ECFR/15) Russia to the EU’s South Solution
Turning Presence into Power: Hakim Darbouche and Susi Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra,
What does Russia think? Lessons from the Eastern Dennison, December 2011 September 2012 (ECFR/63)
edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Neighbourhood (ECFR/46)
Leonard and Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Andrew Why the Euro Crisis threatens
September 2009 (ECFR/16) Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31) Ukraine after the Tymoshenko the European Single Market
verdict Andrew Wilson, Sebastian Dullien, October 2012
December 2011 (ECFR/47) (ECFR/64)
9

10. ABOUT ECFR
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