1) Politburo 2.0 functions as an informal network of Putin's inner circle who distribute sectors of management without formal meetings.
2) Key members remain decision makers in government through staff turnover, preserving stable elite groups' governance.
3) Putin personally controls energy, foreign policy, defense, and law enforcement, while others oversee domestic politics, social policy, finance, and infrastructure.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The document analyzes trends in media coverage of socio-political events in Ukraine from 2014 to 2017 based on monitoring by NGO Detector Media. It finds that for many years, the political views expressed by private Ukrainian TV channels have been defined by the interests of their oligarchic owners rather than objective journalism. Following Ukraine's 2014 revolution, some channels began transforming into public broadcasters, but oligarchic media groups still dominate the landscape. The monitoring found violations of journalism standards increased in news coverage, especially invited commentary that censored opposing views. Overall the analysis shows oligarchic influence and lack of strong public media have hampered quality coverage of political issues important to Ukrainian society.
This document analyzes the socio-economic impact of public spending in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It discusses how public spending is intended to guarantee economic and social stability, but the country's socio-economic situation has deteriorated with high unemployment, lack of infrastructure, and other issues. The document hypothesizes that public spending has had a negative impact in the DRC and explores possible strategies to make the impact positive. It outlines the methodology used, which includes legal and sociological methods as well as documentary research and questionnaires.
1) The document discusses Ukraine's considerations around further integrating with the European Union. Integrating more deeply would require cutting ties with Russia, damaging Ukraine's largest trading relationship.
2) The EU has been supportive of Ukraine through political and economic agreements. However, adopting the Euro currency could be problematic given the ongoing Eurozone crisis.
3) Full integration will be a long, difficult process that could upset both Russian and Ukrainian interests. Ukraine needs to weigh the economic costs of reducing Russian ties against the potential benefits of EU integration.
Presidential elections-2015 will direct all political processes in Ukraine for next 2 years. As Ukraine moves toward presidential elections in 2015, the media is still a long way from providing good quality objective, balanced and varied information to help voters make an informed choice.
The Russia-China partnership has developed over the past 20 years based on several factors:
1) They have a long historical relationship with few conflicts compared to Russia's relationships with other countries.
2) They have parallel experiences with imperial decline in the 19th century and revolutions in the early 20th century.
3) Currently, they share geopolitical interests in opposing US unilateralism and hegemony.
4) Economic cooperation has increased but remains asymmetrical, with Russia exporting energy and arms and China exporting manufactured goods.
5) Ideologically, they both favor state-capitalist models and defense of sovereignty over Western democracy promotion.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The document analyzes trends in media coverage of socio-political events in Ukraine from 2014 to 2017 based on monitoring by NGO Detector Media. It finds that for many years, the political views expressed by private Ukrainian TV channels have been defined by the interests of their oligarchic owners rather than objective journalism. Following Ukraine's 2014 revolution, some channels began transforming into public broadcasters, but oligarchic media groups still dominate the landscape. The monitoring found violations of journalism standards increased in news coverage, especially invited commentary that censored opposing views. Overall the analysis shows oligarchic influence and lack of strong public media have hampered quality coverage of political issues important to Ukrainian society.
This document analyzes the socio-economic impact of public spending in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It discusses how public spending is intended to guarantee economic and social stability, but the country's socio-economic situation has deteriorated with high unemployment, lack of infrastructure, and other issues. The document hypothesizes that public spending has had a negative impact in the DRC and explores possible strategies to make the impact positive. It outlines the methodology used, which includes legal and sociological methods as well as documentary research and questionnaires.
1) The document discusses Ukraine's considerations around further integrating with the European Union. Integrating more deeply would require cutting ties with Russia, damaging Ukraine's largest trading relationship.
2) The EU has been supportive of Ukraine through political and economic agreements. However, adopting the Euro currency could be problematic given the ongoing Eurozone crisis.
3) Full integration will be a long, difficult process that could upset both Russian and Ukrainian interests. Ukraine needs to weigh the economic costs of reducing Russian ties against the potential benefits of EU integration.
Presidential elections-2015 will direct all political processes in Ukraine for next 2 years. As Ukraine moves toward presidential elections in 2015, the media is still a long way from providing good quality objective, balanced and varied information to help voters make an informed choice.
The Russia-China partnership has developed over the past 20 years based on several factors:
1) They have a long historical relationship with few conflicts compared to Russia's relationships with other countries.
2) They have parallel experiences with imperial decline in the 19th century and revolutions in the early 20th century.
3) Currently, they share geopolitical interests in opposing US unilateralism and hegemony.
4) Economic cooperation has increased but remains asymmetrical, with Russia exporting energy and arms and China exporting manufactured goods.
5) Ideologically, they both favor state-capitalist models and defense of sovereignty over Western democracy promotion.
Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin and Putin. Comparative analysisValeriia Didkovska
Domestic Regime, its interests and External Actions.
State vs. Oligarchs, shifts in FP from Yeltsin's to Putin's era, regime type in modern Russia, corporatist-kleptocratic influence on FP
The full-scale financial crisis in Russia erupted in August 1998 made a blow to the President Lukashenko domestic and foreign policy. However, a year-by-year worsening of the domestic economy due to maintaining a system of command economy led to a crisis in Belarus already in the first quarter of 1998. The crisis in Russian spilling over through trade channel only additionally aggravated economic situation in Belarus. The paper briefly characterizes the economic system in Belarus prior to the first quarter of 1998 and then analyzes consequences of the Russian financial crisis on the Belarussian economy.
Authored by: Rafal Antczak, Stanislav Bogdankiewich, Pavel Daneiko, Krzysztof Polomski, Vladymir Usowski
Published in 2000
The document discusses the evolving partnership between Russia and China over the past few decades. It notes that relations have strengthened significantly since the 1990s, with the two countries establishing a strategic partnership in 1996. Key aspects of their cooperation examined include growing military exercises and arms sales between the two militaries, increasing trade volumes but a need for trade to be more balanced, cooperation on energy issues including Russian energy exports to China, and alignment on opposing US unilateralism and supporting multilateralism geopolitically. The relationship demonstrates close political, economic and military ties that are expected to deepen further.
View the most recent commentary from The PRS Group on international macro risk.
This month’s reporting in the Americas includes a new report on Cuba, where the implementation of market-based reforms aimed at shoring up the economic foundation ahead of a planned generational transfer of power within the governing PCC has yet to generate a substantial increase...
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and several Vice Prime Ministers and Ministers provide a report on the work of the Ukrainian government over the past 100 days. They summarize key reforms and policies that have been implemented in areas such as decentralization, deregulation, fighting corruption, and economic stabilization. The officials express their commitment to continuing reforms to improve Ukraine's future and pull the country out of crisis, despite current challenges.
View the most recent commentary from The PRS Group on international macro risk.
Our monthly coverage of the Americas includes a post-election update on Brazil, where President Dilma Rousseff only narrowly secured a second term at a run-off held in late October, and both her party, the PT, and its main ally
EuroPACE is an innovative financial mechanism inspired by an American building improvement initiative called Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE). The innovative character of the EuroPACE mechanism is that financing through EuroPACE is linked to the taxes paid on a property. In other words, the financing lent by a private investor is repaid through property taxes and other charges related to the buildings. EuroPACE is therefore in line with the EC’s objectives of (1) putting EE first, (2) contributing to the EU’s global leadership, and (3) empowering consumers to enable MS to reach their energy and climate targets for 2030. Last but not least, EuroPACE could contribute to the democratisation of the energy supply by offering cash-flow positive, decentralised EE solutions.
The EuroPACE mechanism engages several stakeholders in the process: local government, investors, equipment installers, and homeowners. To establish the EuroPACE programme, several conditions must be satisfied, each of which are relevant for different stakeholder at different stages of the implementation. For the purpose of this report, we divided these criteria into two categories: key criteria, which make the implementation possible, and complementary criteria, which make the implementation easier. For the time being, it is a pure hypothesis to be tested with potential EuroPACE implementation.
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew WilsonEuropean Choice
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
“political technology” and a change in the voting system
that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
authorities were confident they would win.
The document summarizes the activities of the Centre UA organization in 2014. It discusses how Centre UA helped coordinate the Reanimation Package of Reforms initiative, which brought together over 300 experts and activists to develop reforms for Ukraine. Centre UA also advocated for these reforms, organized events to promote them, and maintained communication channels. The document outlines how Centre UA worked to increase transparency and accountability of government bodies through initiatives like CHESNO during the elections.
Strategy Position Paper of the Ukrainian Association for the Club of RomeViktor Halasiuk, PhD
The document outlines Ukraine's development challenges and proposes a strategy. It notes that while Ukraine has significant human and natural resources, its Soviet-era economy is inefficient and the environment neglected. Over 25 years, Ukraine's GDP contracted 35% amid deindustrialization, corruption and oligarchy. The strategy proposes adapting the EU's eco-social market model to spur sustainable and equitable growth through increased investment, exports, employment and purchasing power while reducing corruption, environmental depletion and human capital loss.
Towards authoritarianism. Internal situation in the Slovak Republic (1994–1998)Przegląd Politologiczny
This article discusses the internal situation of the Slovak Republic in the years 1994–1998,
the period in which the country was governed by the coalition of Movement for Democratic Slovakia,
the Slovak National Party and the Slovak Workers’ Association, and the prime minister was Vladimír
Mečiar. The main objective of the research was to analyse the actions undertaken by the coalition government in the context of violations of civil and political rights and freedoms, which could indicate an
authoritarian way of exercising power and the dismantling of a democratic state of law. In the analysed
period, the role of the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition was marginalised, the role of the
media limited, the rights of national and ethnic minorities violated. There was also an ongoing, sharp
conflict between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and President Michál Kováč. The effect of this governance was the union of almost all political forces and seizure of power after the elections in 1998. In
order to answer the research questions, the author used the method of institutional and legal analysis,
decision analysis and the statistical method. The research confirmed the hypothesis that, against the
background of other Visegrad Group countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, in the case of
Slovakia there were many instances of human rights violations in the period analysed. This led to the
drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with many countries and the slowdown of Slovakia’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.
This three sentence summary provides the high level overview of the economic development policy paper:
The document outlines the major economic challenges facing Ukraine, including low purchasing power, high unemployment, lack of investment, declining exports and industrial production, and an excessive shadow economy. It then proposes solutions to address these issues through bold institutional reforms to fight corruption, financial stabilization measures, and actions to achieve energy independence such as introducing transparent natural gas pricing and increasing domestic production. The goal is to unlock Ukraine's economic potential by overcoming these systemic problems through targeted policy changes.
Russia operates as a federal presidential republic with a multi-party system. Power is concentrated in the presidency, currently held by Vladimir Putin. The constitution established a three-branch government with a bicameral legislature. However, Putin has consolidated power by weakening regional authority and limiting political opposition. The economy remains heavily dependent on energy exports and oligarchic control of industries, though Putin has curbed some oligarchic power.
The document provides an overview of the major areas of activity and projects carried out by the Organization in 2015, which included increasing transparency and accountability of public authorities, promoting civic engagement, developing freedom of speech and access to information, and ensuring sustainable institutional development. Key projects discussed include the CHESNO civic movement, Strong Communities of Donetsk Region, Freedom of Speech and Access to Public Information, and Reanimation Package of Reforms. The document also provides financial reporting and analysis of the Organization's development and strategic planning.
The situa on in Ukraine escalated sharply in April as armed insurgents seized buildings in Dontesk and Lugansk. Nego a ons in Geneva agreed to disarmament but the insurgents defied the agreement. Russia keeps demanding Ukraine stop using force but has unclear control over the insurgents. Russia faces tougher sanc ons if it intervenes further in Ukraine. Domes cally, Russia amended laws on ci zenship and elec ons to ghten eligibility and signature requirements, and passed a first reading abolishing direct mayoral elec ons.
The document summarizes a research paper on why Azerbaijan needs strategic reform of its foreign policy towards the European Union. It notes that Azerbaijan's economy has been negatively impacted by decreased oil prices, as oil/gas accounts for over 90% of exports. Closer ties with the EU could help diversify Azerbaijan's economy and overcome the current downturn. The EU is Azerbaijan's main trading partner and investor. Stronger collaboration in areas like energy, trade, finance, visa liberalization, tourism and labor could stimulate economic diversification in Azerbaijan and improve standards. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses an obstacle. In conclusion, EU assistance has benefited sectors in Azerbaijan, and a new agreement could further economic ties.
Hungary, soon 10 years in the European Union!Arnold Stellio
During these three months in Budapest to demonstrate the interest that you wear to the country and the city where we live, we'll focus on the results that is Hungary ago its integration into the European Union.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
This document summarizes trends in Eastern Europe and Russia's neighboring regions. It discusses the failure of projects to integrate Eastern Europe, the rise of nationalism, and multi-speed integration in the region. It also analyzes political instability and clashes between clans in countries like Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. The document presents several scenarios for Ukraine's future and prognostications of continued instability and civil war. It concludes by noting other risks to stability like pressure on Central Asia from ISIS and conflicts in the Caucasus.
Putin was re-elected as president in March 2012. Large protests occurred calling for political reforms. The "Tandem" system of power sharing between Putin and Medvedev failed, with Putin resuming the presidency. New political laws were passed and opposition groups emerged. However, Putin maintained control through allies in the government and security services. The future of further political reforms and opposition movements under Putin's third term as president remains uncertain.
Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin and Putin. Comparative analysisValeriia Didkovska
Domestic Regime, its interests and External Actions.
State vs. Oligarchs, shifts in FP from Yeltsin's to Putin's era, regime type in modern Russia, corporatist-kleptocratic influence on FP
The full-scale financial crisis in Russia erupted in August 1998 made a blow to the President Lukashenko domestic and foreign policy. However, a year-by-year worsening of the domestic economy due to maintaining a system of command economy led to a crisis in Belarus already in the first quarter of 1998. The crisis in Russian spilling over through trade channel only additionally aggravated economic situation in Belarus. The paper briefly characterizes the economic system in Belarus prior to the first quarter of 1998 and then analyzes consequences of the Russian financial crisis on the Belarussian economy.
Authored by: Rafal Antczak, Stanislav Bogdankiewich, Pavel Daneiko, Krzysztof Polomski, Vladymir Usowski
Published in 2000
The document discusses the evolving partnership between Russia and China over the past few decades. It notes that relations have strengthened significantly since the 1990s, with the two countries establishing a strategic partnership in 1996. Key aspects of their cooperation examined include growing military exercises and arms sales between the two militaries, increasing trade volumes but a need for trade to be more balanced, cooperation on energy issues including Russian energy exports to China, and alignment on opposing US unilateralism and supporting multilateralism geopolitically. The relationship demonstrates close political, economic and military ties that are expected to deepen further.
View the most recent commentary from The PRS Group on international macro risk.
This month’s reporting in the Americas includes a new report on Cuba, where the implementation of market-based reforms aimed at shoring up the economic foundation ahead of a planned generational transfer of power within the governing PCC has yet to generate a substantial increase...
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and several Vice Prime Ministers and Ministers provide a report on the work of the Ukrainian government over the past 100 days. They summarize key reforms and policies that have been implemented in areas such as decentralization, deregulation, fighting corruption, and economic stabilization. The officials express their commitment to continuing reforms to improve Ukraine's future and pull the country out of crisis, despite current challenges.
View the most recent commentary from The PRS Group on international macro risk.
Our monthly coverage of the Americas includes a post-election update on Brazil, where President Dilma Rousseff only narrowly secured a second term at a run-off held in late October, and both her party, the PT, and its main ally
EuroPACE is an innovative financial mechanism inspired by an American building improvement initiative called Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE). The innovative character of the EuroPACE mechanism is that financing through EuroPACE is linked to the taxes paid on a property. In other words, the financing lent by a private investor is repaid through property taxes and other charges related to the buildings. EuroPACE is therefore in line with the EC’s objectives of (1) putting EE first, (2) contributing to the EU’s global leadership, and (3) empowering consumers to enable MS to reach their energy and climate targets for 2030. Last but not least, EuroPACE could contribute to the democratisation of the energy supply by offering cash-flow positive, decentralised EE solutions.
The EuroPACE mechanism engages several stakeholders in the process: local government, investors, equipment installers, and homeowners. To establish the EuroPACE programme, several conditions must be satisfied, each of which are relevant for different stakeholder at different stages of the implementation. For the purpose of this report, we divided these criteria into two categories: key criteria, which make the implementation possible, and complementary criteria, which make the implementation easier. For the time being, it is a pure hypothesis to be tested with potential EuroPACE implementation.
THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew WilsonEuropean Choice
Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
“political technology” and a change in the voting system
that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
authorities were confident they would win.
The document summarizes the activities of the Centre UA organization in 2014. It discusses how Centre UA helped coordinate the Reanimation Package of Reforms initiative, which brought together over 300 experts and activists to develop reforms for Ukraine. Centre UA also advocated for these reforms, organized events to promote them, and maintained communication channels. The document outlines how Centre UA worked to increase transparency and accountability of government bodies through initiatives like CHESNO during the elections.
Strategy Position Paper of the Ukrainian Association for the Club of RomeViktor Halasiuk, PhD
The document outlines Ukraine's development challenges and proposes a strategy. It notes that while Ukraine has significant human and natural resources, its Soviet-era economy is inefficient and the environment neglected. Over 25 years, Ukraine's GDP contracted 35% amid deindustrialization, corruption and oligarchy. The strategy proposes adapting the EU's eco-social market model to spur sustainable and equitable growth through increased investment, exports, employment and purchasing power while reducing corruption, environmental depletion and human capital loss.
Towards authoritarianism. Internal situation in the Slovak Republic (1994–1998)Przegląd Politologiczny
This article discusses the internal situation of the Slovak Republic in the years 1994–1998,
the period in which the country was governed by the coalition of Movement for Democratic Slovakia,
the Slovak National Party and the Slovak Workers’ Association, and the prime minister was Vladimír
Mečiar. The main objective of the research was to analyse the actions undertaken by the coalition government in the context of violations of civil and political rights and freedoms, which could indicate an
authoritarian way of exercising power and the dismantling of a democratic state of law. In the analysed
period, the role of the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition was marginalised, the role of the
media limited, the rights of national and ethnic minorities violated. There was also an ongoing, sharp
conflict between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and President Michál Kováč. The effect of this governance was the union of almost all political forces and seizure of power after the elections in 1998. In
order to answer the research questions, the author used the method of institutional and legal analysis,
decision analysis and the statistical method. The research confirmed the hypothesis that, against the
background of other Visegrad Group countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, in the case of
Slovakia there were many instances of human rights violations in the period analysed. This led to the
drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with many countries and the slowdown of Slovakia’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.
This three sentence summary provides the high level overview of the economic development policy paper:
The document outlines the major economic challenges facing Ukraine, including low purchasing power, high unemployment, lack of investment, declining exports and industrial production, and an excessive shadow economy. It then proposes solutions to address these issues through bold institutional reforms to fight corruption, financial stabilization measures, and actions to achieve energy independence such as introducing transparent natural gas pricing and increasing domestic production. The goal is to unlock Ukraine's economic potential by overcoming these systemic problems through targeted policy changes.
Russia operates as a federal presidential republic with a multi-party system. Power is concentrated in the presidency, currently held by Vladimir Putin. The constitution established a three-branch government with a bicameral legislature. However, Putin has consolidated power by weakening regional authority and limiting political opposition. The economy remains heavily dependent on energy exports and oligarchic control of industries, though Putin has curbed some oligarchic power.
The document provides an overview of the major areas of activity and projects carried out by the Organization in 2015, which included increasing transparency and accountability of public authorities, promoting civic engagement, developing freedom of speech and access to information, and ensuring sustainable institutional development. Key projects discussed include the CHESNO civic movement, Strong Communities of Donetsk Region, Freedom of Speech and Access to Public Information, and Reanimation Package of Reforms. The document also provides financial reporting and analysis of the Organization's development and strategic planning.
The situa on in Ukraine escalated sharply in April as armed insurgents seized buildings in Dontesk and Lugansk. Nego a ons in Geneva agreed to disarmament but the insurgents defied the agreement. Russia keeps demanding Ukraine stop using force but has unclear control over the insurgents. Russia faces tougher sanc ons if it intervenes further in Ukraine. Domes cally, Russia amended laws on ci zenship and elec ons to ghten eligibility and signature requirements, and passed a first reading abolishing direct mayoral elec ons.
The document summarizes a research paper on why Azerbaijan needs strategic reform of its foreign policy towards the European Union. It notes that Azerbaijan's economy has been negatively impacted by decreased oil prices, as oil/gas accounts for over 90% of exports. Closer ties with the EU could help diversify Azerbaijan's economy and overcome the current downturn. The EU is Azerbaijan's main trading partner and investor. Stronger collaboration in areas like energy, trade, finance, visa liberalization, tourism and labor could stimulate economic diversification in Azerbaijan and improve standards. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses an obstacle. In conclusion, EU assistance has benefited sectors in Azerbaijan, and a new agreement could further economic ties.
Hungary, soon 10 years in the European Union!Arnold Stellio
During these three months in Budapest to demonstrate the interest that you wear to the country and the city where we live, we'll focus on the results that is Hungary ago its integration into the European Union.
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.
This document summarizes trends in Eastern Europe and Russia's neighboring regions. It discusses the failure of projects to integrate Eastern Europe, the rise of nationalism, and multi-speed integration in the region. It also analyzes political instability and clashes between clans in countries like Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. The document presents several scenarios for Ukraine's future and prognostications of continued instability and civil war. It concludes by noting other risks to stability like pressure on Central Asia from ISIS and conflicts in the Caucasus.
Putin was re-elected as president in March 2012. Large protests occurred calling for political reforms. The "Tandem" system of power sharing between Putin and Medvedev failed, with Putin resuming the presidency. New political laws were passed and opposition groups emerged. However, Putin maintained control through allies in the government and security services. The future of further political reforms and opposition movements under Putin's third term as president remains uncertain.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
Ukrainian revolution from the point of view of the Russian analystЕлена Волковская
This document summarizes the political situation in Ukraine from the perspective of a Russian analyst. It describes the power dynamics between Ukrainian oligarchs, the roles of external actors like Russia and the EU, and the strategies employed by different political factions during the 2013-2014 Ukrainian revolution and subsequent elections. Key events and the various interests, failures, and technologies used by different groups are analyzed.
The Origin of the non-governmental sector in Russia during the presidencies o...Maciej Behnke
Apart from the public (first) and business (second) sectors, the third sector is one
of the pillars constituting the modern democratic society. All the social interests
are concentrated within the third sector and they are being implemented by the
numerous non-governmental organizations cooperating with the state as well
as business world. The birth of the third sector in Russia can be associated with
the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev reforms called the perestroika. The mental
changes that the Russian society underwent influenced by the policy of glasnost
led to the origin of public involvement into the social and political life, taking
upon the role of the often ineffective state. The degree to which the citizens were
involved in the activity of the NGOs was first of all associated with their quality
of life and it depended on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the idea
of social organizations. The time of Boris Yeltsin presidency was characterized
by two phenomena: a drop in the standard of living accompanied by the
intensification of criminalization within the public life and the positive attitude
towards the introduction of the third sector. After the new president assumed
the post, the approach of the new authority changed in a negative way and
the politics implemented led to gaining full control over public associations.
The so-called liberalization of the law in respect to the third sector was only
a display of Kremlin’s political will and did not signify serious treatment of the
principles of the democratic and civic society. The third sector, one of the pillars
supporting the civil society is at present in the state of consolidation, dealing
with numerous amendments of legal norms. After the period of mimicking
western solutions, the Russian NGOs became a power that must be taken into
account by the Russian decision-makers.
Trends in 2017 in districts of donetsk and luhansk regions. overview of major...DonbassFullAccess
The Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in Donbas has been going on for more than three years and is a major factor affecting the lives of people in the uncontrolled territory of Donetsk region.
Everyday life of Ukrainian citizens and social processes in this territory require careful study to form relevant state policy that would help to preserve ties with of uncontrolled territories
residents and facilitate their future integration into Ukrainian common political, informational, cultural, economic, and historical space. An analytical group of the NGO “Donetsk Institute of
Information” (hereinafter - DII) summed up the results of 2017 for the territories which are under the “DPR” control.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
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Authored by: Marek Dabrowski, Radzislawa Gortat
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The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
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Contributi dei parlamentari del PD - Contributi L. 3/2019Partito democratico
DI SEGUITO SONO PUBBLICATI, AI SENSI DELL'ART. 11 DELLA LEGGE N. 3/2019, GLI IMPORTI RICEVUTI DALL'ENTRATA IN VIGORE DELLA SUDDETTA NORMA (31/01/2019) E FINO AL MESE SOLARE ANTECEDENTE QUELLO DELLA PUBBLICAZIONE SUL PRESENTE SITO
2. PR-agency «New Image». Since 1993
International Institute for Political
Expertise (IIPE). Since 2003
Government Relations agency
«Minchenko GR Consulting». Since
2007
Companies of the holding:
Communication Group
«Minchenko Consulting»
2
3. Our projects geography
Belarus;
Georgia;
European Union;
Kazakhstan;
Kyrgyzstan;
Moldova;
USA;
Uzbekistan;
Ukraine;
Turkmenistan;
Regions of Russian Federation: Republic of Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tatarstan,
Udmurtia, Khakassia, Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Primorye, Amur, Arkhangelsk,
Volgograd, Irkutsk, Kirov, Kurgan, Leningrad, Magadan, Moscow, Novgorod,
Orenburg, Pskov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Tver, Tyumen, Nizhni Novgorod,
Chelyabinsk , the Yamal- Nenets autonomous region, the Chukotka autonomous
region, the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region, Saint-Petersburg and Moscow..
Communication Group
«Minchenko Consulting»
3
4. 21 years in the market
of political consultation
Work experience in
various countries and
regions
More than 200
successful election
campaigns
Experience in
creating political
projects "from
scratch”
Author's technology
"political campaigns
scenario programming"
Communication Group
«Minchenko Consulting»
4
5. Board member of Russian Association of political consultants. Member of IAPC (International
Association of Political Consultants).
Rated TOP-10 & TOP-20 among Russian political consultants (according to “Vedomosti” newspaper
& “Obsсhaya Gazeta”).
First place for Minchenko consulting in the rank of major players in Russian political consulting
(according to “Kompaniya” magazine, 2011).
First place in popularity among political analysts rated by Russian journalists (survey of Znak.com,
2013).
Moscow State University, Faculty of World Politics, Lecturer.
Author of 2 books.
Evgeny Minchenko
Political analyst. Consultant. Lobbyist.
Graduate of Chelyabinsk State University in History
(1993), Russian Academy of State Service in Political
Psychology (1997).
In 1993 began career as a political consultant.
2004-2011 - advisor to the Chairman of State Duma
Anti-Corruption Committee, expert of Security and CIS
Countries Committees;
Since 2010 to 2012 - member of Public Council in the
Ministry of Industry and Trade and Expert Council of the
Ministry of Economic Development. Since 2014 -
member of Public Council in the Ministry of Energy.
5
6. Politburo 2.0 works as a network
structure. It is an informal agency and
there is no formalization of its
functions, such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed
among its members, who offer their
management schemes within their
competence.
Politburo 2.0
6
7. This is the model of resource
redistribution and preservation of stable
elite groups, and the future consolidation
of these groups’ governance system.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0
members - do not fall out of the Putin
orbit. These people remain as the key
decision makers in the Government.
There is staff turnover in the
Government, such as in the regions, but
the Politburo 2.0 holds the levers of
control tightly.
Politburo 2.0
7
8. Putin’s team
Leningrad mayor
A. Sobchak team
1996 1999 2003-2004 20081990-1991
Premier-minister s
comrades
Kremlin team Entourage of
a national leader
2003 - 2005
Regional leaders:
S. Sobyanin, A. Khloponin,
Yu. Trutnev
Groups merged
with the Putin s team:
Putin s team: stages of formation and self-determination
Groups opposing
the Putin s team:
2000 - 2004
Yukos and oil lobby
Second-class
federal officials
Coworkers
in the KGB
Leningrad State
University classmates
19751970
1996 - 1999
Natives from St. Petersburg
in the B. Yeltsin s team
1998 - 2003
Old family group
(close relatives of B. Yeltsin)
1998 - 2004
Regional clans political party project – block Fatherland – All Russia
(Moscow mayor Yu. Luzhkov, Tatarstan president M. Shaimiev,
former premier-minister Ye. Primakov)
8
9. MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO 2.0 OCTOBER 2014
The Political Block
Regional Leaders
V. Putin
Candidates for Politburo 2.0 members
The Power Block
The Technical Block (Central
Committee Secretary)
Business
G. Gref
P. Abramovich
V. Yakunin
А. Miller
V. Potanin
О. Deripaska
М. Fridman
А. Usmanov
V. Vekselberg
V. Alekperov
А. Mordashev
А. Kostin
О. Sienko
А. Gromov
D. Peskov
Patriarch Kirill
V. Surkov
А. Kudrin
А. Voloshin
А. Chubaic
A. Bortnikov
V. Kolokolcev
Y. Chaika
E. Shkolov
A. Bastrikin
V. Ivanov
Е. Murov
V. Zolotova
N. Patrushev
M. Fradkov
V. Lebedev
I. Shuvalov
E. Nabiullina
V. Kozhin
D. Kozak
S. Lavrov
A. Vaino
А. Belousov
V. Khristenko
S. Narishkin
V. Matvienko
R. Kadirov
I. Sechin D. Medvedev
System opposition
V. Zhirinovsky
G. Zuganov
М. Prokhorov
S. Mironov
S. Chemezov G. Timchenko S. SobyaninY. KovalchukV. Volodin S. IvanovS. Shoygu
Y. TrutnevA. KhloponinR. MinnikhanovA. Beglov
A. Rotenberg
9
10. Alfa
Group
Old Family
Group
V. Putin
С. Чемезов
В. Володин
С. Иванов
А.Voloshin
A. Novak
R. Abramovich
A. Kudrin
M. Prokhorov
С. Шойгу
A. Siluanov
О.Deripaska
Orbits of Power in Russia
M. Fridman
И. Сечин
«Krasnoyarsk
Group»
V. Matvienko
D. Medvedev
S. Shoygu
S. Sobyanin
G. Timchenko
Y. Kovalchuk
V. Volodin
S. Ivanov
I. Sechin
S. Chemezov
А. Rotenberg
V. Puchkov
А. Dvorkovich
А. Khloponin
D. Rogozin
G. Poltavchenko
Y. Trutnev
R. Minikhanov
M. Fradkov
V. Ivanov
A. Bastrykin
A. Bortnikov
E. Shkolov
V. Kolokolcev
E. Murov
V. Kozhin
R. Kadyrov
D. Kozak
S. Naryshkin
D. Peskov
A. Gromov
В.Yakunin
A. Mordashov
A. Chubais
V. Potanin
А.Beglov
A. Usmanov
V. Vekselberg
G. Zuganov
V. Zhirinovskiy
Y. Chaika
I. Shuvalov
А. Belousov
Patriarch
А. Miller
V. Khristenko
Т. Golikova
V. Surkov
S. Kirienko
А. Nikitin
А. Vorobev
O. Sienko
S. Lavrov
«Keynesian
Group»
S. Neverov
N. Merkhushkin
М. Men
А. Vaino
V. Rashnikov
«Monetarism
Group»
Е. KuivashevV. Basargin
А. Yakushev
E. Nabiullina
G. GrefA. Kostin
N. Patrushev
O. Golodetc
Y. Ushakov
V. Zolotov
V. Mutko
October 2014
10
11. In previous "Politburo 2.0" reports, the orbits
of Russian authorities were represented on
a bipolar coordinate system with two poles
of elite attraction (Igor Sechin, the leader of
the siloviki government hardliners, and
Dmitry Medvedev, the leader of the "system
liberals”).
Now, due to a significant weakening of the
liberal authorities, it is more appropriate to
use a sectoral chart (see below pie chart
"Orbits of the Russian authorities”).
From poles to sectors
11
12. Orbits of Power in Russia 2014
Kovalchuk
Timchenko
Khristenko
Bastyrkin
Bortnikov
Shkolov
Rotenberg
Infrastucture
projects
Yakunin
Lavrov
Lukashenko Nazarbaev
Trutnev
Fridman
Kudrin
Patriarch
Alekperov
Rogozin
Miller
Naryshkin
Surkov
Sienko
Chaika
V.Putin
Medvedev
Matvienko
Media,
communication,
IT
Kolokolcev
Murov
Patrushev
Chubaits
Manturov
Golodets
Kirienko
Siluanov
Khloponin
Zubkov
Zolotov
Beglov
Ushakov
Peskov
Golikova
Dmitriev
Kozak
12
13. The areas of President Vladimir Putin’s
special personal control are the energy
sector, foreign policy, defense and the
defense industry, and law enforcement
agencies.
Responsibility for domestic politics,
social policy, the financial sector and
infrastructure projects is distributed
among the Politburo 2.0 members.
Pie chart
13
14. Inside «Politburo 2.0»
The dismantling process of the duumvirate elements from the period of
Medvedev's presidency in 2008-2012 is completed;
By 2013 ex-president Medvedev became a technical prime minister with
limited terms of reference primarily centered around the social unit;
Alternative to the new position of Dmitry Medvedev has publicly
delineated - the transition into the "experts" category;
The new position, as noted in our 2014 reports "On the Eve of the Elite
Groups’ Reboot" and "Year of the Medvedev Government," facilitates his
survival as Prime Minister;
It is important to note that the influence of his longtime key opponent in
the apparatus, Igor Sechin, has diminished in a parallel manner.
Sechin’s role as the counterweight to the strong figure of Dmitry
Medvedev is no longer in demand.
From poles to sectors
14
15. The reduction of resource potential
among the groups who tried to
position themselves as
communicators with foreign elites
and supporters of the "liberal"
ideology.
New types of resources requested by
Putin:
o Symbolic image;
o Contacts with alternatives to the
foreign players;
o Grassroots support.
General trends
15
16. Level SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF
INFLUENCE
STABILITY DECREASE IN INFLUENCE
Politburo 2.0
members
S. Shoygu
S. Ivanov-С. Chemezov
G. Timchenko-Y. Kovalchuk
V. Volodin
I. Sechin
D. Medvedev
S. Sobyanin
Rotenbergs
Candidates to
the Politburo 2.0
members
Power block (as a
corporation)
Financial triangle «Nabiullina-
Gref-Kostin»
А. Bortnikov
R. Kadyrov
Federal Protective Service
(FSO)
«Krasnoyarsk Group»
R. Minnikhanov
The Old Family
«System Liberal Group»
А. Kudrin
Elite coalitions
and their influence dynamics
16
17. Putin has created a checks and balances system among the elites within
key areas and industries. In fact this has encouraged conflict pairs:
In economics
• Sechin-Timchenko
(energetics)
• Kovalchuks-
Rotenbergs
(infrastructure)
• Keynesian Group-
Monetarism Group
• Triumvirate
«Nabiullina-Gref-
Kostin»-Belousov
In the Power area:
• Kolokolcev-
Shkolov
• Bastrykin-Chaika
• Patrushev-
Bortnikov
• FSB-FSO
Foreign Policy:
• Lavrov-Ushakov
General trends
17
18. Stable position of business that is
close to Putin;
All the sanction victims received and
will receive compensation in the form
of new orders and direct financial
support in the banking sector;
In essence, we have a new
legitimation model of resource
redistribution from one elite group to
the benefit of others.
General trends
18
20. Politburo 2.0
member
August 2012: position in
the Politburo 2.0
January 2013: position in
the Politburo 2.0
January 2014: position in
the Politburo 2.0
October 2014: position in
the Politburo 2.0
Medvedev 1 1
7-9 9-10
Sechin 2 9
7-9 7
Ivanov 3 2
1 1
Chemezov 4 3
4-6 4-5
Volodin 5 4
2-3 3
Kovalchuk 6 7-8
4-6 6
Timchenko 7-8 6
4-6 4-5
Sobyanin 7-8 7-8
10 9-10
Shoygu n/a 5
2-3 2
Rotenberg n/a n/a
7- 9 8
Position distribution dynamics within
«Politburo 2.0»
20
21. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Symbolic & Image resources
Media
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Dmitry Medvedev – Prime Minister
21
Politburo 2.0 ranking: 9-10
(far from Putin)
*not sanctioned
22. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Sergey Sobyanin – Mayor of Moscow
22
Ranking: 9-10
*not sanctioned
23. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Ranking: 8
*under US and EU sanctions
Arkady Rotenberg – Co-owner of
Stroyazmontazh, the largest construction
company for gas pipelines and electrical power
supply lines in Russia
23
24. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Igor Sechin – CEO, Rosneft
24
Ranking: 7
*under US sanctions
25. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Yury Kovalchuk – Head of Board of
Directors and largest shareholder of Bank
Rossiya
25
Ranking: 6
*under US and EU sanctions
26. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Sergey Chemezov – CEO, Rostec (former
Director General of Rosoboronexport)
26
Ranking: 4-5
*under US and EU sanctions
27. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Gennady Timchenko – Owner of private
investment firm Volga Group
27
Ranking: 4-5
*under US sanctions
28. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Vyacheslav Volodin – First Deputy Chief of
Staff
28
Ranking: 3
*under US and EU sanctions
29. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Sergey Shoigu – Minister of Defense
29
Ranking: 2
*not sanctioned
30. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Closeness to Putin
Informal influence
Finance
Regional elites
Formal administrative
Media
Symbolic & Image resources
Political & party resources
Law enforcement resources
External resources
August 2012
January 2013
January 2014
October 2014
Sergey Ivanov – Presidential Chief of Staff
30
Ranking: 1
*under US sanctions
31. We can observe overheating inside
the Politburo 2.0;
Resource amount concentrated in
the hands of Politburo members is
increasing. This includes both power
and economic resources;
At the same time, the amount of
distributable resource is decreasing;
In this regard a “cleaning” inside the
Politburo 2.0 (at least at the
candidate level) is inevitable. The
situation with Evtushenkov
demonstrates that.
General Trends
31
33. Candidates for prime minister
33
Silovik?
Sergey Shoygu
(Minister of defence)
Sergey Ivanov
(head of Presidential Administration)
34. Candidates for prime minister
34
Technocrat?
Rustam Minnikhanov
(head of Tatarstan)
Sergey Sobyanin
(Mayor of Moscow)
35. Candidates for prime minister
35
Liberal?
German Gref
(CEO, Sberbank)
Alexey Kudrin
(Former Deputy Prime Minister)
36. Opposition
36
Alexey Kudrin
(Ex-Deputy Prime Minister)
1) Factor of 1997;
2) Still has his people in the
government;
3) Kudrinomics?
4) A lot of opponents in power
camp;
5) Not very popular and never
was.
37. Opposition
37
Alexey Navalny
(former Moscow mayoral candidate )
1) A tool for the fight between
ruling elite;
2) Was close to siloviki group;
3) Criminal cases;
4) Populist and nationalist with
connections in liberal camp and
the West.
39. Impact of sanctions
About an impact of sanctions and
counter-sanctions on Russian economy:
Few industries won (agriculture,
metallurgy, oil and gas);
Crisis now is less formidable than in
1998 and 2009;
An unemployment level is the lowest
in the history.
40. MINCHENKO CONSULTING Communication Group
38, Bolshoy Tishinsky lane, office 730, 123557, Moscow, Russia
Phone: +7 (495) 605-3681 Fax: +7 (495) 605-3680
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