Download as PDF, PPTX
![NSLog [@“Agenda”];
Quick overview of iPhone iOS Platform.
iOS Security Structure
What is a Jailbreak?
iOS App (IN)Securities](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-5-320.jpg)
![***[Sandboxing]***
NAND Flash
FTL: converts logical partition to NAND flash architecture
looks like BLOCK device
System Partition / (Read Only)
User Partition /private/var
NAND
FTL
Block Device
/ (RO)
(System Partition)
/private/var (RW)
(User Partition)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-10-320.jpg)
![***[Sandboxing]***
3rd Party lives only on User Partition
Apps run as mobile user
Kernel Signature checks executables
in system-call execve()
%{ How did you Jailbreak it? }%
NAND
FTL
Block Device
/ (RO)
(System Partition)
/private/var (RW)
(User Partition)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-11-320.jpg)
![SQL Injection Client-Side
SQL injection is a problem on the client side too!
BAD:
NSString *sql = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"SELECT name FROM products
WHERE id = '%@'", id]; const char *query = [sql UTF8String];
GOOD:
const char *sql = "SELECT name FROM products WHERE id = ?";
sqlite3_prepare_v2(database, sql, -1, &sql_statement, NULL);
sqlite3_bind_text(&sql_statement, 1, id, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-30-320.jpg)
![XSS Client-Side
Can occur whenever user controlled Objective C variables populated in to
WebView
stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString
NSString *javascript = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"var myvar="%@";",
username];
[mywebView stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:javascript];](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-31-320.jpg)
![Vulnerable Obj-C Methods
NSLog()
[NSString stringWithFormat:]
[NSString initWithFormat:]
[NSMutableString appendFormat:]
[NSAlert informativeTextWithFormat:]
[NSPredicate predicateWithFormat:]
[NSException format:]
NSRunAlertPanel](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/pluggedin71-140612041433-phpapp02/85/iOS-Vulner-ability-32-320.jpg)
Uploaded bySubho Halder
iOS (Vulner)ability
This document discusses security issues and vulnerabilities in the iOS operating system. It begins with an overview of the iOS hardware and software architecture, including the security features like sandboxing and code signing. It then explains what a jailbreak is and how it attacks the chain of trust to bypass these protections. The document outlines several ways sensitive data can be accessed, such as through property lists, SQLite databases, keychains, logs, and cached files. It also discusses client-side vulnerabilities like SQL injection, XSS, and logging of sensitive information. Finally, it promotes learning about mobile security through tools like OWASP iGoat and the speaker's company AppKnox.
iOS (Vulner)ability
- 1. iOS (Vulner)ability Subho Halder CoFounder AppKnox
- 3. ./WhoAmI Co Founder ofAppKnox ( XYSec Labs ) Python Lover Sole Creator and Developer of Android Framework for Exploitation (AFE) Found Security Bugs in Apple, Google, Skype, Webkit, Facebook, Microsoft, …..
- 4.
- 5. NSLog [@“Agenda”]; Quick overviewof iPhone iOS Platform. iOS Security Structure What is a Jailbreak? iOS App (IN)Securities
- 6. Peek into astate-of-art Prison
- 7. iOS Hardware Architecture ApplicationProcessor Baseband iOS User interaction Applications ... NucleusOS Radio communication
- 8. iOS Hardware Architecture Application ProcessorBaseband Processor audio display power managment camera WIFI BT GSM UART I2S GPIO DMA controls sim/net-lock !
- 9.
- 10. ***[Sandboxing]*** NAND Flash FTL: convertslogical partition to NAND flash architecture looks like BLOCK device System Partition / (Read Only) User Partition /private/var NAND FTL Block Device / (RO) (System Partition) /private/var (RW) (User Partition)
- 11. ***[Sandboxing]*** 3rd Party livesonly on User Partition Apps run as mobile user Kernel Signature checks executables in system-call execve() %{ How did you Jailbreak it? }% NAND FTL Block Device / (RO) (System Partition) /private/var (RW) (User Partition)
- 12. **Memory Protection W^X Policy NonExecutable Stack or Heap ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomisation) %{ Did you forget about Return-Oriented-Program }%
- 13. Code Signing Implemented insideKernel Kernel signature checks executables in systemcall execve() Kernel stored on System Partition (kernelcache) Kernel is signature checked before being loaded. %{ Can still be by-passed :/ }%
- 14. Encryption @#%$#^% ! Everythongis encrypted Hardware AES Engine Keys derived from hardware keys GID-key UID-key %{Possible to use Jailbreak tools e.g. Syringe to use the hardware engine}%
- 15.
- 16. How your iPhoneboots up? signature check signature check signature check signature check Bootrom LLB (Low Level Bootloader) iBoot Kernel Application NOR NOR NAND NAND
- 17.
- 18. DFU Mode ! BootromiBSS iBEC Kernel Ramdisk Bootrom LLB (Low Level Bootloader) iBoot Kernel Application minimal iBoot
- 19. Attacking the chainof trust! signature check Bootrom LLB (Low Level Bootloader) iBoot Kernel Application signature check signature check signature check signature check attack here (cannot be fixed) attack here attack here attack here System Software
- 20. Where do wego wrong?
- 21. Plists Used by iPhoneto store saved properties and data XML Binary (compressed XML) (depreciated) The binary plists need converting, you can use: plutil to convert to XML Property List Editor (in XCode) plists contain all kinds of juicy information. Check for: Cookies, emails, usernames, passwords, sensitive application data, client side role identifiers, protocol handlers, etc.
- 22.
- 23. INSERT into `SQLite` Alot of iOS applications sensitive data in SQLite3 databases on the device. Sqlite3 does not have built-in support for encryption. There are extensions (CEROD is one, sqlcipher is another) that support encryption, but the code is not publicly available, you need to license it. Apple has not, so the included version of sqlite3 does not support encrypted databases. Still dangerous to store stuff client side. To bypass: Cerod is as simple as looking for “cerod:passwd” or break pointing and pulling out of memory: sqlite3_open(":cerod:passwd:filename.db", &db);
- 24. )()()( Keychains )()()( Keychain= Encrypted container for storing sensitive information Smarter devs store passwords and sensitive data using the keychain. Unfortunately with access to a phone and jailbreaking we can decrypt the keychain and dump the contents.
- 25. tail -f /var/logs/ iOSLogs lots of data, NSLog especially, They can be viewed after the fact in: ~/Library/Logs/CrashReporter/MobileDevice/<Device name>/private/var/ log/system.log Can be viewed in you mac “console” app under utilities
- 26. File Caching m/m/ Ifthe application uses PDF, Excel, or other files it may be possible that these files may have been cached on the device. These can be found at: ~/Library/Application Support/iPhone simulator/x.x.x/ Applications/<application folder>/Documents/temp.pdf
- 27. $(`Keyboard Caching`) Keystrokes forpredictive spellcheck are stored in: ~/Library/Application Support/iPhone Simulator/x.x.x/Library/Keyboard/ dynamic-text.dat This issue is similar to autocomplete for web browsers. Already disabled for password fields Should be disabled for any potentially sensitive fields (account numbers, SSN, etc, etc…) Set UITextField property autocorrectionType = UITextAutocorrectionNo for mitigation.
- 28. Snapshot Caching When inan application and the home button is pushed, the application stores a snapshot (screenshot) in the apps snapshot folder ~/Library/Application Support/iPhone Simulator/x.x.x/Applications/ <application folder>/Library/Caches/Snapshots/ These persist until reboot. Hopefully you weren’t on a screen with any sensitive data!
- 29.
- 30. SQL Injection Client-Side SQLinjection is a problem on the client side too! BAD: NSString *sql = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"SELECT name FROM products WHERE id = '%@'", id]; const char *query = [sql UTF8String]; GOOD: const char *sql = "SELECT name FROM products WHERE id = ?"; sqlite3_prepare_v2(database, sql, -1, &sql_statement, NULL); sqlite3_bind_text(&sql_statement, 1, id, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
- 31. XSS Client-Side Can occurwhenever user controlled Objective C variables populated in to WebView stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString NSString *javascript = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"var myvar="%@";", username]; [mywebView stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:javascript];
- 32. Vulnerable Obj-C Methods NSLog() [NSStringstringWithFormat:] [NSString initWithFormat:] [NSMutableString appendFormat:] [NSAlert informativeTextWithFormat:] [NSPredicate predicateWithFormat:] [NSException format:] NSRunAlertPanel
- 33. How can youget started? https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_iGoat_Project
- 34. AppKnox - CloudBased Security Automation Tool
- 35. Available for Android Comingsoon for iOS
- 36. –Cicero “There is nocastle so strong that it cannot be overthrown”
- 37.