This document is a thesis submitted to Texila American University for a Doctor of Philosophy in Investment Management. It examines the role of corporate governance on the financial performance of commercial banks in Cameroon. The study uses data from 10 commercial banks in Cameroon from 2015 to 2019. The results show that board size and proportion of non-executive directors are negatively correlated with return on equity, while corporate governance disclosure is positively correlated. The level of compliance with corporate governance disclosure requirements among the banks was found to vary. The researcher recommends further efforts to advance corporate governance practices in Cameroonian banks.

2. [TITLE]
Viva voce Submitted to
Texila American University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
[Investment Management]
Submitted by
[Gladys Njoukiang Asaah]
Under the guidance of
[Prof Marcel T. Ngambi]

3. Abstract of the Thesis
 This study seeks to examine the role corporate governance plays on the
performance of commercial banks in Cameroon.
 Does corporate governance have any effect on the financial performance ?
 The study used the ex-post facto research design to find answer to the
research question.
 The sample was 10 banks and data was from 2015 to 2019.

4. Abstract of the Thesis
 The study revealed that disclosure of governance by commercial banks in
Cameroon has a positive and significant relationship with the financial
performance of commercial banks in Cameroon (t=2.702, p=.007).
 Capital adequacy ratio, as a measure of external corporate governance
mechanism, had statistically significant positive effect on bank performance.
 The researcher recommends that in order to advance corporate governance
more effort should be paid on the value of the stock ownership of board
members.

5. Chapter-I
Introduction

6. 1.1 Introducing the topic of Research
 Corporate governance plays a vital role in creating a corporate
culture of consciousness, transparency, and openness.
 In modern business corporations, the main external
stakeholder groups are;
 Internal stakeholders are the board of directors, executives,
and other employees (Akpan & Riman, 2012).

7. Introduction cont’d
 Corporate governance is the collection of mechanisms.
 Governance structures and principles identify the distribution of
rights and responsibilities among different participants.
 Corporate governance is necessary because of the possibility of
conflicts of interests between stakeholders.

8. Introduction cont’d
 In Cameroon, the collapsed of commercial banks in the late 1980s and 1990s
was seriously blamed on inadequate supervisory, official recklessness and
industry was notorious for ethical abuses (Kouassi et al 2007).
 Poor corporate governance was identified as one of the major factors in
virtually all known instances of bank distress in the country.
 Weak corporate governance remain a worrisome feature of the banking
system

9. 1.2 Conceptual Definitions
Sir Adrian Cadbury came out with an acceptable of corporate
governance.
 Corporate governance is the system by which companies are
directed and controlled.
 Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their
companies.

10. 1.2 Conceptual Definitions
 The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors
and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate
governance structure is in place.
 The responsibilities of the directors.
 The Board's actions are subjected to laws, regulations and the
shareholders in general meeting (Olayiwola, 2010).

11. Chapter - II
Review of Literature

12. II Review of Literature
 Devoid of a unified or systematic theory, its paradigm,
diagnosis and solutions lie in multidisciplinary fields i.e.
economics, accountancy, finance among others (Cadbury,
2002).
 In any organization, corporate governance is one of the key
factors that determine the health of the system and its ability
to survive economic shocks.
 The health of the organization depends on the underlying
soundness of its individual components and the connections
between them.

13. II Review of Literature Cont’d
According to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), among the main
factors that support the stability of any country’s financial system
include:
 good corporate governance; effective marketing discipline;
strong prudential regulation and supervision;
 accurate and reliable accounting financial reporting systems;
 a sound disclosure regime and an appropriate savings deposit
protection system.

14. II Review of Literature Cont’d
 Gompers et al. (2003) found that the risk-adjusted returns of
firms with strong governance were 8.5% higher than firms
with poor governance.
 Balasubramanium et al. (2008) found a positive significant
association between their overall India Corporate Governance
Index (ICGI).

15. II Review of Literature Cont’d
 Brown and Caylor (2004) found positive association between
corporate governance scores and financial performance of firm
 One of the key findings of Mani and Sreedharan (2004

16. Theoretical Framework
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory

17. Rationale & need for the Study
The work is specifically to the banking industry.
 Not restricted to the framework of the OECD principles
which is based primarily on shareholder sovereignty.
 compliance of code of corporate governance in Cameroon
commercial banks with the Cameroonian code of corporate
governance.
 Lastly another gap this study intended to fill is that while
other studies on corporate governance had ignored the
operating performance variable as proxies for performance.

18. Research questions
This study addressed issues relating to the following pertinent questions
emerging within the domain of study problems:
1. To what extent does board size affect and the financial performance of
commercial banks in Cameroon?
2. Is there a significant difference in the financial performance of commercial
banks with foreign directors and banks without foreign directors in
Cameroon?
3. Is the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and
the financial performance of commercial banks in Cameroon statistically
significant?
4. To what extent does the level of corporate governance disclosure affect
the performance of banks in Cameroon?

19. Objectives
Main objective
Specific Objectives

20. Hypotheses
To proffer useful answers to the research questions and realize the study
objectives, the following hypotheses stated in their null forms will be tested;
Hypothesis 1:
H0: There is no significant relationship between board size and financial
performance of commercial banks in Cameroon
Hypothesis 2:
H0: There is no significant difference in the financial performance of
commercial banks with foreign directors and commercial banks without foreign
directors in Cameroon

21. Hypotheses
Hypothesis 3:
H0: The relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors
and the financial performance of Cameroonian commercial banks is statistically
not significant
Hypothesis 4:
H0: There is no significant relationship between the governance
disclosures of commercial banks in Cameroon and their performance

22. III Methodology
Statement of the Problem
 Banks have always been at the heart of the world’s last financial crisis.
 Code of Corporate Governance for banks in Cameroon requires banks to
control challenges integration processes of information technology and
culture.
 The problem of corporate governance still remains un-resolved, thereby
increasing the level of fraud which endanger depositors’ funds.

23. III Methodology
Statement of the Problem
 The boards of directors are more often criticized for the decline in
shareholders’ wealth and corporate failure.
 It is in the light of the above problems, that this research work

24. III Methodology Cont’d
Research Design
The research design that was adopted for the study
was ex-post facto research design. This design was
considered appropriate because the researcher had no
control over the dependent and the independent
variables being studied.

25. III Methodology Cont’d
Data Gathering Method
The data used for this study will be secondary data derived from the audited
financial statements of the selected registered commercial banks in Cameroon.
A five years period from 2015-2019 will be the period of concentration.
This study also made use of books and other related materials especially the
BEAC and Douala Stock exchange.

26. III Methodology Cont’d
Research Instruments
• In determining the level of corporate governance disclosure among
the Registered banks in Cameroon, the study used the content
analysis technique as a means of eliciting data from the audited
annual reports of the selected banks. This was done using the
researcher’s checklist constructed using the the OECD code of
corporate governance.
• This is divided into 5 broad categories:
• Financial disclosures,
• non-financial disclosures,
• annual general meetings,
• timing and means of disclosure, and
• best practices for compliance with corporate disclosure.

27. III Methodology Cont’d
Method of Data Presentation
• Data gathered from the annual reports of the
sampled banks are presented in tabular forms.
Percentages were also used to present the level of
compliance to corporate governance disclosure.

28. Variables
• 3.5 Model Specification
• The Econometric model of Miyajima et al (2003) is therefore seen below as;
• Yit = Yit = o + 1Git + 2SZEt + 3 BDTt + et
• Where:
• Yit represents firm performance variables which are: return on capital
employed, earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity for
banking firms at time t.
• Git is a vector of corporate governance variables which include: Board Size
(BDS), Board Composition (BDC) which is defined as the ratio of outside
directors to total number of directors, a dummy variable (CEO) to capture if
the board chairman is the same as the CEO or otherwise, CEO’s tenure of
office (CET).

29. Variables
Model Specification
• The Econometric model of Miyajima et al (2003) is therefore seen
below as;
• Yit = 0 + 1Git + 2 SZEt + 3 BDTt + et
• Where:
• Yit represents firm performance variables which are: return on capital
employed, earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity
for banking firms at time t.
• Git is a vector of corporate governance variables which include:
Board Size (BDS), Board Composition (BDC) which is defined as the
ratio of outside directors to total number of directors, a dummy
variable (CEO) to capture if the board chairman is the same as the
CEO or otherwise, CEO’s tenure of office (CET).

30. Variables Cont’d
• SZEt is the size of the firm
• BDTt is the debt structure of the firm
• et, the error term which account for other possible factors that could
influence Yit that are not captured in the model.
• Based on the fact that we employed different governance and performance
proxies, the above model is therefore modified to determine the
relationship between bank performance and corporate governance of banks
in Cameroon. In doing this we therefore developed two simple definitional
models to guide our analyses. These models are as follows;

31. Variables Cont’d
Model 1
• ROEit = f(BOSt, BCOMPt, CGDIt )……………………………….. (1)
• ROEit = o + 1BOSt + 2BCOMPt + 3CGDIt +et ……………….. (2)
Model 2
• ROAit = f(BOSt, BCOMPt, , CGDIt )…………………………………(3)
• ROAit = o + 1BOSt + 2BCOMPt + 3CGDIt +et……………. (4)

32. Variables Cont’d
• Where:
• ROE and ROA represents firm performance variables which are: Return on
assets and Return on equity for banking firms at time t.
• BOS represents the Board Size; Board Composition is represented by
BCOMP which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to total number of
directors, while CGDI represents Corporate Governance Disclosure Index
respectively.

33. Variables Cont’d
• et, the error term which account for other possible factors that could
influence ROEit and ROAit that are not captured in the model.
The a priori is such that:
• 1BOSt; 2BCOMPt; and 3CGDIt > 0.
• The implication of this is that a positive relationship is expected between
explanatory variables ( 1BOSt; 2BCOMPt; and 3CGDIt) and the
dependent variable.
• The size of the coefficient of correlation will help us explain various levels of
relationship between the explanatory variables.

34. Sample
Study Population
• The population for this study consists of all the 15
registered commercial banks in Cameroon as at
2020.
Sample Size
• The judgmental sampling technique was used in
selecting the 10 listed banks out of the 15
registered commercial banks.

35. Data analysis & Technique
• Panel Data Regression Analysis: this is a type
of regression analysis that involves panel data
analytical technique.

36. IV Results & Discussions
Years
Bank
1
Bank
2
Bank
3
Bank
4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8
Bank
9 Bank 10
2015 23 30 32 24 23 21 18 23 24 31
2016 24 28 33 27 32 27 24 28 33 32
2017 29 32 33 32 35 32 29 31 34 34
2018 30 35 33 34 32 34 30 34 34 36
2019 32 34 36 36 40 38 39 43 41 38
Total 138 159 167 153 162 152 140 159 166 171
Av 27.6 31.8 33.4 30.6 32.4 30.4 28 31.8 33.2 34.2
CGDI 0.61 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.62 0.71 0.74 0.76
Level of Corporate Governance Disclosure by commercial banks in
Cameroon

37. IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Percentage of Banks’ Compliance to Corporate Governance Disclosure Items
Source: computed by researcher using data extracted from annual reports of banks (2020)
CGD ITEMSS CGD
1
CGD
2
CGD
3
CGD4 CGD
5
CGD
6
CGD
7
CGD8 CGD9 CGD1
0
CGD1
1
CGD12
Ave. no of compliant
banks
10 6 10 2 10 2 4 5 10 4 5 8
% of compliant banks 100
%
60% 100
%
20% 100
%
20% 40% 50% 100% 40% 50% 80%
CGD ITEMS
CGD
13
CGD
14
CGD
15
CGD1
6
CGD
17
CGD
18
CGD
19
CGD2
0
CGD2
1
CGD2
2
CGD2
3 CGD24
Ave. no of compliant
banks 10 10 10 10 10 10 2 4 10 10 2 8
% of compliant banks
100
%
100
%
100
% 100%
100
%
100
% 20% 40% 100% 100% 20% 80%
CGD ITEMS
CGD
25
CGD
26
CGD
27
CGD2
8
CGD
29
CGD
30
CGD
31
CGD3
2
CGD3
3
CGD3
4
CGD3
5 CGD36
Ave. no of compliant
banks 10 10 1 3 1 7 6 10 10 10 4 10
% of compliant banks
100
%
100
% 10% 30% 10% 70% 60% 100% 100% 100% 40% 100%
CGD ITEMS
CGD
37
CGD
38
CGD
39
CGD4
0
CGD
41
CGD
42
CGD
43
CGD4
4
CGD4
5
Ave. no of compliant
banks 1 4 10 10 10 7 6 10 10
% of compliant banks 10% 40%
100
% 100%
100
% 70% 60% 100% 100%

38. ROE BOS BCOM CGDI
ROE 1
BOS -.449** 1
BCOM -.486** -.289** 1
CGDI .252** .228** .119 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients Matrix for Model 1
Source: computed by researcher using data extracted from annual reports of banks (2020)

39. ROA BOS
BCO
M
CGD
I
ROA 1
BOS -0.452** 1
BCOM -.323** .289** 1
CGDI .134* .228** 0.119 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients Matrix for Model 2
Source: computed by researcher using data extracted from annual
reports of banks (2020)
IV Results & Discussions Cont’d

40. Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 5.514 1.131 4.875 .000
BOS -.253 .043 -.307 -5.872 .000
BCOM -.418 .056 -.381 -7.418 .000
CGDI .118 .044 .136 2.702 .007
a. Dependent Variable: ROE
Regression Result of model I
R Squared = 0.59
Adjusted R Squared = 0.51
F- Statistics = 49.009
IV Results & Discussions Cont’d

41. IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Regression result for model II
Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 10.444 1.537 6.797 .000
BOS -.173 .058 -.179 -2.961 .003
BCOM .463 .076 .359 6.052 .000
CGDI -.134 .059 -.132 -2.271 .024
a. Dependent Variable: ROA
R Squared = 0.63
Adjusted R Squared = 0.54
F- Statistics = 54.83

42. IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Hypothesis 1:
There is no significant relationship between board size and financial
performance of commercial banks in Cameroon.
• The correlation analysis between board size and return on equity
(ROE) has a coefficient (r) of -.449, meaning that there exists an
inverse correlation between the two variables. Also, the regression
coefficient of the model is negative (-.253), with a p- value of .000
significant at 1%.

43. IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Hypothesis 2:
The relationship between board composition and the financial
performance of Cameroonian commercial banks is statistically not
significant.
• The correlation result of this aspect of the study revealed a negative
correlation coefficient of -.48 which indicates that the more the
number of non-executive directors, the less the financial
performance of commercial banks in Cameroon.

44. IV Results & Discussions Cont’d
Hypothesis 3:
There is no significant relationship between the governance disclosures
of commercial banks in Cameroon and their performance.
• The result of this aspect of the study revealed that there is a positive
correlation of 0.252 was observed between corporate governance
disclosure by selected commercial banks and the performance of
banks as measured by return on equity (ROE).

45. Summary & Conclusion

46. Summary
The summary of findings was in line with the results of the statistical
analysis carried out to examine the relationship that exists between
corporate governance and the financial performance of commercial banks
in Cameroon.
1. The findings from the descriptive analysis of this study showed
that the average board size of commercial banks in Cameroon is 15 which
is relatively moderate board size.

47. Summary
2. Also, board composition which is the proportion of non-executive
directors to the executive directors on the board meeting recorded a
mean of 75%. This means that on average, about 75% of the board
members are outside directors (non-executive directors).
3. The average level of corporate governance disclosure is 84% which
showed that at least all the banks present a statement of their corporate
governance practices. Nevertheless, the comprehensiveness of the
statement differs from one bank to another

48. Summary Cont’d
4. The result of the regression analysis revealed that board size (BOS) has
a negative (-.253) relationship with the financial performance of
commercial banks in Cameroon.
• This result was also significant (t=-5.87, p=.000).
• The findings clearly indicate that an inverse relationship exist between
board size and the financial performance of commercial banks in
Cameroon as measured by ROE

49. Summary Cont’d
5. Also, the regression analysis indicated that there exist a negative (-.418)
between board composition (proposition of non-executive directors)
and the financial performance of commercial banks in Cameroon as
measured by ROE.
This result was equally significant (t=-7.418, p=.000).
The negative sign observed here means that an increase in the non-
executive directors on the board of directors will lead to a corresponding
decrease in the financial performance of commercial banks in Cameroon.

50. Conclusion
• Based on the findings obtained from this study, the following
conclusions could be made; most of the governance issues disclosed
by commercial banks in Cameroon has no consistency.
• Even though all the banks disclose their corporate governance
practices, what is usually disclosed is not in conformity with a
particular standard.
• Information on the performance of debt is hardly made known to the
public.
• Such information assist investors and would be investors an idea of
outstanding debts in terms due dates and their ages.

51. Limitations of the study
• Due to the current civil unrest in the country data
collection was difficult though the researcher
planned her movements to enable her collect the
required data
• The researcher did not have sufficient resources
thus the work took a longer time than anticipated
• The researcher did not get the much needed
support from the internal guide but the co-guide
dedicated much of his time to the best of his ability.

52. Directions for Future Research
Based on the findings of this research, we therefore present the
following recommendations which will be useful to stakeholders.
1) In order to advance corporate governance more effort should be
attentive to the value of the stock ownership of board members,
since this positively affect the operating performance.
2) Advocates of board independence should note with caution the
negative relationship between board individuality and future
operating performance.

53. Directions for Future Research
2) Hence, if the purpose of board independence is to improve
performance, then such efforts might be ill-advised.
However, if the purpose of board independence is to discipline
management of poorly performing firms or otherwise monitor, then
board independence has merit.

54. References
Appendices

55. Wishing you the best of luck in
your mentoring endeavors!
Thank You Very much for
you kind attention