On the political dimension of scientific evidence
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This document discusses the political dimension of scientific evidence and the assessment of carcinogenic risks. It argues that evidence of causation requires considering multiple sources, including correlations between potential causes and effects as well as underlying mechanisms. Both difference-making evidence and mechanistic evidence are important, and integrating different types of evidence provides stronger support for causal claims. The document examines debates around the carcinogenic risks of glyphosate and red meat consumption to illustrate issues regarding what evidence supports causal claims and how scientific knowledge informs actions and policies.
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On the political dimension of scientific evidence
- 1. On the political dimension of scientific evidence Federica Russo Philosophy | Humanities | Amsterdam russofederica.wordpress.com | @federicarusso
- 2. Philosophy of science. And the polis. 2
- 3. “The congenital weakness of the sociology of science is its propensity to look for obvious stated political motives and interests in one of the places, the laboratories, where sources of fresh politics as yet unrecognized as such are emerging. If by politics you mean elections and law, Pasteur […] was not driven by political interests […]. Thus his science is protected from enquiry and the myth of the autonomy of science is saved. If by politics you mean to be the spokesman of the forces you mould society with and of which you are the only credible and legitimate authority, then Pasteur is a fully political man. Indeed, he endows himself with one of the most striking fresh sources of power ever.” Latour, Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world, 1982 3
- 4. An argument from philosophy of science, rather than sociology Whether and how notions and concepts of evidence, knowledge, or certainty can contribute to a better making and understanding of science 4
- 5. Overview Why bothering? The assessment of carcinogenicity of glyphosate and red meat What evidence? Evidential pluralism: correlations, mechanism, and reinforced concrete Beyond evidence quarrels Questions about objective knowledge and truth 5
- 6. DON’T SPRAY THAT STUFF 6
- 7. 7
- 8. SPRAY IT – IT IS SAFE 8
- 9. 9
- 10. [Any conflict to declare?] It’s not just correlations. We’ve got mechanisms. The debate isn’t settled. What should we do? 10
- 11. DON’T EAT THAT STUFF 11
- 12. 12
- 13. Epidemiological facts or individual risk? How much of that stuff we eat today? And how much of that stuff did we use to eat? 13
- 14. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORISING ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 14
- 15. Causality and evidence C causes E Red meat consumption causes cancer Breathing glyphosate causes cancer Statins lower cholesterol Exercising reduces cardiovascular disease … How do we know that? What makes a causal claim true /versus/ What evidence supports a causal claim 15
- 16. Evidential pluralism To establish a causal claim we need multiple sources of evidence: That C makes a difference to E Correlations, counterfactuals, … That C produces E Mechanisms, processes, … Russo and Williamson, Interpreting causality in the health sciences, ISPS 2007 Epistemic causality and evidence-based medicine. HPLS 2011 Clarke et al, The evidence that evidence-based medicine omits, Preventive Medicine 2013 Mechanisms and the evidence hierarchy, Topoi 2014 16
- 17. Disambiguation Mechanistic evidence / difference-making evidence Evidence of … Evidence-gathering methods are not evidence Do RCTs suffice? Do lab experiments suffice? Illari, Disambiguating the Russo-Williamson Thesis, ISPS 2011
- 18. What mechanisms? What mechanism ought to support a causal claim? Fully-known? Confirmed? Plausible? Gillies, The Russo-Williamson thesis and the question of whether smoking causes heart disease, in Causality in the Sciences. 2011
- 19. “[…] In male CD-1 mice, glyphosate induced a positive trend in the incidence of a rare tumour, renal tubule carcinoma. A second study reported a positive trend for haemangiosarcoma in male mice. Glyphosate increased pancreatic islet-cell adenoma in male rats in two studies. A glyphosate formulation promoted skin tumours in an initiation-promotion study in mice. Glyphosate has been detected in the blood and urine of agricultural workers, indicating absorption. […]” 19
- 20. The analogy of reinforced concrete Evidence: integration, not substitution Integration helps tackle more problems Difference making and mechanisms help each other with their respective weaknesses Difference making helps with masking Mechanisms helps with confounding
- 21. Assess evidence of difference- making Assess evidence of mechanism Assess the integration of your total evidence
- 22. Generic vs single-case Generic causal claim are about epidemiological facts Population-level, repeatable “ […]Positive associations were seen in cohort studies and population-based case- control studies between consumption of red meat and cancers of the pancreas and the prostate […], and between consumption of processed meat and cancer of the stomach. […]” Single-case causal claims happens once in time and space E.g., individual diagnosis and prognosis Russo and Williamson, Generic vs. single-case causality. The case of autopsy. EJPS 2011 22
- 23. Mixed aetiology Disease causation is not just a bio-chemical fact Social factors participate in the whole process of disease development Changes in dietary habits and lifestyles are key The whole life world matters E.g.: fast food hypothesis, exposure to asbestos Kelly et al, The integration of social, behavioural, and biological mechanisms in models of pathogenesis, Perspect. Biol. Med. 2014 23
- 24. Knowledge and action How much do we need to know before acting? Ban glyphosate? Anti-inflammatory drugs (Aulin and Mesulid)? What can we learn from history of science? The Semmelweis case: puerperal fever and hand washing 24
- 26. Evidence, knowledge, and objective truths Scientific knowledge and science dissemination 26
- 27. 27
- 28. TO SUM UP AND CONCLUDE 28
- 29. We made progress in phil sci Evidence, causation, knowledge Benefits cross the borders of the discipline Integration of philosophical theorising in real, concrete situations IARC on assessment of carcinogenicity NICE on preparation of guidelines for public health ZINL on regulation of health care 29
- 30. ebmplus.org 30
Editor's Notes
- Scientific evidence is at heart of epistemological and methodological discussions among scientists as well as philosophers of science. But what happens to these theories of evidence once the debate crosses the borders of science and philosophy and enters the ‘political’ sphere? What use are these theories outside the ‘comfort zone’ in which they have been developed? In this talk, I will discuss just a selection of issues that arise when scientific claims reach the political arena and generate public controversies. To motivate and exemplify the claims made in the talk, I will make reference to some work by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and that concludes to the (non-)carcinogenicity of selected chemicals or other substances. Specifically, I will refer to two such decisions: the one on glyphosate — a widely used pesticide – and the recent one concerning consumption of red and processed meat. The objective is not to take side for or against these decisions, but to show how some debates in philosophy of science can help re-frame these controversies. I will present recent work in philosophy of science that develop pluralistic account of evidence. More specifically, I will introduce a thesis – also known as ‘the Russo-Williamson Thesis’ or RWT for short – according to which causal relations in the health sciences are typically established on the basis of evidence of correlation and of mechanisms. I will also present some corollaries about this thesis, namely about the distinction between generic causal knowledge and individual-level causal assessment, and about the integration of social factors in the explanation of disease mechanisms. All these considerations, I will argue, also shed light on another important aspect: the distinction between knowledge and action. To be sure, these philosophical concepts – as well as many others – shed light on numerous aspects of the scientific practice ‘outside the lab’. Yet, the examples examined in this talk function as good test cases for a long-term project that tries to get philosophy of science more actively engaged with several aspects of the scientific practice and with science communication.EndFragmentUseful links:http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/MonographVolume112.pdfhttps://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2015/pdfs/pr240_E.pdfhttp://ebmplus.org Conflict of interest >> precaution Knowledge vs action / decision Sommelweis case ? Glyphosate, IARC and Monsanto Defending science beyond reason Scientism and dogmatism from the backdoor Elena Cattaneo’s defence of GMO What evidence? Integrating statistics with mechanisms Glyphosate, why IARC put in 2A Check stuff on IARC monograph on red meat and processed meant + Lancet oncology to be issued on 26 Oct In particular, I will discuss the following cases. First, claims about epidemiology as junk science because of the huge amount of false positives. Second, the publication of certain scientific results published by respectable scientific agencies– for instance about the carcinogenicity of red and processed meat. Third, the strenuous defense of the safety of some products – e.g., OGMs – by knowledgeable scientists. The objective is not to take side for or against such claims, but to show how some debates in philosophy of science can help re-frame these controversies. The morals to be draw from these cases concern three distinct, albeit often related, levels. First, a separation of methodological caveats from science communication issues. Second, a lack of integration of social, economic, and environmental factors in disease explanation. Third, a confusion between the validity of scientific results and absolute truths. To be sure, these – and many other – philosophical considerations shed light on numerous (and less controversial) aspects of the scientific practice ‘outside the lab’. Yet, the examples examined in this talk function as good test case for a long-term project that tries to get philosophy of science more actively engaged with science in practice.
- Autonomies of Science Philosophy of science Philosophers of science in the agorà Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice EBM+ consortium Political: politikos, pertaining to the polis Scientific evidence and the politês
- So in the end: not interested in arguing for or against some of the controversies that I will mention, but to highlight how some concepts can help re-frame the debate
- Glyphosate: probably carcinogenic (2A)
- Mention various regulatory bodies that expressed favourable opinion
- sufficient evidence in human beings for the carcinogenicity of the consumption of processed meat. limited evidence in human beings for the carcinogenicity of the consumption of red meat.
- Muddled evidence for a causal claim with having knowledge written on the stone. Mostly, objective truth, with a scientistic and positivist flavour enters from the back door. In other cases the problem is muddling issues about what science establishes with the way the results are communicated