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Circuit-Breakers: Can The Case Method Prevent Acting-Out?
INTRODUCTION
What is the status of knowledge in the case method? What is the difference between
knowledge-transfer and building competencies? Is the case method as ‘indifferent’ to
knowledge as it is usually thought to be? Or is there a difference between the
‘knowledge-transfer’ model of learning and what the case method re-defines as
knowledge? Any attempt to answer these questions must begin by noting that the
main assumption here is that knowledge in the strong sense is related to ‘content’
that can be clearly identified; and is, to some extent, independent of who occupies
the locus of the instructor or the students. Knowledge is understood in this model to
be something that is packed into a book. The implicit analogy is that of the container
and contained; the book is the container and knowledge is the contained. Earlier, in
the oral tradition (before the invention of books), the instructor was the container
and knowledge was the contained. Once however knowledge is successfully
transmitted, the student becomes a container in his turn. He can then deploy this
knowledge as a practitioner or transmit it to the next generation as a teacher.
Knowledge is then passed on from one generation to another. When there is an
increase in knowledge, it is compared to filling up the container with even more
content. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with all this since this model has its
own uses, but the case method is working with a different model of knowledge and
a different notion of what it means to ‘contain’ in the classroom (Bonoma, 1989;
Kavous, 2006; Srinivasan, 2015a; Srinivasan, 2015b).
CONTAINING ANXIETY
In psychoanalysis, what the case instructor contains is not knowledge per se (which
to some extent is taken for granted since it is not possible to discuss a case in the
radical absence of knowledge), but the anxiety that is inherent in the learning
process since the subject by definition has a ‘passion for ignorance,’ especially in
matters that might trigger-off his symptom or open up his unconscious. This anxiety
encompasses not only that which is experienced by the student transferentially, but

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also that which is agitated in the instructor counter-transferentially. The notion of
the ‘container’ here then is analogous to a psychoanalyst who will not only conduct
the analysis in such a way that the patient does not act-out, but can also work
through his own counter-transference honestly in order to prevent himself from
acting-out (Evans, 1997; Katz, 2013). In other words, it is not knowledge per se, but
the transferential approaches to knowledge and competency building that is at stake in
the case method. The seeming de-valorization of knowledge then is not because
knowledge is not thought to be important, but the fact that knowledge per se is not
what is in contention. What is in contention then is the point of join between
knowledge and competence, as demonstrated most famously in decision-making
that is well-informed, rational, and vigilant in terms of consequences (both intended
and unintended). While this sort of decision-making is a tall-order and not easy to
build into students or participants in managerial development programs; it is within
the ambit of decision making to make decisions with as few symptomatic impediments
as possible so that decision-makers can act decisively without acting out.
TRANSFERENCE AS MEDIATION
The case method then works with a different model of knowledge from that which
serves as the default modality in the lecture method. The crucial analogy here is not
that of the ‘container’ and the ‘contained’ unless we are using these terms in the
context of handling transferential and counter-transferential turbulence that is
marked by anxiety and other such affects. The container-contained model is more
relevant in situations which envisage a direct transfer of information or knowledge
(as the case may be). This model of knowledge transfer may also be relevant, to some
extent, in self-directed models of learning with exams in mind, but the model of
knowledge that is presupposed in the case method is one that is mediated by the
transference. The container-contained model must give way here to a different
analogy. The analogy that will accommodate the transference as a necessary form of
mediation, then, is that of the relationship between the psychoanalyst and the
patient. The continual sense of ‘bewilderment’ that continues to haunt those who are
working only within the knowledge-transfer model stems from not differentiating

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between the physician’s knowledge and the patient’s knowledge. While in the case of
pathology, it is the physician’s knowledge that is curative; in psycho-pathology, it is
the patient’s knowledge of his own symptom, albeit knowledge which is arrived
through a transferential mediation, that is therapeutic. That is why psychoanalysts
are not trying to cure the patient, but working with a more modest notion of
‘therapy.’ The knowledge-transfer model of learning is also haunted by the idea that
it is possible to short-circuit the transference and arrive at knowledge directly. The
entire wager of the Freudian argument is that this is not possible since the
transference is not an aberration but a structurally necessary form of unconscious
mediation that will give the patient an opportunity to understand his cognitive and
decision-making patterns. These cognitive patterns then are mediated by the
unconscious set of associations that accrue in language, and which have to be
affectively worked-through, and not merely thought-through. Freud was fond of
pointing out that a patient cannot be helped by teaching him the basic rudiments of
meta-psychology. In fact, it is not even necessary that the patient should understand
the formal theory of analysis that is invoked in psychoanalysis as long as he is
willing to follow the fundamental rule.
THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE
The fundamental rule in psychoanalysis is to simply say whatever comes to mind
without getting waylaid by the transference or use it aggressively as a form of
resistance. This is something that is not commonly understood. People who criticize
psychoanalysis use arguments that are quite similar to those who are skeptical of the
case method since they feel that there is not sufficient time to complete the task
assuming that it is worth trying (Srinivasan, 2010). The Freudian demand in the
analytic situation is not that the patient should narrate everything that has happened
in his life to the analyst. The patient merely has to report whatever appears on the
‘surface of his mind’ - this process is known as ‘free-association’ (Rycroft, 1972,
1995). If the demand were the former then there will obviously not be sufficient time
to complete the treatment. There is however no technical or therapeutic requirement
to map the entirety of lived experience with the time invested in the analytic

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situation. The relationship between lived experience and the analytic consideration
of that experience is that of a synecdoche (i.e. it is a part-whole relationship); which
is, by definition, asynchronous and asymmetrical. The notion of time in the analytic
situation is structured by ‘retroactive’ phenomena rather than through a
chronological unfolding of events in a linear sequence. The patient must honestly
report whatever aspect of his lived experience is a source of botheration; that’s all. So
there is, in fact, sufficient time to complete the analysis (Valenstein, 2000). The long
duration of psychoanalysis is not because the patient is talking at length and a lot of
information has to be shared with the analyst, but because of the difficulty involved
in working through the transference. The patient insists on talking about things that
sound interesting but are not relevant to the existential problem that necessitates the
analysis. When the analyst and the patient are able to identify the master-signifier
correctly, the analysis is over (Evans, 1997). But what is the underlying anxiety here?
What is the anxiety that prevents some people from either accepting or working
through the model of knowledge and insight that is built into the psychoanalytic
model? The anxiety is that it will take too long. The anxiety then pertains to the
question of the interminability of analysis, which Freud himself spent time worrying
about (French, 1997). But analysis of the core trauma, if any, is not interminable; the
misunderstanding is related to the belief that everything has to be discussed rather
than the core signifiers that structure the trauma.
RESISTANCE TO THE CASE METHOD
The resistance to the case method is not merely in the transfer of this analogy to a
theory of pedagogy, but intrinsic in some forms of psychotherapy as well. The
resistance is internal to psychoanalysis itself as a profession since psychoanalysts are
human too. The basic demand in all these forms of therapy is to find ways to reduce
the time taken to complete the treatment unless it is a ‘training-analysis,’ i.e., an
analysis where somebody is being trained to become a psychoanalyst. In such a case
the given individual can invest time like a research student who wants to become a
teacher, and is therefore willing to work both at the level of theory and practice, and
invest the effort necessary to do so. Those who are preoccupied with a direct model

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of knowledge transfer are haunted, for instance, by the idea that teaching meta-
psychology will be curative in itself. The pedagogical equivalent of this is to think
that teaching management theory is both necessary and sufficient to train managers.
But merely reading about or being introduced to meta-psychology is only a
requirement in training analysts, it is not a requirement in therapeutic analyses.
Likewise, there is no harm in teaching management theory, but that is not the same
as teaching decision-making or building in other competencies. Both are important
and have their place in the curriculum, but the relevant analogies that are necessary
to understand these phenomena are not the same. There are then two forms of
knowledge in contention: theoretical and practical. It is practical knowledge that is
‘therapeutic,’ since it helps the patient to re-wire his unconscious, or at least
understand the patterns of wiring that constitute the libidinal structure from which
his symptoms are drawn. In other words, knowledge of decision making is not the
same as being knowledgeable in decision making. The case method is pitching its
goals at the latter; it is based on the theoretical wager that a model of pedagogy,
where case discussants can both think-through and work-through offers a more
effective model of managerial education.
THE UNCONSCIOUS
The fantasy in the simple knowledge transfer model of education is that there is no
such thing as the unconscious in the strong sense of the term. What is
misunderstood by the term ‘unconscious’ is more akin to the Freudian pre-
conscious. Freud however uses the term unconscious in the sense of das Unbewusste;
that is, something that cannot be known rather than something that the subject is not
thinking about at this point, but which he can at short notice (Lacan, 1979). The
inability to understand the difference between the pre-conscious and the
unconscious, then, is at the core of the hostility and indifference that the case method
inspires in those who fear it. What animates the subject’s phobic avoidance of such a
model is the gap between the analyst’s knowledge and the patient’s knowledge, and
the role of the transference in negotiating this gap. A pre-occupation with
knowledge in excess is that the trauma induced by this gap (which is a structural

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gap rather than because of any inadequacy in teaching) can be ‘sutured’ once and for
all so that the learning subject will be able to learn without experiencing the
vulnerability that emerges in the context of a transference. The vulnerability is not
only related to the power that the analyst may have over the patient, but also the fear
that the patient experiences about his own unconscious. Furthermore, the patient is
afraid of discovering that just as the transference serves as a form of resistance in the
analytic situation, the learning subject, too, has a habit of self-disruption. In other
words, the frightening truth is that the subject can disrupt his own progress
systematically if he is not acquainted with and willing to work-through the
constitutive ambivalence that goes to the core of his being. Hence, the propensity to
act-out when the decision-maker thinks that he is merely acting or acting decisively.
How will a decision maker know when he is acting and when he is acting out? What
are the safeguards, if any, to prevent the subject from self-destructing when the
pressures mount? What is to prevent a rational subject from acting out
identifications that may not be in his own interests or which are counter-productive
for the firm?
CONCLUSION
So while the pre-occupation with simplistic models of knowledge transfer may be in
denial about the immediate possibility of acting out, the system as such is not in
denial about irrational behavior. A simple example is that of ‘herd-behavior’ in stock
exchanges and the use of ‘circuit-breakers’ to prevent transactions, especially when
too many brokers or participants are selling stocks in a panic-stricken way that is
totally unwarranted by ground conditions. While such actions may be justified in the
short term through the fantasy of ‘buy-back’ modalities, these buy-back schemes are
extremely complicated and require regulatory approval. This process of acting-out
and trying to undo the damage half-heartedly later not only leads to a financial risk
for the firm concerned, but can lead to a serious loss of reputation for a decision-
maker. These then are some of the dangers that being knowledgeable cannot prevent
in how decision makers and firms behave in situations when consequences of
decisions are not thought through. These situations however will not remain

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exceptions in the firm. Given the levels of change, turbulence, and uncertainty, in the
international economy; especially in recessionary environments, it is important to
produce drecision-makers who will remain cool in a crisis, and resist the temptation
to act-out. Impulse control is not a skill-set that can be learnt on the job. In fact, the
more knowledgeable somebody is, the more tempted he will be to make a mistake
because he feels that he knows-it-all. While there are systemic safe-guards in place
like circuit breakers in stock markets, there is a limit to how often these can be
invoked. It is therefore necessary to find a pedagogical strategy that can serve as a
point of join between being knowledgeable and being decisive. There is, in fact, such
a strategy; it is called the case method.
REFERENCES
Bonoma, Thomas (1989). ‘Learning with Cases,’ Case Reprint Number 9-589-080
(Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing).
Evans, Dylan (1997a). ‘Acting-Out,’ An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian
Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge), pp. 2-3.
Evans, Dylan (1997b). ‘End of Analysis,’ An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian
Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge), pp. 53-55.
French, Robert B. (1997). ‘The Teacher as Container of Anxiety: Psychoanalysis and
the Role of the Teacher,’ Journal of Management Education, November 21:4, pp. 483-
495.
Kavous, Ardalan (2006). ‘The Philosophical Foundation of the Lecture-versus-Case
Controversy: Its Implications for Faculty Teaching, Research, and Service,’
International Journal of Social Economics, 33:3/4, pp. 261-281.
Katz, Montana (Ed.) Metaphors and Fields: Common Ground, Common Language, and the
Future of Psychoanalysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), passim.
Lacan, Jacques (1979). The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, edited by
Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books), passim.
Laplanche, Jean and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand (1973). ‘Acting-Out,’ The Language of
Psychoanalysis, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith with an introduction by
Daniel Lagache (London: Karnac Books), pp. 4-6.

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Rycroft, Charles (1972, 1995). ‘Free association,’ A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis
(London: Penguin Books), pp. 59-60.
Srinivasan, Shiva Kumar (2010). ‘Do We Have the Time for the Case Method?’ IIM
Kozhikode Working Papers Series, IIIMK/WPS/77/2010/16.
Srinivasan, Shiva Kumar (2015a). ‘What is at Stake in the Case Method?’ IOSR
Journal of Research and Method in Education, 5:1, Version 1, pp. 1-9.
Srinivasan, Shiva Kumar (2015b). ‘The Eureka Moment: Or, Who Speaks in the Case
Method?’ IOSR Journal of Business and Management, 17:1, Version 2, pp. 25-30.
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Psychoanalytic Association, 48:4 pp. 1563-1589.
SHIVA KUMAR SRINIVASAN, IIM KOZHIKODE