Netzero to the Edge - version 1

SummaryReport
Version1.0
April2014
Preparedfor:
U.S.Army
RapidEquippingForce(REF)
U.S.Army
RapidEquippingForce(REF)
Net-ZerototheEdge

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Acknowledgements
The assessments, insights, conclusions and recommendations summarized in this report are the result
of research and analysis efforts conducted under the Reliability Information Analysis Center (RIAC) for
the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF).
RIAC has served as a Department of Defense (DoD) Information Analysis Center (IAC) for more than 35
years. The mission of a DoD IAC is to improve the productivity of researchers, engineers, and program
managers in the research, development and acquisition communities by collecting, analyzing, applying,
and disseminating worldwide scientific and technical information. The secondary mission is to promote
standardization within their field.
As an IAC, RIAC provides the information, tools, training, and technical expertise in the engineering
disciplines of Reliability, Maintainability, Quality, Supportability, and Interoperability (RMQSI) to support
accurate decision making and implement cost-effective solutions throughout all phases of a product or
system life cycle.
RIAC website: http://www.theriac.org/

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Preface
“Joint Forces must become more expeditionary in nature and will require a smaller logistical footprint in part by
reducing large fuel and energy demands.”
-- 2011 National Military Strategy
Operational energy (OE) is defined by statute as the energy required for training, moving, and sustain-
ing military forces, weapons, and equipment for military operations. OE typically accounts for 75 per-
cent of all energy used by the Department of Defense1
. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom/Operation Enduring Freedom, DoD has initiated numerous studies, assessments, technology
demonstrations, and reports that have made recommendations on how to improve operational energy
use in expeditionary environments.
In 2010, the Department of Defense established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)) to strengthen the energy security of U.S. military
operations. The mission of the office is to help the military services and combatant commands improve
military capabilities, cut costs, and lower operational and strategic risk through better energy ac-
counting, planning, management, and innovation.
In 2011, the Army included “Objective 8.0: Achieve Energy Security and Sustainability Objectives in the
2012 Army Campaign Plan and appointed the Army G-4 as the Army staff lead for Operational Energy
establishing the Army Operational Energy Office that same year.
In May 2011, the US Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF), a staff support agency within the Army G3/5/7
introduced its Energy to the Edge (E2E) initiative, focusing on OE requirements for small units oper-
ating at the tactical edge. This effort evolved into the current Net-Zero to the Edge initiative as the REF
quickly identified common challenges and opportunities associated with water, waste and energy.
The intent of this report is to disseminate observations, findings, and recommendations from the REF’s
E2E and Net-Zero initiatives to the OE community.
1
Department of Defense Annual Energy Management Report, 2009, 2012

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The US Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has been an early pioneer in the Operational Energy (OE)
domain in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2006, REF
established a Power Surety Task Force (PSTF). The PSTF has been responsible for identifying many of
the solutions and capabilities that are deployed in theater today. Organizations including the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD [OEPP]) can trace their roots to the PSTF. When the PSTF
transitioned to OSD in 2008, the REF deferred all energy-related requirements and quickly lost its OE
situational awareness and expertise.
In 2011, however, at the urging of both OSD (OEPP)
and ASA (IEE), REF included Operational Energy in its
Requirements Integrated Priority List (RIPL) and dedi-
cated resources, expertise, and funding to the effort.
The focus of the REF is on Army units operating at the
tactical edge – remote, often austere locations beyond
routine logistical support reach. In order to address
the energy needs of these units more directly, the REF
developed and implemented the Energy to the Edge
(E2E) effort. The primary objective of the E2E initiative
has been to identify and bridge the operational energy
gaps at the tactical edge without resorting to addition-
al ground or aerial resupply operations. A secondary objective is to provide meaningful and measurable
analysis that supports future policy and procurement decisions by Army senior leadership. To heed les-
sons-learned from previous efforts, the REF established five guiding principles for E2E:
1. Understand the Unit’s specific problems and approach them with a range of solutions.
2. Identify measureable metrics and baselines upfront.
3. Integrate collection and monitoring plans early in the procurement phase.
4. Subject Matter Experts and Assessment Teams must be solution-agnostic.
5. Operate in an open, transparent, and collaborative environment.
The REF dispatched OE advisors within months of establishing its Energy to Edge initiative and quickly

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expanded the effort to include water and waste challenges under Net-Zero to the Edge (NZ2E). REF
instituted a spiral approach to solving the problem with the understanding that the effort would con-
tinuously identify new challenges. REF also modified its current rapid equipping process, creating six
phases for its implementation:
1. Identifying and Understanding the Requirement;
2. Establishing Partnerships;
3. Selecting Solutions;
4. Equipping Units;
5. Assessing Impact; and
6. Informing the community.
During Spiral I, REF quickly learned that the biggest challenge at the tactical edge was the lack of power
and energy expertise within the units as soldiers and leaders were not trained to use Army standard
power generation and management equipment. This information was also shared with other OE stake-
holders. While Spiral 1 delivered hybrid and alternative energy systems, the solutions provided a small
percentage of the total quantity of energy consumed in the life support area (LSA) of each outpost.
More than particular technologies, the biggest impact on reducing fuel consumption at the tactical
edge came from OE advisors educating, training, advising and implementing energy efficient strategies
and architectures. Through 2013, these advisors have continued circulating throughout theater. Their
presence ensures a continuous understanding of the problem in a rapidly evolving environment equip-
ping units and assessing impacts.
The REF works very closely with both Army capability and materiel developers with guidance from ASA
(IE&E), G4 OE Office and G3/5/7. Nearly all of the solutions REF procures are selected based on recom-
mendations from Army PEOs and Army Development and Engineering Centers.
Spiral II was generated from an early draft of a U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Operational Need
Statement (ONS) focusing on providing complete camp solutions integrated with energy efficient com-
ponents designed to simultaneously lower energy and water demand while generating energy more
efficiently. The evolving operations in OEF have allowed re-purposing of solutions to support Army op-
erations in several African nations, as well as Honduras and Turkey. REF has initiated Spiral III as it cur-
rently equips units with Spiral II solutions.
REF has equipped units while deployed at home-station, and during their mobilization readiness exer-
cises. Unless these operations are planned well in advance, OE initiatives cannot compete with the

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higher priority training requirements during home-station or training at the Combat Training Centers.
There are advantages to supplying OE equipment in theater, which outweigh the disadvantages associ-
ated with moving equipment and personnel, including:
 Site-Centric Solutions: Equipment and training can be tailored to the specific missions and con-
ditions at the site.
 End-User Education: The end-user has first-hand experience with the challenges and under-
stands the tactical benefits of NZ2E solutions.
 Immediate Relevant Feedback: OE advisors observe first hand end-user acceptance and suita-
bility issues.
 Trained in Relevant Environment. Actual operators and supervisors attend training in relevant
operational environment.
Although focused on the tactical edge, the REF NZ2E initiative has had a strategic impact on the Army’s
overall OE program. There are three key areas where REF contributions have shaped DoD and Army
strategic decision-making:
 Inserting emerging solutions to accelerate materiel enterprise solutions,
 Supporting Army strategic communications, and
 Conducting outreach to industry, especially in the area of emerging technologies.
Another important goal for the REF E2E and subsequent NZ2E initiatives is informing the stakeholder
community. It is a continuous effort that flows through each phase of the REF program and deemed to
be essential for developing strong partnerships and rapidly delivering better solutions in support of the
warfighter. The REF contributions to the US Army OE campaign are directly related to the degree to
which the organization collaborates with the OE stakeholder community. It is most effective when it
operates within its core competencies, namely:
(a) Working with deployed units to understand requirements and derive key insights from field
experience;
(b) Rapidly equipping units to assess capabilities (not specific products); and
(c) Properly informing stakeholders across the capability development and materiel acquisition
organizations to improve the effectiveness, reliability, and durability of deployable solutions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sections
Preface……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iii
Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...vi
1.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
1.1 Army Operational Energy strategy…………………………………………………………………………………. 1
1.2 REF Early OE Efforts ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..3
2.0 REF’s Net-Zero to the Edge initiative…………………………………………………………………………………………... 6
2.1 REF Lessons Learned from Previous Energy Initiatives………………………………………………….. 7
2.2 REF Net-Zero Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
2.2.1 Identifying and Understanding the Requirement………………………………………………..8
2.2.2 Establishing Partnerships…………………………………………………………………………………...9
2.3 Selecting Solutions………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
2.3.1 Considerations for Selection………………………………………………………………………….. 11
2.3.2 Criteria for Selection………………………………………………………………………………………...12
2.3.3 Criteria for Equipping……………………………………………………………………………………... 12
2.3.4 Spiral I Solutions……………………………………………………………………………………………….13
2.3.5 Spiral II Solutions …………………………………………………………………………………………....16
2.3.6 Non-Materiel Solutions……………………………………………………………………………………. 17
2.4 Equipping Units………………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 18
2.5 Assessing Impact…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 19
2.5.1 Tactical and Operational Impact……………………………………………………………………… 21

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2.5.2 Other Observations …………………………………………………………………………………………...24
2.6 Strategic OE Impact ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..28
2.6 Informing the Community of Interest……………………………………………………………………………..30
3.0 Conclusions and Recommendations……………………………………………………………………………………………...32
3.1 Training Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………….32
3.2 Materiel Solution Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………….33
3.3 Capability Enhancement Recommendations ………………………………………………………………….34
Figures
Figure 1. Evolution of Army REF NetZero-to-the-Edge………………………………………………………………………...5
Figure 2. Site Generator Utilization Rate…………………………………………………………………………………………...22
Figure 3. Site Utilization…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….24
Figure 4. Hybrid Power to Mission Critical Systems……………………………………………………………………………25
Figure 5. E2E Impact (Realized & Potential)……………………………………………………………………………………….25
Figure 6. E2E Strategic Impacts………………………………………………………………………………………………………….25

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Army Operational Energy Strategy
The Army has developed a comprehensive Operational
Energy Strategy that requires Assistant Secretaries, Army
Staff, Army Commands, Army Service Component
Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to improve energy
performance through:
 The development of proper techniques, behaviors, and organizational culture;
 The integration of OE considerations into planning, requirements development, acquisition,
construction, operations, R&D, technology evaluation, reporting, and management programs;
 The coordination of energy-related plans, budgets and activities; and
 The tracking, management and reporting operational energy performance and usage.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment (ASA (IE&E)) provides
oversight and is supported by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, who synchronizes activities across
the Army. The intent is to establish an energy informed culture through education, training, and
awareness programs which values energy as a resource that enables enhanced capabilities such as
agility, endurance, flexibility, and resilience, thus lowering operational risk.
To synchronize activities between Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) and Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition Logistics and Technology (ASA (ALT)), Logistics Innovation
Agency (LIA) and other Army Organizations, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 established the
Operational Energy Office. While the G-4 OE office is responsible for the synchronization of all OE
activities, each organization has its own OE responsibilities as outlined below:
 Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3: Validates and prioritizes Army requirements.
 TRADOC: Develops Training and Doctrine supporting OE objectives. As the Army’s capability
developer, it authors requirements documents for the materiel developer community.
 AMC: Develops and delivers global readiness solutions to sustain Unified Land Forces anytime,
anywhere. AMC includes Army Research, Development & Engineering Command (RDECOM)
and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

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 USACE: Provides commercial-level power to military units during full-spectrum operations.
Manages the prime-power electrical support contracts.
 ASA (ALT): Develops, acquires, fields, and sustains equipment and services leveraging
technologies and capabilities to meet current and future Army needs. Program Executive Office
(PEO) Soldier and PEO Combat Support & Combat Service Support are the primary ASA (ALT)
contributors to the Army OE Effort.
 LIA: Responsible for logistics innovation, technology exploration, and changes to logistics
processes to facilitate the development and fielding of concepts that enable Joint
interdependency and keep pace with the current and future operating environments. The
Smart and Green Energy (SAGE) initiative is focused on the Forward Operating Bases and
Combat Outposts.
The REF mission is to bridge capability gaps with interim solutions until an institutional requirement or
acquisition processes can address the need. The REF’s focus on providing near-term interim solutions
allows it to accept risk in researching new solutions. Some of the advantages and resources that
naturally evolve from the REF approach are:
 The permanent theater presence of the REF and its continuous interaction with deployed units
allows access and operational insight into “over the horizon” challenges.
 Congressional funding of REF with both Base and OCO funding. REF is provided a mix of OMA,
OPA and RDT&E funds that allows flexibility in pursuing solutions that may require efforts of
varying time commitments.
 The REF Director is empowered by the DAG3 to validate requirements. A validated REF
requirement is considered an Army requirement.
 Use of both “traditional” and “non-traditional” procurement approaches improve speed of
execution.
 Fund “acceleration” of existing efforts.
 Interim use of FSRs to mitigate Testing Cycle.
 Leverage existing Service Contracts within Government.
 Use of MOUs/MOAs with other government agencies to execute tasks.
 Use of multiple Contracting Offices (maximize the use of Theater Joint Contracting Commands).

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1.2 Rapid Equipping Force Early OE Efforts
Responding to a July 2006 Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) renewable energy Joint Urgent
Operational Need Statement (JUONS), REF dedicated funding and personnel to find and insert
emerging technologies that could reduce fuel consumption and reliance on fuel resupply convoys in
the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). In October 2006, REF formalized the effort and initiated
the Power Surety Task Force (PSTF).
From 2006 to 2008, the PSTF identified and incubated several hybrid power and energy demand
reduction solutions, a number of which have matured and have been deployed by the Army:
 Transportable Hybrid Electric Power Station (THEPS): In
August 2006, REF funded the development of an prototype
5 kW ruggedized hybrid power system that utilizes both
renewable and traditional energy sources: wind turbines,
solar panels, diesel generators and batteries in order to
provide both continuous and back-up power. The system
components fit inside a ¾ ton trailer or 20ft connex. While
the system proved effective in reducing fuel consumption, it
was not ideal for harsh combat conditions. The system is
currently located and operational at the National Training
Center, Ft. Irwin, CA.
 Hybrid Electric Station – K Crossing: The hybrid electric
station demonstration was to decrease the K-Crossing Joint
Operations Center’s (JOC) energy dependence on the local
Kuwaiti power grid. The system was designed to provide
22kW back into the utility grid. The hybrid electric station
can provide renewable power that can be combined with
conventional fossil fuel power to enhance mission capability
while providing constant reliable power. The system
received marginal feedback, primarily due to poor
expectation management. Because the JOC did not receive the power directly, no data was
collected to verify energy offsets.
 Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (TGER): In the summer of 2008, REF deployed two (2) bio-
refinery hybrid power systems to Camp Victory, Iraq for a 90-day operational assessment. TGER,
jointly developed by RDECOM, Defense Life Sciences, and Purdue University, converted roughly

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2,000 pounds of solid waste—paper, plastic, packaging and
food waste-into approximately 800 kWh of electricity via a
standard 60-kilowatt diesel generator. The in-theater
assessment determined that the system required too many
man-hours to operate and maintain. RDECOM recently
completed system upgrades to address many of the
operational shortfalls and is in the process of transitioning
the capability to either a Military Program Office or to the
Industry.
 Tactical Electrical Solar System (TESS): In 2008 REF equipped
units deployed in both Horn of Africa (HOA) and Iraq with
portable Hybrid power systems comprised of two 50W solar
panels and storage capacity in a 100amp-hour absorbed
glass mat battery with four 12V DC receptacles. The entire
system weighs 85lbs and is equipped with a 120V 60Hz AC
component. TESS is the precursor to the current portable
hybrid systems that are currently being deployed by both
the Marine Corps and the US Army REF.
 External Foam Insulation (Eskimo): After several CONUS
demonstrations, the REF PSTF conducted an in-theater
proof of concept, foaming 500,000 square feet of
temporary shelters in Iraq, Afghanistan and Djibouti with
polyurethane insulation – resulting in 75% reduction in
electricity consumed by heating and cooling environmental
control units (ECU). Due to the effectiveness of the solution,
leadership in both Afghanistan and Iraq issued contingency
funding to foam an additional 12 Million square feet. The
assessment of the “theater-wide foaming” effort was mixed
due to a number of factors. First, the post foaming activities, reducing the number and size of ECUs
along with resizing and rebalancing of generators did not take place concurrent with the foaming.
Second, many of the sub-contractors employed lacked the requisite expertise to properly foam the
structures, and third, operational leaders were satisfied with the quality of life benefits and did not
actively pursue fuel savings.
In February 2008, the PSTF was transitioned to the Energy Security Task Force (ESTF) under the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)). All ongoing REF energy

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projects at the time transitioned along with the PSTF, which continued supporting DoD OE objectives
and was instrumental in (a) setting up the USMC Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) and (b) executing
the Net-Zero Plus Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) from 2008 to 2010. The Power
Surety Task Force was disbanded at the end of FY 2010.
In the summer of 2010, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (IE&E) requested that the REF reintroduce
Operational Energy as part of its mission. In the following Spring, REF initiated its Energy to the Edge
(E2E) effort. Figure 1 provides a summary of REF OE programs from inception leading to the
establishment of the PSTF and its transition to OSD under the ESTF (as described above) and the
resurrection of the REF OE initiatives under E2E and NZ2E as further described in the forthcoming
section of this report.
Figure 1. Brief History and Evolution of Army REF Energy and NetZero-to-the-Edge Initiatives

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2.0 NETZERO-TO-THE-EDGE INITIATIVE
In May 2011, the US Army Rapid Equipping Force launched its Energy to the Edge initiative. As a former
BCT commander, the REF Director and his staff, at the time, were not initially armed with a clear
understanding of the operational and tactical value of reducing fuel consumption on the battlefield.
Their perspective was informed by two events:
1. While operating in southern Iraq as BCT commander, the Director’s soldiers lived and operated
in “foamed” structures with ECUs that continued to run 24 hours, 7 days a week. While soldier
comfort was increased, it made no appreciable difference in fuel consumption associated with
electricity generation for the ECUs: “it didn’t reduce fuel; it made it comfortable for my Soldiers
to sleep.”
2. When the PSTF requested support to reduce fuel and energy consumption in the 300 area of FT
Belvoir, it was not clear how such a request could reduce soldier mortality.
The position of the REF evolved as Commanders in the field started to articulate the need to reduce
reliance on resupply operations. Three key events led to REF’s E2E initiative:
1. During an in-theater visit, the REF Director received an overview of Operation Over Watch from
the Deputy Commander, 1/101 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) operating in Regional Command-
East, Afghanistan. Operation Over Watch required a majority of the BCT’s combat power to
resupply 3 combat outposts.
2. A U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and Combined Joint Special Operations
Command Task Force –Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 10-Liner request for sustainment capability to
support theater’s Village Stability Operations (VSO).
3. REF’s participation in the CENTCOM’s Energy Summit in May 2011, where REF heard first-hand
from theater leadership the need to reduce reliance on fuel.
The primary objective of the E2E initiative has been to identify and fulfill the operational energy gaps at
the tactical edge—defined as units located beyond a Battle Space Owner’s routine logistical support
reach, without requiring additional ground or aerial resupply operations. A secondary objective is to
provide meaningful and measurable analyses that support the U.S. Army’s policy and procurement
decisions.

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2.1 REF Lessons-Learned from Previous Energy Initiatives
Prior to committing resources to the Energy to the Edge initiative, the REF reviewed its previous energy
efforts and identified lessons-learned, as well as negative and positive experiences and practices that
can inform better performance under E2E. These findings include the following:
 Warfighters won’t always be able to identify requirements or adequately define them. In many
cases, they won’t know what they want until they see it. It’s the REF’s job to understand their
problems and to approach them with a range of solutions.
 The REF must identify quantitative metrics with defined baselines. For example, internal
temperature of tents and structures was not a useful metric when determining the best ways to
reduce fuel consumption.
 Integrate data collection and monitoring plans early in the procurement phase. These must be
transparent to the warfighter who has many competing demands for his time and attention. .
 Saving money or reducing dependency on fuel is not normally a top priority to tactical units in
the fight. Commanders are concerned with reliable energy, soldier welfare, and fully mission
capable (FMC) equipment.
 HQEs/Assessment Teams must be solution agnostic (the solution provider should not responsible
for measuring its effectiveness). The REF needs dedicated assessment teams that cover a wide
range of energy fields.
 The REF must operate in an open, transparent, and collaborative environment. Previous efforts
lacked coordination—As one example, the tent foaming effort was performed, but generators
weren’t right-sized in coordination with other organizations, resulting in sub-optimal fuel savings.
Including PM-MEP & PM-CS/CSS early on in the effort would have increased the likelihood of
project success.
2.2 REF Net-Zero Methodology
At the onset of the E2E Initiative, REF modified its standard rapid equipping process to follow a more
deliberate approach that would ensure collaboration within the OE community, complement other
Army initiatives, and inform senior Army leadership as well as the OE community. Even though the
Army has been engaged in OIF and OEF for ten (10) years, the Army had practically no data that could
help clearly define the OE challenges at the tactical edge. REF selected a spiral approach with the
understanding that the initiative would use feedback loops to continuously adapt to new knowledge
about requirements. The spiralled approach consists of six essential steps:

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1. Identifying and Understanding the
Requirement: The most important step in
the process. In order to reduce reliance
on fuel resupply missions, the Army
must understand both what the energy
demands are at the tactical edge and
why they are that way.
2. Establishing Partnerships: REF does not
have a monopoly on understanding the
needs in theater, and lacks in-house
subject matter expertise (SMEs) found
throughout the Military, Government,
Academia and Industry.
3. Selecting Solutions: Leverage existing
Department of Defense programs,
demonstrations and research &
development programs.
4. Equipping Units. Equipping includes not only providing solutions to the units but also providing
the necessary training and sustainment packages.
5. Assessing Impact: Using a teaming approach to measure effectiveness of the equipped
solutions, with both qualitative and quantitative appraisals.
6. Informing the community: The second most important step in the process is sharing knowledge
with the OE community at large to enable better responses to the OE challenges at the tactical
edge throughout the DOD community.
REF is currently undertaking Spirals II and III of the effort. Spiral I focused on energy generation,
providing alternative and renewable energy solutions for fixed, mobile, and dismounted operations.
Spiral II focused on reducing energy demand at expeditionary and enduring outposts. Spiral III is
focused on reliable power for mission critical systems.
2.2.1 Identifying and Understanding the Requirement
REF’s gained its first insight into the quantity of fuel consumed at the tactical edge from the Operation
Over Watch briefing provided by the 1/101 BCT. The VSO 10-Liner also provided some insight to
energy loads at austere locations but REF still lacked a deep understanding of the OE challenges at
those remote locations. REF sent a four-man team for a 17-day theater deployment in its first attempt

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to better understand the OE challenge at the tactical edge. However, even though augmented by REF’s
permanent forward unit, the OE team was unable to gain any additional insight. Weather and other
logistical challenges prevented the team from visiting any of the austere locations. Interviews with
leaders at larger Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) confirmed that combat power was being diverted
from the COIN mission to conduct resupply operations at the tactical edge.
Meanwhile, REF teamed with the ASD (OEPP) office to man the United States Forces – Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) OE Office and subsequently deployed an OE assessment team for six months. Teaming with
RDECOM’s Field Assistance in Science and Technology – Afghanistan (RFAST-A) Team, the OE
assessment team was able to assess more than 20 Combat Outposts (COPs), small Forward Operating
Bases (FOBs) and Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The assessment team was able to highlight the
extreme measures and intense resources to resupply austere outposts through ground convoys, rotary
-wing sling load operations and fixed-wing airdrop resupply operations. The OE assessment team
provided the community with a range of recommendations across the Doctrine, Organizational,
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facility (DOTMLPF) spectrum. REF was most intently
focused on the recommendations pertaining to Training and Materiel solutions.
The immediate impact of the information provided by the OE assessment team was that it clearly
identified,-with quantifiable metrics, that in many instances water resupply required as many
resources as moving fuel. Additional insights revealed that waste
removal impacted force protection and relationships with local
population. In deciding to include water resupply and waste
disposal challenges in the E2E effort, the REF changed the name and
scope to Net-Zero to the Edge (NZ2E). The training
recommendations were shared with the community and continue to
be promoted by the OE community. REF extended the OE
assessment effort for an additional six months and later expanded and transformed the effort to OE
advisors in an attempt to address the training gap at the tactical edge. The Materiel solution
recommendations were immediately incorporated into the Net-Zero to the Edge Spiral II initiative.
2.2.2 Establishing Partnerships
The degree of strategic and operational impact of any REF effort is often directly correlated to the
degree REF collaborates with external partners, particularly with ASA (ALT), TRADOC, AMC and the
Army Staff. Due to the complexity of the OE challenge, collaboration has been an absolute necessity
for the NZ2E effort. At the onset of the initiative, the REF established an Integrated Product Team (IPT)
REF-developed Insight:
Water resupply requires just as
many resources as moving fuel
and waste removal impacts
force protection and relation-
ships with local population.

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comprised of several ASA (ALT) Project Managers (PMs), RDECOM, LIA, ASA (IE&E) and the Army G-4.
The IPT later evolved into the OE Working Group (OEWG) that is currently co-chaired by TRADOC and
the G-4 OE Office. Through the OEWG, REF ensures transparency, maximizes collaboration and
develops meaningful partnerships with the following organizations:
 ASA (IE&E): The Assistant Secretary’s office provides strategic guidance and oversight to the
overall Army effort. ASA (IE&E) has referred a number of pre-vetted industry vendors to the REF.
They have also been instrumental in ensuring REF’s OE effort remains competitive in the funding
of unfunded requirements (UFR) process.
 G-4 OE Office: As the co-chair of the OEWG, the OE office synchronizes all OE activities–
leveraging the strengths of each participating organizations. From the REF’s perspective, the OE
Office also helps identify gaps that the REF is best suited to address.
 ASA (ALT): PEO Soldier’s Project Manager Soldier Warrior (PM SWAR) and REF partnered to
accelerate the Product Manager (PdM) Soldier Power program. REF funded the initial assessment
of the initial Soldier Power products. Based on the positive
assessment, REF later funded the fielding of five BCTs as
part of Capability Set 13. REF partnered with PEO CS &
CSS’s PM Mobile Electric Power (PM MEP) and PdM Force
Sustainment Systems (PdM FSS) to accelerate hybrid power
capability and the next generation Force Provider system
respectively.
 ASD (OEPP): The Assistant Secretary’s office has been instrumental in gaining access to
Combatant Commands Area of Operations other than US CENTCOM. REF in turn provides ASD
(OEPP) with real-time situational awareness of the OE challenge in Afghanistan and other
operations throughout the globe. ASD (OEPP) was also instrumental in securing Rapid Innovation
Funds, which funded REF’s NZ2E Spiral II efforts.
 TRADOC: Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
(MSCOE) and the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) are TRADOC’s leads for Operational
Energy, Contingency Basing and Soldier Power respectively. Primarily through TRADOC’s Army’s
Capability Integration Center (ARCIC), REF has partnered with each of the leads sharing
information, participating in demonstration exercises, co-authoring Concepts of Operations
(CONOPS) and training materiel.
 RDECOM: In addition to the strong partnerships developed in theater with the R-FAST Team and
the REF OE advisors, REF and RDECOM have a mutually-supporting relationship. REDECOM
REF Insight:
Partnership and collaboration with
leadership and stakeholder organi-
zations has been a critical enabler
of success under NZ2E.

11 | page
identifies and often develops technically mature technologies with operational potential; REF can
accelerate the development of the solution or insert the technology into the fight to assess
operational suitability and effectiveness. Many of the E2E solutions have early ties to RDECOM
efforts.
 USMC E2O: The REF’s OE focus is similar to the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office’s (E2O)
focus with deployed Marines. Through the annual Experimental Forward Operating Base (EXFOB)
demonstration program, the E2O has been a valuable source of real-world operational data and
information on available solutions.
2.3 Selecting Solutions
REF is an operational organization with the authority to approve requirements and fund solutions. An
ASA(ALT)-assigned Project Manager provides the authority to execute Army investment dollars to
procure materiel solutions to meet REF approved requirements. Since REF only equips limited
quantities to support units in a specified theater for a limited time, project schedule is more important
than performance, which in turn is more important than cost. REF selected solutions have not
necessarily been products targeted as future programs of record. Instead, they represent a capability
that potentially could fill an Army-wide need.
2.3.1 Considerations for Selection
To address theater operational energy challenges, REF looks to military programs, DoD and other
Government research organizations, and industry to assess solution viability based on the following
criteria :
 Availability: How fast can the quantities required be delivered?
 Technical Maturity: DoD uses a Technology Readiness Scale (TRL) from 1 (Basic principals
observed) to 10 (System mission proven). REF typically considers solutions that are at TRL 7
(System prototyping demonstration in an operational environment) and higher.
 Complexity: Systems must be simple enough for an Infantryman with multiple duties to operate
and maintain after minimal training.
 Sustainability/Durability: Solution must be able to endure extreme combat conditions, codified
by the MIL-STD 810 standards.
 Transportability: Size and weight impacts equipment needed to lift and transport throughout
theater. Austere locations typically lack heavy materiel handling equipment.

12 | page
 Commercial Use: Is the system currently used for
commercial purposes and if so, is the commercial
use related to the intended military use?
 Prior Military Use: Have any other Armed
Services deployed the system?
 Safety Assessment: Has any DoD testing
organization identified safety risks in employing
the system?
2.3.2 Criteria for Selection
REF down-selects the best available solutions based on the following criteria:
 Meets the Requirement: Typically the unit will specify acceptable performance parameters and
operating conditions that a system will need to perform.
 ASA (ALT) Support: While approval is not required, ASA (ALT) endorsement or concurrence
carries substantial weight in selecting a solution.
 Compliance with Regulations and Policies: All solutions must be in compliance with DoD, Army,
and Theater regulations and policies.
 No additional logistics burden: Since the effort is to reduce the logistical burden at the austere
outpost; the solution cannot add an enduring additional burden (i.e. introducing methanol fuel
cells would require moving methanol fuel cartridges throughout theater).
2.3.3 Criteria for Equipping
Once a solution has been selected and procured, it must meet the following criteria before REF can
deploy it to a unit:
 Acceptable Safety Risk: Units must be willing to accept the risk associated determined by Army
Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC).
 Reliable/Predictable Performance: System must have strong indicators either through ATEC
performance testing or a system demonstration exercises that the system will perform reliably in
the deployed environment.
 Training Plan: System will deploy with either a training material, virtual training tools and/or on-
site trainers.

13 | page
 Sustainment Plan: REF will sustain equipment for a minimum of one year or until the system is no
longer deployed, whichever comes first. Follow-on sustainment is decided on a case-by-case
basis. Sustainment includes spare parts and onsite or on-call field service representatives.
REF has equipped units through two separate spirals. Spiral I focused on power generation to support
fixed, mobile and dismounted operations, whereas Spiral II focused on energy efficiency measures to
reduce demand at both expeditionary and enduring outposts.
2.3.4 Spiral I Solutions
REF’s NZ2E spiral I supplied eleven (11) new or modified solutions to the deployed forces in
Afghanistan. Solutions fell into three capability categories:
 Soldier Power: Solutions that support dismounted operations;
 Expeditionary Power: Solutions that provide mission power outside the combat outpost; and
 Outpost Power: Solutions that provide power for fixed site operations.
Soldier Worn Integrated Power Equipment System (SWIPES)
SWIPES is a modular power distribution system that is designed for use with a conformal battery. For
commonly used handheld communications, SWIPES utilizes MOLLE pouch mounted chargers to
maintain a high level of charge (80%) within an OEM battery. SWIPES also provides direct power to
various devices, including GPS units, radios, and Shot Detection Systems. This approach reduces the
need for carrying spare batteries for each peripheral on multi-day missions. SWIPES comprises a
conformal battery—a rugged battery pack that provides 150 watt-hours at 5 amps while weighing less
than 2.5 lbs. It’s thin and flexible design allows for safe operation and conforms to a soldier’s front,
back, or side ballistic plates. While feedback across the Army has been very positive for this solution,
demonstrating a battery load reduction of 33%, the benefit is only realized when dismounted
operations exceed 72 hours.
Rucksack Enhanced Portable Power System (REPPS)
REPPS is a lightweight, portable power system capable of recharging batteries and/or acting as a
continuous power source. It was developed through a partnership with Industry and the
Communications Electronics, Research Development & Engineering Center (CERDEC). REF had
deployed 200 systems previously. Conventional forces did not use the systems; the 62 W panel systems
required 5 to 7 hours to charge a BB2590 Battery.

14 | page
Solar Power Adaptor for Communication & Electronics Systems (SPACES)
SPACES is the Marine Corps version of REPPS. It was selected based on a high level of positive feedback
from the in-theater operational assessment. Like the REPPs, conventional forces did not use the
SPACES. Unlike the Marine Battalion, which trained with the systems for several months before
deployment, Army units were issued REPPS while already deployed in theater and did not trust the
SPACES solutions.
Squad Power Manager (SPM)
SPM is a lightweight, portable power management system that can provide device power or battery
charging for up to four devices, including MBITR radios, DAGRs, Toughbooks, and USB-powered
equipment. It can use power from solar sources, AC, military/disposable batteries, and NATO/cigarette
adapters. The ability to scavenge power from multiple sources was well received by users.
300 W Propane Fuel Cell
During its early in-theater assessment, the PM Soldier Warrior (PM SWAR), equipped an Infantry
Battalion with both methanol and propane fuel cells, provided the unit with enough methanol and
propane cartridges to support the assessment period. Believing that propane was ubiquitous in the
Afghan villages, REF selected the propane fuel cell. The assumption that propane was readily available
proved to be incorrect. Thus, these systems have been pulled out of the Afghan theater, but their
consideration should not be discounted in other theaters/environments where propane supply is
available.
kW JP-8 Generator
The commercial gasoline 1kW generator, which was
portable and simple to operate, was widely used in the
battlefield, requiring an additional fuel to be transported
through the battlefield, which is a departure from a
single-fuel Army approach. Developed through a
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
(CRADA) between CERDEC and Industry, the JP8 1 kW
generator demonstrated tremendous promise. Once in theater, however, the REF discovered that the
quality of JP-8 had a significant impact on equipment reliability. The DLA purchases JP-8 from many
countries, many of whom do not meet the same quality standards as the US. As the 1kW generators
REF Insight:
What did not work in Afghanistan is not
necessarily a verdict on the viability of a
solution in other theatres / environments.
Cases in point: (1) Propane Fuel Cells (i.e.,
Afghanistan versus AFRICOM) and (2) quali-
ty of input fuel on the reliability of JP-8 gen-
erators.

15 | page
were built to use US supplied JP-8T, they were unable to operate reliably on sub-standard JP-8 fuel. As
a result, the generators were retrieved from theater.
Small Hybrid Power Generator
To take advantage of available sunlight as a free energy resource and to reduce generator run-time,
REF selected three different hybrid power generation solutions: a 1.8 kW, 3 kW, and a 5kW output
solution. The 1.8 kW solution was a completely modular solution with ten - 1kWh storage modules,
three (3) 360W solar arrays and a power manager to control a connected 3 kW tactical quiet generator
(TQG). It was a predecessor to the original TESS effort with the PSTF and had participated in numerous
CERDEC and PM MEP demonstrations.
The 3 kW system was similarly integrated with three modules: a power module with 3.8 kWh storage,
an AC module that managed AC outputs and inputs, and a DC module that managed all DC inputs and
outputs including 1.2 kW of solar PV panels. The 3 kW system was selected because of its history in
both Iraq and Afghanistan supporting strategic missions. The 5kW system forms a tightly integrated
system that is mounted on a light tactical trailer. It connects to a 5 kW TQG and includes 1.2 kW solar
arrays and 28 kWh of battery storage. The 5kW system was down-selected and deployed by the Marine
Corps after the first ExFOB event.
All of the solutions performed well in theater and were effective in providing reliable power to mission
critical systems. However, the outputs were too small to have a significant impact on the fuel
consumption of the 200 – 300 kW Outposts.
Large Hybrid Power Generator
REF procured two (2) large hybrid solutions during the Spiral 1 cycle. The first a 28.8 kW system that
included 28 kW of rated photovoltaic (PV) panels, 192 kWh of energy storage integrated with a 35kW
commercial generator. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Science and Technology Directorate
previously deployed this system. REF procured eight (8) systems for CJSOTF-A, but operational units
found the size and transportation requirements for moving the systems inter-theater to be challenging.
Six (6) of the systems were never equipped to CJSOTF-A units. The second system, selected by the R-
FAST team in Afghanistan was never deployed due to operational testing challenges.
3 kW & 5kW Tactical Quiet Generators with Auto-Start Kits
In order to take advantage of the hybrid power systems, the power management function of each
system must have the ability to automatically turn the generator off and on. Today’s military

16 | page
generators are not natively equipped with this capability without recourse to a non-standard retrofit
kit. Each REF deployed 5kW and 3 kW TQG was equipped with PM MEP-approved auto-start kits. The
kits were very effective and contributed to 50% reduced run-time and associated maintenance.
2.3.5 Spiral II Solutions
REF’s second NZ2E Spiral focused on providing expeditionary camps and enduring camps with
integrated efficiency solutions for energy and water needs, including product improvements from
Spiral I. To date, REF is in the early stages of the equipping phase of Spiral II solutions.
Light Expeditionary Camps
In order to rapidly deploy and establish an outpost with a sustainment support area and operation
center, REF procured six (6) soft skinned turnkey camps that can support up to 50 Soldiers and
enablers. The camp components were selected based on the feedback and operational experience of a
number of non-conventional small units. The camp is
equipped with insulated liners, sunshades, energy
efficient ECUs and improved hybrid energy solutions. To
date REF has equipped the JTF-B with four (4) camps and
is in the process of equipping units operating in the
Trans-Sahara region of Africa. No operational feedback
has been collected to date.
Enduring Camps
Many of the outposts in Afghanistan have been occupied for more than six to eight years for stretches
of nine (9) to twelve (12) months at a time. These outposts are made out of soft-fabric tents, plywood
B-huts, or indigenous structures. They regularly operate with little or no insulation, poorly run electrical
wiring, and inefficient appliances. Working with PM Force Sustainment Systems (PM-FSS), REF has
procured a number of rigid wall structured camps. The camps have insulated shelters, a 90 kW–150 kW
tactical micro-grid, a grey water re-use system, water efficient hygiene facility, and an energy efficient
kitchen. Two (2) such camps are operational at TRADOC’s Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment
(AEWE) at Fort Benning, GA, and the Network Integration Exercise (NIE) at Fort Bliss, TX. The camps
were well received by the soldiers and preliminary data suggests significant fuel savings when
compared to current techniques and practices in deployed operations. A third camp has been set up at
the Base Camp Integration Laboratory (BCIL) at Fort Devens, MA, to assess new shelter designs.

17 | page
14.8 kW – (with 80 kWh storage) Hybrid Power Generator
In order to meet the robust power requirements of a Village Stability Platform (VSP) or Company
tactical operation center (TOC), REF procured hybrid generator that were larger than the systems
selected in Spiral I. Unlike the larger 28.8 kW system that the REF deployed outside of the NZ2E
program, the new Hybrid systems rely on batteries and generators (as opposed to PV panels) as the
primary power source. This configuration requires a smaller footprint and is significantly lighter. To
date, the systems are still being assessed for Safety purposes.
Product/Capability Improvements from Spiral I
As part of both the Lite and Enduring Camps, REF selected some of the suitable and effective solutions
from the Spiral I effort. They included:
 Small Hybrid Power Generators with improved form, size, and performance.
 Improved Multi-fuel 1 kW Generator.
 Integrated Warrior System that distributes both power and data.
2.3.6 Non-Materiel Solutions
The first and most essential step in the REF Spiral methodology is “understanding and defining the
challenge”. As described in the foregoing sections of this report, REF deployed several assessment
teams at the onset of the NZ2E initiative. The assessment teams arrived on site and began counting,
measuring, and documenting the loads on each generator. They then assessed the loads: Counting
ECUs, computers, displays, radios and any other plug or lighting loads. The tallies were supplemented
by interviewing soldiers and leaders to determine man-hours dedicated to fueling operations and to
determine the level of energy expertise that was available at each site. The assessment team then
provided an overall efficiency assessment based on the site’s power generation and total electrical
load. Based on the performed analysis, a typical site would fall between 15% and 30% efficiency.
After 10 months of conducting assessments in theater, REF developed a better understanding of the OE
challenges in austere locations. Units needed the expertise and assistance in getting sites to operate
effectively and efficiently. In August of 2012, the OE assessment teams shifted to an OE Advisor role.
The team expanded from three (3) to six (6) personnel, bringing on certified electricians. Since the
summer of 2012, REF OE advisors have visited nearly 50 remote locations: assessing, designing, and
implementing energy efficient solutions, primarily with existing Army equipment. They also assisted
units with the integration of some of the non-standard REF NZ2E equipment.

18 | page
2.4 Equipping Units
REF’s Equipping is often focused on time-sensitive, evolving solution based on the needs of a specific
unit or theater. REF provides the minimal training and sustainment acceptable to the receiving unit.
Typically, REF responds to a 10-Liner from a unit deployed in theater and attempts to equip the unit
while they are still deployed. When a REF-provided capability proves capable of enduring beyond the
original unit, REF attempts to equip additional units before they deploy and provide training during
their home-station training cycle and mission readiness exercise (MRE). This is carried out at one of the
three (3) Combat Training Centers (CTCs), namely:
 National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA;
 Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA; or
 Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at the Hohenfels training complex in Germany.
Originally intended to meet operational energy challenges at
Village Stability Platforms (VSPs), REF OE Advisors began actively
finding conventional units operating in austere locations to equip
NZ2E solutions when the CJSOTF-A Science & Technology
Acquisition Corps Advisor (STACA) had declined the REF
solutions2
. REF packaged the solutions in bundles that included
small hybrid power generators, Soldier-Power solutions, and
expeditionary power solutions. After property accountability
actions were completed, REF OE advisors accompanied the
package from the Forward Operating Base to the austere
location and provide training and employment assistance with
the new equipment.
REF also equipped units at both home station and at the JMRC. In
both cases, Unit were often distracted with more pressing
deployment preparations and were thus unable to provide the
resources necessary (Soldiers & Time) for an effective equipping effort. Fortunately, OE advisors in
theater were able to follow up once the units were deployed. Though it may be counter-intuitive, the
REF’s experience has revealed that equipping NZ2E solutions in theater proved to be more effective
than equipping at home-station.
2
This is one of many instances where turnover of personnel in key positions has shifted organizational buy-in of OE concepts.
REF Insight:
Equipping NZ2E solutions in theater
proved to be more effective than
equipping at home-station.

19 | page
2.5 Assessing Impact
The primary objectives of the Net-Zero to the Edge (NZ2E) initiative are to:
1. Provide Commanders at the tactical edge increased operational flexibility by reducing reliance on
resupply operations;
2. Provide suitable, sustainable and reliable power to meet the demand of mission critical systems;
3. Reduce water and waste transport requirements and reduce soldier load during dismounted
operations.
Determining whether the effort has successfully met those objectives remains challenging. As with
every challenge, an important but often ignored step is assessing the impact at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels. While the community performs an adequate job of evaluating the
suitability or effectiveness of various materiel solutions, the OE community expects a broader
2
This is one of many instances where turnover of personnel in key positions has shifted organizational buy-in of OE concepts.
Advantages of In-Theater Equipping
 Site-Centric: Solutions can be tailored to the specific missions and conditions at the site.
 End User Attention: The end-user actually experiences the challenges and understands the benefits of the
NZ2E solutions. The actual operator and supervisor attend the training.
 Immediate Relevant Feedback: The OE advisor gets to observe first hand end-user acceptance and
suitability issues.
 Trained in Relevant Environment.
Disadvantages of In-Theater Equipping
 Potential Burden on Unit: Units at the edge are typically overtaxed with a number of missions and tasks.
Caring, feeding, and supervising additional un-armed personnel requires support from the Unit.
 Travel Constraints: While equipment and personnel can predictably move to theater, intra-theater
movement is entirely unpredictable. Enemy activity, weather, and maintenance issues can delay
movement to an austere location by weeks.

20 | page
perspective for an effort this large. To effectively understand the E2E and NZ2E impacts, REF partnered
with the entire Army Operational Energy stakeholder community, including:
 ASA (IEE) and DA G-4 OE Office not only
provided oversight and synchronization
across the Army OE enterprise but
communicated to our effort on what the
important metrics and effects are that
need to be measured and reported to
impact Senior Leadership decisions.
 249th
Engineer Battalion, the prime power
BN, provided the senior uniformed OE advisor in theater. The in-theater units provided technical
expertise, guidance, and measured meaningful metrics.
 PM MEP has played a meaningful role across every step of REF’s NZ2E initiative.
 PM SWAR provided the Soldier Power expertise as well as the linkage to the Maneuver Center of
Excellence.
 PM FSS provided initial performance data for a number of solutions especially those related to the
Enduring Camp challenges such as the tactical Micro-grid and Grey Water Re-Use System. The
Base Camp Integration Lab (BCIL) at Fort Devens, MA, replicated the operational environment with
the participation of Army units.
 Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) provided analytics to the effort from data
collection to analysis. Their participation as a non-stakeholder added credibility to the effort. They
supported both CONUS and deployed efforts.
 Army Test & Evaluation Command (ATEC) provides the product-centric assessment from an
operational capability and risk perspective. Their Forward Operational Assessment team was a
strong supporter and partner to REF in-theater.
 Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC) was REF’s first choice to measure and understand
the impact of not only REF’s active initiatives, but other programs as well. With reach throughout
the Capability and Materiel development community, ARCIC spearheaded the major assessment
event for the Army OE effort.

21 | page
 Maneuver Center of Excellence was initially focused only on the Soldier Power aspect of OE, but
shifted to other aspects of OE allowing the inclusion of a Net-Zero base camp as part of AEWE,
which provided early Soldier feedback on many initiatives as well as a trial run for data collectors
 Deployed Forces not only allowed REF OE advisers unfettered access to the Soldiers and equipment
in austere locations, but also provided transportation, security and overall care to a number of
assessment teams throughout the duration of the effort.
2.5.1 Tactical and Operational Impact
With input from the OE community, REF identified the following metrics to measure tactical impact:
 Fuel Consumption,
 Man-Hours (Resupply Planning and Executing),
 Class III Black Days,
 Safety Incidents (Power Related),
 Generator Operational Readiness Rate,
 Batteries Consumed,
 Soldier Load (Batteries Carried), and
 System Unavailability (due to Power).
REF OE advisors data collection role focused on observable data such as fuel consumed to generate
electricity; number of generators online, total kilowatts (kW) generated, total load per generator and
total site load. Figure 2 is a snapshot of what REF OE advisors were able to capture. Three of the four
sites, COP MUSHAN, COP KHENJAKAK and VSP LAM included data from before and after fixes were
implemented. COP SPERWAAN CHARR shows only data prior to any E2E/NZ2E fixes. The Potential Fuel
reduction is an estimate of fuel savings if all of the recommendations have been implemented. (Note:
OE advisors actions are limited to the availability of Military equipment and material on-hand or
immediately available).
Because their role shifted to ‘fixing’, rather than merely ‘assessing’ energy issues, the REF OE Advisors
looked to external organizations to assist in determining the impact of its NZ2E effort specific to the
unit level (Tactical), as well as the impact to regional and theater operations (Operational). REF
requested ARCIC’s Accelerated Capabilities Division (ACD) to sponsor and lead the effort to determine
tactical and operational impact. Using ARCIC also increased the integrity and reliability of the effort of
measuring the tactical and operational impact.

22 | page
After spending the first six (6) months designing and planning the assessment event, the ACD OE
assessment team deployed in February of 2013. The changing OPTEMPO, intra-theater transportation
challenges, and limited time limited both the quality and quantity of data collected. Combining
historical theater fuel usage data from 2011, REF data and observations from September 2011 to
February 2013, and data from CONUS-based AEWE Spiral H and NIE 13.2. along with ACD’s own
February 2013 data, ARCIC reached the following conclusions3
:
3
Energy to the Edge Assessment Report, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capability Integration Center, 31 July 2013.
Figure 3-2. Site Generator Utilization Rate

23 | page
 The overall impact of OE Advisors on outposts and BCTs was positive, resulting in improved
operational capabilities, reduced fuel consumption for power generation, reduced workloads for
maintenance and fueling tasks, reduced safety hazards, and improved quality of life for Soldiers on
outposts.
 The overall impact of E2E Spiral I power solutions on outposts provided by REF is neutral, due to
the low number of solutions being employed and their low power output. The power solutions
used at outposts provided a positive impact at the point of employment, but only on the five
outposts at which they were employed between April 2012 and February 2013. Continued
utilization of the available E2E power solutions is recommended. None of the systems are
recommended for nomination for rapid transition to be a Program of Record (POR).
The biggest gains in fuel reduction at the tactical edge resulted from training and educating soldiers
and leaders on how to reduce fuel consumption through the proper use of equipment. Figure 3
graphically depicts the first 26 sites that REF OE advisors visited. Note that the mean generator
utilization was below 30% - sites were equipped with three times the electricity capacity as was needed
to power their sites. This inefficiency resulted in a 50% to100% increase in fuel consumption. The light
shaded green area captures the mean range of a typical site. The darker middle area identifies the
utilization that can be achieved with just OE advisors alone. The final lower shaded area depicts what
can be achieved with a combination of OE Advisors and innovative solutions (those not already in the
Army Inventory) such as tactical micro-grids, hybrid generators and large energy storage capacity.
REF agreed with ARCIC’s determination that overall impact of E2E Spiral I hybrid power solutions were
“neutral” with respect to total power generation. In terms of fuel savings, the 3kW and 5kW hybrid
systems contributed very little to the 200-300kW load of a typical site. The hybrid systems did replace
underutilized, poorly maintained generators with reliable power for mission critical systems. Figure 4
illustrates not only the mission critical assets: Tactical Aerostats, Intelligence Surveillance &
Reconnaissance Platforms, Sustainment and Lethality Systems but also manpower and fuel savings.
ARCIC ACD recently briefed the Army G-4 OE Office to determine the next steps in completing the
impact study. The Army G-4 OE Office agreed that the team had identified the correct metrics and
understood the challenges of data collection. Currently, ARCIC ACD is continuing to look at operational
data available on theater’s classified networks including the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) data to measure
fuel movement and fuel consumption due to mobility.
Because the data collection had been extremely challenging for the entire OE team, REF’s approach to
assessing operational impact has been providing potential Combat Savings (Figure 5). Assuming that
fuel for vehicles or supporting Afghan forces does not change significantly, REF extrapolated potential

24 | page
reduction in using a conservative estimate: Sling Load, Combat Logistic Patrols (CLPs) and
Containerized Drop System (CDS) missions- reducing manpower, rotary wing & fixed wing aircraft, and
ground vehicles required to move fuel on the battlefield. VSP LAM and COP Giro were the first two
sites that REF OE advisors had implemented OE improvements.
Figure 3. Site Utilization
VSP LAM was resupplied through airdrop operations from Kandahar Airfield (KAF) while COP GIRO was
supplied via sling-load operations from its higher HQ’s Forward Operating Base (FOB). Airdrop
operations were conducted bi-weekly while sling-loading fuel was conducted three (3) times per day.
Based on the fuel reduction at each site, REF determined potential reduction in Sling-Load operations
by 15% and Airdrop operations by 33%4
.
2.5.2 Other Observations
Despite the challenges that the Army’s OE teams confronted in collecting quantitative data, the
community agrees with the following REF OE Advisors’ observations - consistently observed across all
46 combat outposts and village stability platforms5
:
 Soldiers and leaders lack training and familiarity with power generation and distribution
equipment such as Tactical Quiet Generators (TQGs) and Power Distribution Illumination System,

25 | page
Figure 4. Hybrid Power to Mission Critical Systems
Figure 5. E2E Impact (Realized & Potential)

26 | page
Electrical (PDISE). The equipment is not on the Unit’s Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) and Soldiers often encounter it for the first time when they occupy the COP.
 The equipment is Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) and because of the general lack of expertise
from previous outgoing units, the incoming unit often inherit poorly maintained and Non-Mission
Capable Systems (NMC) equipment.
 Both military and commercial generators are used to provide “spot power” and were found
drastically under-loaded, with some generators operating continuously below 5% of rated
capacity.
 Under-utilized generators – where loads are significantly lower than the generator capacity –
lead to “Wet Stacking” and eventual NMC. There are typically more NMC generators on a site
than operational systems.
 Major End Items that include integrated generators such as the Persistent Surveillance System-
Ground (PSS-G) Tower and Cerberus Long Range Tactical (LRT) Tower Systems are equipped with
5 kW and 3 kW TQG to meet maximum load requirements required during raising and lowering
the towers. The continuous mean load, however is typically 20-30% of the generator.
Consequently these systems would often fail due to power issues and the original generators
would have to be replaced multiple times.
 Renewable Power, Hybrid Power, Energy Storage, and Power Management are non-doctrinal
terms; Warfighters initially are not able to grasp the terms and concepts
 Soldiers operate and live in poorly insulated structures; B-Huts6
typically have zero insulation and
require heating and cooling units to run 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Force provider
shelters offer a little more insulation but even with an added liner, they only achieve an “R” value
of 4.
 USFOR-A Senior Leadership has issued guidance, directives and policies directing Commanders to
make energy-informed, risk-based decisions on aviation operations, vehicle operations, base
camp designs, power and water generations, and distribution7,8
. Commanders, however will
always select effectiveness over efficiency. The guidance also has not trickled down to the
leaders at small austere locations.
 The OE challenge is a global one. Soldiers are operating in significantly less mature theaters than
4
Commanders on the ground determine priority of fuel usage. Fuel savings achieved in electricity production could be also used for
mobility, Afghan Security Forces or Increasing Days of Supply (DOS) on hand.
5
Based on 46 Site reports completed by Barbaricum LLC in support of REF’s OE Advisor effort

27 | page
CENTCOM out of austere outposts in Africa, Central and South America and Asia where fuel and
water resupply is almost as equally challenging. In Trans-Saharan Africa, small units remain
completely dependent on Host Nation (HN) infrastructure and economies, putting operational
security at risk9
.
6
B-Hut stands for Barracks Hut and typically houses 8-10 Soldiers. It is constructed with 4” plywood and has a central hallway,
central lighting and two Environmental Control units and each entrance.
7
GEN Petraeus Memo, 15 Jun 2011: Operational Energy Requirements for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.
8
GEN Mattis Memo, 12 July 2011
9
REF Trans Sahara Brief to OSD(OEPP) and Army G-4 Operational Energy Office, 12 June 2013.
10
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National
Security Forces, April 2012
Case Study: VSP DELARAM
The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) initiated Village Stability Operations
(VSO) in 2010. VSO are a bottom-up counter-insurgency (COIN) initiative that establishes security areas around
rural villages to promote local governance and development. VSO
rely on Village Stability Platforms (VSPs) - embedded U.S. Special
Operations Forces (USSOF) and Afghan National Security Forces
(ANASF) - to improve security, governance, and development in
communities where the ANSF and ISAF have limited presence.
VSO success has contributed to the significant growth of the
program; VSO initially encompassed only eight districts, but have
since expanded more than 100 communities in 58 districts
throughout Afghanistan10
. VSP DELARAM is located in the
Delaram District in Western Afghanistan.
At the request of the Regional Command-West (RC-W)
leadership, REF OE advisors first arrived at the site on 3 October 2012. Within two months, VSP DELERAM was
consuming 1600 fewer gallons fuel per week – reducing the amount of manpower required for fueling
operations by 30 man-hours. The sites Force Protection (FP) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) system mean time between failures (MTBF) was extended significantly through the introduction of 5kW
and 3kW hybrid power systems, respectively.
In October 2012, VSP DELARAM had thirteen (13) different generators to provide spot-power to eleven
different functions within the compound. In total, the generators were capable of generating 1400 kW; the
combined loads were less than 125 kW – a capacity utilization of approximately 9%. Fueling and maintenance
operations required 7 dedicated Soldiers. A 5kW TQG powered the Ground Based Operational Surveillance
System (GBOSS) despite less than a 1.5 kW continuous load-leading to continuous system failures.

28 | page
2.6 Strategic OE Impact
Although focused on the tactical edge, the REF NZ2E initiative has had a strategic impact on the Army’s
overall OE program. There are three key areas where REF contributions have shaped DoD and Army
strategic decision-making.
 Inserting Emerging Solutions to Accelerate Materiel Enterprise Solutions. In 2011, REF provided
the initial funding to support assessment of Soldier Power equipment designed to reduce the
number of batteries a Soldier carries during dismounted operations with a deployed Infantry
Battalion. In 2012, REF later expanded the effort by equipping a Brigade set between two
deployed Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). In 2013, REF assisted PM SWAR in convincing senior
Army leaders to fund the fielding of Soldier Power packages to the next 7 BCTs scheduled for
deployment12
.
Introducing rigid-wall-structure-equipped camps at both AEWE and NIE, REF has informed the
requirements community of the “art of the possible” with energy efficient enduring camp
technologies potentially identifying the next-generation Force Provider System. As a result of
feedback received, PM Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (PM
NVRSTA) is including small hybrid power generation as part of its small and medium towers.
 Supporting Army Strategic Communications. In 2012, REF was second only to ASA(IE&E) as the
most attributed source in tier-one media outlets. REF’s message has not only remained
consistent with the Army’s Message, but has also enhanced it.
Case Study: VSP DELARAM (cont’d)
REF OE advisors quickly designed and implemented a simpler and efficient power and energy architecture
that required only one generator on-line and a second one serving as a backup. With the unit’s assistance
the OE team laid 1100 feet of cable, a single distribution box, and a fuel pump. The site utilization improved
to 50%, generator maintenance time was reduced by 80% and most importantly, five (5) additional soldiers
were available for operations11
. The feedback from soldiers stationed at VSP Delaram was positive.
11
LTC Keith Mataskella, REF Requirements Chief, presentation to the Defense Power Summit, 12 November 2013.
12
Although not yet a formal ASA(ALT) program of record POR), PdM Soldier Power is currently on track to become a POR or get
absorbed into an existing one .
“The REF Team has made it possible for the members of the unit to focus on planning,
preparation, coordination, and the execution of combat operations vice FOB logistic burdens”. –
Warfighter testimonial at VSP Delaram

29 | page
Operational Energy performance drives operational effectiveness through mobility, agility,
flexibility, resilience and sustainability. Smart energy wins the fight. Improving the Army's
Operational Energy Posture will increase mission effectiveness by enhancing or preserving
adaptability, versatility, flexibility and sustainability, reducing costs and preserving future choice.
Providing energy alternative capabilities and interoperability builds flexibility and resilience
through increased ability to respond to changes in operational demands, and greater ability to
adapt to changes in the operational environment. Integrating operational energy strategies into
the Army’s culture, processes and systems promote adaptive and innovative leaders for a flexible
and agile force of decisive action. The Army needs enough power and energy in the right form, at
the right place and the right time to conduct modern military operations 13
.
Figure 6. E2E Strategic Impacts
 Industry Outreach14
. REF’s secondary mission is to shorten the distance and time between the
identification of a need in theater and the delivery of a solution. One of the effective methods
13
Senior leader message: Army Energy Awareness Month- October 2012 Enhancing Mission Effectiveness.
14
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/burn-energy-journal/todays-army-marches-its-batteries-while-
searching.

30 | page
used in the NZ2E initiative has been to bring the End-user, Capability Developers, Materiel
Developers and Industry into the same room multiple times a year.
2.7 Informing the Community of Interest
Informing the Community is a continuous effort that flows through each phase of the REF NZ2E
initiative—It is as important as the process of understanding the problem and it is essential to the
development of strong partnerships that yield rapid and more effective solutions in support of the
warfighter.
In March 2012, as the NZ2E Spiral I was near completion of
the equipping phase, REF had identified approximately $46M
in unfunded requirements related to the net-zero challenges
in Afghanistan and other operations throughout the globe.
With only $3M remaining for the effort, REF decided that rather than investing the funds in materiel
solutions it would focus on better understanding the problem and informing the community. Prior to
the first assessment team returning from theater in December 2011, it was difficult to accurately
quantify or articulate the challenges at the tactical edge. Though the community understood that
moving fuel on the battlefield was challenging and dangerous, it was difficult to quantify fuel
consumption and define the purpose. For example, when REF discovered that Combat Outposts were
equipped with six to ten 60 kW TQGs—all of which were severely under-loaded—other Army
organizations were simply unaware of this imbalance or even the existence of TQG equipment in their
Modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE). Within weeks, however, those
organizations—now better informed about OE resources in the field—transformed into principal
advocates for solving OE challenges at the tactical edge. PM-MEP, for example, launched Operation
Dynamo that is simultaneously fielding Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS) Generators
and advising leaders in the field. Similarly, informing DoD and Army Senior Leadership resulted in a
balanced OE approach between large sustainment bases, forward operating bases, and tactical edge
locations.
REF used several vehicles to inform the OE Community, including:
 Briefing Senior Leaders and their staffs at the Office of the Secretary of Army, Army Staff, Army
Major Commands, and other supporting agencies and organizations.
 Participating in the Operational Energy Working Group (OEWG).
National Public Radio’s Market
Place segment on the REF’s NZ2E
initiative represents similar
coverage received in Forbes, NY
Times, Army Times, and Defense
News14
.

31 | page
 Including OE updates in the monthly JAAR update to
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
 Sponsoring Bi-annual Net-Zero to the Edge Workshops
that include ASA(IEE), Army G-4 OE Office, TRADOC,
ASA(ALT) and representatives from recently
redeployed Units.

32 | page
3.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
The combination of 21st
century technology and current operational Tactics, Techniques and Practices
(TTPs) developed to fight an asymmetric enemy has placed a tremendous demand on fuel at the
tactical edge. That fuel demand becomes more critical under the current METT-TC conditions.
While often regarded as a commercial and government off-the-shelf (COTS & GOTS) equipping
organization, REF regularly looks at the entire DOTMLPF domain when analyzing a requirement or
capability gap. REF’s analysis identified that adjustments in Training, Leadership and Materiel
capabilities (in that order) are needed to address the OE gap in the current and possible future fight.
REF’s NZ2E initiative started with the ambitious objective of identifying and meeting the operational
energy gaps at the tactical edge without requiring additional ground or aerial resupply operations. REF
has identified and informed the community of the Warfighter’s toughest challenge – lack of OE
expertise at the tactical edge – and has proposed a remedy – the OE Advisor. Once units are capable of
employing, operating, and maintaining Army standard power generation and distribution equipment,
only then can they start introducing advanced systems including hybrid generations, alternative
energy, tactical micro-grids and energy storage technologies.
Understanding that Commanders will always choose effectiveness over efficiency, the Army needs to
train and educate today and tomorrow’s leaders the direct correlation between efficiency and
effectiveness. 50% less fuel used to generate electricity translates into 50% more fuel for mobility.
Decreasing the number of sling-load fueling operations frees aircraft for other critical lift operations.
3.1 Training Recommendations
In order to sustain changes in operational energy, training must be addressed. Currently there is a
capability gap in the number of uniformed personnel that understand power generation and
distribution. The following recommendations address how DoD can emphasize skills in low density
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to increase survivability and reduce vulnerabilities associated
with operational energy:
1. Increase power management expertise at brigade and battalion levels. Power and generator
management expertise is not found organically at brigade and battalion levels. One of the key
drivers of a COP’s operating efficiently is the presence of a skilled warfighter or support
contractor that understands energy management. The average COP Mayor, which is typically the

33 | page
warfighter’s 3rd or 4th task, is not trained on load management, generator efficiency, and
creating a distributed power supply. Generator Mechanics (91D) are not trained on energy
management and Prime Power Production Specialists (21P), who have energy expertise, are not
organic to units. Units can request Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) Logistics
Assistance Representative (LARs) support, but in our observations that is not common. Currently
the uniformed personnel that would focus on the management side of power and generation are
the Army 249th Prime Power, the Air Force Prime Base Expeditionary Emergency Force (BEEF),
and the Navy specialized Seabee units. Units do have generator mechanics, but they focus on
what is inside the generator housing. Those mechanics are not trained on breakers panels,
distribution, managing loads, or overall energy management.
2. Leadership training on basic power management skills. The operations Sergeant Major and
First Sergeant levels, where most of the unit logistical coordination occurs, Sergeants are not
taught energy efficiency. The Sergeants Major Academy, Senior Leaders Course (SLC), and
Advanced Leaders Course (ALC) need to incorporate energy efficiency training, and there need to
be a trained person that understand power generation and energy efficiency in the brigade or
battalion.
In the last two years, we have observed PM MEP accelerate the field deployment of the improved
AMMPS generators, PM SWAR rapidly develop and field innovative Soldier Power solutions, and PM
NVRSTA began integrating hybrid power generation into its programs of records. PM Force Projection
has also been continuously upgrading its Force Provider System incrementally improving energy and
fuel efficiency. REF has determined that this evolutionary approach is a necessity until the Army can
address the other DOTMLPF capabilities that would allow solutions like tactical micro-grids to be
dropped onto a Company size outpost where the Soldiers and leaders would be trained to effectively
deploy, operate, and maintain it.
3.2 Materiel Solutions Recommendations
Once training and leadership challenges are addressed, materiel solutions can play a major role in
reducing demand to increase survivability and reduce vulnerabilities. To affect the current conflict in
Afghanistan, new systems need to integrate and be interoperable with current equipment to optimize
efficiency. Future systems need to focus on scalable and modular designs that provide smart power
management technology and incorporate renewable resources. The following recommendations
address areas where DoD can develop materiel solutions to increase survivability and reduce
vulnerabilities associated with operational energy:

34 | page
1. Distributed Power: This is one of the areas where the biggest reductions can be made and the
biggest impact can be achieved immediately. For the most part, units have sufficient power
generation assets; however, those assets are not being employed as effectively and efficiently as
they could be. There are several promising technologies currently available or in development
that could make a difference on the ground. Moving from spot generation to distributed power
can help address several issues such as wet stacking, unbalanced loads, and energy efficiency.
Increasing solutions that can assist in creating distributed power would be one of the first major
steps in reducing maintenance and increasing efficiency.
2. Efficient Generation: Generators are not being sized correctly to demand levels. In most
instances generators were being oversized, adding to the issues of wet stacking, a condition
where low loads are placed on generators. Base power systems need to be configured so as to
make current generators more efficient through the use of distributed power, hybrid systems,
and intelligent controls. Systems that auto-start and stop and manage load can decrease fuel and
reduce the tasks warfighters need to do on the battlefield.
3. Solution targeting demand: Most of the materiel solutions are focused on the supply side, but
the demand side is extremely important. There are considerable advances that need to be made
to efficient structures in particular. Many tents and buildings have no insulation, causing air
conditioning to escape and the ECUs and the generators to work harder. Logisticians can
incorporate items such as radiant barriers, tent quilts, solar flies and rigid insulation to improve
energy efficiency.
3.3 Capability Enhancement Recommendations
1. Employ current systems: There are current solutions in DoD’s inventory that can connect
generators and create distributed power. These systems need to be better understood and
employed by the units.
2. Automate systems: Deployed warfighters are focused on their mission and executing critical
tasks in a combat zone. Energy is important, but as long as they have essential power, most are
not as concerned with efficiency. Automated systems that can manage loads and efficiency with
little impact on the warfighter are optimal. Systems need to reduce the need for additional
manpower.
3. Efficient Environmental Control Units (ECU): ECUs are the largest power demand on the
battlefield, and a solution to reduce their demand needs to be found. Incorporating soft start

35 | page
capabilities will allow generators to be resized for ECUs and reduce fuel requirements. A generic
soft start retrofit kit for ECUs that would reduce fuel consumption can be incorporated to current
equipment.
4. Increase power density: Whether it is batteries, fuel cells, or efficient generators, a system’s
success is largely dictated by how much power the warfighter can get per unit mass. There are
several renewable systems that can generate power, but the amount of power they generate for
their size is low. OPs that require the power levels these systems can provide typically are very
small and space is a limiting factor. COPs are larger, but their power demand typically exceeds
what many of these systems can produce.
5. Seek effective hybrid technology solutions: Hybrid Technology is currently valued more than
solar or renewables. The need for reliable power is essential and meeting operational needs is
paramount. The concept of using batteries to augment generators shows the most near term
promise. Several of the more successful systems have a storage system incorporated with a
generator. Power is drawn off of the batteries until the batteries fall below a specific state of
discharge at which point the controls will automatically turn on the generator and charges the
batteries, ensuring the system is not without power. This maximizes efficiency by operating the
generator at peak efficiencies and capturing excess power through the battery bank, running the
generator at the optimal efficiency point and cutting down on not only fuel but also on scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance.
6. Plan for multiple energy generation sources to work together. Solar systems, fuel cells, and
other sources are going to be integrated into systems in the future. In many instances,
renewables are currently not robust enough to be stand-alone systems, but they can still be a
valuable component to an energy system if they can be incorporated with current systems.
REF NZ2E initiative’s effectiveness is directly related to the degree it collaborates with the OE
community. It is most effective when it operates within its core competencies: working with deployed
units and understanding the requirements; rapidly equipping units to assess capability (not products)
and informing stakeholders across the capability and materiel development organizations. Finally,
observations and requirements emerging from Army operations in multiple African nations, as well as
Turkey, Philippines, Alaska, Honduras and other parts of Central America clearly illustrate that the OE
gap is not only global, but also an enduring one.

36 | page

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