This document discusses modal logics and formalisms. It defines modal logics as logics that add new logical constants like necessity (□) and possibility (◇) to classical logic. It describes how modal logics can be classified based on whether they are extended logics that add new well-formed formulas or deviant logics that interpret the usual logical constants differently. The document then focuses on modal logics, defining their language and providing details on their model theory using possible world semantics. It discusses truth in possible worlds and models. It also describes several axiomatic modal systems and the relationships between them, and examines the classes of models validated by different axioms.
1.1 arguments, premises, and conclusionsSaqlain Akram
Formal Logic : Leacture 01
Chapter 1: Basic Concepts
1.1 Arguments, Premises, and Conclusions
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Content:
1- Mathematical proof (what and why)
2- Logic, basic operators
3- Using simple operators to construct any operator
4- Logical equivalence, DeMorgan’s law
5- Conditional statement (if, if and only if)
6- Arguments
In this presentation we will learn the concept of Implication and Biconditional or double implication and learn truth value of this two and solved some example to get more spark for this topic.
we see
conditional and biconditional
conditional and biconditional statements
conditional and biconditional connectives
Truth value of conditional and biconditional
conditional and biconditional operator
define conditional and biconditional connectives
conditional and biconditional examples
conditional and biconditional in math
1.1 arguments, premises, and conclusionsSaqlain Akram
Formal Logic : Leacture 01
Chapter 1: Basic Concepts
1.1 Arguments, Premises, and Conclusions
Follow on Facebook:
https://web.facebook.com/learnforgood...
and on Youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8kUyEAA5ix6Bl5H5gKXo3A
Like, Comment and Share.
Also Subscribe For More Videos.
Learn For Good.
Content:
1- Mathematical proof (what and why)
2- Logic, basic operators
3- Using simple operators to construct any operator
4- Logical equivalence, DeMorgan’s law
5- Conditional statement (if, if and only if)
6- Arguments
In this presentation we will learn the concept of Implication and Biconditional or double implication and learn truth value of this two and solved some example to get more spark for this topic.
we see
conditional and biconditional
conditional and biconditional statements
conditional and biconditional connectives
Truth value of conditional and biconditional
conditional and biconditional operator
define conditional and biconditional connectives
conditional and biconditional examples
conditional and biconditional in math
Computing the volume of a convex body is a fundamental problem in computational geometry and optimization. In this talk we discuss the computational complexity of this problem from a theoretical as well as practical point of view. We show examples of how volume computation appear in applications ranging from combinatorics to algebraic geometry.
Next, we design the first practical algorithm for polytope volume approximation in high dimensions (few hundreds).
The algorithm utilizes uniform sampling from a convex region and efficient boundary polytope oracles.
Interestingly, our software provides a framework for exploring theoretical advances since it is believed, and our experiments provide evidence for this belief, that the current asymptotic bounds are unrealistically high.
A polycycle is a 2-connected plane locally finite graph G with faces partitioned
in two faces F1 and F2. The faces in F1 are combinatorial i-gons.
The faces in F2 are called holes and are pair-wise disjoint.
All vertices have degree {2,...,q} with interior vertices of degree q.
Polycycles can be decomposed into elementary polycycles. For some parameters (i,q) the elementary polycycles can be classified and this allows to solve many different combinatorial problems.
Optimal order a posteriori error bounds in L∞(L2) norm are derived for semidiscrete semilinear parabolic problems. Standard continuous Galerkin (conforming) finite element method is employed. Our main tools in deriving these error estimates are the elliptic reconstruction technique which is first introduced by Makridakis and Nochetto [5], with the aid of Gronwall’s lemma and continuation argument.
this is a lecture note of Discrete Mathematics.you can download this slide if you are interested about it.This is really helpful note for the cse students specially for those students who are doing Discrete Mathematics course in this mean time.Thank you all
Learning Analytics : entre Promesses et RéalitéSerge Garlatti
Université Bretagne Pays de Loire, UTICE : LES LEARNING ANALYTICS : QUAND LE BIG DATA S’INTÉRESSE À L’ÉDUCATION.
https://utice.u-bretagneloire.fr/evenement/les-learning-analytics-quand-le-big-data-sinteresse-leducation
L’usage du numérique dans l’éducation permet d’accéder aujourd’hui à une multitude de données sur le comportement des étudiants : identité, interactions entre apprenants, interactions avec les plateformes et outils d’apprentissage, résultats aux évaluations... La collecte et l’exploitation de ces données permettent de mieux comprendre les processus d’apprentissage et ainsi d’adapter les parcours pédagogiques proposés pour en renforcer l’efficacité, mais aussi de personnaliser les apprentissages ou de développer des outils de pilotage des formations. Une communauté de chercheurs et d’enseignants se développe autour de ce que l’on appelle les learning analytics, ou l’analyse des données d’apprentissage. Ce séminaire basé sur les recherches et des retours d’expérience d’enseignants-chercheurs et de jeunes entreprises permettra de cerner les enjeux et les perspectives des learning analytics.
Professional air quality monitoring systems provide immediate, on-site data for analysis, compliance, and decision-making.
Monitor common gases, weather parameters, particulates.
Earliest Galaxies in the JADES Origins Field: Luminosity Function and Cosmic ...Sérgio Sacani
We characterize the earliest galaxy population in the JADES Origins Field (JOF), the deepest
imaging field observed with JWST. We make use of the ancillary Hubble optical images (5 filters
spanning 0.4−0.9µm) and novel JWST images with 14 filters spanning 0.8−5µm, including 7 mediumband filters, and reaching total exposure times of up to 46 hours per filter. We combine all our data
at > 2.3µm to construct an ultradeep image, reaching as deep as ≈ 31.4 AB mag in the stack and
30.3-31.0 AB mag (5σ, r = 0.1” circular aperture) in individual filters. We measure photometric
redshifts and use robust selection criteria to identify a sample of eight galaxy candidates at redshifts
z = 11.5 − 15. These objects show compact half-light radii of R1/2 ∼ 50 − 200pc, stellar masses of
M⋆ ∼ 107−108M⊙, and star-formation rates of SFR ∼ 0.1−1 M⊙ yr−1
. Our search finds no candidates
at 15 < z < 20, placing upper limits at these redshifts. We develop a forward modeling approach to
infer the properties of the evolving luminosity function without binning in redshift or luminosity that
marginalizes over the photometric redshift uncertainty of our candidate galaxies and incorporates the
impact of non-detections. We find a z = 12 luminosity function in good agreement with prior results,
and that the luminosity function normalization and UV luminosity density decline by a factor of ∼ 2.5
from z = 12 to z = 14. We discuss the possible implications of our results in the context of theoretical
models for evolution of the dark matter halo mass function.
Seminar of U.V. Spectroscopy by SAMIR PANDASAMIR PANDA
Spectroscopy is a branch of science dealing the study of interaction of electromagnetic radiation with matter.
Ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy refers to absorption spectroscopy or reflect spectroscopy in the UV-VIS spectral region.
Ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy is an analytical method that can measure the amount of light received by the analyte.
Multi-source connectivity as the driver of solar wind variability in the heli...Sérgio Sacani
The ambient solar wind that flls the heliosphere originates from multiple
sources in the solar corona and is highly structured. It is often described
as high-speed, relatively homogeneous, plasma streams from coronal
holes and slow-speed, highly variable, streams whose source regions are
under debate. A key goal of ESA/NASA’s Solar Orbiter mission is to identify
solar wind sources and understand what drives the complexity seen in the
heliosphere. By combining magnetic feld modelling and spectroscopic
techniques with high-resolution observations and measurements, we show
that the solar wind variability detected in situ by Solar Orbiter in March
2022 is driven by spatio-temporal changes in the magnetic connectivity to
multiple sources in the solar atmosphere. The magnetic feld footpoints
connected to the spacecraft moved from the boundaries of a coronal hole
to one active region (12961) and then across to another region (12957). This
is refected in the in situ measurements, which show the transition from fast
to highly Alfvénic then to slow solar wind that is disrupted by the arrival of
a coronal mass ejection. Our results describe solar wind variability at 0.5 au
but are applicable to near-Earth observatories.
Richard's aventures in two entangled wonderlandsRichard Gill
Since the loophole-free Bell experiments of 2020 and the Nobel prizes in physics of 2022, critics of Bell's work have retreated to the fortress of super-determinism. Now, super-determinism is a derogatory word - it just means "determinism". Palmer, Hance and Hossenfelder argue that quantum mechanics and determinism are not incompatible, using a sophisticated mathematical construction based on a subtle thinning of allowed states and measurements in quantum mechanics, such that what is left appears to make Bell's argument fail, without altering the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. I think however that it is a smoke screen, and the slogan "lost in math" comes to my mind. I will discuss some other recent disproofs of Bell's theorem using the language of causality based on causal graphs. Causal thinking is also central to law and justice. I will mention surprising connections to my work on serial killer nurse cases, in particular the Dutch case of Lucia de Berk and the current UK case of Lucy Letby.
Comparing Evolved Extractive Text Summary Scores of Bidirectional Encoder Rep...University of Maribor
Slides from:
11th International Conference on Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering (IcETRAN), Niš, 3-6 June 2024
Track: Artificial Intelligence
https://www.etran.rs/2024/en/home-english/
2. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
2 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
3. Non-classical Logics
Classical logics: propositional logic, first-order logic
Non-classical logics can be classified in two main categories:
Extended logics
New logical constants are added
The set of well-formed formulas (wff) is a proper superset of the
set of well-formed formulas in classical logic.
The set of theorems generated is a proper superset of the set of
theorems generated by classical logic,
Added theorems are only the result of the new wff.
3 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
4. Non-classical Logics
Classical logics: propositional logic, first-order logic
Non-classical logics can be classified in two main categories:
Deviant logics
The usual logical constants are kept, but with a different meaning
Only a subset of the theorems from the classical logic hold
A non-exclusive classification, a logic could be in both.
4 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
7. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
7 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
8. Modal Logics
Traditional alethic modalities or modalities of truth
Propositional logic
New logical constants
Necessity:
Possibility: ♦
Alphabet
A set of propositional symbols S = {p1, p2, ..., pn}
A set of connectors: ¬, →, ↔, ∨, ∧
A set of modalities: , ♦
8 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
9. The Language
Well-Formed Formulae
Let pi be a propositional symbol, (pi ∈ S), pi is an Atomic
formula
If G and H are wff
(G → H), (G ↔ H), (G ∨ H), (G ∧ H), ¬G, G and ♦G
are wff .
Let P and Q be wff
( P → ♦P)
( ♦P → ♦♦Q)
(( ♦P ∨ ♦ ♦Q) ∧ P)
9 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
10. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
10 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
11. Model Theory
In Propositional and Predicate Logics
The Interpretation function I is truth-functional: the truth or
falsity of a well-formed formula is determined by the truth or
falsity of its components.
11 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
12. Model Theory
In Propositional and Predicate Logics
The Interpretation function I is truth-functional: the truth or
falsity of a well-formed formula is determined by the truth or
falsity of its components.
In Modal Logics, is-it the same?
P ¬P P
V F ?
F V F
11 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
13. Model Theory
In Propositional and Predicate Logics
The Interpretation function I is truth-functional: the truth or
falsity of a well-formed formula is determined by the truth or
falsity of its components.
In Modal Logics, is-it the same?
P ¬P P
V F ?
F V F
In Modal logics, the Interpretation function I is not
truth-functional
11 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
14. Model Theory
A standard Model is a structure M = (W, R, P) where
W is a set of possible worlds
12 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
15. Model Theory
A standard Model is a structure M = (W, R, P) where
W is a set of possible worlds
R is a binary relation on W (R ⊆ W × W)
12 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
16. Model Theory
A standard Model is a structure M = (W, R, P) where
W is a set of possible worlds
R is a binary relation on W (R ⊆ W × W)
R is an accessibility relationship between possible worlds.
We can write: α R β
12 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
17. Model Theory
A standard Model is a structure M = (W, R, P) where
W is a set of possible worlds
R is a binary relation on W (R ⊆ W × W)
R is an accessibility relationship between possible worlds.
We can write: α R β
P is a mapping from natural numbers to subsets of W
(Pn ⊆ W, for each natural number n)
12 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
18. Model Theory
A standard Model is a structure M = (W, R, P) where
W is a set of possible worlds
R is a binary relation on W (R ⊆ W × W)
R is an accessibility relationship between possible worlds.
We can write: α R β
P is a mapping from natural numbers to subsets of W
(Pn ⊆ W, for each natural number n)
P is an assignement of truth value to atomic formulae at possible
worlds.
It is a function on the set {0, 1, 2, ..., } of natural numbers such
that for each such number n, Pn is a subset of W.
It represents an assignment of sets of possible worlds to atomic
formulae (for pi ∈ S, Pi ⊆ W, ∀α such that α ∈ Pi , pi is true),
12 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
19. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
20. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
For propositional symbols pi , |=M
α pi iff α ∈ Pi for
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
21. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
For propositional symbols pi , |=M
α pi iff α ∈ Pi for
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
|=M
α A means that A is true for the world α in the standard
model M
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
22. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
For propositional symbols pi , |=M
α pi iff α ∈ Pi for
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
|=M
α A means that A is true for the world α in the standard
model M
|=M
α ¬A iff not |=M
α A
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
23. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
For propositional symbols pi , |=M
α pi iff α ∈ Pi for
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
|=M
α A means that A is true for the world α in the standard
model M
|=M
α ¬A iff not |=M
α A
|=M
α (A ∨ B) iff either |=M
α A or |=M
α B), or both
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
24. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
For propositional symbols pi , |=M
α pi iff α ∈ Pi for
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
|=M
α A means that A is true for the world α in the standard
model M
|=M
α ¬A iff not |=M
α A
|=M
α (A ∨ B) iff either |=M
α A or |=M
α B), or both
|=M
α (A ∧ B) iff both |=M
α A and |=M
α B)
13 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
25. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
|=M
α A iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
14 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
26. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
|=M
α A iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
|=M
α ♦A iff for some β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
14 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
27. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
|=M
α A iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
|=M
α ♦A iff for some β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
Truth in a Model
|=M
A iff for every world α in M, |=M
α A
14 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
28. Possible Worlds, Truth, Validity
Truth in a possible world, α ∈ W in M = (W, R, P)
|=M
α A iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
|=M
α ♦A iff for some β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β A
Truth in a Model
|=M
A iff for every world α in M, |=M
α A
Validity in a class of Models
|=C A iff for every model M in C, |=M
A
14 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
29. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
15 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
32. Axiomatic Theory
Modal Logic KT
Axioms
Necessity axiom, called T
( P → P)
Axiom K
( (P → Q) → ( P → Q))
16 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
33. Axiomatic Theory
Modal Logic KT
Axioms
Necessity axiom, called T
( P → P)
Axiom K
( (P → Q) → ( P → Q))
Inference Rules
Necessity Rule
P P
16 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
34. Axiomatic Theory
Modal Logic KT
Axioms
Necessity axiom, called T
( P → P)
Axiom K
( (P → Q) → ( P → Q))
Inference Rules
Necessity Rule
P P
Modus Ponens
P, (P → Q) Q
16 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
35. KT System: Axiomatic Theory
Properties of the Modal Logic KT
Consistency: KT is Consistent
Soundness: KT is Sound
Completeness: KT is Complete
Consequences: Axioms K and T are Valid Formulae.
17 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
36. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
18 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
37. Main Modal Systems
The main modal systems are composed from a small set of axioms:
Axiom T: ( P → P)
Axiom D: ( P → ♦P)
Axiom B: (P → ♦P)
Axiom 4: ( P → P)
Axiom 5: (♦P → ♦P)
19 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
38. Main Modal Systems
The main modal systems are composed from a small set of axioms:
Axiom T: ( P → P)
Axiom D: ( P → ♦P)
Axiom B: (P → ♦P)
Axiom 4: ( P → P)
Axiom 5: (♦P → ♦P)
From these axioms, it possible to build the following systems: KT,
KD, KB, K4, K5, K45, KB4, KD4, KTB, KT4, KT5, etc.
19 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
39. Relations between Axiomatic Modal Systems
K
KD K4 K5 KB
KTKDB KD4KD5 K45
KTB KT4 KD45 KB4
KT5
20 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
40. Inclusion of K Axiomatic Systems
For instance, we can demonstrate that KD is included in KT,
We have to deduce ( P → ♦P) from ( P → P)
( P → P)
(¬P → ¬ P)
(¬P → ♦¬P)
T contraposition
(P → ♦P)
( P → ♦P)
Transitivity
21 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
41. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
22 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
42. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: None of the Axioms D, T, B, 4 and 5 is Valid in the
class of all standards models
Proof: it is enough for each axiom to exhibit a counter-model that
falsifies it. For the axiom D: ( P → ♦P):
23 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
43. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: None of the Axioms D, T, B, 4 and 5 is Valid in the
class of all standards models
Proof: it is enough for each axiom to exhibit a counter-model that
falsifies it. For the axiom D: ( P → ♦P):
1 Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model in which W = {α},
R = ∅, Pn = ∅ for n 0
23 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
44. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: None of the Axioms D, T, B, 4 and 5 is Valid in the
class of all standards models
Proof: it is enough for each axiom to exhibit a counter-model that
falsifies it. For the axiom D: ( P → ♦P):
1 Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model in which W = {α},
R = ∅, Pn = ∅ for n 0
2 M contains one world to which no world is related and at which
every atomic formula is false.
23 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
45. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: None of the Axioms D, T, B, 4 and 5 is Valid in the
class of all standards models
Proof: it is enough for each axiom to exhibit a counter-model that
falsifies it. For the axiom D: ( P → ♦P):
1 Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model in which W = {α},
R = ∅, Pn = ∅ for n 0
2 M contains one world to which no world is related and at which
every atomic formula is false.
3 W is a set, R is a binary relation(the empty relation) and P is a
mapping from natural numbers to (empty) subsets of W
23 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
46. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: None of the Axioms D, T, B, 4 and 5 is Valid in the
class of all standards models
Proof: it is enough for each axiom to exhibit a counter-model that
falsifies it. For the axiom D: ( P → ♦P):
1 Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model in which W = {α},
R = ∅, Pn = ∅ for n 0
2 M contains one world to which no world is related and at which
every atomic formula is false.
3 W is a set, R is a binary relation(the empty relation) and P is a
mapping from natural numbers to (empty) subsets of W
4 Every β in M such that αRβ is such that |=M
β P and there is
not some β in M such that αRβ and |=M
β P
23 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
47. Axioms and Class of Models
The necessity Axiom ( P → P) in the following Standard Model:
w1
¬p1
w2
p1
w3
p1
w4
p1R
R
R
R
R
R
RR
24 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
48. Axioms and Class of Models
Under What Conditions, The necessity Axiom ( P → P) in
the KT system will be valid:
Hypothesis |=M
α P, we have to demonstrate |=M
α P
25 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
49. Axioms and Class of Models
Under What Conditions, The necessity Axiom ( P → P) in
the KT system will be valid:
Hypothesis |=M
α P, we have to demonstrate |=M
α P
1 By definition |=M
α P iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β P
25 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
50. Axioms and Class of Models
Under What Conditions, The necessity Axiom ( P → P) in
the KT system will be valid:
Hypothesis |=M
α P, we have to demonstrate |=M
α P
1 By definition |=M
α P iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β P
2 Consequently, |=M
α P iff R is reflexive, that is to say αRα.
25 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
51. Axioms and Class of Models
Under What Conditions, The necessity Axiom ( P → P) in
the KT system will be valid:
Hypothesis |=M
α P, we have to demonstrate |=M
α P
1 By definition |=M
α P iff for every β in M such that αRβ, |=M
β P
2 Consequently, |=M
α P iff R is reflexive, that is to say αRα.
In the KT system, the necessity Axiom is valid under the following
condition:
|=C ( P → P), C is a class of models in which R is
Reflexive
25 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
52. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
26 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
53. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
Serial iff for every α in M there is a β in M such that α R β
26 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
54. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
Serial iff for every α in M there is a β in M such that α R β
Reflexive iff for every α in M, α R α
26 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
55. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
Serial iff for every α in M there is a β in M such that α R β
Reflexive iff for every α in M, α R α
Symmetric iff for every α and β in M, if α R β then β R α
26 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
56. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
Serial iff for every α in M there is a β in M such that α R β
Reflexive iff for every α in M, α R α
Symmetric iff for every α and β in M, if α R β then β R α
Transitive iff for every α, β and γ in M, if α R β and β R γ
then α R γ
26 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
57. Axioms and Class of Models
Definition: Let M = (W, R, P) be a standard model, the
relation R, with α, β, γ ∈ W is:
Serial iff for every α in M there is a β in M such that α R β
Reflexive iff for every α in M, α R α
Symmetric iff for every α and β in M, if α R β then β R α
Transitive iff for every α, β and γ in M, if α R β and β R γ
then α R γ
Euclidian iff for every α, β and γ in M, if α R β and α R γ
then β R γ
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58. Axioms and Class of Models
Theorem: the following axioms are valid respectively in the
indicated class of standard models:
D: Serial
T: Reflexive
B: Symmetric
4: Transitive
5: Euclidian
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59. Axioms and Class of Models
Systems Serial Reflexive Symmetric Transitive Euclidian
KD x
KT x
KB x
K4 x
K5 x
KDB x x
KD4 x x
KD5 x x
KD45 x x
KB4 x x
KB4 x x
KTB x x
KT4 x x
KT5 x x
KT5 x x x
KT5 x x x
KT5 x x x
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60. Progress
1 Introduction
2 Modal Logics
3 Model Theory
4 Axiomatic Theory
5 Main Modal Systems
6 Axioms and Class of Models
7 A Knowledge and Belief Logic
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61. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge,
Knowledge Properties for an agent λ:
Axioms
1 Axiom 1 (Distribution Axiom, K): (KλP ∧ Kλ(P → Q)) → KλQ
- Same as (Kλ(P → Q)) → (KλP → KλQ))
2 Axiom 2 (Knowledge Axiom or T): (KλP → P)
3 Axiom 3 (Positive Introspection Axiom, 4): (KλP → KλKλP)
4 Axiom 4 (Negative Introspection Axiom): (¬KλP → Kλ¬KλP)
- (¬ P → ¬ P) (♦¬P → ♦¬P)
- (♦¬P → ♦¬P) (♦Q → ♦Q) (axiom 5)
30 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
62. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge,
Knowledge Properties for an agent λ:
Inference Rules
Necessitation: P KλP
Omniscience Logic: if P Q and KλP then KλQ (axiom 1 +
necessitation rule)
The axiomatic theory correspond with the KT45 modal system in
which the accessibility relation is symmetric, reflexive and
transitive.
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63. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
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64. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
Three chairs are lined up, all facing the same direction, with one
behind the other. The wise men are instructed to sit down.
32 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
65. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
Three chairs are lined up, all facing the same direction, with one
behind the other. The wise men are instructed to sit down.
The wise man in the back (wise man 3) can see the backs of the
other two men.
32 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
66. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
Three chairs are lined up, all facing the same direction, with one
behind the other. The wise men are instructed to sit down.
The wise man in the back (wise man 3) can see the backs of the
other two men.
The man in the middle (wise man 2) can only see the one wise
man in front of him (wise man 1).
32 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
67. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
Three chairs are lined up, all facing the same direction, with one
behind the other. The wise men are instructed to sit down.
The wise man in the back (wise man 3) can see the backs of the
other two men.
The man in the middle (wise man 2) can only see the one wise
man in front of him (wise man 1).
The wise man in front (wise man 1) can see neither wise man 3
nor wise man 2.
32 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
68. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
33 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
69. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
The king informs the wise men that he has three cards, all of
which are either black or white, at least one of which is
white. He places one card, face up, behind each of the three
wise men.
33 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
70. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
The king informs the wise men that he has three cards, all of
which are either black or white, at least one of which is
white. He places one card, face up, behind each of the three
wise men.
Each wise man must determine the color of his own card and
announce what it is as soon as he knows. The first to correctly
announce the color of his own card will be aptly rewarded. All
know that this will happen. The room is silent; then, after
several minutes, wise man 1 says: My card is white!.
33 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
71. Three-Wise-Men Problem
A king wishes to know whether his three advisors are as wise as
they claim to be.
We assume in this puzzle that the wise men do not lie, that they
all have the same reasoning capabilities, and that they can all think
at the same speed. We then can postulate that the following
reasoning took place.
34 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
73. Three-Wise-Men Problem
Each wise man knows there is at least one white card. If the
cards of wise man 2 and wise man 1 were black, then wise man
3 would have been able to announce immediately that his card
was white.
35 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
74. Three-Wise-Men Problem
Each wise man knows there is at least one white card. If the
cards of wise man 2 and wise man 1 were black, then wise man
3 would have been able to announce immediately that his card
was white.
They all realize this (they are all truly wise). Since wise man 3
kept silent, either wise man 2’s card is white, or wise man 1’s is.
35 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
75. Three-Wise-Men Problem
Each wise man knows there is at least one white card. If the
cards of wise man 2 and wise man 1 were black, then wise man
3 would have been able to announce immediately that his card
was white.
They all realize this (they are all truly wise). Since wise man 3
kept silent, either wise man 2’s card is white, or wise man 1’s is.
At this point wise man 2 would be able to determine, if wise man
1’s were black, that his card was white. They all realize this.
35 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
76. Three-Wise-Men Problem
Each wise man knows there is at least one white card. If the
cards of wise man 2 and wise man 1 were black, then wise man
3 would have been able to announce immediately that his card
was white.
They all realize this (they are all truly wise). Since wise man 3
kept silent, either wise man 2’s card is white, or wise man 1’s is.
At this point wise man 2 would be able to determine, if wise man
1’s were black, that his card was white. They all realize this.
Since wise man 2 also remains silent, wise man 1 knows his card
must be white.
35 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
77. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
36 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
78. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
1 A and B know that each one can see the card of the other one
36 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
79. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
1 A and B know that each one can see the card of the other one
If A does not have a white card, B knows that A does not have a
white card
- (¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
36 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
80. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
1 A and B know that each one can see the card of the other one
If A does not have a white card, B knows that A does not have a
white card
- (¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
A knows that if A does not have a white card, B knows that A
does not have a white card
36 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
81. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
1 A and B know that each one can see the card of the other one
If A does not have a white card, B knows that A does not have a
white card
- (¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
A knows that if A does not have a white card, B knows that A
does not have a white card
- KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
36 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
82. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
2 A and B know that at least one of them has a white card and
each one knows that the other knows it.
37 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
83. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
2 A and B know that at least one of them has a white card and
each one knows that the other knows it.
A knows that B knows that if A does not have a white card then
B has a white card
37 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
84. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
2 A and B know that at least one of them has a white card and
each one knows that the other knows it.
A knows that B knows that if A does not have a white card then
B has a white card
- KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B))
37 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
85. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
2 A and B know that at least one of them has a white card and
each one knows that the other knows it.
A knows that B knows that if A does not have a white card then
B has a white card
- KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B))
B declare that he does not say if he has a white card, then A
knows that B does not knows the color of his card.
37 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
86. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we reduce the problem with two advisors A and B and have the
following axioms:
2 A and B know that at least one of them has a white card and
each one knows that the other knows it.
A knows that B knows that if A does not have a white card then
B has a white card
- KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B))
B declare that he does not say if he has a white card, then A
knows that B does not knows the color of his card.
- KA¬KBBlanc(B)
37 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
87. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
88. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) [1]
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
89. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) [1]
KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B)) [2]
KA¬KBBlanc(B) [3]
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
90. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) [1]
KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B)) [2]
KA¬KBBlanc(B) [3]
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
91. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) [1]
KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B)) [2]
KA¬KBBlanc(B) [3]
[1] (KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) (KλP → P) [Axiom2]
[4] (¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
92. Three-Wise-Men Problem
If we can reduce the problem with two advisors and have the
following axioms:
KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) [1]
KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B)) [2]
KA¬KBBlanc(B) [3]
[1] (KA(¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A)) (KλP → P) [Axiom2]
[4] (¬Blanc(A) → KB¬Blanc(A))
[2] KAKB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B)) (KλP → P) [Axiom2]
[5] (KB(¬Blanc(A) → Blanc(B))
(Kλ(P → Q) → (KλP → KλQ)) [Axiom1]
[6] (KB¬Blanc(A) → KBBlanc(B))
38 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
94. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge, Belief
Properties for an agent λ:
Axioms
40 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
95. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge, Belief
Properties for an agent λ:
Axioms
An agent cannot belief a contradiction: ¬Bλ(False)
40 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
96. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge, Belief
Properties for an agent λ:
Axioms
An agent cannot belief a contradiction: ¬Bλ(False)
Positive Introspection Axiom (axiom 4): (BλP → BλBλP)
an agent believes what he believes
40 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms
97. Knowledge and Belief Logic
Two modal operators, B for Belief and K for Knowledge, Belief
Properties for an agent λ:
Axioms
An agent cannot belief a contradiction: ¬Bλ(False)
Positive Introspection Axiom (axiom 4): (BλP → BλBλP)
an agent believes what he believes
(BλBλP → BλP) (converse of the previous axiom)
(BλBαP → BλP)
an agent can belief what another agent believes
40 / 40 SG Models and Formalisms