Maritime Cyber Security Κυβερνοασφάλεια και Ναυτιλία

1. Παπαδάκης Κων/νος
Αναλυτής Επιχειρήσεων Κυβερνοχώρου και Σύμβουλος
Κυβεροάμυνας-Κυβερνοασφάλειας
Papadakis Konstantinos
Cyber-Information Warfare Analyst & Cyber Defense/Security
Consultant Cyber Security Consultant
“Maritime Cyber Security
and Risk Management”
“… If cybercrime was a country, it would have the 13th
highest GDP in the world…
“Κυβερνοασφάλεια και
Ναυτιλία”

2. Περιεχόμενα
☺ Facts-Opinions
☺ Statistics
☺ Threats
☺ Cyber VS Shipping
☺ Problems
☺ Vulnerabilities
☺ Threats-Incidents
☺ Standard-Guidelines
☺ Risk Management
☺ Conclusions
Temet Nosce

3. ☺ Facts-Opinions
☺ Statistics
☺ Threats

4. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Facts-Opinions
PART 1
Cyber Security

5. The Cyberization of Risk-Everything is connected
Law 1: Everything that is connected to the Internet can be hacked
Law 2: Everything is being connected to the Internet
Law 3: Everything else follows from the first two laws
The impact of a cyber event
can cascade and across an
organization,
reinforcing the magnitude of its
impact
Temet Nosce

6. Opinions
Temet Nosce

7. Opinions
* https://www.gnostech.com/maritime-blog/petya-maersk-one-year-later/
“…the maritime industry needs to be better equipped to face the next
cyberattack, whether globally, like Petya, or specifically targeted at individual
organizations.
To do so, maritime organizations must implement the proper
security and access control measures to ensure sensitive data does not end
up in the wrong hands leading to system and network compromise.
Additionally, when attacked, maritime and port organizations must
be prepared to respond to cyber-attacks and have contingency plans in place
to minimize the disruption to operations and commerce
…”
Lars Jenson
Sea Intelligence Consulting
“…weak security is endemic in the shipping
industry, noting that some 44% of carriers show
signs of low levels of cybersecurity related to
very basic elements, such as patching.
Temet Nosce

8. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Statistics
PART 1
Cyber Security

9. Statistics: Cyber Attacks (Impact-Likehood)
https://www.climatealliance.org.au/blog/2018/global-risks-landscape-global-risks-report-2018-wef Temet Nosce

10. Statistics: Rising Cyber Dependency
https://knowledge.unccd.int/publications/global-risks-report-2018
Rising Cyber
Dependency
Temet Nosce

11. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Threats
PART 1
Cyber Security

12. General Cyber Threat Trends
Threats are increasing
➢ Hacking tools are widely available and simpler to use
➢ The potential impact of cyber attacks continues to grow
Hacker motivations are changing
➢ No longer egocentric
➢ Shift to professional cyber criminals (money motivated)
Certain common factors enable threat actor success
➢ Economy of organized cybercrime
➢ Inter-connected systems
➢ Organizational failure to implement
cyber hygiene
Temet Nosce

13. Attackers come in many guises …
Disruption Espionage Financial
Insiders
Outsiders
Hacktivists
Nation states
Criminal organizations
Terrorists
Hackers and Amateurs
Criminal aims
Disgruntled employees
Unintentional
Temet Nosce

14. Cyber Security in a nutshell – a continuous approach!
What to Protect?
Ship, platform
organization
people
What to protect
against?
Terrorists, cyber
crime, …
How to
protect?
People, Processes and
Technology
Assets Threats Protective measures
Vulnerability and
Risk assessment
modeling
Detection, testing,
monitoring, review
Acceptable
risk?
Temet Nosce

15. It is not only about software and technology
PROCESS
• Management systems
• Governance frameworks
• Policies and procedures
• Vendor/Third party contract follow up
• Audit regimes
TECHNOLOGY
• System design, design review
• Software configurations
• Inspection/verification
• Testing
✓ Functional testing
✓ Vulnerability scanning
✓ Penetration test
PEOPLE
• Training and awareness
• Professional skills and qualifications
• Written procedures
• Authorizations
• Physical security
Temet Nosce

16. ☺ Cyber VS Shipping
☺ Problems
☺ Vulnerabilities
☺ Threats-Incidents

17. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Cyber & Shipping
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

18. Safety in shipping today heavily depends on cyber systems
Temet Nosce

19. Cyber risks are present and migrating to the OT world
Temet Nosce

20. Cyber risks are present and migrating to the OT world
Temet Nosce

21. Is cybercrime really a big problem?
The UK government is investing £1.9 billion in cyber-security over the next five
years
The global cost of cybercrime will reach $2 trillion by 2019
Of 383 organisations asked who suffered at least one data breach in 2016, the
average cost per breach was $4 million
In 2017 the International Data Group (IDG) detected 38% more cyber-security
incidents than the year before
Temet Nosce
48% of data security breaches are caused by acts of malicious intent. Human
error or system failure account for the rest.

22. Impact on the Maritime Supply Chain
Temet Nosce
Hacking into on-line services – including cargo and consignment tracking systems.
Phishing and links to malware & false web sites.
Infection via removable media – flash drives.
Fraudulent Web set up (disclosure of information/reputational damage).

23. Impact on the Maritime Supply Chain
Temet Nosce
Hacking into navigational systems (ECDIS).
AIS/GPS Spoofing.
Impersonation Fraud
Average cost of a cyber fraud at $120K per attack/incident.
➢ Interception and redirection of cash to master funds.
➢ Creating false invoices and accounting details for services such as annual
lifeboat certification

24. Threat Environment
Cybersecurity - Intentional exploitation
➢ External bad actor
➢ Internal bad actor
Cybersafety - Accidental corruption
➢ Accidental corruption
➢ Software or configuration errors
IT Attack
Methods
OT
Protocols
System
Knowledge
Require set
of Skills
Temet Nosce

25. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Problems
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

26. Keep in mind…..
Vessel Digitization
IT vs OT
Temet Nosce

27. Vessel Digitization
Temet Nosce
6

28. Transforming the shipping industry-Entering the digitization era
Computerized systems will transform the shipping industry
Smart–autonomous or even automated ships
Temet Nosce

29. From Digital Ship to the Autonomous Ship
Smart ships don’t represent a ‘stand-alone’ technology.
Short to Medium Term
From the Digital Ship to the Intelligent Ship:
The exploitation of big data acquisition,
communications and analytics to introduce
intelligent, real-time and proactive decision-making
in the design, operation and maintenance of ships
Medium to Long Term
From the Intelligent Ship to the Autonomous
Ship:
The exploitation of sensors and robotics technology
to replace human operators, leading to
semiautonomous
ships (e.g., engine-room crewless ships)
or fully autonomous ships (remote controlled)
They are a manifestation and exploitation of integrated, networked technologies (e.g.
sensors, robotics, big data, advanced materials, and communications)
Digital Ship Intelligent Ship Autonomous Ship
Temet Nosce

30. Common Challenges in Shipping
Competitive Imperatives
➢ Executives must accept a certain level of cyber attack risk
Pervasive cybersecurity implication
➢ Cyber risk touches every business function across a shipping company
➢ Adoption of risk-based strategies
Difficult to quantify Cyber Risk
➢ No single quantitative metric (value at risk) for cyber security
➢ Harder to communicate the urgency to ship owners.
Difficult change behavior
* McKinsey & Co, Why SENIOR Leaders are the front Line AGAINST Cyber Attacks Temet Nosce

31. How cyber aware is the shipping industry?
Urgency for action becoming gradually understood
➢ Why…?????
☺ No apparent ship-related cyber attacks
☺ No mandatory framework from related shipping organizations
☺ Other regulations affect maritime stakeholders (GDPR, NIS)
* McKinsey & Co, Why SENIOR Leaders are the front Line AGAINST Cyber Attacks
Priority
Understand how these affect the
industry in order to minimize cost
Cyber security
as
Return of Investment-ROI
Temet Nosce

32. Crew Connectivity Report 2018
* Chatham House Report
Crew Connectivity
Temet Nosce

33. Crew Connectivity Report 2018
* Chatham House Report
Internet access in selected sectors
Temet Nosce

34. Crew Connectivity Report 2018
* Chatham House Report
Responsibility
Temet Nosce

35. Crew Connectivity Report 2018
* Chatham House Report
Training Requirements
Temet Nosce

36. Events: IMO’s Facilitation Committee - 40th Session, Meeting April 4th - 8th 2016
The Facilitation Committee is expected to identify the facilitation
aspects with regards to protecting the maritime transport network from
cyber threats, with a view to developing voluntary maritime cybersecurity
guidelines, including best practices.
Cyber Security
Temet Nosce

37. Internet of Things Cyber Risk Insight: Mobile Computing
…Easy access to the internet onboard
ships is a key requirement if young people
are to be attracted into the seafaring
profession, according to speakers at a
World Maritime Day IMO symposium on
maritime education and training...
ILO MLC 2006, Title 3 Amendments
List the requirements for recreational facility amenities that
include but are not limited to some or all of the following:
PC equipment
Communication facilities, including email and internet access…
Temet Nosce

38. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Information Technology (IT)
VS
Operational Technology (OT)

39. What is “Cybersecurity”?
Cyber Security is NOT:
➢ Information Technology (IT)
➢ Compliance (ISO, ISM Code,…etc)
➢ Silver Bullet Solution
Cyber Security IS:
➢ Sustained Risk Management Activity-function, designed to provide a
standard of care.
➢ Cultural Change and business transformation.
➢ Mission and business of protecting the entire enterprise.
➢ Nod between User AND Corporate Awareness (All of you!!!!)
Temet Nosce

40. Maritime Industry Snapshot
Mixture of corporate & local cybersecurity governance
Varying levels of automation
Humans-in-the-loop in key processes
Dependence on vendors
Emerging cybersecurity cultures
Increased demand for business & control network integration
Temet Nosce

41. Information Technology (IT)
Spectrum of technologies for information processing, including software,
hardware, communications technologies and related services.
Transaction Processing
Systems
Decision Support
Systems
Executive
Info
Systems
Management
Information Systems
Temet Nosce

42. Operational Technology (OT)
Hardware and software that detects or causes a change through the direct
monitoring and/or control of physical devices, processes, and events in the
enterprise
Temet Nosce

43. IT vs and OT
Information Technology (IT)
Store & process information
Operational Technology (OT)
Manage physical devices & processes
Temet Nosce

44. Different Consequences of System Exploitation
Operational Technology (OT)
Consequences
Information Technology (IT)
Consequences
Financial Impacts Physical Impacts
Temet Nosce

45. Opposite System Priorities
Confidentiality
Preserving authorized restrictions
Integrity
Performing its intended functions
Availability
Ensuring timely & reliable access
Highest
Information
Technology
(IT)
System Priorities
Operational
Technology
(OT)
Lowest Highest
Lowest
Temet Nosce

46. IT/OT Convergence
Traditionally, IT & OT networks have operated independently
New technologies enable better control, enhanced monitoring, & cost savings
Data analytics to increase process efficiency, reliability, & lifespan
Temet Nosce

47. IT/OT Convergence
Temet Nosce

48. IT/OT Convergence
Temet Nosce

49. Trends in OT Systems
Use of new technologies
Increased automation
Increased connectivity (IoT)
Greater complexity
Remote access
Big data & data analytics
Temet Nosce

50. Common OT System Vulnerabilities
Immature cybersecurity governance over OT
Remote and direct access to OT systems by vendors
Use of old and inherently insecure technology
Unsecured physical ports
Temet Nosce

51. Trends in Physical Security Systems
Migration to digital technology
Use of wireless equipment
Lack of cybersecurity expertise
Division of cyber & physical security
Outsourcing of security systems
Temet Nosce

52. Threats to Physical Security Systems
Causing system outages
Gathering sensitive data
Creating fake identities
Creating false situational awareness
Neutralizing alarms
Temet Nosce

53. Common Physical Security Systems Vulnerabilities
Non-segmentation of business & security networks
Direct physical access to equipment
Exploitation of wireless devices connections
Sharing camera feeds with 3rd parties
Uncontrolled remote access by security vendors
Temet Nosce

54. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Vulnerabilities
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

55. Are Ships Vulnerable?
Temet Nosce

56. So What’s Vulnerable?
Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment and Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) for loading/unloading of bulk/containerized cargo
Cargo / Terminal Management Systems
Domain Awareness / Navigational Systems - RADAR, AIS, VTS/VTMS
Any Business Software Application:
➢ email, financial, human resources, finance, logistics, business operations,
etc. - Think “ERP”.
Any Operating Systems (e.g. Microsoft, Linux)
Security Systems - CCTV, Access Control
Mobility devices and platforms - RFID
Communications Systems
Employees (insiders)
Temet Nosce

57. Are Ships Vulnerable?
Temet Nosce

58. Ship cyber Systems
Temet Nosce
EAS-Εngine Automation System
AEMC
Autonomous Engine Monitoring and Control
System
EDL-Engine Data Logger
ACCER
Autonomous Control of the Engine Room
Κύριες μηχανές-Συστήματα υποστήριξής
Βοηθητικές μηχανές
Συστήματα πρόωσης και καθοδήγησης
Συστήματα ελέγχου των δεξαμενών
EH
Emergency Handling
Συστήματα γενικού συναγερμού
Συναγερμός πυρκαγιάς
Συναγερμός ανθρώπου στη θάλασσα
Συναγερμός ακυβέρνητου πλοίου
Συναγερμός ανίχνευσης CO2
Πλημμύρα του δωματίου μηχανών
Πλημμύρα του χώρου φορτίων
EES
Engine Efficient System
MIS
Maintenance Interaction System
BAS-Bridge Automation System
Navigation Systems
AIS-Automatic Identification System
ECDIS-Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems
VDR-Voyage Data Recorder
GPS
ASS-Advanced Sensor Systems
Ραντάρ του πλοίου
Κάμερες ασφάλειας και παρακολούθησης
Συστήματα παρακολούθηση του περιβάλλοντος
ASC-Autonomous ship Controller
GMDSS-Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
Συστήματα επικοινωνίας (VHF-HF-MF)
NAVTEX-COSPAS-SARSAT-INMARSAT
Πομποί SART και ραδιοφάροι EPIRB
CCR-Cargo Management/Cargo Control Room
Συστήματα ελέγχου/ένδειξης επιπέδου
Συστήματα Απομακρυσμένου ελέγχου βαλβίδων
Valve Remote Control System-VRCS
Σύστημα έρματος-Συναγερμού για εισροή υδάτων
Water Intrusion Detection System-WIDS
Συστήματα ελέγχου εισόδου
Electronic Personnel on Board-POB Systems
Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System-BNWAS
Shipboard Security Alarm Systems-SSAS
Συστήματα παρακολούθησης-CCTV
PSMS-Passenger Management System
Property Management System-PMS
Medical Records
Ship passenger/seafarer boarding access systems
Συστήματα υποστήριξης της συνολικής υποδομής
SCC-Shore Control Center
RMSS
Remote Manoeuvring Support
System
HMI-Human Machine Interface

59. Interconnections-Dependencies…..
EAS
Engine Automation
System
BAS
Bridge Automation
System
SCC
Shore Control Center
AEMC
Autonomous Engine
Monitoring and
Control
EES
Engine Efficient
System
EDL-Engine Data Logger
ACCER-Autonomous Control of the Engine
Room
EH-Emergency Handling
MIS
Maintenance
Interaction System
NAV
Navigation
Systems
AIC-Automatic Identification System
ECDIS-Electronic Chart Display and Info Systems
ASS-Advanced Sensor Systems (1)
VDR- Voyage Data Recorder
GPS
ASC
Autonomous ship
Controller
GMDSS-Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
CCR-Cargo Management/Cargo Control Room (1)
Συστήματα Έλεγχου Εισόδου
PSMS-Passenger Management System
RMSS
Remote Maneuvering
Support System
HMI
Human Machine
Interface
Temet Nosce

60. Vessel Digitization
Temet Nosce
6

61. Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS)
ECDIS Systems
➢ Geographic information systems
➢ International Maritime Organization compliant
➢ Alternative / compliant to paper nautical charts
➢ Can be interfaced with NavText and AIS
➢ July 2018 –Mandatory for all vessels in international voyages.
Temet Nosce

62. Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS)
Attacking ECDIS Systems
➢ ECDIS systems are in essence desktop PCs
➢ With physical access a malicious person could use the USB slot to:
☻ Load incorrect/outdated maps
☻ Access the underlying operating system
☻ Spread malware/ransomware USB Flash
Temet Nosce

63. Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS)
Attacking ECDIS Systems
➢ As with any other PC, ECDIS systems can be tampered with
➢ A number of these systems run with administrative rights and no
password protection.
Temet Nosce

64. Vessel Digitization
Temet Nosce
6

65. Automatic Identification System (AIS)
AIS Systems
➢ Automatic tracking system for identifying and locating vessels
➢ 2002 – First mandate for vessels over 300GT to be equipped with a Class
A type AIS transceiver.
➢ AIS information supplements marine radar, which continues to be the
primary method of collision avoidance for water transport.
➢ Aid in accident investigation and in search and rescue operations.
➢ The information is also sent to providers such as:
☺ Maritimetraffic.com, Vesselfinder.com or Aishub.net.
➢ Transmit in the Marine bands:
☺ Channel A 161.975 MHz (87B)
☺ Channel B 162.025 MHz (88B)
Temet Nosce

66. Automatic Identification System (AIS)
AIS Systems Messages
➢ AIS can send up to 27 types of messages
☺ Message 18
Sent between anywhere 30 seconds and 3 minutes to report the
vessels position.
☺ Message 14
Safety related broadcast used in emergencies
Temet Nosce

67. Automatic Identification System (AIS)→Attacks Landscape
Hackers download the data of an existing ship,
changing some of the parameters and submitting it to the AIS service.
Ship Hijacking
Replay Attacks
Hackers capture and store AIS data
and replay spoofed messages in
specific timeframes
Man-in-the-water
Because of maritime laws and
best practices, everyone needs to
address this type of an alert.
Fake CPA
Hackers create a fake CPA (closest
point of approach) alert.
Arbitrary
weather forecast
Hackers impersonate actual
issuers of weather forecast
such as the port authority
and arbitrarily change the
weather forecast delivered to
ships.
AIS Spoofing
Hackers can send specially
crafted messages that could
mimic the location of an
existing vessel, or even
create a fake vessel and
place it on its own virtual
course.
Temet Nosce

68. Automatic Identification System (AIS)→ AIS Systems Attacks
AIS Systems Attacks
➢ Even via RF the hackers have 4 attack vectors
☻ AIS Gateway
☻ Vessel Traffic Service
☻ Vessels
☻ Offshore
* A Security Evaluation of AIS Automated Identification Systems Marco Balduzzi, Alessandro Pasta, Kyle Wilhoit/ Temet Nosce

69. Automatic Identification System (AIS)→ Example
Temet Nosce

70. Automatic Identification System (AIS)→ Verified Attacks
AIS Systems Verified Attacks
Modification of all ship details
☻ Position-Course-Cargo-Flagged country-Speed-Name-MMSI
Creation of fake vessels
☻ having an vessel with nuclear cargo show up off the coast of the US
Create and modify Aid to Navigations (AToN) entries,
☻ Buoys and Lighthouses
Research has been published in 2013
☻ Since then there was not an improvement on the protocol
☻ ITU Radio Communication Sector (ITU-R)-Developers of the AIS standard
and the protocol specification have acknowledged the problem
Temet Nosce

71. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Incidents
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

72. Incidents…..
Temet Nosce

73. Incident trends and regulation development
Drilling rig
infected
with
malware
Pirate
Cyber
Attack
GPS
jamming
/spoofing
Hacking of
cargo
tracking
system
U.S. Port
hacker
attack
Bulk carrier
SWB shuts
down –
ransomware
Major
shipping
company
infected by
ransomware
“Prepare for
the
unknown”
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018
ISO
27001/27002
IEC 62443
January
BIMCO
Cyber security
guideline
IMO
Guidelines on
cyber security
onboard ships
July
NIS directive
September
DNVGL
RP-0496
July
IMO
Guidelines on
maritime
cyber risk
Management
January
DNVGL
Cyber security
Type Approval
May
EU
GDPR
May
DNVGL
Class notation
Temet Nosce

74. Cyber risks are present and migrating to the OT world
Temet Nosce

75. Cybercrime time line
Temet Nosce
2011–IRISL
Services hacked causing damage to rates/loading schedules/delivery
schedules/location of boxes (some never traced).
2011-2013–Port of Antwerp–drug cartel
illicit drugs and contraband seized $365 million/firearms seized $1.5
million (led to MSC v. Glencore International AG [CA])
2012–Australia
illicit drugs and contraband seized $365 million/firearms seized $1.5
million (led to MSC v. Glencore International AG [CA])

76. Cybercrime time line
Temet Nosce
2012–2014–Danish port authority
Email virus led to full shut down and ultimately infected government
systems.
2014-Semi Sub Gulf of Mexico destabilised
19 days to make seaworthy and return to operation.
(Similar attacks to other rigs off Africa).
2016–N.Korea?
280 vessels forced to return to port following problems with
navigation systems

77. Cybercrime time line
Temet Nosce
2017-Black Sea
20 ships in Black Sea AIS/GPS spoofed – 32km inland of actual posi-
tion.
2018-COSCO
COSCO hit by a cyber attack affecting the carriers ability to commu-
nicate with vessels, customers and marine terminals.

78. High-Profile Cyber Events Against IT & OT Systems
Temet Nosce

79. IRISL (Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines→ Hack (2011)
Servers were compromised
Logistics systems crashed
Entire fleet of 172 vessels was
compromised
False information input into systems:
➢ Compromised manifests
➢ Falsification of rates
➢ Containers ‘cloaked’
➢ Delivery dates
➢ Client / Vendor Data
Major Business Interruption!!!!!!!!
Temet Nosce

80. Port of Antwerp:2011-2013 Cyber-enabled cargo theft
Drug traffickers recruited hackers to
breach IT systems.
Controlled the movement and location
of containers over a 2-year period from
June 2011
Drugs were hidden in containers
among legitimate cargo
Enabled traffickers to steal the cargo
before the legitimate owners arrived
Hacking technique involved physical
access to computer networks and
installation of snooping devices
Impact: cargo theft
* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24539417 Temet Nosce

81. Maersk : Ransomware attack-June 2017
Petya ransomware attack.
(…modified with a leaked NSA exploit…)
No data breach or loss to third-parties”
occurred
Impact: the company would lose up to
$300 million in revenues
* https://www.gnostech.com/maritime-blog/petya-maersk-one-year-later/
Maersk operations were certainly impacted
Shut down infected networks
Three container-related businesses were taken
offline
Maersk reinstall its entire infrastructure
4,000 new servers, 45,000 new PCs, 2,500 apps
In 10 days
Temet Nosce

82. Maersk : Ransomware attack-June 2017
* https://www.gnostech.com/maritime-blog/petya-maersk-one-year-later/
Maersk chairman
Jim Haggeman Snabe
“…Imagine a company where you have a ship that
comes into a port every 15 minutes and for 10 days
and you have no IT. It’s almost impossible to even
imagine…”
“…Maersk drew important lessons from the incident, including the
pitfalls of management being “naive” about cybersecurity…”
“…This was a very significant wake up call for AP Moeller Maersk.
We could say a very expensive one… Yet I argue that it was a very
important wake-up call…”
Temet Nosce

83. The Incident
Temet Nosce
At 04:00 12 August 2018 the head office of the "Amazing
Cruise Company" – based in Nassau Bahamas received the
following distress call from the master of their cruise vessel
MV Wonders:
"Mayday Mayday Mayday - this is MV Wonders communi-
cating on all channels. We are under suspected piracy
attack. Please advise”
The following radio traffic then ensued:
“MV Wonders, MV Wonders - this is operations Nassau - please advise current
position, speed and nature of attack”
“Operations – we are currently in position Lat 12 degrees 25 minutes North, Long
043 degrees 53 minutes East, we have increased speed to 18 knots and are
taking avoidance manoeuvres”
“MV Wonder MV Wonders - your position is noted, we are instigating immediate
emergency response and notifying US Naval/Nato - please advise nature of
attack”

84. The Incident
Temet Nosce
“Three vessels approaching at speed, two to starboard one
to port - vessels appear to be heavily armed. Suspected
RPG”
Sound of large explosion
“They have fired RPG–repeat RPG-contact starboard
midships”
The following radio traffic then ensued:
“MV Wonders MV Wonders - please advise scope of
damage, any casualties ? We are in contact with US Naval
authorities”
“MV Wonders MV Wonders - please respond”. “MV
Wonders MV Wonders this is operations Nassau - please
update position/situation”
No further radio traffic is received from the vessel.
The cruise company immediately activate their emergency response plan which
includes notification both to the FBI and US naval authorities. The position of the
vessel as notified in the previous message is communicated. This is also verified by
remote access to the ships electronic systems.

85. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce

86. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce

87. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce
Despite all attempts to re-establish contact with the vessel no response is received.
Fortunately a US naval frigate is in the vicinity of the reported attack and proceeds
with all speed to attend.
Upon arrival the US naval frigate advises that there is no sign of the vessel. The
frigate launches helicopters to search the area..
After a one-hour search operating on a GEOREF search pattern the vessel is located.
Tactical response, which by now includes specialist Navy Seal teams, are dispatched
to the actual location

88. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce
On attendance it becomes immediately apparent that the motive for the attack is
terrorist based.
Six key members of the crew and a further six passengers have been ritually
executed in the vessels main auditorium. Passengers have been forced to watch the
executions.
A check of passenger and crew members shows nine crew and 25 passengers (including
some children) missing. Reports from crew members advise that immediately following
the attack a number of passengers and crew members were forced into the launches
and taken on board a helicopter which had landed on the vessel during the attack.
A DVD left playing on the vessels public address system advises that the attack has
been carried out by a terrorist coalition in retaliation for the continued atrocities of
the West.

89. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce

90. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce

91. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce

92. The Ship’s Electronic Systems
Temet Nosce
The scenario that we have just described may seem far-fetched but;.
The New York Times in 1978 reported how the FBI had arrested four individuals who had
planned to seize a cruise vessel based on the Rod Serling novel, “Assault on the Queen"
and the subsequent film of the same title starring Frank Sinatra.
In 2017 a cargo ship travelling from Cyprus to Djibouti lost control of her navigation
system for 10 hours preventing the captain from manoeuvring with the intention of
steering the vessel into a territory where it could be easily boarded by pirates and
robbed. A source later commented that "the entire IT system of the vessel was
completely hacked”.
Giles Hunnisett (Master Mariner and consultant with Waves Group) – “what I am looking
at more and more is a more widespread problem. ECDIS could have 20,000 vessels, all of
them updated by a few companies. Imagine a bug getting into 1,000 ships all at the
same time. They would not be able to leave or enter ports or if they were at sea establish
exactly where they were. The consequence would be a huge business interruption. The
more people I see the more I hear that they are surprised it hasn't happened yet.
Meanwhile, on board, we know the danger, but we cannot do anything about it”.

93. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Threats
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

94. The Greatest Cyber Threat to us All: Data Integrity
“Integrity. Cyber operations include an
increased emphasis on changing or
manipulating data to compromise its
integrity to affect decision making,
reduce trust in systems, or cause adverse
physical effects.”
Threat actions include:
➢ Posting disinformation on websites
➢ Altering of online media as a means to influence
public discourse and sentiment
➢ Modify stored data
➢ Transmit false data
➢ Track and/or manipulate the flow of information
Temet Nosce

95. USCG Maritime Cyber Bulletin -28 December 2015
Business Email Compromise is a
global scam with subjects and
victims in many countries. The FBI
received victim complaints from
more than 45 countries between
2013 - 2014:
Statistics:
➢ Total U.S. victims: 1,198
➢ Total U.S. dollar loss: $179,755,367.08
➢ Total non-U.S. victims: 928
➢ Total non-U.S. dollar loss: $35,217,136
➢ Combined victims: 2,126
➢ Combined dollar loss: $214,972,503
Temet Nosce

96. The “Whale” Attack: Targeting Key Executives
As of April 2016:
➢ USD $2.3 billion in losses since 2013.
➢ 270% increase since January 2015
➢ 79 Countries have been affected.
* https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/fbi-2-3-billion-lost-to-ceo-email-scams/ Temet Nosce

97. Some common threat scenarios for ship and crew
Social engineering/phishing
Removable media/external hardware
Mixing isolated and open networks
Tampering with ECDIS, navigation systems
Ransomware (malware)
Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS)
Data filtration/data theft
Unintentional
working accident
not following procedures
Bad intentions
planned
Temet Nosce

98. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Threats-Scenarios
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

99. Threat scenario #1
Temet Nosce

100. Threat scenario #2
Temet Nosce

101. Threat scenario #3
Temet Nosce

102. Threat scenario #4
Temet Nosce

103. Threat scenario #5
Temet Nosce

104. Threat scenario #6
Temet Nosce

105. Threat scenario #7
Temet Nosce

106. Best practices:How to avoid cyber mishaps onboard your ship/in your company
Think before you click!
Research the facts behind e-mails and their attachments!
Make sure external drives and USBs are clean!
Be aware when third parties enter your systems or data!
Protect your passwords!
Never connect personal items to the ship critical systems.
Never use external wi-fi for company emails or downloads unless protected by VPN!
Learn how to install and use two step authentication.
Learn how backup and restore is done onboard your ship.
Always report errors and mistakes.
Educate yourself on cyber risks and how it affects your ship, your colleagues and
you personally!
Temet Nosce

107. Opinions
Temet Nosce
Vulnerabilities
PART 2
Cyber Security in
Shipping Industry

108. Vulnerabilities Examples
Unknown System Components
Vulnerabilities
➢ Chief had never opened cabinet containing
PLC for rudder hydraulics Internal bad actor
Countermeasures
➢ Document the connections and identities
of the rudder function
➢ Include in change management program
Uncontrolled Vendor Access
Vulnerabilities
➢ Uncontrolled laptop
➢ Uncontrolled connection to Internet
➢ Undocumented software change
management procedure
Countermeasures
➢ Change management process
➢ Access policies
Temet Nosce

109. Vulnerabilities Examples
Improper Segmentation
Vulnerabilities
➢ 1st Engineer requests printer for alarm
system from IT
➢ IT technician connects alarm system to
“ship” network
➢ Ship network has direct paths to internet
(e.g., port 80, 443)
Countermeasures
➢ Segment safety-critical systems from IT Networks
Uncontrolled Physical Ports
Vulnerabilities
➢ Open physical ports on control system
equipment
Countermeasures
➢ Block unused/infrequently used USB/RJ-
45 ports using port blockers/silicone
Temet Nosce

110. Consequences
Temet Nosce

111. Challenges to Achieve Significant Consequences
Exploitation requires expertise in multiple disciplines
OT networks are generally compartmentalized from IT networks
Highly engineered systems with multiple layers of safeguards
Human-in-the-loop with manual overrides
Generally manual vs. automated valves to the atmosphere
Temet Nosce

112. ☺ Standards-Guidelines
☺ Risk Management
☺ Benefits
☺ Conclusions

113. Standards-Guidelines
PART 3
Cyber Risk Management

114. Standards
ISO/IEC
27001
CIS
20 Critical
Controls (v6)
NIST SP 800.53 R4
NIST CSF
BIMCO
Guidelines on Cyber Security OnBoard Ships (v.2)
ISPS
Code
ISM
Code
OCIMF
TMSA
3
Foundational Cyber Risk
Mgmt. Best Practices
Maritime Risk
Mgmt. Best
Practices
Maritime Cybersecurity Capability Maturity
Temet Nosce

115. IMO-International Maritime Organization
Maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of the extent to which a
technology asset is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, which may
result in shipping-related operational, safety or security failures as a conse-
quence of information or systems being corrupted, lost or compromised.
Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk
Management
Temet Nosce

116. ISM Code
“Assess all identified risk to its ships,
personnel and the environment and
establish appropriate safe guards.”
International Safety Management (ISM) Code
Section 1.2.2.2
Temet Nosce

117. Guidelines: Recent Guidelines Issued
2017
The Guidelines
on Cyber Security OnBoard Ships
Version 2
BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, INTERCARGO,
INTERTANKO, OCIMF and IUMI
2017
The Application of Cybersecurity
Principles to marine and offshore
Operations
Volume: CyberSecurity
ABS
2017
Code of Practice
Cyber Security for Ships
UK Department of Transport-IET
2016
Cyber Security Awareness
A.M.M.I.T.E.C.
Temet Nosce

118. Risks
PART 3
Cyber Risk
Management

119. Specific risks and their consequences to the shipping industry
Temet Nosce
GNSS Jamming and AIS spoofing
Issues with AIS.
No authentication protocols.
Jamming devices cost as little as $100
AIS/GPS spoofing can be achieved with a $100 VHF set
Estimated 250,000 cell towers in Russia are equipped with GNSS jamming
devices.
GPS jamming trial – Flambrough Head – showed effect was to create
incorrect data on ECDIS, AIS and Radar – all systems !
Easy ability to impersonate targets (ships).
Unencrypted messaging.
Jammers have radius of over 30km.
2017 Report – 5 day loss of GNSS would cost UK £149 million
July 2018 NATO issued requests for reports of instances of GPS or AIS
interference in the Mediterranean, noting that in the past few months
several electronic interferences had been detected.

120. Specific risks and their consequences to the shipping industry
Temet Nosce
Unseaworthiness
the ship ‘must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful
and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the
commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable
circumstances of it’
F.C. Bradley & Sons -v- Federal Steam Navigation (1926) 24 L1.L.Rep. 446 –
definition of seaworthiness
“fit to meet and undergo the perils of sea and other incidental risks to
which of necessity she must be exposed in the course of a voyage”
Kopitoff-v-Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377
“requires the crew to be adequately trained”
EURASIAN DREAM” [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719
“requires ports to implement security protocols but are not designed
with cyber attacks in mind”
ISPS/(US) MTSA 2002

121. Specific risks and their consequences to the shipping industry
Temet Nosce
Unseaworthiness (cont.)
If she has that degree of fitness which the ordinary careful owner
would require his vessel to have at the commencement of the voyage
having regard to all the probable consequences of it. Would a prudent
owner have required it should be made good before sending to sea had
he known of it?
A ship is seaworthy:
Extends beyond physical fitness to
(i) sufficient, efficient and compe-tent crew
(ii) adequate and sufficient systems on board to address
matters which may arise during the voyage.
By reference to the state of knowledge in the industry at the time
Luke Parsons QC & Julian Clark concluded, “in the absence of being able to
show positive steps taken in line with implementation of cyber risk mana-
gement systems and protocols an owner will face an up hill struggle in
establishing seaworthiness”

122. Specific risks and their consequences to the shipping industry
Temet Nosce
Malware – Not Petya
Port of LA, Clarksons and Maersk – most high profile.
Estimated $300 million loss;
Clarksons – 6% drop in share value
Maersk:
Congestion in over 80 ports;
Replaced 4,000 servers, 45,000 PC’s and 2,500 applications;
Networked fleet successfully isolated.
COSCO attack - full financial implication presently unclear

123. Specific risks and their consequences to the shipping industry
Temet Nosce
Hacking and beyond
Change of manifests – illicit goods trade (Port of Antwerp), to mis-description
(CHC/Liquefaction risk/Sanctions avoidance – SA Red Acorn).
Business disruption and reputational damage.
A new route to industrial espionage.
Potential to disrupt a Blockchain ?

124. Cyber and litigation risk
Temet Nosce
The Washington DC scandal
No longer just tipex on the log books
Needle in the haystack approach to discovery
GDPR (25 May 2018) E20 million of 4% of global turn over whichever greater
GDPR and new Regulation will enforce cyber hygiene. USA implementing
legislation to penalise companies for inappropriate data handling and storage.
ICCA/New York City Bar/CPR Institute working group on cyber security for
International Arbitration:
No longer just tipex on the log books
Protection of digital information in arbitration;
Identifying and protecting the weak link;
Powers to order cyber security measures;
Framework for adopting cyber security measures during the process.
Why ? High value, high stakes, sensitive and potentially damaging
information access.

125. Corporate Exposure – Are you ready to deal with a cyber attack?
Temet Nosce
A data breach plan with step-by-step actions
The Washington DC scandal
Procedures to regularly rehearse the plan with all staff
A designated person responsible for handling any breach
Regular updates concerning the plan to ensure all senior staff are fully
familiar with it
Prepared notification messages to 3rd parties and suppliers
In the UK gathering of evidence for the Information Commissioner to
show how the breach has been handled. Similar information gathering
for any international regulatory authority.
Regular cooperation with any cyber insurance provider for guidance
and in order to ensure maintenance of cover
Pre-prepared statements to customers advising how the firm will
deal with any damage
A no tolerance party to ransom demands

126. Corporate Exposure – Are you ready to deal with a cyber attack?
Temet Nosce
Identify where the demand or ransomware originated and how this
entered the system
And when an attack takes place:
Isolate all infected devices (immediately take them off-line)
Assess how many and which devices have been affected
Restore lost data from backups
Advise customers if their data has been compromised
Once the attack is under control - prepare a "lessons to be learned"
review.

127. Cyber Risk Model
Functions. Software that control machines on assets
Connections. Nature and number of digital interfaces(e.g., physical
ports, network connections) indicating cybersecurity complexity
Identities. Humans or machines that send or receive data by
means of the digital interfaces
Temet Nosce

128. Cyber Risk Management
Begins at the Top-It’s a Boardroom Challenge
➢ Managing Directors, CEOs & Board Members are accountable for
organization’s Cyber Security.
➢ Cyber Risk Management must be owned by leadership rather than be
relegated to an “IT” challenge
Cyber Risk affects an organization’s:
➢ Balance Sheet/Profit & Loss.
➢ Legal Exposure.
➢ Operational Effectiveness.
➢ Customers.
➢ Vendors.
➢ Partners.
➢ Employees.
Temet Nosce

129. “Cyber Risk” what do we mean?
Cyber risk signifies more than data breaches…
➢ Seaworthiness
➢ Client and employee information
➢ Commercial confidential information / assets
➢ Money (Profit and Loss)
➢ Reputation
Game Changers…
➢ Stuxnet and Shamoon
☺ Proved that physical events can be triggered through cyber means
➢ Sony
☺ Targeted employees, damaging systems and reputations, and
divulged corporate secrets and trade information
Temet Nosce

130. Why Should We Manage Cyber Risk in the Maritime Domain?
Every port authority and terminal operator operating in the world economy
creates, utilizes, stores, manages, and exchanges digital data, along with
financial information, via internal and external networks.
Ports sustain 90% of the global economy
➢ 4,764 Ports in 196 countries
➢ 68,000+ vessels by 2023
* www.mits-forum.org
Recurring Industry Themes:
• Multimodal connectivity
• Increase efficiency of operations
• Increase capacity for small port
infrastructure
• Passenger traffic
Temet Nosce

131. Cyber Risk Management
Business Leaders Unanswered Questions:
➢ What do we invest in first ?
➢ How much do we need to budget ?
➢ What are our priorities when comes to Cyber Security ?
➢ How can we measure the effectiveness of our investments ?
➢ Are our investments sustainable ?
Temet Nosce

132. What can we do ?
Organize our Company:
➢ Cyber Security Assessment
➢ Table Top Exercises (TTX)
➢ Threat Assessments
➢ Cyber Risk Management Planning
➢ Executive Awareness Training
➢ Tools
➢ Cyber Threat Intelligence Support
Temet Nosce

133. The Cyber Risk Reduction Curve
Temet Nosce

134. Driving Risk Reduction
Cyber Risk Reduction Curve
➢ Investing in the right combination of technology and insurance
maximizes risk reduction
☺ 1. Technology Risk Reduction
☺ 2. Insurance Risk Reduction
* Axio Temet Nosce

135. Benefits
PART 3
Cyber Risk Management

136. Benefits
Benefits:
➢ Strengthen cybersecurity capabilities
➢ Institute consistent evaluation and benchmarking of cybersecurity
capabilities
➢ Share knowledge and best practices
➢ Enable prioritized resource allocation
➢ Inform cybersecurity investments
➢ Drive continuous improvement
Temet Nosce

137. Cybersecurity Resources
Cybersecurity Framework
Foundational reference model & common framework providing
set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references
Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
Structure for cyber
risk management
& system
components
Technical,
administrative, &
physical
protections
Monitoring to
discover when
system is
compromised
Initial actions to
limit the
consequences of a
cyber event
Follow-up actions
to restore full
functionality &
operations
Temet Nosce

138. How to get started
Choose standard(s) to guide program development
Perform assessment of current program against standard(s)
Analyze risks and identified gaps
Prioritize actions to address gaps and develop plans
Temet Nosce

139. Guide for choosing standards
Temet Nosce

140. Cybersecurity Maturity
Time
Temet Nosce

141. Driving Continuous Improvements and Setting the Stage for Long-Term IMO Compliance
Launch Strategy
Software
Perform Baseline
Evaluation and Identify
Gaps
Review
Recommendations and
Set Target Profile
Prioritize
Implementations and
Plan Updates to SMS
Allocate Appropriate
Resources & Implement
Improvements
Investment Planning
Resource Allocation
Mitigation Activities
Begin SMS Updates
Sustain Investments & Resources
Mitigation Activities Continue
Finalize SMS Updates
2nd Year 3nd Year
Establishing a Sustainable Cyber Risk Management Program
Temet Nosce

142. Gain Awareness & Train!
Training Programm:
➢ Executive Leadership Briefings.
➢ Workforce training spanning multiple cyber maturity dimensions (e.g.
spearphishing, passwords, social media,etc.).
➢ Consider web-based training awareness tools for baseline and refre-
sher training.
➢ In-house Cyber TTX combined with ISPS Code requirements.
➢ Technical Staff Training
Global organizations can rapidly deliver and sustain cybersecurity and
cyber risk awareness training across the enterprise.
Temet Nosce

143. Insurance Considerations→ Insurance Risk
First Party Damages
(Tangible & Financial)
➢ Response Costs - Forensics,
Notifications.
➢ Legal expenses: advice and
defense
➢ Revenue losses due to network
or computer outages
➢ Restoration costs related to
reconstitution of lost data
➢ Ransomware: Cyber extortion
➢ IP Loss: values of stolen property
➢ Mechanical compromise /
breakdown
➢ Destruction of equipment or
property
➢ Lost revenue due to physical
damages
➢ Bodily injury to employees
Scenarios
Insider threat; Network
Disruption; Network breach;
Malware attack (e.g. on SCADA);
Ransomware
Third Party Damages
(Tangible & Financial)
➢ Financial recovery due to
consequential loss of revenue
➢ Restoration activity expenses
➢ Legal expenses: advice and
defense
➢ Credit monitoring costs
➢ Physical damage / destruction of
equipment and /or property
➢ Environmental cleanup
➢ Bodily injury to others
➢ Regulatory fines
Scenarios
Insider threat; Network
Disruption; Network breach;
Malware attack (e.g. on SCADA);
Temet Nosce

144. Don’t Panic → It’s not all so Bad….
Reliance on crew
➢ Sufficient and continuous training on Cyber Security
➢ Development of a Cyber Security Policy
Reliance on manual controls
➢ Crew-Paper Charts-Radar
Vessels must be treated as any other network
➢ Security Audits
➢ Penetration Testing
➢ Physical Security Assessments
Incident Response
➢ Development of Contingency Plans
➢ Stress Tests
Temet Nosce

145. Effective Cyber Program → key characteristics
Being
SECURE
means having risk prioritized
controls to defend critical
assets against known and
emerging threats.
Being
VIGILANT
means having threat
intelligence and
situational awareness
to anticipate and
identify harmful
behavior.
Being
RESILIENT
means being prepared
and having the ability
to recover from cyber
incidents and minimize
their impact.
Temet Nosce

146. Key characteristics → Cyber risk is not an uncontrollable phenomenon
Maritime Industry is based on IT
solutions
The progress of information
technologies will definitely
proceed
Complex risk-scenarios which
currently seem to be difficult to
be solved.
Balance people, processes and
technology
Information security is not just
about computer security.
Invest in all core elements of
information security: physical,
human and cyber.
Act as you have already been
hacked
Breaches occur at all
organizations
Mix of processes for prevention,
detection and response to keep
cyber-risk below a level
Temet Nosce

147. Re-Thinking Maritime Cyber Resiliency in a “Cyberized” World
Maritime Industry is now in a
digitization era
Balance people, processes and
technology
Assume your business has already been attacked, infiltrated
and compromised
Understand that there is no “magic bullet”
Develop a New Approach:
☺ Take a top-down approach
☺ Implement an enterprise cyber risk management strategy
Temet Nosce

148. Conclusions
PART 3
Cyber Risk Management

149. Re-Thinking Maritime Cyber Resiliency in a “Cyberized” World
Are we focused on the right things?
Understand how value is created in your organization
Where your critical assets are..?
How they are vulnerable to key threats..?
Practice defense-in-depth..
Do we have the right talent?
Quality over Quantity
Not enough talent to do everything in-house
Strategic approach to sourcing decisions
Are the security teams focused on the real business areas.
Temet Nosce

150. Re-Thinking Maritime Cyber Resiliency in a “Cyberized” World
We proactive or reactive?
Retrofitting for security is very expensive
Build it upfront in your management processes, applications, and
infrastructure.
Are we adapting to change?
Regularize → Policy reviews, assessments, and rehearsals of crisis
response processes
Establish a culture of perpetual adaptation to the threat and risk
landscape.
Temet Nosce

151. In conclusion
Temet Nosce
What cyber risks do you identify to ECDIS, AIS and other systems, shipboard and other-
wise?
All of these systems are exposed to infiltration and cyber attack. The scope of the risk
is significant and comes from a range of sources and for a range of motives.
Hackers are attracted to shipping as it represents a challenge to their range of
expertise and yet can be perceived by them as less of a life threatening threat for
them to interfere with.
✓ Destabilization of an oil platform which not only lead to $100,000’s of shut down
costs but raised a significant risk of a major incident on the level of Piper Alpha.
Cyber terrorists and hacktivists – here significant financial disruption and potential
loss of life may well be their aim.

152. In conclusion
Temet Nosce
What are the best ways for owners and crews to protect against cyber risks?
Take the risk very seriously.In fact make it number one on your risk list..
Guidance and procedures must originate at Board level – not left to the IT
department or even those routinely dealing with ISPS.
There must then be in place a rigorous training regime.
✓ Not just how to prevent an attack and identify risk but what steps to take as soon as it
becomes clear an attack is underway
Cyber avoidance risk barriers need to be implemented at every level of the business
– not just across the vessels rail but in the owning office.
✓ for example, security checks and monitoring of all staff (however junior) that could gain
access to electronic systems
Quick and effective response can save millions of dollars and more importantly
business reputation and potential loss of life.

153. In conclusion
Temet Nosce
Can technology always solve technology? What is the human, systemic and societal
element?
If you are asking “is it simply a matter of developing better fire walls etc.?” the answer
is no.
Again this is why a response and culture from the top of the company down needs
to be developed.
✓ All owners, operators and those engaged in the logistics chain are now involved (like it or
not) in a chess game with that hooded figure we often see in cyber risk power points and
presentations.
✓ It’s a matter of constantly trying to think 5 moves ahead – how is my business at risk, what
could someone gain by attacking my business, do I have the response plans in place to deal
with an attack ?
How much of a problem do you see cyber security as being in the short and long term?
It is the single largest threat facing international shipping today.

154. In conclusion
Temet Nosce
How can we make ships and mariners safe from cyber threats?
It is unlikely that you will ever be able to eradicate the risk completely.
Greater training, knowledge and development of cyber emergency response plans
are our best form of defense.
✓ Shipping Companies need to work in close co-operation with the experts in the field (both
legal, risk avoidance and technological) to develop and implement effective systems and
regularly run full emergency drills. Using the Ghost Busters analogy “Who you gonna call ?”
What are the financial risks and solutions?
It is the single largest threat facing international shipping today.
I think I have probably dealt with solutions above.
✓ As to financial – HUGE – look at the recent publicised examples and remember we are only
seeing the tip of the ice berg in what is actually being reported compared to the number
and significance of the attacks taking place.

155. Incidents
Temet Nosce

156. 1. PPT:Maritime Cyber Risk-C.Kapalidis_HudsonAnalytix
2. PPT:Maritime CyberSecurity-A.Cynthia_HudsonAnalytix
3. PPT:DNVGL_Cyber Security Awareness in the Maritime Industry
4. PPT:ABS_Maritime Cybersecurity Awareness_Mowrer
5. Thesis_Peiraias_Kavalieratos_Cyber-attacks to cyber-enabled ship
6. PPT:Deloitte_Cyber Security in the shipping industry
7. Hill Dickinson_Cyber Crime in the Shipping Industry
Βιβλιογραφία-Υλικό
Temet Nosce
Για τη δημιουργία αυτής της παρουσίασης δανείστηκα υλικό από της παρακάτω πηγές:

157. Know Thyself

158. Know Thyself