Majority voting rules require more than half of votes to favor a measure for approval. There are three levels of provision: small, moderate, and large. An example shows preferences between three people (Rakib, Shad, and Sajid) for the three levels. B is chosen as the winner in pairwise votes between options. However, a different preference order leads to cycling between options, showing majority rule is not always transitive. Institutional features like agenda setting can impact final decisions.

1. Welcome To
Presentation

2. Majority Voting
Rule
Name:
ID:
Course Code:
Syed Mustafizur Rahman
16208002
ECO 301

3. Majority Voting rules: one more than half of the
votes must favor a measure to gain approval.
Although the rules are familiar, potential problems
them.
Majority Voting Rules

4. There are 3 level Provision…
• Small amount of provision
• Moderate amount of provision
• Large amount of provision
Majority Voting Rules Levels

5. • Preferences are shown in Table
• People are RAKIB, SHAD, and SAJID
• A is Small , B is Moderate , C is Large
Majority Voting Rule Example

6. Choice RAKIB SHAD SAJID
First A C B
Second B B C
Third C A A
• B vs A = B is the Winner (a vote of 2-1, with SHAD and SAJID voting for B)
• B vs C = B is the Winner (a vote of 2-1, with RAKIB and SAJID voting for B)
• Selection of B in this case is independent of the order in which the votes are taken
Voter Preference That Lead to an Equilibrium

7. Choice Rakib Shad Sajid
First A C B
Second B A C
Third C B A
Voter Preference That Lead to Cycling
• A vs B = A is the Winner a vote of 2-1, with RAKIB and SHAD voting for A
• B vs C = B is the Winner a vote of 2-1, with RAKIB and SAJID voting for B
• A vs C = C is the Winner a vote of 2-1, with SHAD and SAJID voting for C

8. Assuming or Expecting That C will Never Win, so why
again C has won ?
• Because the Majority its not transitive
• There is Condorcet paradox cycle
Choice Rakib Shad Sajid
First A C B
Second B A C
Third C B A
For example, lets say there are three voters, and three different
candidates all running for the same position.
Final deception are extremely sensitive to institutional features such as who can set the agenda, arbitrary time
limits place on deliberation who is permitted to make motions,etc