This is presented during a session "Strategic cultures" at the symposium “Lessons of 1914 for the future of Asia” on 14-15 July 2014 held at Temple University Japan Campus. This symposium is organized by Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Faculty of social and cultural studies, University of Applied Sciences Fulda, Germany and supported by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Japan.

1. Eurasia’s Emerging
Geopolitics: Back to 1914?
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2. Introduction
 A world war is a lengthy (at least one year) military
conflict, having as its principal theater one of the key
regions of the world, in which at least two great powers
confront one another, while many other major and
lesser states are directly or indirectly involved.
 A world war is likely to feature a confrontation of two
camps, led by great powers and possessing roughly
comparable strategic resources so that one side will not
easily and swiftly prevail over the other.

3. Europe’s pre-WW1 past and Asia’s present: troubling
parallels
 Lack of mutual trust
 Mutual animosities and hatreds rooted in the not-so-
distant history
 Alliance entrapment
 The rising tide of nationalism
 The dominance of the Westphalian state

4. Europe’s past and Asia’s present: troubling parallels
 The concentration of great powers
 The power shifts and dissatisfaction with status quo
 Conflict triggers
 Race for space
 Economic interdependence

5. Asia’s flashpoints: can they escalate to a big war?
 U.S.-China rivalry
 Sino-Japanese antagonism and the East China Sea
 The Korean Peninsula
 Taiwan
 India-China rivalry
 India-Pakistan antagonism
 The South China Sea

6. Why there will not be a major war in Asia any time
soon
 The current situation in the East Asian seas
“increasingly resembles a 21st-century maritime
redux of the Balkans a century ago – a tinderbox
on water.”
 This does not mean that Asia is on the verge of
a major war.
 China does not want war now, and in the
foreseeable future, because Beijing knows that
the odds are not on its side.

7. Why there will not be a major war in Asia any time
soon
 China does not want war, because the odds are not on
its side:
1. Militarily, China still significantly lags behind the
U.S.
2. For all the talk of mutual interdependence, China
depends on America much more than the other
way round.
3. China needs at least one major-power ally.

8. Why there will not be a major war in Asia any time
soon
 Even though the current flashpoints in Asia may exhibit many
similarities to the pre-WW I situation, they lack a critical
ingredient to make them truly explosive: there are no rival
alliances of comparable strength, while China alone is hardly able
to confront the reigning superpower.
 However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo
considerable changes, if China is successful in:
1) closing military gap with the U.S.;
2) making its economy less reliant on the Western markets and
overseas raw resources;
3) striking an alliance with one or more major powers.

9. Will Russia be China’s Austria-Hungary?
 The only realistic option for Beijing to
substantially augment its power is through
external balancing, that is by allying with another
major player.
 The only great power potentially available for
such an alliance is Russia.
 What might ultimately emerge is a Eurasian
league somewhat reminiscent of Karl
Haushofer’s anti-Western “continental bloc.”

10. Will Russia be China’s Austria-Hungary?
 There is a strong tendency in the West to underestimate
the potential for Russia-China rapprochement.
 The US-led West is seen by Moscow as a much bigger
threat than China.
 Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not an alliance yet,
but is certainly growing stronger.
 There are rising calls among the expert community in
both countries to upgrade the partnership to a full-scale
alliance.

11. Will Russia be China’s Austria-Hungary?
 The Ukraine crisis of 2014 may well become a tipping
point sealing the fate of Eurasian alignments.
 Russia’s current stance toward Ukraine is reminiscent
of how, in the late 19th and early 20th century, Austria-
Hungary felt about the Balkans, which it deemed its
vital sphere of influence. The fear of losing control over
the Balkans drove Austria-Hungary into the embrace of
Imperial Germany.
 The alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary
contributed to Europe’s splitting into two camps and
eventually the general war.

12. Putin and Xi – the Eurasian Duo?
 The personalities of Russian and Chinese leaders, Putin
and Xi Jinping, are going to be a major factor in
deciding the fate of Russo-Chinese alignment.
 They are two autocrats who have concentrated in their
hands almost exclusive powers to make foreign policy
decisions. Putin and Xi seem to get along quite well and
share the flair for hardball realpolitik.
 Matched against contemporary Western leaders with
underwhelming foreign policy performance, the Putin-
Xi duo is going to be a formidable force.
 It is significant that Putin and Xi are here to stay for a
long time.

13. Flexible multipolarity vs. hostile alliances
 The international system is now at a critical juncture
when the U.S. unipolarity is waning and the new order
are taking shape.
 The crucial question is whether this emerging order will
be one of multipolarity and flexible balance of power or
one split into two hostile alliances.
 Is the American-centered web of alliances going to be
opposed by another grouping, most probably
dominated by Beijing?

14. Is China’s neo-Bismarckian strategy still alive?
 A. Goldstein: since 1996 China had been pursuing a
foreign policy similar to Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy
of flexible strategic partnerships.
 China might not has abandoned this neo-Bismarckian
grand strategy as yet, but its continuation looks much
less certain than a decade ago.
 Should Beijing go for an alliance with Moscow, this
could set in motion the dynamics very similar to
Europe’s run-up to WW 1.
 India is also facing a choice of whether to enter the
game of major-power alliances.

15. 2034: how WW3 may look like
 WW3 erupting in Asia may not be the most probable
future, yet it is not the most implausible either.
 China, Russia, Central Asia, Pakistan vs. US, India,
Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Canada, Britain,
Poland.
 WW3 will be vastly different from the major conflicts
of the 20th century: “world war-lite”.
 No-combat zones, no mass casualties.
 Continued functioning of diplomacy and international
bodies, continued international trade.

16. 2034: how WW3 may look like
 However, there will always be a risk that at some
point the “humane” low-intensity warfare with
designated no-combat zones and codes of
conduct could degenerate into a more traditional
bloodshed with heavy casualties and no
restraining rules, with possible nuke escalation.

17. Conclusion
 The contemporary Asia has a number of striking
similarities with the pre-WW1 Europe, but we
are NOT on the brink of war.
 China’s potential, even if realized to its
maximum extent, will not be nearly enough to
take on the U.S. and its allies.
 Chinese leadership may be on the verge of
abandoning its strategy of non-alignment,
although the final decision is yet to be made.

18. Conclusion
 Asia now resembles the Europe in the early
1890s, when the multipolar equilibrium began to
fall apart and the configuration of rival alliances
was being decided.
 It took Franco-Russian, Franco-British and
Anglo-Russian agreements (1891-4, 1904 and
1907), plus the series of colonial and Balkan
crises, to finally push Europe to war.

19. Conclusion
 Today, as then, we lack statesmen of
Bismarckian stature with strategic vision capable
of perceiving the canvas of world geopolitics in
its entirety and in the long-term perspective.
 Yet it is important to see Eurasia as a single
geopolitical space, where Europe, the Middle
East, Central, South and East Asia are
increasingly linked together.

20. Conclusion
 Russia, China and the U.S. are the three most
powerful strategic actors in Eurasia.
 None of them is innocent, but America’s
policies seem especially short-sighted and
provocative in that Washington tries to contain
both Russia and China.
 The ‘pincer move’ continues, literally pushing
Russia and China together and tempting them
into a fateful alliance.

21. Conclusion
 Eurasian concert of powers, borrowing some of the
elements from the nineteenth-century Concert of
Europe, could be one possible way to avoid a slide into
the trap of hostile alliance politics and build a stable
multipolar order.
 The accommodation among the U.S., China and Russia
must form the initial basis for such an international
architecture, in which other Eurasian players should
also be invested and engaged.
 In trying to accomplish this immensely difficult task we
will at least have the benefit of historical lessons.