The Ukrainian government faces a critical situation in eastern Ukraine against pro-Russian forces, which pose a serious threat to the country's sovereignty. To avert disaster, Ukraine must mobilize its military more effectively, seal off its border to limit rebel support from Russia, and provide substantial services to the civilian population. Additionally, NATO and the EU should offer more robust support to Ukraine without direct military intervention, as failure to act soon could lead to Ukraine's collapse and greater Russian influence in the region.

1. Ukraine – Time for Real Action
By Michael Sonenshine
Prague – 31 August 2014 – The Ukrainian government faces a serious dilemma in Eastern
Ukraine. The pro‐Russian forces operate a guerilla war, supported from within Russia. Rebel
forces embed themselves into towns, effectively turning the civilian population into human
shields. Rooting the rebels out comes at a heavy price – high casualties and the devastation of
civil infrastructure.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine is financially not in position to sustain a prolonged conflict. The Ukrainian
government is strapped with high debts. The economy in many regions has virtually ground to a
halt. Winter nears. The prospects of food and fuel shortages grow closer with each passing day.
The range of alternatives for Ukraine is in fact shrinking. Diplomacy unfortunately offers little
hope. Ukraine suggests it will apply for NATO membership. European and US leaders offer
political support in the form of strong words and sanctions, but little else. Political and
economic ties and NATO membership might well be viable in the long term, but in the near term
they won’t solve Ukraine’s fundamental problem.
Reality is that neither NATO nor the EU, nor the United States has the political stomach to send
any significant military support into Ukraine. The Ukrainian government is reluctant to escalate
the conflict for fear of losing support from America and the EU. This is a fact Russia knows well
and uses to its advantage.
Time is running out and unless the Ukrainian government acts quickly Ukraine is bound to lose
its sovereignty. The Ukrainian state as we know it will collapse. Russia will continually send
Trojan horses in the form of aid convoys, humanitarian missions and eventually, peace keepers
into Ukraine. Rebel forces will cross into Russia, load up with fresh supplies and stream back in.
Eastern Ukraine will fall into their hands.
Eventually winter will set in, food and gas shortages will develop, weakening Ukraine further.
The Ukrainian oligarchs will see the handwriting on the wall. They will export what capital they
can and flee, they will hedge the bets and call for changes in the Ukrainian government that are
more pro‐Russian or they will sell the country outright to the Russians. Fear and greed will drive
their behavior. The emboldened rebels will seize the opportunity and head for Kiev. Vladimir
Putin understands this well and counts on it.
There is really only one viable alternative. Ukraine must act now or it will soon be too late. The
Ukrainian government must embark on a bold strategy, escalate the war and isolate the rebels.
Prima facia this seems a frightening thing. Policy makers in the West will wring their hands in
fear that a world war will begin. They will, however, be wrong. This is the only strategy that can
save Ukraine and in fact this is the strategy that will quickly bring the war to an end.
Ukraine’s strategy should incorporate the following elements. Firstly, the Ukrainian military
must be mobilized in much greater strength and much greater numbers than it is mobilized.
Ukraine is faced with the possibility of extinction and it needs to act as if that is the case. This

2. may mean doubling, or tripling the number of troops in Eastern Ukraine. This may mean
committing heavier artillery to the conflict than has been committed. This may mean mobilizing
air strikes on rebel positions.
No army can conduct its mission if it is feels it will lose. Anything short of a fully committed
army that can vastly outnumber and out gun its enemy is a losing proposition. An
undersupported, underfed, underequipped army is bound to suffer casualties and will only be
demoralized. Unless Ukraine dedicates the full resources it is bound for failure.
In World War II one of the turning points was D‐Day, when the United States arrived with a
convincingly large force that could destablise the German army and embolden the Allied forces
elsewhere in Europe.
The second element of Ukraine’s strategy must revolve around sealing off the border to Russia
as much as possible. The rebels are being supplied from Russia, obviously. Restricting border
access means starving the rebels. A convincingly large, professionally run Ukrainian presence on
its border can accomplish the task of building moral, demonstrating the Ukraine’s resolve and
cutting off the supply lines. The rebel forces, faced with short supplies, isolation and a
convincingly superior force, will surrender or melt back into civilian life. Cut off the money and
the supplies and they have no real cause worth fighting for.
The third element of Ukraine’s strategy must be to offer real services and real support to the
population in any town that is not rebel held and to quickly rebuild infrastructure and services in
any area retaken from the rebels. The Ukrainian government must demonstrate that it cares
about the people and about delivering good government services. A population which can’t
move freely around the town, get medical services, enjoy clean streets, running water and
reliable electricity is not a population that will be supportive of any government. In contrast, a
government that offers its people genuine hope and genuine services is a government that will
be supported.
Finally NATO and the EU must offer support to the Ukrainian government in the form of real aid.
They need not send in troops, but they can send more weapons, military equipment and
infrastructure support and humanitarian aid.
To understand why this is the winning strategy requires an understanding of the Russian
mentality and cold‐war game theory. Perhaps one of the most important, yet misunderstood
things about the Russian psyche is the importance and value of not losing. Winning is different
than not losing. Winning means conquering and victory. Everyone likes to win and if Russia can
win Ukraine, of course it will want to do so. But Russia is even more concerned with not losing,
because losing means weakness that is loathe to the Russian psyche. This means that the
second best alternative for Russia must be to be able to find a graceful exit and claim some
victory or success in the process.
The Cuban missile crisis would have ended with military conflict had it not been for the fact the
US offered to remove its missiles from Turkey. Once the US determined to take missiles out of
Turkey Nikita Kruschev was able to claim a victory. He left the conflict better off than he went
into the conflict.

3. Ukraine is not a threat to Russia’s security. Vladimir Putin understands that. The Ukrainian army
is certainly no match for the Russian army. But even the ever popular Putin wouldn’t have much
internal support for sending a serious military force into Ukraine. Already capital is fleeing
Russia.
A serious escalation from the Ukrainian side would deter Russia from exercising greater force in
Ukraine. If, upon crossing the boarder Russian forces were dealt a serious blow Vladimir Putin’s
position would be weakened. Vladimir Putin must be convinced that sending in real forces
would be a disaster. If convincing him means Ukrainian troops must destroy any piece of
Russian artillery and use deadly force against any Russian soldier found in the country, so it be.
The few Russian troops that have crossed the border to support the rebel forces in Eastern
Ukraine won’t sacrifice their lives for the Ukrainians. They cross the border because at this point
they face little or no resistance and they are paid mercenaries. But none want to go into a
battle they will lose. If either they can’t cross the border because it is too well defended or
crossing the border comes at the expense of enough casualties they simply won’t cross the
border. The Ukrainian government will thus eliminate a means of supporting the rebels and
contrary to people’s worst fears, no world war will come.
If Ukraine were able to deliver a convincing military victory two good things would happen.
Firstly, rebel soldiers facing little support would begin disbanding. Second, Kiev would be better
positioned to end the crisis with diplomatic and political initiatives. Kiev should use any such
opportunity well and must ensure that the East Ukrainian political and military leadership gets a
clear path forward to being part of a Ukrainian government that is truly inclusive. Vladimir Putin
can use this opportunity to help repair political schisms, rebuild ties to Ukraine and regenerate a
Russian‐Ukrainian partnership. The business ties between Russia and Ukraine are indeed
strong.
Reality is that countries that can’t defend their borders are countries that can’t survive when a
test of survival comes. Russia understands that and now the Ukrainian government must show
that it also understands this basic principal.
Ultimately the way out of this mess depends on the government in Kiev. If Ukraine wants to
survive as a state it must now take the serious measures and act as if its survival depends on it
because in fact, its survival hangs in the balance.
By Michael Sonenshine
Michael Sonenshine is based in Prague and has lived and worked in Central and Eastern Europe
since 1992. He is CEO of Symfonie Capital, LLC. E‐mail: msonenshine@symfoniecapital.com