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Don’t Build a Death Star
Chris Teitzel, Lockr
Who Is This Guy?
• Chris Teitzel
– Founder / CEO
• Lockr / Cellar Door Media
– Drupal for 8 years
– F100, e-commerce,
Startups
– 3rd Generation Tech Nerd
@technerdteitzel
You have ambitions to build a product or service that will conquer the galaxy
Initial launch was a great success!
However there are a few bad actors...
… who are plotting to take the whole thing offline.
And with one small hole in your defenses...
… they are able to take down everything you built.
Don’t Build a Death Star
A Post-Mortem Look at the Empire’s Failings
Perimeter
Defenses
“The battle station is heavily shielded and carries
a firepower greater than half the star fleet. It's
defenses are designed around a direct
large-scale assault. A small one-man fighter
should be able to penetrate the outer defense.”
Perimeter Defenses
• WAF (Web Application Firewall)
– SaaS - Cloudflare, Sucuri, Fastly
– IaaS - AWS, Azure
– PaaS - Mulesoft, 3Scale
Perimeter Defenses
• Create specific rules for your application
– ex. “Don’t allow any x-wings in meridian trench”
• Protects against generalized threats and even
zero-days
Authentication
“There's a planet-wide defensive shield with a
single main entry gate. This shuttle should be
equipped with an access code that allows us
through.”
Authentication
• Authentication before
application
– Do initial authentication
at the web server
– ex. Lockr uses x.509
certificates to not only
secure the request but
authenticate as well
Apache
with
SAML
Application
Software
Authentication
• Keys and Tokens
– Don’t just let anyone through the front door
– Show it to a user once and only once
– If using user-generated passwords - hash or stretch!
• API Consumers - Protect your API keys!
– Treat as if it’s an encryption key (it just might be)
Authentication
https://xkcd.com/538/
Capabilities vs.
Authentication
“You don't need to see his identification.”
Ambient Authority
Set a course for
Alderaan.
Governor Tarkin
How it’s
supposed
to work:
Setting course,
Governor.
Helm/Weapons
How it can
fail: Set a course for
Coruscant.
Imposter Tarkin
Setting course,
Governor.
Helm/Weapons
Mandatory Access Control
Set a course for
Alderaan.
Governor Tarkin
How it’s
supposed
to work:
Setting course,
Governor.
Helm/Weapons
May
target
Rebel
Set a course for
Coruscant.
Imposter Tarkin
Setting course,
Governor.
Helm/Weapons
May
target
Rebel
Attempted
hack:
Capability Based Security
Set a course for
ef28bc28 (signed
token for Alderaan).
Governor Tarkin
How it’s
supposed
to work:
Setting course,
Governor.
Helm/Weapons
Attempted
hack:
Code
validation
Set a course for, um,
3a2eb45a
(invalid token).
Imposter Tarkin
Sorry, that code isn’t
working in my helm
system, Governor.
Helm/Weapons
Code
validation
Keep your
secrets… Secret
“It is a period of civil war. Rebel spaceships,
striking from a hidden base, have won their first
victory against the evil Galactic Empire.
During the battle, Rebel spies managed to steal
secret plans to the Empire's ultimate weapon,
the DEATH STAR, an armored space station
with enough power to destroy an entire planet”
Secrets Storage
“It's a small thermal exhaust
port, right below the main port.
The shaft leads directly to the
reactor system. A precise hit will
start a chain reaction which
should destroy the station.”
Why Do We Do This?
Or This?
Separate Your Secrets
• Store outside your codebase / databases
• Inject as environment variables at creation of
service with automation tools
• Use software such as Lockr, Vault, AWS KMS,
Azure Key Vault etc.
Prevent a Breach
from Spreading
“Uh, we had a slight weapons malfunction, but
uh... everything's perfectly all right now. We're
fine. We're all fine here now, thank you. How are
you?”
Systems Isolation
Web-Facing Systems Intranet Systems
Load
Balancer
Application
Server
Database
Server
Cache
Server
Active
Directory
Exchange
File
Shares
HR
Records
Shared Secrets
DatabaseApp
Password or Key
Compromise
Point #1
Compromise
Point #2
Public Key Infrastructure
Admin
Firewall
MariaDBCDN nginxHTTPS
Client
Certificate
Server
Certificate
PHP-FPM
+ Drupal
MySQL
Solr
HTTPS
File
System
NFS
or Sim
ilar
Client
Certificate
Server
Certificate
Client
Certificate
Server
Certificate
Server
Certificate
Client
Certificate
SSH Jump or VPNTunnel
Server
Key
SSH
Key
User HTTPS
Server
Certificate
Plan for Chaos
“It’s a trap!”
Act Like Everyone Is Out To Get You
• Security by design
• Build redundancy
• Defense-in-Depth
• Never trust your users
• Only handle data you
absolutely have to
• Encrypt all the things!
When The Sh*t Hits the Fan
• Have a plan in place
• Breath, Backup, Fix
• Build Again
– Post Mortem
– Document your
mistakes
– Don’t blame… learn
Thank You
And May The Force Be With You

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LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star

  • 1.
  • 2. Don’t Build a Death Star Chris Teitzel, Lockr
  • 3. Who Is This Guy? • Chris Teitzel – Founder / CEO • Lockr / Cellar Door Media – Drupal for 8 years – F100, e-commerce, Startups – 3rd Generation Tech Nerd @technerdteitzel
  • 4. You have ambitions to build a product or service that will conquer the galaxy
  • 5. Initial launch was a great success!
  • 6. However there are a few bad actors...
  • 7. … who are plotting to take the whole thing offline.
  • 8. And with one small hole in your defenses...
  • 9. … they are able to take down everything you built.
  • 10. Don’t Build a Death Star A Post-Mortem Look at the Empire’s Failings
  • 11. Perimeter Defenses “The battle station is heavily shielded and carries a firepower greater than half the star fleet. It's defenses are designed around a direct large-scale assault. A small one-man fighter should be able to penetrate the outer defense.”
  • 12. Perimeter Defenses • WAF (Web Application Firewall) – SaaS - Cloudflare, Sucuri, Fastly – IaaS - AWS, Azure – PaaS - Mulesoft, 3Scale
  • 13. Perimeter Defenses • Create specific rules for your application – ex. “Don’t allow any x-wings in meridian trench” • Protects against generalized threats and even zero-days
  • 14. Authentication “There's a planet-wide defensive shield with a single main entry gate. This shuttle should be equipped with an access code that allows us through.”
  • 15. Authentication • Authentication before application – Do initial authentication at the web server – ex. Lockr uses x.509 certificates to not only secure the request but authenticate as well Apache with SAML Application Software
  • 16. Authentication • Keys and Tokens – Don’t just let anyone through the front door – Show it to a user once and only once – If using user-generated passwords - hash or stretch! • API Consumers - Protect your API keys! – Treat as if it’s an encryption key (it just might be)
  • 18. Capabilities vs. Authentication “You don't need to see his identification.”
  • 19. Ambient Authority Set a course for Alderaan. Governor Tarkin How it’s supposed to work: Setting course, Governor. Helm/Weapons How it can fail: Set a course for Coruscant. Imposter Tarkin Setting course, Governor. Helm/Weapons
  • 20. Mandatory Access Control Set a course for Alderaan. Governor Tarkin How it’s supposed to work: Setting course, Governor. Helm/Weapons May target Rebel Set a course for Coruscant. Imposter Tarkin Setting course, Governor. Helm/Weapons May target Rebel Attempted hack:
  • 21. Capability Based Security Set a course for ef28bc28 (signed token for Alderaan). Governor Tarkin How it’s supposed to work: Setting course, Governor. Helm/Weapons Attempted hack: Code validation Set a course for, um, 3a2eb45a (invalid token). Imposter Tarkin Sorry, that code isn’t working in my helm system, Governor. Helm/Weapons Code validation
  • 22. Keep your secrets… Secret “It is a period of civil war. Rebel spaceships, striking from a hidden base, have won their first victory against the evil Galactic Empire. During the battle, Rebel spies managed to steal secret plans to the Empire's ultimate weapon, the DEATH STAR, an armored space station with enough power to destroy an entire planet”
  • 23. Secrets Storage “It's a small thermal exhaust port, right below the main port. The shaft leads directly to the reactor system. A precise hit will start a chain reaction which should destroy the station.”
  • 24. Why Do We Do This?
  • 26. Separate Your Secrets • Store outside your codebase / databases • Inject as environment variables at creation of service with automation tools • Use software such as Lockr, Vault, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault etc.
  • 27. Prevent a Breach from Spreading “Uh, we had a slight weapons malfunction, but uh... everything's perfectly all right now. We're fine. We're all fine here now, thank you. How are you?”
  • 28. Systems Isolation Web-Facing Systems Intranet Systems Load Balancer Application Server Database Server Cache Server Active Directory Exchange File Shares HR Records
  • 29. Shared Secrets DatabaseApp Password or Key Compromise Point #1 Compromise Point #2
  • 30. Public Key Infrastructure Admin Firewall MariaDBCDN nginxHTTPS Client Certificate Server Certificate PHP-FPM + Drupal MySQL Solr HTTPS File System NFS or Sim ilar Client Certificate Server Certificate Client Certificate Server Certificate Server Certificate Client Certificate SSH Jump or VPNTunnel Server Key SSH Key User HTTPS Server Certificate
  • 32. Act Like Everyone Is Out To Get You • Security by design • Build redundancy • Defense-in-Depth • Never trust your users • Only handle data you absolutely have to • Encrypt all the things!
  • 33. When The Sh*t Hits the Fan • Have a plan in place • Breath, Backup, Fix • Build Again – Post Mortem – Document your mistakes – Don’t blame… learn
  • 34. Thank You And May The Force Be With You