This document outlines the Joint IED Defeat Organization's Counter-IED Strategic Plan for 2012-2016. It describes the enduring global IED threat and the transnational networks that employ IEDs. These threat networks are resilient, adaptive, and interconnected, using IEDs as their common weapon of choice due to their low cost and potential strategic impact. The document discusses the current IED threat environment and assumptions, and sets strategic goals and objectives to coordinate DoD counter-IED efforts and provide capabilities to combat the threat.
This document discusses audio and video forensic evidence analysis. It begins by explaining how audio and video recordings can provide eyewitness accounts of crimes. It then discusses different types of recordings, including analog and digital, as well as techniques for repairing, authenticating and enhancing recordings. The document outlines the process of audio and video analysis, including how the analysis is performed and what information is included in analysis reports. It discusses limitations and certification programs in the field.
The document discusses external ballistics and the factors that affect the trajectory of a bullet. It defines external ballistics as dealing with the motion of a projectile from the muzzle of a weapon to the target. The main factors that influence a bullet's flight are gravity, which pulls it downward, and air resistance, which reduces its velocity. In a vacuum with no air resistance or gravity, a bullet would travel in a straight line at a constant velocity. However, in reality bullets follow a parabolic trajectory due to these forces. The document also discusses other factors like velocity, spin, angle of fire, yaw, drift, and temperature that can impact a bullet's trajectory.
The document summarizes the components and functioning of cartridges used in shotguns and rifles. It describes the key parts of a cartridge including the case, primer, gunpowder, wads and bullets. The case contains the primer, gunpowder and bullet and comes in different materials. It ensures the components stay together and seals in gases. Shotguns use multiple small shot pellets while rifles have a single elongated bullet. When the trigger is pulled, the firing pin strikes the primer igniting the gunpowder and propelling the bullet down the barrel.
This document discusses the topic of internal ballistics, which is the science of what occurs inside a firearm when it is discharged. It begins with a brief history of ballistics and defines internal ballistics. Some key phenomena of internal ballistics discussed include ignition, combustion of propellants, barrel length, atmospheric conditions, the shape of cartridge cases, and heat problems during combustion. Lock time and barrel time are also defined. The document provides details on each of these topics as they relate to internal ballistics and ballistic performance.
Interpretation of dna typing results and codis Neha Agarwal
An STR genotype is the allele, in the case of a homozygote, or alleles, in the
case of a heterozygote, present in a sample for a particular locus and is normally
reported as the number of repeats present in the allele. A full sample genotype
or STR profi le is produced by the combination of all of the locus genotypes into
a single series of numbers. This profi le is what is entered into a case report or
a DNA database for comparison purposes to other samples.
This document discusses the emerging field of forensic microbiology and its applications. It begins by defining forensic microbiology as using molecular analysis to infer the origin and transmission of microbial strains. The main goals of forensic microbiology are to identify biological threats, vulnerable populations, create databases of genetic signatures, and develop identification protocols. The document then provides numerous examples throughout history of biological warfare and biocrimes using microorganisms, highlighting the need for this new discipline. It discusses laboratory aspects such as quality control, chain of custody, and guidelines established by groups like SWGMGF to validate forensic microbiology analysis results.
This document discusses audio and video forensic evidence analysis. It begins by explaining how audio and video recordings can provide eyewitness accounts of crimes. It then discusses different types of recordings, including analog and digital, as well as techniques for repairing, authenticating and enhancing recordings. The document outlines the process of audio and video analysis, including how the analysis is performed and what information is included in analysis reports. It discusses limitations and certification programs in the field.
The document discusses external ballistics and the factors that affect the trajectory of a bullet. It defines external ballistics as dealing with the motion of a projectile from the muzzle of a weapon to the target. The main factors that influence a bullet's flight are gravity, which pulls it downward, and air resistance, which reduces its velocity. In a vacuum with no air resistance or gravity, a bullet would travel in a straight line at a constant velocity. However, in reality bullets follow a parabolic trajectory due to these forces. The document also discusses other factors like velocity, spin, angle of fire, yaw, drift, and temperature that can impact a bullet's trajectory.
The document summarizes the components and functioning of cartridges used in shotguns and rifles. It describes the key parts of a cartridge including the case, primer, gunpowder, wads and bullets. The case contains the primer, gunpowder and bullet and comes in different materials. It ensures the components stay together and seals in gases. Shotguns use multiple small shot pellets while rifles have a single elongated bullet. When the trigger is pulled, the firing pin strikes the primer igniting the gunpowder and propelling the bullet down the barrel.
This document discusses the topic of internal ballistics, which is the science of what occurs inside a firearm when it is discharged. It begins with a brief history of ballistics and defines internal ballistics. Some key phenomena of internal ballistics discussed include ignition, combustion of propellants, barrel length, atmospheric conditions, the shape of cartridge cases, and heat problems during combustion. Lock time and barrel time are also defined. The document provides details on each of these topics as they relate to internal ballistics and ballistic performance.
Interpretation of dna typing results and codis Neha Agarwal
An STR genotype is the allele, in the case of a homozygote, or alleles, in the
case of a heterozygote, present in a sample for a particular locus and is normally
reported as the number of repeats present in the allele. A full sample genotype
or STR profi le is produced by the combination of all of the locus genotypes into
a single series of numbers. This profi le is what is entered into a case report or
a DNA database for comparison purposes to other samples.
This document discusses the emerging field of forensic microbiology and its applications. It begins by defining forensic microbiology as using molecular analysis to infer the origin and transmission of microbial strains. The main goals of forensic microbiology are to identify biological threats, vulnerable populations, create databases of genetic signatures, and develop identification protocols. The document then provides numerous examples throughout history of biological warfare and biocrimes using microorganisms, highlighting the need for this new discipline. It discusses laboratory aspects such as quality control, chain of custody, and guidelines established by groups like SWGMGF to validate forensic microbiology analysis results.
Soham Bhattacharya's document discusses hair evidence in forensic investigations. It provides background on the history of using hair analysis dating back to the late 1800s. Hair is considered class evidence that cannot identify a specific individual unless the follicle is present for DNA analysis. Hair can persist for long periods on surfaces and clothes due to its tough outer coating and resist decomposition. The recovery of hair evidence can occur at the crime scene or in laboratories.
Brain fingerprinting by ankit 2017............ankitg29
information about the brain fingerprinting technology . by EEG method by neuron firing and impulse of brain wave.P300 mean is 300-1000 m-sec brain wave, is better tech. than the polygraph test and other than than PET test. is basically depand the brain wave. is not the depand on the emotions and the pulse rate
Internal ballistics is the study of a projectile's behavior from ignition until it exits the gun barrel. It examines factors like lock time, ignition time, and barrel time. Piobert's law states that gunpowder burns layer by layer. Newton's third law means that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, causing recoil. Recoil velocity can be calculated using the projectile and gun masses and velocities. Rusting and erosion over time degrade the gun barrel and reduce accuracy.
The document provides a history of firearms, describing their evolution from early hand cannons in China in the 13th century to modern centerfire weapons. It outlines key developments like the matchlock, wheellock, flintlock, percussion cap, pinfire, rimfire systems. Each new system improved ignition reliability, accuracy, and rate of fire, culminating in centerfire cartridges that enabled self-contained ammunition and rapid reloading.
This document discusses forensic ballistics and ammunition. It begins by defining forensic ballistics as the branch of science dealing with shooting incidents for legal purposes. It then discusses different types of ammunition such as rimfire, centerfire, caseless, and blank ammunition. It describes the components of ammunition including primers, propellants, and bullets. Various bullet types are outlined like full metal jacket, hollow point, ballistic tip, open tip, dum-dum, wire patched, rubber, and incendiary bullets. Improvised ammunition is also briefly discussed.
Tool marks evidence plays an important role in forensic science. Tool marks are impressions or marks left on surfaces by tools and can be used to identify the specific tool that made the mark. There are different types of tool marks such as impressions, abrasions, cuts, and drill holes. Tool marks contain both class characteristics common to groups of tools and unique individual characteristics. Tool marks are collected using methods like photography, casting, and test marks. Examiners compare both class and individual characteristics of tool marks using various techniques like microscopy and superimposition to determine if two marks have a common origin.
The document discusses the classification of firearms. It describes firearms as being classified based on their bore (smooth bore vs rifled), loading mechanism (muzzleloader, breechloader, magazine loader), action (lever, bolt, self-loading), firing capability (single shot vs repeater), how they are handled (handguns vs shoulder arms) and their use (service vs sporting). Primitive firearms discussed include matchlock, wheel-lock, flintlock and muzzleloaders. Modern firearms are classified based on these various characteristics.
Internal ballistics refers to what occurs within a weapon's barrel from firing to bullet exit. Key phenomena include:
- Ignition starts when the firing pin strikes the primer, igniting propellant which burns to form high-pressure gas.
- Propellant combustion and barrel length impact velocity - short barrels require fast-burning powder while long barrels use progressive-burning powder.
- Atmospheric conditions like temperature affect ballistics, as ammunition is manufactured for a specific temperature range and velocities vary with temperature.
1) O documento é uma apostila sobre Ordem Unida para concurso de bombeiros militares no Rio de Janeiro em 2008. 2) Aborda conceitos básicos de ordem unida, termos militares, comandos e formatações individuais e coletivas. 3) Inclui capítulos sobre instrução individual sem arma, instrução coletiva, deslocamentos e regulamento de continência, honras e sinais de respeito.
The document discusses the factors that affect the trajectory of a bullet, including both internal and external factors. The main internal factors are the velocity of the projectile, spin of the bullet, angle of fire, structural features, and gravity. The main external factors are wind, air resistance, and the Coriolis effect. The trajectory takes the form of a parabola, being affected most significantly by the bullet's velocity, as well as air resistance and gravity acting upon it during flight.
This document provides an overview of physical evidence identification pertaining to wildlife forensics. It defines wildlife as non-domesticated plants and animals that live in natural habitats. Forensic science uses scientific methods to investigate crimes, and wildlife forensics applies these methods to conserve and protect wild animals. Physical evidence like footprints, hair, and scales can be collected, preserved, and identified through techniques like DNA analysis to determine species and gender. Samples are collected through careful procedures to preserve evidentiary value. Wildlife forensics helps relate suspects, victims, and crime scenes to physical evidence to investigate cases where wild animals are victims, the cause of incidents, or provide information about crimes.
Equipamentos Táticos para Técnicas Verticais do Comando de Operações TáticasFalcão Brasil
O documento especifica equipamentos táticos para operações verticais como cintos para rapel, luvas para cordas, conjuntos de ascensores de resgate, freios e kits de escadas de alumínio. É detalhada a descrição e especificações técnicas mínimas de cada item, assim como as quantidades necessárias. O objetivo é atender às necessidades do Comando de Operações Táticas do Departamento de Polícia Federal.
This document discusses key concepts in ballistics and firearms. It defines ballistics as the science of motion of projectiles and describes its three components: internal, external, and terminal ballistics. It then classifies firearms into smooth bored and grooved firearms like shotguns, rifles, revolvers, and pistols. Key terms are defined such as caliber, velocity, range, rifling, choking, and their purposes and effects are explained. Important parts of firearms like the barrel, firing pin, hammer, trigger, and magazine are also outlined.
Poroscopy and edgeoscopy are fingerprint identification techniques that examine sweat pore and ridge edge details. Poroscopy studies the distinctive patterns of sweat pores on fingerprints, which are unique to each individual. Edgeoscopy analyzes ridge edge alignments and shapes. These techniques allow identification to be made from partial or unclear fingerprints left at crime scenes. A 1912 case in France demonstrated poroscopy's use in identifying suspects from blurred fingerprints left at a burglary.
This document discusses principles and practices of firearm identification in forensic science. It defines key ballistics terms and describes how class and individual characteristics can be used to identify firearms. Specific characteristics examined include rifling marks, firing pin impressions, breech face marks, and striations. Methods of comparing bullets and cartridge cases using comparison microscopes, stereomicroscopes, test firing, and automated databases like NIBIN and IBIS are summarized. The document provides an overview of the field of forensic ballistics and firearm identification.
Firearms identification experts can identify key details about firearms from ballistic evidence:
- Rifling marks on bullets can identify the specific gun used due to variations between firearms.
- Firing pin and breechblock markings on cartridge casings are also unique to each gun.
- The type of bullet, firearm, and presence of gunshot residue can provide important clues during investigations.
Firearms are classified based on bore characteristics, mechanism characteristics, and use characteristics. Bore characteristics include whether the firearm has a rifled or smooth bore. Mechanism characteristics refer to the action (such as lever, bolt, or automatic) and loading mechanisms (such as muzzle, breech, or magazine loading). Finally, firearms are also classified based on their intended uses, such as sporting, military, or self defense purposes. The classification system helps to effectively identify, differentiate, and understand different types of firearms.
Explanation of ballistics, various fields of ballistics, Forensic Ballistics,Firearms and its components, Ammunition and its components, firing mechanism of firearm, Identification & individualization.
This document discusses the impact of blast loading from nuclear explosions on structures. It notes the continuing need to protect both military and civilian populations from attacks. The challenges of evolving threats like terrorism require multi-layered defenses that balance security and civil liberties. The project aims to develop guidelines for analyzing, designing, evaluating, retrofitting, and testing structures to withstand unusual loads like explosions. It will involve both dynamic analysis to simulate blast effects and assess stresses, as well as static analysis for normal loads, following standards like UFC, ASCE, FEMA, and Indian codes. Protecting against modern asymmetrical threats will be an ongoing challenge requiring technological and theoretical innovations.
A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF BLAST LOADING FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON STRUCTURESIAEME Publication
In today’s geopolitical environment, the need to protect both military facilities and civilian
population from enemy attack has not diminished. Furthermore, we noted an increasing need
to protect civilian populations against terrorism and social and subversive unrest. Protecting
society against this form of featureless evolving type of warfare will remain a challenge, at
least through the first half of 21st century and certainly longer. Any outstanding recognition
will require a well planned multi-layered contribute to that strikes a fine coordination between
ensuring a nations security and support the freedoms that modern society enjoys. In this
context, this project is done to study the impact of blast loading for nuclear explosion on
buildings. On high these recommendations define the structural strength pre-eminent to
withstand the force produced by a surface burst of a nuclear weapon. A brief forum of the
major parameters which exercise the force acting on a structure is followed by a specification
of the peak magnitude and time variation of these forces. Specific details which define the net
forces acting on an element of the basic structural types are given. As this design requires a
sound background on blast loading mitigations and as it not economical only. Following the
discussion of the effects of the size and function of a structure is specification of basic
properties of reinforced concrete and steel. The protective structural analysis is based upon
the Tri Service Manual TM 5-1300, ASCE Manual 42, FEMA guidelines and Indian Standards
Soham Bhattacharya's document discusses hair evidence in forensic investigations. It provides background on the history of using hair analysis dating back to the late 1800s. Hair is considered class evidence that cannot identify a specific individual unless the follicle is present for DNA analysis. Hair can persist for long periods on surfaces and clothes due to its tough outer coating and resist decomposition. The recovery of hair evidence can occur at the crime scene or in laboratories.
Brain fingerprinting by ankit 2017............ankitg29
information about the brain fingerprinting technology . by EEG method by neuron firing and impulse of brain wave.P300 mean is 300-1000 m-sec brain wave, is better tech. than the polygraph test and other than than PET test. is basically depand the brain wave. is not the depand on the emotions and the pulse rate
Internal ballistics is the study of a projectile's behavior from ignition until it exits the gun barrel. It examines factors like lock time, ignition time, and barrel time. Piobert's law states that gunpowder burns layer by layer. Newton's third law means that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, causing recoil. Recoil velocity can be calculated using the projectile and gun masses and velocities. Rusting and erosion over time degrade the gun barrel and reduce accuracy.
The document provides a history of firearms, describing their evolution from early hand cannons in China in the 13th century to modern centerfire weapons. It outlines key developments like the matchlock, wheellock, flintlock, percussion cap, pinfire, rimfire systems. Each new system improved ignition reliability, accuracy, and rate of fire, culminating in centerfire cartridges that enabled self-contained ammunition and rapid reloading.
This document discusses forensic ballistics and ammunition. It begins by defining forensic ballistics as the branch of science dealing with shooting incidents for legal purposes. It then discusses different types of ammunition such as rimfire, centerfire, caseless, and blank ammunition. It describes the components of ammunition including primers, propellants, and bullets. Various bullet types are outlined like full metal jacket, hollow point, ballistic tip, open tip, dum-dum, wire patched, rubber, and incendiary bullets. Improvised ammunition is also briefly discussed.
Tool marks evidence plays an important role in forensic science. Tool marks are impressions or marks left on surfaces by tools and can be used to identify the specific tool that made the mark. There are different types of tool marks such as impressions, abrasions, cuts, and drill holes. Tool marks contain both class characteristics common to groups of tools and unique individual characteristics. Tool marks are collected using methods like photography, casting, and test marks. Examiners compare both class and individual characteristics of tool marks using various techniques like microscopy and superimposition to determine if two marks have a common origin.
The document discusses the classification of firearms. It describes firearms as being classified based on their bore (smooth bore vs rifled), loading mechanism (muzzleloader, breechloader, magazine loader), action (lever, bolt, self-loading), firing capability (single shot vs repeater), how they are handled (handguns vs shoulder arms) and their use (service vs sporting). Primitive firearms discussed include matchlock, wheel-lock, flintlock and muzzleloaders. Modern firearms are classified based on these various characteristics.
Internal ballistics refers to what occurs within a weapon's barrel from firing to bullet exit. Key phenomena include:
- Ignition starts when the firing pin strikes the primer, igniting propellant which burns to form high-pressure gas.
- Propellant combustion and barrel length impact velocity - short barrels require fast-burning powder while long barrels use progressive-burning powder.
- Atmospheric conditions like temperature affect ballistics, as ammunition is manufactured for a specific temperature range and velocities vary with temperature.
1) O documento é uma apostila sobre Ordem Unida para concurso de bombeiros militares no Rio de Janeiro em 2008. 2) Aborda conceitos básicos de ordem unida, termos militares, comandos e formatações individuais e coletivas. 3) Inclui capítulos sobre instrução individual sem arma, instrução coletiva, deslocamentos e regulamento de continência, honras e sinais de respeito.
The document discusses the factors that affect the trajectory of a bullet, including both internal and external factors. The main internal factors are the velocity of the projectile, spin of the bullet, angle of fire, structural features, and gravity. The main external factors are wind, air resistance, and the Coriolis effect. The trajectory takes the form of a parabola, being affected most significantly by the bullet's velocity, as well as air resistance and gravity acting upon it during flight.
This document provides an overview of physical evidence identification pertaining to wildlife forensics. It defines wildlife as non-domesticated plants and animals that live in natural habitats. Forensic science uses scientific methods to investigate crimes, and wildlife forensics applies these methods to conserve and protect wild animals. Physical evidence like footprints, hair, and scales can be collected, preserved, and identified through techniques like DNA analysis to determine species and gender. Samples are collected through careful procedures to preserve evidentiary value. Wildlife forensics helps relate suspects, victims, and crime scenes to physical evidence to investigate cases where wild animals are victims, the cause of incidents, or provide information about crimes.
Equipamentos Táticos para Técnicas Verticais do Comando de Operações TáticasFalcão Brasil
O documento especifica equipamentos táticos para operações verticais como cintos para rapel, luvas para cordas, conjuntos de ascensores de resgate, freios e kits de escadas de alumínio. É detalhada a descrição e especificações técnicas mínimas de cada item, assim como as quantidades necessárias. O objetivo é atender às necessidades do Comando de Operações Táticas do Departamento de Polícia Federal.
This document discusses key concepts in ballistics and firearms. It defines ballistics as the science of motion of projectiles and describes its three components: internal, external, and terminal ballistics. It then classifies firearms into smooth bored and grooved firearms like shotguns, rifles, revolvers, and pistols. Key terms are defined such as caliber, velocity, range, rifling, choking, and their purposes and effects are explained. Important parts of firearms like the barrel, firing pin, hammer, trigger, and magazine are also outlined.
Poroscopy and edgeoscopy are fingerprint identification techniques that examine sweat pore and ridge edge details. Poroscopy studies the distinctive patterns of sweat pores on fingerprints, which are unique to each individual. Edgeoscopy analyzes ridge edge alignments and shapes. These techniques allow identification to be made from partial or unclear fingerprints left at crime scenes. A 1912 case in France demonstrated poroscopy's use in identifying suspects from blurred fingerprints left at a burglary.
This document discusses principles and practices of firearm identification in forensic science. It defines key ballistics terms and describes how class and individual characteristics can be used to identify firearms. Specific characteristics examined include rifling marks, firing pin impressions, breech face marks, and striations. Methods of comparing bullets and cartridge cases using comparison microscopes, stereomicroscopes, test firing, and automated databases like NIBIN and IBIS are summarized. The document provides an overview of the field of forensic ballistics and firearm identification.
Firearms identification experts can identify key details about firearms from ballistic evidence:
- Rifling marks on bullets can identify the specific gun used due to variations between firearms.
- Firing pin and breechblock markings on cartridge casings are also unique to each gun.
- The type of bullet, firearm, and presence of gunshot residue can provide important clues during investigations.
Firearms are classified based on bore characteristics, mechanism characteristics, and use characteristics. Bore characteristics include whether the firearm has a rifled or smooth bore. Mechanism characteristics refer to the action (such as lever, bolt, or automatic) and loading mechanisms (such as muzzle, breech, or magazine loading). Finally, firearms are also classified based on their intended uses, such as sporting, military, or self defense purposes. The classification system helps to effectively identify, differentiate, and understand different types of firearms.
Explanation of ballistics, various fields of ballistics, Forensic Ballistics,Firearms and its components, Ammunition and its components, firing mechanism of firearm, Identification & individualization.
This document discusses the impact of blast loading from nuclear explosions on structures. It notes the continuing need to protect both military and civilian populations from attacks. The challenges of evolving threats like terrorism require multi-layered defenses that balance security and civil liberties. The project aims to develop guidelines for analyzing, designing, evaluating, retrofitting, and testing structures to withstand unusual loads like explosions. It will involve both dynamic analysis to simulate blast effects and assess stresses, as well as static analysis for normal loads, following standards like UFC, ASCE, FEMA, and Indian codes. Protecting against modern asymmetrical threats will be an ongoing challenge requiring technological and theoretical innovations.
A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF BLAST LOADING FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON STRUCTURESIAEME Publication
In today’s geopolitical environment, the need to protect both military facilities and civilian
population from enemy attack has not diminished. Furthermore, we noted an increasing need
to protect civilian populations against terrorism and social and subversive unrest. Protecting
society against this form of featureless evolving type of warfare will remain a challenge, at
least through the first half of 21st century and certainly longer. Any outstanding recognition
will require a well planned multi-layered contribute to that strikes a fine coordination between
ensuring a nations security and support the freedoms that modern society enjoys. In this
context, this project is done to study the impact of blast loading for nuclear explosion on
buildings. On high these recommendations define the structural strength pre-eminent to
withstand the force produced by a surface burst of a nuclear weapon. A brief forum of the
major parameters which exercise the force acting on a structure is followed by a specification
of the peak magnitude and time variation of these forces. Specific details which define the net
forces acting on an element of the basic structural types are given. As this design requires a
sound background on blast loading mitigations and as it not economical only. Following the
discussion of the effects of the size and function of a structure is specification of basic
properties of reinforced concrete and steel. The protective structural analysis is based upon
the Tri Service Manual TM 5-1300, ASCE Manual 42, FEMA guidelines and Indian Standards
Driving Technological Surprise: DARPA’s Mission in a Changing WorldIlya Klabukov
This document provides an overview of DARPA's mission and strategy. It discusses how DARPA aims to drive technological surprise for national security by pursuing high-risk, high-reward research and developing breakthrough capabilities. Some key areas of focus include game-changing systems technologies, layered warfighting concepts, and adaptable systems. Examples given are investments in position/navigation/timing alternatives to GPS and developing capabilities for integrated cyber and kinetic warfare. The document also briefly describes DARPA's process of moving successful technologies to programs of record or commercial applications.
HM502
Unit 5 DQ
Topic 1: Infrastructure Protection
A detailed discussion of threats to and the process of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) sectors from man-made and natural disasters are essential for understanding one of the main missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In detailed analysis of threats and protection challenges, several CI/KR sectors have emerged that require the attention of DHS professionals. These sectors include:
· Agriculture and Food
· Banking and Finance
· Communications
· Defense Industrial Base
· Energy
· Information Technology
· National Monuments and Icons
· Transportation Systems
· Water
What are some of the major threats to the CI/KR sectors identified above? Discuss some of the critical vulnerabilities of these CI/KR sectors. What are some of the prime consequences if these CI/KR sectors are damaged or destroyed? Describe DHS plans to deter threats, mitigate vulnerabilities, and minimize consequences.
Topic 1 Student Response #1 (Respond to Jeffery)
Jeffery Bailey
Hello classmates/Professor
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. The act assigns DHS the responsibility for developing a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for recommending the “measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with State and
local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (Chertoff, 2009) The NIPP defines the organizational structures that provide
the framework for coordination of CIKR protection efforts at all levels of government, their framework includes the action of setting goals and objectives, Identify Assets, Systems and Networks, Assess Risk, consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats. Prioritize, Implement Programs and Measure effectiveness.
The NIPP Conducts research and development and using technology to improve CIKR protection-related capabilities to ensure refined risk assessments for many years into the future. The NIPP assistance programs offers Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial entities; and complement relevant private sector activities. Part of their mission is to make America safer and more secure from cyber attacks and also both man made and natural disasters. Together, the NIPP and SSPs provide the mechanisms for identifying critical assets, systems, and networks, and their associated sectors. In dealing with risk and emergencies the NIPP has Sector Specific Agencies that are assigned certain areas of responsibilities such as Agriculture, Food, Energy and Water. Banking and Finance Communications, in dealing with the potential risk that may befall any of these entities the NIPP takes critical steps to assess, mitigate, protect, and plan for futur ...
This document summarizes a strategy paper on resourcing the US 2030 Cyber Strategy. It discusses:
1) The strategy proposes building defensive cyber capabilities, deterrence capabilities, and promoting international cooperation to establish cyber norms by 2030. However, funding these initiatives will be challenging.
2) Fifty percent of the strategy relies on acquiring new cyber technologies, which requires navigating the lengthy defense acquisition system and gaining approval through processes like JCIDS.
3) Coordinating support across the executive branch, Congress, and private industry will be difficult due to competing interests but is crucial for successful implementation.
- President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed "Star Wars", in 1983 which envisioned creating a missile defense system to protect the US from nuclear attack.
- The SDI proposed developing new technologies like lasers and particle beams to intercept incoming missiles, replacing the policy of mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.
- Reagan's announcement marked the beginning of extensive research into missile defense, though the technology proposed in 1983 was still far beyond what was feasible at the time.
This document proposes a course and minor program in maritime cybersecurity at the CSU Maritime Academy. The introduction to maritime cybersecurity course would educate students on current cyber threats in the maritime domain, the actors involved, and governing policies. The proposed minor would include introductory courses in information systems and ports/terminal management, as well as courses on cybersecurity policy, maritime cybersecurity organizations, and cyber warfare. The goal is to increase awareness of cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime industry and their implications for economic and national security.
1) Effects-based operations leverage both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to achieve desired effects against threats that are distributed, networked, and different from traditional nation-state adversaries.
2) Future warfare will involve new technologies like robots, chemicals, electrons, directed energy, and nonkinetic weapons that can substitute for traditional fire and maneuver.
3) Adversaries will avoid direct confrontation and instead conduct swarming attacks using global networks and commercial infrastructure, requiring new approaches from the US military.
Title United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security .docxjuliennehar
Title: United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security - Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS
Terrorists are opportunistic. They exploit vulnerabilities we leave exposed, choosing the time, place, and method of attack according to the weaknesses they observe or perceive. Increasing the security of a particular type of target, such as aircraft or buildings, makes it more likely that terrorists will seek a different target. Increasing the countermeasures to a particular terrorist tactic, such as hijacking, makes it more likely that terrorists will favor a different tactic.
Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets is thus a formidable challenge. Our open and technologically complex society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets, and our critical infrastructure changes as rapidly as the marketplace. It is impossible to protect completely all targets, all the time. On the other hand, we can help deter or deflect attacks, or mitigate their effects, by making strategic improvements in protection and security. Thus, while we cannot assume we will prevent all terrorist attacks, we can substantially reduce America's vulnerability, particularly to the most damaging attacks.
All elements of our society have a crucial stake in reducing our vulnerability to terrorism; and all have highly valuable roles to play. Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets requires an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of government-with private industry and institutions, and with the American people. The federal government has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and enabling all of these entities to work together to provide America the security it requires.
What must we protect? The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical infrastructure as those "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." Our critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the functions or services they provide to our country. Our critical infrastructures are also particularly important because they are complex systems: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct target, and reverberate long after the immediate damage.
America's critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors. Our agriculture, food, and water sectors, along with the public health and emergency services sectors, provide the essential goods and services Americans need to survive. Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom, and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential capabilities to help safeguard ...
The document discusses the Sputnik education reform movement of the 1950s-60s and lessons that can be learned from it for current education reform efforts. The Sputnik reform was driven by the goal of putting a man on the moon in response to the USSR launching Sputnik. It benefited from a clear goal, timeline, and legislative support. Current reform efforts also aim to address global challenges, 21st century job skills, and national security issues. International assessments show the need for continued reform.
The document is the Department of Defense's 2015 Cyber Strategy. It outlines 5 strategic goals for the DoD's cyber activities over the next 5 years: 1) Build ready cyber forces and capabilities, 2) Defend the DoD information network and secure data, 3) Be prepared to defend the US from disruptive cyberattacks, 4) Develop cyber options to control conflict escalation, and 5) Build international partnerships to deter shared cyber threats. The strategy focuses on improving cyber defenses, responding to cyberattacks, and using cyber capabilities to support military plans and contingencies in line with US and international law.
The document discusses cyber threats facing the US industrial base from sources like rogue states and insider threats. It notes that critical infrastructure remains vulnerable despite administration progress on cybersecurity. Securing cyberspace and protecting industry requires a strategy combining agile national security policies with market incentives to develop technological protections. Any strategy also needs flexible legislation balancing security, privacy, and international agreements establishing cyber norms. With aware citizens, responsible agencies, a skilled workforce, and public-private cooperation, the US can safeguard its industrial base within cyberspace.
The document discusses the role of military engineers in security cooperation operations. It describes how engineers can work with other government agencies and non-governmental organizations to build host nation capacity through infrastructure development projects and disaster response. Specifically, it provides examples of how U.S. Army engineers have partnered with Iraqi engineers on projects like constructing a sewer system and surveying a canal system to improve governance and stability in Iraq. The document argues that engineers are well-suited to lead security cooperation efforts using a whole-of-government approach due to their technical expertise in infrastructure and experience coordinating across agencies.
The document is an annual threat assessment report from the U.S. Intelligence Community. It identifies the most serious threats to U.S. national security over the next year. It analyzes threats from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and issues like health security, climate change, transnational crime, and regional conflicts. Regarding China, it notes China will continue efforts to achieve global influence and secure its territorial claims, while challenging U.S. influence and pursuing technological advancement through espionage. It also discusses China's growing military capabilities, including its expanding nuclear arsenal and development of hypersonic weapons. The report provides similar analyses of threats posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and additional transnational issues
The document provides a strategic overview of Ukraine's cyber threat landscape since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 based on Cisco Talos' analysis. It finds that Ukraine faced a diverse set of cyber actors, including opportunistic cybercriminals, Russian state-sponsored groups like Gamaredon, and the pro-Russian hacktivist group Killnet that conducted DDoS attacks against NATO allies. Telemetry data from Cisco Secure Endpoint deployments in Ukraine revealed the top threats observed were related to web shell creation, PowerShell usage, and the increased use of the "Signed binary proxy execution using rundll32" technique by adversaries beginning in May 2022.
The Department of Defense is one of the largest consumers of energy in the United States. Currently, the DOD is investing heavily in renewable energy and aims to spend $10 billion annually on renewable energy by 2030. This focus on renewable energy will help reduce the military's fossil fuel consumption and dependence on foreign oil.
How does Terrorism Effect on Business and Relation Between Countriesijtsrd
The international business or IB is threatened by the indirect and direct effects of terrorism. Since the moment governments have tightened the safety of public sites, the various businesses have turned into exponential attractive targets for terrorist attacks, with vital implications for the performance and operations of the companies that are multinational in nature. Though, substantial studies have been done in different fields about terrorism, less scholarly research has been done on the various challenges which it inflicts upon international business as well as how to address terrorism as a problem. Through this particular article we would conceptualize the terrorism concerned with international business. The background on effects and dimensions of terrorism as well as developing theoretical grounding for researching terrorism by sketching on literature provided by international business, political science, economics and different sectors; shall be provided by us. Once discussion on findings from review of the literature is done, a comprehensive program for subsequent research concerning the connection between international business and terrorism is offered by us. The program that we offer emphasizes on the effects of organizational preparedness, terrorism, company performance and its strategy, global distribution and global supply channels, as well as the issues pertaining human resource. The review that we render, aid in establishing a baseline that further assists in empirical research in the future. This consistent with research in an early stage, international business scholars get encouragement to offer perspectives as well as effective solution that are useful and throw required light on the various aspects of terrorism and also aid in reducing its devastating effects for multinational firms and international business.. Prof. Sidharth S. Raju | Pooja"How does Terrorism Effect on Business and Relation Between Countries" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-1 | Issue-6 , October 2017, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd4598.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/management/international-business-issues/4598/how-does-terrorism-effect-on-business-and-relation--between-countries/prof-sidharth-s-raju
This document provides an overview of cyber weapons. It defines cyber weapons as computer code used to threaten or cause harm to systems or living beings. Cyber weapons have two components - a penetration component to gain access to targeted systems, and a payload component to achieve intended effects like data destruction. Characteristics of cyber weapons include their dual-use nature for intelligence and attacks, difficulty in attribution, and potential for unintended consequences. The document discusses various definitions of cyber weapons and elements that comprise cyber weapons like vulnerabilities, exploits, and propagation methods. It also outlines the unique features of cyber weapons in cyberspace.
1
POLICY MEMORANDUM SAMPLES
2
I. Introduction
The following policy memorandum samples provide you with examples on the format of a policy
memorandum. They display a variety and approaches and styles that you may find helpful when
developing your own policy memorandum.
Please note that these examples do not necessarily correspond to the writing guidelines and
evaluation criteria specifically established for the Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge
(e.g. some memos do not provide sources). The samples are therefore by no means a template for
your memo.
Please carefully follow the memo writing instructions provided separately to ensure that your
submission meets the requirements established for the Global Debate and Public Policy
Challenge.
II. List of sample policy memos
1. Harvard Kennedy School of Government (no date). Re-organizing the Government to Combat the
WMD Threat. Retrieved from
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/degree-
programs/registrar/sample-policy-memo.pdf
2. LK11538 (2012). Digital Freedoms and Canadian Economic Policy. Submission to the Global Debate
and Public Policy Challenge 2012-2013.
3. KG10240 (2012). Sanctions of the 21st century. Submission to the Global Debate and Public Policy
Challenge 2012-2013.
MEMORANDUM
TO: President of the United States
FROM: [ ]
SUBJECT: Re-organizing the Government to Combat the WMD Threat
DATE: xx / xx / xxxx
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is the most serious threat to U.S.
security today, and will remain so far into the future. Whereas combating proliferation is an
inherently government-wide mission, the existing national security architecture has resulted in
a series of agency-specific efforts that are often poorly coordinated and fail to take advantage of
important synergies. Re-organizing the government to meet the WMD threat therefore requires
reforms that strengthen White House management of nonproliferation programs, expand
interagency counterproliferation capabilities, and improve WMD-related intelligence.
Strengthen White House Management of Nonproliferation Programs
The Departments of Energy (DOE), State, Defense (DOD), Commerce, and Homeland Security
(DHS) all contribute to U.S. nonproliferation efforts, but receive insufficient top-level program
guidance and coordination. For example, DOE did not learn of Libya’s decision to abandon its
nuclear program until it was revealed in the press. Moreover, DOE had no plan in place to
dismantle Libya’s nuclear assets despite its central role in performing such activities. Finally,
proliferation detection R&D projects are currently managed by a community of end users that
have overlapping needs but rarely communicate with each other.
To prevent future interagency breakdowns, the White House should designate a new senior-
level Nonproliferation Pol.
The document discusses proposals for strengthening cybersecurity of US government and critical infrastructure. It recommends developing a robust cyber policy, securing federal networks, and engaging internationally. The government needs to work with critical infrastructure owners to assess threats, develop protective measures, and integrate intelligence sharing. Research should promote secure infrastructure design and modeling of incident impacts. Communication systems must enable real-time information access across government levels using accurate data.
Similar to JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013 (20)
This report summarizes the program plans and funding for each of the major acquisition programs included in the SAR and four additional programs. The Air Force’s Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), Long Range Standoff Missile (LRSO), and Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the future replacement for the Minuteman III, and the Navy’s Ohio-Class Replacement are not yet reported in the SAR, but enough is known about each program to construct a reasonable cost estimate. These programs are among the largest acquisition programs in DoD’s portfolio, and any discussion of major acquisitions would be incomplete without them. The programs included in this report represent 36 percent of the total acquisition budget in the FY 2016 FYDP. The remaining 64 percent of funding is used for hundreds of smaller acquisition programs not reported in the SAR or other programs too early in development to be included in the SAR.
“The Tustin Hangars: Titans of History” is a comprehensive history of the two blimp hangars at the former U.S. Navy and Marine Corps air station in Tustin, California. The hangars were built early in World War II to house manned blimps or, in Navy terminology, non-rigid lighter-than-air (LTA) airships.
This document provides the 36th Commandant's initial planning guidance for the Marine Corps. It outlines several priorities, including enhancing recruitment screening to evaluate psychological resilience, addressing gaps in leadership at the non-commissioned officer level, and improving personnel stability and unit cohesion. The Commandant intends to guide the Marine Corps to be ready to meet its expeditionary mission and win future battles by focusing on leadership, warfighting capabilities, and balanced readiness across the force.
This document provides guidance from the Commandant of the Marine Corps on advancing the Marine Corps over the next four years. It outlines five focus areas: people, readiness, training/experimentation, integration with naval/joint forces, and modernization. The guidance emphasizes maintaining high quality personnel, decentralizing training while adhering to maneuver warfare principles, and modernizing through new technologies. Specific objectives include reviewing force structure, growing cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, ensuring leaders have time to train units pre-deployment, and reenergizing support for Marines after they leave active service. The overall goal is for the Marine Corps to remain the nation's crisis response force and be most ready when the country is least ready.
CRS - Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carri...Tom "Blad" Lindblad
The document summarizes the Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) programs. It provides background on the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in 2011 and the rationale for the ACV and MPC. It discusses requirements, program developments including contracts awarded in 2015, and the FY2016 budget. It notes potential issues for Congress regarding the new acquisition strategy for the ACV and MPC.
MCRP 5-12D Organization of United States Marine Corps 26 Aug15Tom "Blad" Lindblad
This document provides an overview of the organization of the United States Marine Corps, including its command structure and major components. It outlines the mission and roles of Headquarters Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Operating Forces including the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) framework of Marine Expeditionary Force, Brigade, and Unit levels. It also describes the Supporting Establishment, Marine Corps Reserve, and geographic and functional Marine Corps Components responsible for different regions and missions.
The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) retirement
reform plan is a blended approach that includes a defined benefit (DB), a defined contribution
(DC) plan, and higher current compensation in the form of continuation pay at year
of service (YOS) 12. In addition, the plan allows active component (AC) service members—at
the time of their retirement from the military—a choice regarding the DB annuity receivable
from the time of retirement to age 67.1 The member may choose a full DB annuity, a full
lump-sum payment in lieu of the annuity, or partial DB annuity and partial lump sum. The
DB is like today’s DB, except with a multiplier of 2.0 percent instead of 2.5 percent in today’s
system. Reserve component (RC) retirees could elect to receive (1) a full DB annuity starting
at age 60; (2) a lump sum paid at the time of retirement from the RC in lieu of the annuity to
age 67; or (3) a partial DB annuity from ages 60 to 67 and a partial lump sum paid at the time
of retirement from the RC, then receive the full annuity starting at age 67. The DC plan vests
at YOS 3, the Department of Defense (DoD) makes an automatic contribution of 1 percent of
basic pay from years 1 to 20, and DoD matches the member’s contribution up to 5 percent of
basic pay over years 3–20.
GAO - Surface Ships: Status of the Navy’s Phased Modernization PlanTom "Blad" Lindblad
The Navy originally proposed a Phased Modernization Plan in 2014 that would place 11 cruisers and 3 dock-landing ships into reduced operating status for up to 12 years for maintenance and modernization. However, in 2015 the Navy significantly revised the plan in response to congressional concerns about capacity shortfalls. The revised plan limits the number of cruisers in modernization status at one time to no more than 6, and the time per cruiser to no more than 4 years. The Navy did not consider formal alternatives to the original plan and revised it primarily to address congressional concerns about reduced fleet capacity.
DOD's 2015 China Military Power Report (85 pages long)
Text Document
On May 9, 2015, the Defense Department released its annual China military power report.
This document provides an overview of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) procurement structure and spending in fiscal year 2014. It discusses that DHS spent $16.5 billion through 86,594 transactions in FY2014, with the largest components by spending being the Office of Procurement Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It also breaks down DHS spending by commodity families such as IT & telecom, professional services, and facilities & construction. The document outlines DHS' strategic sourcing program and notes that it achieved $471 million in savings for FY2014.
USMC Expeditionary Force 21 MAGTF Ground Combat Element (2015)Tom "Blad" Lindblad
1) The document discusses the need for the Marine Corps Ground Combat Element (GCE) to adapt to changing operational environments and complex mission requirements, such as non-combatant evacuations and raids on terrorist camps.
2) It analyzes recent missions and potential scenarios, questioning whether the GCE is adequately prepared and trained to execute complex, time-sensitive missions involving dispersed small units coordinating with air and naval assets.
3) The author calls for focusing on improving capabilities like integrated digital communications, reducing timelines for planning and execution, and standardizing training across the GCE to ensure readiness for large-scale operations on short notice against determined enemies.
Commandant of Marine Corps Posture Statement_2015 to CongressTom "Blad" Lindblad
Attached is the current posture statement and opening statement from yesterday's briefing by General Dunford to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.
Topics in the Posture Statement include:
• OEF-Afghanistan
• ARG/MEU Operations
• SPMAGTF-CR Operations
• Marine Corps in the Pacific
• Black Sea Rotational Force, Embassy Security Forces, and Theater Security Cooperation
• Fiscal Year 16 Budget Priorities
• Force Structure
• Amphibious Combat Vehicle
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
• Joint Strike Fighter
• CH-53K
• Command, Control, Communications and Computers
• Naval Integration and Programs of Interest
Readiness
• High Quality People
• Unit Readiness
• Capacity to Meet Combatant Commanders' Requirements
• Facility Investments
• Equipment Modernization and Innovation
• Marine Corps Force Integration Program (MCFIP)
• Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
• Suicide Prevention
• Wounded Warriors
• Transition Readiness
The FY 2016 budget request provides $126.5 billion for the Army base budget and $20.7 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations. The request maintains an end strength of 475,000 soldiers for the Active Army, 342,000 for the Army National Guard, and 198,000 for the Army Reserve. Funding is prioritized for military pay and benefits, training, readiness and modernization to ensure the Army remains capable of meeting global commitments.
Report of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission-2...Tom "Blad" Lindblad
The document is a report from the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission summarizing its recommendations for modernizing the military's compensation and retirement systems. The Commission studied these issues over two years and received input from over 100,000 service members, veterans, and their families. The report outlines 15 recommendations that aim to improve pay and benefits while maintaining fiscal sustainability. The recommendations include transitioning to a blended retirement system, reforming health care programs, and enhancing education and family benefits. The Commission believes the changes will help recruit and retain high quality service members for the future.
This document provides an overview and agenda for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). It discusses the requirements environment, capabilities-based planning process, key JCIDS documents including the Initial Capabilities Document, Capabilities Development Document, and Capability Production Document. It also covers topics like the requirements approval process, capabilities-based assessments, key performance parameters, and the relationship between JCIDS and the acquisition process.
This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active missions Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as
well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties. Some
of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website and
others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.
Here is Gabe Whitley's response to my defamation lawsuit for him calling me a rapist and perjurer in court documents.
You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
Acolyte Episodes review (TV series) The Acolyte. Learn about the influence of the program on the Star Wars world, as well as new characters and story twists.
04062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
Discover the essential tools and strategies for modern PR business success. Learn how to craft compelling news releases, leverage press release sites and news wires, stay updated with PR news, and integrate effective PR practices to enhance your brand's visibility and credibility. Elevate your PR efforts with our comprehensive guide.
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
2. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
Cover image: A U.S. Marine with 1st Platoon, India Company, 3rd Battalion,
4th Marine Regiment, (3/4) uses a compact metal detector during a training
exercise at Mojave Viper at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29
Palms, Calif. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Christopher M. Burke)
3. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | iii
Foreword
As we continue to address the improvised explosive device threats of today, we
must simultaneously prepare for tomorrow’s counter-IED and counter-threat
network effort by institutionalizing the knowledge, capabilities, and experience
we have amassed during the last decade. Building upon hard-earned lessons
learned, this Counter-IED Strategic Plan extends the focus beyond current opera-
tions and establishes an azimuth for the development of future and enduring
counter-IED capabilities.
When discussing future threats, it is important we consider both the net-
works that employ IEDs as well as the device itself. The IED is the weapon of
choice for the overlapping consortium of networks operating along the entire
threat continuum — criminal, insurgent, and terrorist alike. Threat networks use IEDs because they are cheap,
readily available, easy to construct, lethal, and effective. The IED is a weapon used strategically to cause casualties,
create the perception of insecurity, and influence national will. This threat is complex and transnational in nature,
representing layers of interdependent, inter-connected global threat networks, and support systems.
In the networks that support, supply, and employ IEDs, we see the nexus of narcotic, criminal, insurgent,
and terrorist networks supported by the easy flow of dual-use components through legitimate businesses, using
local readily available explosive materials, and a generation of combat-experienced IED makers — all interacting
and operating in current or emerging conflict areas. They are largely seamless, overlapping, and not confined by
geographical or jurisdictional boundaries. These threat networks are like a virus that breeds and flourishes in a cli-
mate of instability.
Globalization, the Internet, and social media have extended the transnational reach of these organizations,
allowing threat networks to easily spread IED technology. Of great concern is the growth in the use of homemade
explosives. These IEDs, comprised of fertilizers and other legally produced materials, have been used with devas-
tating effects worldwide — from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to domestic targets such as Oklahoma
City and Oslo, Norway. The ubiquitous nature of IED materials, their low cost, and the potential for strategic
impact guarantee the IED will remain a threat and main casualty-producing weapon for decades to come.
The mission to disrupt the transnational threat networks employing IEDs, and to defeat the IED itself,
requires a comprehensive and seamless effort supported across all levels of our government. This threat must be
met with a whole-of-government approach that integrates efforts and leverages the combined authorities and capa-
bilities of all interagency partners. While we are never going to stop all IEDs, a holistic, decisive, whole-of-govern-
ment approach will significantly impact the effect the IED has in future operations and to our domestic security.
The IED threat and the networks that employ them will endure — they are here to stay. This compel-
ling threat requires us to maintain constant vigilance, an enduring counter-threat network, and counter-IED
capabilities.
MICHAEL D. BARBERO
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director
5. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | v
Table of Contents
Strategic Vision................................................................................................................1
Mission.............................................................................................................................1
Assumptions ....................................................................................................................1
Strategic Environment — the Current and Enduring Threat...........................................2
Meeting the IED Challenge.............................................................................................6
Goals and Objectives .....................................................................................................10
Future C-IED Research and Development Requirements..............................................12
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................13
Acronyms........................................................................................................................15
The following annexes will be available upon completion:
• Annex A: Action Plan
• Annex B: Process Integration
• Annex C: References
7. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 1
Strategic Vision
Reduce the effectiveness and lethality of IEDs to allow free-
dom of maneuver for joint forces, federal agencies, and partner
nations in current and future operating environments
We will use a synchronized and integrated approach to
coordinate the Department of Defense’s counter-IED efforts
and rapidly provide capabilities to counter the IED threat
in support of operational commanders. Critical to these
efforts are forces trained in the latest C-IED techniques and
provided with tailored and fused intelligence support. As
authorized, we will provide support to other federal agen-
cies as they analyze, pursue, disrupt, protect, and respond to
the terrorist use of explosives in the United States. We will
aggressively seek to maintain the research and development
advantages needed to neutralize the IED threat.
Above all, we must remain agile and responsive to the
needs of our commanders and warfighters, proactive in our
approach, and tireless in our pursuit of comprehensive and
timely solutions to the IED threat.
Mission
Lead DoD actions to rapidly provide C-IED capabilities and
solutions in support of Combatant Commanders, the Services,
and as authorized, other federal agencies to enable the defeat of
the IED as a weapon of strategic influence.
Assumptions
• An enduring global IED threat will drive Combatant
Commander requirements for C-IED capabilities.
• Homemade explosives will continue to be widely
available and employed in IEDs.
• Fiscal constraints will likely result in a call for shared
responsibilities and resources with other federal
agencies.
• Future C-IED operations will include allies or coalition
partners, requiring U.S. forces to contribute to
multinational solutions in concert with our allies and
partners.
• Deployed units will continue to require a rapid response
to C-IED issues and threats.
• U.S. forces will continue to transition security
responsibilities in Afghanistan; however future
operations will require C-IED capabilities.
• In the event of an IED-related domestic incident, the
lead federal agency will require DoD support.
• A networked and adaptive adversary aided by the latest
information technology will continue to evolve and
interact with other violent extremist organizations
to constantly modify the design of IEDs and their
methods of employment.
““In the 20th
century, artillery was the greatest producer of troop casualties.
The IED is the artillery of the 21st
century.”
Lieutenant General Michael Barbero
Director, Joint IED Defeat Organization
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
8. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
2 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Strategic Environment — the
Current and Enduring Threat
The Problem
The future IED threat consists of an overlapping consortium
of networks spanning the entire threat continuum — from
criminal gangs to insurgencies to terrorists with global reach
— for which the IED is the common weapon of choice.
These threat networks operate in an environment charac-
terized by the easy flow of dual-use components through
legitimate businesses and one with access to local, readily
available explosive materials. A generation of combat-expe-
rienced IED makers with skills for hire, who operate where
weak and corrupt governance and desperate socioeconomic
conditions prevail, can easily create political and economic
instability. These networks and devices will be an enduring
threat to our operational forces and to our domestic security.
Background
The IED threat is enduring and not new. In 1605, a radi-
cal group attempted to blow up the British Parliament and
assassinate King James I. Though averted, the attack was
one of the first large-scale attempts to
use explosives as a weapon of strategic
influence — in this case, to change a
government. In 1919, extremists con-
ducted simultaneous attacks in eight
U.S. cities, targeting U.S. govern-
ment officials including members of
Congress. The next year, anarchists
exploded a bomb on Wall Street that
killed 38. Throughout World War II,
guerrillas and partisans used explo-
sives to conduct sabotage. During the
Vietnam War, the Viet Cong made
extensive use of mines and IEDs
against U.S. forces, both on land and
in rivers, causing 33 percent of all
U.S. casualties.
The Provisional IRA employed
sophisticated improvised mortars and remote-con-
trolled IEDs during the conflict in Northern Ireland, and
Hezbollah made extensive use of explosives against Israeli
forces in Lebanon. In March 2004, there was a bombing
of a commuter train in Madrid. This had a major strate-
gic effect — as it was timed before a national election, and
influenced Spain’s support to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
There also was the failed Times Square attempt in May
of 2010. In 2011, significant IED-related events occurred
in Pakistan, India, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Colombia,
Norway, and bomb-making materials were found at home
— in San Jose, California.
Threat Networks
Though best understood in a regional context, the threat is
much more complex and transnational in nature, represent-
ing layers of interdependent, interconnected global networks
and support systems. These networks
adapt rapidly, communicate quickly,
and are unconstrained by political bor-
ders. In geographic areas where IED
use is more likely, most of the popu-
lace share similar social, economic,
and religious identities. Weak gover-
nance and the absence of rule of law,
corruption, mass migration, poverty,
illiteracy, high unemployment, large
populations of disaffected youth, and
competition for water, food, and natu-
ral resources are factors that serve to
unite and motivate a disaffected popu-
lation. These factors, fueled by oppor-
tunistic leadership, can lead to the
emergence of insurgencies and violent
extremist organizations. These extrem-
ists often find common cause with
existing criminal elements who are apt to use the circum-
stances to gain power and strengthen their illicit activities.
The interaction of these networked organizations is enabled
by the latest information technologies that provide recruit-
ing opportunities, technical expertise, training resources,
planning support, funding, and social interaction. Especially
noteworthy is the essential nature of financial resources that
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Threat
A GLOBAL THREAT
From January to November 2011,
outside of Iraq and Afghanistan:
• 6,832 IED events globally,
averaging 621 per month
• 12,286 casualties
• 111 countries
• Conducted by individuals
supported by 40 regional and
transnational threat networks
• Of those totals, 490 events
and 28 casualties were in the
United States
9. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 3
facilitate these illicit networks. Disparate groups of differ-
ing origins easily interact and leverage each others’ ability
to finance their causes, launder money, and transfer funds
around the globe. Criminal networks have long been able
to effortlessly use and manipulate otherwise legitimate net-
works to move money, resources and information.
Today’s threat networks have proven to be resilient,
adaptive, interconnected, and agile. They have learned to
operate flexibly, aggregating and disaggregating quickly in
response to countermeasures, extending their reach in physi-
cal and virtual dimensions. They adapt technology in short
cycles and rapidly evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs). Finally, today’s networks operate unbounded by the
law of war, rules of engagement, central policy, moral con-
straints, or other limitations from a central authority. The
IED is the common weapon of choice for elements along the
threat continuum.
Social trends and communications technologies envi-
sion more diffuse network hierarchies with amorphous lead-
ership structures in the future. The users of IEDs will adapt
the most recent and successful TTPs gained from experi-
ences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and use them for
political, ideological, or criminal purposes worldwide. They
will seek to build the capability for more complex attacks,
as seen in the July 2011 coordinated bombings in Mumbai,
India. Their fundraising and financial transaction tech-
niques will become more sophisticated, they will link with
pirates and other criminal enterprises to enable their opera-
tions, and they will seek covert support from sympathetic
state and non-state actors.
THE IED IS THE WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR ADVERSARIES
OPERATING ALONG THE THREAT CONTINUUM.
Device Technology
The IED will remain the weapon of choice for groups along
the threat continuum and will remain an enduring global
threat due to the accessibility of materials and the poten-
tial strategic impact resulting from their use. Today’s IEDs
are relatively simple “low-tech” devices which routinely use
command-wire, victim-operated, or radio-controlled trig-
gers. Many components are readily available, have legiti-
mate commercial uses, and are easily adaptable as parts of
bombs, e.g., circuit boards, cell phones, and simple elec-
tronic transmitters and receivers. Homemade explosives,
often composed of ubiquitous fertilizers, easily transport-
able and convertible to greater-than-TNT explosive power,
are predominant in IEDs and have been routinely employed
against troops and domestic targets. IEDs are highly effec-
tive because of the innovative ways the adversary employs
them. They are assembled with no or low amounts of metal
components and can be concealed in plastic jugs, walls,
wood, or debris. The rudimentary nature of basic IED tech-
nology simplifies design and construction techniques, which
can be easily communicated via the Internet. In current
combat theaters, more sophisticated devices, particularly
explosively formed projectiles and advanced triggers, have
caused disproportionate levels of casualties relative to the
numbers employed.
Threat Continuum
10. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
4 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
In the future, devices will adopt ever more sophis-
ticated technology, limited only by the terrorists’ imagi-
nations. Most fearsome would be weapons of mass effect
— chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear — for
which commercial control measures are not yet developed
or in place. Future bomb makers will seek to incorporate
such enhancements as peroxide- and hydrogen-based explo-
sives; nanotechnology and flexible electronics; new forms
of power, e.g., microbial fuel cells, non-metallic and solar;
advanced communications (Bluetooth, 4G, Wi-Fi, broad-
band); optical initiators (using laser or telemetry more
than infrared); and highly energetic and molecular mate-
rials. Indicators have shown that terrorist networks which
innovate with these new technologies are also develop-
ing enhanced IED concealment techniques and may even
combine IED use with concurrent cyber attacks. Bomb
makers will take advantage of available technology and
innovate in response to countermeasures — weapons will
be more lethal and harder to detect and defeat.
Methods of Delivery
Today, threat networks employ a variety of means to deliver
IEDs to their targets. These explosives are commonly bur-
ied in or alongside roads or in culverts, transported by vehi-
cles to a detonation site, or used by suicide bombers. The
current threat also includes a variety of waterborne tech-
niques — surface, submersible, and semi-submersible. In
some areas, postal bombs are common. IED users have
resorted to specialized delivery techniques to circumvent
C-IED measures, such as embedding IEDs in shoes, under-
wear, toner cartridges, and cameras. There are efforts to
ADVERSARIES WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE IED LETHALITY AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
— FUTURE DEVICES WILL BE OF LARGELY OFF-THE-SHELF TECHNOLOGY.
Upper right: Afghan National Security and International Security Assistance
Forces conducted a clearing operation in Ormuz district, Helmand province.
The operation lead to the discovery of 616 pounds of wet opium, 88 pounds
of concentrated fertilizer, narcotics paraphernalia, and a pressure plate.
(Photo courtesy ISAF)
Middle right: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Kevin Bullivant, an explosive
ordinance disposal technician with the 466A Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Team, sweeps off the explosive charge of an improvised explosive device found
in a wadi in Jamal, Afghanistan. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Guffey)
Bottom right: The Newseum expanded its FBI exhibit with a section focusing
on the FBI’s role in fighting terrorism before and after Sept. 11, 2001. Sixty
new artifacts include Richard Reid’s shoes he tried to ignite while on a
commercial flight. (Photo by Jeff Malet, maletphoto)
11. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 5
achieve low-detectable methods and greater precision using
smaller-sized devices. Examples include shipping containers
at varied transportation nodes; remotely piloted delivery in
all domains — land, sea, air, and space; and even surgically
implanted devices on humans and animals.
Domestic Nexus
The threat of IED use
within the United States is
real. A free and open soci-
ety with guaranteed civil
liberties is vulnerable —
elements of the same over-
seas IED threat continuum
and networks seek to strike
within the borders of the
homeland. While the use
of explosives by organized
crime and other groups
within the United States
is not new, the nature of
today’s threat has unique
elements.
First, the threat is
largely from non-state
actors who wish to take the
fight to the U.S. homeland
is a relatively recent development. An organized, sophis-
ticated, and tactically adept network of terrorist-affiliated
individuals with access to offshore resources is an ever-pres-
ent danger. Al-Qaida, its associated groups, and the Tehrik-
e-Taliban in Pakistan have made attempts within the past
year to attack the homeland, often recruiting Americans
or Westerners who can pass heightened security measures.
Second, the availability of a range of bomb-making tech-
nology and components allows motivated and empowered
individuals to act alone or with only a few accomplices.
Third, and particularly worrisome, is the threat of domes-
tic radicalization and homegrown extremism —individ-
uals who have lived primarily in the United States but
are energized by ideology promoted by foreign terrorist
organizations.
Protecting the home-
land, defending interests
abroad, and sustaining strate-
gic flexibility require a proac-
tive approach that counters
threat networks and antici-
pates evolving IED designs,
tactics, and technology. In
2007, the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 19,
Combating Terrorist Use of
Explosives in the United States,
was signed. This document
and subsequent implementing
instructions direct a whole-
of-government approach that
envisions seamless federal,
state, and local government
efforts to “deter, prevent,
detect, protect against, and
respond to explosive attacks.”
The Defense Department’s demonstrated C-IED capa-
bilities, experience abroad, and international working rela-
tionships can have significant impact upon the domestic
C-IED effort. Strong partnerships with our allies and all
U.S. government agencies to synchronize our counter-threat
network capabilities and actions are required. The domes-
tic threat evolves and adapts quickly and continuously. U.S.
domestic capabilities must evolve more rapidly — it takes a
network to defeat a network.
THE DOMESTIC THREAT
On May 25, 2011, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Force arrested two al-Qaida in Iraq-affiliated,
Kentucky-based Iraqi refugees, Waad Ramadan
Alwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi.
• Alwan was arrested for conspiracy to murder
a U.S. national while outside the United
States, conspiracy to use a weapon of mass
destruction, and attempting to provide
materiel support or resources to terrorists.
• Hammadi was also arrested for attempting
to provide materiel support or resources to
terrorists, as well as knowingly transferring,
possessing, or exporting a device designed
or intended to launch or guide a rocket
or missile.
EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE DOMESTIC EXPLOSIVES THREAT REQUIRE A
SEAMLESS WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH.
12. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
Meeting the IED Challenge
IEDs have emerged as the threat weapon of choice and are
one of the greatest challenges facing coalition forces in the
current theaters of operation. The ubiquitous nature and
lethal effect of IEDs used by insurgents directly threaten
deployed forces’ freedom of maneuver and the ability of
indigenous governments to provide for the safety and secu-
rity of their populations. There is no single solution to
defeat the IED because there is no single enemy IED net-
work. A range of efforts — supported by a whole-of-govern-
ment approach — to neutralize threat networks and devices
is required.
Defeating the device is an unceasing effort, mak-
ing use of the latest technological advances, to counter the
adaptive adversary’s adjustments to friendly C-IED capa-
bilities. To have a decisive and lasting impact on the adver-
sary’s use of IEDs, friendly actions must focus on defeating
the adversary’s network. This requires the fusion of informa-
tion, analysis, and partner support. It also requires a focused
approach that is agile, adaptive, innovative, persistent, and
relentless.
To defeat the threat, we must continually identify
likely capability gaps and focus our supporting communi-
ties of interest to develop solutions. Leveraging the research
and development (RD) community in this endeavor
ensures innovation that addresses these future challenges
and provides a venue to discover and develop C-IED-related
research and technology related to the C-IED mission.
This strategic plan’s vision and mission describe the
“ends” of this strategy — the requisite C-IED capabilities
and solutions in the hands of the warfighters, supporting
Combatant Commanders, the Services, and as authorized,
other federal agencies to enable the defeat of the IED as a
weapon of strategic influence. The “ways” are a set of endur-
ing capabilities employed via three lines of operation, which
in an interagency and multinational context, may be con-
sidered as lines of effort. The third leg of the strategy, the
“means” are the resource allocation processes used to ensure
capability to rapidly respond to emerging IED threats.
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Christopher Smith, left, a combat engineer with 2nd
Platoon, Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, looks for a potential
improvised explosive device during a census patrol in Sangin, Helmand province,
Afghanistan. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Dexter S. Saulisbury)6 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
13. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 7
Enduring Capabilities
An effective C-IED effort requires specific and focused
capabilities to address both the threat networks and their
devices. Joint forces must be enabled to counter an adver-
sary’s use of increasingly sophisticated and ever-evolving
IEDs. With assistance from the RD community, the
materiel response must rapidly harness the latest technolo-
gies and concepts to enable engineering, procurement, and
fielding of effective and timely C-IED systems. Joint force
freedom of maneuver requires well-trained forces with
unique skill sets who are able to develop situational under-
standing, be proactive, and employ advanced technology.
The exploitation of threat networks and devices by leverag-
ing all available all-source information and intelligence is
essential.
The U.S. military is not the only group affected by
IEDs. Allies and partner nations are also vulnerable, and the
U.S. homeland continues to be an attractive target. A com-
prehensive, long-lasting solution to the IED and the adver-
sary networks requires cultivating a culture of cooperation,
collaboration, information exchange, and when necessary,
mutual support and assistance on the part of international
and interagency national security and public safety partners.
To counter this enduring
threat, the five enduring capabilities
described below must be integrated.
These enduring capabilities must be
scalable, affordable, adaptable, expe-
ditionary, appropriate for domestic
application, and support a whole-of-
government approach.
• Rapid acquisition and field-
ing is the scalable ability to employ authorities, flexible
resources, streamlined processes, and effective oversight
to drive the RD community to rapidly anticipate,
identify, develop, and integrate emerging technologies
and concepts into effective fielded C-IED solutions.
• Operations-intelligence-information fusion and
analysis is an expeditionary and scalable network and
analytical capability enabling DoD, other federal agen-
cies, and coalition partners to understand threat-network
activities globally. This fused, analytic capability lever-
ages all available, all-source information and intelligence,
to provide the most accurate, effective, time-sensitive
information and counter-network support to Combatant
Commanders and, as authorized, other federal agencies.
• Training is the ability to develop, define, and set C-IED
and attack-the-network training standards for joint forces
in response to Combatant Commanders’ requirements
and integrate those standards into appropriate joint and
DoD concepts and doctrine in support of Combatant
Commander requirements, to provide training and to
build partner C-IED and counter-network capacity.
• Weapons technical intel-
ligence (WTI) is the ability to
conduct relevant and timely col-
lection, analysis, and technical
and forensic exploitation of cur-
rent and emerging IED tech-
nologies to swiftly enable force
protection, component and mate-
riel sourcing, targeting, coun-
tering of threat networks, and
expeditious support to prosecution.
• Whole-of-government approach is the ability to rap-
idly synchronize counter-threat network capabilities and
actions among joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
international, and other federal agencies’ C-IED stake-
holders. This is done through collaborative planning,
information sharing, and cooperative capability devel-
opment to reduce the impact of IEDs on operational
forces and the threat to the homeland.
These essential enduring capabilities are synergis-
tic and provide a comprehensive response to a complex and
dynamic threat.
ENDURING CAPABILITIES
• Rapid Acquisition and Fielding
• Operations-Intelligence-
Information Fusion and Analysis
• Training
• Weapons Technical Intelligence
• Whole-of-government Approach
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Enduring
Capabilities
14. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
8 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Lines of Operation
The five enduring capabilities are employed through three
mutually supporting lines of operation — Attack the
Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. The lines
of operation (LOOs) are the “ways” that provide the orga-
nizing construct and focus of effort for this strategic plan.
They serve to integrate the C-IED enduring capabilities,
synchronize internal operations, and increase agility. The
three LOOs are defined as:
• Attack the Network enables offensive operations
against complex networks of financiers, IED makers,
trainers, and their supporting infrastructure. Attack
the Network is focused on information fusion, exten-
sive partner collaboration, and expanding analyti-
cal support to combatant commands. Key to DoD’s
Attack the Network effort is the C-IED Operations/
Intelligence Integration Center (COIC), which har-
nesses, masses, and fuses information, analysis, technol-
ogy, interagency collaboration, and training support.
COIC support enables more precise attacks to defeat
violent extremist networks. Personnel with unique skill
sets can be forward deployed to provide timely analysis,
accurate information, and responsive support to forces
in theater. COIC’s extensive reachback capability sup-
ports commanders’ with all-source information fusion
and analysis.
• Defeat the Device provides technologies to detect IED
components, neutralize the triggering devices, and miti-
gate the effects of an IED blast to ensure freedom of
maneuver and effective operations for commanders. A
unique process of accelerated requirements determina-
tion and acquisition gives DoD the ability to rapidly
research, develop, produce, integrate, assess, and field
proven materiel and non-materiel C-IED initiatives to
counter known, newly deployed, and emerging IED
threats. The goal is to provide fielded solutions to the
warfighter between four and 24 months from require-
ments identification.
Enduring
Capabilities
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
The arm of a Talon robot grasps a mortar tail during an operations
check on the robot at Forward Operating Base, Azizullah, Afghanistan.
The robot is used to interrogate IEDs when explosive ordnance disposal
personnel need to investigate an IED from a safe distance. (Photo by Staff
Sgt. Stephen Schester)
Cpl. Sean Connell launches a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle, providing a
demonstration of the system to then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George
W. Casey Jr. at the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, Calif.
(Photo by D. Myles Cullen)
15. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 9
ATTACK
THE NETWOR
K
AtN
TRAIN
THEF
ORCE
TtF
DEF
EAT TH
EDEVI
CEDtD
Rapid
Acquisition
Fielding
Ops/Intel/Info Fusion
Analysis
Training
Weapons Technical
Intelligence
Whole-of-
Government
Approach
ENDURINGCA
PABILITIES
• Train the Force enables deploying forces to combat
IED employment by attacking the network, integrat-
ing equipment and systems for the individual and battle
staffs, and enhancing their knowledge and proficiency
of C-IED TTPs. Focused C-IED training provides the
most up-to-date tactics and technologies to troops at the
individual and unit level. Commanders and staffs are
educated and trained to integrate Attack the Network
and Defeat the Device tools and enabling resources. To
be successful, joint forces must understand threat net-
works and how to attack and defeat them.
16. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
10 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Goals and Objectives
Our overarching goal is to mitigate the effects of IEDs
on the commander’s freedom of maneuver and to enable
the defeat of these devices as weapons of strategic influ-
ence. JIEDDO’s role, as an integral part of the whole-of-
government approach — to lead, advocate, and coordinate
all DoD C-IED actions in support of the Combatant
Commander — provides for unifying goals today and in
the future. These goals embrace a larger C-IED community
of action while continually seeking innovative solutions to
the C-IED problem set.
This strategy has five principal goals with support-
ing objectives that institutionalize C-IED within DoD
and, as authorized, provide support and assistance to other
federal agencies to meet the evolving IED threat. These
goals directly support and are tied to the JIEDDO LOOs
of Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the
Force. This provides for clear, consistent, effective, and effi-
cient resource provision that builds C-IED capability. We
synchronize operations and intelligence fusion, require-
ments identification and validation, rapid acquisition of
desired capabilities, and training to enhance proficiency,
while partnering with other DoD organizations, the inter-
agency and multinational entities. These goals and objec-
tives will be validated annually and can be changed or
modified as required.
We will track and assess the accomplishment of these
goals through action plans based on published goals and
objectives that are reviewed on a quarterly basis to assess
progress.
Goal 1: Rapidly identify, validate, and prioritize immedi-
ate and future C-IED requirements to enable Combatant
Commanders to effectively attack complex IED production and
support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ a
trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.
• Objective 1.1: Support the validation of current and
emerging Combatant Commanders’ requirements to
ensure priority capability gaps are being addressed.
• Objective 1.2: Determine both current and future
required capabilities by identifying threat-focused oper-
ational needs and capability gaps to rapidly respond to
dynamic C-IED needs.
• Objective 1.3: Prioritize acquisition decisions to sup-
port C-IED requirements to ensure investments are
made with the greatest impact for the warfighter.
• Objective 1.4: Ensure resources are justified and
applied to ensure congressional approval of resource
allocation to rapidly develop and field C-IED
capabilities.
• Objective 1.5: Conduct assessments that enable transi-
tion, transfer, terminate, or continue decisions within
24 months from initiatives origination to institutional-
ize C-IED capabilities and ensure the JIEDDO invest-
ment is leveraged for the future.
• Objective 1.6: Direct, monitor, and modify, as nec-
essary, activities regarding the WTI process as they
pertain to the collection, technical and forensic exploi-
tation, and analysis of IED components to swiftly
enable force protection, targeting, component and
materiel sourcing, and expeditious support to prosecu-
tion. Establish the standards, processes, and procedures
required for application of forensics to WTI collection,
analysis, and exploitation.
Goal 2: Provide operations and intelligence fusion, analy-
sis, training, and sensitive activity support to Combatant
Commanders, federal agencies, and coalition partners to enable
freedom of maneuver from IEDs and to enhance a collective
ability to counter threat networks and supporting activities.
• Objective 2.1: Staff, train, and equip a scalable, deploy-
able, highly qualified workforce to sustain Combatant
Commander integration support and global contin-
gency operations.
• Objective 2.2: Provide operationally relevant and
timely operations-intelligence fusion, analytical sup-
port, and training integration to enable Combatant
Commanders to attack threat networks.
Enduring
Capabilities
Operation IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Operation IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
17. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 11
• Objective 2.3: Innovate and improve information
technology infrastructure and analytical methods to
enhance global collaboration in fully established or aus-
tere environments.
• Objective 2.4: Build partnerships to enable global
threat information sharing, analysis, and collaboration
to leverage and focus a whole-of-government effort.
• Objective 2.5: Maintain a global knowledge base of
current and future IED threats to provide solutions to
counter friendly vulnerabilities.
• Objective 2.6: Provide sensitive activities support
to enable Combatant Commanders’ and, as autho-
rized, other federal agencies’ counter-threat network
operations.
Goal 3: Rapidly seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutions
to fulfill validated requirements that ensure a Combatant
Commander’s ability to effectively attack complex IED produc-
tion and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and
employ a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.
• Objective 3.1: Develop, procure, implement, evaluate
and deploy C-IED solutions to enable offensive opera-
tions against networks; ensure freedom of maneuver and
effective operations for commanders; and enable deploy-
ing forces to mitigate the impact of IED employment.
• Objective 3.2: Aggressively seek innovative C-IED
solutions requiring research and technology matura-
tion and prioritize within DoD to advance capabilities
required for the future.
• Objective 3.3: Conduct continuous evaluation of
C-IED capabilities based on identified requirements,
goals, and objectives to determine effectiveness.
• Objective 3.4: Underwrite risk by understanding the
future threat, rapidly applying resources, and synchro-
nizing DoD efforts.
• Objective 3.5: Provide effective management and over-
sight of JIEDDO contracts.
Goal 4: Lead DoD C-IED training and training capability
development that support the Joint Staff’s, the Services’, and
Combatant Commanders’ efforts to prepare joint forces to suc-
cessfully attack the network and defeat the device in contempo-
rary and future operating environments.
• Objective 4.1: Develop and execute a synchronized
C-IED training plan supporting Joint Staff, Service,
Combatant Command, and, as directed, partner nation
and interagency C-IED training requirements.
• Objective 4.2: Develop C-IED training programs and
capabilities, and transition those that are enduring to
the Services.
• Objective 4.3: Collect and incorporate C-IED after
action reviews, lessons learned, and TTPs into C-IED
training.
Goal 5: Build a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
international C-IED community of action through collabora-
tive planning, information sharing, and cooperative capabil-
ity development for discrete IED problem sets (e.g., homemade
explosives, domestic threat, partner C-IED capability
development).
• Objective 5.1: Assist Combatant Commanders to
develop international and interagency partner C-IED
capability and capacity building to mitigate the effects
of IEDs.
• Objective 5.2: Seek opportunities to expand the role of
international and interagency partners to synchronize
C-IED capabilities and to share information, intelli-
gence, and technology.
• Objective 5.3: As authorized, assist the C-IED efforts
of other federal agencies — as part of the whole-of-
government approach — to provide for defense sup-
port of civil authorities and to support interagency
organizations when directed, to augment and enhance
C-IED capabilities to protect U.S. citizens and national
infrastructure.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ENABLE US TO TRANSFORM STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
INTO SPECIFIC, EFFECTIVE, AND MEASURABLE ACTIONS.
18. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
12 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Future C-IED Research and
Development Requirements
Harnessing the innovative potential of the RD community
to meet a dynamic, complex, and adaptive threat is especially
important. DoD will “cast a net into the future” to acceler-
ate the most promising C-IED solutions to combat the ever-
evolving threat. We can find capability gaps by considering
Combatant Commanders’ requirements over time, extrapo-
lating the technical and tactical threat trends, and conduct-
ing a comparative analysis of the most fruitful possibilities
given existing systems and promising new technologies. DoD
will close these future capability gaps by engaging the pub-
lic and private RD sectors to refine
capabilities and develop new systems,
technologies, and tactics.
These sectors consist of a
wide variety of organizations and
represent the Services, government agencies, commercial
firms, the defense industry, research laboratories, and aca-
demia. These multifaceted entities can be selectively engaged
to address issues across the IED spectrum. An effective DoD
C-IED RD strategy can play to each of their strengths
and develop a true synergy across the community of interest.
The elements of this strategy will include research funding,
collaborative development, policy direction, developmental
contracts, information sharing, and venture capital invest-
ment. The end result of these efforts is the first, but most
important, step in future capabilities development to com-
bat an adaptive threat — understanding the most promis-
ing short-, medium-, and long-term opportunities for RD
investments. The goal is to promote an informed and agile
research and acquisitions process
that stays ahead of the threat
and develops timely and effective
C-IED solutions to safeguard
our troops, our citizenry, and
our international partners.
FUTURE RD CAPABILITY GAPS 2012
• Pre-detonation
• Counter-threat Network
• Detection
• Counter-device
• Homemade Explosives
• Information Integration and Fusion
• Weapons Technical Intelligence
U.S. Army Spc. John “Rocky” Montoya scans
his sector while on a combat patrol to sweep
for roadside bomb triggermen in the Alingar
district in Afghanistan’s Laghman province.
Montoya is a M2 gunner assigned to the
Laghman Provincial Reconstruction Team.
(Photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane)
12 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
19. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 13JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 13
Conclusion
The armed forces of the United States and partner nations
will continue to be engaged throughout the world. In future
operations, joint forces will encounter improvised explosive
devices employed by determined adversaries. These cost-
effective, adaptive weapons and the violent extremist organi-
zations that use them are sure to evolve over time. The IED
threat will not be limited to overseas operations; intelligence
trends indicate the potential use of these weapons within the
U.S. homeland. This is not unprecedented.
In executing this strategy, we will build enduring
capabilities to meet the enduring IED threat by with a
swift C-IED response. It is the synergy of rapid acquisition
and fielding, operations and intelligence fusion and analy-
sis, training, weapons technical intelligence, and a whole-
of-government approach that coupled with a single focus
on the global IED threat ensures our ability to meet the
warfighters’ requirements. Using the battle-tested LOOs —
Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force
— we detect, prevent, protect, and mitigate IEDs and their
effects. We seek to achieve the stated goals and objectives of
this document through our annual planning process, begin-
ning with threat and capability gap analyses, proceeding
through the capability acquisition process, and ending with
C-IED investment decisions leading to desired solutions.
JIEDDO continually assesses these efforts in support of the
Combatant Commanders.
The global IED threat must be met with a coher-
ent and focused approach that collaboratively and continu-
ally seeks effective solutions. This strategy sets the path for
the C-IED effort in collaboration with partner nations, the
interagency, and intergovernmental organizations to enable
the defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence.
Enduring
Capabilities
Goals
Objectives
Lines of
Operation
Enduring
Threat
Strategic
Environment
C-IED
Capabilities
Solutions
Meeting the
IED Challenge
Lance Cpl. Arturo Valtierra, a mortarman with Redemption II, Weapons
Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, scans for IEDs during a foot
patrol to a local Afghan National Police near Patrol Base Gorgak, Garmsir
District, Helmand province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Jesse Stence)