The document summarizes the Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) programs. It provides background on the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in 2011 and the rationale for the ACV and MPC. It discusses requirements, program developments including contracts awarded in 2015, and the FY2016 budget. It notes potential issues for Congress regarding the new acquisition strategy for the ACV and MPC.
Abstract AAV or EFV - Amphibious Tracked Vehicle 35-65 t for US Marine Corps ...Andrey F Engineer
Preliminary design of the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) 35-65 t and possible vehicles of this family. Requirements (Based on Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps), Description, Specifications.
Abstract AAV or EFV - Amphibious Tracked Vehicle 35-65 t for US Marine Corps ...Andrey F Engineer
Preliminary design of the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) 35-65 t and possible vehicles of this family. Requirements (Based on Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps), Description, Specifications.
The USMC is shaping a 21st century approach to force insertion and to the sea base as a key element of such an approach. A key element of working the way ahead is the USMC approach to digital interoperability in shaping an integrated force with reach range and punch.
This document reflects my personal assessment, based on your input, of the most immediate opportunities to improve the quality of our Corps and our warfighting capabilities. My guidance
reflects what the Nation expects from its Corps of Marines, our approach to leadership, and our warfighting philosophy. My intent is to direct actions at the institutional level with a particular emphasis on leadership, warfighting, and balanced readiness across the force. To ensure a common understanding of the end state of our efforts, the planning guidance begins with a brief summary of what we do for the Nation, who we are as Marines, and the future operating environment.
“The Tustin Hangars: Titans of History” is a comprehensive history of the two blimp hangars at the former U.S. Navy and Marine Corps air station in Tustin, California. The hangars were built early in World War II to house manned blimps or, in Navy terminology, non-rigid lighter-than-air (LTA) airships.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
Recently, several Navy attack submarines have been delayed in receiving maintenance at public shipyards. As a result, they have missed deployments or had shortened deployments. CBO was asked by the House Armed Services Committee to compare the maintenance costs at public and private shipyards.
CBO’s analysis focused on the most common type of overhaul, the Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA), for SSN-688 class submarines. CBO found that no matter which method it used to calculate costs, private shipyards were less expensive, on average, than public shipyards for DSRA overhauls. The methodology and findings in this slide deck will be more thoroughly documented in a forthcoming CBO report.
The USMC is shaping a 21st century approach to force insertion and to the sea base as a key element of such an approach. A key element of working the way ahead is the USMC approach to digital interoperability in shaping an integrated force with reach range and punch.
This document reflects my personal assessment, based on your input, of the most immediate opportunities to improve the quality of our Corps and our warfighting capabilities. My guidance
reflects what the Nation expects from its Corps of Marines, our approach to leadership, and our warfighting philosophy. My intent is to direct actions at the institutional level with a particular emphasis on leadership, warfighting, and balanced readiness across the force. To ensure a common understanding of the end state of our efforts, the planning guidance begins with a brief summary of what we do for the Nation, who we are as Marines, and the future operating environment.
“The Tustin Hangars: Titans of History” is a comprehensive history of the two blimp hangars at the former U.S. Navy and Marine Corps air station in Tustin, California. The hangars were built early in World War II to house manned blimps or, in Navy terminology, non-rigid lighter-than-air (LTA) airships.
As the Navy prepares a new force structure assessment, CBO has examined three kinds of risks to the Navy’s plan to build a 355-ship fleet. Those risks arise from budgetary pressure, growth in the costs of building new ships, and uncertainty about the design of future ships. CBO has also provided some illustrations of alternative approaches to building the Navy’s amphibious warfare and surface combatant forces.
Recently, several Navy attack submarines have been delayed in receiving maintenance at public shipyards. As a result, they have missed deployments or had shortened deployments. CBO was asked by the House Armed Services Committee to compare the maintenance costs at public and private shipyards.
CBO’s analysis focused on the most common type of overhaul, the Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA), for SSN-688 class submarines. CBO found that no matter which method it used to calculate costs, private shipyards were less expensive, on average, than public shipyards for DSRA overhauls. The methodology and findings in this slide deck will be more thoroughly documented in a forthcoming CBO report.
This presentation is an example of reported worked briefed to Military and Civilian leadership after fact finding and analysis. These results were incorporated into other high level briefings that helped determine the type and method of Program Management that is being used to upgrade, replace and enhance DoD warfighting capabilities.
Stability Standards and Testing of Commercial Vessels on Inland Waters (ISS)NASBLA
The new Inland Stability Standard that the Westlawn Institute of Marine Technology is developing for NASBLA is discussed and also the cost-effective training program being developed to equip state law-enforcement personnel to inspect and approve such vessels' stability as either safe for operation or unsafe and not approved. Implementation of ISS and the associated training program will serve to close this gap in safety standards, provide firm guidance for state regulators to enhance public safety.
Final Report (TCP/RLA/0069)
Development of Standards for the Construction and Inspection of Fishing Vessels
Final Report TCP/RLA/0069 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/final-report-of-project-57610513
Annex I http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-i-57610511
Annex II http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-ii-57610508
Annex III http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-iii
Annex IV http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-iv-57610500
Annex V http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-v-57610497
Annex VI http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-vi-57610495
Schedule 1 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-1-57610492
Schedule 2 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-2-57610486
Schedule 3 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-3-57610481
Schedule 4 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-4-57610477
Schedule 5 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-5-57610474
Schedule 6 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-6-57610470
Schedule 7 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-7-57610465
Schedule 8 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-8-57610456
Schedule 9 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-9-57610450
Schedule 10 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-10-57610439
Schedule 11 http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/schedule-11-57610431
Annex VII http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-vii-57610416
Annex VIII http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-viii-57610410
Annex IX http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-ix-57610400
Annex X http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-x-57610393
Annex XI http://www.slideshare.net/safetyforfishermen/annex-xi-57610383
CBO estimates that the Navy’s 2020 shipbuilding plan would cost an average of $31 billion per year (in 2019 dollars) over 30 years. Under the plan, the fleet would grow from 290 ships today to the Navy’s overall goal of 355 in 2034 but would fall short of the Navy’s specific goals for some types of ships. In particular, the Navy’s plan would increase the amphibious warfare force from the current 32 ships to a high of 38 ships by 2026. A larger fleet would lead to higher operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric J. Labs, an analyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 25th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference.
In December 2016, the Navy released a new force structure assessment that called for building a 355-ship fleet. CBO estimates that construction costs for a fleet of 355 ships would average $26.6 billion (in 2017 dollars) per year over the next 30 years, which is 60 percent more than what the Navy has spent on average over the past 30 years. A larger fleet will also lead to greater operation and support costs.
Presentation by Eric Labs, CBO’s Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Defense Outlook Forum.
Similar to CRS - Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress (20)
This report summarizes the program plans and funding for each of the major acquisition programs included in the SAR and four additional programs. The Air Force’s Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), Long Range Standoff Missile (LRSO), and Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the future replacement for the Minuteman III, and the Navy’s Ohio-Class Replacement are not yet reported in the SAR, but enough is known about each program to construct a reasonable cost estimate. These programs are among the largest acquisition programs in DoD’s portfolio, and any discussion of major acquisitions would be incomplete without them. The programs included in this report represent 36 percent of the total acquisition budget in the FY 2016 FYDP. The remaining 64 percent of funding is used for hundreds of smaller acquisition programs not reported in the SAR or other programs too early in development to be included in the SAR.
The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) retirement
reform plan is a blended approach that includes a defined benefit (DB), a defined contribution
(DC) plan, and higher current compensation in the form of continuation pay at year
of service (YOS) 12. In addition, the plan allows active component (AC) service members—at
the time of their retirement from the military—a choice regarding the DB annuity receivable
from the time of retirement to age 67.1 The member may choose a full DB annuity, a full
lump-sum payment in lieu of the annuity, or partial DB annuity and partial lump sum. The
DB is like today’s DB, except with a multiplier of 2.0 percent instead of 2.5 percent in today’s
system. Reserve component (RC) retirees could elect to receive (1) a full DB annuity starting
at age 60; (2) a lump sum paid at the time of retirement from the RC in lieu of the annuity to
age 67; or (3) a partial DB annuity from ages 60 to 67 and a partial lump sum paid at the time
of retirement from the RC, then receive the full annuity starting at age 67. The DC plan vests
at YOS 3, the Department of Defense (DoD) makes an automatic contribution of 1 percent of
basic pay from years 1 to 20, and DoD matches the member’s contribution up to 5 percent of
basic pay over years 3–20.
DOD's 2015 China Military Power Report (85 pages long)
Text Document
On May 9, 2015, the Defense Department released its annual China military power report.
Commandant of Marine Corps Posture Statement_2015 to CongressTom "Blad" Lindblad
Attached is the current posture statement and opening statement from yesterday's briefing by General Dunford to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.
Topics in the Posture Statement include:
• OEF-Afghanistan
• ARG/MEU Operations
• SPMAGTF-CR Operations
• Marine Corps in the Pacific
• Black Sea Rotational Force, Embassy Security Forces, and Theater Security Cooperation
• Fiscal Year 16 Budget Priorities
• Force Structure
• Amphibious Combat Vehicle
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
• Joint Strike Fighter
• CH-53K
• Command, Control, Communications and Computers
• Naval Integration and Programs of Interest
Readiness
• High Quality People
• Unit Readiness
• Capacity to Meet Combatant Commanders' Requirements
• Facility Investments
• Equipment Modernization and Innovation
• Marine Corps Force Integration Program (MCFIP)
• Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
• Suicide Prevention
• Wounded Warriors
• Transition Readiness
This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active missions Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as
well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties. Some
of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website and
others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.
To provide information about its plans beyond the coming year, the Department of Defense (DoD) generally provides a five-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), that is associated with the budget it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget in the longer term, CBO regularly examines DoD’s FYDP and projects its budgetary impact for roughly a decade beyond the period covered by the FYDP. For this analysis, CBO used the FYDP that was provided to the Congress in April 2014; it spans fiscal years 2015 to 2019, and CBO’s projections span the years 2015 to 2030.
For fiscal year 2015, DoD requested appropriations totaling $555 billion. Of that amount, $496 billion was for the base budget and $59 billion was for what are termed overseas contingency operations (OCO). The base budget covers programs that constitute the department’s normal activities, such as the development and procurement of weapon systems and the day-to-day operations of the military and civilian workforce. Funding for OCO pays for U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan and other nonroutine military activities elsewhere. The FYDP describes DoD’s plans for its normal activities and therefore generally corresponds to the base budget.
DoD’s 2015 plans differ from its 2014 plans in important ways. For example, in an effort to reduce costs, the current FYDP includes sizeable cuts in the number of military personnel, particularly in the Army.
Since its establishment, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has been directing, administering, and providing DoD-wide guidance for the execution of programs for which it is responsible. This role is made difficult by the rapidly changing international environment, by resource scarcity, and by the overall complexity of the Security Cooperation community (SCC). It requires a whole-of-government approach to building capacities with our partners that support U.S. interests. DSCA Vision 2020 lays out a plan for DSCA to enable such an approach by the Security Cooperation enterprise (SCE), focusing on three interlocking areas: (1) synchronizing security cooperation activities, (2) meeting customer expectations, and (3) ensuring the effective and efficient use of community resources.
Department of Defense Instruction 5143_DUSD Intelligence 24Oct14Tom "Blad" Lindblad
Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)) to update the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the USD(I), pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) by sections 113 and 137 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (b)), and in accordance with section 3001 et seq. of Title 50, U.S.C. (Reference (c)), as well as Public Law 108-458 (Reference (d)), Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 (Reference (e)), and E.O. 13470 (Reference (f)).
The Ground X-Vehicle Technologies Program is a 24 month effort to develop new technologies which ‘break the more armor’ paradigm of ground vehicles.
• Increase expeditionary mobility and survivability AT THE SAME TIME not trade them against each other
• The core effort is Technology Development
• Subsystem technologies which can be demonstrated at the end of the two year effort
• Example areas which are ripe for development are discussed below
• Supplemented by Analysis
• Concept Definition – define vehicles which showcase the technologies
• Modeling and Simulation – which develop analysis tools for combat simulation
• GXV-T could lead to an X-Vehicle demonstration program which would utilize the technologies developed and matured to create vehicle demonstrators to prove the
premise that expeditionary mobility and survivability are not mutually exclusive
In these times of extreme budget pressures and uncertainty, combined with evolving and increasing national security threats, particularly threats to our technological superiority, improving the performance of the defense acquisition system is essential for the DoD. We must ensure that our acquisition professionals have the knowledge they need to incentivize industry and to control cost, schedule, and performance. This report is one of many steps we are taking to achieve that goal.
The Honorable Frank Kendall
Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
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‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
CRS - Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress
1. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle
(ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
December 3, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42723
2. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service
Summary
On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the
Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability
demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was
intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to
move quickly to develop a “more affordable and sustainable” vehicle to replace the EFV. The
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV
capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the
Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and
mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious
like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland
waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the
littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operations.
On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program “on ice” due to budgetary pressures
but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary
resources might be more favorable.
In what was described as a “drastic shift,” the Marines decided to “resurrect” the MPC in March
2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200
vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious
version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although
ACV Increment 1.1 will have a swim capability, a “connector” will be required to get the vehicles
from ship to shore.
On November 5, 2014, it was reported the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP)
for ACV Increment 1.1. The Marines are looking for information from industry regarding
program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings can be achieved.
On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop
ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE’s contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC’s for $121.5
million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both
vendors are expected to start delivering their prototypes in the fall of 2016 for testing, and the
Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018.
The Administration’s FY2016 Budget Request for the ACV was $219.1 million in Research,
Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. Congress approved the
Administration’s FY2016 ACV budget request.
A potential issue for Congress is the Marines’ new MPC/ACV acquisition strategy and its
associated challenges and risks. This report will be updated.
3. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Significance for Congress................................................................................................................ 2
The Marines’ Justification for the ACV and MPC .......................................................................... 2
ACV .......................................................................................................................................... 2
MPC .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Desired Operational Capabilities..................................................................................................... 2
ACV .......................................................................................................................................... 2
MPC .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Is There a Need for a Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Capability?............................................ 4
Expeditionary Force 21 and “Finding the Seams”.................................................................... 5
The Shift Toward Connectors.................................................................................................... 6
Program Information ....................................................................................................................... 7
2013 Decision to “Shelve” the MPC......................................................................................... 7
Major Change to Marine Corps Modernization Strategy.......................................................... 7
Marines Release Request for Information (RFI) for ACV Increment 1.1................................. 7
Marines Release Draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1............................ 8
Additional Details on 2015 ACV 1.1 RFP ................................................................................ 8
ACV 1.1 Fielding Plan........................................................................................................ 8
Marines Award ACV 1.1 Contracts........................................................................................... 9
Budget Activity................................................................................................................................ 9
FY2016 Budget Request ........................................................................................................... 9
H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016.................................... 10
Funding............................................................................................................................. 10
S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016........................................ 10
Funding............................................................................................................................. 10
H.R. 2685, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 ............................................... 10
Funding............................................................................................................................. 10
S. 1558, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 ................................................... 10
Funding............................................................................................................................. 10
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2016 ................................................................................................................................ 10
Funding............................................................................................................................. 10
Potential Issue for Congress...........................................................................................................11
The Marines’ New ACV/MPC Acquisition Strategy ...............................................................11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...........................................................................................................11
4. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 1
Background
U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions,
dated October 1, 1986, states:
The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and
land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land
campaigns.
In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct
amphibious operations and land operations. The ACV and MPC are considered integral systems
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement.
On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the
Marine Corps—with “encouragement” from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
(EFV) program. The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions. The EFV
was cancelled due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing.
Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a
“more affordable and sustainable” vehicle to take the place of the EFV. The Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more
practical and cost-efficient manner.
In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to
serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. At present, the
Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry
carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an
AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim1
capability for inland
waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the
littorals. Because of a perceived amphibious “redundancy,” some have questioned the need for
both the ACV and MPC. In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the
MPC program “on ice” and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years.2
With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned if the
Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation. In
response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan
Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-
scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious
operations will be conducted in the future. The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine
Corps’ and Navy’s amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global
interests of a maritime nation. The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by
Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in
greater detail below).
1
An amphibious capability generally refers to a vehicle’s ability to debark from a ship offshore at a considerable
distance and then move under fire to shore. A swim capability refers to a vehicle’s ability to traverse limited water
obstacles such as streams, rivers, and smaller bodies of inland water.
2
Lee Hudson, “Marines Put Marine Personnel Carrier on Shelf Due to Budget Constraints,” InsideDefense.com, June
14, 2013.
5. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 2
Significance for Congress
Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs,
including the ACV and the MPC. In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how
the ACV and MPC enable the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also
operations ashore. Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious
assault capability is a necessary component of U.S. national security.
The Marines’ Justification for the ACV and MPC
ACV
At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines
from ship to shore. The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and will continue to use it until
replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle. Over the years, the Marines claim the AAV has become
increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain. As weapons technology and threat
capabilities have evolved over the preceding four decades, the AAV—despite upgrades—is
viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance,
lethality, protection, and network capability. The AAV’s two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed
by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval
amphibious forces.
MPC
While the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not
intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle. The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored
Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional
Marines. The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7.62 mm machine gun but is not
fully amphibious as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of
connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC). The LAV-25 has been in service
since 1983. According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is
not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine
scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew.3
In this regard, the MPC was viewed as
necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine
infantry forces.
Desired Operational Capabilities
ACV4
The Marines’ 2011 Request for Information (RFI)5
to industry provides an overview of the
operational requirements for the ACV. These requirements include the following:
3
Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems Marine Personnel Carrier Fact Sheet, 2010.
4
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from the Amphibious Vehicle Request for Information
(RFI) issued by the Marine Corps Systems Command on February 11, 2011.
5
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines an RFI as “a document used to obtain price, delivery, other market
(continued...)
6. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 3
The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and
deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 Marines) from a launch distance at
or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 knots in seas with 1-foot
significant wave height and must be able to operate in seas up to 3-foot
significant wave height.
The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for
sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain. The vehicle’s road and cross-
country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to the M-1A1.
The vehicle’s protection characteristics should be able to protect against direct
and indirect fire and mines and improvised explosive device (IED) threats.
The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) systems
that permit it to operate both at sea and on land. The vehicle, at a minimum,
should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy infantry and light
vehicles.
MPC6
The Marine Corps’ 2011 Request for Information (RFI)7
to industry provided an overview of the
operational requirements for the MPC. These requirements included the following:
The vehicle must accommodate nine Marines and two crew members and have a
“robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore [not designed to embark from an
amphibious ship]) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed
sea.”8
The vehicle must be able to operate on land with M-1A1s in mechanized task
forces across the Marine Corps’ mission profile.
The vehicle shall provide protection for the occupants from the blasts, fragments,
and incapacitating effects of attack from kinetic threats, indirect fire, and
improvised explosive devices and mines.
The vehicle shall be capable of firing existing Marine anti-structure and anti-
armor missiles and should be able to accommodate existing command and
control (C2) systems.
(...continued)
information, or capabilities for planning purposes when the Government does not presently intend to issue a
solicitation. [FAR 15.202(e)].”
6
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from Annex A: Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) Family
of Vehicles (FOV) Requirements Set to the Marine Personnel Carrier Request for Information (RFI), February 17,
2011.
7
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines an RFI as “a document used to obtain price, delivery, other market
information, or capabilities for planning purposes when the Government does not presently intend to issue a
solicitation. [FAR 15.202(e)].”
8
Annex A: Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) Family of Vehicles (FOV) Requirements Set to the Marine Personnel
Carrier Request for Information (RFI), February 17, 2011.
7. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 4
Is There a Need for a Marine Corps Amphibious
Assault Capability?
As previously noted, Title 10 requires the Marines to have an amphibious and land operations
capability. Marine involvement in protracted land campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
growing acquisition of anti-access technologies, such as guided missiles, by both state and non-
state actors, led some influential military thinkers to question if the Marines would ever again be
called upon to conduct large-scale amphibious assault operations.9
In a May 2010 speech, then
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted rogue nations and non-state movements such as
Hezbollah possessed sophisticated anti-ship guided missiles, such as the Chinese-designed C-802,
which could destroy naval ships and force them to stay far off shore, thereby making an
amphibious assault by Marines highly dangerous.10
These and similar pronouncements by some
defense analysts led to questioning the need for dedicated amphibious assault capabilities in light
of growing “anti-access” technologies and weapon systems available to both hostile nations and
non-state actors. With the proliferation of anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and anti-aircraft systems,
anti-access and area denial capabilities are increasing worldwide and have become not only a
strategic but also operational and tactical considerations when contemplating amphibious
operations.
In early 2012, DOD published the results of studies and supporting concepts that it asserted
affirmed the need for the Marine Corps to maintain an amphibious assault capability. In March
2012, the Army and Marine Corps issued Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine
Corps Concept, which expressed the views of the two services on how they would project and
sustain military power world-wide in the face of growing challenges to access and entry.11
The
two services note:
Marine Corps forces embarked on amphibious shipping are specifically designed to
provide multi-domain capabilities that are employed from the sea. U.S. Army forces may
also operate from the sea in some scenarios. Sea-based forces utilize littoral maneuver
(via surface and/or vertical means) to exploit gaps and seams in enemy defenses, deceive
adversaries, and maneuver directly to key objectives ashore.12
In April 2012, the Marine Corps published the results of an Amphibious Capabilities Working
Group study on naval amphibious capability. The study, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st
Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change, contends the United States is a maritime
nation with critical maritime interests, noting 90% of global commerce that travels by sea is most
vulnerable where sea meets land in the littorals.13
The study further finds “for a maritime nation
with global interests, a minimal two brigade amphibious force represents a sound investment in
ensuring access for the rest of the joint force.”14
While the study did not explicitly call for the
9
Tony Perry and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Rethinks a Marine Corps Specialty: Storming Beaches,” Los Angeles Times,
June 21, 2010.
10
Ibid.
11
Information in this section was taken from “Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept,”
authored by the United States Army’s Army Capabilities Integration Center and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, March 2012.
12
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
13
Information in this section was taken from “Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st
Century: Strategic Opportunity
and a Vision for Change,” a report of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group, April 27, 2012.
14
Ibid., p. 12.
8. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 5
development of the ACV or MPC—the study recommendations are characterized as resource-
informed, program-neutral—the ACV and MPC are used in the study for evaluating the ability to
project power ashore. While large-scale, World War II-type amphibious operations might no
longer be the norm, the study suggests there are other roles for the ACV and MPC. Noting that
emerging battlefield capabilities could mean that small teams might now have the ability to
generate effects once associated with larger forces, the Marines propose that company landing
teams (CLTs) might now be a more appropriately sized force for most amphibious operations.15
CLTs are viewed as being small enough to be inserted in a single wave but large enough to
provide a capable force immediately. Another alternative to large scale amphibious operations are
small-scale amphibious raids described as “an historical forte of the Marine Corps.”16
These raid
forces go ashore only for the duration of the operation and then return to the sea. These raids
could be useful in denying terrorist sanctuary, securing potential weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) sites, destroying pirate safe havens, or destroying threat capabilities in port.17
In this
sense, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st
Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for
Change might be viewed as redefining thinking about the role of amphibious operations and
making an argument for the need for the ACV and MPC.
Expeditionary Force 21 and “Finding the Seams”
Navy and Marine Corps thinking on amphibious assault continues to evolve, most recently
articulated in March 2014’s Expeditionary Force 21 - Forward and Ready: Now and in the
Future.18
Regarding amphibious assault operations, Expeditionary Force 21 notes:
After World War II, the Marine Corps pursued the development of the helicopter as a
tactical means to avoid fixed defenses, but the “Hogaboom Board” soon recognized that
vertical maneuver capabilities alone would not fully replace surface maneuver, owing to
weight and volume constraints. Since then, the Naval services have sought to develop
complementary means of conducting vertical and surface littoral maneuver from
increased distances, and via multiple penetration points, using the sea as maneuver space
to offset the range and precision of modern weapons. In recent years, we have been very
successful regarding vertical maneuver capabilities, but less so in the realm of surface
maneuver. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) has been effective but is nearing the
end of its service life. Our recent attempts to field an affordable, high-speed, long-range
amphibious vehicle capable of maneuver at sea and on land have not met the
requirement. Fielding high-speed, long-range high-capacity system of connectors,
amphibious vehicles, and boats are a critical necessity for amphibious operations.
We will continue to conduct future amphibious operations at the time and place of our
choosing. We will maneuver through the littorals to positions of advantage, employ
disaggregated, distributed and dispersed forces to secure entry points that allow us to
rapidly build our combat power ashore and allow for the quick introduction of follow-on
joint/coalition forces to maintain momentum and expand the area of operation. Mindful
of limitations on resources, we need to develop a viable combination of connectors,
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and boats, as well as the ships—to include the well
decks or davits—that project them exploring a mix of surface maneuver options that:
15
Ibid., p. 48.
16
Ibid., p. 49.
17
Ibid.
18
Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Force 21 - Forward and Ready: Now and
in the Future,” March 4, 2014.
9. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 6
- Are deployable, employable and sustainable given the power projection means
available.
- Operate with reduced signature to multiple penetration points.
- In coordination with the Navy, employ low-signature landing craft and boats with
increased range and speed, as well as the ability to penetrate an unimproved coastline.
- Provide the means to conduct surface maneuver from amphibious ships beyond 65 nm
offshore.
- Provide the capability to maneuver through the complex terrain of the littorals.
- Provide a mechanism to identify, bypass, and if required breach shore-laid obstacle
belts (explosive and non-explosive) to secure entry points.
- Provide maneuver options to extend operations within constraints of fuel resupply
resources.
- Increase ability to work with space assets and develop capabilities within the cyber
realm.19
Marine leadership has emphasized the need for high-speed connectors—surface and air vehicles
that can transport Marines, vehicles, and equipment from ships to shore—to accomplish these
goals. Instead of confronting an enemy “head on,” Marine leadership envisions using high-speed
connectors and associated vehicles such as the MPC to “side step the full force of an enemy,
instead penetrating its seam.”20
This concept of “finding” the seams is viewed as necessary to
avoid confronting a growing array of “anti-access” technologies and weapon systems available to
both hostile nations and non-state actors that could pose a significant threat to connectors
associated with Marine amphibious operations.
The Shift Toward Connectors21
The Navy and Marines continue to refine their respective thinking on the changing nature of
amphibious warfare. As the threat from long-range precision weapons continues to evolve, stand-
off distances for naval vessels participating in amphibious operations could be as much as 100
nautical miles from shore. At these distances, ship-to-shore connectors take on a much more
prominent role in amphibious operations and ACVs will no longer need to be as capable in the
water, as they are expected to traverse shorter distances to shore. With this being the case, the cost
of producing ACVs would likely be less than originally envisioned.
This increased dependence on connectors could prove problematic as current connectors—such
as the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), Landing Craft Utility 1600, and even the Joint High-
Speed Vessel (JHSV)—are mostly unprotected and would be vulnerable to enemy fire and need to
operate outside the range of an enemy’s small arms fire. Even the Navy’s future Ship-to-Shore
Connector (SSC)—the LCAC’s replacement—is not planned to have the enhanced protection
needed to operate close enough to shore to debark ACVs for a beach assault. This suggests the
protection requirements for next generation connectors could play a prominent role in the
development of future connectors.
19
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
20
Lara Seligman, “Glueck: Marines Will Penetrate Enemy’s “Seam” with Connector Strategy,” InsideDefense.com,
June 27, 2014.
21
Information in this section is taken from Daniel Wasserbly, “Bridging the Gap: USMC Outlines Future Amphibious
Assault Strategies, Equipment,” Jane’s International Defence Review, September 2014, pp. 38-39.
10. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 7
Program Information
2013 Decision to “Shelve” the MPC
As previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the
MPC program “on ice” and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years.22
At the time
of the decision, the Marines’ acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).23
While the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV,
difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to
confront Marine leadership.24
Major Change to Marine Corps Modernization Strategy25
In what was described as a “drastic shift,” the Marines decided in March 2014 to “resurrect” the
MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1.1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles. The
Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470
vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 will have a
swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore.
Plans call for ACV Increment 1.1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and
Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to
one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production. Marine budget documents do not
address ACV Increment 1.2 program timelines, thereby effectively delaying the development of a
fully amphibious assault vehicle.
Marines Release Request for Information (RFI) for ACV Increment
1.126
On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1.1. Some of the required
capabilities include:
... operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to
enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four
to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships
as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent
unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a .50 caliber remote weapon station (RWS) with
22
Lee Hudson, “Marines Put Marine Personnel Carrier on Shelf Due to Budget Constraints,” InsideDefense.com, June
14, 2013.
23
For information on the JLTV, see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert
24
Christopher J. Castelli, “General: Marine Corps Could Shelve Development of High-Speed ACV,”
InsideDefense.com, October 25, 2013 and Jason Sherman, “Marine Corps Dials back ACV, Capability, Defers High
Water Speed Plans,” InsideDefense.com, March 25, 2014.
25
Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates, Navy,
Justification Book, Volume 2, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, Budget Activity 4, March 2014, pp.
417-421, and Lee Hudson, “Marine Corps Drastically Shifts Ground Vehicle Modernization Strategy,”
InsideDefense.com, March 14, 2014.
26
Lee Hudson, “Marines Release Amphib Vehicle RFI, Seek Accelerated Schedule,” InsideDefense.com, April 25,
2014.
11. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 8
growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/.50 caliber RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS;
carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13
embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle
ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite
provided as government furnished equipment... 27
The RFI includes a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after
contract award in April 2016 at a rate of four vehicles per month.28
The Marines estimate ACV
Increment 1.1 will cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than
what the previous ACV version was expected to cost.29
Marines Release Draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV
Increment 1.130
On November 5, 2014, it was reported that the Marines released a draft RFP for ACV Increment
1.1. The Marines are looking for information from industry regarding program milestones,
delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings can be achieved. Plans are for two
companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing. Companies reportedly expected to
compete for the two contracts include BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS),
Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC).31
Additional Details on 2015 ACV 1.1 RFP32
Reports suggest the Marines plan to release its RFP for ACV 1.1 in late March 2015. Under the
provisions of this RFP, the ACV 1.1 is envisioned as an eight wheeled vehicle capable of carrying
10 Marines and a crew of three and would cost between $4 million to $7.5 million per copy—a
change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle. In terms of mobility, the
ACV 1.1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate
waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas and be able to keep up with the M-1
Abrams tank once ashore.
Proposals would be due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly plan to award two EMD
contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016. In 2018, the Marines would
then down select to one vendor in 2018 and start full production.
ACV 1.1 Fielding Plan33
The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1.1s, to be allocated as follows:
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Lee Hudson, “Next-Generation Amphibious Vehicle Estimated to Cost $5-$6M Per Copy,” InsideDefense.com, June
27, 2014.
30
Information in this section is taken from Megan Eckstein, “Marines Expect ACV RFP in Spring; Will Choose 2
Winners for Prototype Production, Testing,” Defense Daily, September 29, 2014, and Lee Hudson, “Marines Release
Next-Gen Amphibious Vehicle Draft Request for Proposal,” InsideDefense.com, November 6, 2014.
31
Megan Eckstein, “Marines Expect ACV RFP in Spring; Will Choose 2 Winners for Prototype Production, Testing,”
Defense Daily, September 29, 2014.
32
Information in this section is taken from Joe Gould, “Marine Amphibious Vehicle RFP Due in March,” Defense
News, February 16, 2015.
33
Ibid.
12. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 9
1st
Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA—67;
2nd
Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC—46;
3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan—21;
Assault Amphibian School, Camp Pendleton, CA—25;
Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty
Nine Palms, CA—25; and
Program Manager, Quantico, VA, and Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp
Pendleton, CA—20.
Marines Award ACV 1.1 Contracts34
On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop
ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE’s contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC’s for $121.5
million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both
vendors are expected to start delivering their prototypes in the fall of 2016 for testing, and the
Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018. Initial operational capability (IOC) is
expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1.1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by the summer of
2023. Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1.1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs.
It should be noted that ACV 1.1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but will rely on
ship-to-shore connectors, and ACV 1.2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability,
including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships.
BAE plans to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari). BAE’s
prototype can accommodate 13 Marines and can travel 11.5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph)
in surf and 65 mph on land. BAE’s version incorporates a V hull design intended to protect
passengers from underside blasts and has external fuel tanks for increased safety. BAE intends to
produce its porotypes at its York, PA, facility.
SAIC plans to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an
existing design called Terrex. SAIC’s version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V
hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats.
Budget Activity
FY2016 Budget Request35
The FY2015 budget request for the ACV was $219.1 million in RDT&E funding. Program
activities planned for FY2016 included ACV 1.1 activities including Milestone B decision, and
award of an EMD contract as well as continuing studies/technology development to advance
high-water speed capability.
34
Dan Parsons, “Marine Corps Awards BAE, SAIC $225 Million Amphibious Combat Vehicle Contracts,” Defense
Daily, November 25, 2015; Lee Hudson, “BAE and SAIC Both Win Contracts for USMC Next-Gen Amphib Vehicle,”
InsideDefense.com, November 24, 2015; Jen Hudson, “BAE, SAIC Named as Finalists in Marines ACV Competition,”
Defense News, November 24, 2015.
35
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense
Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2015, pp. 3-9.
13. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 10
H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
Funding36
The House authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for ACV 1.1 RDT&E funding.
S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
Funding37
The Senate authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for ACV 1.1 RDT&E funding.
H.R. 2685, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016
Funding38
The House approved $150.685 million of the FY2016 presidential budget request for ACV 1.1
RDT&E funding, cutting $68.397 million from the request. The $68.397 million cut breaks out as
follows:
$3.097 million cut for “program support excess growth”;
$4.000 million cut for “government furnished equipment (GFE) funds
carryover”; and
$61.300 million cut for “program execution.”
S. 1558, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016
Funding39
The Senate approved the FY2016 presidential budget request for ACV 1.1 RDT&E funding.
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2016
Funding40
The conference authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for ACV 1.1 RDT&E funding.
36
H.Rept. 114-102, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1735, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 5, 2015, p. 463.
37
S.Rept. 114-49, Report to Accompany S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 19,
2015, p. 405.
38
H.Rept. 114-139, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016,
June 5, 2015, pp. 227 & 235.
39
S.Rept. 114-63, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016, June
11, 2015, p. 159.
40
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, Sept 22, 2015, p
535.
14. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC
Congressional Research Service 11
Potential Issue for Congress
The Marines’ New ACV/MPC Acquisition Strategy
Given Marine leadership’s decision to alter their vehicle modernization strategy and pursue the
MPC-based ACV Increment 1.1 in lieu of the ACV-based ACV Increment 1.2, Congress might
decide to examine this issue in greater detail. Potential questions include but are not limited to the
following:
Because ACV Increment 1.1 is connector-dependent, are sufficient connectors
presently available to support amphibious assault operations in the near term?
Based on the operational concepts put forward in Expeditionary Force 21 which
are heavily dependent on having future, next-generation connectors available, are
amphibious operations involving ACV Increment 1.1 at risk until a sufficient
number of advanced connectors are procured?
Will the Navy and Marines prioritize the development of advanced connectors
and will sufficient budgetary resources be allocated to their rapid development?
Could the potential use of foreign suppliers for the ACV outright or major
components of the vehicle cause difficulties in acquisition?
Regarding the reported March 2015 RFP, the requirement to “negotiate waves up
to at least 2 feet” might appear to some to be a low requirement, given the need
to operate from ship or connector to shore from at least three nautical miles out.
Does this requirement relegate ACV 1.1 use to relatively calm seas and is this a
realistic requirement?
Reportedly, the April 2014 RFI called for and ACV 1.1 cost between $5 million
to $6 million per vehicle. The March 2015 RFP reportedly calls for a per vehicle
cost between $4 million to $7.5 million per copy. What programmatic or design
changes occurred between 2014 and 2015 to change the per vehicle cost range?
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673