The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to take over oil fields in late spring 2014.
Since then, ISIS has expanded its operations by creating a loosely integrated and thriving
black economy, consisting of approximately sixty percent of Syria's oil assets and seven
oil producing assets in Iraq. The terrorist organisation has also managed to set up an
extensive network of middlemen in neighbouring territories and countries, with the aim of
trading crude oil for cash and in kind. Upon extraction, the commodity is first lightly
refined on site and then a shadow supply-chain network takes over, to bring it to the
market.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, however. Iran also released two U.S. Navy vessels and 10 sailors on January 13, following their overnight detention after a purported mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in the Sahel region. At least three Islamist militants attacked a café and a hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, on January 15, temporarily holding about 180 hostages and killing at least 28 people. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed credit for the attack on behalf of its affiliate al Murabitoun, which reunited with AQIM in late 2015 and participated in the November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. AQIM cited Western presence in the Sahel as justification for the attack. The attack underscores a high level of coordination between AQIM and its affiliates in the Sahel and signals that further attacks on Western targets in regional capitals are likely.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Al Shabaab militants attacked a Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region, stealing equipment and claiming to have killed over 100 soldiers. Kenyan and AMISOM officials have acknowledged the deaths of soldiers, but have not given a casualty figure. This attack is the third in a series of attacks that began in June 2015 against a Burundian-run base in Lego, Bay region, and a September 2015 attack against a Ugandan-run base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
Our early December 2015 assessment of the Paris attacks by ISIS:
"The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an increasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015 ... As shown with the Paris attacks the absence of coherent and rooted answers to core security questions, such as how did they perform such a complex attack? why and how was this achieved? will they strike again? how underprepared are the security services in Europe? is this the beginning of an orchestrated campaign? etc… have been as near shocking as the events themselves."
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
This ppt tends to describe what happened in Paris, and what can be its outcomes. it further goes on to discuss a topic that people shy out while in public, though it is a heated topic with varied opinions in private- the connection of terrorism with muslim youth.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, however. Iran also released two U.S. Navy vessels and 10 sailors on January 13, following their overnight detention after a purported mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in the Sahel region. At least three Islamist militants attacked a café and a hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, on January 15, temporarily holding about 180 hostages and killing at least 28 people. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed credit for the attack on behalf of its affiliate al Murabitoun, which reunited with AQIM in late 2015 and participated in the November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. AQIM cited Western presence in the Sahel as justification for the attack. The attack underscores a high level of coordination between AQIM and its affiliates in the Sahel and signals that further attacks on Western targets in regional capitals are likely.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Al Shabaab militants attacked a Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region, stealing equipment and claiming to have killed over 100 soldiers. Kenyan and AMISOM officials have acknowledged the deaths of soldiers, but have not given a casualty figure. This attack is the third in a series of attacks that began in June 2015 against a Burundian-run base in Lego, Bay region, and a September 2015 attack against a Ugandan-run base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
Our early December 2015 assessment of the Paris attacks by ISIS:
"The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an increasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015 ... As shown with the Paris attacks the absence of coherent and rooted answers to core security questions, such as how did they perform such a complex attack? why and how was this achieved? will they strike again? how underprepared are the security services in Europe? is this the beginning of an orchestrated campaign? etc… have been as near shocking as the events themselves."
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
This ppt tends to describe what happened in Paris, and what can be its outcomes. it further goes on to discuss a topic that people shy out while in public, though it is a heated topic with varied opinions in private- the connection of terrorism with muslim youth.
Bankrolling Terrorism: The Secret Financing Power of the Al-Kuwari Clan in Al...aljazeeramasoom
The U.S. Treasury Department has released declassified information regarding individuals from Qatar associated with 'Al-Qaeda.' The Al-Kuwari clan is identified as the primary financial supporter of Al-Qaeda. Members of the Al-Kuwari family in key positions within Qatar's administration play a central role in financing and coordinating international terrorist cells, utilizing a controlled banking network and non-profit organizations.
From 2011 to 2015, Kuwaris involved in Al-Qaeda's terrorist activities were included in U.S. sanctions lists. However, this did not impact their status or advancement within Qatar's power structure, and they continued to be accepted in the international political establishment.
Ali Bin Ahmed al-Kuwari, Qatar's Minister of Finance, was previously included in the sanctions list. The U.S. Treasury Department documented his direct involvement in financing Al-Qaeda activities, directing funds to 'Al-Qaeda' in Iraq and providing substantial amounts to members of 'Al-Qaeda' in Syria, 'Ash-Shabaab' in Somalia, and 'Al-Qaeda' in the Arabian Peninsula through the charitable organization Qatar Charity.
The financing schemes, totaling tens of millions of dollars, originated from an affiliated network of Islamic banking linked to Ali Bin Ahmed al-Kuwari, including Qatar National Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank, and Qatar International Islamic Bank, with intermediation through Barwa Bank and Masraf Al-Rayan.
Qatar Charity, led by Ali Bin Ahmed al-Kuwari's brother Yousef Ahmed al-Kuwari, maintains consistent accounts with QNB. The U.S. Interagency Counterterrorism Committee and the National Counterterrorism Center categorized Qatar Charity as a 'Tier III (TSE) terrorist support organization.' The organization has been implicated in several criminal cases related to terrorist acts funded through the Islamic banking system managed by Ali Bin Ahmed al-Kuwari. These funds were used by Al-Qaeda to orchestrate attacks.
The British branch of Qatar Charity, rebranded as Nectar Trust, sponsored the Emaan Islamic Center in the UK. According to WikiLeaks data, the center's director until 2020, Ahmed Alravi, was associated with supporting uprisings inspired by Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Palestine. The Qatar Centre for Voluntary Activity (QCVA), overseen by Abd al-Latif bin Abdullah al-Kuwari, participated in fundraising initiatives for radicals.
Abd al-Latif al-Kuwari, sanctioned by the U.S. and the UN in 2015, facilitated the travel of Al-Qaeda leaders to Qatar in the 2000s. He was involved in overseeing fundraising campaigns for Al-Qaeda in Syria and later worked in the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning in Qatar.
Collaborating with him was Salim Hasan Khalifa Rashid Al-Kuwari, identified by the U.S. Treasury Department for providing financial and logistical support to Al-Qaeda in Iran. He facilitated the travel of extremist recruits and held a position in the Ministry of Interior in Qatar's 'civil defense' sector, even after the scandal
The U.S. Treasury Department has declassified lists of Qataris associated wit...aldiamiakhmed
Nectar Trust, associated with the Al-Kuwari family, has been identified as a primary sponsor of Al-Qaeda. Qatar Charity, closely linked to Al-Qaeda, received recognition as a 'Tier III (TSE) terrorist support organization' from the U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and the National Counterterrorism Center. Supported by the Qatari government and key figures like Yousef Ahmed Al-Kuwari and Ali bin Ahmed Al Kuwari, Qatar Charity stands accused of funding terrorism through various channels, including the QNB banking network.
Dark Alliances: Al-Kuwari Family's Shadowy Support for Al-Qaeda Revealed at Nectar Trust
Qatar Charity collaborates with banks such as Masraf Al Rayan QSPC and Qatar Islamic Bank, with QNB serving as the primary financial conduit. Operating globally, the organization is involved in money laundering, channeling funds to support terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra. Noteworthy is Qatar Charity's connection with the United Kingdom through its subsidiary, Qatar Charity UK, which rebranded as Nectar Trust following the high-profile attacks in 2017, possibly to avoid suspicion.
Despite the name change, Nectar Trust (formerly Qatar Charity UK) continues its involvement in commercial activities, knowingly committing transgressions in foreign territories. The organization benefits from certain advantages and protection, impeding affected parties from bringing lawsuits against foreign governments accused of financing terrorist groups. Yousef Ahmed Al-Kuwari, the head of Qatar Charity, strategically removed his official presence from Nectar Trust while retaining his leading managerial role, allowing the funding of terrorist organizations to persist discreetly in the United Kingdom.
Similar to ISIS EXPORT GATEWAY TO GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKETS (20)
The lack of visibility given to the counterparties by Gunvor is posing a major
obstacle for an investor à la ADNOC to determine the group value.
● Gunvor USA has closed $1.45B “uncommitted” credit: an uncommitted facility
loan that once signed, does not oblige the lenders to provide the funds to the
borrower… previously it signed a near $1B in off-balance sheet financing facility.
● *****Muriel Anouk Scwab, CFO is on “sabbatical leave”.
● Gunvor Group poses substantial risks to the Swiss banking and financing sector:
By the derivatives even if Gunvor survives, the debt to equity is now 11X.
● It is a less than $1B balance-sheet carrying billions of MTM derivatives contracts
84% of its cash is generated by a debt-inflow.
This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 116-260).
AOT’s complaint plausibly alleges that ADM violated the CEA by engaging in a scheme to
manipulate the Chicago Benchmark Price. ADM has not demonstrated otherwise, and its motion to
dismiss should be denied in its entirety.
In three trading days BROYLES lost $3.6M. His losses accelerated the following week. On January 9 lost $2.2M and twice as much as on January 8. As his losses mounted, Smith tried to reach BROYLES on the morning of January 10. However BROYLES did not arrived until the afternoon and his portfolio lost more than $5.2 Million that day.
CEMP USD Trade Flow Fund SP Tradeflow capital management pte risk report (2)GE 94
Tradeflow capital management pte risk report (1)
USD Trade Flow Fund SP Cayman Islands, Grand Cayman in the worst case is an outright fraud and in your very best case leverage is 75:3
Trade finance funds loaded up commodity sector transactional financing in the...GE 94
Trade finance funds loaded up commodity-sector transactional financing in the recent years have stopped redemptions to the investors
The damages have already been done. Some funds will cease unless they succeed to mash-out the losses into new funds.
The reality contrasts very much with the portrait brushed by INOKS and Scipion in trade finance.
Hin leong trading financial statements (unaudited) (1)GE 94
According to the Chinese Dao "reality is built from the beating of opposites". We can't fully comprehend the ocean of mysteries in the Hin Leong affair unless we understand "who hold the bag": the bigger risk, in all this is the banks.
Covered interest parity a law of nature in currency marketsGE 94
CIP is a cornerstone principle in international finance. First described by John Maynard Keynes in 1923, the idea that FX forward rates must reflect interest rate differentials between currencies has long been considered one of the best tested theories in financial economics. If a market participant is willing to swap a higher yielding currency for a lower yielding currency over some time horizon, he must be compensated for the difference in yield via an adjusted forward price. Otherwise an arbitrage opportunity arises until prices and interest rates align again.
The financial crisis and direct aftermath revealed cracks in the armour of CIP. In a market environment with scarce liquidity and high credit risks in forward markets, dealers were constrained in their ability to profit from what was previously regarded as an almost risk-free arbi¬trage trade. But as conditions in financial markets slowly normalised after the crisis, CIP deviations remained and cross-currency basis never returned to its pre-crisis levels. After narrowing for some time, it started to widen again across most G10 pairs since approximately 2015. Increasingly, FX forward markets seemingly do not reflect what would be expected given the observed interest rate differentials. Figure 1 illustrates these dynamics by depicting the magnitude of G10 cross-currency basis over time for an exemplary three-month tenor.
La région lémanique est l’un des sites les plus importants au monde pour le commerce des matières premières.
L’importance économique du secteur des matières premières
sur les rives du Léman est considérable. Sept des dix premières
entreprises suisses en termes de chiffre d’affaires sont issues de
ce secteur ou y sont fortement liées. Cinq d’entre elles (dont
Vitol, Trafigura et Cargill) sont basées à Genève, et une (Nestlé)
à Vevey. Près de deux tiers de toutes les entreprises de matières
premières en Suisse se trouvent dans les cantons de Genève et de
Vaud. L’industrie des matières premières ne comprend pas seulement des sociétés de négoce, mais intègre également des entreprises de secteurs qui y sont fonctionnellement liées comme
les banques, les compagnies d’assurance, les compagnies de
navigation et les groupes d’inspection de marchandises. Selon
les estimations| 1, ce cluster génère plusieurs milliers d’emplois
à Genève – dont un grand nombre de salariés hautement qualifiés – et 20% des recettes fiscales des personnes morales selon
l’administration cantonale. La région lémanique est le leader
mondial du négoce physique de matières premières (voir figure),
du financement du commerce et de l’inspection des marchandises. 22% des transports globaux de matières premières sont
organisés depuis la région.
2. Elemental Economics - Mineral demand.pdfNeal Brewster
After this second you should be able to: Explain the main determinants of demand for any mineral product, and their relative importance; recognise and explain how demand for any product is likely to change with economic activity; recognise and explain the roles of technology and relative prices in influencing demand; be able to explain the differences between the rates of growth of demand for different products.
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the what'sapp contact of my personal pi vendor
+12349014282
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just what'sapp this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
+12349014282
STREETONOMICS: Exploring the Uncharted Territories of Informal Markets throug...sameer shah
Delve into the world of STREETONOMICS, where a team of 7 enthusiasts embarks on a journey to understand unorganized markets. By engaging with a coffee street vendor and crafting questionnaires, this project uncovers valuable insights into consumer behavior and market dynamics in informal settings."
5 Tips for Creating Standard Financial ReportsEasyReports
Well-crafted financial reports serve as vital tools for decision-making and transparency within an organization. By following the undermentioned tips, you can create standardized financial reports that effectively communicate your company's financial health and performance to stakeholders.
What website can I sell pi coins securely.DOT TECH
Currently there are no website or exchange that allow buying or selling of pi coins..
But you can still easily sell pi coins, by reselling it to exchanges/crypto whales interested in holding thousands of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell to these crypto whales and holders of pi..
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners and pi merchants stands in between the miners and the exchanges.
How can I sell my pi coins?
Selling pi coins is really easy, but first you need to migrate to mainnet wallet before you can do that. I will leave the what'sapp contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
+12349014282
Eco-Innovations and Firm Heterogeneity.Evidence from Italian Family and Nonf...
ISIS EXPORT GATEWAY TO GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKETS
1. 1
ISIS EXPORT GATEWAY TO GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKETS
George KIOURKTSOGLOU*
Visiting Lecturer, University of Greenwich, London
Dr Alec D COUTROUBIS
Principal Lecturer, University of Greenwich, London
Abstract
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to take over oil fields in late spring 2014.
Since then, ISIS has expanded its operations by creating a loosely integrated and thriving
black economy, consisting of approximately sixty percent of Syria's oil assets and seven
oil producing assets in Iraq. The terrorist organisation has also managed to set up an
extensive network of middlemen in neighbouring territories and countries, with the aim of
trading crude oil for cash and in kind. Upon extraction, the commodity is first lightly
refined on site and then a shadow supply-chain network takes over, to bring it to the
market.
Are there any oil terminals in the South-East Mediterranean Sea used by ISIS and its
shadow network as export gateways for smuggled crude? We answer this question by
tapping into the proxy indicator of tanker charter rates. First, we look at the map for crude
oil loading terminals that geographically fall within, or border the sphere of ISIS control.
Second, for the ‘suspect’ terminals we take a closer look at the charter rates of tankers
over a period of years, seeking to establish patterns. Third, looking for ‘suspect’ pattern-
breaking charter rates, we narrow the time-frame down to the period from July 2014,
when ISIS started off its smuggling operations, until mid-February 2015.
We conclude by offering remarks on the illicit trade, while providing insights into the
criminal practices of ISIS.
Keywords: ISIS, crude oil port-terminals, smuggling, charter rates.
* Author for correspondence at george_kiourktsoglou@yahoo.com
2. 2
1. Introduction: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
ISIS is a terrorist organisation. It is based in the Middle East and its stated goal is to
create a caliphate that will merge parts of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon into one Islamic state-
entity. At its inception, ISIS was a motley crew of Sunni fighters, most of them coming
from Iraq’s local Al-Qaeda franchise and Saddam Hussein’s die-hard republican army.
Head of the organisation is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a well-known to the West terrorist
with a background in Iraq’s insurgency against the U.S. led coalition forces (New York
Times 2014 I).
ISIS began to morph into a proto-state by taking advantage of Syria’s civil war. Its capital
is Raqqa, located on the north bank of the Euphrates River about 160 kilometres east of
Aleppo. It is infamous for its brutality, which manifests itself, not least, through
beheadings, rape, throwing of homosexuals off the roofs of tall buildings, enslavement of
women and trafficking of children as sex-workers. Muslims are not exempt from
brutalities, a fact that in February 2014 led Al Qaeda to distance itself from its new blood-
brethren. Its practices of proselytization include the deft use of social media like
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. In this way, the terrorist organisation has spread its
tentacles all over the globe, acting like a magnet for young aspiring jihadists. At the time
of writing of this paper, ISIS boasts 3,000 foreign fighters from all over the world (New
York Times 2014 II).
In the summer 2014, the international community started to react more forcefully against
ISIS. On the social media front, propaganda videos were taken down and as a step further
in the same direction, monitoring of material posted for reasons of proselytization became
an entrenched standard practice (The Heritage Foundation 2015). In the physical world, a
campaign of air bombardments, with the U.S. taking the lead, managed to slow down the
precipitous development of ISIS ground troops. However, the single most important event
that played the major role in the effort to mount effective resistance against the sweeping
scourge was the awakening of Iraqi tribes that took the initiative and came together to
fight the Islamic State.
The caliphate financially supports itself through extortion, crime syndication, hostage
taking, trade of Syrian and Iraqi antiquities and donations. Additionally, it’s taking
advantage of hefty cashflows generated through smuggling of crude oil (CNN 2015 a).
The present study represents the effort of the authors to delve into the potential
integration of ISIS smuggled crude within the global oil markets.
2. The Upstream Oil Business of ISIS
Contrary to the worldwide public belief that ISIS is just another group of bloodthirsty
militants, the terrorist organisation represents the next evolutionary step of Islamic
militant fundamentalism. Whereas Osama bin Laden’s brainchild, Al-Qaeda, still depends
on international donors, ISIS managed to reactivate a long sleeping black market
economy, mainly but not exclusively, over the territories it controls. At the very epicentre
of this initiative lies the shadow network of crude oil smugglers that was initially set up
three decades ago by Saddam Hussein, with the aim of working around the U.S. economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq (Interview with Correspondent Y 2014 a). The outcome has
been astonishing, given that the Caliphate’s portfolio of assets now includes sixty percent
of Syria's oil assets and seven oil producing assets in Iraq (Brookings 2014). At some
3. 3
point, immediately after the launch of its crude oil venture in summer 2014, ISIS
achieved production of roughly 30,000 barrels of oil per day (CNN 2015 b). This rate has
gone up, and in February 2015 reached the mark 45,000 b/d. This is a stonking statistic
and it becomes almost baffling if one considers the fact that the commodity is being
smuggled within a war zone. Although the price of crude nosedived in the last two
quarters of 2014 (see Graph I), it is estimated that the caliphate’s cash inflows reached
levels between one and three million dollars per day (Vocativ 2014). Its key to success
was the sale of crude oil at rock-bottom prices between $60 and $25, when the price of
the commodity was correspondingly hovering around $100 and $80 per barrel. However,
it has to be mentioned that since then, the series of air raids that have been launched by
the U.S., with the support of a handful of other NATO and Gulf nations, effectively
curtailed the ISIS oil cashflows, chiefly through the destruction of oil manufacturing
facilities. An interesting point to be made is that extraction wells in the area of
bombardments have yet to be targeted by the U.S. or the air-assets of its allies, a fact that
can be readily attributed to the at times ‘toxic’ politics in the Middle East (New York
Times 2014).
Graph I: Crude Oil Prices, (Wall Street Journal 2015)
2.1 The Geography of ISIS oil portfolio and means of oil transportation
Map I depicts the area under ISIS control (New York Times 2015). Within this vast
territory, there are a number of oil fields whose control was lost by the Syrian central
government soon after the break-out of the civil war. Most of these oil fields were assets
in the portfolio of the Al-Furat Petrolum Company, a Royal Dutch Shell affiliate. The
crude oil still produced in these oil fields is of fairly good quality, because it has low
concentration in sulphur and as such, it can be easily processed. Once pumped to the
surface, it is lightly refined either onsite in unelaborate facilities, or transported
straightaway to Turkey on truck-lorries (World Policy Blog 2014).
The tradesmen/smugglers responsible for the transportation and sale of the black gold
send convoys of up to thirty trucks to the extraction sites of the commodity. They settle
their trades with ISIS on site, encouraged by customer friendly discounts and deferred
payment schemes. In this way, crude leaves Islamic State-run wells promptly and travels
4. 4
through insurgent-held parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey, while at the same time, the
tradeflows cover local demand. ISIS also uses its oil wealth to shore up its local tribal
support-base by strengthening commercial ties with tribes in the areas under its control. It
actively urges its network to build stockpiles and allows Bedouins in the Deir al-Zor
province to tap wells, such as the Bar al Milh, al Kharata, Amra, Okash, Wadi Jureib,
Safeeh, Fahda and other extraction assets near Jebel Bushra. At least nine major tribes
have benefited out of similar regional-friendly schemes, including Iraqi ones such as the
influential Jabour tribe. As a rule of thumb, a large trailer carrying 30,000 litres of crude
can make $4,000 profit in just one journey lasting a few days (Business Insider 2014).
The result of this policy is soaring support for the caliphate.
Map I: ISIS controlled areas, (New York Times 2015)
As an extra measure of logistical support, the militant group allows convoys to pass more
quickly through its checkpoints. Moreover, since allied U.S. air-raids do not target the
truck lorries out of fear of provoking a backlash from locals, the transport operations are
being run efficiently, taking place most of times in broad daylight. Traders lured by high
profits are active in Syria (even in government-held territories), Iraq and south-east
Turkey. According to Correspondent X (1st
and 2nd
Interview 2014), in Turkey and along
the international route E90, ISIS managed to set up a string of trading hubs as depicted on
Map II. European route E 90 is an A-Class West-East route, extending from Lisbon in
Portugal in the west, to the Turkish-Iraqi border in the east. The supply chain comprises
the following localities: Sanliura, Urfa, Hakkari, Siirt, Batman, Osmaniya, Gaziantep,
Sirnak, Adana, Kahramarmaras, Adiyaman and Mardin.
The string of trading hubs ends up in Adana, home to the major tanker shipping port of
Ceyhan. In the next section 3 of the present study, the authors will try to answer the
question whether a part of ISIS smuggled crude oil is being fed into the global oil markets,
transported in tankers leaving the port of Ceyhan.
5. 5
Map II: String of Smuggled Crude Trading Hubs in S.E. Turkey, (1st and 2nd
Interview with Correspondent X 2014)
3. The Port of Ceyhan (see Map III)
Ceyhan is a city in south-eastern Turkey, with a population of 110,000 inhabitants, of
whom 105,000 live in the major metropolitan area. It is the second most developed and
most populous city of Adana Province, after the capital Adana with a population of
1,700,000. It is situated on the Ceyhan River which runs through the city and it is located
43 km east of Adana. Ceyhan is the transportation hub for Middle Eastern, Central Asian
and Russian oil and natural gas (Municipality of Ceyhan 2015). Like everywhere else on
the Turkish south-eastern Mediterranean coast, the climate is baking hot in the summer
and fairly mild in the winter.
Map III: Ceyhan via Google Maps
6. 6
3.1 The Port Facilities (see Map IV)
The port of Ceyhan plays host to a marine oil terminal that is situated in the Turkish
Mediterranean and has been operating since 2006. It receives hydrocarbons for further
loading in tankers, which carry the commodity to world markets. The terminal is the
export gateway for crude from offshore assets in the Caspian Sea transported via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the new pipeline - commissioned in 2013 - coming
from the Kurdish oil fields in Iraq. At times the terminal may also receive Iraqi crude via
the Kirkuk – Ceyhan pipeline (SOMO Iraqi Oil Marketing Company 2015). The terminal
covers an area of 144 hectares (1.44 sq. km) and houses a number of facilities (British
Petroleum 2015). The latter include seven crude oil storage tanks - one million barrels
each - with floating roofs, a crude export jetty - 2.6km in length - with two berths for
simultaneous loading of two tankers of up to 300,000 deadweight tonnes each, a back-up
system for monitoring and control of loading operations, six km of lines from oil storage
tanks to tanker loading area, a Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) incineration plant, an
onsite waste water treatment plant, and accommodation facilities for management,
administration and staff. Additionally, the port features a cargo pier and an oil-terminal,
both of 23.2m depth that can load tankers of more than 500 feet in length (Ports.com
2015). The annual export capacity of the terminal runs as high as 50 million tonnes of oil.
The terminal is operated by Botas International Limited (BIL), a Turkish state company
that also operates the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on the territory of Turkey.
Map IV: The Port Facilities (Ports.com 2015)
7. 7
3.2 Supply Statistics (volumes of crude exported via Ceyhan)
Based on the analysis in the previous paragraph 3.1, the supply of crude to the terminal in
Ceyhan originates from three different sources (see Map V and Table I):
1. Offshore assets in the Caspian Sea, with crude exported via the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline. In the third quarter 2014, these exports averaged 680,000 b/d
(International Energy Association 2014 a);
2. Onshore assets in northern Iraq, controlled by the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), with crude exported independently of the federal Iraqi
government via the KRG own regional pipeline, which was recently re-purposed to
handle up to 550,000 b/d. In the third quarter 2014, these exports averaged
approximately 200,000 b/d, with a very strong upward trend that ended up in
December 2014 with quantities of more than 350,000 b/d. To the latter, one must
add the quantities of crude exported by the federal Iraqi government via the same
KRG pipeline. These quantities could average in the near future roughly 150,000
b/d, following the deal that was struck between the KRG and the federal
government on the 2nd
of December 2014 (International Energy Association 2014
b);
3. Onshore assets in northern Iraq, controlled by the federal Iraqi government,
with crude exported via the federally-controlled pipeline to Ceyhan. In the past,
Baghdad managed to ship up to 300,000 b/d from its northern fields, until its
pipeline to Turkey was shut in early March 2014 due to repeated attacks by ISIS
combatants. Since then, exports via this route have been intermittent (International
Energy Association 2014 b).
Map V: Pipelines to Ceyhan via Google Maps
Table I: Pipelines to Ceyhan (International Energy Association 2014 a, b)
Source of Crude Exports to Ceyhan via Pipeline Quantity (000 b/d)
1 Offshore assets in the Caspian Sea TBC 680
2 Onshore assets in northern Iraq, controlled by the KRG new, KRG controlled btw. 350 and 500
3 Onshore assets in northern Iraq, controlled by the FG FG controlled intermittent
8. 8
Based on Table I, it becomes obvious that the quantities of crude oil that are being
exported to the terminal in Ceyhan, exceed the mark of one million barrels per day.
Putting this number into context and given that ISIS has never been able to trade daily
more than 45,000 barrels of oil (see Section 2, ‘The Upstream Oil Business of ISIS’, page
2), it becomes evident that the detection of similar quantities of smuggled crude cannot
take place through stock-accounting methods. However, the authors of the present paper
believe that there is another proxy-indicator, far more sensitive to quantities of ultra-
cheap smuggled crude. This is the charter rates for tankers loading at Ceyhan. In the next
sub-section 3.3, the focus shifts from the supply- to the demand-side, and more
specifically to potentially sudden spikes of charter rates from Ceyhan that cannot be
explained via prevalent trends across the global crude oil market.
3.3 Tanker Charter Rates and Regression Analysis
The Baltic Exchange (2015 a) tracks the charter rates on major seaborne trading routes of
crude oil. To render its service more efficient and easily understood, it uses the system of
Baltic Dirty Tanker Indices (Baltic Exchange 2015 b). One of these indices used to be the
BDTI TD 11, 80,000 Cross Mediterranean from Baniyas, Syria to Laveras, France (see
Map VI). Route 11 was discontinued in September 2011, due to Syria’s civil war and
soon thereafter, it was replaced by BDTI TD 19 (TD19-TCE_Calculation 2015), of
exactly the same technical specifications as BDTI TD 11, with the exception of the
loading port of Ceyhan instead of Baniyas.
Map VI: Baniyas (Syria), Ceyhan (Turkey), Laveras (France) via Google Maps
For the Middle East, the BDTI system of Baltic Exchange also includes the following
four major trading routes:
1. BDTI TD1: 280,000mt, Middle East Gulf to US Gulf (TD1-TCE_Calculation
2015);
9. 9
2. BDTI TD2: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Singapore;
3. BDTI TD3: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Japan (TD3-TCE_Calculation
2015);
4. BDTI TD8: 80,000mt, Crude and/or DPP Heat 135F, Kuwait to Singapore
(TD8-TCE_Calculation 2015);
Since late 2002 and early 2003, when data on TD 11 became available, the Route has
featured a strong correlation of 58% with the previous four major trading routes from the
Middle East. (see Table II and Graph II).
Table II: Regression Statistics on TD 11, (Authors’ Calculations)
Graph II: TDI 1-2-3-8-11, (Source: Clarksons Research Services Limited)
Multiple R 76%
R Square 58%
Adjusted R Square 58%
Standard Error 47.2
Observations 2,125
Coefficients
Intercept 36.0
BDTI TD3: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Japan (WS) 2.0
BDTI TD2: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Singapore (WS) -2.3
BDTI TD8: 80,000mt, Crude and/or DPP Heat 135F, Kuwait to Singapore (WS) 0.4
BDTI TD1: 280,000mt, Middle East Gulf to US Gulf (WS) 1.3
10. 10
After September 2011, when TD 19 (from Ceyhan/Turkey to Laveras) replaced TD 11
(from Baniyas/Syria to Laveras), the former ‘decoupled’ from the four major Middle East
trading routes and its correlation with the latter fell to a meagre 22% (see Table III and
Graph III).
Table III: Regression Statistics on TD 19, (Authors’ Calculations)
Graph III: TDI 1-2-3-8-19, (Source: Clarksons Research Services Limited)
Multiple R 47%
R Square 22%
Adjusted R Square 21%
Standard Error 22.9
Observations 703
Coefficients
Intercept 2.3
BDTI TD3: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Japan (WS) 13.6
BDTI TD2: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Singapore (WS) 13.1-
BDTI TD8: 80,000mt, Crude and/or DPP Heat 135F, Kuwait to Singapore (WS) 0.8
BDTI TD1: 280,000mt, Middle East Gulf to US Gulf (WS) 0.4-
11. 11
However, from July 2014 when ISIS launched its crude oil venture, until February 2015,
TD 19 ‘re-coupled’, up to a certain degree, with the four major Middle East trading routes,
featuring this time a correlation of 34% (see Table IV and Graph IV).
Table IV: Regression Statistics on TD 19 (after July 2014), (Authors’ Calculations)
Graph IV: TDI 1-2-3-8-19 (after July 2014), (Source: Clarksons Research Services
Limited)
Multiple R 58%
R Square 34%
Adjusted R Square 32%
Standard Error 29.1
Observations 161
Coefficients
Intercept 49.0-
BDTI TD3: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Japan (WS) 15.9
BDTI TD2: 260,000mt, Middle East Gulf to Singapore (WS) 17.7-
BDTI TD8: 80,000mt, Crude and/or DPP Heat 135F, Kuwait to Singapore (WS) 1.2
BDTI TD1: 280,000mt, Middle East Gulf to US Gulf (WS) 4.6
12. 12
3.4 Spikes of Charter Rates from Ceyhan and Timeline of ISIS Activities
From July 2014 until February 2015, the curve of TD 19 features three unusual spikes
that do not match the trends featured by the rest of the Middle East trade-routes (see
Graph IV):
i. The first spike develops from the 10th
of July 2014 until the 21st
, lasting
approximately ten days. It coincides with the fall of Syria’s largest oil field, the Al-
Omar, in the hands of ISIS (Reuters 2014);
ii. The second spike takes place from the end of October until the end of
November 2014, lasting one month. It happens at the same time with fierce fighting
between fundamentalists and the Syrian army over the control of the Jhar and Mahr
gas fields, as well as the Hayyan gas company in the east of Homs province
(International Business Times 2014; Albawada News 214);
iii. The third spike lasts from the end of January 2015 until the 10th
of February,
stretching roughly ten days. It happens simultaneously with a sustained US-led
campaign of airstrikes pounding ISIS strongholds in and around the town of Hawija
east of the oil-rich Kirkuk (Rudaw 2015);
4. Conclusions
The authors of this paper would like to make it clear from the very beginning that this has
not been the case of a ‘smoking gun’. The evidence has been inconclusive. But even if
volumes of ISIS crude found their way, beyond any reasonable doubt, to the international
crude oil markets via the Ceyhan terminal, this fact would not conclusively point to
collusion between the Turkish authorities and the shadow network of smugglers, let alone
ISIS operatives.
However, having clarified such a politically sensitive issue, the authors believe that there
are strong hints to an illicit supply chain that ships ISIS crude from Ceyhan. Primary
research points to a considerably active shadow network of crude oil smugglers and
traders (see section 2.1, page 3), who channel ISIS crude to southeast Turkey from
northeast Syria and northwest Iraq. Given the existence of Route E 90, the corresponding
transportation of oil poses no unsurmountable geographic and topological challenges.
Moreover, since the launch of the ISIS oil venture in summer 2014, tanker charter rates
from Ceyhan re-coupled up to a degree with the ones from the rest of the Middle East (see
section 3.3, page 11). This partial realignment may be attributed to additional Kurdish
crude, whose export via Ceyhan coincided with the rise of ISIS and its oil business.
Alternatively, it may be the result of boosted demand for ultra-cheap smuggled crude,
available for loading from the same port. At this point the authors cannot be categorical.
Nevertheless, primary research (Interview with Correspondent Y 2014 b) points to the
latter scenario, while making clear that the same oil traders/shippers who used to ship oil
from Baniyas, moved to Ceyhan, once Syria’s civil war brought all its seaborne trading
activities to a grinding halt.
An additional manifestation of the invisible nexus between Ceyhan and ISIS became
evident through the concurrent study of the tanker charter rates from the port and the
timeline of the terrorists’ military engagements (see section 3.4 on this page). It seems
that whenever the Islamic State is fighting in the vicinity of an area hosting oil assets, the
13. 13
exports from Ceyhan promptly spike. This may be attributed to an extra boost given to
crude oil smuggling with the aim of immediately generating additional funds, badly
needed for the supply of ammunition and military equipment. Unfortunately, in this case
too, the authors cannot be categorical.
If there is a certainty within the context of this paper and given the clear and present
danger of terrorism, it is the urgent need for further research. The focus should be on the
criminal ventures of ISIS and particularly on those that can potentially integrate it within
the global economy. As implausible as it may sound, it invokes the known adage that
‘where imagination stops, reality begins’.
Acknowledgments
Research featured in this paper would be impossible to take place without the first-hand
intelligence and crucial insights promptly provided by:
Correspondent X
Correspondent Y
Clarksons Plc
The Authors of the paper express their gratitude to all the above.
14. 14
Key Participant Interviews and References
Key Participant Interviews
1. Correspondent X, 1st
Interview, online via Skype, location unknown, Date: 14
November 2014, speaking on condition of anonymity.
2. Correspondent X, 2nd
Interview, online via Cisco WebEx, location unknown,
Date: 04 January 2015, speaking on condition of anonymity.
3. Correspondent Y a and b, Interview, via email, location unknown, Date: 10
December 2014, speaking on condition of anonymity
References
Analysis
1. Web Document, Analysis: Authors (2015), ‘Authors’ Calculations’, 25 February,
http://goo.gl/rbDmAf
2. Web Document, Analysis: Brookings (2014), ‘The UN Strikes Back at ISIL's
Black Economy’, 23 August, viewed 04 February 2015, http://goo.gl/J1GZ0m
3. Web Document, Analysis: International Energy Association (2015) a, ‘Oil Market
Report’, page 25, 16 January, viewed 20 February 2015, http://goo.gl/CDmRJ3
4. Web Document, Analysis: International Energy Association (2015) b, ‘Oil Market
Report’, pages 18-19, 16 January, viewed 20 February 2015, http://goo.gl/CDmRJ3
5. Web Document, Analysis: TD1-TCE_Calculation (2015), viewed 27 February
2015, http://goo.gl/v29wXm
6. Web Document, Analysis: TD3-TCE_Calculation (2015), viewed 27 February
2015, http://goo.gl/gEfj0a
7. Web Document, Analysis: TD8-TCE_Calculation (2015), viewed 27 February
2015, http://goo.gl/4mf7sg
8. Web Document, Analysis: TD19-TCE_Calculation (2015), viewed 27 February
2015, http://goo.gl/dEu9ff
Articles
1. Web Document, Article: Albawada News (2014), ‘Syrian army retakes gas fields
from ISIL’, 06 November, viewed 28 February 2015, http://goo.gl/Efa07d
2. Web Document, Article: Business Insider (2014), ‘Here's How ISIS Keeps Selling
So Much Oil Even While Being Bombed And Banned By The West’, 25 October, viewed
10 February 2015, http://goo.gl/8JWCL6
15. 15
3. Web Document, Article: CNN (2015) a and b, ‘How ISIS makes (and takes)
money’, 20 February, viewed 21 February 2015, http://goo.gl/Hax4Qd
4. Web Document, Article: International Business Times (2014), ‘Isis Seizes Second
Syrian Gas Field’, 03 November, viewed 28 February 2015, http://goo.gl/W0AYnV
5. Web Document, Article: New York Times (2014), ‘In Airstrikes, U.S. Targets
Militant Cell Said to Plot an Attack Against the West’, 23 September, viewed 12
February 2015, http://goo.gl/ZyJ2RH
6. Web Document, Article: New York Times (2015), ‘Areas Under ISIS Control’, 02
January, viewed 12 February 2015, http://goo.gl/4ww5pb
7. Web Document, Article: Reuters (2014), ‘Islamic State seizes oil field and towns
in Syria's east’, 03 July, viewed 21 February 2015, http://goo.gl/XMxXAt
8. Web Document, Article: Rudaw (2015), ‘US-led airstrikes target ISIS positions
east of Kirkuk’, 09 February, viewed 28 February 2015, http://goo.gl/hX8T6W
9. Web Document, Article: Vocativ (2014), ‘ISIS’ Black Market Oil Business Could
Net up to $100 Million a Day’, 09 May, viewed 12 February 2015, http://goo.gl/XwZUzs
10. Web Document, Article: World Policy Blog (2014), ‘Understanding the Oil
Money Fueling ISIS’, 13 November, viewed 12 February 2015, http://goo.gl/XC9lH2
Portals
1. Web Portal: Baltic Exchange (2015) a, viewed 20 February 2015,
http://goo.gl/0FXYKR
2. Web Portal: Baltic Exchange (2015) b, ‘Dirty tanker Index’, viewed 20 February
2015, http://goo.gl/GVvnlA
3. Web Portal: British Petroleum (2015), ‘Ceyhan terminal’, viewed 14 February
2015, http://goo.gl/9wi6GY
4. Web Portal: Clarksons Research Service Limited (2015), viewed 25 February
2015, http://goo.gl/X6Kyg
5. Web Portal: Municipality of Ceyhan (2015), viewed 14 January 2015,
http://goo.gl/crzYWH
6. Web Portal: Ports.com (2015), ‘Botas Ceyhan Oil Terminal, Turkey’, viewed 14
February 2015, http://goo.gl/Ki7j0g
7. Web Portal: SOMO Iraqi Oil Marketing Company (2015), ‘Crude Oil Exports’,
viewed 14 February 2015, http://goo.gl/65LbZk
8. Web Portal: Wall Street Journal (2015), ‘Market Data Center’, viewed 10
February 2015, http://goo.gl/RO6cU5
16. 16
Video Clips
1. Web Document, Video Clip: New York Times (2014) I, ‘The Evolution of ISIS’,
13 December, viewed 03 February 2015, http://goo.gl/9YbgCb
2. Web Document, Video Clip: New York Times (2014) II, ‘ISIS: Behind the Group
Overrunning Iraq’, 10 June, viewed 03 February 2015, http://goo.gl/5kkbsQ
3. Web Document, Video Clip: The Heritage Foundation (2015), ‘ISIS’ Influence in
Social Media’, 04 February, viewed 23 February 2015, http://goo.gl/u2i5bD