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Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
The document discusses the challenges of providing secure networking in public and private cloud environments. It notes that security is difficult because connectivity needs to be provided by default while preventing unwanted connections, and that security policies are harder to apply than just enabling connectivity. The document also examines issues like tenant isolation, application isolation, multitenant challenges, identity and location-based security approaches, and how to better integrate security capabilities into cloud platforms like OpenStack. It argues that security must be designed into networks from the beginning as an integrated system rather than added as an afterthought.
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Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
- 1. The Role ofNetworking in building Secure Public/Private Clouds Pere Monclus Oct 18th, 2012 pmonclus@plumgrid.com
- 2. Networking Dilemma Prevent Unwanted Provide Connectivity Connectivity (default closed) (default open) A matter of Policy QoS ∞ QoS QoS 2
- 3. Why so hard?(part 1) Midsize Enterprise Network diagram (Cisco Safe guides) WHERE to apply Security Policies is harder than Connectivity 3
- 4. The approach toSecurity Designing Network Security • Adding Security as a self contained element Designing Secure Networks • Incorporate Security from the beginning Network Security is a System !! 4
- 5. Why so hard?(part 2) The problem doesn’t start at Network Security … Business Needs Risk Analysis Security Policies Security System … often is expected to be solved by a Network Service 5
- 6. And… what aboutCloud? Tenant 1 Tenant 2 Tenant 3 Business Needs Business Needs Business Needs Risk Analysis Risk Analysis Risk Analysis Security Policies Security Policies Security Policies Security System Security System Security System Users / Tenants Infrastructure Guarantees Public / Private Cloud provider Superset of Business Needs requirements Risk Analysis Security Policies Security System 6
- 7. Cloud Provider: TenantIsolation Provider Tenant Tenant Tenant Internet Control 1 2 3 Infrastructure Cloud Provider Multitenancy Isolation Self Provisioning Cloud Services 7
- 8. Tenant: Networking ApplicationIsolation Inbound/Outbound policies 10.0.1.0/24 10.0.2.0/24 VM VM VM VM Interface attached network security policies Services: FW, VPN, IPS, UTM, … (pics!) Is this the right model in a virtual world? 8
- 9. What is Isolation?What SLA are we willing to sign up to? • Subnet separation? • Security rules? • Security services (FW/IPS/UTM/…) Tenant • • Enforcement points? Tenant Inbound/Outbound enforcement? owns? • Common/Separate? • … • New types • How to merge policies? • Network separation? Physical? Virtual? Provider • owns? Transit Policies? • Policy definition vs. Policy Rendering? • Data Leakage? • Proper workflows • Physical Placement? • Traffic confidentiality? • ... 9
- 10. Security Life Cycle What about? • System Monitoring and Maintenance • Compliance Checks • Incident Response • Forensics / Visibility / Analysis tools Who owns that? How do we cross from Provider to Tenant and we still provide simple operational models? 10
- 11. Network security andOpenStack 11
- 12. OpenStack Quantum Model Network Controller Management Network Compute Network Node(s) Quantum server quantum-*-plugin-agent Compute Node(s) Cloud Controller Networking quantum-l3-agent Node quantum-dhcp-agent quantum-*-plugin-agent Storage Virtual Network Data Network Physical Network * from Quantum Admin guide 12
- 13. OpenStack Network Types Virtual Virtual Local Network Ports Network Tenant (VMs) Networks Linux Overlays Tenant Bridges Networks Provider Physical Physical Networks Network Ports Flat VLANs Network (Servers) 13
- 14. Spoofing/MiM v2.0 (ProviderWorries) Can I compromise/impersonate a VM/Server/Port? • How to prevent the provisioning of a rogue Server • How to prevent the provisioning of a rogue VM • How to prevent the provisioning of a rogue Port / Taps But… if it happens: • How to prevent the ‘connectivity’ of a rogue Server / VM / Port to a physical or logical network * Not to enter into discussions about securing the Cloud Controller 14
- 15. Application Policy Management(Tenant Worries) In a Virtual environment: • Policy definition • Policy Rendering • Policy Enforcement • Security Services Offering (Virtual Appliances) 15
- 16. Identity and Locationto the rescue Understanding the linkage between Physical and Virtual Understanding the linkage between Identity and Address 16
- 17. Multisite Clouds Physical/Virtual and Identity/Address expand across Datacenters 17
- 18. Possible steps tointegrate Security in OpenStack • Service Insertion (Choke points at the Operator and Tenant level) • Physical Appliances • Virtual Appliances • Distributed Appliances • New policy capabilities • Applied at the VM ifc level (definition-rendering problem) • Identity based • Proper articulation of Virtual/Physical bindings • Cloud Controller workflows for security • Discussion on where to apply/attach global policies • What SLAs and Certifications will the Tenants expect? 18
- 19. Conclusion • No easy answer to Security • Blurring the line between Virtual and Physical networks brings many additional challenges and OPPORTUNITIES • Centralized control structures are more vulnerable. Need proper workflows. • Incorporate Security from early stages, it is difficult to bolt it in 19
- 20. Questions? Pere Monclus pmonclus@plumgrid.com www.plumgrid.com 20