Argues that the qualitative character distinctive of conscious perceiving also occurs without being conscious, so that being conscious is not essential to such qualitative character.
"Mental Qualities, Valence, and Intuition: Comments on Machery", PowerPoint presentation at the March 2011 workshop of the Metro Experimental Research Group (M.E.R.G.) at NYU.
Argues that the qualitative character distinctive of conscious perceiving also occurs without being conscious, so that being conscious is not essential to such qualitative character.
"Mental Qualities, Valence, and Intuition: Comments on Machery", PowerPoint presentation at the March 2011 workshop of the Metro Experimental Research Group (M.E.R.G.) at NYU.
This is an introduction to the topic "Reference and Meaning" as one of the issues/concerns of philosophy of language. The thoughts of John Locke is also included here. The reference for this material is "Philosophy of Language" by Hornsby and Longworth.
summarize Wayne C. Booths What Is an Idea (reprinted below) and .docxjonghollingberry
summarize Wayne C. Booth's "What Is an Idea?" (reprinted below) and then answer the following question for evaluation: Do you agree or disagree with Booth's explanation of the phenomenon commonly described as "writer's block"?
**********************************************************************************
"What Is an Idea?"
Wayne C. Booth
"I've got an idea; let's go get a hamburger." "All right, now, as sales representatives we must brainstorm for ideas to increase profits." "The way Ray flatters the boss gives you the idea he's bucking for a promotion, doesn't it?" "Hey, listen to this; I've just had an idea for attaching the boat to the top of the car without having to buy a carrier." "The idea of good defense is to keep pressure on the other team without committing errors ourselves." "What did you say that set of books was called?
The Great Ideas?
What does that mean?"
The word
idea,
as you can see, is used in a great many ways. In most of the examples above it means something like "intention," "opinion," or "mental image." The "idea" of going for a hamburger is really a mental picture of a possible action, just as the "idea" of a boat carrier is a mental image of a mechanical device. The "ideas" of good defense and Ray the flatterer are really opinions held by the speakers, while the appeal for "ideas" about how to increase profits is really an appeal for opinions (which may also involve mental images) from fellow workers. None of these examples, however, encompasses the meaning of "idea" as it has always been used by those who engage in serious discussions of politics, history, intellectual movements, and social affairs. Even the last example, an allusion to the famous set of books edited by Robert Maynard Hutchins and Mortimer Adler at the University of Chicago, does not yet express an idea; it only directs us toward a source where ideas may be encountered.
These uses of "idea" are entirely appropriate in their contexts. Words play different roles at different times. One can "fish" for either trout or compliments, and a scalp, an executive, and a toilet (in the Navy) are all "heads." Usually, these different uses have overlapping, not opposed, meanings. For example, we wouldn't know what fishing for compliments meant unless we already knew what fishing for trout meant; and the "heads" we just referred to are all indications of position or place. In the same way, the different uses of the word
idea
overlap. Even the most enduring ideas may appear to some as "mere opinion." What, then, does
idea
mean in the context of serious talk, and what keeps some opinions and mental images from being ideas in our sense?
Three central features distinguish an idea From other kinds of mental products:
1. An idea is always connected to other ideas that lead to it, follow from it, or somehow support it. Like a family member, an idea always exists amid a network of ancestors, parents, brothers, sisters, and cousins. An idea could no more sprin.
Pragmatics and Discourse , context & speech actsNaeemIqbal88
Pragmatics and Discourse
What is pragmatics?
An approach within DA which concentrates on the way language
acquires meaning in use. It has developed from the tradition of the
philosophy of language known as pragmatics.
Focus: The study of contextualised meaning and is concerned with
describing the principles that underlie how we interpret the meaning
behind words: how we get from what we say to what we mean.
Pragmatic approaches tend to be interested in the 'big picture': trying
to formulate generalisable principles about how people produce and
interpret discourse (eg’ the use of humour in business meetings’).
Context
Context is an important concept in DA. Language does not take place in a vacuum and we
need to consider the context in which it occurs in order to understand it.
However, this seemingly unproblematic statement masks the issues and debates that are
ongoing in discourse analysis around the concept of context and its significance.
Two types of context
The 'intrinsic' or 'linguistic' context which refers to information that can be found
within the text that surrounds the language that is being analysed at a particular
moment. It is generally agreed that this type of context is not only useful but essential.
The more problematic type of context lies outside the actual text: what is sometimes
called 'extrinsic' (Schegloff 1997) or 'experiential' context.
This refers to all sorts of information about setting, situation, social circumstances of the
participants such as age, gender, ethnicity and possibly also about the shared
background knowledge and assumptions of the participants.
So, in the example:
'Later, an item about vasectomy and the results of the do-it-yourself competition'
(from Cameron 2001:12)
 The issue with extrinsic context is moving from description to interpretation in
research. Along with describing 'what' is happening in the discourse , it is also
important to interpret 'why' it is happening.
 Extrinsic contextual evidence can be potentially very useful in discussing why
participants say a particular thing in a particular way at a particular time,
however, there is also a danger of 'reading too much into the text' and of
judging which out of many possible interpretations is the 'right' one.
For instance, if the analyst is aware of gender, age or ethic difference among
discourse participants, these variables may well appear to influence the
discourse but how do we know which of these particular variables are
important to the participants in an particular communicative event.
 This is not to say that we should ignore extrinsic context but to suggest that we
need to be cautious about what we select as significant and rigorous about how
we incorporate it into our analyses. Schegloff (1997) advises that the best
option is to use only what can be shown to be relevant to participants.
 Can you imagine a meaningful context for this text?
a. Which of you was the prawns?
Reading people like a book: How to understand people's body language and psyc...Lucky Gods
Introduction: Unleash your Human Decoder Ring ️♀️: Crack the code of body language & psychology to know what people are really thinking !
Feeling like everyone else speaks in secret emojis? Wish you could see through facade walls and understand what people are actually feeling? This book is your superpower decoder ring, unlocking the fascinating world of body language and psychology!
**Master micro-expressions like a ninja **, decipher crossed arms from genuine hugs , and stop missing all those hidden tells . We'll dive into the science behind how people tick, revealing the unconscious cues that betray their every emotion and intention. No more mind-reading mystery: you'll become a human lie detector, a master of social situations, and a champion of communication clarity!
Imagine navigating relationships with ease , closing deals like a boss , and reading every room like an open book . This knowledge is your power, your secret weapon for thriving in a world where words don't always tell the whole story. So, buckle up, detective ️♀️, and get ready to crack the human code! The truth is out there, waiting to be decoded.
This presentation contains a short comparison between resilient and resistant behaviors and outlines the ground rules, and do's and don'ts, for effective communication; specifically "dialogue".
GEB3213 Final PaperFinal Paper– The final paper assignment is toJeanmarieColbert3
GEB3213 Final Paper
Final Paper– The final paper assignment is to write a one-page summary of a peer-reviewed, business article from a scholarly journal. Key words are summary and one page.
The article is below titled Louder Than Words: The Hidden Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace by Fred Lunenburg.
Note about a Summary. A summary is not about your opinion so leave your opinion out. Mention the author and cite the source. Follow the rubric and the items mentioned in Five Essential Points of Summarizing:
1. Provide a condensed version of the author’s key points. Focus only on the relevant points of the source.
2. Decide on what your audience needs to know. Add details sparingly and go only to the depth necessary for your audience to understand and appreciate the source.
3. Develop topic sentences to give your audience an idea of the main points.
4. Use your own words, leave out your opinion, and always include a citation.
5. Include the title of the article (in correct format), author’s name (in correct format), and the article’s topic somewhere in the first paragraph.
Place “Final Paper” as a watermark on the paper. See our class CANVAS for instructions, if needed.
Name your paper LastnameFinalPaper (such as CarterFinalPaper) and place your paper in the CANVAS labeled Final Paper by the deadline.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCHOLARLY ACADEMIC INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1, 2010
Louder Than Words: The Hidden Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace
Fred C. Lunenburg
Sam Houston State University
________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
It is estimated that people communicate at least as much nonverbally (i.e., without words) as they do verbally. It is important for leaders to understand the meanings of nonverbal cues from organization members in the workplace. In this article, I examine the four kinds of nonverbal communication: kinesics, proxemics, paralanguage, and chronemics.
________________________________________________________________________
We communicate as many messages nonverbally as we do verbally. Nonverbal communication – the way we stand, the distance we maintain from another person, the way we walk, the way we fold our arms and wrinkle our brow, our eye contact, being late for a meeting – conveys messages to others. However, we need not perform an act for nonverbal communication to occur. We communicate by our manner of dress and appearance, the automobile we drive, and the office we occupy.
Nonverbal communication comes in many forms. The four kinds of nonverbal communication are kinesics, proxemics, paralanguage, and chronemics (Hickson, 2010).
They are important topics for leaders attempting to understand the meanings of nonverbal signals from organization members.
Kinesics
Kinesics is the st ...
GEB3213 Final PaperFinal Paper– The final paper assignment is to.docxshericehewat
GEB3213 Final Paper
Final Paper– The final paper assignment is to write a one-page summary of a peer-reviewed, business article from a scholarly journal. Key words are summary and one page.
The article is below titled Louder Than Words: The Hidden Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace by Fred Lunenburg.
Note about a Summary. A summary is not about your opinion so leave your opinion out. Mention the author and cite the source. Follow the rubric and the items mentioned in Five Essential Points of Summarizing:
1. Provide a condensed version of the author’s key points. Focus only on the relevant points of the source.
2. Decide on what your audience needs to know. Add details sparingly and go only to the depth necessary for your audience to understand and appreciate the source.
3. Develop topic sentences to give your audience an idea of the main points.
4. Use your own words, leave out your opinion, and always include a citation.
5. Include the title of the article (in correct format), author’s name (in correct format), and the article’s topic somewhere in the first paragraph.
Place “Final Paper” as a watermark on the paper. See our class CANVAS for instructions, if needed.
Name your paper LastnameFinalPaper (such as CarterFinalPaper) and place your paper in the CANVAS labeled Final Paper by the deadline.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCHOLARLY ACADEMIC INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1, 2010
Louder Than Words: The Hidden Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace
Fred C. Lunenburg
Sam Houston State University
________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
It is estimated that people communicate at least as much nonverbally (i.e., without words) as they do verbally. It is important for leaders to understand the meanings of nonverbal cues from organization members in the workplace. In this article, I examine the four kinds of nonverbal communication: kinesics, proxemics, paralanguage, and chronemics.
________________________________________________________________________
We communicate as many messages nonverbally as we do verbally. Nonverbal communication – the way we stand, the distance we maintain from another person, the way we walk, the way we fold our arms and wrinkle our brow, our eye contact, being late for a meeting – conveys messages to others. However, we need not perform an act for nonverbal communication to occur. We communicate by our manner of dress and appearance, the automobile we drive, and the office we occupy.
Nonverbal communication comes in many forms. The four kinds of nonverbal communication are kinesics, proxemics, paralanguage, and chronemics (Hickson, 2010).
They are important topics for leaders attempting to understand the meanings of nonverbal signals from organization members.
Kinesics
Kinesics is the st ...
The Importance of the Principle of CharityOne of the most import.docxrtodd33
The Importance of the Principle of Charity
One of the most important ways to grow intellectually (and otherwise) is to actually
listen
to others and seek to understand them as they intend to be understood. Yet it is all too common for people to understand others in ways that do not reflect the best and most fair interpretation of their intended meaning.
Prepare
: Review “Principle of Accuracy and the Principle of Charity” from
Chapter 9, along with the required resources from this week.
Reflect
: Find specific examples in the media or in life in which someone misunderstands someone else. This happens a lot with political and religious arguments, but it also happens in daily life, especially when we find ourselves in conflict with others. Have you interpreted others uncharitably?
Write
: Present a case, either in the media or in your own life, in which someone interpreted another uncharitably. What specifically did the first person say? In what way did the other person understand it? What did the person really mean? Do you think that the misunderstanding was intentional? What were the consequences of the misunderstanding? How might the situation have been better if the person had practiced the principle of charity? Finally, are there areas in which
you
could do more to understand others favorably? How might you be a wiser person if you did so?
DUE: 25 JULY 2019 AT 6 PM EST
.
How to Make a Field invisible in Odoo 17Celine George
It is possible to hide or invisible some fields in odoo. Commonly using “invisible” attribute in the field definition to invisible the fields. This slide will show how to make a field invisible in odoo 17.
June 3, 2024 Anti-Semitism Letter Sent to MIT President Kornbluth and MIT Cor...Levi Shapiro
Letter from the Congress of the United States regarding Anti-Semitism sent June 3rd to MIT President Sally Kornbluth, MIT Corp Chair, Mark Gorenberg
Dear Dr. Kornbluth and Mr. Gorenberg,
The US House of Representatives is deeply concerned by ongoing and pervasive acts of antisemitic
harassment and intimidation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Failing to act decisively to ensure a safe learning environment for all students would be a grave dereliction of your responsibilities as President of MIT and Chair of the MIT Corporation.
This Congress will not stand idly by and allow an environment hostile to Jewish students to persist. The House believes that your institution is in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the inability or
unwillingness to rectify this violation through action requires accountability.
Postsecondary education is a unique opportunity for students to learn and have their ideas and beliefs challenged. However, universities receiving hundreds of millions of federal funds annually have denied
students that opportunity and have been hijacked to become venues for the promotion of terrorism, antisemitic harassment and intimidation, unlawful encampments, and in some cases, assaults and riots.
The House of Representatives will not countenance the use of federal funds to indoctrinate students into hateful, antisemitic, anti-American supporters of terrorism. Investigations into campus antisemitism by the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means have been expanded into a Congress-wide probe across all relevant jurisdictions to address this national crisis. The undersigned Committees will conduct oversight into the use of federal funds at MIT and its learning environment under authorities granted to each Committee.
• The Committee on Education and the Workforce has been investigating your institution since December 7, 2023. The Committee has broad jurisdiction over postsecondary education, including its compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, campus safety concerns over disruptions to the learning environment, and the awarding of federal student aid under the Higher Education Act.
• The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is investigating the sources of funding and other support flowing to groups espousing pro-Hamas propaganda and engaged in antisemitic harassment and intimidation of students. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the US House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X.
• The Committee on Ways and Means has been investigating several universities since November 15, 2023, when the Committee held a hearing entitled From Ivory Towers to Dark Corners: Investigating the Nexus Between Antisemitism, Tax-Exempt Universities, and Terror Financing. The Committee followed the hearing with letters to those institutions on January 10, 202
Read| The latest issue of The Challenger is here! We are thrilled to announce that our school paper has qualified for the NATIONAL SCHOOLS PRESS CONFERENCE (NSPC) 2024. Thank you for your unwavering support and trust. Dive into the stories that made us stand out!
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
Embracing GenAI - A Strategic ImperativePeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
2024.06.01 Introducing a competency framework for languag learning materials ...Sandy Millin
http://sandymillin.wordpress.com/iateflwebinar2024
Published classroom materials form the basis of syllabuses, drive teacher professional development, and have a potentially huge influence on learners, teachers and education systems. All teachers also create their own materials, whether a few sentences on a blackboard, a highly-structured fully-realised online course, or anything in between. Despite this, the knowledge and skills needed to create effective language learning materials are rarely part of teacher training, and are mostly learnt by trial and error.
Knowledge and skills frameworks, generally called competency frameworks, for ELT teachers, trainers and managers have existed for a few years now. However, until I created one for my MA dissertation, there wasn’t one drawing together what we need to know and do to be able to effectively produce language learning materials.
This webinar will introduce you to my framework, highlighting the key competencies I identified from my research. It will also show how anybody involved in language teaching (any language, not just English!), teacher training, managing schools or developing language learning materials can benefit from using the framework.
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Unit 8 - Information and Communication Technology (Paper I).pdfThiyagu K
This slides describes the basic concepts of ICT, basics of Email, Emerging Technology and Digital Initiatives in Education. This presentations aligns with the UGC Paper I syllabus.
Model Attribute Check Company Auto PropertyCeline George
In Odoo, the multi-company feature allows you to manage multiple companies within a single Odoo database instance. Each company can have its own configurations while still sharing common resources such as products, customers, and suppliers.
1. Translation and
Understanding
David Rosenthal Hamilton College
CUNY Graduate Center Humanities Forum:
Philosophy and Cognitive Translation and
Science
Cultural
http://davidrosenthal1.googlepages.com/ Exchange
2. OVERVIEW
I. Disagreement and
Misunderstanding
II. How We Translate:
Three Principles
III. Words and Things
IV. Truth and the Self
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 2
3. I. Disagreement and
Misunderstanding
We think of verbal communication mainly
in terms of everyday conversation.
And because such conversation typically
flows so smoothly, we seldom pay much
attention to the pitfalls and failures of
mutual understanding.
But misunderstanding in daily conversation
is not all that rare. Indeed, the way we
interact socially often conceals it:
We converse as though comprehension
is wholly transparent and effortless—
often covering over when it is not.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 3
4. Occasionally we note that what somebody
said wasn‟t clear to us or that we didn‟t
understand what was meant. But typically
we just let it pass—unless getting things
just right is for some reason important.
When it is, things often don‟t look good.
Misunderstanding is especially rife in the
humanities—despite our training in the use
of words. Academics sometimes even find
it hard to recognize that they agree!
And when they don‟t, misunderstanding
may be rampant—and people may become
intent on putting their point forcefully, in
ways that can hinder more than enhance.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 4
5. Consider scholarly disagreements in
humanities journals—not about things we
can readily settle, such as how often a
word occurs in a text, but about how,
e.g., to interpret or evaluate a passage.
We often see those who disagree with us
about those latter issues as simply not
grasping what we‟re saying.
And looked at from the outside, there‟s
some justice in that: Disagreements in
journals (and at conferences) often seem
due to misunderstanding—in both directions
and in ways that, seen from the outside,
may seem not all that hard to avoid.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 5
6. Mutual comprehension can also be elusive
in discussing political, moral, and aesthetic
issues—to the frustration of all concerned.
Some make a virtue of the apparent
ubiquity of mutual misunderstanding—
as with Harold Bloom‟s intriguing idea that
writers tacitly, but actively and creatively,
misread those of the predecessors (and
professors?) who most influence them.
I‟ll return to Bloom in II. But I want first
to ask how we tell, in both controversial
and mundane contexts, that somebody
misunderstands us. How do we identify an
exchange as a case of misunderstanding?
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 6
7. The mark most commonly appealed to is
intractable disagreement about matters
each person sees as obvious—intractable
relative to what each has already said.
Suppose you advance a moral, political,
aesthetic, or academic judgment, defend
it ably, and I still don‟t come around.
It might of course be that I‟m defective in
some way—academically incompetent or
morally or aesthetically insensitive.
But another possibility is that I just don‟t
get it—that I somehow miss your point or
fail to grasp the force of the considerations
you adduce. I simply misunderstand you.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 7
8. Disagreement by itself need not, of course,
signal any misunderstanding; only when
it‟s intractable is misunderstanding often
the best explanation of disagreement.
Why else, one may wonder, would anybody
resist the force of one‟s point and what
one says in support of it? “If the person
simply understood what I‟m saying … .”
Intractable disagreement may well be our
most common mark of misunderstanding,
but misunderstanding also occurs even
when somebody agrees with us—
agreeing for what we see as the wrong
reasons, and so still missing our point.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 8
9. And misunderstanding occurs also when
somebody fails to grasp what we mean by
our words—because the other person uses
pivotal words in different ways.
I‟ll return in a moment to these three
ways in which misunderstanding occurs.
But it‟s important first to see the crucial tie
between understanding and translation.
When you grasp my meaning—i.e., the
meaning of something I say—you make
what I say your own.
You render what I say in your own terms,
in words you would use to talk about the
things under consideration.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 9
10. So all understanding of others‟ remarks is
a translation—a rendering of what the
other person says into one‟s own words.
Translation is typically thought of across
languages—e.g., from Greek to English or
German to Mandarin. But it can be useful
to think of the use each individual makes
of such languages as being itself a distinct
language—what linguists call an idiolect.
And then your rendering of my words into
your own is your translating my idiolect
into your own. All mutual understanding
is mutual translation—and all failures of
understanding are failures of translation.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 10
11. Sometimes people converse without any
attempt at mutual understanding, each
simply reacting to the other‟s remarks with
whatever comes to mind to say. These
interactions aren‟t relevant to theorizing
about understanding and interpretation
But speech acts other than assertions,
such as those brilliantly described by J. L.
Austin, do figure; questions, requests,
expressions of doubt or wonder, and the
like all require interpretation.
And the factors described above, which
apply to assertion, are readily adapted to
apply to speech acts of other sorts.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 11
12. II. How We Translate:
Three Principles
I‟ve described three factors that explain
others‟ misunderstandings of us:
(1) Others disagree with us about what‟s
true—in ways that persist no matter how
much we explain ourselves;
(2) Others agree with us, but for reasons
different from those we give; and
(3) Others use words differently from us.
These ways of identifying and explaining
cases of misunderstanding reflect three
principles that govern how we understand
and translate others‟ remarks.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 12
13. Consider first intractable disagreement.
We tend to construe others‟ words so as
to minimize the number of things they say
that we think are untrue.
We seek, normally without explicit thought
or attention, to maximize agreement.
Such construing typically isn‟t conscious,
but it can be. When somebody says
something that sounds wrong to us, we
often think, “What that person must mean
is such-and-such.” We render others‟
words into our own so as to maximize
truth—that is, truth as we see things.
That‟s a first principle of translation.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 13
14. Seeking to maximize agreement—being
charitable in construing others‟ remarks—
is known in philosophy as the principle of
charity (Neil L. Wilson, W. V. Quine, Donald Davidson).
Suppose I say, “It‟s raining, and also not
raining.” You automatically come up with
things I probably mean that would make it
true—different places or a slight drizzle.
But there are risks. Suppose what I say
seems to call for such rendering—without
which you would see it as untrue.
In putting what I say into your words in a
way that makes them true by your lights,
you risk using words differently from me.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 14
15. And that‟s another way we misunderstand:
using words differently. And that gives us
a second principle: Just as we construe
others‟ remarks in ways that as much as
possible make them true, we also construe
other as using words correctly.
And that‟s using words as we use them—
i.e., whoever is doing the construing.
We map others‟ words onto words of our
own that sound the same, or have standard
lexical entries that map onto our words.
We assume that same-sounding words and
standard lexical entries reflect sameness
at least in the things words apply to.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 15
16. We construe others‟ remarks so their words
apply as ours do and their statements are
as often as possible true, as we see things.
A third principle of translation appeals to
the reasons people give for saying things.
Independent of lexical meaning and truth,
we seek to construe so that the reasons
others give for things seem to us, as much
as possible, to be germane and compelling.
We construe others so that their remarks—
whether or not we see them as true—hang
together in ways we regard as rational.
And that partly governs how we translate.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 16
17. Since remarks can go together rationally
but still be untrue, maximizing truth and
maximizing forcefulness of reasons are
independent.
So even when others agree with us, it can
seem to be “for the wrong reasons.”
And maximizing truth and rationality are
each independent of whether another‟s
words map straightforwardly onto ours.
All three considerations are versions of
the principle of charity:
We construe others charitably in respect
of the truth of their remarks, their use of
words, and the rationality of their thinking.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 17
18. Because the three principles of charity are
independent of one another, they can, as
already noted, conflict. Maximizing truth
and rationality, e.g., may come only if we
take liberties with standard uses of words.
And the best way to construe remarks as
true may come only at the cost of their
going together in maximally rational ways.
The inevitability of such conflicts has not
been noted in the literature. But it‟s crucial
to see that such conflicts occur—
so that there may often be alternative
ways to balance the claims of rationality,
truth, and the use of individual words.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 18
19. Moreover, when there are alternative ways
to balance truth, rationality, and the use
of individual words in the way we construe
another‟s remarks,
it may be that none of the alternatives is
plainly better than some of the others.
That explains why there‟s often no way to
decide among alternative interpretations
of others‟ remarks—and among alternative
translations of texts: The alternatives rely
on equally good ways of balancing.
Indeed, the failure to note the need to
balance these three factors may be due to
the discomfort such deadlocks occasion.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 19
20. The three principles work off of three
crucially different units of language:
(1) sentences in the case of truth,
(2) individual words apart from their roles
in sentences, and (3) combinations of
sentences for the forcefulness of reasons.
That underscores their independence,
and why there often are equally good
alternative ways to balance the three.
When we construe others‟ remarks as true
and their reasons as forceful, we do so as
we see those things. Others may lead us
to rethink things, but there is in the end
nothing to rely on but how we see things.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 20
21. So interpretation and translation always
rely on how the interpreter thinks about
the things under discussion and uses of
words. There‟s no way around that.
So in historical matters interpretation is
unavoidably “Whiggish,” as Richard Rorty
noted; we cannot avoid interpreting by
appeal to how we now see things.
As useful as it is to immerse ourselves in
our target period, each plank in such
immersion will rely on our interpreting
things, and every interpretation must at
bottom rest on appeals to our views
about what‟s true and what‟s rational.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 21
22. Bloom argues that writers engage in an
intellectual struggle with those who most
influence them, which leads to agonistic
misreadings of those predecessors—
more stronger writers giving misreadings
that are more compelling.
On my argument, such misreading is due
not to any intellectual struggle—Bloom‟s
“anxiety of influence”—but to the role one‟s
own views must play in interpreting others,
views that seldom match earlier writers‟.
Compelling misreadings may often go with
Bloomian intellectual struggle,
but misreading is not due specifically to it.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 22
23. Let me address an objection that will have
occurred to many in what I‟ve said.
I said it‟s a mark of misunderstanding that
we disagree with others—at least when
that disagreement is intractable, i.e., when
it doesn‟t yield to rational discussion.
But don‟t people sometimes just disagree—
and intractably? Why not take intractable
disagreement at face value? People
understand one another, but don‟t agree.
Still, it often also seems that intractable
disagreement is due to people just “going
past” each other—to their “thinking
differently,” i.e., mutual misunderstanding.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 23
24. More important: We have no way to tell
that people actually do understand each
other apart from broad, general agreement
on very many relevant matters.
We judge there‟s mutual understanding
despite intractable disagreement only
when people agree on most other things
relevant to the issue at hand.
It‟s of course a judgment call as to how
much background agreement we need to
judge that there‟s mutual understanding.
But without broad agreement on very many
relevant issues, we couldn‟t conclude that
mutual understanding does ever occur.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 24
25. III. Words and Things
Charity in construing others‟ assertions
and supporting reasons relies on our own
views about what‟s true and rational.
But how do we determine what others‟
individual words apply to?
I argued that we rely on words‟ sounding
and being spelled alike, and on standard
lexicons.
But can these factors by themselves
ensure that words do actually apply to
things in the same ways?
A puzzle about this will illustrate the issue.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 25
26. Suppose one wants to know what the
word „rabbit‟ refers to. Presumably it
refers to rabbits; we get that for free—
just by removing the quotation marks.
But that‟s hardly informative. And as the
20th century philosopher, W. V. Quine,
noted, whenever there is a rabbit, there is
also an undetached part of a rabbit—and
whenever there‟s a part of a rabbit, so long
as it‟s undetached there‟s also a rabbit.
So it‟s true to assert that there‟s a rabbit
in this room in just those circumstances in
which it‟s true to assert that there‟s an
undetached rabbit part in this room.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 26
27. That‟s at the level of whole sentences:
The sentences „There‟s an undetached
rabbit part‟ and „There‟s a rabbit‟ are true
in exactly the same circumstances.
But the terms „rabbit‟ and „undetached
rabbit part‟ plainly do not apply to the same
things: One applies to whole animals and
the other to parts of those animals—albeit
only when undetached from the whole.
Suppose, then, I say something using the
word „rabbit‟, e.g., „There‟s a rabbit over
there in the corner‟. Is it clear that I mean
my word „rabbit‟ to apply to the whole
animal, and not to an undetached part?
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 27
28. It‟s tempting to say that of course my
word „rabbit‟ applies to the whole animal;
any other construal would be silly.
But if we press the question about whether
my word applies to the whole animal or an
undetached part, how might we support
one answer rather than the other?
It won‟t help to say, as before, that my
word „rabbit‟ applies to rabbits; that‟s just
to say, unhelpfully, that I use the word
„rabbit‟ to apply to whatever I call rabbits.
And its plainly uninformative and circular
to settle what „rabbit‟ applies to by appeal
to the very word that‟s in question.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 28
29. A natural suggestion is to appeal to whole
sentences in which I use the word „rabbit‟—
in particular, to the conditions under which
such sentences are true.
Shouldn‟t that determine how I‟m applying
the word „rabbit‟?
But that can‟t help. That‟s because the
sentences „There‟s a rabbit‟ and „There‟s
an undetached rabbit part‟ are true in
exactly the same circumstances.
So appealing to sentences of mine that
contain the word „rabbit‟ can‟t determine
whether my word applies to whole animals
or to undetached parts.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 29
30. But how about counting? There are lots
of undetached parts for every one rabbit.
So can‟t you settle what my word „rabbit‟
applies to when I say “There‟s a rabbit in
the corner” simply by asking me how
many there are?
No. The trouble is that if my word „rabbit‟
did apply to undetached parts, my other
words—„there is‟, „is the same‟, and the
like—would be adjusted to compensate.
How would that work? I might construe
your question about how many as asking
how many groupings of parts, rather than
how many parts—and then I‟d say one.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 30
31. There is arguably no way around this.
Any gerrymandered construal of ordinary
nouns like „rabbit‟ could be offset by
compensatory adjustment in words like „is‟.
You could hypothesize that my words apply
only to middle-sized objects;
that hypothesis about how to construe my
words could provide an answer.
But there would always be an alternative
theory about how to construe my individual
words. And we could decide among such
alternative hypotheses only by some even
higher-level theory about how words apply
in the lower theory—and so forth on up.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 31
32. IV. Truth and the Self
How troubling is the puzzle about rabbits
vs. undetached parts?
Not very. Whether my word „rabbit‟ refers
to rabbits or undetached parts, it surely
refers to something leporine—as opposed
to canine or feline or inanimate altogether.
Our detour through that puzzle was to
give an illustration of how hard it can be
to get independent support for our usual
assumption that phonetics, orthography,
or standard lexical translation of words do
preserve sameness of application.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 32
33. But the puzzle also points to how it is that
we are ever able to get any grip on what
somebody‟s individual words apply to.
It‟s by appeal to the role those words play
in full sentences. Our only grip on what
a individual word applies is by appeal to
which sentences the word occurs in are
true and which are not.
Only because leporine objects make
sentences with „rabbit‟ in them true do we
know that „rabbit‟ applies to such objects.
Truth and falsity of sentences is required
to determine what words apply to.
Without sentences, words would float free.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 33
34. Truth and falsity of sentences is also basic
to assessing rationality. We see one thing
(A) as supporting another (B) only if we‟re
disposed not to assert A and also deny B.
A (say, it‟s raining) is a compelling reason
for believing B (it‟s wet outside) only if we
would resist affirming A while denying B.
Rationality consists in how we assign truth
and falsity to sentences in suitable groups.
All interpretation and translation hinges on
charity about rationality, use of words, and
the truth of statements.
And since the first two hinge on what we
take to be true, truth is most basic.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 34
35. I urged that we can tell what individual
words apply to only by appeal to the truth
and falsity of sentences that contain them.
But that way of determining the application
of individual words may not always match
homophonic or lexical translation.
Words that are spelled or sound alike or
that standard lexicons tell us are equivalent
may not be equivalent when judged by
their roles in containing sentences.
But that‟s just the independence of charity
about individual words from charity about
truth of sentences. And as we saw, those
two must be balanced against each other.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 35
36. I want to close by considering a question
about the possible need to interpret one‟s
own remarks.
I‟ve argued elsewhere that we are all self-
interpreters in the way our mental lives
appear in our stream of consciousness.
The thoughts, desires, feelings, and
perceptions we have are conscious only
when we are aware of ourselves as being
in those mental states.
And being aware of such states requires
interpretation about what states we are in.
Conscious awareness is itself a form of
self-interpretation.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 36
37. But I want here to pose only a narrower
question about self-interpretation:
Do we need to interpret our own remarks?
Here‟s a reason to think we needn‟t.
If I say „I‟ll meet you at the bank‟, you
may have to disambiguate my use of the
word „bank‟, but I don‟t need to.
I know automatically which I have in mind.
But the quandaries about interpretation
we‟ve been considering are more subtle
and complex. So our knowing what we
mean in that particular way may not settle
whether we need to interpret our own
remarks as well as those of others.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 37
38. Here‟s a reason to think we might:
We‟re in no better position to tell whether
our own use of „rabbit‟ applies to whole
animals or undetached parts than we are
with anybody else‟s use of the word.
We have no more to go on in such self-
interpretation than in interpreting others.
But that puzzle about how individual words
apply doesn‟t figure here.
Recall how charity in interpretation and
translation works: We construe others‟
statements as true and their reasons as
good—both as we see those things—
and their words as applying as ours do.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 38
39. Interpretation and translation are anchored
in our views about truth and rationality
and in our use of words. All translating
and interpreting unavoidably relies our
own views and our own use of words.
Moreover, the application of our individual
words and our assessments of rationality
both depend on what we see as true.
Since all interpreting of others rests on our
taking some statements to be true and
others not, all translation and interpretation
rests on self-interpretation—on interpreting
ourselves, albeit seldom consciously,
as believing some things and not others.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 39
40. Interpreting oneself as holding a belief
makes one aware of having it. But that
needn‟t make the belief conscious; one
might be aware of it just by noting one‟s
being disposed to say various things that
would express such a belief.
Nor need self-interpretation be in place
prior to interpretation of others; access to
one‟s own thoughts need not precede
understanding of others‟ speech.
Rather, our ability to interpret what we
believe develops together with our ability
to interpret others. Interpretation of self
and other go together holistically.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 40
41. Summary
The need to translate others‟ remarks,
even those in a common first language,
is evident from the often overlooked
failure to understand what others say.
Such translation—as with translation from
other languages—depends on construing
others charitably with respect to what
they think is true and rational and how
they use individual words.
These three factors can conflict; so there
will often be alternative ways to balance
them with no way to decide among them.
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 41
42. Thank you for
your attention
Austin, J. L., Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 1961/1979.
Bloom, Harold, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, Oxford University Press, 1973;
2nd edn. 1997.
Davidson, Donald, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation, Clarendon Press, 1984.
Quine, W. V., Word and Object, MIT Press, 1960.
Rorty, Richard M., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, 1979.
Rosenthal, David, Consciousness and Mind, Clarendon Press, 2005.
Wilson, N. L., “Substances without Substrata,” The Review of Metaphysics, 12, 4 (June 1959).
Translation and Understanding Hamilton College Humanities Forum, October 17, 2011 42