This document is a dissertation submitted by a student for their BA degree in philosophy. The 8,194 word document contains an abstract, introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion examining whether the later philosophy of Wittgenstein can be considered a form of transcendental idealism. Chapter 1 defines transcendental idealism according to Kant and contrasts it with realism and idealism. It also discusses an interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy as a form of transcendental solipsism. Chapter 2 evaluates Bernard Williams' argument that Wittgenstein's later philosophy retains elements of transcendental idealism. Chapter 3 examines the nature of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations. The conclusion argues that

1. Was the Later Wittgenstein
a Transcendental Idealist?
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the BA Degree in Philosophy with History
Student Number: 09002615
Course: PHI-30025
Final Word Count: 8,194
Date of Submission: 30/04/2012

2. Was the Later Wittgenstein
a Transcendental Idealist?
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the BA Degree in Philosophy with History
Course: PHI-30025
Final Word Count: 8,194
Date of Submission: 30/04/2012

3. Table of Contents
Abstract 1
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Kant and Transcendental Idealism 2
1.1: Early Wittgenstein and Transcendental Solipsism 6
Chapter 2: Bernard Williams: ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ 10
2.1: Criticisms of Bernard Williams’ position 16
Chapter 3: Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy and its Nature 21
Conclusion 28

4. Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?
Abstract: Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,
scholars have attempted desperately to decipher the cryptic meaning that
Wittgenstein took pains to communicate to us. Amongst the various subjects of
debate is the question of Wittgenstein’s subscription to ‘linguistic idealism’. Those
who argue that Wittgenstein was a form of idealist have often attributed his position
as following the work of Kant. By contrast, others suggest that Wittgenstein was an
odd sort of realist. Others, including myself, argue that Wittgenstein does not
subscribe to a place anywhere on the traditionally conceived ‘philosophical map’.
Rather, his philosophical writings, particularly in the later period, reflect his desire to
turn his back on philosophical theories altogether and instead merely describe the
view that we have always had.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine the idea that the later phase of Wittgenstein’s
work, notably the Philosophical Investigations (PI), is engendered by the Kantian notion
‘transcendental idealism’. I argue that Wittgenstein does not admit any place on the
philosophical map, which precludes his subscription to transcendental idealism. I begin in
chapter 1 by establishing what ‘transcendental idealism’ is with reference to Kant. In section
1.2, I sketch Peter Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein as a transcendental solipsist as
endorsed by Bernard Williams. This approach feeds into chapter 2 which specifically
evaluates Bernard Williams’ approach towards answering the question of the later
Wittgenstein’s transcendental idealism. Finally, I will advocate the view that Wittgenstein in
the Philosophical Investigations is not concerned with advancing philosophical theories,
such as realism or idealism but merely wishes to clarify the use of our language so that we
may resist the natural urge to position ourselves upon a philosophical map.

5. 1. Kant and Transcendental Idealism
Before itispossible toassesswhetherornot the laterWittgensteinwasatranscendental idealist,we
must first establish what is meant by ‘transcendental idealism’. In this chapter I will provide a
general definition and explanation of the term in relation to the particular kind of transcendental
idealism as held by Kant. Section 1.2 explores Wittgenstein’s transcendental solipsism and is
importantbecause itprovidesuseful background knowledge for chapter 2. To begin with however,
we will focus on what transcendental idealism is by deconstructing it and explaining each part in
turn with regards to some neighbouring concepts with the intention of creating a useful contrast.
In order to get a firm grasp of what is meant by ‘transcendental idealism’ we turn to
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant is the champion of transcendental idealism; he coined the term
within the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1971) and was the first person to develop a
philosophical position of this kind. For this reason it may be useful to treat Kant’s formulation as a
touchstone when attempting to understand interpretations of Wittgenstein as a transcendental
idealist. The question is then: what is transcendental idealism? To talk about ‘transcendental
idealism’ is to refer to a metaphysical position that holds that the rational human mind conditions
possible experience of objects.Thisrequiressomefurtherexplanation. It is a metaphysical position
with epistemology at its heart. That is to say, it breaks away from the traditional conception of
metaphysicswhichiscentred on ontology and moves to blur the boundary between the questions
‘what exists?’ and ‘what can we know about what exists?’ (Gardner 1999: 39) A ‘transcendental’
study is therefore primarily concerned with the conditions for the possible experience of objects
such as cars, trees and rollercoasters. Wittgenstein provides a loose, but useful analogy that
illustrates the relationship between that which is transcendental and its conditional role to
experience: the eye is conditional for the visual field and yet you do not see the eye (TLP: 5.633).

6. Similarly,the transcendental isconditional forexperience yet you cannot find the transcendental in
the world through empirical investigation. As a condition for the possibility of the visual field, the
eye mustnecessarilyexist a priori– before experience.Toreiterate,the transcendental is an a priori
form of knowledge which is concerned not only with objects, but more specifically with the
conditions that are necessary for the possibility to experience those objects (A11/B25).
Kant was not a metaphysical realist. Rather, he is a metaphysical idealist. It is useful to
briefly touch on these terms and contrast them to further emphasise their features. When we use
the term ‘realism’inconnection with metaphysics we refer to the belief that what we represent is
objectivelyfoundwithinthe physical world.Thatis,whatwe representconstitutesobjective reality.
The object of knowledge for any representation is therefore ultimately answerable to the
representedobjectandisconsideredexternal tothe subjectexperiencingit.Forinstance,if we were
to perceive achair,the objectof knowledge ultimatelylieswithin the nature of the chair and how it
existsindependentlyof humansensibility.Tosaythisdifferently,we representexactlywhatis found
in the physical world and our minds contribute nothing to its representation, it merely mirrors
‘reality’.
Idealism is an antithesis to realism in the sense that, upon the rejection of the realist
conceptionof reality,idealismisanalternative view to adopt. Kant rejects that we could ever know
anything about what he calls the noumenal realm, or objects as they are in themselves and apart
from human sensibility (A246/B303). As Kant says:
“Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not
therebycome anynearerto knowledgeof the constitution of objects in themselves.” (A42-
3/B59-60)

7. Thismeansthat knowledgeof the noumenal realm is transcendent, above and beyond experience
and therefore unknowable.Hence we cannothave knowledge of reality as it is in itself because we
cannot escape the influence of ourownsensibility. This is why Kant is an idealist. When we use the
term ‘idealism’ we refer to the belief that our representations are indebted in part by the
representationsthemselves.The idealist believes that the form of the representation plays a chief
role in the way in which we perceive the physical world. Therefore, the form of representations
ultimatelydependsuponsomethingthatthe subjectcontributes and not the object itself. For Kant,
it is the sensibility and understanding of human mind that is responsible for the form of our
representations,whichistosay,responsibleforperceivingobjectswithinthe pure a priori intuitions
of space and time (A21-2/B35-6). When an idealist looks at a chair, its form is not ultimately found
withinthe chairbut inside the mindexperiencingit.The extentto which the mind is responsible for
our conception of reality is often debated amongst different kinds of idealists. An alternative
idealism was held by George Berkeley1
(1685-1753). His was a radical form of idealism called
‘empirical idealism’ which means that representations as we perceive them constitute everything;
everythingisthe productof ourmind.He therefore excludes the possibility that there is a material
worldindependentof mind.Transcendental idealismdiffersfromempirical idealisminsofar that it is
merelythe formof our representationsof anobjectthatultimatelyanswerstothe mind. It does not
denythat the objectsthemselveshave anindependentexistence; merely that we cannot represent
or know about that existence independently of human sensibility. Whilst empirical idealism and
transcendental idealismare radicallydifferent positions, the two positions do share the belief that
the mindhas a (varying) role to play regarding the comprehension of reality. It is this shared belief
that makes them idealist positions (Dilman 2002: 37).
We have seen what ‘transcendental’ means and also what it means to be an ‘idealist’ but I
have yet to answer the question at hand: what is transcendental idealism? For Kant, it is the view
1Berkeley, G. (1948–1957).The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (eds.).
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 9 vols.

8. that our conception of reality ultimately depends upon the mind of the experiencing subject; it
dependsonhumansensibility. This dependence on the mind does not entail that the mind creates
realityasGeorge Berkeleywouldassert;more that when we intuit something, our mind conditions
our sensibility so as to render the intuition within space and time. Further, the conditions of our
experiencesare notthemselvesidentifiableat the empirical level of reality (Moore 1997: 122). That
is to say, the conditions underpinning the form of representations cannot be found within our
representations.The conditionsof knowledge ultimately lie within the mind rather than the object
themselves, therefore these conditions must in some sense be ideal and hence we have
‘transcendental idealism’.
Kant believed that the a priori conditions for possible experience were ultimately found
within the mind and its particular structure. The early Wittgenstein however, it may be argued,
thoughtthat language ultimately fulfilsthe role of conditioningourworld.Thiskindof reading often
focuses on the passage: “the limits of my language mean the limit of my world” (TLP 5.6). In the
followingsectionIwill sketchan interpretation of the early Wittgenstein as what has been called a
‘transcendental solipsist’.
1.1 Early Wittgenstein and Transcendental Solipsism
FollowingP.M.SHacker’sseminal readingof Wittgensteinwithin Insight and Illusion (1972), Bernard
Williams in his paper ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ (1974) designates the early Wittgenstein a
transcendental solipsistwithinthe TractatusLogico-Philosophicus (1921).It isnot difficulttosee why
some interpreters see Wittgenstein as following in the footsteps of Kant when Wittgenstein says
“logic is transcendental” (TLP: 6.13) and that “propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the
world, or rather they represent it.” (TLP: 6. 124) Williams’ kind of reading may be considered as a
form of ‘linguistic idealism’ because language contributes to the way in which we represent the

9. world.The Tractatus hasalso beencalled‘neo-Kantian’ by Robert Hannah who considers the thesis
of the Tractatus to be a reformulation of strong transcendental idealism with Wittgenstein’s own
linguistic element as inspired by both Kant and Schopenhauer (Hannah 2011: 21). Hacker’s and
Williams’sinterpretationwill be sketchedwithlittle assessmentatthisstage toserve the purpose of
showing how this kind of position might be employed within Wittgenstein’s linguistic system of
philosophy2
. Furthermore, this section compliments the understanding of chapter 2 whereby
Williamsarguesthatthere are elementswithinthe laterwork of Wittgenstein that may properly be
called ‘transcendental idealism’ left over from his early philosophy.
To explainwhattranscendental solipsismisandhow itmightbe consideredastrongversion
of Kant’stranscendental idealism,some keyfeaturesof the Tractatus thatWilliamspaysattentionto
have been laid out:
(1) The limits of my language are the limits of my world (TLP: 5.6)
(2) The limits of my language must found by reflectively moving around ‘inside’
our view of things i.e. no God’s eye view (Williams 1974: 85)
(3) The solipsistic ‘I’ is metaphysical and therefore goes above and beyond
empirical enquiry (TLP: 5.632, 5.641)
From points (1) & (2) we can see that solipsist’s position might be described as idealist. The world
owes its constitution to the private language of the solipsist; or that which is privately thought. To
clarify, the way in which Hacker is interpreting the word ‘language’ is broad, one that means
something similar to ‘conceptual scheme’ which designates everything that is comprehensible
2 However, Williams’ dependence upon Hacker’s reading may serve as a useful point of attack regarding
Williams’ overall suggestion.Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein will be touched upon in section 2.1.

10. (Hacker1972: 68). The use of the term‘language’anditsrelationship to the world might be seen as
similartothe way inwhichKant usesthe humanmindandits relationshipto the world. As sketched
out above,forKant,we perceive objectsphysicallyinaspatio-temporal frameworkas a result of the
particular cognitive structure internal to subject. In a comparable (but not identical) fashion,
Wittgenstein’smetaphysical self orsolipsistic‘I’represents the boundaries of the world in virtue of
‘language’ that it conditions or ‘limits’. That is to say, the solipsistic ‘I’ is a necessary a priori
conditionforlanguage whichin turn determines the limits of my world based on what can possibly
be thought of or grasped with the logical conceptual scheme as exemplified by our linguistic
practices (TLP: 5.62). The horizon of the world i.e. everything that we could possibly represent, is
demonstrated by that which is conceivable; anything that cannot be conceived of simply does not
exist. Point (2) specifically epitomizes Wittgenstein’s idea that it is nonsensical to attempt to use
logic (and therefore language) to denote what can and cannot exist within the world because that
would“require thatlogicgobeyondthe world”(TLP:5.61). Instead,the onlyoptionavailableto us is
to ‘move aroundwithinlogic’sensingwhenthingsbecomeincreasinglyincomprehensible (Williams
1974: 85). That is to say, we cannot ascribe logic a view from both sides of what exists and what
cannot exist;thiswouldrenderlogicashavinga‘God’s eye view’. We must assess logic from within
in order to determine what makes sense to us; anything that does not is cast aside as
incomprehensible.Itisinthiswaythat Wittgensteinattemptstodraw the limitationsof whatwe are
able to represent; to draw the limits of what we can know.
Point (3) Confirms the transcendental nature of the solipsistic position because the
metaphysical ‘I’(TLP5.641) makeslanguage possiblebutisnotitself within the world and therefore
cannot be subjecttoempirical investigation. Hacker draws a parallel between Wittgenstein’s claim
that “the thinking, presenting subject: there is no such thing” (TLP: 5.631) and what he calls a
standardHumeanposition (1739: I-iv)3
, namely, that the ‘thinking self’ cannot be found within the
3 As pointed out by Hacker, P.M.S. (1972) Insight and Illusion:Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the metaphysics
of experience. London: Oxford University Press pp. 59

11. world. We are not talking about the body of a person which is within the world, rather by ‘self’ or
‘subject’we meana‘metaphysical self’.The metaphysical self transcendentally conditions‘language’
which is in turn responsible for the solipsist conception of the world; “the language which I alone
understand”(TLP:5.62). So to drive thispoint,the idealistic characteristic of this thought is fulfilled
by ‘language’. The idea here being that we can only conceive of the world from within the logical
conceptionof the language available tous,if ‘something’were toevade ourlogical language, then it
wouldbe inconceivable tous,hence “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (TLP:
5.62). The transcendental elementisthe metaphysical self,which serves to condition the language.
Williamspaysclose attentiontothe fact that the transcendental nature of solipsism cannot
be said, but merely make itself manifest (TLP: 5.62) (Williams 1974: 77). What is meant by this the
ideathat the truth of transcendental solipsismcannotbe meaningfullyrepresentedusingconceptual
schemes because language can only be applied to that which is within the world, as the
metaphysical self isnot,itcannotbe talkedaboutat the empirical level orevenidentifiedwithin the
worldwithoutsayingsomethingimminently false (Moore 1997: 119). Williams takes the preclusion
of coherence at the imminent level to mean that Wittgenstein is participating in metaphysical
philosophy,namely, transcendental philosophy. Whilst this particular reading is plausible, it is not
devoidof difficulties. In the next chapter we will look closer at Williams’ suggestion that it may be
illuminating to interpret the later Wittgenstein’s work in relation to the early Wittgenstein’s
philosophical position. Then in section 2.1 we will assess Williams’ suggestion.

12. 2. Bernard Williams: ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’
In his paper ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ (1974), Bernard Williams makes the positive assertion
towardsthisend,suggestingthatWittgenstein’s later work contains elements that are reminiscent
of Kant’stranscendental idealism4
onthe groundsthatthe laterperiodcontinuesin a similar vein to
the early period. In the previous section I sketched the early Wittgenstein’s of transcendental
solipsismasWilliamspresentsit.Williamspressesthe ideathatthe transition that saw the rejection
of solipsismfromearlytolaterWittgensteinneednot see the total rejection of idealism, theorising
that idealismconstitutesafundamental partof his philosophical thought throughout his career. He
concludes his article with:
“The new theory of meaning, like the old, points in the direction of a transcendental
idealism, and shares also the problem of our being driven to state it in forms which are
required to be understood, if at all, in the wrong way.” (Williams: 1974: 95)
4 It should be stressed that it Williams is careful not to overtly express the view that Wittgenstein was a
transcendentalidealist, however this is perhaps more to do with the difficulty in substantiating such a move
rather than through a lack of conviction. p. 85

13. Williamsbelievesthatitisa fruitful exercise tointerpretthe laterWittgenstein in terms of the early
philosophy, postulating that it would illuminate otherwise puzzling elements within his later
philosophy.Forinstance,Wittgenstein’suse of the firstpersonplural ‘we’maybe betterunderstood
if we consider it to naturally follow from its early counter-part, the solipsistic ‘I’ in the Tractatus.
Williams clarifies that this shift can be translated into something such as aggregate or communal
solipsism.Inthissectionthissuggestionwill be explored. Following this, Section 2.1 focuses on the
difficulties that surface when Williams’ suggestion is followed through.
BernardWilliams’article Wittgenstein and Idealism affords a place among the most famous
or, perhaps, infamous readings of Wittgenstein that associates his later work with transcendental
idealism.The article isacritical response to Peter Hacker’s book Insight and Illusion (1972) in which
he asserts that the transition from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations involved a
“refutationof solipsismandhence of idealism”(Hacker1972: 59). However,Williamsisunconvinced
by this relation of ideas, instead suggesting that “the shift from ‘I’ to ‘we’ takes place within
transcendental ideasthemselves”(Williams1974: 79) and therefore preserving the idealistic nature
that he purportedly detects within the later work. As previously mentioned, part of Williams’
incentive for engaging in this exercise rests in the hope that it may illuminate Wittgenstein’s
enigmatic use of the first person plural ‘we’ and the role it plays within his later works. Williams
illustrates this suggestion by comparing claim that “the limits of my language are the limits of my
world”(TLP:5.6) fromthe Tractatus may evolve into“the limitsof ourlanguage are the limits of our
world”(Williams1974: 82) withinthe laterperiod.The evolvedstate of thisclaim, Williamsexplains,
resultsina form of aggregate solipsism or transcendental idealism. If Williams can secure the idea
that there iscontinuitybetweenthe earlyWittgensteinandthe later,thenthiswill lend credence to
the claim that the later Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist.
With the goal of clarifying his suggestion, Williams instructs the reader how he thinks that
we ought not to understand the metaphysical ‘we’. Wittgenstein did not mean for his first-person

14. plural ‘we’tobe interpretedasmerelyatautologyandwe can see the value of this assertion in that
the purpose of the analogous singular version from the Tractatus did not warrant this sort of use
(Williams1974: 83). He pointsoutthat if we were to interpretitasa tautology,thenitwouldreadas
‘whatever we understand, we understand and what we can speak of, we can speak of’ which is an
inconsequential truism.Furthermore,Williamsdiscouragesanempirical readingof the word‘we’. At
thispointinthe article, Williams carefully navigates the reader away from what he considers to be
detrimental interpretationsof otherfeaturesof Wittgenstein’sterminology. Williams warns against
erroneoususes of ‘language’and‘the world’here,firstlynotingthat on the one hand, we ought not
to understand ‘language’ in the narrow sense and on the other hand, the ‘world’ should be
understood in the broad sense.
To take Wittgenstein’s meaning of ‘language’ in the empirical sense would refer to a
particularcommunityof ‘language-users’ found within the world (Mulhall 2009: 390). For example,
we shouldnottake Wittgenstein’suse of ‘we’toreferto the group that consists of English speakers
as opposed to group of Chinese speakers; this would generate a picture whereby the world be
limiteddifferentsimplyasaresultof the methodof communication employed. This kind of reading
of ‘ourlanguage’wouldmisrepresentWittgenstein as an empirical idealist5
, a position he does not
intendtoadvocate (Minar2007: 190). Regardingthe latter,‘the world’asWilliamsunderstands it, is
meant to be construed technically as the logical space of reality which admits not only to what is,
but alsoto whatis possible.He thinks‘the world’means‘whatcouldpossiblybe conceivedof’rather
than the sense in which it means ‘the earth’.
Havingomittedthe tautological andempirical readings of ‘our language’, Williams believes
that we should understand it as a descendant of the first person solipsistic ‘I’. That is, as a first
person plural ‘we’. ‘Our language’ i.e. that which constitutes the limits of our world, should be
understoodastranscendental - as the conditions for the world that are not themselves empirically
5 Whilst it may be possible to understand Wittgenstein as an empirical realist, this is not an issue that I will deal
with in this paper.

15. identifiable withinthe world (Williams 1974: 82). The logical form of language relates to the logical
form of the world insofar that the world is dependent on language in order to conceptualise it or
representit(Moore 1997: 150). This‘dependence’of the worlduponourlogical conceptualisationof
it shouldnotbe takenas ‘if itwere not formy logical concepts- mylanguage- thenthe physical world
would not exist’. This is an empirical reading which is quite clearly a falsehood (Moore 1997: 118).
Rather, the dependence should be taken at the transcendental level, itself not being part of the
physical world but the conditions for it. Williams is driving at a related point when he says:
“What the world is for us is shown by the fact that we can make sense of some things and
not of others:or rather - to lose the last remnants of an empirical and third-personal view -
in the fact that some things and not others make sense” (Williams 1974: 84)
Any empirical investigation into ‘our limits’ or ‘our language’ – essentially ‘our conception of the
world’, would render the ‘limits of the world’ both inside and out of the world that they are
supposedtolimit.Toputit anotherway,an empirical investigation into our language or conception
of the world, would necessarily be coloured by the very thing that the investigation seeks to
elucidate (Cunningham 2008: 125). Wittgenstein hints at a similar point: “logic pervades the world,
the limits of the world are also its limits” (TLP: 5.62). To attribute these limitations as empirical
wouldbe tantamounttoassigninglogica‘Gods eye view’,therebyprovidingaperspectivefromboth
sidesof our conceptual scheme i.e.thatwithinlogicandoutside of it.Wittgensteindoesnot believe
that our logicworksinthis manner and it is for this reason that logic cannot say that the world “has
this in it and this but not that” (TLP: 5.61). Instead, logic works from within, or from our side of the
conceptual scheme, so to speak. It is for this reason that we could not explain why we fail to
understand something outside of our conception of the world- we could not come to explain our

16. ‘non-understanding’ of it because whatever ‘it’ is lies outside of that which we are able to
comprehend. Williamsholdstherefore,thatanempirical explanationof Wittgenstein’smetaphysical
subject is necessarily nonsensical and must therefore be understood as the framework for
conceiving the world. Herein rests Williams’ formulation of the ‘transcendental character’ that he
claims to detect within the later Wittgenstein.
Integral to this line of thought is the ‘say-show distinction’. This is the idea that whilst
transcendental truthscannotbe meaningfully said, they can be shown. This is important because if
we cannot grasp our non-understanding of something due to a limitation to articulate them, how
then can we establish the truth of the metaphysical subject? The idea is that whilst we cannot say
anythingabout‘ourlanguage,butcertainfeaturesof realitymake themselvesmanifestinthe way in
whichwe live,whichistosaythat these manifestationshintatanineffable truthof the metaphysical
subject. Michael Kremer explains this brilliantly when he says:
“The ‘logical form’whichapropositionshareswiththe realitythatitdepicts cannot itself be
made the subjectof depiction,butis shown inthe propositionwhich possesses it.” (Kremer
2004: 2)
In relation to Williams’ claim, this means that the truth of the communal or ‘aggregate solipsism’
cannot be stated without saying something meaningless on the grounds that anything that is said
would not capture transcendental features; it would be stained with the colours of that which it is
meantto condition.These truthsmanifest themselves within our interests, concerns and activities
(Williams1974: 85). The logical formof ‘ourlanguage’isso interconnected to our conception of our
worldthat itsformis implicitinhowwe live.Williams believes that it is this ‘like-mindedness’ -i.e.
shared interests, concerns and activities- that warrants his designation of ‘our language’ (and

17. therefore the laterWittgenstein’suse of ‘we’) asa“kindof idealism”(Williams 1974: 85). To express
thisideadifferently,Williams’use of ‘idealism’ here isintendedtobe regardedin the same way that
Kant asserted that we all share the same cognitive faculties as rational human beings. In the same
waythat we share cognitive faculties,similarlywe share ‘like-mindedness’ with respect to the ways
in which we engage with human interests.
To take stock, Williamssuggeststhatitisilluminating to examine Wittgenstein’s later work
through a ‘Tractarian lens’ so to speak. He attempts to understand Wittgenstein’s use of ‘we’ in
relation to the solipsist ‘I’ as per Hacker’s interpretation within Insight and Illusion (1972). If we
understand‘ourlanguage’tomeanthe transcendental conditioningforthe logical formof our world
inthe same waythat the Tractatus conveys ‘my language’ then we have the transcendent element
withinthe laterWittgenstein.The idealism is shown in our ‘shared conception’ or like-mindedness
concerningthe worldandour verynature; its logical form is shown through our activities, concerns
and interests and never through propositions. If we take the theory to be sound, then it is not
difficult to see why Williams made claim to detect transcendental idealism within Wittgenstein’s
later work. However, as we shall see in the following section, taking his theory to be sound may
prove problematic.
2.1 Criticisms of Bernard Williams’ position
The firstcriticismof Williams’positionisbyIlhamDilman(2002),whomthinksthatWilliamsiswrong
to attribute Wittgenstein’spositionasa kind of idealism (Dilman 2002: 86). He makes this assertion

18. on the grounds there is a disanalogy here between the positions of Kant and Wittgenstein. Kant’s
idealismsoughtthe source of the possibilityof experience. He attributed this to the rational human
mindwhichisfixedandnecessarilyconditionsall ourknowledgeandobjectsof experience.ForKant,
the ‘transcendental conditioner’isfoundwithinthe mind.AccordingtoWilliams,the transcendental
feature within Wittgenstein’s early and later work is found within language. Whilst the mind’s
structure necessitatesthe forms in which we experience the phenomenal world is fixed, grammar
and natural language is subject to change over time or the culture in which the language was
formed. Furthermore, Dilman explains, the grammatical structures or ‘language-games’ are not
‘above andbeyondwhatthe speakers do’- talk of language within Wittgenstein’s more developed
viewistherefore farfromthe realmof transcendental idealism(ibid). Rather, it seems more akin to
an historical explanation which may serve to show us why we use a concept in one way and not in
another(PI§43). Notably,thissortof readingmightcomplimentWittgenstein’sthesisof ‘meaningas
use’(PI §43). In sum, Williams’ application of ‘idealism’ to Wittgenstein’s later period is a tenuous
one at best.Furthermore,itfliesinthe face of significantremarksbyWittgensteininhis later period
as we will see in chapter 3.
A further point of concern is Williams’ reliance on Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein as a
transcendental solipsist.Williamsis“substantially in agreement” with Hacker (Williams 1974: 77); if
doubt can be cast over Hacker’s interpretation, then the foundations upon which Williams’
argumentrestsbreaksdown,thuslosinganysense of plausibility that it might have had. If Hacker’s
and Williams’ interpretation of the Tractatus is misrepresentative of its true purpose, then the
‘Tractarian lens’ through which Williams judges Wittgenstein’s later work serves to distort rather
than illuminate. Therefore any claim made by Williams regarding the engenderment of
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with transcendental idealism loses further credibility.
For this kind of criticism I turn to Cora Diamond who argues in her book The Realistic Spirit
(1991) that Hacker’s interpretation of the limitations of language misrepresent Wittgenstein’s

19. intentionsforthe Tractatus as a whole. The problem with Hacker’s account, according to Diamond,
isthat it “chickensout”(Diamond 1991: 181) by choosingnot to take seriously Wittgenstein’s claim
that the philosopher must “throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it” (TLP: 6.54).
Consequently,advocatesof Hacker’sreading are forced to say self-refuting statements about what
the unsayableis;theyare forcedto saythe unsayable.Diamondarguesthatthisisexactlythe sortof
nonsense that Wittgenstein attempted to warn his readers about in the preface of Tractatus:
“The bookwill...drawalimittothinking,orrather – not to thinking,buttothe expression of
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both
sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the
limit will be simply nonsense.” (TLP: Preface iii-iv)
DiamondunderstandsWittgensteintobe warningreadersof nonsensewithinphilosophythatstems
from the deep-seated urge to peer beyond the limits of logic; beyond what can be thought and
therefore said. For Diamond, this instructs the reader how to read the work as a whole, which is in
stark contrast to that of Hacker’s and Williams’ reading. She regards sections ‘6.5-57’ and the
preface within the Tractatus as examples of how not to use philosophy and the confusions that
ensue if we attempt to go beyond the logical/conceptual scheme that is available to us in order to
provide explanations about the world (Diamond 1991: 182). As a result, Diamond believes that a
reorientation of the Tractatus is necessary to understand that Wittgenstein’s view is closer to the
notionof not beingable toadvance metaphysical positions,rather than clutching to some ineffable
truth about reality. This is a position that will be explored further in the next chapter.

20. As we have seen, Hacker and Williams hold that part of Wittgenstein’s agenda within the
Tractatus is to instruct us that we are sometimes deluded in our assertions of certain kinds of
propositions or rather, ‘pseudo-propositions’, because the kind of things that we wish to say can
onlyeverbe shown.Inotherwords,Hacker wantsto saythat we can still glean illuminating insights
from what immanently appears to be utter nonsense (Hacker 1972: 18). Williams also says that
“attemptsto talkabout[the metaphysical subject] orstate itsexistencemustcertainlybe nonsense”
(Williams 1974: 78). This strikes me as nothing more than nonsense as a whole, but even if this
positioncanbe lookedatwith some sense of comprehensibility, it seems to take more for granted
than it explains. Hacker and Williams seems to simply ignore the preface of the Tractatus which
seemsconcernedwithdiagnosinganddispelling philosophy of the nonsense that Hacker wishes to
employaspart of Wittgenstein’sdoctrine.(Costello2004: 107). Significantlyfor the purposes of this
paper,the plausibility of Wittgenstein’s supposed subscription to the claim that ‘the metaphysical
subject makes language possible and thus the limits our world’ is dependent upon this kind of
reading. Alternatively, if we adopt Diamonds interpretation then it would seem that upon
Wittgenstein actually ‘throwing the ladder away’, he rejects that we can sensibly advance
metaphysical theories. To say this differently, if the ‘say-show’ distinction turns out to be an
unfounded misrepresentation of Wittgenstein’s purpose for the Tractatus, then talk of the
‘metaphysical subject’ as being shown within our activities, concerns and interests and activities
seemstocrumble apart arounditself,leavingthe notionof ‘ineffable knowledge’ as pure nonsense.
The plausibility of Williams’ claim hinges on whether or not we employ Diamond’s
interpretationof the Tractatus.If Diamond’sreadingof the Tractatus is more conceivable, then the
foundationsthatsupportWilliams’assertionare severelycompromised; leaving his contention that
the later Wittgenstein was a transcendental idealist in ruins. I would assert that Diamond’s
reorientationof the Tractatus is more plausible for two reasons. Firstly, it precludes the necessary
commitment to the obscure notion of the ‘say-show’ distinction, which arguably goes against the
grainof Wittgenstein’sintended message within the Tractatus. Secondly, despite a new reading of

21. the Tractatus there is still a profound continuity of Wittgenstein’s thought into the Philosophical
Investigations,thoughitisnotthe continuitythatWilliamshadinmind.Rather,Diamond hasturned
his method on its head by interpreting aspects of the early work in relation to the later. This point
may have an air of circularity to it with regards to the wider question of this paper. Further, I have
not conclusively proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that the later Wittgenstein was not a
transcendental idealistinhislaterwork- perhapsthisistoomuchto ask. Nonetheless, I have shown
that BernardWilliams’attempttocharacterise him as such is lacking in plausibility and foundation.
The nextsectionwill be primarilyconcernedwithprovidinganinterpretationof Wittgenstein’s later
work.

22. 3. Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy and its Nature
At this stage it would be an appropriate time to address similar interpretations as
expounded by other scholars, however there is not the space here to do so in as much detail
as such a task deserves. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to simply
acknowledge some prominent scholars and direct the reader towards the appropriate
material. Following closely behind Williams’ position is Jonathan Lear,6 Thomas Nagel7 and
Michael Forster8 all of which contend, for various reasons, that it is apt to designate the
later Wittgenstein transcendental idealist in one sense or other. Rather than sketching their
reasons out and critically examining them, I intend to advocate for a view that short-circuits
their collective position, namely, that Wittgenstein never intended to advance philosophical
theories. Therefore, in this section I will be arguing that an attempt to place Wittgenstein
6 Lear, J and Stroud, B., (1984). The Disappearing ‘We’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes,
Vol. 58: 219-258
7 Nagel, T., (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press
8
M, Forster., (2004). Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press

23. anywhere on the ‘philosophical map’ with regards to metaphysical theories is contrary the
function that he assigns philosophy (PI§ 109). In this sense, it could be understood that
Wittgenstein redefines what it means to ‘do’ philosophy.
For Wittgenstein the goal of philosophy is to “shew the fly the way out of the fly-
bottle” (PI§ 309). This is a reference to his view that language, or rather the misuse of
language, serves to inevitably lead the philosopher into puzzlement and conceptual
confusion. He believes that the solution is to treat philosophy not as a scientific project
whereby the philosopher suggests theories in order to gain knowledge and understanding,
but as a series of activities or therapies (PI§ 133) designed to avoid the entanglements that
so often accompany philosophical thought. Wittgenstein is concerned with providing a new
method of engaging with philosophy which rejects the advancements of theory as found in
the Tractatus. This point is characterised by the alternative style of the Philosophical
Investigations (1953) in that it does not provide a linear or hierarchical argument, but a set
of remarks that merely hint at his thoughts. It is an elucidatory work, meaning that his
primary task is to clarify our use of natural language through reflection on the way in which
we use grammar, thus dissolving many philosophical pseudo-problems. As Wittgenstein
puts it:
“Our investigationis therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our
problem by clearing misunderstandings away.” (PI§ 90)
Moreover, Adrian Moore asserts that it is not the goal of Wittgenstein’s mature view to
advance ‘isms’ (Moore 1999: 126). Rather, his philosophy is concerned with doing away with

24. explanation and replacing it with description, thus providing insight into what lies before our
eyes (PI §109).
At the heart of Wittgenstein’s new approach to philosophy is what he famously
terms ‘language-games’ (PI §7). The use of the term ‘language-games’ helps us to spot
implicit assumptions that we make about natural language which are often the source of
philosophical problems (Tejedor 2011: 118). Further, it is meant to show us that language is
a ‘purposeful activity’; a purpose that changes depending upon the context of its use. (ibid)
Wittgenstein hints at this:
“…the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life” (PI§23)
When Wittgenstein uses the term ‘language-game’ he refers to the rule governed nature of the
grammars that are appropriate to the different forms of life (Dilman 2002: 81). By forms of life, we
meanthe way inwhichgrammar instantiateditself within different activities and interests that are
prolificwithinculture. Forexample,religionisaformof life;itisan activityor interestthatmanifests
itself withinourculture.Talkof ‘sins’,‘sacrifice’and‘God’are all ways in which we use our grammar
ina waythat is appropriate tothe formof life (religion). That is to say, when we use these words in
the religious context, we follow the appropriate grammatical rules of the language-game.
It is here thatWittgensteinmovesawayfromanessentialisttheoryof meaning of language
and instead points towards ‘family resemblance’ (PI §67). Thus, the meaning of a concept is not
foundwithinafundamental core,butrathermeaningisfoundinthe inter-connected, criss-crossing
nature of the waywe use it(PI §66). For instance,there is no single feature (or set of features) that
can accuratelycharacterise the differentsortsof games,religionsorideologiesetc.If we think about
the gamespokerand cricket,itis notimmediately obvious what they share that renders them both

25. ‘a game’.Thisisbecause theyare merely‘related’toeachother.To illustrate,if A is shares a feature
withB and B sharesa separate feature withCthenbothA and C are relatedwhilsthaving nothing in
common themselves. The assumption that there are essential features grounding our language to
the world is an assumption that might be held by the linguistic realist. Wittgenstein’s
characterisationof language like a‘familyresemblance’underpinsthe rejection of linguistic realism
and also philosophical theories in general. It is mistaken to embrace the search for necessary and
sufficient conditions in order to reveal the essential meaning of a word in order to provide an
explanation of its meaning. We know this because as we have just seen, words do not possess
essences to be found.
The significance of thisisthatthe nature of Wittgenstein’sphilosophyissuch that he rejects
linguistic realism. That is to say, he rejects the idea that there is some external reality or abstract
entity(notunlike aPlatonicform) uponwhichlanguage-users may refer to in order to agree that an
expression should be classed as a rule (Dilman 2002: 19). Instead, we can see that he believes that
the meaning of a word comes from its relative use within the appropriate context or ‘form of life’;
the meaningof language is internal to the forms of life in which it is manifest (Dilman 2002: 29). By
contrast,if Wittgensteinwas a linguistic realist, then the meaning (as it exists independently from
our language and life) would determine the use of the word. For Wittgenstein, the absence of
essential features connecting the meanings of words renders ‘linguistic realism’ as patently false.
Upon the philosophical map,itisoftenthe case that with the rejection of realism follows idealism.
Yet as we have seen,Wittgenstein does not approve of advancing philosophical theories; meaning
that it is necessary to show how the rejection of realism does not entail the adoption of idealism.
As previouslymentioned,Nagel andLearprovide readingsof Wittgenstein that label him as
an idealist;theydosowithdirectreferenceto‘formsof life’or‘mindedness’ in order to qualify this
classification.Nagel andLearconstrue Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ as conditioning our experience
to the degree that any attempt to think of something beyond the extent of their influence is

26. nonsensical (Nagel 1986: 106) (Lear 1982: 385). From this description, it may be concluded that the
‘forms of life’ in which grammar is interwoven and which constitutes the rules by which our
language is governed are responsible for the forms of our representations. In other words, it is
language thatdeterminesthe way the world is. However, I believe this to be misrepresentative of
what Wittgenstein actually meant by his use of ‘forms of life’.
Wittgenstein’s‘formsof life’are notstaticor universal influencesuponthe wayin which the
world is conceived. To qualify this, I mean that forms of life are not motionless, they change over
time inthe same way that culturesdevelopbyadoptingnew interestsandactivities and leaving ‘old
fashioned’ activities behind. Kant, by contrast, holds the view that our representations ultimately
owe theirconstitutiontosome kindof intersubjectiveconditionswithinthe mind.‘Forms of life’ are
not analogous to how Kant understands mind because they change and are not fixed conditioning
influences. As Wittgenstein describes:
“Our language can be seenasan ancientcity:a maze of little streetsand squares, of old and
new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a
multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.” (PI §18)
By this,I take Wittgenstein to mean that our forms of life come and go over time because they are
as contingent as life itself. That is to say, forms of life are not a fixed or necessary as the mind is
withinKant’ssystemof thought.Ourlanguage correspondstoourinterests,concerns and activities,
all of which are subject to change. It is for this reason that our ‘forms of life’ cannot be used in an
argumenttowardslabellingWittgensteinanidealistandhence languagedoesnothave metaphysical
import. To illustrate this idea, consider a Catholic person, they believe that God’s existence is
independentof anythingtheysay,butthe reality of God’sexistenceisonly meaningfully said within

27. the religious‘language-game’(Dilman2002: 50). Talkof God to an alienrace may be meaningless to
them because that particular language-game has hitherto been unavailable to them. However, it
does not follow that the unavailability of the language-game should have any bearing on the
independentexistence of God;God merelyhas no place in any of their ‘forms of life’. Similarly, the
physical world i.e. ‘mountains, oceans and trees’ existed before language and is therefore
independent of it, meaning that the physical world is not dependent on our forms of life or the
natural languagesthatgrow fromthem.Talkof physical reality,like talkof God,onlyhasits meaning
within the appropriate language-game. Therefore, forms of life and the language-games that
correspond to them cannot contribute to metaphysical theories one way or the other because the
extentof theirinfluence isinternal tolanguage itself.Whilst it is true that we cannot talk outside of
our language orconceptual scheme,itdoes not follow therefore that we cannot conceive of things
which exist independently of that language; we merely think about that which is independent by
way of the language in which we think.
Contrary to Nagel and Lear then, Wittgenstein does not hold an idealist conception of
realitybasedonhisuse of ‘formsof life’.We cansee this for two reasons. On the one hand, it is not
obvioushowthe formsof life mayconditionourlanguage insucha wayas to determinethe way the
worldis.Unlike Kant’sconceptionof mind that is fixed, timeless and a priori, Wittgenstein’s use of
our ‘forms of life’ describes them as existing alongside our language and not preceding it. It is this
feature thataffordsour formsof life afluidnature,thusallowingouractivities,interests and culture
to change and develop new conceptionsof the world,effectivelyexpandingits‘limits’. On the other
hand,the influence of language doesnotextendasfaras being able to impose conditions on things
that existexternallytoitsuch as the physical world;meaningthatourforms of life merelymatchthe
limits of our human world, but they do not condition it.

28. Conclusion
The objective of thispaperhasbeentoargue againstthe view thatthe laterWittgensteinsubscribed
to a form of transcendental idealism. My approach began in section 1.2 where the notion of
Wittgenstein’s earlier work was considered in a light that lends credence to the suggestion that
Wittgensteinissympathetictoa Kantianconceptionof philosophy.I explored what it means to be a
transcendental solipsist inthe Tractatus withthe intentionof showingthat the existing elements of
transcendental idealism under Bernard Williams and Peter Hacker’s reading, were not retained in
Wittgenstein’slaterphase asWilliamssuggests.Thispaperaddressesthisideaon twofronts. Firstly,
I attemptedtoundermine the suggestionthatthere are elementsof transcendental idealism within
the earlyperiodthatmightsurvive tothe laterperiodwhichisdealtwith in section 2.1. Secondly, in
chapter 3 I attempted to characterise Wittgenstein’s later work in such a way that is incompatible
with the subscription to any philosophical position and therefore transcendental idealism.
Section 2.1 explores concerns with respect to Williams’ article. Williams’ thesis is heavily
reliant on the acceptance of Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein. I advocated for the
incoherence of the ‘say-show’ distinction with reference to Cora Diamond whom provides, what I
believetobe,a more plausiblereadingof the Tractatus. If we decided to adopt Diamond’s reading,
then we are able to approach the Tractatus as sharing similar goals as the Philosophical
Investigations asexpoundedinchapter3,namely,toclarifylanguage inordertoavoidnonsense and
conceptual confusion. Consequently, Hacker’s attempt to glean meaningful insights from the
ineffable maymisunderstandthe purposeof the Tractatus as a whole. If ineffable truth is rejected,
thenthe truth of transcendental solipsisticsubjectwhichcanonlybe ‘shown’tobe true must alsobe
dismissed.The transcendental subject makes language possible as it represents the non-empirical
subject, the sum of the person’s experience, without it language cannot limit the world, meaning
Hacker has fallen prey to the nonsense that Wittgenstein warned against; thus his interpretation
collapses. It is not my intention to make a definitive claim regarding the philosophy within the

29. Tractatus; I merely wish to provide a plausible alternative in order to reveal the weakness of
Williams’ position. I aimed to show that Williams’ suggestion that the later Wittgenstein is
engenderedby the same elements of transcendental idealism in his early work falls to the ground
upona differentinterpretationof the Tractatus.Consequently,IconcludedthatWilliams’attemptto
classifythe laterWittgensteinwiththe engendermentof transcendentalidealismfails.Icome to this
conclusiononthe groundsthat he lackstextual evidence withwhichtodefendhisposition or how it
mightit fitsintoWittgenstein’slaterwork and more significantly, he does this against the threat of
alternative interpretations of the Tractatus.
In chapter 3, I presented a picture of the later Wittgenstein that is incompatible with the
suggestion that he subscribes to transcendental idealism. I begin by focussing on Wittgenstein’s
aspiration to provide a new conception of philosophy that involves the description of “what lies
before everyone’s eyes” (PI § 109) rather than providing theories of explanation. Subsequently, I
provided a reading of Wittgenstein that rejects the notion that he belongs anywhere on the
traditionally conceived ‘philosophical map’ which holds positions such as metaphysical realism or
idealism.Iillustrate howthisviewcanbe foundwithinWittgenstein’slaterworkbypaying attention
to whathe calls:‘language-games’,‘familyresemblance’,‘grammar’and‘formsof life’. These linked
ideas contribute towards the notion that language is a rule-following activity that we engage in
simplybyparticipatinginthe interests and concerns that our culture affords. This is contrary to the
traditional realist view that holds that an abstract entity of meaning is what determines the use of
words. Furthermore, I argued that the rejection of the realist perspective does not entail the
adoptionof a kindof idealism.Kant’sidealismwasfoundedonthe elevatedstatusof the mindwhich
exists a priori and fixedly conditions all possible experience and knowledge. By contrast, ‘our
language’ is unsolidified and subject to change. Language does open doors to certain conceptual
dimensionswithinourworldsuchas the notion of a promise, but that is not to say that it is capable
of conditioning that which exists independently from its influence such as the physical world.

30. The difference betweenWittgenstein’suse of language and the use of human minds within
Kant’s system of thought is what leads me to conclude that the later Wittgenstein was not a
transcendental idealist of any kind. Rather, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy does not
contribute to any particular metaphysical school of thought; he merely wishes to show us that the
deep-seated urge to choose a position on the philosophical map is the result of misusing natural
language. That is to say, he wants to show us that important “philosophical problems arise when
language goes no holiday.” (PI §38)
Word count: 8,194

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