OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; 2011 - 2015

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Democratic struggle is as old as the Nigerian State. The new democratic
experiment in Nigeria, after many years of military rule came into reality on the
29th May 1999, thus, setting the pace for the Fourth Republic. The term
democracy is capable of having many definitions and connotations to different
school of thoughts. However, the definition by Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992)
which states that the concept of democracy should be examined from two points of
view, that is; as ideology and as politics captures it all. Democracy, as ideology is
the philosophy of governance which sets a high premium on the basic freedom or
fundamental human rights of the citizen, the rule of law, provision of basic
infrastructures, the flow of information and the right of choice between alternative
political positions democracy as politics is concerned with the institution and
processes of governance. These institutions and the procedures of governance that
they elicit tend to foster consensus whilst promoting and sustaining respect for the
ideology of democracy. When viewed as politics, various institutions tend to
collaborate to promote the act of governance, which is facilitated by the provisions
of the existing Constitution of a Country.
In an ideal democracy, there exist the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
These various arms of government perform complimentary roles, all working
together to promote the rule of law and to ensure that the citizens of a nation enjoy
good governance. The constitution empowers the legislative arm of government to
make laws; it also gives it certain oversight functions over the activities of the
executive arm. Against this background, Godowoli (2001) classifies these
oversight functions as a model of intergovernmental relations, which can be

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described as a body of activities or interactions occurring between the executive
arm of government and the legislative arm. It is a form of systematic check and
balance on the activities of government, which is constitutionally backed up. The
complexity of the nature and patterns of oversight functions arises from the
number of programmes and activities which different levels of government are
engaged in within a specified period. These series of activities call for efficient and
orderly management. Accordingly, the efficient, orderly coordination and
management of activities and programmes brings to light the human dimension of
legislative oversight functions, which is very critical. (Janda et al 2002). The
dimension of legislative oversight function in the fourth Republic brings a lot of
question to mind especially with the amount of valuable resources, in terms of
human material and financial that was committed to this venture whose outcome
has never improved nor strengthened the country’s political process and service
rendered to the masses. This study shall examine the legislative institutions and
oversight functions in the National Assembly within the period of 2011 to 2015. It
evaluates the extent to which these oversight functions were performed and the
impact it has on the programmes of the executive arm of government as well as the
citizenry within the specified period.
1.2 Statement of Problem
The long reign of the military government in Nigeria and its subsequent
intervention in the political affairs of the nation has rubbed off on the political
class and the development of democratic institutions. The performance and
appropriate responsibility of the elected leaders as enshrined in the constitution has
always been hampered by lack of experience and greed on the part of the political
actors.

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The performance of oversight functions by the legislative arm of government in
Nigeria has over the years fallen below expectation. This is as a result of poor
commitment on the part of the leadership of this nation to the provisions of the
nation’s constitution. Corruption, greed and the deteriorating infrastructural
facilities have hampered the performance of government business.
Rather than provide qualitative service for the people, the elected representatives
had always contrived the democratic space, muzzled opposition, overturn electoral
choices and in the end engendered the rule of law and order within the democratic
space.
The executive on its part has always cash on the corruption tendencies on the part
of the legislative arm by attempting to bribe them anytime a crisis occurs or a
discovery is made in the execution of programmes that negates constitutional
provisions.
This study shall attempt to examine some of these problems with a view to
evaluating the performance of legislative oversight functions and how this has
affected the provision of social services to the citizenry during the said period.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The broad aim of this study is to examine the performance of legislative oversight
functions during the period between 2011 and 2015, with reference to the Nigeria’s
National Assembly and with particular focus on the Appropriation and Health
Committees etc.
The study also has the following objectives:
i. To examine the meaning, model and objectives of legislative oversight
functions in the National Assembly,

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ii. To examine the factors that determine the nature of legislative oversight
functions,
iii. To highlight the goals of legislative oversight functions,
iv. To evaluate the achievements of the legislative arm of government during
the fourth republic in the performance of oversight functions, and
v. To examine the challenges confronting the legislative arm of government
in the performance of legislative oversight functions.
1.4 Research Questions
The following questions will be addressed in the course of this study.
i. What is the nature of the legislative institutions in the Nigeria?
ii. What is the meaning of legislative oversight function and how is it been
carried out?
iii. What are the goals of the legislative oversight functions?
iv. How far has the legislative arm of government gone in the attainment of
these goals?
v. What are the challenges confronting the performance of legislative
oversight function in the Assembly?
vi. How can these challenges be addressed?
1.5 Research Hypothesis
Two hypotheses have been formulated in the course of this study.
Ho: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant
impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period within
2011 to 2015.

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Hi: The performance of legislative oversight functions has no significant impact
on the activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to
2015.
1.6 Significance of the Study
The belief by the people in a democratic system of government gave rise to the
uproar that ensures the emergence of the forth republic after many years of military
rule. One of the institutions that guarantees adequate participation of the people in
a democratic government is the legislative arm, charged with the responsibility of
making appropriate legislation for the nation and also acting as a watchdog on the
executive. Hence the legislative arm plays a pivotal role in any democratic
dispensation.
This study is significant in the sense that the performance of legislative oversight
functions of the legislative institutions is paramount and cannot be over
emphasized. The strengthening of the laws and legislations are very significant part
of the administration of democratic government, which must not be neglected.
The study is also said to be significant in the sense that it will serve as a useful
avenue for evaluating the legislature during the said period; their impacts,
challenges and prospects. It will also be useful in promoting greater understanding
of the importance of intergovernmental relations and interactions in Nigeria.
The study is also important in the sense that it will serve as a contribution to
knowledge as well as a reference point for future research endeavor with similar
disposition.

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1.7 Scope of the Study
This study will focus extensively on the performance of legislative oversight
functions of the National assembly within the period 2011 to 2015.
1.8 Research Methodology
The research design is intended to specify the methods and procedure of the study
and also state the nature of the study. In the presentation of this research study both
the exploratory and descriptive research designs were used. The justification for
this is that both method deals with determination, evaluation and explanation of
past events essentially for the purpose of gaining a better and clearer understanding
of the present and making a more reliable prediction of the future especially as it
relates to the topic under consideration.
The data used in this research study were mainly from two sources: the primary
source which involves the carrying out of a survey study through the
administration of a questionnaire to a group of selected respondents and the
secondary source which entails extracts from textbooks, literatures, journals and
publications internet. This source constitutes a larger portion of the literature
review. All relevant extractions have been duly acknowledged.
The primary data required for this study was collected through the administration
of a structured questionnaire to a selected group of respondents within and outside
the National Assembly. Specific attention was given to respondents who were
selected from the legislative arm to drive home the issues involved.
Because the population is very large, the researcher decided to select samples from
the population upon which the study was based. Since a good sample must as
nearly as possible reflect representative of the entire population, care was taken to

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ensure that the sample size is large enough to convey a measure of credibility to
the outcome of the study. Care was also taken to ensure that the choice of the
sample is left to chance, so as to reduce the possibility of bias in sampling.
In order to facilitate easy administration and collection of questionnaires, a total
number of 200 questionnaires were administered to respondents, of these 197 were
returned. The sample size for this work is therefore 197. The use of bias sampling
technique was adopted, where respondents who have little or deep knowledge of
the area under study were selectively chosen from the populace.
The responses to the questions raised in the questionnaire were analyzed by using
the chi-square (X2). The objective of the analysis was to establish the extent of
variation between the observed frequency (actual perception of the people on the
legislative institutions and the performance of oversight functions during the said
period) and the expected frequency (statistical expectation regarding respondent’s
perception on the topic). It therefore aims at testing the independence of perception
held by the respondents.

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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.0 Introduction
This chapter review relevant literature on the same thematic areas in order to
identify areas of convergence and divergence views of renowned authors,
researchers and writers. This chapter also covers conceptual review, empirical
studies and theoretical framework of the topic under study.
The organization of any polity is the task of the government who is the custodian
of the sovereignty of the entire citizenry which collectively and willingly they have
submitted to it in return for peaceful and meaningful co-existence propelled by law
and good government. It is therefore trite to say that the extent to which the
activities or efforts of the components of the state especially human beings are
effectively and efficiently galvanized towards productive activities and in the best
interest of the state and the citizens determines the extent of the “goodness” or
otherwise of its government. It is again not dubitable that a critical instrument for
the organization of the state is law which government relies on day in, day out to
ensure societal equilibrium. Legislation which is a product of institutionalized law-
making process is by far the most important arsenal from which government
derives its laws. The foregoing, therefore, lends credence to the avowed roles and
responsibilities of legislation as a source of law in any society and by implication,
on the Legislature which is wholly and constitutionally responsible for making
these laws. The task of this section therefore is to critical x-ray and review
literatures that have been written in the area of legislative oversight function in
developing and developed countries of the world.

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2.1 The Legislature
Most African countries that re-democratized in the 1980s (Boadi, 1998) and those
that democratized thereafter have had to tackle some evident rots and conflicts left
behind by the military administrations. However, the post-military era challenges
facing the states have been partially blamed on colonial legacies (Osaghae, 1998).
While some of the challenges indeed are both the direct and indirect consequences
of colonialism, the greatest social, political and economic troubles facing most of
the African states today are in most cases self-inflicted. Mismanagement of
national resources, high official corruption, absence of institutional accountability,
authoritarianism, political instability, violence, and inter-tribal strife and wars have
at varying degrees undermined the ability of most of the African states to develop
and progress on the continents. Among the states that have been in this ways
seriously affected is Nigeria. Although Nigeria became independent in 1960, it has
failed to meet the high expectations reposed in it at independence. Indeed, the
Nigerian state appeared to have fallen from the position it once occupied in its
early years of political independence in the 1960s. Some of the countries that
became independent at the same time with Nigeria have today left her far behind in
terms of political maturity and economic advancement, societal cohesion and
national development (Osaghae, 1998, Nnamani, 2003).
Osaghae (1998) identified three major challenges that have been confronting
Nigeria since independence, namely political instability evidenced by high regime
overthrow often prompted by constant military coups; low level of national
cohesion manifesting in the form of incessant inter-ethnic struggles, religious
violence and adversarial politics, which are induced by the polarization and
division among the various ethnic and religious groups; and economic crisis
evidenced by huge debt burden lasting up till 2005, poor living condition of

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majority of the citizenry and lopsided and skewed distribution of national wealth
resulting in inequality and wide gap between the rich few and the wretched
masses.
Most writers on Nigerian politics have attributed the regressive economic
condition, absence of national unity and the political volatility in the country to
the prolonged military rule (Ajayi, 2011). The democratic rule, no doubt, died at
infancy in 1965, 1983 and 1993. In the three republics of Nigeria, democracy did
not last for over six years. Consequently, the restoration of democracy in 1999
was seen as a welcome development, although there were skeptics who did not
believe that the new democracy could survive due to the predatory instinct of the
Nigerian military class. Nevertheless, the return of representative democracy was
expected to mark a departure from the authoritarian-styled policy-making process
that characterized the earlier, successive military regimes – regimes that did not
only undermine institutional accountability but also robbed the political system of
the checks and balance as well as participatory politics fundamental to system
efficiency and good governance.
With the restoration of democracy and the attendant adoption of a presidential
arrangement in 1999, the executive and legislative organs were made separate and
functionally distinct, unlike during the military administrations. While the
executive organ continued to exist under successive military regimes and law and
policy-making role and policy implementation were solely borne by the executive,
the creation of a presidential arrangement under the fourth republic meant that the
legislature would have to take up some of the responsibilities that the executive
organ had exclusively performed previously.

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Being the representatives of the various constituents, the members of the National
Assembly, comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives, have the
mandate to debate and reflect the concerns, opinions and interests of the
constituents in government policy decisions. The legislature was expected to
reverse the decline in the economy, stabilize the polity and integrate the society,
generally. It was expected to take actions and initiate necessary reforms with a
view to transforming the state, and changing its poor national picture, as Osaghae
(1998) painted. Nigerians under the new democratic dispensation should be proud
of their beloved country.
Structure and Function of Legislative Institution
The roles the legislature performs in a democracy and the extent to which the roles
are performed vary with the system of government in place, as well as they differ
from one country to another. Essentially, the legislative institution provides for the
citizenry the platform for participatory political process. However, the
participation afforded by the legislative institution is the indirect type, as it will be
practically impossible for the electorate to gather in one place for policy decisions,
implementation and governance. Fashagba (2011) noted:
The presence of legislative institution in any
modern polity suggests the indirect participation of
the electorates in the making of decisions on issues
that affect their daily lives. Not only is the
presence of a legislature salient to the
acceptability of democratic regime, but also the
extent to which the legislature demonstrates
capability to freely express itself and asserts its

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power determine how democratic the government
is.
Government in a democratic system implies the rule of the majority. Apparently,
the legislature is one democratic institution that allows the various constituencies
to which a state is delineated elect their representatives. When elected, the
representatives are expected to represent the views, concerns and interests of their
constituents in the legislature. In fact, central to representative democracy is the
notion that elected representatives of the people constitute the legislative arm of
government (Kousoulos, 1982). Indeed, representation of citizens in parliament is
at the core of liberal democracy.
The legislature, hence, is saddled with enormous roles in any democratic system.
This is even especially so where the institution enjoy a huge measure of autonomy
in determining their internal operations, where there is constitutional provisions
for operational and institutional independence. According to Fish and Kroenig
(2009), the study of modern government and politics involving contemporary
nation-states is impossible without an appreciation of the role of the legislature.
Fashagba (2009) also affirmed that in modern democracies the roles of
representation, law-making and oversight of administration are often ascribed to
the legislature. In his view, Alabi (2010) established the power to make laws as
distinctively resided with modern parliaments. It is however important to point out
that while legislatures are often vested with the law-making role, some legislatures
contribute effectively in initiating bills and raising policy issues for the House to
deliberate upon but others simply debate whatever proposals the executive present
to it. Of course, the former in addition to initiating bills deliberate on policy
proposals and bills emanating from the executive.

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Oversight function is also a very important role of the modern legislature.
Oversight function particularly appears to preoccupy modern legislatures.
According to Verney (1969), the watchdog function is perhaps more important for
a legislative assembly than that of law-making (p. 167). The legislature provides
the institutional mechanism for ensuring accountability and good governance.
Stapenhurst also noted that ‘In most countries, the legislature is constitutionally
mandated as the institution through which governments are held accountable to
the electorate’. The role of oversight of executive administration thus specifically
entails: scrutinizing and authorizing revenues and expenditures of the government
and ensuring that the national budget is properly implemented. The constitutional
power to participate in budgetary appropriation gives the legislature needed
political influence to shape governance, and possibly carry out reforms that are
sustainable. In this regard, Saffell (1989) asserted that ‘no function of the congress
is more jealously guarded or more basic to administrative control than the power
of the purse’ (p. 69). In the same vein, Posner and Park (2007) affirmed
‘Legislatures in some countries have gained a role in approving macro fiscal
frameworks’. The Nigerian legislature belongs to the class of legislative
assemblies vested with preponderance of power over fiscal matters, perhaps.
The modern legislature equally performs representational function. Principally,
the people’s representatives for the singular fact that they are elected by the
people, especially under a democratic regime, hold the mandate of their
constituencies within the polity (Davies, 2004). Sodaro put it thus: ‘the essence of
representative democracy lies in the delegation of governmental power and
responsibility to a small number of people by the citizenry as a whole’ (2007, p.
179). Consequently, the elected members of the legislature are expected to pursue
good public policies for national development; this is most characteristic of

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electorates in the developed democracies of the world. In the emerging
democracies some variation may be seen, in terms of what the representational
roles of the legislators specifically are. Beyond public policy goals, patronage
opportunities for members of the constituencies are expected, by electorates in
emerging democracies, from their elected representatives in the legislature. This
other electorates are so predisposed as the result of their high level of
impoverishment and their neglect especially under the prolonged military rule.
It is noteworthy that the modern legislature serves as an agent of reform in the
state (Reed & Scheimer, 2003). In a state where some members of parliament are
ideologically inclined the desire to implement their reform agenda will greatly
influence their behaviors in the assembly. There is the instance of Japan in 2003
when some members of the ruling party switched parties to form a new party: the
party defectors sought to push for their reform agenda which they could not
achieve in their former part. Moreover, Nelson Polsby (cited in Ornstein, 1992)
observed that the legislature may be broadly categorized into area and
transformative legislatures (cited in Orstein, 1992). As area legislature, the
assembly serves as forum for discussion of ideas and policies and it provides a
formal platform for deliberation among significant political forces in the life of a
political system. Conversely, the transformative legislature actively translates
ideas into laws. The transformative legislature enjoys a huge measure of
institutional autonomy to act on bills or policy proposals emanating either within
the assembly itself or from the executive arm of the government. They mold and
transform bills and proposals into laws, irrespective of the source.
Nevertheless, a legislature can be transformative in function, a reformer in
character, but such behavior is cautiously exhibited. According to Saffell (1989, p.
66), a common strategy is for congressmen to be conservative, clinging to past

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positions, while cautiously reaching for new positions on a few issues. This
suggests that a legislature may sometimes find it very difficult to openly and
passionately champion the necessity for a drastic reform, unless the action will
improve the political fortune of the members pushing for the reform. Discarding
old ideas for new ones thus means that not only has the society bought into the
reform proposals but also the expected benefits of electoral rewards for the
proponents far outweigh the cost. When this is the case, very many legislators
willingly pursue reform agenda in the legislature. However, where the political
cost is seen to outweigh the benefit, personal interest of the legislators will dictate
that they tread with caution, as far as reform agenda are concerned. This perhaps
explains why reform agenda have been difficult to push through in the Nigerian
legislature in the current fourth republic. Notwithstanding, some legislators have
attempted to push for one reform or the other (Lewis, 2009).
Power of the Legislature under the 1999 Constitution
The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public
policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end is a function of
the level of power given to it by the constitution on one hand and the extent to
which the executive defer to it, on the other hand. Unlike the executive arm which
most often wields a preponderant of discretionary power, in addition to its explicit
constitutional power (Fashagba 2009), the legislature is strictly guided by the
provisions of the constitution that established it. Indeed, for most part of the 1980s
and 90s, precisely a period spanning fifteen years and five months between
January 1984 and May 28, 1999, the Nigerian military was in power, ruling
through decrees and by administrative fiat (Akintayo, 1999). The military
however transferred power to a civilian government under a new constitution in
May, 1999. The 1999 Nigerian constitution which was amended in 2010 is

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currently undergoing another amendment process. The constitution was based on
the presidential system. This translates into the separation of governmental
powers, institutions and personnel under three distinct arms. In other words, the
executive, legislature and judiciary were created as separate institutions, with each
institution manned by distinct personnel. Consequently, each arm of the Nigerian
government draws its power from the 1999 constitution (amended in 2010). In this
study, the interest is particularly on the power vested in the legislature.
The Nigerian central legislature, known as the National Assembly, enjoys a broad
range of power under the 1999 constitution. This is perhaps so not only to rid the
state of its immediate authoritarian past, but also to enable it initiates, molds and
shapes policy on the democratic platform of the fourth republic. Section 4, sub-
section 1 vests the power to make law for the nation in the National Assembly
comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives. In sub-section 2 of
section 4, the constitution provides that:
The National Assembly shall have power to make
laws for the peace, order and good governance of
the federation or any part thereof with respect to
any matter included in the exclusive legislative list
spelt out in part 1 of the second schedule to this
constitution.
In addition to having the exclusive power to make laws on items in the exclusive
list, the National Assembly is equally vested with power to make laws with
respect to any matters in the concurrent list. This is provided for in the sub-section
4a of section 4. This means that the central legislature shares the power to make

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laws with the states (constituent units of the federation) on matters captured in the
concurrent list.
In a similar vein, the National Assembly is vested with a unique power that makes
it the only institution of the democratic government that can openly and legally
amend the constitution of Nigeria. This is captured in section 9 of the 1999
constitution. However, the amendment of any section of the constitution by the
National Assembly must be supported by the resolutions of not less than two-
thirds majority of all the members of the central legislature and approved by
resolution of the houses of assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states.
There are thirty-six states in the Nigerian federation among which twenty are
required to supportany proposed amendment to any part of the constitution before
such amendment can become valid.
Furthermore, in section 80 of the 1999 constitution, the legislature is vested with
the power to authorize expenditure from consolidated revenue fund of the
federation. The sub-section 3 of the section gives the power to authorize
withdrawal from public funds of the federation to the National Assembly. Also, it
is also part of the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner of withdrawal
of money from the public funds of the federation. The section of the constitution
gives the power to authorize spending and raising funds to the legislature. This
power of the purse importantly allows the legislature immense influence in
shaping government policies, certainly (Saffell, 1989; Verney, 1969). The power
to debate, deliberate, mold and/or amend the annual budgetary appropriation
proposal presented by the executive president is hence the opportunity to shape
the state policies and influence governance. In this manner, the central legislature
ultimately collaborates with the executive to meet the aspirations of the governed.
This legislature’s role in budgetary appropriation proposal, therefore, in a state

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where lack of institutional accountability and participatory policy-making under
successive military regimes bred mismanagement of national resources and
dysfunctional public policy, is of an uttermost imperative. With the legislature-
executive collaboration on budgetary appropriation under the democratic
Nigeria’s fourth republic the economic crisis and erosion of national cohesion
under the juntas should be reversed. There is yet the power to impose tax or duty
vested in the National Assembly, stipulated in section 163 of the 1999
constitution.
And the legislature is given power to intervene in the judicial administration. For
instance, the power to indicate cases in which appeals may be right, cases arising
from judgments in the court of appeal to be referred to the Supreme Court, is
vested in the National Assembly by the provisions of section 233 and sub-section
21. The legislature is also given the power to override executive veto on any bill.
Where the legislature decides to make a bill it has passed have the full force of
law, it can decide to use its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law.
Consequently, the bill so passed by the two-thirds members of the National
Assembly will no longer require presidential assent to become a law.
Considering the enormous constitutional powers vested in the central legislature,
in addition to the fact that it has absolute power to determine its internal
operations (stipulated in section 101 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution), as well as
constitute a distinct and independent body, the legislature of the fourth republic is
maximally equipped, politically and constitutionally, to shape and influence
government policies, and serve as springboard for new ideas and policy reforms.
The extent to which the legislature is able to use these powers, the level at which
it is able to come up with policy initiatives, and the degree to which it is
responsive to public opinions, society's developmental challenges and aspirations

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will determine its impact level on re-engineering the nation, socially,
economically and politically.
2.1.1 The Committee System
Each Branch of the National Assembly meets in plenary session or through one of
its committees. It would be unimaginable to conceive a situation where all the
legislative proposals, report form oversights etc. of the National Assembly are
considered in plenary session. The size of the Assembly of which a good
proportion would want to participate in any discussion before the House would
render this impracticable. As a result, the Assembly has been characterized by a
stable system of committees with fixed functions and jurisdiction. Michael (1979)
Each House may appoint a committee of its members for such special or general
purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such
a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise, delegate any
functions exercisable by it to any such committee. However, neither House is
empowered to delegate to a committee, its power to decide whether a Bill shall be
passed into law or its power to pass a resolution on any matter. (Section 62 of the
1999 Constitution) The National Assembly has several different kinds of
committees, which can be grouped into four. These are the Committee of the whole
House, the Standing Committees, the Special Committees and the select
Committees. (By Virtue of the 1999 Constitution)
Committee of the whole House
The Committee of the whole House as its name suggests, is the whole Senate or
House of Representatives sitting as a committee. This usually happens after a Bill
has been read the second time when it shall stand committed to the whole House
unless the House decides to commit it to a standing or select Committee. In such a
situation, the President or Deputy President of the Senate or the Speaker or Deputy

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Speaker, as the case may be, vacates the chair. However, he continues as the
Chairman of the Committee of the whole House.
Standing Committees
These are sometimes called ‘General Purpose Committees’ and are appointed at
the beginning of the life of each legislature. Under the 1979 Constitution, there
were twenty-seven of these in the House of Representatives and twenty-two in the
Senate. Each Standing Committee in the House of Representatives and the Senate
at that time had twenty-five and eleven members respectively.
Special Committees
These are sometimes called “Special Purposes Committees” and are appointed at
the beginning of each legislative session, though any other special committee may
be appointed by either House and assigned such duties as the need may arise. The
most important of the Special Committees is the Committee of Selection,
appointed at the beginning of every session. Under the 1979 Constitution, in the
Senate, it consisted of the President, the Deputy President and four other senators
while in the House of Representatives, it was made up of the Speaker, Deputy
Speaker and nominees of political parties in accordance with their numerical
strength in the House. Its functions include nominating members to serve on ad
hoc special committees and on parliamentary delegations.
Select Committees and Examples of Committees
The Senate or the House of Representative may appoint a Select Committee of ten
or fifteen members respectively to consider any matter that may be referred to it.
The nomination in each case is by the Committee of Selection after a notice has
been given on a motion made and a question put.
2.1.3 The Oversight Functions
The oversight function of the legislature in Nigeria finds legislative importance in
Section 88, Sub-sections 1(a)- (b) and 2(a)-(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the

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Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that “each House of the National
Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official
Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an
investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to
make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or
government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or
responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by the National
Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be
appropriated by the National Assembly”. Sub-section 2(a)-(b) stipulates that “the
powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of the section are
exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to (a) make laws with respect to any
matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws;
and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration
of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration
of funds appropriated by it”. Besides, Section 89 of the 1999 Constitution
empowers the legislature to procure evidence, summon persons to give evidence
and require such evidence to be given on oath through examination of witnesses.
The National Assembly has the power to summon persons to procure additional
document or oral evidence and (where necessary) issue a warrant to compel
attendance by any person so required, on the pain of punishment if they fail to
attend. The legislature has the constitutional responsibility to supervise and
regulate the activities of the executive arm of government of the federation to
eschew waste and ensure fiscal discipline, observance of the rule of law and strict
compliance in implementing laws as passed by the legislature, and execution of
development programmes and policies. If the National Assembly loses faith in an
agency, the Congress can respond in a number of ways to put things in their proper
perspectives. For example, Congress can pass a law to overrule agency decisions,

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and/or to narrow the agency’s jurisdiction. It can use its appropriations power to
restrict the agency’s funding. It can also narrow the agency’s regulatory authority.
Ezeani (2010) noted that in spite of the importance of legislative oversight in
contemporary democratic governance, it has been controversial in all ramifications
in the political scene, and has remained the major source of executive and
legislative conflict in Nigeria. A former Attorney-General of the Federation and
Minister of Justice, Honourable Justice Oluwadare Aguda had once argued that
oversight functions as was carried out by the legislature was often unconstitutional
and violates the principle of separation of powers which is basic to democratic
government. He observed that “the legislature in Nigeria is systematically usurping
the functions of both the executive and the judiciary”, warning that “this could
hamper political stability and socio-economic development”
Therefore, the central thesis of the criticisms of legislative oversight is its integrity
which has been subjected to questions by critics who contend that oversight has
become a political tool for the harassment and blackmail of members of the
executive branch and perceived political enemies or rivals. It is argued that this
scenario gave credence to former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s stance on
different occasions on oversight functions, whereby it is alleged that he directed
some of his Ministers to ignore National Assembly summons because he
considered such political aberrations as undue interference, illegal acts and
ungodly avenues for corruption and extortions of resources from the Ministers.
Notwithstanding, the legislature with its robust legal instruments, is the symbolic
arm of government that determines the effectiveness or otherwise of democratic
governance. The power of legislative oversight is not without limitations as was
rightly captured by Chief Justice Warren as he succinctly observed that:

23
The power of congress to conduct investigation is
inherent in the legislative process. The power is
broad; it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defect in our social, economic or political system
for the purpose of enabling congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into department of
the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency and waste. But broad as this power of
inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of the congress nor is the congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. There are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of
government. No enquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to, and in furtherance of the legislative
task of the congress. Investigation conducted
solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to “punish” those investigated is
indefensible. Warren (2012)
It is expressly explicit from the above jurist’s assertion that the primary objective
of legislative power is, generally speaking, to lie down, be they decision rules or
conduct rules and to carry out oversight and investigative function. It must be
recognized that the legislative’s power to investigate is not absolute as it has some

24
legal impediments. This was made known by the court in Tony Momoh Vs. Senate
of the National Assembly (1982) NCLR 105. In that case, the Court of Appeal
clearly held that section 82 of the 1979 Constitution (akin to section 88 of the 1999
Constitution) is not designed to enable the legislature usurp the general
investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the
judiciary. Any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose
defined in section 82(2) that is now 88(2) of the 1999 Constitution is invalid. The
prosecution of the persons guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or
misconduct in the discharge of the public office is left to the executive. This only
reinstates the doctrine of separation of power between the various arms of
government. Invariably, the oversight functions of the legislature end up with
identifying corruption, misconduct of public officers, resource waste or
inefficiency in service, review of government actions and activities for good
governance, etc. and findings thereof are referred to the appropriate arm of
government for further necessary actions in order to address the issues raised
therein inappropriate and acceptable procedures.
The Meaning Objective and Function of Legislative Oversight Function
According to Ndoma-Egba (2012), legislative oversight refers to the power of the
legislature to review, monitor and supervise government agencies, programmes,
activities and policy implementation strategies of the executive arm of government.
This is to ensure that the arm sustains the principles of good governance, remains
responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorates. The committee structure
of the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate) is being used to
execute oversight functions through supervision, watchfulness, or curtail excesses,
review of executive actions and activities. Oversight functions ensure that activities
of the executive arm of government and its agencies are kept under constant
surveillance and scrutiny by the legislature. A leading role for the legislature has

25
always been adjudged an essential defense against executive tyranny. The
legislature monitors, raises queries and (where necessary) censors executive
activities, activities of government agencies (such as ministries, departments,
parastatals, etc.) to ensure good governance and accountability (Onuoha, 2009).
John Locke (quoted in Johari, 1989) noted that it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons who have the power of
making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they
may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make. When the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body
of magistrates, there can be no liberty because apprehension may arise, lest the
same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a
tyrannical manner (Johari, 1989:280). Heywood (1997:318) observed that the
legislative and representative roles of assemblies have declined in significance;
greater emphasis has been placed on the ability of assemblies to constrain or check
executive power. Assemblies have increasingly become scrutinizing bodies, the
principal role of which is to deliver responsible or accountable government. He
noted that assemblies are not always effective in calling executives to account. For
example, in the National People’s Congress in China, control by a monopolistic
party, party loyalty has turned the assembly into a mere propaganda weapon, with
government policy nearly always being approved by unanimous votes. This means
that party discipline also constrains parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. In
essence, the principal function of the assembly in this context is to uphold and
support government actions and activities as majority of the members of
parliament belong to the governing party. The ruling political party ideology and
interest override national interest to retain, sustain and consolidate political power.
The legislative oversight, a critical aspect of the functions of the legislature other
than law making, have been severally compromised and often misused to serve

26
personal interest. These lapses have given rise to query why the legislative
oversight, a robust mechanism institutionalized to checkmate the excesses of the
executive arm of government and its agencies to curb waste in governance,
corruption, absolutism in the exercise of political power, has been compromised.
The end of absolute executive power is affirmed by giving to the legislature, and to
it alone, the right or power to make laws. In this context, arbitrary government is
replaced by a formal procedure for law making. Therefore, if the painstaking
process for passing bills into law is eloquent signal to demonstrate the degree of
importance attached to government by rules rather than individual arbitrariness,
why do law makers compromise the very ingredient for checks and balances in
governance? Thus the criticism as to the relevance of legislative oversight in
democracy, the primary objective of this article is to investigate the activities of the
legislature on its legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ
in ensuring accountability, responsiveness and sustainability of good governance in
Nigeria polity.
Challenges of Law-Making and Lawmakers Oversight Function in Nigeria
The foregoing analysis of the score card of the legislature in Nigeria shows that a
lot needs to be done by the legislature to ensure or promote good governance in
Nigeria and a considerable difference can be done through oversights. The law-
making process is beset with a legion of challenges that need to be addressed
squarely for the legislature to be truly independent of the executive in conducting
oversights and achieve the much-needed succor for Nigerians through legislation.
The challenges include the following:
 Lack of Established Democratic Culture
The Nigeria’s fledgling democracy is at its infancy, Eine, O.I, (op.cit at 2008). The
debilitating effect of prolonged military rule in Nigeria has produced negative
consequences that continue to haunt individuals and institutions in Nigeria. The

27
legislature is not an exception. The legislature today is truly not independent of the
Executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from acting as the watchdog of
executive activities. Annan, K (2005) Thus, the inordinate ambition of members
and leadership of the legislative houses often sees them hob-nobbing with the
executive such that valuable time for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying
for juicy leadership positions and committees in the legislative houses.
 Corruption And Nepotism
Corruption and nepotism have been the bane of public life in Nigeria. It is often
rumored that bills hardly sail through the legislature until members have had their
hands greased. Oyewo .O, (2007) The implication of this, therefore, is that debates
on such bills either at the plenary or committee levels cannot be subjected to
thorough scrutiny in the best interest of Nigerians who are the objects of such bills
eventually when they become laws. It is indeed not too gratifying that such
primordial and mundane issues have roles to play in passage of bills into law.
 Personal Interests and Ambition of the Legislators
It is common knowledge that a good number of members of the legislative houses
at both federal and state levels pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them
from combating the challenges of law-making. Members pursue contracts from the
leadership of the houses and even from the executive such that they easily
compromise when it comes to contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of
the house. At times, some members resort to absenteeism from the floor of the
house and do not participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of the
legislators have ambitions to contest for leadership positions in the house or
membership and chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable legislative time is
wasted while pursuing these ambitions.
 Interference With Legislative Oversight Functions By The Executive

28
The legislature is given a lot of powers in the constitution to perform oversight
functions and act as the watchdog of the executive. (See for example, Section 88 of
the Constitution) Again, the legislature must screen and approve certain appointees
of the executive. (See Sections 147, 154(1), 171(4), 231, 238 and 250 of the 1999
Constitution). The legislature is further empowered to even remove the President,
Vice President, Governor and the Deputy Governor through impeachment
procedure provided for in the constitution. (See Sections 148 and 188 of the
constitution). It is however disheartening to say that the exercise of the above
function to ensure good governance for the benefit of all and sundry is often
interfered with and hampered by the executive. This is done, first and foremost, by
the executive ensuring that their cronies are elected as the leaders of those houses
through excessive politicking orchestrated and funded by the executive. Again,
where the legislature musters enough courage and ventures to carry out any of the
oversight functions, the executive often resorts to the use of money to pursue a
“divide and rule” agenda to break the rank and file of the legislators. The effect of
the game is that good governance is denied to Nigerians who are entitled to have
same.
Benefit of Legislative Oversight to the Nigerian Democratic System
 The principle of separation of power is the major ingredient of democracy
which guarantees that the executive arm of government does not control the
affairs of the legislature nor the judiciary. The doctrine of the separation of
powers implies that there should be three separate organs of government with
their separate sets of functions and powers. The presidential system of
government being practiced in Nigeria makes provision for separation of
powers, apportioning disparate powers and duties to the executive, legislative
and judicial arms of government. Essentially, the legislature as a symbol of true
democracy makes laws which the executive is under obligation to implement.

29
The judiciary is legally called upon in the determination of civil rights and
obligations to interpret the laws. This system of government understands from
the onset that powers may be abused and therefore introduced a system that
guarantees checks and balances amongst the three arms of government.
Therefore, through the power of interpretation, the courts can declare laws
made by the legislature unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect
whatsoever. On the other hand, the legislature has the power of oversight over
the execution and administration of laws by the executive. The executive holds
the powers of investigation, coercion and implementation of laws and can as
well use these powers to call the legislature and judiciary to order (Onyekpere,
2012).
 In other words, it implies that the three organs of government should be kept
apart from each other in the interest of individual liberty and it is a perfect
system created for the overall benefit of the citizens. The functions of the
government should be differentiated and performed by different organs
consisting of different bodies of persons so that each department be limited to
its respective sphere of activity and not be able to encroach upon the
independence and jurisdiction of another (Johari, 1989:280). The principal
function of the executive is to execute laws, orders, rules, regulations, decrees,
prevention of the breaches of law, rendering a host of social welfare services
and meting punishment to the delinquents so as to maintain peace and good
government. On the other hand, in spite of its primary function of legislating
laws, amending or repealing existing laws, the legislature serves a number of
overlapping objectives and purposes to improve the efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness of governmental operations; evaluate programmes and
performance; detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary
and capricious behaviour, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct; protect civil

30
liberties and constitutional rights; inform the general public and ensure that
executive policies reflect the public interest; gather information to develop new
legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes; ensure administrative
compliance with legislative intent; and prevent executive encroachment on
legislative authority and prerogatives encapsulates in oversight functions
(http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Congressional_oversight). It also executes the
functions of oversight over the actions or inactions and other activities of the
executive and its agencies.
 Legislative oversight encourages checks and balances; it enthrones fiscal
discipline, good governance, accountability and transparency in public offices.
It promotes accountability in government through enforcing efficiency and cost
effectiveness in course of generating people-centred policies and programmes
necessary to address the numerous challenges confronting governments at all
levels. Congressional oversight takes place when the National Assembly (the
Senate and the House of Representatives) continually review the effectiveness
of the executive arm in carrying out the congressional mandates through
supervision, watchfulness, or review of executive actions and activities. This
helps the National Assembly to establish issues and address problem areas in
order to make the necessary improvements or changes to create an effective
process. This legislative process brings to the knowledge of the public what the
executive branch is doing, and it affords the electorates the opportunity to see
what public office holders are actually doing, whether they are really serving
their collective interest or not. Most often, the public is not aware of what the
government is actually doing. This gives credence to Woodrow Wilson’s (1885)
classic study of the legislative branch as he observed that:
The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function. Unless

31
Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and dispositions of the
administrative agents of the government, the
country must be helpless to learn of how it is being
served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these
thingsand sift them by every form of discussion, the
country must remain in embarrassing, crippling
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most
important it should understand and direct. Wilson
(1885)
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Various theories abound that could be adopted as framework upon which the
literature could be built, these theories range from; Structural Functionalism,
Systems theory and theory of checks and balance. All three theories will be
discussed subsequently but for the purpose of this study we will adoptthe theory of
checks and balance.
System Theory and Structural Functionalism Theory
Although structural functionalism finds its roots much earlier than systems theory,
as researchers use it today, it is based on systems theory. Structural functionalism
traces its beginnings back to the ancient Greeks and the writings of Aristotle
(Susser, 1992). Systems theory emerged much later. Although the discussion of
systems began with biologists in the l9th century systems theory was not fully
articulated until the 1920s. Ludwig von Bertalanry (1956, 1962), who developed
general systems theory was a principal in establishing it as a field of study.
Although systems theory originated later than functionalism, when researchers
study functions within their structures – such as is the case in committees in the
legislature functioning as organs in a system – they do it within the scope of

32
systems. The study of political systems came into its own with the adoption of a
structural-Functional approach.
The systems approach of David Easton (1965a, l965b) and Karl W. Deutsch (1963)
grew out of sociological and communication theory and a move toward the theory
and data of politics (Almond & Powell, 1966). Easton and Deutsch followed a
communication, or cybernetic, model to study politics. Gabriel A. Almond's study
of political systems grew out of a tradition of political theory and draws from
sociological and communications theories. While Easton and Deutsch adopted a
purely systems approach, Almond applied structural functionalism to systems
theory. Both have value in the study of political systems.
Systems Theory
A system, according to Anatol Rapoport (1966, 1968), is a set of interrelated
entities connected by behavior and history. Specifically, he stated that a system
must satisfy the following criteria:
1. One can specify a set of identifiable elements – committees.
2. Among at least some of the elements, one can specify identifiable relations –
committees and the body of legislature.
3. Certain relations imply others.
4. A certain complex of relations at a given time implies a certain complex (or one
of several possible complexes) at a later time. (Rapoport, 1966)
This definition is broad enough to include systems as different as the solar system
and language. Social systems, including economics and politics or in this case the
various committees and the body of legislature and their constituents, fit within the
definition. Social systems might be described as a class of entities (individuals,
families, institutions) with relations among them (communication channels,
influence, obligations). Systems are classified by the "nature of their relation to
their environments" and the search for laws governing the behavior of each class

33
(Rapoport, 1968). Systems appear to have "a will" of their own and a 'purpose" to
maintain a steady state. Living systems do this through homeostasis mechanisms
that restore equilibrium. Social systems have similar mechanisms (Rapopo 1968).
While systems in the physical sciences (like the solar system, chemical reactions,
and ecological systems) are extremely rigorous, social systems are less precise. In
social systems, the elements and relations are vague and hard to define. As the
basic unit of social systems, roles are commonly difficult to identify and classify.
For the "hard" sciences, this ambiguity would be regarded as problematic, but with
the social sciences, it would be commonplace (Rapopo 1966).
The Political System
A long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account for
the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell
(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that
characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships
are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these
power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and
applied to sociology. Political roles deal with decision making on behalf of society
and with performing actions that implement the decisions and allocate scarce
resources. In analyzing the political system, the researcher typically describes these
roles and the people performing them. Traditionally, the main approach to
classification has been "the distribution of power" or more practically the
supervision of members of legislatures on resources already allocated – in the form
of oversight – (Mitchell, 1968) among the members of the system. Because the one
dimension of roles has inadequately described political systems, systems analysts
have developed more inclusive variables that lend themselves better to
measurement (Mitchell, 1968). Talcott Parsons (1951) put forth a set of variables

34
that he called pattern-variables. Gabriel Almond (1956; Almond & Coleman,
1960) suggested classifying structures based on;
(a) The degree of differentiation between structures,
(b) The extent to which the system is "manifest" or "visible,"
(c) The stability of the functions of the various roles, and
(d) The distribution of power. Mitchell (1968) added a fifth dimension, concerning
the "sustainability of roles."
Applying Systems Analysis
Easton (1966) proposed to define political systems more broadly than did
Rapoport. Eastondefined a system as "any set of variables regardless of the degree,
of interrelationship among them". He preferred this definition because it freed the
researcher from the need to prove that a political system is really a system. The
only question of importance became whether the system was interesting and thus
worth studying. The analysis need only provide understanding and an explanation
of the human behavior that was of concern to the researcher. Easton (1953, 1966)
suggested that a political system was distinct from other systems because it
concerned itself with "the interactions through which values are authoritatively
allocated for a society" (1966). He divided the political environment into two parts:
the intra-societal and the extra-societal. The first comprises those systems in the
same society as the political system that are not political systems because they do
not have political interactions. Intra-societal systems form the segments of society
of which the political system is a component, including the economy, culture,
social structure, and personalities. These systems create and shape the conditions in
which the political system operates. A changing economy culture or social
structures all have impact on political life. The extra-societal environment includes
all the systems that are outside the given society. They may form a supra-system of
which the political system may be a part.

35
Structural Functionalism
The terms functional analyses and structural analyses have been applied to a great
variety of approaches (Cancian, 1968; Merton, 1968). With their broad use in the
social sciences has come discussion of the appropriateness of the use of structure
and function and the type of analysis associated with the concepts (Levy, 1968).
The functional approach is used more often than any other method in the study of
Western political science (Sussec 1992). Although structural functionalism
predated systems theory it still presupposes a "systems" view of the political world.
Similarities link functionalism to systems analysis. Susser (1992) writes that both
focuses on input—output analysis, both see political systems as striving for
homeostasis or equilibrium, and both consider feedback in their analysis. Yet
functionalism is significantly different.
Applying Functional Analysis to the Study of Politics
According to Michael G. Smith (1966), four approaches are useful in the
comparative study of political systems: process, content, function, and form.
Studies based on process and content face huge obstacles. In developed countries,
the processes of government are "elaborately differentiated, discrete and easy to
identify," but in simpler societies, the same processes are rarely differentiated and
discrete". They occur within the context of institutional activities that are difficult
to analyze for political processes. The more "differentiated and complex" the
government processes, the "greater the range and complexity" of content. Since
content and process are "interdependent and derivative," they require independent
criteria for studying government. The functional approach does not have the same
limitations as process and content, It defines government as all those activities that
influence "the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed
for a society" (Easton, 1957). From this definition, various schemata were
developed to study the functions of government. Easton listed five modes of action

36
as elements of all political systems: legislation, administration, adjudication, the
development of demands, and the development of support and solidarity. These
were grouped as input and output requirements of political systems.
An Example of the Structural Functional Approach and systems Theory
Structural functionalism analysis consists of nothing more than stating empirical
questions in one of the following forms or some combination of them:
(a) What observable uniformities (or patterns) exist in the phenomenon under
study?
(b) What conditions result because of the phenomenon?
(c) What processes occur as a result of the conditions?
The first question asks: What structures are involved? The second:
What functions have resulted because of the structures? Asked in the opposite
direction, different results could occur: What functions exist? What structures
result from the functions? Another problem, according to Levy (1968), is that the
general concept of structure has many different referents, in both the biological and
the social sciences. Joseph Woodger (1948) in biology and Merton (t968) in the
social sciences have pointed to the abundance of referents given to the term
functionalism. This has led to a lot of confusion. Much of the literature is
preoccupied with function, whereas structure has been discussed less, Function
may be defined as any condition or state of affairs resulting from an operation of a
unit of the type under consideration in terms of structure. In the biological sense,
the unit is an organism or subsystem of an organism. In the social sciences, the
unit is usually a set of one or more persons (actors). Structure may be defined as
pattern of observable uniformity in terms of the action or operation taking place. In
the social sciences, the focus of analysis has been on the Criticisms of Structural
Functionalism.

37
Critics of structural functionalism view it as "a translation of Anglo-American
political norms in methodological terminology" (Susser, 1992). Structural
functionalism may be in decline as a methodological approach for the study of
politics; however, it leaves a set of terms that are still used in political jargon.
Some of those in the functionalist camp (Merton among them) rejected the notion
of this decline. Much of what was best in the political research of an entire
generation was couched in its terms (Susser, 1992). One of the main criticisms of
structural functionalism is that its categories were too undifferentiated to be of real
help in actual research (Susser 1992). Although Almond's functional taxonomy has
greater specificity and serviceability than the systems approach, it is seen as not
much more than a translation of familiar and known phenomena into blandly broad
categories. As such it promotes a terminological rather than an essential
transformation in the discipline (Susser, 1992). Another criticism is related to the
methodological approach used in functionalism. A list of functions is created
deductively and then appropriate structures are identified. In some cases, this
approach leads to "empirical contortions" to satisfy the framework. This criticism
applies to much academic research, leaving the researcher, rather than the
approach, responsible for assuring research validity. A final criticism, according to
Susser (1992), is that functionalism "harbors an ideological slant" that sustains
existing structures. It describes what exists rather than what ought to be, thus
maintaining the status quo. As if anticipating this criticism, Almond and Powell
(1966), responded to the criticism that functional-systems theories imply an
equilibrium or harmony of parts and 'that they have a static or conservative bias’.
Political systems are not necessarily harmonious or stable, they wrote, but
interdependent. The task of political science researchers is to ascertain how change
in any one of the part of a political system affects other parts and the whole. They
built political development into their approach to the study of systems. They look

38
at political systems as whole entities shaping and being shaped by their
environments. To understand the processes of political development, they examine
the interaction of the political system with its domestic and international
environments. These theories and the approach are still alive and well (Chamock,
2009; Fisher & Soemarsono, 2008; Fisk & Malamud, 2009; Mohamed, 2007;
Scheuerell, 2008). Understanding politics requires political syntax, much of which
continues to be based on structural functionalism and systems theory.
Weaknesses of the above theories
The weaknesses of functionalist and system theory is that they tend to lead to
exaggerated accounts of positive consequences of events and participation in such
events such as the performance of oversight by legislatures, however it mistakenly
assumes that there are no conflicts of interests between the different groups in
society such as the executive, legislature and judiciary and yet it doesn’t recognize
that politicking without certain checks on excesses can privilege or disadvantage
people more than others. The theory also ignores the powerful historical and
economic factors that have influenced social events and social relationships.
The long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account
for the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell
(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that
characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships
are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these
power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and
applied to sociology, which is a major weakness in the application of system
theory not just to our discussion but to major arguments in the area of political
science. Functionalist theory on the other hand is centered on the idea that there is

39
a consensus in the values and norms of society and that social institutions found
within a society are integrated and function together.
• Assumptions: The conceptual assumptions underlying the approaches can be
divided into two basic areas:
The social system is the prior causal reality and the system parts are functionally
interrelated,
All social phenomena have functions for the larger social system. Concerning these
functions:
• they may be functional for the whole system or only part of it,
• there may be functional alternatives,
• there may be multiple consequences from particular phenomena, and finally,
• Dysfunctions account for tension and change in the system.
 The approaches assume that systems can be identified and specified, that the
boundaries are measurable
• They are ideal model of society rather than an empirically derived one
 Operational definitions are hard to come by
• At their outset they have a tendency to value stability, consensus
• They cannot explain the existence of societies in the first place
• They cannot easily explain rapid social change or breakdown of societies
 Social change and social conflict became significant topics in the latter period
of functionalist dominance

40
• Rests on assumptions that are hard (perhaps impossible) to test
• Explanations can be tautological
Check and Balances Theory
The guarantee of liberty in any given government to the people is the practice of
the theory of separation of powers. This theory according to Gettel, implies that,
the three functions of the government ―should be performed by different bodies
of persons; each department (the legislature, the executive and judiciary) limited to
its own sphere of action, and within that sphere should be independent and
supreme (Chaturvedi; 2006:282). The theory of separation of powers is predicated
on the premise that, if a single group holds all the three powers of the government,
they are bound to have unlimited powers. They could prescribe any law arresting
say, criminals. Because, they exercise unlimited powers could pronounce the
criminals guilty without recourse to fair trial. It is through the separation of powers
that any given group cannot at the same time prescribe, execute and adjudicate in
any case. Otherwise, there will be no justice. That is why, it is only through the
combination of all these departments that a government can use force especially in
a military rule. The theory of separation of powers means that, a different body of
persons is to administer each of the three departments of government (The
legislative, executive and judiciary). And that, no one of them is to have a
controlling power over either of the others. Such separation is necessary for the
purpose of preserving the liberty of the individual and for avoiding tyranny. The
term ―Separation of powers originated with Baron de Montesquieu, a French
enlightenment writer. Nevertheless, the actual separation of powers amongst
different branches of government can be traced to ancient Greece. The framers of
the American constitution decided to base the governmental system on this theory
of separation of powers whereby the legislature, executive and judiciary branches

41
will be separate from each other. This gave rise to the idea of checks and balances
on each other. As a result, no one branch can gain absolute power or abuse the
power given to them like in despotic military regimes. The model of separation of
powers was first developed in ancient Greece and gained recognition by the
Roman Republic as part of the unmodified constitution of the Roman Republic. In
this model, the state is divided into branches, each with separate and independent
powers and areas of responsibility in such a way that no branch has more powers
than the other branches. This also, forms the concept of separation of church and
state as is the practice in many countries of the world depending on the applicable
legal structures and the prevailing views towards the exact roles of religion in the
given society. In respect to our discussion it will imply the roles assigned each of
the committees in oversight investigation, reporting its findings to the body of
legislature thereby strengthening in practical terms the notion of checks and
balances.
Meaning and origins of the concept
It must be noted that, the doctrine of separation of powers has been developed over
the centuries. The evolution of the conceptof separation of powers can be traced to
the British Parliament‘s gradual assertion of power and resistance to the royal
decrees during the 14th century. James Harrington, an English scholar was one of
the first modern philosophers to analyze the doctrine of separation of powers.
Harrington in his essay, ―Common Wealth of Oceana (1656), built upon the
works of earlier philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli, described a
utopian political system that included a separation of powers. In his second
Treatise on Government (1690), John Locke an English Political theorist, gave the
concept of separation of powers more refined treatment. John Locke argued that
legislative and executive powers were conceptually different. But that it was

42
necessary to separate them in government institutions. However, in Locke‘s
conception, judicial power played no significant role.
The modern idea of the doctrine of separation of powers was vigorously explored
in the ―Spirit of Laws (1748) by Baron de Montesquieu a French Political writer
in his work. He based his exposition on the British constitution of the first part of
the 18th century the way he understood it. As a doctrine, it has been interpreted as,
―Where an individual occupies the position of both the executive and the
legislature, there is the danger of the legislature enacting oppressive laws which the
executive will administer to attain its own ends. Montesquieu in the process
outlined a three-way division of powers in England amongst the parliament, the
king and the courts, even though such divisions were not in existence at that time.
Montesquieu apparently believed that the stability of the English government was
due to this practice of separation of powers despite the fact that he did not use the
word ―separation. It must be realized that Plato, Aristotle, Harrington, Locke,
Montesquieu and other commentators saw the conceptof separation of powers as a
way to eliminate the arbitrary powers to check dictatorial tendencies. One
condition of liberty is the separation of the legislature from the executive, and the
existence of an independent and impartial judiciary. It is also as a result of this that,
Montesquieu regarded ―the separation of powers as an essential safeguard of
liberty. According to him, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. That is why according to Gettel, this doctrine
implies that the three functions of the government ―should be performed by
different bodies of persons; each department limited to its own sphere of action,
and within that sphere should be independent and supreme (Chaturevedi,
2006:282).
Hence, separation of powers is presently understood to mean that, none of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers is able to interfere with the others. For

43
example, the Judges should be independent of the executive and legislature in
theory. Or that the same persons should not hold posts in more than one of the
three branches. For example, that one branch of government should not exercise
the functions of another. That is, the executive should not make laws which fall
within the purview of the legislature. That be as it may, closely related to this
theory is the ―doctrine of checks and balances. This doctrine states that,
governmental power should be controlled by overlapping authority within the
government and by giving citizens the right to criticize state actions and remove
officials from office. But the big question is, what happens in despotic military
regimes and, dictatorial civilian regimes or in parliamentary systems where the
cabinet minister must be a member of either houses of parliament as we have seen
in Mymmar (Burma), Nigeria, before 1966 Coup, Thailand, Chile, China, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before it crumbled in 1989 with the
introduction of glass-note and prestorica by Govbachev or how about where there
is one party dominance in a political system? The whole argument in favor of
separation of powers will be meaningless as well as hopeless in the above situation
or circumstances. Nevertheless, it must be stated that, like in Italy and in most
democracies, separation of governmental powers in their constitutions has a
separate constitutional courts to review cases that raise constitutional issues. Such
democratic countries create such mechanisms to ensure judicial independence from
legislative and executive officials. However, some scholars were of the opinion
that, creating an extreme separation of powers can make government less effective
because, it increases the possibility of ―governmental paralysis. Where the leaders
in different branches of the government disagree about fundamental objectives, the
country‘s official business will come to a standstill.

44
Is separation of powers feasible?
It must be noted that, separation of powers is almost impossible to carry out in
actual practice. ―However, in a modified form the theory has been adopted in
America, Nigeria France and other countries. The President and the legislature in
U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, are both elected by the people and are responsible
to them. While the judges once appointed hold office during good behavior. But in
both U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, the President has the legislative power of
vetoing to bills and the Senate has the executive duties of sanctioning
appointments and treaties, while, the Supreme Court has the power to determine
the constitutionality of the laws. In India and France for example, where there is
parliamentary form of government in place, the executive is responsible to the
legislature because, the cabinet members are members of the legislature and
therefore performs both executive and legislative functions. In England with
parliamentary system in place, there is no separation of powers because, the House
of Lords performs judicial functions and the judiciary has jurisdiction over the
executive officers. The cabinet performs legislative functions and its members are
also the members of the parliament (Sachdeva and Gupta; 1980:221).
Separation of powers in Nigeria in theory and practice
It is interesting to note that, the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle which spells
the roles and duties of the three arms of the government. These principles are
enunciated in the constitution as follows:
Part I Section 231(1), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of
Chief Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the president on the recommendation of
the National Judicial Council subject to the confirmation of such appointment by
the Senate.

45
Part I Section 231(2), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of a
Justice of the Supreme Court shall be made by the president on the
recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of the
appointment by the Senate.
Section 232 (2) states that, in addition to the Jurisdiction conferred upon it by sub-
section(1) of this section, the Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction
as may be conferred upon it by any Act of the National Assembly.
Part II Section 4(8) states that, save as otherwise provided by this constitution,
exercise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of
Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of Judicial
tribunals established by law and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of
Assembly shall not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a
court of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law.
Chapter V (The Legislature) Section 5 8(1) States that, ―The Power of the
National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised except as otherwise provided
by this section and sub-section (5) of this section, assented to by the President.
Section 58(3) says, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House in which it
originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and it shall be presented to the
President for assent when it has been passed by that other House and agreement
has been reached between the two Houses on any amendment made on it.
Section 5 8(4) states that, ―Where a bill is presented to the President for assent, he
shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent.
Chapter V Part II (House of Assembly of A State) Section 100(1) states that,
―The Power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by bills
passed by the House of Assembly and, except as otherwise provided by this
section, assented to in accordance with the provisions of this section.

46
Section 100(2) states that, ―a bill shall not become Law unless it has been duly
passed and, subject to sub-section (1) of this section, assented to in accordance
with the provision of this section.
Section 100(3) states that, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House of
Assembly; it shall be presented to the Governor for assent.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the essence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is to protect the arbitrariness of rules. It by bills passed by both the Senate
and House of Representative and, prevents the danger that is most likely to
emanate by the conferment of two much powers any single person or body and
check of one power by another (The Tide; 2010:23). The power of the executive to
convene the legislature and to veto its enactments affirms of defense while the
legislative power to impeach is necessary and sufficient to hold the executive
accountable to examination without holding him hostage. The people also look
forward to the judiciary for the dispensation of justice and that of judge must
carefully but firmly set out to administer according to law which is established by
the legislature or by the binding authority of president, which itself is substantially
founded on the laws passed by the legislature (The Tide: 20 10:23). Despite the
grammatical niceties with which the constitution is coated with in practice, any
rigid separation of the state departments as stated above is obviously going to
paralyze the governmental activities of the state. In theory separation of powers
seems to imply that, the powers of government consist mainly in making,
executing and applying laws to cases through the rule of law.
The theory of separation of power is most apt in this research because, here
separation of powers appears not to operate any legal restriction on power but, it
provides the basis for important principles which the law protects such as
independence of the judiciary and in this context the committees of the national
assembly in carrying out their various oversight functions as enshrined in their

47
constitutional rights as members of the legislative arm of government. It provides a
basis for the adoption of structure processes and control which protects liberty now
and in the future for the members of such committees to effectively and efficiently
discharge their responsibilities of checks on the executive. It guards against broad
spectrum of the ills like absurd judgment avaricious and ambitious self-serving
behavior and inefficient performances of functions, in other words checks the
excesses of all the legislatures who are to carry out the function of checks on the
executive and it’s MDA’s. In respect to our topic theory of check and balance
helps to identify some of the lope holes in the parastatals and ministries which are
under the auspices of the executive arm of government. The various committees set
up by the body of legislature will by virtue of their oversight responsibility check
the excesses of the executive through its MDA’s and by this strengthen
transparency and accountability which are essential pillars of democracy. And as it
is known our system of government evolves new conventions, political practices
and events at times which also require legal rules which will need to be devised to
protect the liberty of the people and our nascent democracy. The doctrine of
separation of powers therefore provides the justification for these measures and
helps to determine their nature and scope. Apparently, there is the need to monitor
our political system, be vigilant about our liberty and advocate new measures when
the liberty is threatened.

48
CHAPTER THREE
Legislative Oversight in Nigeria
3.1 Restoration of Democratic Dispensation in Nigeria
The name Nigeria was coined by Mrs. Flora Shaw who later became the wife of
the British Governor General Lord Lugard. The entity Nigeria was an amalgam of
the hitherto empires, kingdom and chiefdoms were made under a single
administrative system. In 1960, Nigeria got its independence through the combined
efforts of Nigerians in diaspora as well as the activities of nationalist such as Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
Three major political parties existed during this period thus Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC), and the
Action Group (AG) while the NPC has its stronghold in the north, the NCNC
dominating the south east and the A.G in the south west. NPC and NCNC formed
an alliance in the 1959 general election and subsequently won the election and
formed the government with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the Prime Minister and
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as President. As the Prime Minister of the newly independent
nation, Balewa made an unparallel effort in uniting and integrating all the regions.
However his government was ousted in a military coup led by major Kaduna
Chukwuma Nzeagu in January 1966. A counter coup was staged in May 1966
where General Yakubu Gawon became the president and soon a rancor became
inevitable within the ranks of the Nigerian Army. This discontents culminated in
the three year Nigerian civil war (1967 – 1970) with its attendant loss of significant
proportion.
General Yakubu Gowon was in turn ousted by General Muritala Ramat
Mohammed. Mohammed barely spent six months as the Nigerian President when

49
Colonel Buka Dinka assassinated him. General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded
Mohammed and later in 1973, a general election was conducted and Alhaji Shehu
Shagari became the President of the second republic. His government was marred
by series of crisis and in 1978, General Mohamed Buhari topple his government in
a military coup. Buhari also barely spent one year when General Ibrahim Badamosi
Babangida overthrew him in 1978, IBB rule for eight years (1975 – 1983) after
which a general election was conducted. The 1983 election was adjudged to be the
freest and fairest election ever conducted in the history of Nigeria. Moshood
Abiola emerged the winner of the June 12 election but the military governments
choose to hand over power to an interim government led by Shonekan. General
Sani Abacha took over power from Shonekan in 1993 and he died in 1998 in a
controversial circumstance and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power
and conducted the 1999 General election that ushered the third republic.
Nigeria’s democratic journey in contemporary times began with the tacit
acceptance by the military hierarchy of the need to demilitarize the nation’s
political space. This gained actual fruition on May 29, 1999 when the then General
Abdulsalami Abubakar as Head of State handed over political power to an elected
President in the person of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. For over ten years of
democratic experimentation, the nation has conducted and witnessed four general
elections which took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and the most recent 2011 elections
respectively. All of these election, especially the first three, have had their
outcomes vehemently contested in the court of law and election tribunals; and
heavily repudiated in the domains of the general public. This has been the case
because these elections have been conducted in a fashion in which they have been
easily characterized by myriad of irregularities. These irregularities have in turn,
left the electorate and the entire masses speechless and utterly disenfranchised

50
while at the same time draining mass of qualified voters into cesspits of mortal
political apathy. For example, Fidelis and Stephen cited Oddih (in Jega and Ibeanu
eds 2007:179) has cleverly noted that “the net effect” of an election that is
characterized by “fraud and manipulations” or irregularities is that it “… can lead
to apathy, leadership crisis, political violence, assassination galore, poor political
culture and insensitivity to the needs of the people”. Fidelis and Stephen (2014
p:131) further argued that the ignoble frauds that have dogged elections in the
country have only led to the ascendancy of leaders at all levels whose kettle of
legitimacy is dry, or whose political oasis has evaporated. And, it is an
uncontrovertibly conclusion that a leader without the people’s legitimacy in a
democratic formation is naturally exposed to the vagaries of unpopular,
unacceptable government. To this end, the leader becomes susceptible to self-
destruction, at least politically.
3.2 Overview of Oversight Functions in the Fourth Republic
The oversight functions of the legislature or its investigative power has attracted
some degree of criticisms against its apparent abuse of this parliamentary
mechanism since the inception of 1999 democratic dispensation. The National
Assembly’s perception of legislative oversight function as a short-cut to richness is
generally worrisome because it negates the principle of good governance. Any
legislative investigation means a sure way of enriching the legislators involved in
the exercise, and it earns them political relevance in the system as they seem to
assume quasi-judicial demigods to those public officers being investigated. As
soon as they secure the chairmanship of these committees, the next item on their
political agenda is oversight functions, which results in the preliminary
investigation trips to parastatals and government departments under their
supervision, and subsequent public sittings (a parliamentary simulation exercise for

51
public entertainment). Most often, the orchestrated committees abandon the
substance at issue to chase the shadow with a view to humiliating and intimidating
their prey to bow to pressure and accept to negotiate for unholy settlement.
Akomolede and Bosede (2012) espoused this observation thus:
The legislature is truly not independent of the
executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from
acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus,
the inordinate ambition of members and leadership
of the legislative houses often sees them hob-
nobbing with the executive such that valuable time
for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying for
juicy leadership positions and committees in the
legislative houses. It is common knowledge that a
good number of members of the legislative houses
pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them
from combating the challenges of lawmaking.
Members pursue contracts from the leadership of
the houses and even from the executive such that
they easily compromise when it comes to
contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of
the house. At times, some members resort to
absenteeism from the floor of the house and do not
participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of
the legislators have ambitions to contest for
leadership positions in the house or membership and
chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable

52
legislative time is wasted while pursuing these
ambitions.
To buttress the inordinate ambitions of some members of the legislature, an
inference may be drawn from this scenario where in a public hearing conducted by
a committee of the House of Representatives during which specific charges of
corruption were preferred by Ms Aruma Oteh, the Director- General of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the Chairman of the House
Committee (Mr. Herman Hembe) which raised fundamental questions about
Nigeria’s system of government. The report revealed that “as part of its statutory
oversight functions, the House [of Representatives] Committee on Capital Market
and Institutions probed the manifest cause of the near collapse of the capital
market” for two years running. It was alleged that the House Committee Chairman
resorted to unguarded utterances on the accused thus: “you are not fit to regulate
the sector”. The Committee Chairman allegedly accused Ms Oteh of profligacy,
asserting that she had “been spending money as if it was going out of fashion since
assuming office one year ago. You stayed in a hotel for eight months and spent
over N30 million. In one day you spent N85,000 on food at the hotel. The other
day you spent N850,000 on food. These are the things we should look at to see
how you will regulate a market that is collapsing (The Nation Newspaper, March
21, 2012, p.2). The Director-General was completely taken aback as she could not
put up a defense immediately. Rather, she questioned the credibility of the
Chairman to preside over the probe, alleging that the Committee Chairman (Mr.
Hembe) collected a cheque to travel to the Dominican Republic to attend a
conference. He did not attend the conference nor did he return the money. She
accused him of undermining his capacity to carry out his duties as Chairman of
House Committee by asking the Securities and Exchange Commission to
contribute N39 million for the public hearing, and demanded N5 million for

53
himself to avert justice. The Director-General of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) queried why the Chairman received information from the SEC
and passed judgment based on its face value without reference to the Commission
to verify the veracities of the issues raised therein. Aguda (2012) noted that while
bribery and corruption could seriously undermine any system of government, they
are not as fundamental in the damage they can do to a system of government as the
breach of the principle of separation of powers or as a disregard for fair hearing as
illustrated above. Hence, he made reference to the time-honoured procedure for the
conduct of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings which has long been well
established by the courts in all the common law countries, including Nigeria. The
procedure requires that any person against whom any allegation is made, or whose
interest may be adversely affected by such allegation, or by any statement made,
must be clearly and fully informed of such allegations or statements in advance of
any trial or investigation involving the accused. Therefore, the principles of legal
procedure demands thus:
Before any accused person is required to make his
or her defense or counter any statements adversely
affecting him or his interest, the following
requirements must be complied with. First, the
accused must be given the details of all allegations
or statements made against him; then he must be
afforded reasonable time and opportunity to prepare
his defense effectively to all the matters at issue; he
must be able to confront and challenge his accuser
or accusers at his trial or during any investigation.
These requirements apply in all situations and to all
proceedings involving any form of trial or

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