This document summarizes a presentation on database authentication methods and security. It discusses different hashing algorithms used by Oracle over time, password cracking calculations, and various authentication methods including native Oracle authentication, secure wallet stores, LDAP/OID, Kerberos integration with Active Directory, and Kerberos configuration in Oracle 12c. Key topics covered include hashing algorithms, password strength, external user security, and single sign-on authentication protocols.

1. DOAG Konferenz 2016
Oracle Logon Security:
Last Man Standing
Database Authentication Methods –
A Practical Comparison

2. DOAG Konferenz 2016
Jan Schreiber
Loopback.ORG GmbH, Hamburg
Database Operations &
Security
Data Warehouse &
Business Intelligence
Oracle Architektur &
Performance

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Table
USER: SYSTEM
PW: MANAGER
USER: SCOTT
PW: TIGER
USER: OLAPSYS
PW: OLAPSYS
USER: ANONYMOUS
PW: ANONYMOUS
Table 8-2 Oracle 9i Default Accounts and Passwords

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Quelle: XKCD

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Oracle Hash Algorithms
3DEShash(upper
(username||password)
)
password hash (20
bytes) = sha1(password
+ salt (10 bytes))
S8F2D65FB5547B71C8DA3760F10960428CD307B1C6271691FC55C1
F56554A;
H:DC9894A01797D91D92ECA1DA66242209;
T:23D1F8CAC9001F69630ED2DD8DF67DD3BE5C470B5EA97B622F75
7FE102D8BF14BEDC94A3CC046D10858D885DB656DC0CBF899A79CD
8C76B788744844CADE54EEEB4FDEC478FB7C7CBFBBAC57BA3EF22C
Age old:
11gR1:
12.1.0.2:
11g SHA1
hash
12.1.0.1: HTTP Digest
(md5digest(‘USER:XDB:password'))
PBKDF2-based SHA2(SHA512) hash

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Fox
The red fox jumps
over the blue dog
The red fox jumps
oevr the blue dog
The red fox jumps
ouer the blue dog
The red fox jumps
oer the blue dog
DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A
696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17
0086 46BB FB7D CBE2 823C
ACC7 6CD1 90B1 EE6E 3ABC
8FD8 7558 7851 4F32 D1C6
76B1 79A9 0DA4 AEFE 4819
FCD3 7FDB 5AF2 C6FF 915F
D401 C0A9 7DA9 46AF FB45
8ACA D682 D588 4C75 4BF4
1799 7D88 BCF8 92B9 6A6C
cryptographic
hash function
Input Digest

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size number of hashes cum hashes 50% Time (days) time (mins)
1 26 26 0 0
2 936 962 0 0
3 33.696 34.658 0 0
4 1.213.056 1.247.714 0 0
5 43.670.016 44.917.730 0 0
6 1.572.120.576 1.617.038.306 0 17
7 56.596.340.736 58.213.379.042 0 606
8 2.037.468.266.496 2.095.681.645.538 8 21.830
9 73.348.857.593.856 75.444.539.239.394 273 785.881
10 2.640.558.873.378.820 2.716.003.412.618.210 9.824 28.291.702
11 95.060.119.441.637.400 97.776.122.854.255.600 353.646 1.018.501.280
12 3.422.164.299.898.950.000 3.519.940.422.753.200.000 12.731.266 36.666.046.070
13 123.197.914.796.362.000.000 126.717.855.219.115.000.000 458.325.576 1.319.977.658.532
14 4.435.124.932.669.030.000.000 4.561.842.787.888.150.000.000 16.499.720.732 47.519.195.707.168
15 159.664.497.576.085.000.000.000 164.226.340.363.973.000.000.000 593.989.946.340 1.710.691.045.458.060
16 5.747.921.912.739.070.000.000.000 5.912.148.253.103.040.000.000.000 21.383.638.068.226 61.584.877.636.490.000
17 206.925.188.858.606.000.000.000.000 212.837.337.111.709.000.000.000.000 769.810.970.456.125 2.217.055.594.913.640.000
18 7.449.306.798.909.830.000.000.000.000 7.662.144.136.021.540.000.000.000.000 27.713.194.936.420.500 79.814.001.416.891.000.000
19 268.175.044.760.754.000.000.000.000.000 275.837.188.896.775.000.000.000.000.000 997.675.017.711.138.000 2.873.304.051.008.080.000.000
20 9.654.301.611.387.140.000.000.000.000.000 9.930.138.800.283.920.000.000.000.000.000 35.916.300.637.601.000.000 103.438.945.836.291.000.000.000
Password Cracking Calculations
Initinal char keyspace = 16; keyspace = 36; cracker speed = 1.600.000 hash per second

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http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf (2011)

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Oracle Native Authentication Protocol
Client
Oracle
Database Server
Connect [SID]
Resend
Connect [SID]
Accept
....
[Username]
[AUTH_VFR_DATA] (11g Salt)
[AUTH_SESSKEY]
[AUTH_SESSKEY]
[AUTH_PASSWORD ]
Password verification
takes place. Server
authenticates user or
responds with error.

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Secure External Password Store (Wallets)
$ mkstore -wrl /home/jans/oracle/wallet -create
$ mkstore -wrl /home/jans/oracle/wallet -createCredential ORCL
SYSTEM secret
$ sqlplus /@ORCL
SQL*Plus: Release 12.1.0.2.0 Production on Wed Jan 13 15:38:50
2016
Copyright (c) 1982, 2014, Oracle. All rights reserved.
SQL>

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0x00 - 0x4C Header:
0x00 - 0x02 First 3 bytes are always A1 F8 4E (wallet recognition?)
0x03 Type = SSO: 36; LSSO: 38
0x04 - 0x06 00 00 00
0x07 Version (10g: 05; 11g: 06)
0x08 - 0x0A 00 00 00
0x0B - 0x0C 11g: always the same (41 35)
0x0D - 0x1C DES key
0x1D - 0x4C DES secret (DES -> CBC -> PKCS7 padding) which contains the PKCS#12
password
0x4D - EOF PKCS#12 data (ASN.1 block)
________________________________________________________________________________________
$ ./ssoDecrypt.sh ../PX-Linux11/cwallet.sso
sso key: c29XXXXXXXXXX96
sso secret: 71c61e1XXXXXXXXXX99c77d747fa0f53e79ccd170409964b
p12 password (hex): 1e482XXXXXXXXXX1f1f0b296f6178021c
Secure External Password Store Hacking
http://blogs.loopback.org/2015/11/oracle-wallets-hacken/

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Create new wallet
$ echo 1e482XXXXXXXXXX1f1f0b296f6178021c | xxd -p -r > cwallet.key
$ ls -lhrt
total 18K
-rwxr--r-- 1 akira friends 6,5K Nov 24 15:16 ewallet.p12
-rw------- 1 akira friends 6,5K Nov 24 15:16 cwallet.sso
-rw-r--r-- 1 akira friends 16 Nov 24 18:28 cwallet.key
$ dd if=cwallet.sso of=NewP12wallet.p12 bs=1 skip=77
6560+0 records in
6560+0 records out
6560 bytes (6,6 kB) copied, 0,0240742 s, 272 kB/s
Verify validity
$ openssl pkcs12 -in NewP12wallet.p12 -nodes -passin file:cwallet.key
MAC verified OK
Bag Attributes
friendlyName: orakey
localKeyID: E6 B6 52 DD 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
(...)
Set new password
$ orapki wallet change_pwd -wallet NewP12wallet.p12 -oldpwd `cat cwallet.key` -newpwd test1234 Oracle
PKI Tool : Version 12.1.0.2
Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Use new wallet
$ orapki wallet display -wallet NewP12wallet.p12
Oracle PKI Tool : Version 12.1.0.2
Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Enter wallet password:
Requested Certificates:
User Certificates:
Subject: CN=ORCL11G
Trusted Certificates:
Subject: CN=PX.CORP-PROC01,O=px.corp,ST=Hamburg,C=DE
Subject: CN=PX.CORP-ROOT01,O=px.corp,ST=Hamburg,C=DE

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Oracle Internet Directory (OID) / LDAP
(1) Connect
Leonard.
Nimoy/
BIGDB
Verifies hash,
assignes roles and
schema to user
(2) Request
Leonard.Nimoy
(3) Returned
Leonard.Nimoy
LDAP
Server
(OID)
Repository for user,
rolle & EUS
configuration
SQL> alter user ... identified externally;

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Hashes in OID

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Kerberos-AD-
Connection
Verify user data
(2)
AD
Domain Controller
Key Distribution Center (KDC)
Authentication Service (AS)
Ticket Granting Service (TGS)
Authentification(1)
User-Ticket TGT (3)
Client-PC
Ticket-Cache
Check ST for application
server
with TGT (6)
Request Service Ticket ST with TGT (5)
Domain Login
User
Password
TGT (4)
ST (7)
DB Server
ST verification (9)
Shared key exchange

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Kerberos User Login
SQL> create user USER01 identified externally as
'USER01@TESTED.LCL';
User created.
SQL> grant connect to user01;
[oracle@ioaotow01 ~]$ okinit user01
Kerberos Utilities for Linux: Version 12.1.0.2.0 - Production
Copyright (c) 1996, 2014 Oracle. All rights reserved.
Password for user01@TESTED.LCL:
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
[oracle@ioaotow01 ~]$ oklist
Kerberos Utilities for Linux: Version 12.1.0.2.0 - Production on 08-FEB-2016 16:24:43
Copyright (c) 1996, 2014 Oracle. All rights reserved.
Ticket cache: /oracle/diag/krb/cc/krb5cc_99
Default principal: user01@TESTED.LCL
Valid Starting Expires Principal
08-Feb-2016 14:11:20 08-Feb-2016 22:11:11 krbtgt/TESTED.LCL@TESTED.LCL
08-Feb-2016 14:11:33 08-Feb-2016 22:11:11 oracle/ioaotow01@TESTED.LCL
08-Feb-2016 14:16:40 08-Feb-2016 22:11:11 oracle/ioaotow01.tested.lcl@TESTED.LCL
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
[oracle@ioaotow01 ~]$ sqlplus /@TESTDB
SQL*Plus: Release 12.1.0.2.0 Production on Mon Feb 8 16:24:51 2016
Copyright (c) 1982, 2014, Oracle. All rights reserved.
Last Successful login time: Mon Feb 08 2016 14:17:35 +01:00
Connected to: Oracle Database 12c Enterprise Edition Release 12.1.0.2.0 - 64bit Production With
the Partitioning, OLAP, Advanced Analytics and Real Application Testing options
SQL> show user;
USER is "USER01@TESTED.LCL

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AD-Integration with Oracle
Unified Directory (OUD) & Kerberos
DB FARM
OUD
Database
Client
SqlPlus,
Java, etc
(EUS)
Map Users,
Schema,Roles
Groups
OracleContext
OUD Proxy Setup:
• AD-User w/ read privilege
• Read privilege on DB-user
data in AD
• Oracle Context on LDAP
server
• Software: OUD,
WebLogic, ADF
• Works with EUS also[linux7 Oracle_OUD1]$ ./oud-proxy-setup
[linux6]$ okinit testuser
[linux7]$ oklist
Kerberos Ticket
https://wiki.loopback.org/confluence/x/FQCl

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Kerberos & Database 12c
• New Software Stack
• RC4-HMAC-NT / W2012 Server
• ORA-12638: Credential retrieval failed
– SQLNET.AUTHENTICATION_SERVICES= (BEQ,TCPS,KERBEROS5PRE,KERBEROS5)
Bugs...
Reading List:
Doc ID 1958479.1: "Bug 19931730, The keytab has/uses arcfour-hmac encryption which currently has an open 12c bug:19636771. The workaround for this is to use AES encryption in the keytab"
Doc ID 1611643.1: Bug 17497520 : KERBEROS CONNECTIONS USING A 12C CLIENT AND THE OKINIT REQUESTED TGT ARE FAILING
Doc ID 182979.1: Oracle is not able to parse the krb5.conf file due to the tabs between the assignment operator in the domain to realm mapping section.
Doc ID 185897.1: Kerberos Troubleshooting Guide
Master Note For Kerberos Authentication (Doc ID 1375853.1)
WNA- Kinit Fails with Exception: krb_error 6 Client Not Found in Kerberos Database (Doc ID 294890.1): "While creating the keytab file, SSO hostname value was given without specifying fully
qualified domain"
How To Configure EUS Kerberos Authentication For Database Administrative Users (SYSDBA and SYSOPER) (Doc ID 2081984.1): "On a 12c database sqlplus connection fails with ORA-1017 and this
is caused by Bug 19307420 : KERBEROS AUTHENTICATED EUS USER FAILS WITH ORA-01017 FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LOGIN."
Configuring ASO Kerberos Authentication with a Microsoft Windows 2008 R2 Active Directory KDC (Doc ID 1304004.1)
Microsoft Technet: Service Logons Fail Due to Incorrectly Set SPNs
Laurent Schneider: The long long route to Kerberos
Microsoft Technet: FIX: User accounts that use DES encryption for Kerberos authentication types cannot be authenticated in a Windows Server 2003 domain after a Windows Server 2008 R2
domain controller joins the domain
WNA- Kinit Fails with Exception: krb_error 6 Client Not Found in Kerberos Database (Doc ID 294890.1)
Case Study: Configuring the Kerberos Adapter in a Windows Environment (Kevin Reardon, Consulting Technical Advisor)
https://wiki.loopback.org/confluence/x/CwCl

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Mimikatz
Quelle: Benjamin Delpy

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Kerberos Golden Ticket
• The entire Kerberos security relies on
symmetric keys under “krbtgt” account
• – 128 bits for RC4/AES128
• – 256 bits for AES256
• And once generated, these keys aren’t
changed in years
– only during domain functional
upgrade from NT5 -> NT6
– 2000/2003 to 2008/2012
– 2008 -> 2012 doesn’t change the value
– the previous one (n-1) still valid…
Quelle: Benjamin Delpy

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PKI-Authentication
Private Key
Private Key
User /
Application
Database
Certificate Authority (CA)
User
.csr
SSL Handshake
User/CA
Certs
DB
.csr
DB/CA
Certs

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PKI: Certificates and Wallets
Database Server
1. Create empty wallet
2. Create Key and Certificate Request
3. Sign Request by CA (e.g. CN=db12c)
4. Inport CA Certificate (CN=myCA)
5. Import signed server certificate
Database Client
1. Create empty wallet
2. Create Key and Certificate Request
3. Sign request by CA (e.g. CN=jans)
4. Import CA certificate (CN=myCA)
5. Import signed user certificate

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Display Wallet
[oracle@linux11 ~]$ orapki wallet display -wallet
/u01/app/oracle/product/11.2.0/dbhome_1/network/pki
Oracle PKI Tool : Version 11.2.0.3.0 - Production
Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Requested Certificates:
User Certificates:
Subject: CN=LOOPDS
Trusted Certificates:
Subject: OU=Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority,O=VeriSign, Inc.,C=US
Subject: CN=LBO Root Certificate II,OU=LoopCA,O=Loopback.ORG
GmbH,O=Loopback.ORG,L=Hamburg,ST=No-State,C=DE
Subject: OU=Secure Server Certification Authority,O=RSA Data Security, Inc.,C=US
Subject: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root,OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc.,O=GTE
Corporation,C=US
Subject: OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority,O=VeriSign, Inc.,C=US
Subject: OU=Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority,O=VeriSign, Inc.,C=US

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PKI: Login using certificate
SQL> create user JANS identified externally as 'CN=jans';
SQL> grant create session to JANS;
$ sqlplus /@DB12C
Connected.
SQL> select sys_context('USERENV', 'NETWORK_PROTOCOL') from dual;
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','NETWORK_PROTOCOL')
---------------------------------------------------
tcps
SQL> select sys_context('USERENV', 'AUTHENTICATION_METHOD') from dual;
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','AUTHENTICATION_METHOD')
-----------------------------------------------------
SSL

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Windows AD CA with
Autoenrollment

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Linux-Workstations:

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Benefit Analysis
Feature Passwords Pwd Wallets Kerberos SSL-PKI EUS
Password theft protection   ✔ ✔ ./.
Reduced administrative
overhead per user account
  ✔ ✔ ✔
Audit proof   ✔ ✔ ./.
Central user and password
administration
  ✔  ✔
Central role administration     ✔
Serves technical users ✔ ✓  ✔ ✔
Serves human users ✔  ✔  ✔
Minimal rollout difficulty ✔    
No additional license costs ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
No directory dependence ✔ ✔   

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Jan Schreiber, Loopback.ORG GmbH, Hamburg
database intelligence | operations excellence | bi solutions
jans@loopback.org
blogs.loopback.org
Thank you very much for your attention!