Crimea has historically been part of various empires and was part of Ukraine from 1954 until its annexation by Russia in 2014. Russia had been promoting a "Russian world" idea in Crimea for years prior to annexation through various civil organizations and influencing authorities. In early 2014, Russian forces seized control of the Crimean parliament and blockaded Ukrainian military units in Crimea. A referendum was held and Crimea was annexed by Russia in March 2014, demonstrating a new era of hybrid warfare involving information and psychological operations.

1. Annexation of Crimea:
story and lessons

2. • ….BC… – Greek and Roman installations
• from XV century – Ottoman empire
• from 1783 – part of Russian empire
• from 1954 – part (autonomous republic) of Ukraine
within USSR
• 24 August 1991 – Ukraine’s independence
• 26 February – 18 March 2014 -Annexation by Russia
Crimea: historical backgroundCrimea: historical background

3. • Dacha area for Soviet nomenclature and “retirement
resort” for ex-military
• Heavy militarized area
Crimea: strategic contextCrimea: strategic context
before 1990sbefore 1990s
• Population – 2,0 mln. (0,7 mln. –
pensioners)
• Main supplies from Ukraine:
water – 85%, electricity – 80%,
gas – 70%
• Main GDP contributors:
tourism, agriculture, vinery,

4. Crimea: strategic contextCrimea: strategic context
1990-2000s1990-2000s
• Economical crisis, gas – political instrument of Russia
• Ukrainian Armed Forces reduction, Black Sea Fleet
division, Russian Naval bases in Crimea
• Promotion of “Russian world” idea in Crimea (as
outcome of economy control):
parties and civil organizations;
pensioners and ex-military;
brunches of universities and institutions;
Russian and Soviet history holidays, monuments;
influence on Ukrainian civilian and military authorities.

5. Promotion of “Russian world” idea

6. Promotion of “Russian world” idea

7. Promotion of “Russian world” idea

8. Promotion of “Russian world” idea

9. • Rotation of Russian personnel
• Logistic prepositioning in Crimea
• Sochi Olympics as “cover” for Russian military
prepositioning and exercises, hidden deployment to
Crimea to “enforce counter-terror”
• Ukrainian security sector in Crimea demoralized after
Maidan
• “Political tourists” and pro-Russian organization protests
• Hectic “elections” of alternative pro-Russian power
• Local para-military units creation, critical infrastructure
and entry points control
Crimea: 2014 Annexation /Crimea: 2014 Annexation /
preparationspreparations

10. Hectic elections of alternative pro-Russian power in Sevastopol, 23 Feb 2014

11. “Political tourists” and pro-Russian organization protests in Sevastopol, Local
para-military units creation, Feb 2014

12. • Seize of Crimean parliament by “green people”
• Ukrainian military and Coast guard units blockade
• Russian TV broadcast (instead Ukrainian)
• Pro-Russian psychological influence
• Stewarded Referendum
Crimea: 2014 AnnexationCrimea: 2014 Annexation

17. Annexation of Crimea pact, 18 March 2014

18. CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::
Lesson LearnedLesson Learned
• Era of HYBRID warfare started:
informational superiority and psychological pressure,
PSYOPS and INFOOPS
visible military potential
SOF as main instrument for high precision engagement
soft force of local population
treason of leadership

19. • Psychological conditioning and Ideology. Ukrainian
military were trained to see Russians as friends and brothers. Russians used it to
accomplish mission of Crimea annexation.
• Passive Command and Control. UKR military trained to act after
receiving order rather than reacting if needed when the situation requires.
• Centralized C2 negatively affected in decision
making Losing time instead of prompt response
CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::
Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

20. • Intelligence systematically was used as tool of
power rather than tool of operation. Withholding access to
strategic warning information to all level of C2
• Overbearing Working Mentality Overchecking and overcontrol in
system of managing security didn’t work and had damage effect on the morale and ability
of commanders to act
• Training Classic warfare, old fashioned, insufficient resources (fuel, spare parts)
•Equipment (uniform, aircraft , warships) Warn out and old
fashioned, not durable, uncomfortable to use.
CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::
Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

21. • Territorial recruiting and social policy for military.
Military in Crimea were mostly recruited from Crimea and were not able to fight with the
pro-Russian population. Most of them (up to 80%) didn’t stay loyal to Ukraine. Lack of
trusted and reliable social (particularly in housing) policy for Ukrainian military also
affected their decision to stay within Crimea rather than to move to continental Ukraine
• Lack of security of critical infrastructure
(Government buildings, airports, energy suppliers,
transportation, TV and communication) Existing protection
plan wasn’t activated because of Crimean security service and police treason. Military as
supportive agency wasn’t activated and didn’t take a lead in crisis situation because of a
gap in legislation.
• Unsecure location of military installations Many military
HQs and units located within civilian infrastructure, neglecting secure perimeter,
autonomous energy and water supply requirements and other measures of physical
security.
CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::
Lesson LearnedLesson Learned