CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN MYANMAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD

www.transparency.org
www.cmi.no
Author(sMarie Chêne, U4 Helpdesk, Transparency International, mchene@transparency.org updated by Maira Martini,
Transparency International, mmartini@transparency.org
Reviewed by: Marie Chêne, Transparency International, mchene@transparency.org and Robin Hodess, Ph.D. Transparency
International, rhodess@transparency.org
Date: 23 March 2009 updated in 1 October 2012 Number Number: 349
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Query
Can you please give us an overview of the corruption status in Burma?
Purpose
We are preparing an analysis of our development
cooperation programs in Burma
Content
1. Forms and Extent of Corruption in Burma
2. Anti-Corruption Efforts in Burma
3. Resources
Summary
After more than four decades of military rule, political
violence and systematic repression of democratic
opposition, Burma held its first general elections in
2010, and is passing through major economic and
political reforms. Parliamentarian by-elections were
held in 2012 with Aung San Suu Kyi party (National
League for Democracy) receiving the overwhelmingly
majority of votes. Such reforms and the significant and
seemingly genuine opening up of the country have
encouraged the United States and the European Union
to lift trade embargoes against the country. However,
the military continues to exercise influence in politics
and despite improvements, restriction on media and
civil society organisations, as well as human rights
violations continue.
Against this background, Burma continues to face
major challenges of endemic corruption, consistently
ranking at the bottom of TI’S Corruption Perception
Index (CPI). Little is known on the specific forms and
patterns of corruption in the country, but the scale of the
informal and illicit economy suggests strong links
between the ruling elite and organised crime activities.
In the absence of sound democratic institutions and an
effective system of checks and balance, the legal and
institutional frameworks against corruption appear, to
date, rudimentary and are likely to be misused for
political reasons. On a more positive note, the recent
elected government has demonstrated willingness to
improve the country’s institutional and legal framework
as well as the space for political participation.
Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar)

www.U4.no 2
1 Forms and extent of
corruption in Burma
Background
Burma, officially the Union of Myanmar1, has known
more than four decades of military rule after General Ne
Win’s coup in 1962. The country remained under the
tight control of the military led State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) until when the Junta was
dissolved as a result of the 2010 general elections. The
former Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thein Sein
was appointed as President in 2010. Parliamentarian
by-elections2 took place in June 2012 and despite
several irregularities the National League for
Democracy party of the Nobel Prize winner and former
political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi received the
majority of votes.
The civilian government has announced several
economic reforms as well as the release of political
prisoners, the right to form trade unions, and an easing
in media censorship. Such economic and political
reforms are seen by the President as key for Burma’s
progress, as according to him, years of military misrule
had left Burma far behind its neighbours in terms of
development (Freedom House, 2012).
A more open dialogue with the popular opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been playing an
instrumental role in the country’s struggle for
democracy, was launched, and the President has also
called on the government to be more accountable to its
people and focus its efforts on improving their daily
lives. Nevertheless, there are indications that the
military continue to dominate politics (Fund for Peace,
2012), and the country still suffers from restrictive
government controls, inefficient economic policies,
fiscal instability, corruption, rising inflation, human rights
violations, and widespread poverty, especially in rural
areas.
1 The Union of Burma was renamed Union of Myanmar in 1989 by
the military junta. The United Nations endorsed the name while
other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia and Canada still refer to the country as Burma.
2 Parliamentary by-elections take place when a seat in the
Parliament becomes vacant between general elections.
In the past, the government’s crackdown against a pro-
democracy uprising, including against thousands of
monks, triggered a series of international economic and
targeted sanctions. The European Union banned
investment and trade in Burmese gems, timber, and
precious stones, while the United States tightened
existing economic sanctions on the regime leaders,
their families and supporters, including asset freezing
and travels restrictions against designated individuals
responsible for human rights abuses and public
corruption.
In the first part of 2012, encouraged by the fall of the
regime and recent reforms, the United States and the
European Union suspended economic sanctions, which
provides for many opportunities for investment and
growth, but also for new and ever growing forms of
corruption.
Extent of Corruption
Due to the closed nature of the former military
dictatorship there are very few independent sources of
data on the state of governance and corruption in
Burma.
The available sources and observers agree that
rampant corruption pervades all levels of the political
and administrative systems. The country has
consistently ranked among the world's most corrupt
countries in Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index. In 2011, the country was ranked
180 out of the 183 assessed countries with a score of
1,5 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) scale.
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators confirm the country’s poor performance in
terms of control of corruption (0,5 on a scale from 0 to
100), regulatory quality (1,4), government effectiveness
(2,4), rule of law (4,2) and political stability (13,7) in
2011. Burma has, nevertheless, improved significantly
in terms of voice and accountability (from 0.9 in 2010 to
2.3 in 2011) (World Bank, 2011).
Forms of Corruption
There is little evidence of the main forms of corruption
in the country. Available reports and country profiles
state that corruption in Burma is widespread, affecting
different sectors in a variety of forms as discussed
below.

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Bureaucratic corruption
Burma generally lacks regulatory and legal
transparency, and there is a broad consensus that
corruption in the country is rampant and endemic
(Political Risk, 2011; Heritage Foundation, 2012). The
US Department of State’s Investment Climate
Statement further declares that rent-seeking activities
are supported by a complex and “capricious” regulatory
environment combined with extremely low government
salaries.
According to economists and businesspeople,
corruption is one of the most serious barriers to
investment and commerce in the country as very little
can be accomplished without resorting to illegal
payments often referred to locally as ‘tea money’. The
major areas where investors may face corruption are (i)
when seeking permission for investment in the country;
(ii) in the taxation process; (iii) when applying for import
and export licenses; (iv) when negotiating land and real
state leases (Political Risk, 2011; Heritage Foundation,
2012).
Cronyism
Personal relationships seem to play an import role in
the country’s public sector. As there are no competitive
selection processes to enter the public sector, personal
connections and bribery are maybe more important
than qualifications. For instance, it is common practice
to select ministers and high-level civil servants from the
military ranks rather than based on expertise
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
The privatisation process which took place in 2009-
2010 also shows the close relationship between the
government, the military and its close friends. There is
evidence that numerous state assets were sold to the
military, family members, and associates of senior
government officials at fire sale prices (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012). Several experts have also
denounced that privatisation could actually enhance
conflict of interest and corruption by creating a new
generation of businesses whose control of industries is
dependent on government connections and other forms
of collusion (Currie, 2012).
Political corruption
The first democratic general elections after almost fifty
years of military rule took place in 2010. Burma’s
political system is composed of a bicameral legislature,
which consists of the 440-seat People’s Assembly, and
the 224-seat Nationalities Assembly, or upper house.
25% of the seats in both houses are reserved for the
military and filled through appointment by the
commander in chief. The legislature elects the
president, though the military members have the right to
nominate one of the three candidates, with the other
two nominated by the elected members of each
chamber (Freedom House, 2012). As a result of the
2010 elections, the former Prime Minister Lieutenant
General Thein Sein was appointed as President.
According to several reports, the 2010 elections were,
however, marked by fraud and serious restrictions on
political participation (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012;
Freedom House, 2012).
In order to guarantee a pro-military government, the
regime allegedly made use of advanced votes, which
were collected by force in front of the authorities
(Freedom House, 2012; Bertelsmann Foundation
2012). Moreover, opposition political parties faced
several restrictions3 such as high registration fees, and
no access to the state media. Such restrictions made
the main opposition party, the National League for
Democracy, boycott the elections. Elections monitoring
was also restricted, and the government did not allow
international organisations to support the process. As a
result, the pro-military party USDP (Union Solidarity and
Development Party) won almost 80% of the seats up for
election (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
The Parliamentary by-election which took place in May
2012 was also marked by fraud and irregularities, in
spite of the government efforts to show the international
community that democracy was advancing in the
country. Independent candidates have reported
harassment and several restrictions on their campaign
activities. Reports also show irregularities at the pools;
many who sought to vote for opposition candidates
found that wax coating their ballots prevented them
from doing so (Jacobs, 2012). Despite those
irregularities, the NLD still overwhelmingly won the by-
elections (BBC, 2012).
Sectors most affected by corruption
There is no research and data available on sectors
most affected by corruption in Burma, probably due to
3 The Political Party Registration Law, announced in March 2010,
gave new political parties only 60 days to register, mandated that
existing parties re-register, and required parties to expel members
currently serving prison terms, Freedom House, 2012.

www.U4.no 4
the lack of political will for such scrutiny. However,
specific forms of corruption derive from the nature of
the local economy that suggests strong ties between
the current regime and organised crime activities.
According to the CIA’s World Fact book, official
statistics are inaccurate and published statistics on
foreign trade greatly understated because of the
volume of off-book, the size of the black market, illicit
and unrecorded border trade - often estimated to be as
large as the official economy (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2008).
Burma is a resource-rich country. Agriculture and
extractive industries, including natural gas, mining,
logging and fishing provide the major portion of national
income. The country appears to be plagued by traffic
in narcotics, people, wildlife, gems, timber, and other
forms of contraband that flow through Burma’s
permeable borders. Burma’s border regions are indeed
difficult to control. In some remote regions active in
smuggling, continuing ethnic tensions with armed rebel
groups hamper government control. Collusion between
traffickers and Burma’s ruling military junta also
allegedly allows organised crime groups to function with
virtual impunity (United Stated Department of State,
2008).
Illegal logging
A major review conducted for the World Bank in 2006
estimates illegal logging as equal or exceeding the legal
harvest rates in Burma by 80 % (Illegal Logging Info,
website). This has resulted in major deforestation taking
place in the country. Although Burma remains one of
the most forested countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
the amount of land covered by forest in Burma dropped
from 47% in 2005 to 24% in 2008, according to Burma’s
Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation
Committee (UPI, 2012).
Large quantities of timber are being smuggled out of
the country across the Chinese borders. A logging ban
in Thailand has also resulted in Thai loggers crossing
illegally through Burma. The sanctions imposed by the
EU and US on the Myanmar military regime were
extended in 2007 to prohibit the import of all timber
products, but teak products from Myanmar are allegedly
still being imported to the UK through other countries
such as China or Indonesia (Illegal Logging Info,
website).
According to a Global Witness report (2009), imports of
logs and sawn wood across the land border from
Burma fell by 70% between 2005 and 2009 after the
Chinese government sealed the borders4 in 2006.
Nevertheless, illicit trade continues with local authorities
often turning a blind eye to smuggling. Chinese
companies interviewed by Global Witness also reported
that they usually rely on personal relationships and
illegal payments to continue importing illegal wood
(Global Witness, 2009).
Oil and gas
Burma is endowed with oil, gas, hydropower and
minerals, which are located mainly in the ethnic minority
regions that continue to be areas of conflict. There is no
publicly available information on who has the rights for
exploiting what resources in what areas, what the terms
and conditions are, and on how the revenues are being
shared and spent (TrustLaw, 2012). According to
Human Rights Watch, Burma continues to earn billions
of US dollars in natural gas revenues, little of which is
directed into social services such as health care and
education (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
According to the Withholding Tax Law enacted on
January 1, 2011, state-enterprises and military-owned
companies are exempt from taxes. The government
requires that foreign companies conducting oil and gas
exploration be partnered with at least one domestic
energy firm, usually with the state-owned energy firm
MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), which
controls significant portions of key oil and gas projects
in the country. According to the opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi, such joint ventures arrangements lack
transparency and accountability.
For instance, Burma has granted Chinese state-owned
oil firm oil and gas pipeline concessions, but there is no
publicly available information on the terms of those
contracts. In addition, since the US and the European
Union5 have suspended the economic sanctions,
European and American companies are now also
allowed to partner with Burmese oil and gas
companies.
4 For more information on the agreement between Burma
and China please see: Interim Measures to Manage Timber
and Minerals Cooperation between Myanmar and Yunnan
Province
5 Please see:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pres
sdata/EN/foraff/130188.pdf

www.U4.no 5
U.S. companies investing in Burma are, however,
required by the U.S. government to report on their
investment activities including: (i) an overview of
operations in Burma; (ii) summary of investment-related
human rights, labor rights, anti-corruption, and
environmental policies and procedures; (iii) acquisition
of property/land, including processes to identify land
rights and address resettlement practices, if the
property is worth more than US$ 500,000 or over 30
acres; (iv) payments to the Government of Burma, sub-
national authorities, and state-owned enterprises if the
aggregate annual amount exceeds US$10,000; (v)
summary of human rights, labor rights, and
environmental due diligence conducted by the company
(Nolan, 2012).
Recently, Burma’s President Thein Sein vowed to join
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
a global standard for governments and companies to
voluntarily report how much is paid for extracting
natural resources (Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, 2012). A possible Burmese candidacy to EITI
could mean a big push to hold the government to
account and increase transparency in the sector.
Land management
Land has been a politically and economically sensitive
issue in the country for many decades. All land in
Burma is owned by the government, and farmers are
given land use or tillage rights. The seizure of land has
long been practiced in the country, but in recent years
its dynamics have changed, from direct seizure by army
units and government departments, to seizure by army-
owned companies, joint ventures and other
economically and politically powerful operations with
connections to the military (Asian Legal Resource
Centre, 2012).
According to the Asian Centre and other human rights
organisations, cases of land grabbing are becoming
increasingly common. Many farmers have been forced
to move without receiving proper compensation
because of major projects, such as the oil and gas
pipelines, or smaller projects of firms linked to the
military (Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2012).
The problem is aggravated by the country’s lack of rule
of law, no protection of property rights, and a weak
judiciary, which offer tremendous rent-seeking
opportunities for corrupt officials and their business
partners (Morrell, 2012).
The new Farmland law enacted in 2012 aimed, among
other things, at reducing the prospects of land grabbing.
However, the law still opens the door to confiscation of
agricultural land on any pretext associated with a state
project or the national interest (TrustLaw, 2012).
Drug producing and trafficking
In spite of the government recent steps to tackle money
laundering (see section below), Burma remains a
country at risk of drug money being funnelled into
commercial enterprises and infrastructure due to an
underdeveloped financial sector and the large volume
of informal trade.
According to the United Nations Office in Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), nearly all of the world’s illicit opium
and heroin production is concentrated in Afghanistan,
Burma and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia)
(United Nations Office in Drugs and Crime, 2010).
Burma is also a primary source of amphetamine-type
stimulants in Asia. However, the country’s share of
opium production on the global market is declining
(United Nations Office in Drugs and Crime, 2010), and
although the Burmese Government has expanded its
counter-narcotics measures in recent years, production
and trafficking of narcotics still remain major issues in
the country (Yong-an, 2012).
While the Burmese Government has actively pursued
mid-level and independent traffickers, it remains
reluctant to investigate, arrest, and prosecute high level
international traffickers (Central Intelligence Agency,
2008). The CIA considers that the lack of government
will to take on major narco-trafficking groups and lack of
serious commitment against money laundering
continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2008).
Human trafficking
The CIA also reports that Burma is a source country for
women, children, and men trafficked for the purpose of
forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation.
Burmese women and children are trafficked to East and
Southeast Asia for commercial sexual exploitation,
domestic servitude, and forced labour. According to the
2006 US Department of State Human Rights Report,
while there are no reliable estimates on the number of
Burmese who are trafficked, most observers believe
that the number of victims is at least several thousand
per year. (United States Department of State, 2007).
Some trafficking victims transit through Burma from
Bangladesh to Malaysia, and from China to Thailand

www.U4.no 6
while internal trafficking occurs primarily from villages to
urban centres and economic hubs for labour in
industrial zones, agricultural estates, and commercial
sexual exploitation.
The CIA report further states that Burma does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination
of human trafficking as military and civilian officials
remain directly involved in significant acts of forced
labour and unlawful conscription of child soldiers
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). The Burmese
Government was placed in Tier 3 in the U.S.
Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report
(2007) for not fully complying with the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and not making significant
efforts to do so (United States Department of State,
2007).
2 Anti-corruption efforts in
Burma
Public Initiatives against corruption
There is no in-depth research and analysis on
corruption and anti-corruption efforts in the country and
very little is known on the state of the anti-corruption
legal and institutional framework in Burma. The
following section is based on the information that could
be compiled within the time frame of this query. More
research and resource would be needed to provide a
comprehensive assessment of the corruption situation
in Burma.
The legal framework
The country has a set of anti-corruption laws and since
as early as 1948, corruption is officially a crime that can
carry a jail term. Most relevant laws and legal
instruments against corruption related offences include
Burma Penal Code Volume 8, Public Property
Protection Volume 2, the Money Laundering Law and
the Anti-Drug Law (Burma Lawyer’s Council, 2005).
There has been hardly any prosecution for office abuse
in Burma. However, according to many sources, it was
common practice for the ruling generals to misuse anti-
corruption laws as a means of ousting political
opponents, as when the SPDC arrested then-Prime
Minister General Khin Nyunt and many of his
colleagues and family members for corruption in 2004
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
Furthermore, there is no right to information, and public
procurement procedures are opaque (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012). The budget process also lacks
transparency, and sources of budget revenues remain
undisclosed. In 2012, a budget drafted by the president
was submitted for the first time for the approval of the
Parliament, as required by the 2008 Constitution, which
states: “The Union Government shall draft the Union
Budget Bill based on the annual Union budget, after
coordinating with the Financial Commission, and submit
it for approval to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Parliament) in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”.
On one hand, the President and its cronies still enjoy
great budgetary autonomy. Transparency and
accountability are further hindered by the fact that there
has been no independent auditing of state spending.
On the other hand, significant legislative reforms are
being undertaken by the government, including the
adoption of the Labour Organizations Law and the
Peaceful Demonstration Law, as well as the
amendment to the Political Party Registration Law.
President Thein Sein is also working with
parliamentarians affiliated with the National League for
Democracy to fight corruption by requiring all
government officials to publicly declare their assets
(Morrell, 2012). These changes are encouraging, but it
remains to be seen how they will be implemented.
Burma is a party to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and ratified the UN
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in August 2006. Burma signed
the UN Convention on Corruption in December 2005,
but has not yet ratified it.
The Institutional Framework
There is no fully independent anti-corruption institution
in Burma. The SPDC power until recently was not
balanced by parliament or any other political institution.
In fact, until 2011 there was no formal separation of
powers. Besides holding the Executive and legislative
powers, the SPDC also exercised control over the
Judiciary.
The new Constitution formally guarantees the
independence of the judiciary and the separation of
powers. In practice, however, the judiciary still faces
political interference. For instance, the head of the
Supreme Court and other members of the
Constitutional Court were still nominated by the
President without the consent of the Parliament in

www.U4.no 7
2011. A March 2012 United Nations report on human
rights in Burma also noted that the country “lacks an
independent, impartial and effective judiciary.”
In addition, courts adjudicate cases according to the
junta’s promulgated decrees. Administrative detention
laws allow people to be held without charges, trial or
access to legal counsel for up to five years for
threatening the state’s security or sovereignty. The lack
of independence of the judiciary allows officeholders to
abuse their position without fear of judicial action.
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012)
The body in charge of corruption offences is the Bureau
of Special Investigations that reports to the Ministry of
Home Affairs. It addresses financial crime related
cases, including cases involving trading, tax evasion
and corruption of government officials (Ministry of
Home Affairs, website). However, there is no publicly
available information on the number or status of such
investigations.
Improvements in the area of Money laundering resulted
in the removal of the country from the Financial Action
Task Force’s list of Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories (NCCT) in October 2006. Burma enacted a
“Control of Money Laundering Law” in 2002. It also
established the Central Control Board of Money
Laundering in 2002 and an investigating Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2003 whose size was
increased to 11 permanent members, plus 20 support
staff in 2005. The government also established a
Department against Transnational Crime in 2004,
staffed by police officers and support personnel from
banks, customs, budget, and other relevant government
departments.
The 2002 law created reporting requirements to detect
suspicious transactions. It set a threshold amount for
reporting cash transactions by banks and real estate
firms. In 2004, the anti-money laundering regulations
were amended to include eleven predicate offenses,
including narcotics activities, human trafficking, arms
trafficking, cyber-crime, and “offenses committed by
acts of terrorism,” among others. Fraud was also added
to the list of predicate offenses. Anti-Money Laundering
regulations further expanded in 2006, requiring banks,
customs officials and the legal and real estate sectors
to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and
impose severe penalties for noncompliance. In 2007,
the Burmese Government amended its “Control of
Money Laundering Law” to expand the list of predicate
offences to all serious crimes to comport with FATF’s
recommendations (US Department of State, 2008).
Recently, however, according to the Financial Action
Task Force, Burma has not made sufficient progress in
implementing its action plan, and important anti-money
laundering deficiencies remain. The country has until
October 2012 to tackle efficiently these deficiencies,
including by (i) adequately criminalising terrorist
financing; (ii) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (iii)
further strengthening the extradition framework in
relation to terrorist financing; (iv) ensuring a fully
operational and effectively functioning Financial
Intelligence Unit; (v) enhancing financial transparency;
and (vi) strengthening customer due diligence
measures. If such measures are not undertaken, Burma
may face countermeasures to be decided by the
Financial Action Task Force (Financial Action Task
Force, 2012).
A national Human Rights Commission (MHRC) was
established in 2011. While it is too early to assess its
activities, the international community has urged the
Government of Burma to take the necessary steps to
ensure the commission’s independent, credible and
effective functioning (United Nations Human Rights,
2012).
The potential for other anti-
corruption Initiatives
During the past decades, the dictatorship nature of the
regime provided little opportunities for public
participation and for holding government accountable
for its actions and decisions. The 2008 Constitution,
which came into effect in January 2011, allows freedom
of association and assembly, but only as long as the
exercise of these rights does not go against existing
security and emergency laws. In spite of recent
improvements related to voice and accountability
mechanisms, both civil society and the media are still
controlled and repressed.
Civil society
Civil society development has always been restricted by
the absence of civil liberties and very restrictive
regulations. In the past five years, political shifts in
Burma have created some openings for civil society
efforts. As mentioned, freedom of association and
assembly is now allowed as long as security and
emergency laws are respected.

www.U4.no 8
Nevertheless, civil society in the country does not have
strong roots, and many organisations or associations
are co-opted by the military (Bertelsmann Foundation,
2012).In addition, in spite of recent improvements, the
ability of civil society organisations to monitor the
elections was strongly restricted. Local NGOs and a
regional monitoring group have to conduct secret
monitoring by sending volunteers to voting stations in
few cities, but several foreign volunteers from the
regional group were caught and deported (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012).
The space for international civil society groups is also
opening up. As of 2011, there were approximately 65
international NGOs (INGOs) operating in the country,
often under various framework agreements with the
government, such as Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) or Letters of Agreement with a relevant ministry
(The Hauser Center, 2011). These INGOs are usually
engaged in advocacy activities with the government,
aiming to inform and promote dialogue with the
government, rather than assess blame (The Hauser
Center, 2011).
Media
There have been a number of positive developments
with regards to the media in Burma. Government’s
reforms have included a reduction in the level of
censorship of the press, the loosening of restrictions on
access to the internet, and the release of political
prisoners (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
In 2012, the government stopped censoring private
periodicals before publication, but repressive laws, such
as the Printers and Publishers Registration Law, which
has severely restricted the activities of the press,
and the Electronic Transactions Law, which has
criminalized the sharing of electronic information
deemed threatening to the Union, still offer obstacles
for Burmese to express their opinions, as they have
been used to arrest, detain and imprison journalists and
activists.
Burma ranked 169th out of 179 countries in the
Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index
(2011-2012). A slightly better position than in previous
years as a result of recent political changes that have
raised hopes but need to be confirmed (Reporters
without Borders, 2012).
In spite of recent democratisation reforms, the country
continues to face major governance challenges. It
remains to be seen the impact such reforms will have
on corruption.
3 Resources
Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2012. Myanmar at Risk of
Land-Grabbing Epidemic.
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2012/06/myanmar-
myanmar-at-risk-of-land-grabbing-epidemic/
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 2008. Mutual
Evaluation Report on Myanmar.
http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Myanmar%202008
.pdf
BBC, 2012. Burma'sAungSanSuuKyiwinsby-election:NLDparty.
Published: 1 April, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-17577620
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012. Myanmar Country Report.
http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/aso/mmr
Burma’s Lawyers Council, 2005. Legal Issues on Burma. Nr.
20/2005. http://www.blc-burma.org/pdf/liob/liob20.pdf
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2008. The World Factbook
Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bm.html
Currie, K., 2012. Burma in the Balance: The Role of Foreign
Assistance in Supporting Burma’s Democratic Transition.
Project
2049.http://project2049.net/documents/burma_in_the_balanc
e_currie.pdf
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2012. Myanmar
reaffirms intention of implementing the EITI.
http://eiti.org/news-events/myanmar-reaffirms-intention-
implement-eiti
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2012. Myanmar: FATF
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m/myanmar/documents/fatfpublicstatement-22june2012.html
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world/2012/burma-0
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perspective.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=em
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burma/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_c
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swiss-suukyi-idUSBRE85C1NA20120614
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not-the-time-for-business-as-usual-in-myanmar
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poverty-myanmar-targets-natural-resources
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_2011_09_08.pdf
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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012
/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_
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“ #Maldives အစ ရဟ အကငပက ခစ မကဆနကင နတအရန
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10/18/2019 Asia Pacific: little to no progress on anti-corruption - Transparency International
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SURVEYS (/SEARCH?TOPIC=14) • 29 JANUARY 2019
ASIA PACIFIC: LITTLE TO NO PROGRESS ON ANTI-CORRUPTION
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SNAPSHOT OF THE REGION
At the top of this year’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), New Zealand scores 87 out of 100, making it the
leading country fighting corruption in the region and second across the globe. New Zealand is followed closely
by Singapore and Australia, with scores of 85 and 77 respectively.
At the bottom of the index, North Korea brings up the rear with a score of 14, given widespread and enduring
corruption across the country. North Korea is followed by Afghanistan (16) and Cambodia (20) to round out the
poorest performers in the region.
With an average score of just 44 for three consecutive years, the Asia Pacific region is making little progress in
the fight against corruption. Compared to other regions, Asia Pacific is on par with the Americas (average score:
44) in its lack of progress and behind Western Europe and the European Union (average score: 66).
Why is Asia Pacific making little to no progress in its anti-corruption efforts? One of the reasons is an overall
weakening of democratic institutions and political rights.
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CORRUPTION AND A CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY
Most top scorers in the region, including New Zealand and Australia, have well-functioning democratic systems,
which help contribute to their top scores. However, there are some countries within the region, including
Singapore and Hong Kong, which still control corruption effectively, despite being largely non-democratic.
Why do some weak democracies and autocracies perform well on the CPI without the same checks and
balances found in full democracies? In the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, both countries are microstates
with strong anti-corruption institutions. These help to control corruption in some areas, but don’t ensure the
sustainable, anti-corruption infrastructures that are found in many full democracies.
However, despite these outliers, the erosion of democratic foundations is stifling anti-corruption efforts across
the region, including in Cambodia and Thailand.
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IMPROVERS
Despite scores throughout the region being largely at a standstill, where any upward or downward movements
are relatively small, there are three countries worth highlighting as their scores show some positive progress.
In the Pacific, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, with scores of 46 and 44 respectively, have both improved their
scores since last year. With an increase of five points, the Solomon Islands successfully passed a comprehensive
anti-corruption law, including provisions for a new anti-corruption commission. Our chapter, Transparency
Solomon Islands, played an important role in advocating for the bill’s passage and is now advocating for a sister
bill on whistleblower protection.
With an increase of three points, Vanuatu enacted new legislation to improve access to information, opening up
the government to better accountability and citizen participation. Our chapter, Transparency Vanuatu, played a
key a role in this by providing technical assistance in the drafting process.
Finally, with a score of 57, South Korea also improved by three points since 2017. High profile corruption
scandals over the last few years, which involved the former president and top businessmen, put the country’s
institutions to the test, including the local judicial system.
In all three countries, democratic principles and institutions proved effective in combatting corruption. Political
rights were also upheld, allowing for citizen participation and activist engagement to push for necessary reforms
in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands and demand justice in South Korea.
In addition, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and South Korea all have strong engagement among youth, where
young activists take to the streets to demand action from their governments.
DECLINERS
Since 2017, several countries in the region declined by two or three points, including Timor-Leste (35),
Bangladesh (26), Maldives (31) and Vietnam (33).
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Unfortunately, these countries share several common factors that work to counteract anti-corruption efforts.
These include a lack of strong and independent democratic institutions that can deliver checks and balances,
and a strong-handed central government that limits or suppresses free and open media and citizen participation.
As the performance of democratic institutions weakens and political rights decline, corruption festers and grows.
Vietnam has taken a strong approach towards prosecution and punishment of corrupt individuals over the last
few years. However, this is not enough to fight corruption effectively. Strong enforcement efforts are only part of a
comprehensive and effective anti-corruption strategy. In addition, weak democratic institutions and few political
rights cast serious doubts on the fairness of the arrests and prosecutions in the country.
Vietnam was involved in several recent corruption scandals involving Denmark, Japan and the US
(https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption_2018). In 2015, authorities in
both Japan and the US, found that companies were paying bribes to Vietnamese government officials in
exchange for either government contracts or development assistance. In addition, more recently in 2017 the
World Bank debarred a Danish consultant company for its involvement in bribing Vietnamese government
officials.
COUNTRIES TO WATCH
Despite stagnation and declines in the 2018 scores, there are promising political developments within the region,
particularly in Malaysia (47), Maldives (31), Pakistan (33) and India (41) that will be important to watch moving
forward.
In all four countries, massive public mobilisation against corruption coupled with significant political participation
and voter turnout resulted in new governments that promise extensive anti-corruption reforms.
However, despite these encouraging developments, we are yet to see how this translates into solid action,
especially when it comes to combatting elusive forms of grand corruption.
Although Malaysia has made significant strides since last year’s election, including key arrests of corrupt officials,
the country has an ongoing investigation into the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal. The scandal
is estimated at more than US$4.5 billion and involves political leaders at the highest levels of government,
including the former Prime Minister Najib Razak (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-
12/malaysia-s-mahathir-says-enough-evidence-to-reopen-1mdb-probe), and continues to reveal a trail of
illegal financial transactions.
As India gears up for its upcoming elections, we see little significant movement in its CPI score, which moved
from 40 in 2017 to 41 in 2018. Despite spectacular public mobilisation in 2011, where citizens demanded that the
government take action against corruption and advocated for the passage of the comprehensive Jan Lokpal Act,
these efforts ultimately fizzled and fell flat, with little to no movement on the ground to build the specialist anti-
corruption infrastructure required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
With the exception of a few of top scorers in the Asia Pacific, most countries are failing in the fight against
corruption and need to do far more. Governments must intensify their efforts and keep in mind the
following issues, when tackling corruption in their countries:
Because there is no single solution to a deep-rooted and complex issue like corruption, a diverse national strategy is key.
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Latest
Many countries in the region are implementing reforms that aim in the right direction, like improved
access to information laws and stronger anti-corruption agencies, while other countries are
strengthening the prosecution of corrupt individuals. However, a glaring gap exists for most countries
throughout the region: a robust and comprehensive strategy that focuses on the entire anti-
corruption system, including legal infrastructure and punishment, proper enforcement of rules,
prevention mechanisms and engagement of citizens.
While some countries captured by an undemocratic political elite or institution may make small strides against corruption in the short-
term, they cannot fight corruption effectively in the long-term.
Low performing countries on the CPI share several undemocratic commonalities that hinder any
long-term progress in anti-corruption. These include weak democratic institutions, laws, regulations
and enforcement mechanisms. While a few authoritarian countries may show some incremental
progress in fighting corruption, this is unsustainable since any progress depends on the attitudes
and mood of those dictators in power, as opposed to a healthy democratic system led by the
people. Democracies have the necessary checks and balances, like judicial independence, which is
key to the sustainability of any anti-corruption enforcement plan. Without these and other democratic
institutions and practices, countries cannot expect to tackle corruption effectively.
For any press enquiries please contact press@transparency.org (mailto:press@transparency.org)
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Fighting corruption in the age of “fake news”
"Fake news" has become a major threat to public trust in
democracy and news media outlets over the past years. The fight
against corruption is also affected.
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Right to information: a tool for people pow
Globally, approximately 120 countries have r
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International Right to Know Day, citizens are
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are most people even aware of their right to r
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Global Corruption Barometer - Latin America and the
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The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) – Latin America &
Caribbean highlights the disproportionate effect that corruption
has on women and a significant lack of political integrity among
government leaders.
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(/news/feature/global_corruption_barometer_gcb_latin_america_2019) Mujeres y corrupción en Latinoamérica y el Caribe
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Under the former #Maldives gov’t, close to a 100 islands w
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“The pace the #Maldives government is moving at against
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10/18/2019 - - Transparency International
(/SEARCH?TOPIC=14) 29 ဇနနဝ ရ 2019 • စစတမ မ (/SEARCH?TOPIC=14)
အ ရပစဖတ - အကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ င ပတသက၍
တ တကမအနည ငယသ ရသည
(http
s://pl
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to:?
(/fee
d/nw
ဒသ၏လပတစ ပက
ယခစအကငပက ခစ မသ ဘ ထ အ မငန ကန (CPI) ၏ထပဆ တငနယ ဇလနသည ၁၀၀ အနက ၈၇ မတရရခပ ဒသ
တင အဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ တငထပတန ငင ဖစပ ကမ အတငဒတယ နရ တငရသည။ နယ ဇလနကစငက ပငသ
စ တ လတကအန ကပလကပ ၈၅ င ၇၇ အသ သ အသ သ ရသည။
အန ကန ၏ အ က ခတင မ ကကရ ယ သညငငတစဝမ တငအကငပက ခစ မမ ပတညရ န ခင က ငရမတ ၁၄
မတ ဖင န ကသတက နသည။ မ ကကရ ယ ကအ ဖဂနနစတန (၁၆) ငက မ ဒ ယ (၂၀) တက န ကမ လက၍ ဒသ
တင ရအဆင ရဆ အဆ တ မ က ပသငခသည။
သ စဆကတကပမ မရမတ ၄၄ မတ ဖငအ ရပစဖတ ဒသသညအကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ တငတ တကမအနည ငယသ ရ
သည။ အ ခ ဒသမ ငင ယပ ကအ ရပစဖတသညအ မရကတကငင ယထ သည (ပမ မအမတ - ၄၄) တ တကမမရ
ခင ငအ န ကဥ ရ ပငဥ ရ ပသမဂ (ပမ မအမတ - ၆၆) ။ ၁
ဆင အပ!

အဘယ က ငအ ရပစဖတက၎င ၏အကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ အ ထတမအတကတ တကမအနည ငယသ လပ နသလ
အ က င ရင တစခမ ဒမက ရစအငစတက ရင မ ငငင ရ အခငအ ရ မ အ နည ခင က င ဖစသည။
အကငပက ခစ မငဒမက ရစ၏အကပအတည
နယ ဇလနငMostစ တ လတအပ အ ၀ င ဒသတင ရထပတန ဂ သင သအမ စတင က င မနစ လညပတ န သ ဒမကရက
တစစနစမ ရကသည။ သ သ စငက ပင ဟ င က ငအပ အ ၀ ငငငအခမ ဒမက ရစငမကကည သ လည
အဂတလကစ မကထထ ရ က ရ ကထန ခပထ ဆ ဖစသည။
ဘ က ငအ နည သ ဒမက ရစငငမ ငအ ဏ ရငစနစမ သညဒမက ရစအငအ စမ တငတည သ ထန ခပမင
မတမမရဘ CPI ကအဘယ က င က င မနစ လပ ဆ ငငသနည ။ စငက ပင ဟ င က ငတတငစငငစလ သည
အဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ အဖအစည မ ငအသငအတငရကသည။ ၎င တသညအခ သ ဒသမ ရအဂတလကစ မက
ထန ခပရနကည သ လည ဒမက ရစအ ပညအဝတင တရ သ ရရညတညတ သ ၊
မညသပငဆ စက မ၊ ဤအ ပငသ ရ က န သ င ဒမက ရစအတ မစမ တကစ မ က ငက မ ဒ ယ ငထင ငငအပ အ
၀ င ဒသတင အကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ က ပမ မမ ကဟနတ နသည။
၁
ဆင အပ!

တ တကမ
ဒသတစခလ မရမတမ မ မ သ အ ဖငရပတန နသညက မအထကသသမဟတ အ ကသ ရလ မအနည ငယမသ ရ
သညတင၎င တ၏ရမတမ မ အ ပသ ဘ ဆ င သ တ တကမက ပသသညအခ အ လ ပ ထက သ ငငသ ငငရသည။
ပစဖတ ဒသတင Vanuatu င Solomon Islands တငရမတ ၄၆ င ၄၄ အသ သ ရပ ပ ခသညစကစပ ရမတမ တ တကခ
သည။ အခက ၅ ခကတ မငလက ခင ဖင ဆ လမနကန စမ သညလ ဘ ပ လ ဘယမတကဖက ရ က မရငအသစအတက
ပဌ န ခကမ အပ အဝင ပညစသညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ ဥပ ဒက အ င မငစ ခမတခသည။ ကပတ၏အခန ၊
ပငလင မငသ မရသည ဆ လမနကန မ သညဥပ ဒမကမ ၏ ထ ကခခကတငအ ရ က သ အခန ကဏ played မပ ၀ င
ပ ၊
အခက ၃ ခကတ လ သညငအမဗအ သညသတင အခကအလကရရမကတ တက စရနအစ ရအ ပမပငလင သ တ ၀ နခ
မငငငသ မ ၏ပ ၀ ငမအတကဥပ ဒအသစ ပဌ န ခသည။ ကပတ၏အခန Transparency Vanuatu သညမကမ ရ ဆ
ခင လပငန စတငနည ပည အကအည ပ ခင ဖငအဓကအခန ကဏ in မပ ၀ ငခသည။
န ကဆ အ န ဖငရမတ ၅၇ မတ ဖင တ ငကရ ယ သည ၂၀၁၇ ခစမစ၍ အဆငသ ဆငတ တကလ ခသည။ ယခငသမတင
ထပတန စ ပ ရ သမ မ ပ ၀ ငခ သ လနခ သ စအနည ငယအတင အကငပက ခစ မအပ တ ပ က င
တင ပည၏အဖအစည မ က ဒသခတရ စရင ရ စနစအပ အ ၀ ငစမ သပခသည။ ။
ငငသ ငငလ တငအကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ တငဒမက ရစအ ခခမမ ၊ ငင ရ အခငအ ရ မ ကလည ထန သမ ထ
ပ ငငသ မ ၏ပ ၀ ငမငတကကလပရ သမ ပ ၀ ငမအ ဖငဗတင ဆ လမနကန မ တငလအပ သ ပ ပင
ပ င လမမ ပလပရနင တ ငကရ ယ တငတရ မတမက တ င ဆရနခင ပခသည။
ထအ ပငဗအ ၊ ဆ လမနကန စင တ ငကရ ယ ငငအ လ သညလငယမ အက ပင ထန သ ထ တဆကဆမရပ
လငယမ သညတကကလပရ သမ အ သတ၏အစ ရမ ထမအ ရ ယမမ တ င ဆရနလမ မ ပသတကကသည။
ကဆင နသည
၂၀၁၇ ခစမစ၍ ဒသတင ရငငမ စ သည Timor-Leste (၃၅)၊ ဘဂလ ဒရ (၂၆ စ)၊ Maldives (၃၁) ငဗယကနမ (၃၃)
အပ အ ၀ ငအခကစခကသမဟတသ ခကဆင ခသည။
၁
ဆင အပ!

ကမ က င စ ဖငဤငငမ သညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ က ပမ မမ ကတန လနရနလပ ဆ ငသညဘအ က င ရင
မ စ ကမ ဝ ပ သည။ ၎င တတင လတလပ၍ ပငလင သ မဒယ င ပညသလထပ ၀ ငမအ ကနသတသမဟတဖပ သ
အ က သ လကဝယဗဟအစ ရပ ဝငသည။ ဒမက ရစအငစတက ရင မ ၏စမ ဆ ငရညအ နည လ သညငအမငင ရ
အခငအ ရ မ ကဆင လ သညငအမလ ဘ ပ လ ဘယမမ ပ လ သည။
လနခ သ စအနည ငယအတင ဗယကနမငငသညအကငပက ခစ မကက လနသမ ကတရ စဆ ခင ငအ ပစ ပ ခင မ
က ပင ထန သ ခ ကပမ ပလပခသည။ သရ တင၎င သညအဂတလကစ မကထ ရ ကစ တကဖကရနမလ လ ကပ ။
ခငမ သ ဘက တ သ က ပမ မမ သညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ မဟ ဗဟ ၏အစတအပင တစခသ ဖစသည။ ထ
အ ပငအ နည သ ဒမက ရစအငစတက ရင မ ငငင ရ အခငအ ရ အနည ငယသညတင ပညအတင ရဖမ ဆ မမ င
တရ စဆမမ ၏မတမအ ပက မ သ သသယမ ဖစ စသည။
ဗယကနမသည မက သ မကဒန မတ၊ ဂပနငအ မရကနငငမ ငအဂတလကစ မဆငရ အပ တ ပမ
(https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption_2018) တငပ ဝငခသည ။ ၂၀၁၅ ခ
စတငဂပနငအ မရကနစငငလ ရအ ဏ ပငမ ကကမဏမ သညအစ ရစ ခပမ သမဟတဖဖ ရ အကအညမ
အတကလလယရနအတကဗယကနမအစ ရအရ ရမ အ လ ဘ ပ နသညဟ တရခသည။ ထအ ပငခစ၊ မက သ မက
လည ကမ ဘဏသညဗယကနမအစ ရအရ ရမ ကလ ဘထ ရနဒန မတအတငပငခကမဏတစခအ ပတပငထ သည။
စ ငကညဖငငမ
၂၀၁၈ ခစရမတမ တဟနထ ကဆင သ သ လည ဒသတင တငအထ သ ဖငမ လ ရ ငငတင (၄၇)၊ မ လဒက (၃၁)၊ ပ
ကစတန (၃၃) ငအယ (၄၁) တတငငင ရ တ တကမမ ရလ သည။
ငင လ ငငစလ တငအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ တင ပညသလထ၏ပ ပ င ပ ဝငမငငင ရ ပ ၀ ငမငမဆရငမ ၏မ
ပ မတ က ငအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ ပ ပင ပ င လမမ ကကတ ပ ခသည။
အထ သ ဖငက မ သ အကငပက ခစ မမ တကဖက ရ တင၎င သညခငမ သ လပ ဆ ငမအ ဖစမညသ ပ င လသ
သညကကပတယခထမ တရ သ ပ ။
မ လ ရ သညယမနစ ရ က ကပမအကငပကအရ ရမ ကအဓကဖမ ဆ မမ အပ အ ၀ ငသသ ထငရ သညတ တကမမ
ပလပခ သ လည 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) အပ တ ပကတင ပညအ န ဖငဆကလကစစမ စစ ဆ
လကရသည။ ဤအပ တ ပသညအ မရကန ဒလ ၄.၅ ဘလယ က ခနရပ ၀ နက ခပန ဂစရ ဇကခ
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-12/malaysia-s-mahathir-says-enough-evidence-to-
reopen-1mdb-probe) အပ အ ၀ ငအစ ရ၏အ မငဆ အဆငရငင ရ ခ င ဆ ငမ ငတရ မ ၀ င င က ဆငရ အ
ရ င အ ၀ ယမ ကဆကလကထတ ဖ ပသ နသည။
လ မည ရ က ကပမ ကအယကအဆငသင ဖစလ သ အခ ၂၀၁၁ ခစတင ၄၀ မ ၂၀၁၁ တင ၄၁ သ ပ င သ သည။ CPI
ရမတသသသ သ လပရ မအနည ငယသ ရသည။ ၂၀၁၁ ခစတင ပညသလထကစည  လ ဆ မမ ပလပခ သ လည
ငငသ မ အ န ဖငအစ ရအကငပက ခစ မကအ ရ ယရန တ င ဆခသည။ ပညစ သ Jan Lokpal အကဥပ ဒ၏နဒ န
တငဤက ပမ မမ သညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ အ ခခအ ဆ ကအအတည ဆ ကရနအတက မ ပင ပတင
လပရ မအနည ငယသ ရသည။
အ က ပခကမ
အ ရပစဖတတငထပတန ဂ သင သအခ မလ၍ ငငအမ စအကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ တငက နရပ ပမ
လပ ဆ ငရနလအပသည။ အစ ရမ အ န ဖင၎င တ၏တင ပညမ တငအကငပက ခစ မကကငတယ ဖရင ရ တငသ
တ၏က စ အ ထတမကပမ ပင ထန စပ အ ကပ ပissuesန မ ကစတထမတထ ရမည။
အဂတလကစ မကသ သ နကင စ အ မစတယ န သ ပ ထ သ ပtoန က ဖရင ရနတစခတည သ နည လမ မရ သ က ငမတက ပ သ
အမ သ မဟ ဗဟ သညအဓကကသည။
၁
ဆင အပ!

န ကဆ ပ
ဒသတင ရငငမ စ သညသတင အခကအလကဥပ ဒမ ပမ က င မနလ စရနငပမအ က င သည
အဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ အဂငစမ ကသမနကန သ ဦ တညခကအတကရညရယသည ပ ပင ပ င လမ
မ ကအ က ငအထည ဖ နစ၊ အ ခ ငငမ ကအကငပက ခစ သမ အ တရ စဆမကအ ဖည ပ
နသည သရ တင ဒသတင ရငငအမ စအတကသသ ထငရ သညက ဟမတစခ ဖစသည။ ဥပ ဒ ရ ရ အ ခခ
အ ဆ ကအအင ပစဒဏ ပ ခင ၊ စည မ စည ကမ မ ကလကန ကငသ ခင ၊ က ကယတ ဆ ရ ယရ
မ ငငငသ မ ငထ တဆကဆ ခင တအပ အ ၀ ငအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ စနစတစခလ ကအ စက
သညခငမ ပ ပညစ သ မဟ ဗဟ ဖစသည။
ဒမက ရစနည မက သ ငင ရ အထကတန လ သမဟတအဖအစည မဖမ ဆ ရမ သ ငငအခသည ရတတငအကငပက ခစ မကအနည ငယ သ
ခလမ မ လမ ငသည။
CPI ရစမ ဆ ငရညနမ သ ငငမ သညအကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ တင ရရညတ တကမကဟနတ သ
ဒမက ရစမက သ တညခကမ စ ရသည။ ၎င တတငဒမက ရစအငစတက ရင မ ၊ ဥပ ဒမ ၊ အ ဏ ရငငင
အခသညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ တငတ တကမအခရ သ လည လအမ ဦ ဆ င သ ကန မ သညဒ
မက ရစစနစငဆနကင။ တ တကမတင သညအ ဏ ရအ ဏ ရငမ ၏သ ဘ ထ ငစတဓ တအ ပမတည
သည။ ဒမက ရစငငမ တငတရ စရင ရ လတလပမကသ သ လအပ သ စစ ဆ မမ ငခနခငမ ရသည၊
၎င သညအဂတလကစ မတကဖက ရ စမခက၏ ရရညတညတမအတက သ ခက ဖစသည။ ဤငအ ခ ဒမက
ရစအဖအစည မ ငအ လအကငမ မရပ ကငငမ သညအကငပက ခစ မကထ ရ ကစ ကငတယင
လမမညဟမ မ လငငပ
စ နယဇင မ မန မမ အတက က ဇ ပ၍ press@transparency.org က (mailto:press@transparency.org) ဆက
သယပ (mailto:press@transparency.org)
ပပ မ TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
ကန တ တကကညပ (/DONATE)
ပမ က င မန သ ပ င စပ ခင - ရရညတညတခငမ
သ ဖဖ တ တကမက င က ထ ကပရ တငကမ
ဘဏမပငလင မငသ မကမညသ မငတငငသညက
ယခအပတတင ၀ ါရငတနဒစ၌စစကင ပ သ ကမ ဘဏ
အစည အ ဝ မ အရ Transparency International သည ၂၀၃၀ အစအစ
က င က ထ ကပရ တငကမ ဘဏ၏ပပ မမ တငပမပငလင
မငသ မ၊
(/news/feature/better_blending_how_the_world_bank_can_promote_transparency_in_financing_su)
“ သတင အတ” ခတ၏အဂတလကစ မကတကဖကရန
"သတင အတ" သညပ ခသညစမ အတင ဒမက ရစငသတင မဒယ
မ အ ပလထ၏ယကညမကက မ သ ခမ ခ ကမတစခ ဖစလ ခ
သည။ အကငပက ခစ မတကဖက ရ ကလည ထခကသည။
(/news/feature/fighting_corruption_in_the_age_of_fake_news)
သတင အခကအလကပငခင - လစမ အ
တစခ
တစကမ လ အတင အတ အရငင ပ င ၁၂၀ ခနတ
အခကအလကဥပ ဒမ ရသည။ အခ သ ငငမ
ထပတန အဆငရ သ လည အခမ မဥပ ဒမ မရ
ထငရ သညတ တကမမ လအပသည။ ငငတက
ငငသ မ သညအစ ရမပမတ ၀ နယမ ပ ရန တ
သ သ လအမ စကသတင အခကအလက တ င
ကပ သလ ။
(/news/feature/right_to_information_people_powGlobal Corruption Barometer - လကတငအ မရကငက ရ
ဘယ 2019
၁
ဆင အပ!

Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) - လကတငအ မရကငက ရစဘ
ယငငမ တငအဂတလကစ မသညအမ သမ မ အ ပက မ သည
အခ အစ မညမမငအစ ရ ခ င ဆ ငမ အက ငင ရ အရသမ ဓရမ
မရ ခင ကမ မ င ထ ပသည။
(/news/feature/global_corruption_barometer_gcb_latin_america_2019)
Mujeres y corrupción en Latinoamérica y el Caribe
လကတငအ မရကမလကတငအ မရကမလသ မ သ က ရဘယသညဂ
လ ဒ စအ ဂလဘယလက ဇ ရင ငလက အ ကခယရ မ ကအသ ပ
သည။
(/news/feature/mujeres_y_corrupcion_en_latinoamerica_y_el_caribe)
လကတငအ မရကငက ရဘယမအမ သမ မ င
အဂတလကစ မ
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) - လကတငအ မရကငက ရဘ
ယသညအကငပက ခစ မသညအမ သမ မ အ ပမညသသက ရ ကမရ
သညကန လညရနအတကအ ရ က သ ခလမ ဖစသည။ ပထမ ဦ ဆ
အ န ဖင GCB သညလငက ပ မဆငရ အဂတလကစ မ၏အထငရ ဆ
သ အရ မ အနကတစခ ဖစ သ လငပင ဆငရ ခမ ခ ကမသမဟတ
sextortion ငပတသက သ အခကအလကမ ကမ မ င ထ ပသည။ ထ
အ ပငလ ဘ ပ လ ဘယမဆငရ အမ သမ အ တအ ကမ ငပတသက
သညအခကအလကအသစမ ကလည တင ပထ သည။
(/news/feature/women_and_corruption_GCB)
Latinoamérica y el Caribe, အထ သ ဖင en
elecciones
El Barómetro Global de la Corrupción - Amér
Caribe တသည ရ က ကပဆငရ မဆရငမ က
ရသည။
(/news/feature/falta_de_integridad_politica_espe
လမမဒယ(http://www.facebook.com/TransparencyInternational/) (http://www.twitter.com/anticorruption/)
န ပ က လက ဒသတင နထင သ လအမ စအတက က င သ ဆ
ဘကဆငရ အ ဆ ကအအမ ကရယရနခကခသည။ အစ ရ ဆ မ သ
ကန မ ရ စ င ရ ကမညဖင ခင င ပတသက၍ တငက ခကမ က
လည မလယကပ ။ ဒ နရ မ ကန တ တဘယလကညခသလ။
ဘဝစစမန သ ပ ပငမ ၊ န ပ
ဒဇ တလမ ဟ Real Life၊ Real Stories ရအစတအပင ဖစပ ၊ အ ရပစ
ဖတ ဒသရကပတ၏အမ သ အခန က မ ၀ နထမ မ ရ သ သ စ
ရ တစခ ဖစသည။ ပ ပငမ ...
Netflix ၏ Lava Jato ကစ ဖစ သ The Mechanism အ ပ အ ခခ၍ စ
ရ အသစမ ကသတ၏ပလက ဖ င ပတငသ ထတ ပနခသည။
ထ က ငကပတသညအကငပက ခစ မအမ မ က ပသသညအ က င
ဆ Netflix စ ရ ၅ ခစ ရင ကအတတကထ ခသည။ သတကထက
စစ ဆ !
အဂတလကစ မငပတသက သ အ က င ဆ Netflix စ
ရ (၅) ခ (House of Cards မဟတ)
House of Card မ ကလတင သသညမ Netflix ကအဂတလကစ မင
ပတသက၍ ပသ သ လည န ကဆ စအနည ငယအတင လကကမ
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10/18/2019 25 corruption scandals that shook the world - Transparency International
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/25_corruption_scandals 1/23
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (/SEARCH?TOPIC=12) • 5 JULY 2019
25 CORRUPTION SCANDALS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD
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Updated on 21.08.2019
Twenty-five years ago, when Transparency International was founded, corruption was seen as the necessary
price of doing business and something so deeply ingrained that exposing and fighting it was regarded as futile
and even harmful.
We live in a different world now: citizens, media and politicians across all regions actively condemn abuses of
power. Such attitude change is partly due to exposure to past scandals and their consequences.
We compiled a list of some of the biggest corruption scandals over the last 25 years that inspired widespread
public condemnation, toppled governments and sent people to prison.* These scandals involve politicians across
political parties and from the highest reaches of government, staggering amounts of bribes and money
laundering of epic proportions.
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In the wake of many of these scandals, many governments and international bodies committed to or
implemented anti-corruption reforms, counted and, in some cases, recovered losses.
While much progress has been made to improve accountability, raise awareness about how corruption happens
and change norms and perceptions, we still have a long way to go to learn from these scandals and fight
corruption effectively.
1. Siemens: corruption made in Germany
2. Draining Nigeria of its assets
3. Fujimori’s Peru: death squads, embezzlement and good public relations
4. Kadyrov’s Chechnya: bikers, boxers, bribes
5. Shutting down competition in Tunisia
6. Ukraine’s missing millions
7. Ricardo Martinelli’s spy-game in Panama
8. The 1MDB fund: from Malaysia to Hollywood
9. The Russian Laundromat (with a little help from Moldova)
10. Spain’s largest corruption scandal: Gürtel
11. Venezuela’s currencies of corruption
12. The Panama Papers
13. Maldives: a paradise lost
14. Teodorín Obiang’s #LuxuryLiving in Equatorial Guinea
15. How the Gupta family captured South Africa through bribery
16. Lebanon’s garbage: the stench of corruption
17. FIFA’s football parallel universe
18. Myanmar’s dirty jade business
19. Fighting impunity in Guatemala
20. Turkey’s “gas for gold” scheme
21. The Azerbaijani Laundromat
22. Paradise Papers: where the rich & powerful hide their money
23. Operation Lava Jato: clean cars, dirty money
24. The Troika Laundromat
25. Andrej Babiš’s conflict of interest in Czechia
*Listed in no particular order.

SIEMENS: CORRUPTION MADE IN GERMANY
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Embed from Getty Images (http://www.gettyimages.de/detail/1021936816)
Did you know that certain bribes paid abroad were technically tax deductible for German companies until 1999?
They could simply categorise them as “useful expenditures”, as long as those expenses were not incurred in
Germany and there were no foreign state officials involved.
In 2006, however, it became clear that Siemens, one of Germany’s biggest companies, was taking corporate
bribery to a whole new level. For over a decade, it paid bribes to government officials and civil servants around
the world, amounting to approximately US$1.4 billion. While corrupt decision makers profited, citizens in the
affected countries paid the costs of overpriced necessities such as roads and power plants.
The company’s transactions eventually caught the interest of authorities in several countries, including the US
and Germany, which launched investigations and ultimately secured a historic sanction of US$1.6 billion. Read
more… (https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-massive-siemens-corruption-scandal-one-
decade-later-108694)

DRAINING NIGERIA OF ITS ASSETS
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see more(FILES) - Picture dated 30 August shows Nigerian Preside…
AFP | AFP
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Sani Abacha was a Nigerian army officer and dictator who served as the president of Nigeria from 1993 until his
death in 1998. His five-year rule was shrouded in corruption allegations, though the extent and severity of that
corruption was highlighted only after his death when it emerged that he took between US$3 and $5 billion of
public money.
In 2014, the US Justice Department revealed that it froze more than US$458 million in illicit funds that Abacha
and his conspirators hid around the world. For years, Nigeria has been fighting to recover the stolen money, but
companies linked to the Abacha family have gone to court to prevent repatriation.
Encouragingly, the secretive British tax haven of Jersey recently announced it was putting US$268 million, which
had been stashed in a Deutsche Bank account, into an asset recovery fund that will eventually return the cash to
Nigeria. Read more… (https://qz.com/1651742/british-tax-haven-jersey-is-returning-sani-abachas-270-
million-to-nigeria/)

FUJIMORI’S PERU: DEATH SQUADS, EMBEZZLEMENT AND GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS
How does a former president get approval from two-thirds of his citizens while standing trial for human rights
violations? Peru’s Alberto Fujimori partly managed this by using over 75 per cent of the National Intelligence
Service’s unsupervised budget to bribe politicians, judges and the media.
Fujimori presented a clean image to the public during his presidency while he used death squads to kill guerrillas
and allegedly embezzled US$600 million in public funds. After fleeing to Japan in 2000, he became the first
elected head of state to be extradited to his home country, tried and convicted for human rights abuses.
With a sentence of more than 30 years in prison, Fujimori joins a long line of former Peruvian presidents who
have been investigated or jailed for corruption. Read more…
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-09/a-suicide-rattles-the-corruption-stained-political-
class-in-peru)

KADYROV’S CHECHNYA: BIKERS, BOXERS, BRIBES
see moreHuman rights activists gather in front of the Chilean emba…
AFP | EITAN ABRAMOVICH
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Imagine having to pay a bribe to keep your job. Chechens have to do exactly that, every month. In Chechnya,
everyone earning a wage pays an unofficial tax to an opaque fund controlled by the head of the republic, Ramzan
Kadyrov.
While the fund helped build homes and mosques and provided international aid to Somalia, it also allegedly paid
for Kadyrov’s lavish 35th birthday party and the celebrities that attended it, a US$2 million boxing session with
Mike Tyson and 16 motorbikes that Kadyrov very publicly gifted to a nationalist biker gang.
Some Chechens lose half their income to this fund, which collects US$648 to 864 million a year, roughly the
equivalent of two thirds of Chechnya’s budget. Kadyrov is also said to help himself to that national budget whilst
committing human rights abuses that have led to sanctions from US authorities. Read more…
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/putins-closest-ally-and-his-biggest-liability)

SHUTTING DOWN COMPETITION IN TUNISIA
see moreGUDERMES, CHECHNYA, RUSSIA - MARCH 2006: Ramzan p…
Getty Images News | Getty Images
see moreSmoke rises from fire left after clashes between security f…
AFP | FETHI BELAID
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There are no Big Macs in Tunisia. That’s because the McDonald’s franchise was awarded to a business that
didn’t have connections to the ruling family and the government stopped the fast food chain from entering the
country.
From 1987 to 2011, President Ben Ali created laws that meant companies needed permission to invest and trade
in certain sectors. This allowed him to shut competition out whilst letting 220 family businesses monopolise
numerous industries, including telecommunications, transport and real estate. In 2010, these businesses
produced 3 per cent of Tunisia’s economic output, but took 21 per cent of the private sector profits.
Unsurprisingly, the Ben Ali family amassed US$13 billion.
Tunisians paid a heavy price for this and missed out on employment opportunities, while new entrepreneurs and
unconnected investors continued to fail.
Ben Ali fled the country in 2011 and his assets were auctioned off, but few restrictive laws have been repealed,
and questionably-connected firms with privileged access continue to reinforce and profit from inequality. Read
more… (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/27/tunisias-golden-age-of-
crony-capitalism/?utm_term=.57bd39851fa9)

UKRAINE’S MISSING MILLIONS
A golf course, ostrich farm, private zoo and full-size Spanish galleon replica were just some of the attractions
at Mezhyhirya, the multimillion dollar 137-hectare estate of Ukraine’s former President Viktor Yanukovych.
Yanukovych and his family fled to Russia in February 2014 after civil unrest sparked deadly conflict claiming over
100 lives, including by sniper bullets. Three years after these tragic events, a Ukrainian court found Yanukovych
guilty of high treason and sentenced him to 13 years in prison in absentia.
As he fled, Yanukovych left behind documents that showed how he financed a life of luxury at the expense of his
citizens. Using nominees as frontmen in a complex web of shell companies from Vienna to London to
Lichtenstein, Yanukovych allegedly concealed his involvement while syphoning off Ukrainian public funds for
personal benefit.
In February, Swedish public broadcaster SVT reported that Yanukovych’s shell company with a Swedish bank
account received a US$3.7 million bribe in 2011 and executed two transactions with a total worth of US$18
million in 2007 and 2014.
see moreKIEV, UKRAINE - FEBRUARY 26: Balls are left on a billiards …
Getty Images News | Jeff J Mitchell
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