Presented by Peter Cronkleton of the Center for International Forestry Research at the 16th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons July 14, 2017 in Utrecht, the Netherlands.

1. Comparing governance
reforms to restore the forest
commons in Nepal, China and
Ethiopia
Peter Cronkleton, Himlal Baral, Kiran Paudyal, Mani Ram
Banjade, Habtemariam Kassa, Emiru Birhane, Yustina Artati,
Liu Jinlong, Tu Chengyue
16th Biennial Conference of the International
Association for the Study of the Commons
14, July 2017 Utrecht, the Netherlands

2. Objective: Draw lessons from policy
reforms intended to promote forest
landscape restoration
Examples will:
• Describe national reform processes and
their local manifestations
• Explain how policy reforms for FLR have
targeted forest commons to
o Reclassify land
o Designate legitimate stewards
o Define acceptable land uses practices,
responsibilities and benefits
• Show how the devolution of rights to local
user groups was usually a key turning point
for slowing forest degradation

3. Nepal Case

4. Nepal Case
Policy transition occurred over
several decades
1957 Private Forest Nationalization Act
placed all forests under state control
• Intended to protect and conserve forests
• Instead increased degradation
1976 National Forestry Plan
• Devolved rights to local governments
• Promoted local participation to establish
forest plantations on public land
1988 Master Plan for the Forest Sector
• Recognized community forestry as
strategy for reforesting denuded mid-hills

5. Nepal Case
1993 Forest Act
• Devolved control forest ‘wastelands’ to local
people
• Recognized rights of community forest user
groups (CFUG) over devolved lands
• Required CFUGs to develop constitutions and
operational plans for forest management
• Reduced the quasi-judicial power of forestry
officials,
• Granted rights indefinitely (but operational
plans renewed every 5 years)
Result: CF quickly scaled up nationally:
• ~ 19,000 CFUGs manage 1.7 million of forests
• 33% of forests; 40% of total HH
(Source: DOF, 2016)

6. Nepal Case
Sandhe Raniswara Dopahare (SRD),
Phewa Watershed, Western Nepal
Phewa watershed: 77 CFUGs, 2421 ha
forests managed by 7756 HH
SRD characteristics: 219 households
manage a 22 ha forest for restoration
Prior to 1993:
• No rights over forest resources, no
stake in decision-making.
• Conservation activities were designed
by external experts, and implemented
with minimal local involvement
• Residents lacked interest in
participation and did not collaborate
with conservation measures.

7. Nepal Case
Sandhe Raniswara Dopahare (SRD),
Phewa Watershed, Western Nepal
After 1993 Forest Act:
• SRD initiated forests restoration using their
own rules
• In 1995 forest management rights were
officially devolved to SRD
• Forest is managed for wood fuel, fodder and
bedding material
SRD CFUG regulations:
• Invest labor for tree planting and as guards to
control grazing and monitor for forest fires.
• Designated collection periods for fuel wood and
leaf litter
• Rights (access, withdrawal, management and
exclusion) are perpetual but updated every 5 years
Significant increase in forest quality,
possible benefits from PES and ecotourism

8. China Case

9. China Case
Key Policy Trends
1981: Household responsibility system
• The reallocation of agricultural land increased
productivity (tenure certificate as long term lease
contract)
• Subsequently applied to forest lands
2003 and 2008: New Tenure reform
• 99% of China’s collective forestlands devolved to
individual households, household groups, investors
(leases) and village collectives.
• Long-term tenure security (70-year renewable contracts)
• Potential subsidies for forest restoration (for those with
forest tenure certificates)
• Reversed trend in forest loss in the southern China

10. China Case
Changting County, Western of Fujian
Province
Changting County Characteristics:
• Area 309,900 ha, Population 500,000
Once one of most degraded counties:
• One of China’s poorest counties with widespread soil
erosion
• Forest landscape restoration program began in 1981
• Program included exclosures, afforestation and
orchard plantations
By 2015:
• Eroded lands reduced from 31% in 1985 to 10%
• Forest coverage increased from 60% in 1986 to 80%
• Annual Income increased from US$60 in 1978 to
US$1110 (source: RCFEP, Renmin University)

11. China Case
Changting County, Western of Fujian
Province
Separate policy processes for forest
tenure reform and forest restoration
(different levels of government and mandates)
Forest Three Fixed Reform (early 1980s)
• Intended to stabilize forest ownership
• Delimitated boundaries for mountain
exclosures
• Devolved system of forest responsibility (16%
of mountainous ‘forest land’ distributed to 94% of
households in small parcels >1 ha)
• Most forest remained collectively managed by
government

12. China Case
Changting County, Western of Fujian
Province
“Who plant, Who Own" and "Wasteland Auction"
policy (1990s)
• Granted certificates of forest rights to villagers
investing in afforestation and plantations
• Increased participation, forest cover and income
Reform of collective forest rights system (2002)
• Decentralization of forest rights (collective to
individual)
• State maintained ownership of forestland
• Granted households access, use and management
rights to forestland
• Additional incentives reduced taxes and fees
• Allowed forestland mortgage
Increased enthusiasm for investments in
afforestation,
Diversified participation in forest landscape
restoration

13. China Case
Changting County, Western of Fujian
Province
Key Trends:
Collective publicly-owned property rights
provided relatively low incentives (1981-2002)
Forest Three Fixed reform
• Provided Insufficient incentives for
management and protection
• Continued ‘theft’ of forest products
Collective forestry reform
• Decreased theft and illegal harvests,
however, no afforestation activities either,
land often managed by exclosure
• Villagers unwilling to invest in FLR on small
remote areas and with limited rights

14. China Case
Changting County, Western of Fujian
Province
Trends in incentives:
• Individualized forest rights arrangements
provide relatively high economic incentive to
large households, enterprises, and
cooperatives
• Individual stakeholders willing to invest in
afforestation to obtain economic benefits
• Individualized property rights arrangements
encouraged public participation and
diversified participation in the restoration of
forest landscape

15. Ethiopia Case

16. Ethiopia Case
Policy trends:
After 1975 coup, land and forests were
nationalized and held as state property
• Created an ‘open access’ problems for forests
o Policy did not accommodate local customary
practice
o State agencies lacked capacity to control forests
• Increased natural resource degradation
• Large scale government programs to conserve
soil and water on slopping and degraded lands
o Massive tree planting programs on state lands
o Major investments with limited success

17. Ethiopia Case
Policy trends:
Governmental change in 1991 maintained
tenure policy but introduced reforms
National Conservation Strategy (1994)
• Used decentralized approach
• Stressed local participation in development
• Created space for NGOs to experiment with
participatory forest management
o Negotiated agreements between
communities and regional government
agencies
o No formal change in property rights
o Designated withdrawal (use) rights, and
some management and exclusion rights

18. Ethiopia Case
Chilimo Forest
Chilimo Forest: Dendi district, Oromia
• Designated as a National Forest
Priority Areas (NFPAs) in 1991
• High deforestation during period of
weak governance following violent
change of government
• From 1982 to 1995 forest shrank from
22,000 ha to 6,000 ha
• In 1996, NGOs FARM Africa and SOS
International initiated PFM as brokers

19. Ethiopia Case
Chilimo Forest
Chilimo Forest: Dendi district, Oromia
PFM Process
NGOs negotiated with District Agricultural
Office technicians:
• Calculated ‘carrying capacity’ of forest. Used to
limit the number of participants
• Defined 12 FUGs from 6 villages surrounding the
forest, members of FUGs have ‘official’ access, non-
members are excluded
• FUGs given access, withdrawal, management and
exclusion rights
• In 2004 management and use rights officially
transferred to the FUGs

20. Ethiopia Case
Chilimo Forest
The Chilimo FUG management plan
• Devolved rights Included natural forest and
plantations in buffer zone
• Only harvest NTFPs from the natural forest
(grass, medicinal plants, fuelwood)
• Collective sale of timber from plantation
o Less restriction on use
o Considerable income for FUG participants
Deforestation has been reduced and
regeneration enhanced

21. Ethiopia Case
Chilimo Forest
Concerns:
Marginalization of non-FUG families
• Lack of transparency in distribution of
responsibility and benefit sharing
mechanisms
• State agencies lack capacity to assist with
enforcement of exclusion
o Illegal harvest of small diameter trees
o Leakage into non-PFM forests near FUGs
In FUGs without plantation timber,
economic returns lower than
expected
• However, communities expect that PFM is
incremental step for gaining recognition of
stronger property rights in the future

22. Conclusions
• The devolution of rights to local
user groups is usually a key turning
point for slowing forest degradation
• Governments were initially
reluctant reformers and generally
devolve rights partially producing
co-management situations
• Efficient and effective solutions
result from adaptive multi-
stakeholder processes involving
negotiation and balance of
tradeoffs

23. cifor.org
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