The document discusses several covert CIA operations during the Vietnam War that were aimed at influencing the conflict in America's favor but ultimately contributed to its failure. It describes how the CIA was involved in the overthrow and assassination of South Vietnam's president Diem in 1963 after he became uncooperative. It also discusses the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and how questionable CIA intelligence operations may have provoked North Vietnam into attacking US ships, leading to greater US escalation. Finally, it outlines the CIA's Phoenix Program launched in 1967 to disrupt Viet Cong operations through identification and elimination of civilian supporters, a highly controversial program.

1. Grant Benson
History 3487
Professor Mai Na M. Lee
April 22, 2010
CIA Covert Operations in Vietnam
The Vietnam War is perhaps America’s most painful and most controversial conflict
overseas. Debates over the war usually stem from U.S. failures in strategic operations, paranoia
surrounding the Cold War and the spread of Communism (as well as the idea of Containment),
and the young lives lost in the fighting done abroad. However, a facet of the War that usually is
not discussed is the role of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Various covert
operations like the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the Gulf of Tonkin Desoto Missions, the
CORDS/Phoenix Program, and the Secret War in Laos, were designed to gain intelligence and
tip the balance of the war in the American’s favor. Much blame is thrown around when it comes
to the conflict in Vietnam, but blame is rarely thrown in the direction of the failed CIA missions
programmed to gain the upper hand and launch the United States to victory. As one scholar has
said, “The Vietnam War is Exhibit A for the abolition of the CIA.” The Vietnam War had its
share of miscues and failed operations, and while there is much to blame for these mistakes, the
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency is quietly in the center of America’s failure in
Vietnam.
America’s reliance on covert operations began with the South Vietnamese regime led by
Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem’s rise to power began in 1954, when he was appointed Prime Minister of
the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai. At the time, Vietnam was being partitioned at the

2. Geneva Conferences after defeating the French at Dien Bien Phu. The State of Vietnam ruled the
country south of the 17th parallel. The split at the Demilitarized Zone was supposed to be
temporary until a national election took place in 1956 with the goal of unifying the nation. The
elections never occurred, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) led by Ho Chi Minh and
the Viet Minh became recognized as a separate state. Meanwhile, locked in a power struggle,
Bao Dai reluctantly selected Diem as Prime Minister in hopes he would bring U.S. aid to the
South. Diem scheduled a referendum in October 1955 to decide whether South Vietnam would
become a republic. Diem’s referendum passed, despite being rigged, and he appointed himself
President of the new Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Diem played right in the hands of the
Americans—or so they thought—he was a well-educated Catholic who hated Communism; a
perfect propaganda machine for a red-fearing United States. The Americans thought they could
“pull the strings” of their “puppet” in Saigon and lead the country further away from
Communism.
However, Diem refused to play along with the Americans. He refused to hold the
reunification elections in 1956 on grounds the State of Vietnam hadn’t signed the Geneva
Accords. Diem began to rule over the south with an iron fist. Anyone opposed to his rule were
immediately jailed or executed in the thousands, elections were habitually rigged, and opposing
candidates were falsely charged with conspiring with the Vietcong. As opposition to Diem grew
in the south, Kennedy and the CIA’s patience with Diem was dwindling. Perhaps the boiling
point came when Buddhists’ who were tired of Diem’s Catholic bias, protests for religious
freedom ended in bloodshed. While Diem remained stagnant of escalating Buddhist demands,
sections of society began calling for his removal of power. Plenty of coup plans had been
explored from within ARVN, but they weren’t realized until the administration of John. F.

3. Kennedy began to look into a change of power. Upon hearing an overthrow of Diem was being
designed by ARVN generals, the U.S. gave assurances to the ARVN generals that the U.S.
would not hinder the coup d’état. The ARVN generals overthrew their leader on November 1,
1963 and Diem was executed on November 2. Acting under immense pressure from the south
and continuing problems from Diem, American Central Intelligence had already made their first
mistake in Vietnam. After learning of Diem’s death, Ho Chi Minh was quoted as saying "I can
scarcely believe the Americans would be so stupid. The consequences of the 1 November coup
d'état will be contrary to the calculations of the U.S. imperialists ... Diem was one of the
strongest individuals resisting the people and Communism. Everything that could be done in an
attempt to crush the revolution was carried out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent
lackeys of the U.S. imperialists ... Among the anti-Communists in South Vietnam or exiled in
other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and abilities to cause others to obey.
Therefore, the lackey administration cannot be stabilized. The coup d'état on 1 November 1963
will not be the last." 1
The American’s role in the war didn’t come full circle until the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
which occurred on August 2, 1964 and August 4, 1964. Previously, in 1961, the CIA had
launched a highly-classified program of covert operations against the DRV called Operational
Plan 34A. Operation 34A consisted of agent team insertions, aerial reconnaissance missions, and
naval sabotage missions. As part of 34A, the U.S. Navy had begun conducting secret, electronic
surveillance operations (codenamed the Desoto Patrols), which were carried out by destroyers
operating along the cost of North Vietnam.2 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred in conjunction
1 Mark Moyar,Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965.(Cambridge U. Press) Pg. 286
2 The History Place, America Commits 1961-1964,http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-
1961.html (1999)

4. with the U.S. Destroyer USS Maddox performing a Desoto patrol off the coast of North Vietnam
on the morning of 2 August, 1964. The Maddox came under attack by three North Vietnamese
Navy torpedo boats. The sea battle resulted in the damage on one U.S. aircraft, one small hit on
the Maddox, with no U.S. casualties. The second attack came two days later when another
Desoto patrol was launched by the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy in order to “show the flag”
after the first incident. During the patrol that went from the late evening into the early morning,
the destroyers received radar, sonar, and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack
from the North Vietnamese. For two hours, the two ships fired on radar targets amid electronic
and visual reports of spotted enemies. The Navy claimed there had been two enemy torpedo
boats sunk, but there was no wreckage, bodies of North Vietnamese sailors, or any other physical
evidence present at the scene of the alleged incident.3
The alleged attacks on the USS Maddox and the C. Turner Joy led to the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, in which President Lyndon B. Johnson enacted his Presidential powers to conduct
“police action” anywhere the United States sees fit. The Resolution led to the first escalated
troop presence in Vietnam. By March 1965, US Marines had landed in Da Nang, near the DMZ.
Although U.S. troop intervention was already well under way, controversy surrounding the Gulf
of Tonkin Incident continued, centered around controversial Desoto patrols that were part of
Operation 34A launched by the CIA. North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap suggested that
the Desoto patrols had been sent in to the Gulf to provoke a North Vietnamese attack, giving an
excuse for escalation in the war. Members aboard the Maddox have also produced similar
theories. George Ball, an American diplomat, told a British newspaper after the war that “at the
3 John Prados, The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President, New York, George Washington University
25 October 2009.

5. time, many people were looking for an excuse to initiate bombing.”4 The conflict in Vietnam
was just beginning to heat up, and CIA initiated operations had already begun to pit the United
States squarely into the titanic struggle that would plague the country for the next decade and
beyond.
In 1967, when U.S. intervention in Vietnam was beginning to heat up, the CIA launched
the Phoenix Program. Phoenix was part of the pacification effort in South Vietnam under
CORDS (Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support). CORDS was the brainchild
of President Johnson’s special assistant for pacification in Vietnam, Robert Komer. In that
position, Komer was responsible for winning the “hearts and minds” of South Vietnamese
peasants and sway support against the northern Vietcong.5 Komer believed the pacification
process in Vietnam could only be achieved by incorporating three different tasks. The first
involved security, CORDS had to keep the rural population safe from the enemy forces in the
north. Second, if the first task was successful, the Vietcong had to be weakened by destroying
their infrastructure and creating programs to win over the population’s sympathy for the South
Vietnamese government and the U.S. forces. Third, the aforementioned tasks had to be employed
on a large scale to successfully turn around the situation. 6
As stated previously, the Phoenix Program was one of many different programs within
the CORDS program. But Phoenix was perhaps the most controversial program in CORDS. The
Phoenix Program, designed by the CIA, was military, intelligence, and internal security program
that was executed by the DRV’s security apparatus U.S. Special Operational Units, like the
4 Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina
Press,1996.
5 Mark Leepson, The Heart and Mind of USAIDS Vietnam Mission, www.afsa.org/fsj/apr000/leepson.cfm+cords
1995
6 Andrade, Dale; Willbanks,James H. (2006):CORDS/Phoenix. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the
Future. Military Review (March/April),pp.77-91.

6. NAVY SEALs, U.S. Armed Special Forces and the MACV-SOG (a special operations group in
the CIA’s Special Activity Division. Phoenix was used to identify and “destroy” the civilian
infrastructure supporting the Vietcong via infiltration, capture, terrorism, and assassination.
Enforcement of the program was placed on local government militia and police forces, rather
than the military.7 Neutralization of suspected Vietcong supporters was not arbitrary, however
took place under special laws that allowed for the arrest and detention of suspected communists,
but only within the legal system. The laws required three different pieces of evidence be
submitted against a suspected NLF supporter before any conviction could take place. If the
suspected NLF supporter was found guilty, he could held in prison for two years with the option
of a renewal after that.
The Phoenix Program had many critics. On one hand, Phoenix was a clear success. Over
the course of the program, 81,740 NLF members were successfully neutralized, 26,369 of whom
were killed. That’s a large section of the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) that was taken out and,
between 1969 and 1971; Phoenix was successful in destroying the VCI in many important areas.8
However, there are many harsh critics of the CIA’s Phoenix Program. Some critics maintain that
all counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam were complete failures, one reason being the NLF had
already established and large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before
Phoenix was implemented. While it’s true Phoenix delivered significant damage to the VCI, it
was little too late to alter the war.9 Phoenix is also sometimes described as an “assassination
campaign,” and has been used an example of human-rights atrocities committed by the CIA and
U.S. Military Intelligence. During a series of investigative hearings, a former serviceman named
7 DaleAndrade, Ashes to Ashes, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr06/Andrade-Willbanks.pdf
8 DaleAndrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, pg 53 (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1990
9 Ken Tovo, From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/ksil241.pdf,18 March 2005,pg. 19

7. K. Barton Osborn claimed that the Phoenix Program was a “sterile depersonalized murder
program.”10 Osborn never used any evidence to back up his claim, but there were some situations
that led to abuses. In many instances, rival Vietnamese would report their own enemies as
Vietcong in order to get U.S. troops to kill them. The CIA tried to address this problem by
instituting monthly neutralization quotas, but these often led to fabrications or false arrests.11 On
the outside, Phoenix looks like a success, but further investigation in the matter reveals another
possible CIA failure in Vietnam.
As the war raged on in Vietnam, another war no one knew about was also being fought in
the country of Laos. In fact, this war became known as the Secret War. Like its name, the war
was a total secret. The background on the Secret War began with the Geneva Conference in
1954, which establish Laotian neutrality. North Vietnamese forces, however, continued to
operate in northern and southern Laos. The North Vietnamese constructed the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laotian territory in the southeast of Laos running parallel to the Vietnamese border. The
purpose of the trail was to assist Northern Vietnamese troops and supplies into the southern DRV
and to support the NLF. The war against the Americans wasn’t the only struggle the NLF was
engaged in. The NLF had a sizeable military effort in northern Laos supporting the Pathet Lao
communists in their uprising against the Royal Lao Government in Laos.
In an attempt to disrupt NFL operations in northern Laos without direct U.S. military
intervention, the CIA responded by training a guerilla force of thirty thousand Laotian tribesman,
mostly local Hmong tribesman led by Royal Lao Army General Vang Pao. The army was
supported by the CIA propriety airline Air America, the nation of Thailand, and Royal Lao Air
10 http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/2008_Symposium/2008symposium.php
11 Ken Tovo, From the Ashes, pg. 29

8. Force and fought the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the NLF, and the Pathet Lao allies. At
the time, the Secret War in Laos ended greatly aiding the U.S. interests in the war in Vietnam.
The status of the war in the north actually largely depended on the weather. North Vietnamese
operations didn’t start until the dry season, usually in November or December. Fresh troops and
supplies would flow from North Vietnam on new routes. The CIA’s trained guerilla army (also
known as the Clandestine Army) would then intervene, devastating the PAVN and the Pathet
Lao until they retreated. Massive airstrikes would then take place against the communist forces
to hold off capture of the Laotian capitals Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Once the rainy season
started again six months later, the NLF supply lines would become inoperable and the
communists would retreat back to Vietnam. The front in the south against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
was primarily from the air.
The U.S. conflict in Laos is often referred to as the CIA’s “Secret War” because details
simply weren’t available to the public due to the Government’s denial that the war actually
existed. Denial of the Secret War was thought to be mandatory, because America and North
Vietnam had signed agreements that Laos was to remain neutral. Ultimately, the CIA was sent in
to train guerilla units because the DRV had already conquered a large part of Laos and
intervention was necessary to support the U.S’s policy on communist containment. The
Americans were paranoid of the communist ideology of the DRV, Soviet Union, and China
spreading into Laos. The Secret War was America’s largest covert operation ever at the time,
prior to the Afghan-Soviet War.12
Although, at the time, the Secret War was aiding U.S. interests in Vietnam, the Secret
War in Laos was ultimately a failure. The U.S’s fortunes in Laos relied too much on the goings
12 Branfman, Fred, Wanted May 18, 2001

9. on in Vietnam. When the Americans withdrew their troops from Vietnam in 1975, they also
withdrew the training teams and military support from Laos and their Hmong guerillas. The
Royal Lao Government couldn’t handle the absence of CIA intervention and Laos ultimately fell
to the Pathet Lao communists. Much controversy surrounded the Hmong guerillas that were left
behind after the U.S. withdrew. The Hmong that were left behind were seen as a threat and
persecuted. Deserted by their U.S. allies, many Hmong had to flee to Thailand for refuge. To this
day, the Hmong are still persecuted in Laos.13 22 years following the end of the war in 1997,
under the pressure from American conservatives, America finally admitted their role in the
Secret War. A memorial was erected on the grounds of Arlington National Cemetery. Also, in
2004, the U.S. Government reversed a long-standing policy of denying immigrant rights to
Hmong refugees, who had fled Laos for refugee camps in Thailand.14
The Vietnam War was obviously a dark time period in American history. Countless
strategic mistakes were made and it cost the lives of many of American soldiers and North and
South Vietnamese. In an attempt to gather intelligence and gain the upper hand, the U.S.
government allowed the CIA to control various, important events in Vietnam. When Kennedy
and the CIA gave ARVN generals secret assurance they wouldn’t intervene with the coup against
Diem, they were making mistake (despite the immense un-popularity of Diem). Diem’s
compliance had started to dwindle, bur he was the staunch voice against communism that was
needed in the south. Even Ho Chi Minh himself, expressed how big of a mistake the Americans
made in ousting Diem. If that wasn’t bad enough, the CIA Desoto patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin
ultimately led to direct American intervention in Vietnam…intervention that would last for a
decade and would lead to other CIA miscues.
13 Memories of the Secret War, Secret War, http://library.thinkquest.org/trio/TR0110763/secretWar.html,2001
14 "Acts of Betrayal," by Michael Johns, National Review, October 23, 1995.

10. The Phoenix Program, which was a part of CORDS can’t be considered a success
because it didn’t achieve the program’s primary goal; win the hearts and minds of the south
Vietnamese. It also gave the CIA bad press, as many southern Vietnamese were assassinated,
thus adding to the accusation that the Phoenix Program was merely a “sterile depersonalized
murder program.” And while all this was going on, the Secret War was also raging on in Laos
where the CIA trained thirty thousand troops in guerilla warfare. Efforts in Laos were effective
in saving American lives, but were also done at the expense of Hmong lives fighting for the CIA.
One scholar has said, “The Vietnam War is Exhibit A for the abolition of the CIA.” While that
may be a little harsh, there’s no denying that the Central Intelligence Agency was quietly in the
center of America’s failure in Vietnam.