The research studies whether major life events affect the perception of social norms. Specifically, I focus on how giving birth to a first child affects attitudes towards gender norms. I find that after childbirth people become more likely to agree with traditional division of household chores. Effects are contingent on country and demographic characteristics
After couples have their first child, parents become more likely to agree with statements showing traditional gender norms. In this research I study how common this finding is across countries,and whether differences across countries can shed light on the reasons
Delayed fertility and statistical discrimination against womenGRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Does childbearing makes us more conservative?GRAPE
The research shows that upon becoming parents, mothers (and fathers) embrace more traditional norms in a number of domains. They are more likely to put a higher value on family that before, and they would even conform to a male breadwinner model. The change in attitudes is more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, and almost negligible elsewhere. I further show that this is related to a series of characteristics of those countries. Noteworthy, changes are more frequent in countries where women receive less support during motherhood from the state, and where differences in norms across genders are more marked.
We study whether parents modify their attitudes towards gender norms after childbirth. By comparing their answers before and after childbirth, we observe that parents become more traditional. Moreover, we find that this effect is more pronounced in contexts where it is more difficult to reconcile work and care responsibilities. This finding shows that people adjust their attitudes to their circumstances.
Statistical gender discrimination: evidence from young workers across four de...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps among younger workers. Employers could discount women's wages to adjust for probable costs linked to childbearing. Given trends towards lower and delayed fertility one should observe a lower discount in wages and a reduction in the gender wage gap among entrants. We test this conjecture using estimates of adjusted gender wage gap among young workers from 56 countries. We find that postponing childbirth by a year reduces the adjusted gap by two percentage points (15%). We further benchmark the implied gender inequality with the help of time-use data.
After couples have their first child, parents become more likely to agree with statements showing traditional gender norms. In this research I study how common this finding is across countries,and whether differences across countries can shed light on the reasons
Delayed fertility and statistical discrimination against womenGRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Does childbearing makes us more conservative?GRAPE
The research shows that upon becoming parents, mothers (and fathers) embrace more traditional norms in a number of domains. They are more likely to put a higher value on family that before, and they would even conform to a male breadwinner model. The change in attitudes is more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, and almost negligible elsewhere. I further show that this is related to a series of characteristics of those countries. Noteworthy, changes are more frequent in countries where women receive less support during motherhood from the state, and where differences in norms across genders are more marked.
We study whether parents modify their attitudes towards gender norms after childbirth. By comparing their answers before and after childbirth, we observe that parents become more traditional. Moreover, we find that this effect is more pronounced in contexts where it is more difficult to reconcile work and care responsibilities. This finding shows that people adjust their attitudes to their circumstances.
Statistical gender discrimination: evidence from young workers across four de...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps among younger workers. Employers could discount women's wages to adjust for probable costs linked to childbearing. Given trends towards lower and delayed fertility one should observe a lower discount in wages and a reduction in the gender wage gap among entrants. We test this conjecture using estimates of adjusted gender wage gap among young workers from 56 countries. We find that postponing childbirth by a year reduces the adjusted gap by two percentage points (15%). We further benchmark the implied gender inequality with the help of time-use data.
Statistical discrimination at young age: new evidence from four decades of in...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Fertility, contraceptives and gender inequalityGRAPE
Our analysis shows that increasing the age at first birth is associated with a substantial decline in gender wage gaps: postponing first birth by a year reduces the gap by around 15%. In order to establish causality, we propose a novel instrument that exploits international variation in approval of oral contraceptives (the pill). Our estimates are consistent with a model of statistical discrimination where employers offer lower wages to women to hedge the expected costs associated with childbearing and childrearing.
We study the relationship between gender inequality among youth and fertility timing. We show that postponing fertility by one year leads to a substantial reduction of gender inequality. This finding is consistent with a simple statistical discrimination model, where employers offer lower wages when they anticipated costs related to fertility, and that these costs are higher for female employees.
Statistical discrimination is a possible, rational motive behind the persistent differences in earnings between men and women. Employers could women to bear a larger share of the burden associated with having children, and subsequently discount that on wages. We test the empirical validity of this claim using data from over 50 countries and 40 years. Using IV we find causal evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Postponing birth by one year leads to large falls in the adjusted gender wage gap.
The Ipsos MORI report, Family Matters, followed eleven families feeling the strain from depressed incomes, rising living costs and cuts to benefits and services. The report provides insight into the lived experiences of modern families away from the policy and political debates that dominate discourse about families. The key drivers of family fragility – whether financial, emotional, relational or physical – were the four C’s: cost of living, cars, credit and childcare.
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling story to understand gender wage gaps, at least during the early stages of the career. Employers believe that women will get pregnant with a positive probability, which leads to potential losses, eg. costs associated with finding substitutes, potential losses in customers, etc. Employers then have an incentive to offer women lower wages, in order to discount for future losses. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants.
In order to test for this hypothesis, we collect individual level data from European countries dating back to the early 1990. Having compiled these data, we compute the adjusted gender wage gap for workers at the early stages of their career, that is for those aged 25 to 29. These adjuste differences are obtained using the non-parametric approach pioneered by Nopo. We then regress these measures on macro data on fertility changes. If the statistical discrimination hypothesis is correct, we should expect that the secular decline in fertility observed in Europe over the last 30 years is correlated with lower estimates of the gender wage gap. Our estimates suggest that this is indeed the case. Using the age at first birth as a proxy for fertility, we find that postponing childbirth by an additional year leads to a reduction of .18 in the adjusted gap.
One caveat with this result is that fertility can be endogeneous to wages. If women were to receive higher wages, they might choose to postpone childbirths. To address this issue, we instrument our measure of fertility with the number of years since the introduction of the pill in the country. This measures varies across countries and over time, while at the same time it is fairly exogeneous, as the introduction of the pill occurred several generations back, normally in the mid-60 and 70s. First stage regressions reveal that the instrument correlates well with mean age at first birth. Second stage estimates are still significant, though they are smaller in magnitude. We conclude that recent changes in fertility helped to reduce the gender wage gap among women entering to the labor market.
When hiring employees, an employer might use information from the group to these employees belong as a proxy for productivity related unobserved variables, such as the probability of becoming a parent. We put this conjecture to test by collecting data from over 50 countries and 40 years. We find that delaying fertility leads to a fall in gender inequality, a finding that is consistent with statistical discrimination.
We provide causal evidence that delaying fertility leads to a decrease in the adjusted gender wage gap. To avoid possible reverse causality, we employ an instrumental variable approach. We introduce several instruments, among them a novel one: international variation in the introduction of the contraceptive pill. Our estimates are large: a one-year delay in fertility leads to a 12% fall in the gender wage gap
Intergenerational mobility, intergenerational effects, the role of family background, and equality of opportunity: a comparison of four approaches
Anders Björklund
SOFI, Stockholm University
SITE, Stockholm, September 2, 2014
Child-related transfers: is there a room for welfare improvement?GRAPE
How does income risk affect the optimal size of the child-related transfer system? I answer this question in an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and PAYG social security. I show that the optimal size of the child-related transfer is increasing in income risk.
First, in the stylized model, I provide the intuition behind this result. Second, I quantify the size of welfare gains due to child-related transfer reform in a full-fledged model calibrated to the US economy.
Expansion of child-related transfer yields to welfare gain even with constant income dispersion. In a scenario with higher income dispersion, welfare gains increase from 1.08% to 1.2% of lifetime consumption.
Third, I show that in a scenario with high-income dispersion, even higher welfare gains may be obtained if the child-related transfer system has a more redistributive nature.
HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", Andrew ClarkStatsCommunications
Presentation at the HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", 30-31 October 2014, Turin, Italy, http://oe.cd/HLEG-workshop-subjective-wb-2014
Aspirations and women's empowerment: Evidence from KyrgyzstanCGIAR
This presentation was given by Katrina Kosec (IFPRI/PIM), as part of the Annual Gender Scientific Conference hosted by the CGIAR Collaborative Platform for Gender Research. The event took place on 25-27 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, hosted by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and co-organized with KIT Royal Tropical Institute.
Read more: http://gender.cgiar.org/gender_events/annual-conference-2018/
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
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Statistical discrimination at young age: new evidence from four decades of in...GRAPE
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps during the early stages of the career. Expecting absences related to child-bearing and child-rearing, the employers discount productivity to adjust for the probable losses such as costs associated with finding substitutes, leaving customers, etc. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants. We put this conjecture to test against the data. We provide a novel set of estimates of adjusted gender wage gaps among youth for 56 countries spanning four decades. We estimate that postponing childbirth by a year reduce the adjusted gap 2 percentage points (15%). We show that this estimate is consistent with statistical discrimination, but for some countries the estimates of AGWG imply that either statistical discrimination is not accurate or taste-based mechanisms are also at play.
Fertility, contraceptives and gender inequalityGRAPE
Our analysis shows that increasing the age at first birth is associated with a substantial decline in gender wage gaps: postponing first birth by a year reduces the gap by around 15%. In order to establish causality, we propose a novel instrument that exploits international variation in approval of oral contraceptives (the pill). Our estimates are consistent with a model of statistical discrimination where employers offer lower wages to women to hedge the expected costs associated with childbearing and childrearing.
We study the relationship between gender inequality among youth and fertility timing. We show that postponing fertility by one year leads to a substantial reduction of gender inequality. This finding is consistent with a simple statistical discrimination model, where employers offer lower wages when they anticipated costs related to fertility, and that these costs are higher for female employees.
Statistical discrimination is a possible, rational motive behind the persistent differences in earnings between men and women. Employers could women to bear a larger share of the burden associated with having children, and subsequently discount that on wages. We test the empirical validity of this claim using data from over 50 countries and 40 years. Using IV we find causal evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Postponing birth by one year leads to large falls in the adjusted gender wage gap.
The Ipsos MORI report, Family Matters, followed eleven families feeling the strain from depressed incomes, rising living costs and cuts to benefits and services. The report provides insight into the lived experiences of modern families away from the policy and political debates that dominate discourse about families. The key drivers of family fragility – whether financial, emotional, relational or physical – were the four C’s: cost of living, cars, credit and childcare.
Statistical discrimination offers a compelling story to understand gender wage gaps, at least during the early stages of the career. Employers believe that women will get pregnant with a positive probability, which leads to potential losses, eg. costs associated with finding substitutes, potential losses in customers, etc. Employers then have an incentive to offer women lower wages, in order to discount for future losses. If that is the case, lower and delayed fertility should imply lower discount in wages, and consequently reductions in the gender pay gap among entrants.
In order to test for this hypothesis, we collect individual level data from European countries dating back to the early 1990. Having compiled these data, we compute the adjusted gender wage gap for workers at the early stages of their career, that is for those aged 25 to 29. These adjuste differences are obtained using the non-parametric approach pioneered by Nopo. We then regress these measures on macro data on fertility changes. If the statistical discrimination hypothesis is correct, we should expect that the secular decline in fertility observed in Europe over the last 30 years is correlated with lower estimates of the gender wage gap. Our estimates suggest that this is indeed the case. Using the age at first birth as a proxy for fertility, we find that postponing childbirth by an additional year leads to a reduction of .18 in the adjusted gap.
One caveat with this result is that fertility can be endogeneous to wages. If women were to receive higher wages, they might choose to postpone childbirths. To address this issue, we instrument our measure of fertility with the number of years since the introduction of the pill in the country. This measures varies across countries and over time, while at the same time it is fairly exogeneous, as the introduction of the pill occurred several generations back, normally in the mid-60 and 70s. First stage regressions reveal that the instrument correlates well with mean age at first birth. Second stage estimates are still significant, though they are smaller in magnitude. We conclude that recent changes in fertility helped to reduce the gender wage gap among women entering to the labor market.
When hiring employees, an employer might use information from the group to these employees belong as a proxy for productivity related unobserved variables, such as the probability of becoming a parent. We put this conjecture to test by collecting data from over 50 countries and 40 years. We find that delaying fertility leads to a fall in gender inequality, a finding that is consistent with statistical discrimination.
We provide causal evidence that delaying fertility leads to a decrease in the adjusted gender wage gap. To avoid possible reverse causality, we employ an instrumental variable approach. We introduce several instruments, among them a novel one: international variation in the introduction of the contraceptive pill. Our estimates are large: a one-year delay in fertility leads to a 12% fall in the gender wage gap
Intergenerational mobility, intergenerational effects, the role of family background, and equality of opportunity: a comparison of four approaches
Anders Björklund
SOFI, Stockholm University
SITE, Stockholm, September 2, 2014
Child-related transfers: is there a room for welfare improvement?GRAPE
How does income risk affect the optimal size of the child-related transfer system? I answer this question in an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and PAYG social security. I show that the optimal size of the child-related transfer is increasing in income risk.
First, in the stylized model, I provide the intuition behind this result. Second, I quantify the size of welfare gains due to child-related transfer reform in a full-fledged model calibrated to the US economy.
Expansion of child-related transfer yields to welfare gain even with constant income dispersion. In a scenario with higher income dispersion, welfare gains increase from 1.08% to 1.2% of lifetime consumption.
Third, I show that in a scenario with high-income dispersion, even higher welfare gains may be obtained if the child-related transfer system has a more redistributive nature.
HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", Andrew ClarkStatsCommunications
Presentation at the HLEG thematic workshop on "Multidimensional Subjective Well-being", 30-31 October 2014, Turin, Italy, http://oe.cd/HLEG-workshop-subjective-wb-2014
Aspirations and women's empowerment: Evidence from KyrgyzstanCGIAR
This presentation was given by Katrina Kosec (IFPRI/PIM), as part of the Annual Gender Scientific Conference hosted by the CGIAR Collaborative Platform for Gender Research. The event took place on 25-27 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, hosted by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and co-organized with KIT Royal Tropical Institute.
Read more: http://gender.cgiar.org/gender_events/annual-conference-2018/
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Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
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(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
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Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
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Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
Introduction to Indian Financial System ()Avanish Goel
The financial system of a country is an important tool for economic development of the country, as it helps in creation of wealth by linking savings with investments.
It facilitates the flow of funds form the households (savers) to business firms (investors) to aid in wealth creation and development of both the parties
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the telegram id of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Tele gram: @Pi_vendor_247
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
how to sell pi coins on Bitmart crypto exchangeDOT TECH
Yes. Pi network coins can be exchanged but not on bitmart exchange. Because pi network is still in the enclosed mainnet. The only way pioneers are able to trade pi coins is by reselling the pi coins to pi verified merchants.
A verified merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell it to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
Empowering the Unbanked: The Vital Role of NBFCs in Promoting Financial Inclu...Vighnesh Shashtri
In India, financial inclusion remains a critical challenge, with a significant portion of the population still unbanked. Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) have emerged as key players in bridging this gap by providing financial services to those often overlooked by traditional banking institutions. This article delves into how NBFCs are fostering financial inclusion and empowering the unbanked.
Currently pi network is not tradable on binance or any other exchange because we are still in the enclosed mainnet.
Right now the only way to sell pi coins is by trading with a verified merchant.
What is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone verified by pi network team and allowed to barter pi coins for goods and services.
Since pi network is not doing any pre-sale The only way exchanges like binance/huobi or crypto whales can get pi is by buying from miners. And a merchant stands in between the exchanges and the miners.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant. I and my friends has traded more than 6000pi coins successfully
Tele-gram
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins in all Africa Countries.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network for other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, usdt , Ethereum and other currencies And this is done easily with the help from a pi merchant.
What is a pi merchant ?
Since pi is not launched yet in any exchange. The only way you can sell right now is through merchants.
A verified Pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins from miners and resell them to investors looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before mainnet launch in 2026.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
What price will pi network be listed on exchangesDOT TECH
The rate at which pi will be listed is practically unknown. But due to speculations surrounding it the predicted rate is tends to be from 30$ — 50$.
So if you are interested in selling your pi network coins at a high rate tho. Or you can't wait till the mainnet launch in 2026. You can easily trade your pi coins with a merchant.
A merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive quantities till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank Introduce New Co-Branded Credit Cardnickysharmasucks
The unveiling of the IndusInd Bank Poonawalla Fincorp eLITE RuPay Platinum Credit Card marks a notable milestone in the Indian financial landscape, showcasing a successful partnership between two leading institutions, Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank. This co-branded credit card not only offers users a plethora of benefits but also reflects a commitment to innovation and adaptation. With a focus on providing value-driven and customer-centric solutions, this launch represents more than just a new product—it signifies a step towards redefining the banking experience for millions. Promising convenience, rewards, and a touch of luxury in everyday financial transactions, this collaboration aims to cater to the evolving needs of customers and set new standards in the industry.
what is the future of Pi Network currency.DOT TECH
The future of the Pi cryptocurrency is uncertain, and its success will depend on several factors. Pi is a relatively new cryptocurrency that aims to be user-friendly and accessible to a wide audience. Here are a few key considerations for its future:
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram if u want to sell PI COINS.
1. Mainnet Launch: As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, Pi was still in the testnet phase. Its success will depend on a successful transition to a mainnet, where actual transactions can take place.
2. User Adoption: Pi's success will be closely tied to user adoption. The more users who join the network and actively participate, the stronger the ecosystem can become.
3. Utility and Use Cases: For a cryptocurrency to thrive, it must offer utility and practical use cases. The Pi team has talked about various applications, including peer-to-peer transactions, smart contracts, and more. The development and implementation of these features will be essential.
4. Regulatory Environment: The regulatory environment for cryptocurrencies is evolving globally. How Pi navigates and complies with regulations in various jurisdictions will significantly impact its future.
5. Technology Development: The Pi network must continue to develop and improve its technology, security, and scalability to compete with established cryptocurrencies.
6. Community Engagement: The Pi community plays a critical role in its future. Engaged users can help build trust and grow the network.
7. Monetization and Sustainability: The Pi team's monetization strategy, such as fees, partnerships, or other revenue sources, will affect its long-term sustainability.
It's essential to approach Pi or any new cryptocurrency with caution and conduct due diligence. Cryptocurrency investments involve risks, and potential rewards can be uncertain. The success and future of Pi will depend on the collective efforts of its team, community, and the broader cryptocurrency market dynamics. It's advisable to stay updated on Pi's development and follow any updates from the official Pi Network website or announcements from the team.
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t's important to note that buying verified Coinbase accounts is not recommended and may violate Coinbase's terms of service. Instead of searching to "buy verified Coinbase accounts," follow the proper steps to verify your own account to ensure compliance and security.
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the contact information for my personal pi vendor.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)DOT TECH
Anywhere in the world, including Africa, America, and Europe, you can sell Pi Network Coins online and receive cash through online payment options.
Pi has not yet been launched on any exchange because we are currently using the confined Mainnet. The planned launch date for Pi is June 28, 2026.
Reselling to investors who want to hold until the mainnet launch in 2026 is currently the sole way to sell.
Consequently, right now. All you need to do is select the right pi network provider.
Who is a pi merchant?
An individual who buys coins from miners on the pi network and resells them to investors hoping to hang onto them until the mainnet is launched is known as a pi merchant.
debuts.
I'll provide you the Telegram username
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)
Childbearing and attitudes towards gender norms
1. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Childbearing and attitudes in labor market
Lucas van der Velde
Warsaw School of Economics
FAME| GRAPE
2021 ASSA Annual Meeting
2. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
Motivation
Gender wage gaps are impacted by beliefs on gender roles
(Steinhauer 2018, Charles et al. 2018, Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer and Zweim¨uller 2019)
Children penalty plays an important role in explaining GWG
(Polachek 1981, Kleven, Landais and Søgaard 2019, Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020)
3. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
Motivation
Gender wage gaps are impacted by beliefs on gender roles
(Steinhauer 2018, Charles et al. 2018, Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer and Zweim¨uller 2019)
Children penalty plays an important role in explaining GWG
(Polachek 1981, Kleven, Landais and Søgaard 2019, Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020)
But beliefs are not stable
Evolution of beliefs around childbirth
(Borrell-Porta et al. 2019, Kuziemko et al. 2018, Berrington et al. 2008, Cunningham 2008)
Cognitive dissonance
(Kranton 2016)
4. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
Motivation
Gender wage gaps are impacted by beliefs on gender roles
(Steinhauer 2018, Charles et al. 2018, Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer and Zweim¨uller 2019)
Children penalty plays an important role in explaining GWG
(Polachek 1981, Kleven, Landais and Søgaard 2019, Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020)
But beliefs are not stable
Evolution of beliefs around childbirth
(Borrell-Porta et al. 2019, Kuziemko et al. 2018, Berrington et al. 2008, Cunningham 2008)
Cognitive dissonance
(Kranton 2016)
Shortcomings of the literature
Focus on a single country (mostly US or UK)
Emphasize changes for a men or women, rarely both
5. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
How does this paper fit in the literature?
Main hypothesis
Birth as an information shock (Kuziemko et al. 2018)
6. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
How does this paper fit in the literature?
Main hypothesis
Birth as an information shock (Kuziemko et al. 2018)
Childbirth
Unanticipated
difficulties in WLB
Cognitive
dissonance
↑ traditional
attitudes
7. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Introduction
How does this paper fit in the literature?
Main hypothesis
Childbirth
Unanticipated
difficulties in WLB
Cognitive
dissonance
↑ traditional
attitudes
The procedure
Estimate the relation between birth of first child and attitudes
Explore heterogeneity across countries & demographics groups
8. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Gender and generations survey
a.k.a. Gender and generations programme
Effort coordinated by UNECE & the NIDI
Data collected by national administrators
Survey instrument adapted to national circumstances
Survey years: between 2002 & 2014; 2 waves per country, 3-5 years
between waves
Country coverage :
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland, and Russia
9. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Sample desciption
Study focuses on respondents who
1 Appear in 2 waves
2 Are childless in wave 1
3 Are between 20 and 35 years old in wave 1
10. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Sample desciption
Study focuses on respondents who
1 Appear in 2 waves
2 Are childless in wave 1
3 Are between 20 and 35 years old in wave 1
How binding are these conditions?
All In wave 2 & in 20-35 & Childless
N 112 784 89 675 18 875 11 468
11. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Sample desciption
Study focuses on respondents who
1 Appear in 2 waves
2 Are childless in wave 1
3 Are between 20 and 35 years old in wave 1
How binding are these conditions?
All In wave 2 & in 20-35 & Childless
N 112 784 89 675 18 875 11 468
# countries: 10 → Average N per country = 1147
Conditions by country Go
12. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Agreement with traditional gender norms
I measure agreement in two domains:
Role of the family
Women in labor market
13. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Agreement with traditional gender norms
I measure agreement in two domains:
Role of the family
1 Women require a child to be fulfilled
2 Men require a child to be fulfilled
3 Pre-school children suffer if their mother works
Women in labor market
14. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Agreement with traditional gender norms
I measure agreement in two domains:
Role of the family
1 Women require a child to be fulfilled
2 Men require a child to be fulfilled
3 Pre-school children suffer if their mother works
Women in labor market
4 When jobs are scarce, men have more right than women
5 If women earns more than husband, it is not good for the relationship
6 Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as a paid job
7 When jobs are scarce, people with children have more right to work
than childless
15. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Agreement with traditional gender norms
I measure agreement in two domains:
Role of the family
1 Women require a child to be fulfilled †
2 Men require a child to be fulfilled
3 Pre-school children suffer if their mother works † ‡
Women in labor market
4 When jobs are scarce, men have more right than women †
5 If women earns more than husband, it is not good for the relationship
6 Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as a paid job †
7 When jobs are scarce, people with children have more right to work
than childless
†
Seguino (2007), Steinhauer (2018), ‡
Berrington et al. (2008), Schober and Scott (2012),
Perales et al. (2019), Charles et al. (2018)
16. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Method: Diff-in-diff estimation
I estimate LPMs of the form
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
(1)
17. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Method: Diff-in-diff estimation
I estimate LPMs of the form
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
(1)
where
P(agreesy )i,t → respondent (strongly) agrees with a norm
Parentsi indicates whether i would-be (W1) or is (W2) a parent
Afteri indicates survey wave → after childbirth for parents
Xi,1 other covariates measured at the time of first survey (or FE)
18. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Method: Diff-in-diff estimation
I estimate LPMs of the form
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
(1)
where
β3 → Coefficient of interest
→ Causal effect of childbirth on attitudes
→ I expect β3 > 0 for women
19. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Threats to identification
Self-selection into motherhood
Pre-trends
20. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Threats to identification
Self-selection into motherhood
1 Inclusion of FE for unobserved time-invariant characteristics
2 Reweighting the sample → differences in X’s between groups
(Smith and Todd 2005, Imai and Ratkovic 2013)
→ Needed? Yes Go
Pre-trends
21. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Threats to identification
Self-selection into motherhood
Pre-trends
1 Childless group: difference in means between waves
22. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Data and Methods
Threats to identification
Self-selection into motherhood
Pre-trends
1 Childless group: difference in means between waves
2 Parents group. I estimate
P(agrees|parent)i,t = α+θ1Aftert +θ2f (t)+θ3Aftert ×f (t)+γ2Xi,1 +υi,t
If θ2 are significant → Evidence against null of no pre-trends for parents
23. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Do parents change their answers: Mothers
Before After Comparisons of proportions N
Parent Y N Y N (1v2) (3v4) (1v3) (2v4)
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.567 0.507 0.607 0.499 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ 6158
2 0.485 0.424 0.507 0.419 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 6144
3 0.465 0.459 0.455 0.427 ∗∗ 4720
4 0.168 0.150 0.194 0.149 ∗∗∗ 4582
5 0.170 0.188 0.156 0.169 ∗ 4974
6 0.542 0.475 0.543 0.456 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 4928
7 0.429 0.395 0.471 0.364 ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ 4582
List of outcomes Go
Parents are different before, & more so after
Little evidence of change (bef. v after) in both groups
24. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Do parents change their answers: Fathers
Before After Comparisons of proportions N
Parent Y N Y N (1v2) (3v4) (1v3) (2v4)
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.641 0.537 0.651 0.534 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 8056
2 0.612 0.504 0.642 0.494 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 8128
3 0.581 0.533 0.609 0.511 ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ 6006
4 0.411 0.338 0.383 0.313 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ 5974
5 0.205 0.193 0.176 0.183 6552
6 0.529 0.501 0.560 0.494 ∗∗∗ 6542
7 0.561 0.505 0.571 0.464 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 5980
List of outcomes Go
Differences between parents and non-parents are more pronounced
Little evidence of change (bef. v after) in both groups
25. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and family life
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
26. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and family life
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (1): Women require a child to be fulfilled
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 0.063 *** 0.065 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 0.023 -0.023 * -0.030 * -0.004 -0.001 -0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
β3 0.050 *** 0.051 *** 0.057 *** 0.016 0.014 0.030
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
27. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and family life
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (2): Men require a child to be fulfilled
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 0.061 *** 0.065 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 0.016 -0.020 -0.034 * -0.011 -0.023 -0.024
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
β3 0.029 0.029 0.038 * 0.042 ** 0.040 ** 0.055 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
28. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and family life
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (3): Pre-school child suffer if mother works
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 -0.004 0.045 **
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 -0.054 ** -0.062 ** -0.073 ** -0.049 * -0.041 * -0.106 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
β3 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.046 * 0.052 ** 0.070 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
29. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and family life
Summary
Women (appear to) priorize family over career → Outcome (1) , (2)
Children also gains importance for men → Outcome (2)
Men appear to embrace more traditional gender roles
→ Outcome (3)
→ ‘Mighty’ girl effect ? (Borrell-Porta et al. 2019)
30. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
31. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (4): When jobs are scarce men should have priority
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 0.008 0.036 **
(0.01) (0.02)
β2 -0.027 -0.026 -0.082 *** -0.034 -0.044 ** -0.068 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
β3 0.031 * 0.030 * 0.046 ** 0.007 0.003 0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
32. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (5): If women earn more, the relationship suffers
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 -0.018 0.009
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 -0.061 *** -0.060 *** -0.038 -0.028 -0.031 -0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
β3 0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.024 -0.021 -0.032
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
33. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (6): Being a housemaker is just as fulfilling as working for pay
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 0.051 ** 0.002
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 -0.015 -0.033 -0.005 -0.023 -0.023 -0.057
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
β3 0.028 0.028 0.017 0.039 0.041 0.043
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
34. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Outcome (7): When jobs are scarce, parents have priority over childless
Women Men
DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE DiD DiD+FE DiD + FE
+PSM +PSM
β1 0.040 ** 0.045 **
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 -0.028 -0.055 ** -0.093 ** -0.046 * -0.064 *** -0.093 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
β3 0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.074 *** 0.062 ** 0.054 ** 0.061 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
35. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: Women and work realm
Summary
No evidence on men changing their attitude in gender norms
(Outcomes 4-7)
Women appear to become more conservative in
→ Access to jobs (4)
→ But not in earnings nor household chores
Parents have a ‘corporativist’ view of employment
→ Similar effects across genders
→ What do they tell about gender inequality?
36. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Diff-in-diff results: no pre-trends analysis
P(agrees|parent)i,t = α+θ1Aftert +θ2f (t)+θ3Aftert ×f (t)+γ2Xi,1 +υi,t
Women Men
Linear Quad Cubic Linear Quad Cubic
Women & family life
Women need a child 0.618 1.454 0.995 1.292 3.986∗∗ 3.564∗∗
Men need a child 1.638 1.977 1.401 2.539 1.740 1.549
Child suffers 0.184 0.764 0.639 0.036 2.175 1.701
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.041 1.161 1.211 0.302 0.193 0.137
Woman earns more 0.165 0.126 0.087 0.166 0.102 0.304
Being a housemaker 0.016 2.881∗ 1.876 0.055 0.289 0.199
Job priority: Parent 0.452 3.163∗∗ 2.128∗ 1.194 2.459∗ 1.646
Alternative specifications More
37. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by country groupings
Central and Eastern European vs Western European countries
By availability of formal care
By division of household chores
Skip
38. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by country groupings
Central and Eastern European vs Western European countries
In CEE countries more marked change in opinions
Effects vary by country, very large in Lithuania, smaller in Poland.
Estimates are not precisely estimated (N < 1000 in most cases)
WE countries are not all same (German speaking vs France)
See table
By availability of formal care
By division of household chores
Skip
39. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by country groupings
Central and Eastern European vs Western European countries
By availability of formal care
GGS reports whether children receive institutionalized care
Estimate the share of households that use any form of care
Low formal care → ↑ more traditional norms
See table
By division of household chores
Skip
40. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by country groupings
Central and Eastern European vs Western European countries
By availability of formal care
By division of household chores
GGS reports division of HH chores in 7 domains
Estimate the share of households tasks done mostly or only by
women
High share of tasks done by women
↑ increase in traditional roles for both
Strongest for child suffers ....
See table
Skip
41. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by respondents characteristics
By age at first birth
By education status
By labor market status
By partnership status
Skip
42. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by respondents characteristics
By age at first birth
Below vs above median age at first birth
↑ ”Need to have children to be fulfilled” for older cohorts
↑ ”Job priority for parents” for younger cohorts
∼ change in job priority for men ... but p-values>.15
See table
By education status
By labor market status
By partnership status
Skip
43. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by respondents characteristics
By age at first birth
By education status
Completed tertiary in first wave vs. not completed
↑ change in job priority for men for less educated women
p-values∼.15
↑ ”child suffers if mother works” among men with tertiary
See table
By labor market status
By partnership status
Skip
44. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by respondents characteristics
By age at first birth
By education status
By labor market status
Employed respondents vs. non-employed
↑ Need for a child among employed respondents
↑ ”child suffers if mother works” among employed men
↑ ”job priority for women” among non-employed women ... but
p-values>.15
See table
By partnership status
Skip
45. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Heterogeneity analysis: by respondents characteristics
By age at first birth
By education status
By labor market status
By partnership status
Respondents living with a cohabiting partner vs. partner not in
household
↑ Results stronger in non-partnered households
↑ ”Child suffers ...” among partnered men.
Is marriage driving change? No
See table
Skip
46. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Results
Attitudes unrelated to childbirth
P(agreesy )i,t = α+β1Parentsi +β2Afteri,t+β3Aftert×Parentsi +γ Xi,1+ i,t
Women Men
Homosexual couples -0.009 -0.012
(0.02) (0.02)
People can be trusted -0.014 -0.009
(0.03) (0.03)
People take adv. 0.008 0.026
(0.04) (0.03)
Divorce with children 0.013 0.003
(0.02) (0.02)
Single mothers -0.031 -0.023
(0.02) (0.03)
47. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks
Results expand literature on child gap by looking at how other
outcomes are affected
Attitudes towards traditional gender norms change after childbirth
→ agreement that children are required to be fulfilled
→ agreement that children suffer if mother works (men)
→ Men priority if jobs are scarce (women)
Evidence of cross-country heterogeneity in these answers
→ agreement stronger in CEE
→ agreement stronger if lack of formal care / help
Individual heterogeneity
Disadvantaged groups →↑ agree with job priority for men
Advantaged groups →↑ agree with satisfaction of having a child
49. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Concluding remarks
Questions (?)
Thank you for your attention
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: lvandervelde@grape.org.pl
50. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
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Borrell-Porta, M., Costa-Font, J. and Philipp, J.: 2019, The ‘mighty girl’ effect: does
parenting daughters alter attitudes towards gender norms?, Oxford Economic
Papers 71(1), 25–46.
URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article/71/1/25/5237459
Charles, K. K., Guryan, J. and Pan, J.: 2018, The effects of sexism on american
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Cukrowska-Torzewska, E. and Matysiak, A.: 2020, The motherhood wage penalty: A
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Appendix
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52. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Sample selection by country
Country All In wave 2 & in 20’s & Childless
Austria 5000 3918 1468 1042
Bulgaria 12858 9363 2316 1255
Czechia 10006 9723 2211 1507
France 10079 8643 1562 1097
Georgia 10000 9845 2136 1216
Germany 10017 3977 556 370
Hungary 13540 10641 2510 1653
Lithuania 10036 9877 2003 1236
Poland 19987 12952 1949 1091
Russia 11261 10736 2164 1001
Total 112784 89675 18875 11468
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53. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Are parents and non-parents different? Yes
Wave 1 Wave 2
Parents No Yes No Yes
Demographics
Female 0.43 0.53 0.43 0.53
Age 25.56 26.72 28.91 30.14
Married 0.06 0.31 0.14 0.67
Education
Primary 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Secondary 0.64 0.59 0.47 0.50
Tertiary 0.28 0.33 0.45 0.42
Labor Market Status
WE or SE 0.60 0.76 0.66 0.69
Family workers 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.17
Unemployed 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08
Inactive 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.06
Back to threats
54. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Agreement with traditional gender norms
Role of the family
1 Women require a child to be fulfilled
2 Men require a child to be fulfilled
3 Pre-school children suffer if their mother works
Women in labor market
4 When jobs are scarce, men have more right than women
5 If women earns more than husband, it is not good for the relationship
6 Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as a paid job
7 When jobs are scarce, people with children have more right to work
than childless
Back to differences
Pre-trends
55. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
More on pre-trends
What is the right threshold for pre-period?
Women Men
Linear Quad Cubic Linear Quad Cubic
Discontinuity 6 months before birth
Outcome 1 0.000 0.643 0.581 0.582 0.384 0.285
Outcome 2 0.273 1.058 1.277 0.088 0.100 0.080
Outcome 3 0.014 0.513 0.403 1.406 1.318 1.012
Outcome 4 0.048 1.474 1.407 0.179 0.152 0.152
Outcome 5 0.087 0.049 0.065 0.423 0.212 0.808
Outcome 6 2.214 1.822 1.432 2.013 1.582 3.731∗∗
Outcome 7 0.058 2.512∗
1.831 0.581 2.664∗
2.156∗
Discontinuity 12 months before birth
Outcome 1 0.220 0.472 0.827 1.115 0.573 0.416
Outcome 2 0.356 0.207 0.350 0.005 0.254 0.183
Outcome 3 0.233 0.473 0.364 2.687 1.391 0.969
Outcome 4 0.013 3.350∗∗
2.237∗
0.010 0.008 0.024
Outcome 5 0.507 1.110 0.739 0.157 0.325 1.013
Outcome 6 3.084∗
1.837 1.853 0.208 0.696 1.249
Outcome 7 0.558 1.967 1.598 0.303 0.831 0.754
56. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Even more on pre-trends0.05.1.15.2
Density/Pr(agree|time)
−36 −24 −12 0
Months to childbirth
(−12 = 1 year before)
When jobs are scarce, men have priority
Significant differences appear to be driven by very early observations
Sample composition issues
Pre-trends
57. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Heterogeneity: Working in the first wave
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.052 ** 0.030 0.022 -0.001
(0.02) (0.33) (0.34) (0.98)
Man needs a child ... 0.032 -0.001 0.062 *** -0.020
(0.17) (0.99) (0.01) (0.63)
Child suffers ... -0.002 0.066 0.067 ** 0.021
(0.93) (0.12) (0.03) (0.67)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.015 0.045 0.005 -0.028
(0.43) (0.19) (0.85) (0.53)
Woman earns more ... -0.016 0.040 -0.008 -0.048
(0.47) (0.22) (0.72) (0.29)
Being a housemaker ... 0.019 0.043 0.002 0.117 **
(0.51) (0.33) (0.93) (0.03)
Job priority: parents 0.071 ** 0.078 * 0.050 * 0.044
(0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.36)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
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Appendix
Heterogeneity: Completed tert. studies in the first wave
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.084 *** 0.020 0.021 0.016
(0.00) (0.39) (0.58) (0.50)
Man needs a child ... 0.041 0.009 0.010 0.057 **
(0.16) (0.72) (0.80) (0.01)
Child suffers ... 0.035 0.004 0.127 *** 0.018
(0.33) (0.90) (0.01) (0.57)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.001 0.038 0.047 -0.017
(0.96) (0.10) (0.22) (0.53)
Woman earns more ... 0.023 -0.010 0.007 -0.034
(0.40) (0.68) (0.85) (0.16)
Being a housemaker ... -0.001 0.041 0.065 0.024
(0.98) (0.19) (0.19) (0.42)
Job priority: parents 0.076 ** 0.082 *** 0.004 0.080 ***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.92) (0.01)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
59. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Heterogeneity: below median age at first birth
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.022 0.064 ** -0.031 0.050 *
(0.36) (0.03) (0.36) (0.07)
Man needs a child ... -0.031 0.072 ** 0.028 0.066 **
(0.25) (0.02) (0.40) (0.01)
Child suffers ... 0.023 0.007 0.065 0.037
(0.47) (0.85) (0.11) (0.30)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.027 0.020 -0.037 0.021
(0.25) (0.43) (0.30) (0.48)
Woman earns more ... 0.002 -0.022 -0.052 0.001
(0.95) (0.44) (0.10) (0.98)
Being a housemaker ... 0.027 0.015 0.084 ** 0.015
(0.44) (0.70) (0.04) (0.68)
Job priority: parents 0.087 *** 0.057 0.100 ** 0.020
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.54)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
60. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Heterogeneity: has cohabiting partner in the first wave
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.019 0.076 *** -0.015 0.064 **
(0.47) (0.00) (0.64) (0.02)
Man needs a child ... 0.031 0.045 -0.012 0.102 ***
(0.30) (0.11) (0.72) (0.00)
Child suffers ... 0.004 0.063 * 0.132 *** 0.027
(0.92) (0.06) (0.00) (0.46)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.019 0.052 * 0.012 0.011
(0.44) (0.05) (0.73) (0.73)
Woman earns more ... -0.014 0.004 -0.048 0.001
(0.61) (0.87) (0.12) (0.98)
Being a housemaker ... 0.009 0.045 0.056 0.046
(0.81) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
Job priority: parents 0.065 * 0.071 * 0.041 0.061 *
(0.07) (0.05) (0.30) (0.09)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
61. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Heterogeneity: wants to have a child in first wave
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.028 0.005 0.078 0.026
(0.55) (0.92) (0.11) (0.61)
Man needs a child ... -0.003 -0.023 0.074 0.032
(0.95) (0.58) (0.13) (0.54)
Child suffers ... 0.027 -0.022 0.104 * 0.026
(0.64) (0.63) (0.07) (0.67)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.010 -0.005 0.015 0.004
(0.81) (0.85) (0.77) (0.92)
Woman earns more ... -0.015 -0.018 -0.050 -0.033
(0.73) (0.62) (0.28) (0.31)
Being a housemaker ... 0.067 0.054 0.048 0.031
(0.26) (0.29) (0.44) (0.58)
Job priority: parents 0.096 0.119 ** 0.011 0.086
(0.11) (0.01) (0.85) (0.15)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
62. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Heterogeneity: CEE vs Western countries
Women Men
Y N Y N
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.065 *** 0.013 0.028 -0.027
(0.00) (0.67) (0.21) (0.51)
Man needs a child ... 0.035 0.001 0.050 ** 0.015
(0.15) (0.97) (0.03) (0.71)
Child suffers ... 0.058 * -0.032 0.097 *** -0.059
(0.07) (0.32) (0.00) (0.20)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.039 0.007 0.008 -0.023
(0.14) (0.66) (0.78) (0.44)
Woman earns more ... 0.007 -0.003 -0.014 -0.045 *
(0.80) (0.91) (0.59) (0.06)
Being a housemaker ... 0.044 -0.005 0.052 * -0.007
(0.16) (0.89) (0.09) (0.89)
Job priority: parents 0.088 *** 0.071 ** 0.055 * 0.044
(0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.31)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote
pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. CEE: Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia.
Non-CEE: Austria, Germany, France.
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63. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Diff-in-diff results: Access to formal care
Women Men
Below Above Below Above
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.077 *** 0.029 0.051 * -0.020
(0.01) (0.17) (0.07) (0.46)
Man needs a child ... 0.076 ** -0.013 0.067 ** 0.019
(0.01) (0.59) (0.02) (0.48)
Child suffers ... 0.056 -0.013 0.107 *** -0.037
(0.11) (0.66) (0.00) (0.36)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.039 0.007 0.008 -0.023
(0.14) (0.66) (0.78) (0.44)
Woman earns more ... -0.012 0.019 -0.018 -0.030
(0.68) (0.41) (0.52) (0.23)
Being a housemaker ... 0.044 0.005 0.061 * -0.009
(0.20) (0.88) (0.06) (0.83)
Job priority: parents 0.088 *** 0.071 ** 0.055 * 0.044
(0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.31)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. Below and Above indicate countries’ position relative to
median . SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
P-values in parentheses.
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64. Does childbearing make us more conservative?
Appendix
Diff-in-diff results: Female share of household chores
Women Men
Above Below Above Below
Women & family life
Woman needs a child ... 0.062 *** 0.039 0.023 0.004
(0.01) (0.13) (0.34) (0.91)
Man needs a child ... 0.028 0.023 0.028 0.064 *
(0.33) (0.37) (0.24) (0.06)
Child suffers ... 0.069 * -0.007 0.091 *** 0.007
(0.08) (0.81) (0.01) (0.85)
Women & work realm
Job priority: men 0.050 0.017 0.023 -0.021
(0.21) (0.31) (0.54) (0.45)
Woman earns more ... 0.049 -0.025 -0.010 -0.035 *
(0.14) (0.25) (0.77) (0.08)
Being a housemaker ... 0.070 * 0.000 0.065 * 0.006
(0.08) (0.99) (0.08) (0.86)
Job priority: parents 0.096 ** 0.075 *** 0.061 * 0.044
(0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.20)
Notes: DiD estimates with individual FE. Below and Above indicate countries’ position relative
to median. SE clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * denote pvalues < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
P-values in parentheses.
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