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1
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Self-Assessment Multiple Choice Quiz
Chapter 8: Security in Computer Networks
Suppose Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice using public key cryptography.
Then Bob should
Using public-key cryptography, suppose Bob wants to send a message to Alice, and
Alice wants to be sure that the message was indeed sent by Bob. Then Bob should
Computer Networking: a Top-Down
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encrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message toencrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message to
Alice.Alice.
encrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted messageencrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted message
to Alice.to Alice.
encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.
encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.
encrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message toencrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message to
Alice.Alice.
encrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted messageencrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted message
to Alice.to Alice.
encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.
encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.
3
4
5
Using public-key cryptography, suppose Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice,
and Alice wants to be sure that the message was indeed sent by Bob. Then Bob
should
Suppose Bob wants to send Alice a digital signature for the message m. To create the
digital signature,
Suppose Alice receives from Bob a message m along with a digital signature for the
message m. To verify that the message was not changed and that Bob indeed sent
the message, Alice
encrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's privateencrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's private
key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.
encrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's publicencrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's public
key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.
encrypt the message with his public key, encrypt the result with Alice's publicencrypt the message with his public key, encrypt the result with Alice's public
key, and send Alice the message.key, and send Alice the message.
encrypt the message with Alice's public key, encrypt the result with his publicencrypt the message with Alice's public key, encrypt the result with his public
key and then send the result.key and then send the result.
Bob encrypts m with his private key and then applies a hash function to theBob encrypts m with his private key and then applies a hash function to the
result;result;
Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his publicBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his public
key;key;
Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his privateBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his private
key;key;
Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with Alice's publicBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with Alice's public
key.key.
6
7
Suppose a CA contains Bob's certi cate, which binds Bob's public key to Bob. This
certi cate is signed with
Consider the secure e-mail examples discussed in Section 8.5 suppose Alice wants to
send a message to Bob, and she wants secrecy, sender authentication and message
integrity. The package that Alice sends to Bob makes use of
applies a de-hashing function to the digital signature and compares the resultapplies a de-hashing function to the digital signature and compares the result
to m;to m;
applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, then a de-hashing function toapplies Bob's public key to the digital signature, then a de-hashing function to
the result. She then compares the result of this last operation with the messagethe result. She then compares the result of this last operation with the message
m;m;
applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, applies the hash function to m,applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, applies the hash function to m,
and compares the results of the two operations;and compares the results of the two operations;
none of the abovenone of the above
Bob's private key;Bob's private key;
Bob's public key;Bob's public key;
The CA's private key;The CA's private key;
The CA's public key.The CA's public key.
Alice's public key and Bob's public key;Alice's public key and Bob's public key;
Alice's private key and Bob's private key;Alice's private key and Bob's private key;
Alice's public key and Bob's private key.Alice's public key and Bob's private key.
Alice's private key and Bob's public key;Alice's private key and Bob's public key;
8
9
10
SSL provides
Suppose Bob is purchasing merchandise from Alice Inc. over the Internet. SSL
permits
The network layer is said to provide secrecy if
IPsec can provide:
server authenticationserver authentication
encryption for messages sent by both client and serverencryption for messages sent by both client and server
optionally client authenticationoptionally client authentication
all of the aboveall of the above
Bob to determine if Alice Inc. is a bona fide companyBob to determine if Alice Inc. is a bona fide company
Bob to determine whether Alice Inc. is authorized to accept payment-cardBob to determine whether Alice Inc. is authorized to accept payment-card
purchasespurchases
Alice Inc to determine is Bob has a good credit historyAlice Inc to determine is Bob has a good credit history
all of the aboveall of the above
the headers in IP datagrams are encryptedthe headers in IP datagrams are encrypted
the data in IP datagrams are encryptedthe data in IP datagrams are encrypted
both headers and data in the IP datagram are encryptedboth headers and data in the IP datagram are encrypted
none of the abovenone of the above
11
12
13
p
Filtering in a rewall can be based on
Some of the problems of application gateways include
See Results
Encryption of IP datagram payloads.Encryption of IP datagram payloads.
Data integrity.Data integrity.
Origin authenticationOrigin authentication
All of the above.All of the above.
source and destination IP addressessource and destination IP addresses
source and destination port numberssource and destination port numbers
TCP ACK bitsTCP ACK bits
all of the aboveall of the above
they can often have software bugs, allowing attackers to penetrate themthey can often have software bugs, allowing attackers to penetrate them
for each application, a server has to be installed and configuredfor each application, a server has to be installed and configured
their use is not completely transparent to the internal users and/or clienttheir use is not completely transparent to the internal users and/or client
softwaresoftware
all of the aboveall of the above
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Chapter 8 - Security in Computer Networks

  • 1.  Home Self-Assessment Multiple Choice Quiz Chapter 8 1 2 Self-Assessment Multiple Choice Quiz Chapter 8: Security in Computer Networks Suppose Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice using public key cryptography. Then Bob should Using public-key cryptography, suppose Bob wants to send a message to Alice, and Alice wants to be sure that the message was indeed sent by Bob. Then Bob should Computer Networking: a Top-Down Approach, 7th Edition Kurose • Ross COMPANION WEBSITE Help  Sign out encrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message toencrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message to Alice.Alice. encrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted messageencrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted message to Alice.to Alice. encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message. encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message. encrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message toencrypt the message with his private key and send the encrypted message to Alice.Alice. encrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted messageencrypt the message with Alice's private key and send the encrypted message to Alice.to Alice. encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with his public key and send Alice the message. encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send Alice the message.
  • 2. 3 4 5 Using public-key cryptography, suppose Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice, and Alice wants to be sure that the message was indeed sent by Bob. Then Bob should Suppose Bob wants to send Alice a digital signature for the message m. To create the digital signature, Suppose Alice receives from Bob a message m along with a digital signature for the message m. To verify that the message was not changed and that Bob indeed sent the message, Alice encrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's privateencrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's private key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice. encrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's publicencrypt the message with his private key, encrypt the result with Alice's public key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice.key, and then send the encrypted message to Alice. encrypt the message with his public key, encrypt the result with Alice's publicencrypt the message with his public key, encrypt the result with Alice's public key, and send Alice the message.key, and send Alice the message. encrypt the message with Alice's public key, encrypt the result with his publicencrypt the message with Alice's public key, encrypt the result with his public key and then send the result.key and then send the result. Bob encrypts m with his private key and then applies a hash function to theBob encrypts m with his private key and then applies a hash function to the result;result; Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his publicBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his public key;key; Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his privateBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with his private key;key; Bob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with Alice's publicBob applies a hash function to m and then encrypts the result with Alice's public key.key.
  • 3. 6 7 Suppose a CA contains Bob's certi cate, which binds Bob's public key to Bob. This certi cate is signed with Consider the secure e-mail examples discussed in Section 8.5 suppose Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and she wants secrecy, sender authentication and message integrity. The package that Alice sends to Bob makes use of applies a de-hashing function to the digital signature and compares the resultapplies a de-hashing function to the digital signature and compares the result to m;to m; applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, then a de-hashing function toapplies Bob's public key to the digital signature, then a de-hashing function to the result. She then compares the result of this last operation with the messagethe result. She then compares the result of this last operation with the message m;m; applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, applies the hash function to m,applies Bob's public key to the digital signature, applies the hash function to m, and compares the results of the two operations;and compares the results of the two operations; none of the abovenone of the above Bob's private key;Bob's private key; Bob's public key;Bob's public key; The CA's private key;The CA's private key; The CA's public key.The CA's public key. Alice's public key and Bob's public key;Alice's public key and Bob's public key; Alice's private key and Bob's private key;Alice's private key and Bob's private key; Alice's public key and Bob's private key.Alice's public key and Bob's private key. Alice's private key and Bob's public key;Alice's private key and Bob's public key;
  • 4. 8 9 10 SSL provides Suppose Bob is purchasing merchandise from Alice Inc. over the Internet. SSL permits The network layer is said to provide secrecy if IPsec can provide: server authenticationserver authentication encryption for messages sent by both client and serverencryption for messages sent by both client and server optionally client authenticationoptionally client authentication all of the aboveall of the above Bob to determine if Alice Inc. is a bona fide companyBob to determine if Alice Inc. is a bona fide company Bob to determine whether Alice Inc. is authorized to accept payment-cardBob to determine whether Alice Inc. is authorized to accept payment-card purchasespurchases Alice Inc to determine is Bob has a good credit historyAlice Inc to determine is Bob has a good credit history all of the aboveall of the above the headers in IP datagrams are encryptedthe headers in IP datagrams are encrypted the data in IP datagrams are encryptedthe data in IP datagrams are encrypted both headers and data in the IP datagram are encryptedboth headers and data in the IP datagram are encrypted none of the abovenone of the above
  • 5. 11 12 13 p Filtering in a rewall can be based on Some of the problems of application gateways include See Results Encryption of IP datagram payloads.Encryption of IP datagram payloads. Data integrity.Data integrity. Origin authenticationOrigin authentication All of the above.All of the above. source and destination IP addressessource and destination IP addresses source and destination port numberssource and destination port numbers TCP ACK bitsTCP ACK bits all of the aboveall of the above they can often have software bugs, allowing attackers to penetrate themthey can often have software bugs, allowing attackers to penetrate them for each application, a server has to be installed and configuredfor each application, a server has to be installed and configured their use is not completely transparent to the internal users and/or clienttheir use is not completely transparent to the internal users and/or client softwaresoftware all of the aboveall of the above
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