CHAP TER 36 ---; The Morality of Capital Puni.docx

CHAP TER 36
:::::::::::---;
The Morality of Capital Punishment -
Walter Berns
Leaving aside both the legal issues involved in deciding wh ti .
1 . . . . . . e 1er capi ta pums~ment 1s const1tut1onal and t~e
empmcal issues regarding its
effectiveness as det~rrent and the fairness with which it is
applied, is it
by its nature a v10lat1on of human dignity? Walter Berns
(1919-2015),
who was Professor ?f Gov~rnment at <?eorgetown University,
argues that
the death penalty 1s a fittmg expression of our care for victims
of hor-
rendous crimes and our ange r at those who have perpetrated
brutal in-
justice. Indeed , by punishi ng criminals appropriately, we are
holding
them responsible fo r their actions and paying them the respect
due
them as human b eings.
"Many sorrows sh all b e to the wicked: but he that trusteth in
the
Lord, mercy shall com pass him about. Be glad in the Lord, and
re-
joice, ye righteous: and shout for joy, all ye that are upright in
heart!" 1

What is said in Psalms about the Lord must also be said about
the law,
and as belief in divine reward and punishment declines, it must
be
said more emphatically about the law: we must trust in the law,
and
those who do will be rewarded. The law must respond to the
deeds of
th
e wicked, and the righteous must have confidence that the law
will
r~spond, and do so in an appropriate manner. It must punish t~e
wicked because the righteous or law-abiding citizens make th1s
dernauct of it. They are angered by the sight or presence of
crime, and ange ·
r is not merely a selfish passion. . .
Roosevelt Grier, the former New York Giants defensive
lmeman,
:~
th
e other friends of Robert Kennedy see him shot down before
eir eyes. They are shocked, then grief stricken, then angry; but
from W
c alter B M l 't if the Death Penalty. 0PYright © erns, For
Capital Punishment: Crime and the · ora 1 Y O • h
c
1979
by Basic Books , Inc. Reprinted by permission of th e pubhs e r.

325
'.)26 P A RT Ill MORAi. l'H 013U'. MS
Ca lifo rni a la w can not p e rmit th e m to disc h arge that
anger on . . . d d its
cau se , Ke nn e d y's assass in ; th ey must b e r es tra m e , _a
n the app rop .
h
. ri -
a tc way of res tra inin g th e m is to a ssure the m t at It , the
law, will re-
spond to thi s c rime. The law must ass uage ~h a t an ge r ~y
satisfying it,
bu t n ot ... simply to pre ve nt the m fr o m ta km g the law mto
th e ir own
h a nd s.
Co n side r a n o the r example. A few years ago , a seven-ye ar-
old bo
was bruta ll y murd e red on the lowe r East Side of Manhattan.
Th ~
n ex t d ay, in a n ea rby neighborhood , a twenty- e ight-year-
old woman
was sta bbe d to d e ath in the doorway to her apartment. When
the
p o lice caught th e man suspected of doing it, they had a hard
time
prote cting him from an angry crowd of local residents . A week
later a
thirty-one -ye ar-old m a n was stabbed to death by a burglar in
his

a partment (one of the increasing number of felony murders) ,
this
b efore th e eyes of his wife. The Tim es account continues as
follows:
On th e lowe r East Side, most re side nts seemed to agree with
the
poli ce that th e n e xt tim e a murder su sp ec t is identified ,
Tuesday's mob
sce ne is ve r y likely to be r e p e ate d . There is a widespread
feeling that
th e police, the courts, the entire criminal justice system simply
acts out
a sort of c harade , and that it is up to t h e community to
demand that
justice is done. "When the police find him, they'll just say he's a
sick
m a n a nd se nd him to a hospital for two years," said ... a
Delancey
Street shopkeeper. "Then he'll be right back on the street. The
only
thing to do is to kill this man right away, quickly and quietly."
2
The law must not allow that to happen , and not merely because
the
criminal may indeed be sick; it must provide the forms of
justice in
order to fulfill its educative function.
Robert Kennedy's friends were angry; that East Side mob was
angry; and it is not only right that they be angry (for murder is a
ter-
rible crime), but punishment depends on it and punishment is a
way

of promoting justice ....
[A] just society is one where everyone gets what he deserves,
at1cl
· , " as
the wicked deserve to be punished-they deserve "many sorr0 "15
'. _
the Psalmist says-and the righteous deserve to be joyous.
punisl;t
ment serves both. t~ese ends: it makes the criminal unhap~Y .~
1v
makes the law-ab1dmg person happy. It rewards the law-abidi g
·
. f . d nd b)
satts y1~1g the anger he feels at the sight of crime. It rewar s, a
rewardmg teaches law-abidingness · ' · · · · the)
[T]o th e extent that men cease to be loving and hating rn en: 1
e
l b
. . r is t 1
a so eco me md1fferent to what we know as crime ... • Ange
p as sion th a t r ecogni ze s a n d cares about justice ....
C(--t A P TE H 36 THL•: MO R A l.lT Y OF CA P I TAi. PU N
ISIIMF N T 32 7
Anger is ex!Jresse d o r man il~s lc d on Lhosc occasions wh en
some-

) as acte d 111 a manner th a l Is thought Lo b e uni ust and on e
of ·r oJ1C 1 . . . :., , I S
bases is the o pinion t haL m e n are respo~s1ble , a nd sho u ld
be held
n sible, for what they do . Thus, ange r Is accompani ed not only
by
respo l . h . h . ain cau sed by 11m w o 1s t e object of anger,
but by the pleas ure
the P .· f . . . a- [rom the expectation o exac tmg revenge on
someon e who is
ansll1o . 3 .
ght to deserve rt. We can become angry with an in ani ma te
thOU . d l k' k.
b
. ct (the door we run mto an t 1en IC m return) only by foo lishl
y
0 ~e 'b'l' . d d ··buting responsI I Ity to It, an we cannot o that
for long, which
attil . . . hy we do not thmk of returnmg later to revenge
ourselves on the
JS W door. For the same reason, we cannot be more than
momentarily
·r·y ,1/ith an animate creature other than man; only a fool or
worse
ang would dream of taking revenge on a dog. And, finally, we
tend to pity
rather than to be angry with men who-because they are insane ,
for
example-are not responsible for their acts. Ang~r, then, is a
very
human passion not only because only a human bemg can be
angry,

but also because it acknowledges the humanity of its objects: it
holds
them accountable for what they do. It is an expression of that
element
of the soul that is connected with the view that there is
responsibility
in the world; and in holding particular men responsible, it pays
them
that respect which is due them as men. Anger recognizes that
only
men have the capacity to be moral beings and, in so doing,
acknowl-
edges the dignity of human beings. Anger is somehow
connected
with justice, and it is this that modern penology has not
understood;
it tends, on the whole, to regard anger as merely a selfish
passion.
It can, of course , be that; and if someone does not become
angry
with an insult or an injury su ffered unjustly, we tend to think
he does
not think much of himself. But it need not be selfish, not in the
sense
of being provoked on ly by an injury suffered by oneself. There
were
many angry men in America when President Kennedy was
killed; one
of them-Jack Ruby-even took it upon himself to exact the
punish-
ment that, if indeed deserved , ought to have been exacted by
the law.
T_here were perhaps even angrier men when Martin Luther
King was kt:d, for King, more than anyone else at the time,
embodied a peo-

p es quest for justice; the anger-more, the "black rage"-
expressed
on that oc . . . . had casion was simply a mamfestat10n of the
great change that
lar occurred among black men in America, a change wrought in
ser~:
1
?art by King and his associates in the civil rights m ovement:
the
I ity and£ f . and th ear o the past h ad been replaced by pnde
and anger,
e treat h course . ~en t t at had formerly been accepted as a
matter of
or as if It d . . were eserved was now seen for what 1t was,
unJUSt
328 P AR T Ill M ORA L P ROB LE M S
d Ce. p ta ble Kin g preach e d love but th e move m e n t h an u
n ac · . · e le
d . d ange r as we ll a s love , and that anger was n o t d d de, pe
n e on . . espic
b . ith e r se lfish nor u1~3ust1fied. On the contrary, it w able,
e1ng ne . .· d as a refl
.· f what was called sohdanty an may more accurately
6
ec,
t1o n o k fi h b e cal]
. ·ofou n d caring for others, blac or ot er lacks, white £ b ect

a p1 . b 'Id A . or lack . d in the world King was trymg to u1 ,
mencan for othe A s, a n , . r me .
Cans If men are not saddened when someone else suffers r1-('. .
, or an
whe n someone else suffers unjustly, the implication is that th
gry
h l ey do not care for anyone other than t emse ves or that they
lack
. . . h . sorne quality that befits a man. When we cntiCize t em
for this we ack
' now1. edge that they ought to care for others. If men are not
angry whe
d f . . I h . na neighbor suffers at the han s o a cnmma , t e
implication is that
their moral faculties have been corrupted , that they are not
good
citizens.
Criminals are properly the objects of anger, and the perpetrators
of terrible crimes- for example, Lee Harvey Oswald and James
Earl
Ray-are properly the objects of great anger. They have done
more
than inflict an injury on an isolated individ u a l; they have
violated
the foundations of trust and friendship , t h e necessary
elements of a
moral community, the only community worth living in. A moral
community, unlike a hive of bees or a hill of ants, is one whose
mem-
bers are expected freely to obey the laws and, unlike a tyranny,
are
trusted to obey the laws. The criminal has vio la ted that trust,

and in
so doing has irtjured not merely his immediate victim but the
com·
munity as such. He has called into question the very possibility
of
that community by suggesting that men cannot be trusted freely
to
respect the property, the person, and the dignity of those with
whom
~hey are associated. If, then, men are not angry when someon~
else
is robbed, raped, or murdered, the implication is that there 15
110
1 . other mora commumty because those men do not care for
anyone .
than themselves. Anger is an expression of that caring, and
sooetl
needs men who care for each other who share their pleasures ~n
th · · ' 4 h ass1on eir pains, and do so for the sake of the others.
It is t e P fi h
that can d · th sel 5 cause us to act for reasons having nothing
to O wi r-
or mean_calculation; indeed, when educated, it can become a
ge~~y
ous passion th · • count[) , e passion that protects the
commumty or h ·ch
demanding p · h . . . ff from w 1 un1s ment for Its enemies. It
1s the stu heroes are made
. . . . f the
Capital · h · sty 0 pums ment ... serves to remind us of t he m
aJe
11
se·

m oral 0rd er that is embodied in o ur law and o f the t errible
c:relY
qu en ces of · t b h d be fl1 1 s reac • The law must n o t b e u n
de r stoo to
r
C
1.1 Ap'TER 36 THE MORALI TY OF C A P l T AL ) .
pn l: JN 1 S l--H v1. '£.NT
329
hat we enact or repeal at our will and obey O d' b . ite t . 11 h . .
r iso ey at ou
sti ll . 1ce especia y not t e criminal law. Wh ere .l . r ven1e1 ' .
ver . aw is re-
co11 d s merely statutory, men will soon enough disobey it d h
rde a . h . , an t ey
ga ·n how to do so wit out any inconvenience to themsel T h ·n
leaI . . ves. e
w1_ . l law 1nust possess a dignity far beyond that possessed by
crnu1na .1. . . mere ·v enactment or utl itarian and self-
interested calculations· statutoI ; h . . . '
ost powerful means we ave to give it that dignity is to authorize
the l1l l · l Th . . l l . impose the u t1mate pena ty. e cnmina aw
must be made
it to . . . .
if l by which I mean, awe-insp1nng, or commanding "profound
a,~u , "I . d f h . ect or reverential fear. t must remin us o t e
moral order by

iesp . h b . d . d h which alone we can live as uman eings, an 1n
our ay t e only
punishment that can do this is capital punishment.
Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill
J hn Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was the leading English
philosophe
o K ' h' 1 r of the nineteenth century. Whereas _ant s et ica
system concentrates
exclusively on the reason for an act10n and does not take
account of
its results, Mill's system focuses only on consequences. Mill
defend
utilitarianism, the view that the supreme principle of morality is
to ac:
so as to produce as much happiness as possible, each person
counting
equally. By "happiness" Mill means pleasure and the absence of
pain.
He grants, however, that some pleasures are more worthwhile
than oth-
ers. "It is ... better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied." His
evidence for this claim is that anyone who knew the lives of
both would
choose the former rather than the latter.
Utilitarianism provides a means of dealing with the quandary of
conflicting obligations. For instance, suppose you promised to
meet

someone for lunch but on the way encounter a child in need of
imme-
diate aid. What should you do? Utilitarianism solves the
problem by
telling you to give priority to helping the child because that
course of
action will produce more happiness. Shouldn't we keep our
promisesr
Mill says that usually we should because the practice of keeping
one's
promises produces important social benefits. An exception
should be
made, however, on those occasions when more happiness will
be pro-
duced by not keeping a promise.
What Utilitarianism Is
· · · creed which accepts as the foundation of morals "utility"
or t e greate
st
happiness principle" holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to h d to
d h promote appiness· wrong as they ten pro uce t e reverse of
ha · ' e
PPllless. By happiness is intended plea5ur
From John Stuart Mill, Utilitari~ism 0863).
118

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 1] 9
and the absence of pain· by h · · · ·
. , un app1ness, pain and the pnvat1on of
pleasure. To give a clea~ view of the moral standard set up by
the
~heory, rr.mch ~ore reqmres to be said; in particular, what
things it
mcludes m the ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent
this is
left an open questi~n. But t~ese supplementary explanations do
not
affect the theory of hfe on which this theory of morality is
grounded-
na~ely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things
des1~able as ~~ds;_ and that all desirable things (which are as
numer-
ous 1n the utihtanan as in any other scheme) are desirable either
for
pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of
pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among
them
in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate
dis-
like. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end
than
pleasure-no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit-they
de~ignate as utterly mean and groveling, as a doctrine worthy
only of
swine ....
But there is no known ... theory of life which does not assign to
the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination,

and of
the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to
those
of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian
writ-
ers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily
plea-
sures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness,
etc., of
the former-that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than
in
their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have
fully
proved their case; but they might have taken the other and, as it
may
be called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite
compati-
ble with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some
kinds
of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It
would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things
quality is
considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should
be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.
If I am asked what I mean by difference in quality in pleasures,
or
what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as
a
pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one
possible
answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost
all
who have experience of both give a decided preference,
irrespective

of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desir-
able pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are
competently ~c-
quainted with both, placed so far above the other that they
prefer 1t,
even though knowing it to be attended with a greater a mount of
.. -
4 ......
•.
1~0 PART II MORAL 'I llf,ORJES
rli sco ntent , and wou ld n~t resign it for any qu~nti_ty of ~he
other
sure which their nal'ure 1s capabl~ o~, w_e are J~5tified 1n
ascribi:1ea.
the 1:,rcfr rrcd cn ioyment a superio rity m quality so far outw .
g tri
:i • • • t· II e1ghi quan tity as to render 1t, 111 companson, o
sma account. n~
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are
bl f · · e9ua11 acqu ainted with and equally capa e O
apprec1atmg and e . . y
h llJoy,n hoth do give a most marked preference to t e manner
of exj g
. . l . F h Stene which employs their high er facu ties. ew uman
creatures e
. would conse nt to be chan ge d into any of the lower ammals

for a prorn·
' 1 . . ISe Of the full est all owance of a beasts p easures; no
mtelhgent hu
l . d rnan being wou ld consent to be a foo, no mstructe person
would b
. d . l e an ignoramus, no person of feel mg an conscience wou d
be selfish and
base , even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the
dune
or th e ra scal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with
theire,
They wou ld not resign what they possess more than he for the
mo:~
complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in
comma
wi th him. If they ever fancy they would: it is only in cases of
unhap~
piness so extreme that to escape from 1t they would exchange
their
lot for alm ost any other, however undesirable in their own
eyes. A
being of high er faculties requires more to make him happy, is
capa-
ble probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to
it at
more poi nts, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these
liabili-
ties, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a
lower
grade of ex istence . ...
Jt is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better Lo be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if
the fool ,

or th e pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only
know
th eir own sid e of the qu estion. The other party to the
comparison
knows both sides .
It may be objected that many who are capable of the higher
plea-
sures occasiona ll y, under the influence of temptation, postpone
them
to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full
appreciation of
the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity
of
character, make their election for the nearer good, though they
know
it to be the less va lu able; and this no less when the choice is
between
two bodily pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental.
They
pursue se nsual indulge nces to the irtjury of health, though
perfectly
aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected
that
many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble,
as
they advance in years, sink into indolence and selfishness. But I
do n_ot
believe that those who undergo this very common change
voluntanly
CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 121
choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the

higher.
I believe that, before they devote themselves exclusively to the
one,
they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for
the
nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily
killed, not
only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and
in the
majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the
occupations to
which their position in life has devoted them, and the society
into
which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that
higher
capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose
their
intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for
in-
dulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures,
not
because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are
either
the only ones to which they have access or the only ones which
they
are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned
whether
anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of
plea-
sures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower, though
many, in
all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine
both.
From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend
there

can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having
of two
pleasures, or which of the two modes of existence is,the most
grateful
to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its
conse-
quences, the judgment of these who are qualified by knowledge
of
both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must
be ad-
mitted as final. And there needs to be the less hesitation to
accept
this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is
no
other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity.
What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two
pains, or the _ intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except
the gen-
eral suffrage of those who are familiar with both? ...
I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom
have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms
the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the
agent's
own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own
happi-
ness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as
strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the
golden
rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the
ethics of
utility. "To do as you would be done by," and "to love your
neighbor
as your self," constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian
morality.

As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal,
utility
would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should
place
122 PAR T II TH E ORIES MORAL
. ractically, it may be called) the inte .
. ess or (as, speaking P ossible in harmony With the ini.
1
.
the happm individual as nearly as K t ed ucation and opinion,
Which
est o~ e;;rwhole;I and, secondly, t h:racter, should so use that
PoWer
est o t st a power over human c . dividual an indissoluble asso.
have so va · d of every m t
ablish in the mm . d the good of the whole, espe. as to es .
happmess an h
. . between his own . d the practice of sue modes of c1at1on h
pmess an h •
. II between his own ap. d for the universal appines,
oa y . d os1ttve as regar . h 'b• nd
uct negative an P ' b able to conceive t e poss1 Ii-co , 1 he may
e un P
rescribes; so that not on y . 1 ith conduct opposed to the h. lf
consistent Y w
ity of happiness to tmse • . . lse to promote the general b 1 that
a direct 1mpu . .

general good, ut a so . . f the habitual motives of actton,
good may be _in every md1v1dual ~:;e: ith may fill a large and
promi-
and the senuments connec:d t ' entient existence. If the tmpugn-
nent place in every human . emg s s d 't to their own minds in
•i· · rahty represente 1
ers of the uu 1tanan mo d r on possessed
this its true character, I know not what recommen a I • to it·
by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wantmg t
'
what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human na
ur;
any other ethical system can be supposed to foster; or what
sprin_g~
0 action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on
for givmg effect to their mandates. .
The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with
rep-
resenting it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, those
among
them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested
char-
acter sometimes fi nd fault with its standard as being too high
for
humanity. They say it is exacting too much to requ ire that
people
shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general
inter-
est of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a
standard of
morals and confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It
is the
business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test
we may

know them; but no system of ethics requires that the soJe
motive of
all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine
hun-
dredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and
rightly
so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the
more
unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension
should
be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as Utilitarian
moral-
ists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming tha, the
motive
has nothing to do with the morality of the actioo, though much
With
the worth of the agent. He who saves a fel!ow creature from
drown-
ing does what is mora!Jy right, whether his motive be duty or
the
hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend
that
tr~sts him is guilty ~fa crime, even if his object be to serve
another
fnen~ to whom he 1s under greater obligations . But to speak
only
of _ac~ions _d~ne fr~m the motive of duty, and in direct
obedience to
pnnc1pl~: It.Is a ~•sap_prehension of the utilitarian mode of
thought
t~ conceive It a_s nnplying that people should fix their minds

upon so
wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The greatest
major-
ity of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world
but
for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made
up;, and
the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these
occasions
travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as
is
necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not
violat-
ing the rights , that is, the legitimate and authorized
expectations,
of anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to
the
utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which
any
person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this
on an
extended scale-in other words, to be a public benefactor-are but
exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to
consider
public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or
hap-
piness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those
alone
the influence of whose actions extends to society in general
need
concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the
case of
abstinences indeed-of things which people forbear to do from
moral
considerations, though the consequences in the particular case
might

be beneficial-it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to
be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if
practiced
generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the
ground of
the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the
public
interest implied in this recognition is no greater than is
demanded by
every system of morals, for they all enjoin to abstain from
whatever is
manifestly pernicious to society ....
Again, utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral
doc-
trine by giving it the name of "expedien~y," ~nd t~ki~g
advantage of
the popular use of that term to contrast It with pnno~le. But the
ex-
pedient, in the sense in which it is opposed to the nght,
generally
means that which is expedient for the particular interest of the
agent
himself as when a minister sacrifices the interests of his country
to
keep hi,mself in place. When it means ~nythi~g bett~r than this,
it
means that which is expedient for some immediate obJect,
so1:1e tem-
b t Whl.ch vi·olates a rule whose observance 1s expe-porary
purpose, u . . . .
d
. · h h. h r degree The expedient, 1n this sense, instead
ient 1n a muc 1g e · .

f b
· h th. ng wi·th the useful 1s a branch of the hurtful. o e1ng t e
same 1 '
124 PART II THEORIES MORAL
·~
d . t for the purpose of getting b expe ,en ' . °""
't would often e t or attaining some object imme•· Thus I
barrassmen , . B . ti, O
mentary em h to tell a he. ut masmuch a, th some m I s or ot ers,
b' e I U
seful to ourse ve 't1've feeling on the su ~eq of Veracity ate y I
of a sens1 h c . I
. ation in ourse ves h nceeblement oft at ,eehng one of cu uv f I
and t e e " .
. ne of the most use u' h' hour conduct can be mstrumental• IS o
. h • s to w 1c ' t
he most hurtful, t mg . t ntional deviation from truth does
even unm e ' . f h and inasmuch as any, . th trustworthmess o
uman asser. d eakenmg e -
that much towar w . . al support of all present social Wei!.
tion, which is not only ~he prmfc1ph' h does more than any one
thing h . ffic,ency o w ,c .
being, butt e msu k back civilization, virtue, everythmg on
that can be named to eep h 1 est scale depends-we feel that . h
iness on t e arg
which human app d t of a rule of such transcendent . l . c r a
present a van age,
the v10 at1on,

10
. h h ho for the sake of conve-
~7!':!~:cii~:~~ :;~;~~':::~ ~~:: i:~iv~d:a1,' does whaht depehnds
~n
1
. d d · flict upon t em t e ev1 ,
him to deprive mankind of the goo ' an m . each
involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place m
other's words, acts the part of one of their worst en_em,~s. Yet
that
even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions IS
acknowl-
edged by all moralists, the chief of which is when the
withholdmg of
some fact (as of infonnation from a malefactor, or of bad news
from
a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially
an indi-
vidual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and
when
the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that
the
exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have
the
least possible effect in Weakening reliance on veracity, it ought
to be
recognized and, if possible, its limits defined; and, if the
principle of
utili_ty is good for anything, it must be good for Weighing
these con-
fl1c11ng UIIht1es agamst one another and marking out the

region Within which one or the other preponderates.
Again, defenders_ of utility. of ten find themselves called upon
to
reply to such obJec11ons as thlS-that there is not tirne p ·
. . , rev1ous to ac11on, for calculat1~g and Weig?ing the effects
of any line of conduct
on the general happmess. This IS exactly as if anyone '"er t h
· · · 'bl · ,. e o say t at It IS unpossi e to guide our conduct by
Christianity be h .
. . . cause t ere 1s
not time, on every occasion on Which anything has to b d d h h
h
e one, to
rea t roug t e Old and New Testaments. The answer t th b'
. . h h h o e o ~ec-t1on IS t at t ere as been ample time namely
the Who}
- . . ' ' e Past dura.
t1on of the human species. Dunng all that time mankind h b I
· b • ave een earn mg y experience the tendencies of actions on
'"hi· h .
' •v C experi-
ence all the prudence as Well as all the morality of life are dep
d
en ent.
C HAP TE R l .~ UT JLI TA RI AN IS M 125

P~ople ta lk as if th e ~omm ence ment o f thi s co u rse of ex
pe ri e nce had
hith erto b een put off, a nd as if, at th e mo me nt when so me
ma n feels
tempte d to_ m e?dle with th e pro perty o r life o f ano th e r,
he had to
begin con std e nng for the first time wheth er murder and theft
are
injuriou s to hum a n h appiness. Eve n th en I do no t think th
at he would
find th e question ver y pu zzling; but, at all events, th e matte r
is now
don e to his h a nd. It is truly a whim sical supposition that , if
ma nkind
were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, th
ey
would remain without any agreement as to what is useful , and
would
take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught
to
the young and enforced by law and opinion. There is no
difficulty in
proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill if we suppose
uni-
versal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis
short of
that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs
as to the
effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs
which have
thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and
for the
philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. That
philoso-
phers might easily do this, even now, on many subjects; that

the. re-
ceived code of ethics is by no means of divine right; and that
mankind
have still much to learn as to the effects of actions on the
general
happiness, I admit or rather earnestly maintain. The c~rollaries
fro~
the principle of utility, like the p~ecepts of ev~ry practical art,
admit
of indefinite improvement, and, m a progressive state of the.
human
mind, their improvement is perpetually going on. But to
con~ider the
rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over th~
m_t~rme-
diate generalization entirely and endeavor to te~t each
mdiv1d~al
· d' tl by the first principle is another. It 1s a strange notion
action Irec y . . .
that the acknowledgment of a first principle is mcons1stent ':1th
the
d . . f econdary ones To inform a traveler respectmg the a
m1ss1on o s · . I d k
lace of his ultimate destination is not to forbid the use of. an
~ar s
P . . h ay The proposition that happmess is the and direct10n-
posts on t e w · I · d
d d . f morality does not mean that no road ought to be a1
en an aim o . thither should not be ad-
down to that goal, or that personshgomg th r Men really ought
to
d . · rather t an ano e · vised to take one Irecuon h ' b•iect

which they would
. k' d f nonsense on t is su:., ,
leave off talking a in ° f practical concernment.
1. t n other matters o neither talk nor 1sten ° O . . •s not
founded on astron-
h h t of navigation 1 Nobody argues t at t e ar . 1 late the
Nautical Almanac. •i not wait to ca cu omy because sa1 ors can
i'th it ready calculated; and
. . they go to sea w . . Bemg rat10nal creatures, h ea of life with
thelf mmds
out upon t es all rational creatures go . f •ght and wrong, as well
as on
n questions o n made up on the commo
126 PART II
THEORIES MORAL
. f wise and foolish. Anct this suons o d h ' d. fficult que . 't is
to be presume t ey Wii f more
1
ahty, 1 I · ·
of the ar . human qu h fundamenta pnnc1pie of many ight 1s a d
t as t e . h . l
ong as fores h tever we a op . . les to apply It by; t e Illlpos. as
d w a rmc1p
ntinue to
0

· . bordinate P mon to all systems, can co reqmre su being com
m
orality, we 'thout them, . particular; but gravely to d ·ng w1 ne
m .
sibility of
01
t against any O Id be had, and as if Illan. gumen . 'pies cou .
afford no ar h econdary prmn t remain, Without draw-· r o sue s
d lways mus . .
argue as
I
n . d till now, an a . nee of human hfe 1s as h d emame he
expene . .
kind a r
1
nclusions from t ched in phllosoph1ca) ing any genera he? k as
absurdity has ever rea high a pitch, I t m ,
controversy. • · ·
Of What Sort of Pr~of the Principle
of Utility Is Susceptible d questions about what Q
uestions about en s ar~, . d t . e is that happmess IS e-d in other
wor s, . . d . .. Th tihtanan oc rm .
things are desirable. e u . d all other things bemg
sirable and the on y In d Wh t ought to be required oft e
1 th· g desirable as an en , . h
only desirable as means to th~t en . . . t ~hat the doctrine should

ful-doctrine, what cond1t1ons is It reqmSI. e l
fill-to make good its claim to be heheved. . . . . .
The only proof capable of being given that an object I~ VIs'.ble
ts
that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is
~ud1ble is t?at
eople hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In
hke
~anner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce
that
anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. If the
end
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself Were not, in
theory
and in practice, acknowledged to he an end, nothing cou]d ever
con-
vince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the
gen-
eral happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he
believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This,
however,
being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case
admits of,
but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good
that
each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the
ge~era]
happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all Persons.
Bappi-
ness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct •nct
quently, one of the cntena of morahty.
. . . , conse-
But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the soJe

criterion.
To do that It Would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show
only that people desire happiness hut that they never desire not
thing else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things
Whicha~y~
, In
common_ language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness.
They deslfe, for example, virtue and the absence of vice no less
really
than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is
not as
universal, but it is as authentic a fact as the desire of happiness.
And
hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they
have
a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides
happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation
and disapprobation.
But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue,
or
maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very
reverse. It
maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to
be de-
sired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of
utili-
tarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is
made

virtue, however they may believe (as they do) that actions and
disposi-
tions are only virtuous because they promote another end than
virtue, yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from
con-
siderations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only
place
virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to
the
ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the
pos-
sibility of its being, to the individual, a goo~ in ~tself, ':itho~t
looking
to any end beyond it; and hold that the mind 1s not m a nght
sta_te,
not in a state conformable to utility, not in the state most
conducive
to the general happiness, unless it does lov: virt~e i~ ~his
~anner-
as a thing desirable in itself, even although, m the md1v1dual
inst~nc~,
it should not produce those other desirable consequenc~s whICh
~t
d t Oduce and on account of which it is held to be virtue. This
ten s o pr , h ·
. . . ot i·n the smallest degree, a departure from the appi-
op1n1on 1s n , · d
. . 1 The 1· ngredients of happiness are very vanous, an ness
pnnc1p e. 'd d
h of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when consi ere
as
eac . t The principle of utility does not mean that any swelling
an aggrega e. . · f

. . for instance or any given exemption rom given pleasure, as
music, ' 11
. 1 health is to be looked upon as means to a co ec-
pa1n, as for examp e h , . and to be desired on that account. . h'
termed app1ness, .
tlve somet 1ng . . d r themselves· besides bemg
d · d d desirable m an ior ' They are esire an d y· t e according
to the utilitarian
means, they are a part of the en : . ir 'part of the end, but it is
ca-
doctrine, is not naturally a~d ohngma hy live it disinterestedly
it has
. . and m t ose w o .
pable of becoming so, h . h d not as a means to happ1-. d . d and
c ens e ' become so, and 1s esire .
f th . r happmess. . ness, but to a part O ei ember that virtue 1s
not the
h . f ther we may rem To illustrate t IS ur ' d h' h 1· f it were no
t a means to . 11 ns an w IC only thing origina Y a mea '
128 PART II MORAL THEORIES L
d emain indifferent, but Which bya
1 Id be an r • .
8
Soti anything else wou to comes to be desired for Itself, ¾d ha-
' t ·s a means 1 h t at
tion with what

1 1
. .t What for examp e, s aU We say of h ost mtens1 y. ' . t ,
too with the utm . thing originally more des1rabJe ab , There 1s
no ou1
love of money. h f glittering pebbles. Its Worth is So)
1
b t any eap o e)
money than a ou . h . .11 buy· the desires for other things than
h' wh1c It WI '
that of the t mgs f atifying. Yet the love of money is
001
. h · · a means o gr .
itself, wh1c It is . £orces of human hfe, but money is, in f h t
ongest movmg . . .
one o t e s r . d £ 'tself- the desire to possess It 1s often d · ed m
an ori ' .
many cases, es1r · 1 't and goes on increasing When all h the
desire to use , .
stronger t an . d beyond it to be compassed by It, are d · hich
pomt to en s …
Guidelines:
· Read the article at least twice before taking any notes on it.
· Begin your presentation by stating your name and the title of
your article.
· Explain the main point of the article or the central claim the
author is trying to convey. For this part, you should be able to
summarize in one sentence what the point of the article is, i.e.
the conclusion. Use your own words to explain this, do not just
read a quote from the article.

· Do not just summarize the entire article.
· I would like you to incorporate at least two interesting points
that the author makes, which supports their premises. You may
use quotes in this presentation, however, keep it to a minimal.
· You must note one of the thinkers we studied in this course
and how they would react to this article.
· Try to relate an example to actual life.
Grading Rubric
Overall 20 pts.
Premise 1 15 pts.
Premise 2 15 pts.
Thesis Statement 15 pts.
Example 15 pts.
Thinker to Relate 20 pts.

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