OS Xのセキュリティ脆弱性研究はMacのデバイスが人気になるにつれ、より人気が高まっている。OX XのIOKitはユーザモードからの切り替えにおけるカーネル自身およびカーネル拡張の危殆化によりハッカーからの多くの攻撃にさらされている。多くの研究者はこの分野の研究(リファレンスを参照のこと)を進めており、我々は本研究分野の次のいくつかの成果を共有したい。
1. カーネル脆弱性を検出するためのコンテキストエンライトメントによるパッシブファジングフレームワーク
2. SMAP&SMEPをバイパスするためのユーザモードプログラムからカーネルメモリを占有するためのエクスプロイト技術
3. 本ファジング手法により検出された脆弱性の活用方法とOS Xに対し二度の成功をもたらしたルート詐取のための新たなエクスプロイト手法
我々は次の新たな手法を紹介する。PFACEと呼ばれる、OS X IO Kitに対するコンテキストエンライトメントによるパッシブファジングである。PFACEは次のような特徴を有する。
第一に、条件依存でありシステムクラッシュをもたらすコードの実行および検出を深くまた広く許可する。次に以下が含まれるモジュールを出力する。コンテキスト:脆弱性の疑いに対するインジケーター。インジケーターは最初にモジュールをレビューするための手段としてレビュアーにとって有用であろう。
多くの脆弱性を有する場合、主要な課題はどのようにROPガジェットをユーザモードプログラムからカーネル空間に転送するかである。なぜなら近年のOS XではSMAPおよびSMEPを許可しているためである。高名なセキュリティ研究者であるステファン・エッサーはOSDataはカーネルメモリを占拠する良い構造であると提案している。[リファレンスセクション5]もちろんOSDataは確かによいデータ構造である。しかし、実際にはOSDataが機能しないいくつかの課題が存在する。我々はOSDATAがユーザモードプログラムからカーネルメモリを占拠するよう機能させるための新たな手法を発見し、本手法により、新たな脆弱性の検出およびOS X (10.11.3) のルート詐取に成功している。
実際に我々はCVEにおける多くの脆弱性を発見しており、ファジング効果によるカーネルクラッシュを実現している。また、我々はMac OS X(10.11.3)においていくつかの脆弱性を使って、二つの異なるローカル権限昇格手法を確立している。
--- Moony Li & Jack Tang
LINQソースでGO!
In 名古屋MS系秋祭り 2013/09/21
* Containes too many aminatable elements, so broken look'n feel in slideshare.
http://www.kekyo.net/2013/09/21/%e5%90%8d%e5%8f%a4%e5%b1%8bms%e7%a7%8b%e7%a5%ad%e3%82%8a-linq%e3%82%bd%e3%83%bc%e3%82%b9%e3%81%a7go/
LINQソースでGO!
In 名古屋MS系秋祭り 2013/09/21
* Containes too many aminatable elements, so broken look'n feel in slideshare.
http://www.kekyo.net/2013/09/21/%e5%90%8d%e5%8f%a4%e5%b1%8bms%e7%a7%8b%e7%a5%ad%e3%82%8a-linq%e3%82%bd%e3%83%bc%e3%82%b9%e3%81%a7go/
Update on Project Valhalla delivered during the Japan Java User's Group Cross Community Conference Spring 2019 Keynote. After a very brief review of Project Valhalla and its goals, we cover nest-based access control (JEP 181, new in JDK 11) and an overview of the currently available value type prototypes (MVT and LW1).
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...CODE BLUE
Recently, services that provide remote control and acquire vehicle location information (GPS) is increasing. (As far as we know, it has been especially popular in the EV cars.)
These services are the challenging business for the automotive industry and OEMs because these have a potentially huge market or an additional value to their products in the future.
On the other hands, these services may lead to new threats and risks for the automobiles. This is because the Internet connection did not consider it was not necessary for automobiles so far.
Further, some researchers have already reported vulnerabilities in the remote services that are provided by various OEMs.
These issues are all reported in a foreign territory. Then, how about in Japan?
Therefore, we analyze the client apps for Japan provided by the various OEMs. But we also targeted analyzing apps for the US because apps for Japan is not many yet.
Specifically, we analyzed vulnerabilities (cooperation between apps, certificate verification, etc...) and whether these apps are using anti-analysis techniques such as obfuscation.
In this talk, we'll introduce about a potential for abusing of remote service apps in the future and countermeasures for these risks.
--- Naohide Waguri
Naohide Waguri joined FFRI in 2013. Before he joined FFRI, he had participated in software quality assurance, software development and promotion of test automation of network equipment (Gigabit Ethernet or Multilayer switches) as a network engineer. After joined FFRI, he participated in penetration testing, analysis and investigating the trend of cyber attacks. He is currently researching threat/risk analysis and evaluation method for a security of embedded systems such as in-vehicle devices. He was a speaker at CODE BLUE 2015.
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson GuimaraesCODE BLUE
For quite some time we have been seeing espionage cases reaching countries, governments and large companies.
A large number of backdoors were found on network devices, mobile phones and other related devices, having as main cases the ones that were reported by the media, such as: TP-Link, Dlink, Linksys, Samsung and other companies which are internationally renowned.
This talk will discuss a backdoor found on the modem / router rtn, equipment that has a big question mark on top of it, because there isn’t a vendor identification and no information about who’s its manufacturer and there are at least 7 companies linked to its production, sales and distribution in the market. Moreover, some of them never really existed.
Which lead us to question on the research title: “Who put the backdoor in my modem?”
--- Ewerson Guimaraes
Degree in Computer Science from Fumec University, Security Analyst and Researcher at Epam Systems. Certified by Offesinve Security(OSCP) and Elearn(WPT) as Pentester, Ewerson has published articles in the Brazilian Information Security/Computers magazines H4ck3r and GEEK, moreover, posted exploits and advisory on SecurityFocus found in big companies like: IBM, McAfee, Skype, Technicolor, Tufin, TrendMicro and others. Contrib to develop some modules to Metasploit Framework Project. Founder of BHack Conference and Area31, the first hackerpsace in Minas Gerais and is an active Kali Linux Community Contributor
Update on Project Valhalla delivered during the Japan Java User's Group Cross Community Conference Spring 2019 Keynote. After a very brief review of Project Valhalla and its goals, we cover nest-based access control (JEP 181, new in JDK 11) and an overview of the currently available value type prototypes (MVT and LW1).
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...CODE BLUE
Recently, services that provide remote control and acquire vehicle location information (GPS) is increasing. (As far as we know, it has been especially popular in the EV cars.)
These services are the challenging business for the automotive industry and OEMs because these have a potentially huge market or an additional value to their products in the future.
On the other hands, these services may lead to new threats and risks for the automobiles. This is because the Internet connection did not consider it was not necessary for automobiles so far.
Further, some researchers have already reported vulnerabilities in the remote services that are provided by various OEMs.
These issues are all reported in a foreign territory. Then, how about in Japan?
Therefore, we analyze the client apps for Japan provided by the various OEMs. But we also targeted analyzing apps for the US because apps for Japan is not many yet.
Specifically, we analyzed vulnerabilities (cooperation between apps, certificate verification, etc...) and whether these apps are using anti-analysis techniques such as obfuscation.
In this talk, we'll introduce about a potential for abusing of remote service apps in the future and countermeasures for these risks.
--- Naohide Waguri
Naohide Waguri joined FFRI in 2013. Before he joined FFRI, he had participated in software quality assurance, software development and promotion of test automation of network equipment (Gigabit Ethernet or Multilayer switches) as a network engineer. After joined FFRI, he participated in penetration testing, analysis and investigating the trend of cyber attacks. He is currently researching threat/risk analysis and evaluation method for a security of embedded systems such as in-vehicle devices. He was a speaker at CODE BLUE 2015.
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson GuimaraesCODE BLUE
For quite some time we have been seeing espionage cases reaching countries, governments and large companies.
A large number of backdoors were found on network devices, mobile phones and other related devices, having as main cases the ones that were reported by the media, such as: TP-Link, Dlink, Linksys, Samsung and other companies which are internationally renowned.
This talk will discuss a backdoor found on the modem / router rtn, equipment that has a big question mark on top of it, because there isn’t a vendor identification and no information about who’s its manufacturer and there are at least 7 companies linked to its production, sales and distribution in the market. Moreover, some of them never really existed.
Which lead us to question on the research title: “Who put the backdoor in my modem?”
--- Ewerson Guimaraes
Degree in Computer Science from Fumec University, Security Analyst and Researcher at Epam Systems. Certified by Offesinve Security(OSCP) and Elearn(WPT) as Pentester, Ewerson has published articles in the Brazilian Information Security/Computers magazines H4ck3r and GEEK, moreover, posted exploits and advisory on SecurityFocus found in big companies like: IBM, McAfee, Skype, Technicolor, Tufin, TrendMicro and others. Contrib to develop some modules to Metasploit Framework Project. Founder of BHack Conference and Area31, the first hackerpsace in Minas Gerais and is an active Kali Linux Community Contributor
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...CODE BLUE
The state of VPN protocols is not pretty, with popular options, such as IPsec and OpenVPN, being overwhelmingly complex, with large attack surfaces, using mostly cryptographic designs from the 90s. WireGuard presents a new abuse-resistant and high-performance alternative based on modern cryptography, with a focus on implementation and usability simplicity. It uses a 1-RTT handshake, based on NoiseIK, to provide perfect forward secrecy, identity hiding, and resistance to key-compromise impersonation attacks, among other important security properties, as well as high performance transport using ChaCha20Poly1305. A novel IP-binding cookie MAC mechanism is used to prevent against several forms of common denial-of-service attacks, both against the client and server, improving greatly on those of DTLS and IKEv2. Key distribution is handled out-of-band with extremely short Curve25519 points, which can be passed around in the likes of OpenSSH. Discarding the academic layering perfection of IPsec, WireGuard introduces the idea of a "cryptokey routing table", alongside an extremely simple and fully defined timer-state mechanism, to allow for easy and minimal configuration; WireGuard is actually securely deployable in practical settings. In order to rival the performance of IPsec, WireGuard is implemented inside the Linux kernel, but unlike IPsec, it is implemented in less than 4,000 lines of code, making the implementation manageably auditable. The talk will examine both the cryptography and kernel implementation particulars of WireGuard and explore an offensive attack perspective on network tunnels.
---
Jason Donenfeld
Jason Donenfeld is an independent security researcher and software developer, with a broad background of experience, well-known in both the security community and the open source world, and has pioneered several exploitation techniques. He has worked with many severe vulnerabilities in widespread software projects, including working on 0-day vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel, as well as extensive hardware reverse engineering. His security work spans advanced mathematical and geometric algorithms, cryptography, and remote exploitation.
Jason founded Edge Security (www.edgesecurity.com), a highly capable security consulting firm, with expertise in vulnerability discovery, security assessments, reverse engineering, hardened development, and physical security.
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés RianchoCODE BLUE
この講演では、難解なWebアプリケーションの脆弱性を詳しく見せる。これらの脆弱性は多くのセキュリティ・コンサルタントの簡易な脆弱性診断では見逃される可能性があり、リモートコード実行、認証バイパスや、実際にお金を支払うことなくPayPal経由でお店の商品を購入されてしまうことに繋がる。
SQLインジェクションは廃れたが、私は気にしない。null、nil、NULLの世界や、noSQLインジェクション、通話音声傍受に繋がるHostヘッダ・インジェクション、PayPalの二重支払い、RailsのMessage Verifierのリモートコード実行の世界を探検しようではないか。
--- アンドレス・リアンチョ Andres Riancho
アンドレス・リアンチョはアプリケーション・セキュリティの専門家であり、現在はコミュニティを前提としたオープン・ソースのw3afプロジェクトを率いていて、世界中の企業に徹底的なWebアプリケーション侵入テストサービスを提供している。
研究の分野では、3comやISSからのIPS装置に対し重大な脆弱性を発見していて、元雇用者のひとりが行ったSAP研究に貢献し、何百ものWebアプリケーションに対して脆弱性を報告している。
彼が注力しているものは常に、Webアプリケーションのセキュリティ分野である。それは彼が開発したw3afであり、侵入テスターやセキュリティ・コンサルタントたちに幅広く使われるWebアプリケーション攻撃、Auditフレームワークだ。アンドレスは、BlackHat(米国と欧州)、SEC-T(スウェーデン)、DeepSec(オーストリア)、OWASP World C0n(米国)、CanSecWest(カナダ)、PacSecWest(日本)、T2(フィンランド)、Ekoparty(ブエノスアイレス)など、世界中の多くのセキュリティ会議において講演をし、トレーニングの場を設けてきた。
アンドレスは、自動Webアプリケーション脆弱性の検知と開発を更に研究するため、2009年にWebセキュリティに特化したコンサルタント会社Bonsai Information Securityを設立している。
[CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten NohlCODE BLUE
Based on one decade of impactful security research and several years as a risk manager, Karsten Nohl reflects upon what he would have done differently in pushing a data security agenda.
Our community is convinced that stellar IT security is paramount for companies large and small: We need security for system availability, for brand reputation, to prevent fraud, and to keep data private. But is more security always better?
Poorly chosen protection measures can have large externalities on the productivity, innovation capacity, and even happiness of organizations. Can too much security be worse than too little security?
This talk investigates the trade-off between security and innovation along several examples of current security research. It finds that some hacking research is counter-productive in bringing the most security to most people, by spreading fear too widely.
---
Karsten Nohl
Karsten Nohl has spoken widely on security gaps since 2006. He and co-investigators have uncovered flaws in mobile communication, payment, and other widely-used infrastructures. In his work at an Asian 4G and digital services provider, and as Chief Scientist at Security Research Labs in Berlin, a risk management think tank specializing in emerging IT threats, Karsten challenges security assumptions in proprietary systems and is fascinated by the security-innovation trade-off. Hailing from the Rhineland, he studied electrical engineering in Heidelberg and earned a doctorate in 2008 from the University of Virginia.
[CB16] Using the CGC’s fully automated vulnerability detection tools in secur...CODE BLUE
End-user’s requirements for secure IT products are continually increased in environment that are affected directly to human life and industry such as IoT, CPS. Because vendors and end-user sell or buy products based on trustworthy or objective security evaluation results, security evaluation roles are important. Security Evaluations are divided to two parts, one is evaluation on design level such as ISO/IEC 29128(Verification of Cryptographic Protocols) and another one is post-implementation level such as ISO/IEC 15408(Common Criteria). These security evaluation standards, both ISO/IEC 29128 and ISO/IEC 15408, advise to use formal verification and automated tools when high assurance level of target products is required.
For a long time, vulnerability detection using automated tools have been tried and studied by many security researchers and hackers. And recently, the study related to automated vulnerability detection are now more active than ever in hacking community with DARPA’s CGC(Cyber Grand Challenge). But, too many tools are developed continually and usually each tool has their own purpose to use, so it’s hard to achieve ultimate goal of security evaluation effectively and verify evaluation results.
Furthermore, there are no references for categorizing about automated tools on perspective of security evaluations. So, in this presentation we will list up, categorize and analyze all of automated tools for vulnerability detection and introduce our result such as pros and cons, purpose, effectiveness, etc.
-- InHyuk Seo
My name is Inhyuk Seo(Nick: inhack). I graduated B.S. in Computer Science and Engineering at Hanyang University(ERICA) in 2015. Now I’m a researcher and M.S. of SANE(Security Analaysis aNd Evaluation) Lab at Korea University. I’m interested in Programming Language, Software Testing, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence.
In 2012, I completed high-quality information security education course “the Best of the Best(BoB)” hosted by KITRI(Korea Information Technology Research Institute) and conducted “Exploit Decoder for Obfuscated Javascript” Project.
I participated in many projects related with vulnerability analysis. I conducted “Smart TV Vulnerability Analysis and Security Evaluation” and “Developing Mobile Security Solution(EAL4) for Military Environment ”. Also, I participated in vulnerability analysis project for IoT products of various domestic tele-communications.
-- Jisoo Park
Jisoo Park graduated with Dongguk University B.S in Computer science engineering. He participated in secure coding research project in Programming Language Lab and KISA(Korea Internet & Security Agency). He worked as a software QA tester at anti-virus company Ahnlab. He also completed high-quality information security education course “Best of the Best” hosted by KITRI(Korea Information Technology Research Institute) and conducted security consulting for Car sharing service company.
Now, Jisoo Park is a
IMAX3: Amazing Dataflow-Centric CGRA and its Applications
I present this slide to all hungry engineers who are tired of CPU, GPU, FPGA, tensor core, AI core, who want some challenging one with no black box inside, and who want to improve by themselves.
[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...CODE BLUE
It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten NohlCODE BLUE
Most 5G networks are built in fundamentally new ways, opening new hacking avenues.
Mobile networks have so far been monolithic systems from big vendors; now they become open vendor-mixed ecosystems. Networks are rapidly adopting cloud technologies including dockerization and orchestration. Cloud hacking techniques become highly relevant to mobile networks.
The talk dives into the hacking potential of the technologies needed for these open networks. We illustrate the security challenges with vulnerabilities we found in real-world networks.
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...CODE BLUE
Printer has become one of the essential devices in the corporate intranet for the past few years, and its functionalities have also increased significantly. Not only print or fax, cloud printing services like AirPrint are also being supported as well to make it easier to use. Direct printing from mobile devices is now a basic requirement in the IoT era. We also use it to print some internal business documents of the company, which makes it even more important to keep the printer safe.
Nowadays, most of the printers on the market do not have to be connected with USB or traditional cable. As long as you are using a LAN cable connected to the intranet, the computer can find and use the printer immediately. Most of them are based on protocols such as SLP and LLMNR. But is it really safe when vendors adopt those protocols? Furthermore, many printers do not use traditional Linux systems, but use RTOS(Real-Time Operating System) instead, how will this affect the attacker?
In this talk, we will use Canon ImageCLASS MF644Cdw and HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M283fdw as case study, showing how to analyze and gain control access to the printer. We will also demonstrate how to use the vulnerabilities to achieve RCE in RTOS in unauthenticated situations.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...CODE BLUE
Yuuma Taki is enrolled in the Hokkaido Information University Information Media Faculty of Information Media (4th year).
At university he is focusing on learning about security for lower-level components, such OS and CPU. In his third year of undergraduate school, he worked on trying to implement the OS security mechanism "KASLR", at Sechack365.
Currently, he is learning about ROP derivative technology and embedded equipment security.
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...CODE BLUE
In October 2021, we published the first analysis of Wslink – a unique loader likely linked to the Lazarus group. Most samples are packed and protected with an advanced virtual machine (VM) obfuscator; the samples contain no clear artifacts and we initially did not associate the obfuscation with a publicly known VM, but we later managed to connect it to CodeVirtualizer. This VM introduces several additional obfuscation techniques such as insertion of junk code, encoding of virtual operands, duplication of virtual opcodes, opaque predicates, merging of virtual instructions, and a nested VM.
Our presentation analyzes the internals of the VM and describes our semi automated approach to “see through” the obfuscation techniques in reasonable time. We demonstrate the approach on some bytecode from a protected sample and compare the results with a non-obfuscated sample, found subsequent to starting our analysis, confirming the method’s validity. Our solution is based on a known deobfuscation method that extracts the semantics of the virtual opcodes, using symbolic execution with simplifying rules. We further treat the bytecode chunks and some internal constructs of the VM as concrete values instead of as symbolic ones, enabling the known deobfuscation method to deal with the additional obfuscation techniques automatically.
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...CODE BLUE
Kimsuky is a North Korean APT possibly controlled by North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau. Based on reports from the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and other vendors, TeamT5 identified that Kimsuky's most active group, CloudDragon, built a workflow functioning as a "Credential Factory," collecting and exploiting these massive credentials.
The credential factory powers CloudDragon to start its espionage campaigns. CloudDragon's campaigns have aligned with DPRK's interests, targeting the organizations and key figures playing a role in the DPRK relationship. Our database suggested that CloudDragon has possibly infiltrated targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Victims include think tanks, NGOs, media agencies, educational institutes, and many individuals.
CloudDragon's "Credential Factory" can be divided into three small cycles, "Daily Cycle," "Campaign Cycle," and "Post-exploit Cycle." The"Daily Cycle" can collect massive credentials and use the stolen credentials to accelerate its APT life cycle.
In the "Campaign Cycle," CloudDragon develops many new malware. While we responded to CloudDragon's incidents, we found that the actor still relied on BabyShark malware. CloudDragon once used BabyShark to deploy a new browser extension malware targeting victims' browsers. Moreover, CloudDragon is also developing a shellcode-based malware, Dust.
In the "Post-exploit Cycle," the actor relied on hacking tools rather than malicious backdoors. We also identified that the actor used remote desktop software to prevent detection.
In this presentation, we will go through some of the most significant operations conducted by CloudDragon, and more importantly, we will provide possible scenarios of future invasions for defense and detection.
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...CODE BLUE
Social media is no doubt a critical battlefield for threat actors to launch InfoOps, especially in a critical moment such as wartime or the election season. We have seen Bot-Driven Information Operations (InfoOps, aka influence campaign) have attempted to spread disinformation, incite protests in the physical world, and doxxing against journalists.
China's Bots-Driven InfoOps, despite operating on a massive scale, are often considered to have low impact and very little organic engagement. In this talk, we will share our observations on these persistent Bots-Driven InfoOps and dissect their harmful disinformation campaigns circulated in cyberspace.
In the past, most bots-driven operations simply parroted narratives of the Chinese propaganda machine, mechanically disseminating the same propaganda and disinformation artifacts made by Chinese state media. However, recently, we saw the newly created bots turn to post artifacts in a livelier manner. They utilized various tactics, including reposting screenshots of forum posts and disguised as members of “Milk Tea Alliance,” to create a false appearance that such content is being echoed across cyberspace.
We particularly focus on an ongoing China's bots-driven InfoOps targeting Taiwan, which we dub "Operation ChinaRoot." Starting in mid-2021, the bots have been disseminating manipulated information about Taiwan's local politics and Covid-19 measures. Our further investigation has also identified the linkage between Operation ChinaRoot and other Chinese state-linked networks such as DRAGONBRIDGE and Spamouflage.
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...CODE BLUE
Malwares written in Go is increasing every year. Go's cross-platform nature makes it an opportune language for attackers who wish to target multiple platforms. On the other hand, the statically linked libraries make it difficult to distinguish between user functions and libraries, making it difficult for analysts to analyze. This situation has increased the demand for Go malware classification and exploration.
In this talk, we will demonstrate the feasibility of computing similarity and classification of Go malware using a newly proposed method called gimpfuzzy. We have implemented "gimpfuzzy", which incorporates Fuzzy Hashing into the existing gimphash method. In this talk, we will verify the discrimination rate of the classification using the proposed method and confirm the validity of the proposed method by discussing some examples from the classified results. We will also discuss issues in Go-malware classification.
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...CODE BLUE
Malware analysts normally obtain IP addresses of the malware's command & control (C2) servers by analyzing samples. This approach works in commoditized attacks or campaigns. However, with targeted attacks using APT malware, it's difficult to acquire a sufficient number of samples for organizations other than antivirus companies. As a result, malware C2 IOCs collected by a single organization are just the tip of the iceberg.
For years, I have reversed the C2 protocols of high-profile APT malware families then discovered the active C2 servers on the Internet by emulating the protocols. In this presentation, I will explain how to emulate the protocols of two long-term pieces of malware used by PRC-linked cyber espionage threat actors: Winnti 4.0 and ShadowPad.
Both pieces of malware support multiple C2 protocols like TCP/TLS/HTTP/HTTPS/UDP. It's also common to have different data formats and encoding algorithms per each protocol in one piece of malware. I'll cover the protocol details while referring to unique functions such as server-mode in Winnti 4.0 and multiple protocol listening at a single port in ShadowPad. Additionally, I'll share the findings regarding the Internet-wide C2 scanning and its limitations.
After the presentation, I'll publish over 140 C2 IOCs with the date ranges in which they were discovered. These dates are more helpful than just IP address information since the C2s are typically found on hosted servers, meaning that the C2 could sometimes exist on a specific IP only for a very limited time. 65% of these IOCs have 0 detection on VirusTotal as of the time of this writing.
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...CODE BLUE
We are swamped with new types of malware every day. The goal of malware analysis is not to reveal every single detail of the malware. It is more important to develop tools for efficiency or introduce automation to avoid repeating the same analysis process. Therefore, malware analysts usually actively develop tools and build analysis systems. On the other hand, it costs a lot for such tool developments and system maintenance. Incident trends change daily, and malware keeps evolving. However, it is not easy to keep up with new threats. Malware analysts spend a long time maintaining their analysis systems, and it results in reducing their time for necessary analysis of new types of malware.
To solve these problems, we incorporate DevOps practices into malware analysis to reduce the cost of system maintenance by using CI/CD and Serverless. This presentation shares our experience on how CI/CD, Serverless, and other cloud technologies can be used to streamline malware analysis. Specifically, the following case studies are discussed.
* Malware C2 Monitoring
* Malware Hunting using Cloud
* YARA CI/CD system
* Malware Analysis System on Cloud
* Memory Forensic on Cloud
Through the above case studies, we will share the benefits and tips of using the cloud and show how to build a similar system using Infrastructure as Code (IaC). The audience will learn how to improve the efficiency of malware analysis and build a malware analysis system using Cloud infrastructure.
セル生産方式におけるロボットの活用には様々な問題があるが,その一つとして 3 体以上の物体の組み立てが挙げられる.一般に,複数物体を同時に組み立てる際は,対象の部品をそれぞれロボットアームまたは治具でそれぞれ独立に保持することで組み立てを遂行すると考えられる.ただし,この方法ではロボットアームや治具を部品数と同じ数だけ必要とし,部品数が多いほどコスト面や設置スペースの関係で無駄が多くなる.この課題に対して音𣷓らは組み立て対象物に働く接触力等の解析により,治具等で固定されていない対象物が組み立て作業中に運動しにくい状態となる条件を求めた.すなわち,環境中の非把持対象物のロバスト性を考慮して,組み立て作業条件を検討している.本研究ではこの方策に基づいて,複数物体の組み立て作業を単腕マニピュレータで実行することを目的とする.このとき,対象物のロバスト性を考慮することで,仮組状態の複数物体を同時に扱う手法を提案する.作業対象としてパイプジョイントの組み立てを挙げ,簡易な道具を用いることで単腕マニピュレータで複数物体を同時に把持できることを示す.さらに,作業成功率の向上のために RGB-D カメラを用いた物体の位置検出に基づくロボット制御及び動作計画を実装する.
This paper discusses assembly operations using a single manipulator and a parallel gripper to simultaneously
grasp multiple objects and hold the group of temporarily assembled objects. Multiple robots and jigs generally operate
assembly tasks by constraining the target objects mechanically or geometrically to prevent them from moving. It is
necessary to analyze the physical interaction between the objects for such constraints to achieve the tasks with a single
gripper. In this paper, we focus on assembling pipe joints as an example and discuss constraining the motion of the
objects. Our demonstration shows that a simple tool can facilitate holding multiple objects with a single gripper.
【DLゼミ】XFeat: Accelerated Features for Lightweight Image Matchingharmonylab
公開URL:https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.19174
出典:Guilherme Potje, Felipe Cadar, Andre Araujo, Renato Martins, Erickson R. ascimento: XFeat: Accelerated Features for Lightweight Image Matching, Proceedings of the 2024 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2023)
概要:リソース効率に優れた特徴点マッチングのための軽量なアーキテクチャ「XFeat(Accelerated Features)」を提案します。手法は、局所的な特徴点の検出、抽出、マッチングのための畳み込みニューラルネットワークの基本的な設計を再検討します。特に、リソースが限られたデバイス向けに迅速かつ堅牢なアルゴリズムが必要とされるため、解像度を可能な限り高く保ちながら、ネットワークのチャネル数を制限します。さらに、スパース下でのマッチングを選択できる設計となっており、ナビゲーションやARなどのアプリケーションに適しています。XFeatは、高速かつ同等以上の精度を実現し、一般的なラップトップのCPU上でリアルタイムで動作します。
10. なぜなら
Poison Here?
Dam poison Passive fuzzing
River Stream Data flow of code execution
(Open driver, IOCtl
driver……)
Up stream User mode data
Down stream Kernel mode data
Poison at Dam Fuzz at hook of system call
Fish die in
downstream
Kernel crash
Trace the poison
origin
Reproduction
…
13. アーキテクチャ概要
Origianl function
Hooker
IOAcceleratorFamily2.kext
Targeted application from apple store
Suspicious
module/function
manifest
IOThunderboltFamily.kext IOUSBFamily.kext
AppleGraphicsPowerManagement.kext AppleHDA.kext … …
I. is_io_connect_method
II. is_io_connect_async_method
III. iokit_user_client_trap
IV. IOMemoryDescriptor::createMappingInTask
V. ipc_kmsg_get
VI. ipc_kmsg_send
VII. Copyio
…...
Conditon Checker
Ring3
Ring0
Target
drivers
XNU/
IOKit
Tamper
StackFrame,
Process,
UserClient,
MsgID,
…...
Context Matcher
35. バグ vs 緩和策
Mitigation Bugs/Exploit Notes
KASLR KSlide leak e.g. CVE-2016-4655 カーネル情報の漏洩
SMAP Kernel Heap address leak CVE-2016-xxxx:ディスクイメージモジュールに
おいて、これはカーネルヒープの中に存在する
オブジェクトのアドレスをリークさせる。
SMEP a. Control RIP
b. ROP Chain
c. Disable CR4 bits
d. Execute any
CVE-2016-1820 :ディスクイメージモジュール
において、これはオブジェクトのアドレスを取
得し、関数ポインターの呼び出しとしてのオブ
ジェクトの中のQWORDの値を使う。
Welcome everyone
I’m very happy to be presenting here today at the CodeBlue conference.
My name is Moony and I will be presenting today on the topic of How we fuzz and exploit the Apple core.
Today I will cover several key areas
1. First I’ll tell you a little about me and my partner, and what we have done
I will then introduce you to passive fuzzing framework that we use to hunt vulnerabilities.
And finally I will show you exploit tips using the vulnerabilities we have found and how we root OSX machines.
My name is Moony
I’ve worked for 7 years in security.
My role has been to develop sandbox systems.
Focusing on Mac - Windows and Android Kernel vulnerabilities.
Moony Li: Twitter: @Flyic
7 years of security production development
RD Leader of Sandcastle core engine of DD(Deep Discovery) production for Gateway 0day exploit detection.
Current focusing on research about Mac/Windows kernel ,Android vulnerability and exploit
Jack Tang: Twitter: @jacktang310
10 years of anti-malware solution development
Familiar with Windows/Mac kernel technology, browser and document exploit.
Current focusing on research about Mac, virtualization vulnerability and exploit
My partners name is Jack
Jack has worked in security for 10 years
His focus has been on browser and document vulnerabilities as well as Mac – Windows and virtualization vulnerabilities.
Jack cannot be with us today he has broken his leg and is not able to travel.
Moony Li: Twitter: @Flyic
7 years of security production development
RD Leader of Sandcastle core engine of DD(Deep Discovery) production for Gateway 0day exploit detection.
Current focusing on research about Mac/Windows kernel ,Android vulnerability and exploit
Jack Tang: Twitter: @jacktang310
10 years of anti-malware solution development
Familiar with Windows/Mac kernel technology, browser and document exploit.
Current focusing on research about Mac, virtualization vulnerability and exploit
We are proud to have found many vulnerabilities, exploiting them to root OSX machines
Because of our work we have been awarded many CVE credits as shown here
Today I will cover several key areas
1. First I’ll tell you a little about me and my partner, and what we have done
I will then introduce you to passive fuzzing framework that we use to hunt vulnerabilities.
And finally I will show you exploit tips using the vulnerabilities we have found and how we root OSX machines.
1. Traditional fuzzing by IOKit interface.
These researchers open the IOKit service name which they want to test, and pour fuzzing data into kernel by the IOKit usermode API (e.g. IOConnectCallMethod, IOConnectCallAsyncMethod …)
Optimized Fuzzing IOKit in iOS, Blackhat 2015
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Lei-Optimized-Fuzzing-IOKit-In-iOS-wp.pdf
But it has a critical limitation. It is hard to hunt the bugs which are triggered with condition dependency. We summarize the condition decency as following:
*Call sequence dependency
For example: for the IOKit service “AppleCamIn”, which controls camera device, only correct IOConnectCallMethod call sequence would it work up: OpenDevice -> PowerOnCamera -> … If the fuzzer doesn’t invoke OpenDevice and PowerOnCamera IOKit call, following IOKit call will be returned with failure in earlier stage.
*Input data dependency
For example: the IOKit service “AppleHDAEngineInput” ‘s user client “IOAudioEngineUserClient” requires the input data to include a user mode buffer pointer. If the fuzzer doesn’t prepared the user mode buffer before , error will be returned in earlier stage.
*Timing dependency
For example: for the IOKit service “IOHDIXHDDriveOutKernel”, the service only appears after user or application opens a DMG file. If the fuzzer open it directly , it will fails directly.
2. Code review of target kernel extension
This costs much effort to reverse binary code and in the face of so many IOKit services and userclient. So the target selecting will impact researcher’s efficiency. What target should be reviewed firstly for more possible vulnerabilities is a headache problem.
Today I will cover several key areas
1. First I’ll tell you a little about me and my partner, and what we have done
I will then introduce you to passive fuzzing framework that we use to hunt vulnerabilities.
And finally I will show you exploit tips using the vulnerabilities we have found and how we root OSX machines.
Today I will cover several key areas
1. First I’ll tell you a little about me and my partner, and what we have done
I will then introduce you to passive fuzzing framework that we use to hunt vulnerabilities.
And finally I will show you exploit tips using the vulnerabilities we have found and how we root OSX machines.
a. Use KEEN team’s published method (Reference section [7]) to calculate KSLIDE.
b. Open any DMG file in order to let IOHDIXHDDriveOutKernel service can be opened.
c. Open IOHDIXHDDriveOutKernel service ‘s user client IOHIDIXControllerUserClient. Open IOPMrootDomain service ‘s user client RootDomainUserClient.
d. Call user client IOHIDIXControllerUserClient ‘s selector 1 (getRequest64) . From the output , we can get a kernel heap address of object IOHDIXCommand whose size is 0x68. This is vulnerability #1.
e. Call IOHDIXHDDriveOutKernel service ‘s selector 2 (processReply64). It will release the object.
f. Call RootDomainUserClient user client ‘s selector 7 (kPMSleepSystemOptions) with a carefully prepared XML as parameter , which include ROP gadget in <data> part. The <data> part occurs multiply times in order to occupy the target space successfully. We tune the XML ‘s <data> ‘s size in order to create size 0x68 buffer which OSData field point to. After the call, our controlled buffer occupy the freed IOHDIXCommand object location. And the kernel address is known by user mode program.
g. Call IOHIDIXControllerUserClient user client selector 2 (processReply64) with argument which include the address (leaked by step d). The call will take the address as a IOHDIXCommand object, and call the address located at 0x50 offset. So we control the RIP and let it execute ROP gadget.
h. In the ROP gadget, we disable the SMAP and SMEP bits in CR4. Then executes the shell code to modify current process’ uid to root and fork a shell.