The document summarizes and critiques a book written by Carey Schofeld called "Inside the Pakistan Army". It makes the following key points:
1) The book was commissioned and supported by the Pakistan Army but provided a superficial and non-critical analysis that failed to analyze major operations or strategic issues and instead focused on small tactical incidents.
2) The author was given extensive access to the Army's officers and operations but produced a disappointing work that was more of a public relations piece than serious analysis.
3) By publishing allegations about the suspicious death of a general in a British newspaper, the author may have damaged her relationship with the Pakistani military and raised questions about what other sensitive information she learned during her research
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
Realism, heroism, bravery, boldness or cowardiceAgha A
'Heroism' and 'realism', 'bravery' or 'cowardice' are powerful words pregnant with multiple meanings and thus often misunderstood in common discussion. This is not exactly an article but a cursory examination of how certain individuals in various stages of world history made remarkable achievements by being 'Heroic' 'Realistic' etc.
The 'Hero' is a man who does not surrender in face of overwhelming odds and thus emerges 'victorious' or is perceived by posterity to have been morally victorious despite having been physically destroyed.
Khalid Bin Waleed, Napoleon, Alexander, Churchill etc may be grouped in the first cate-gory and Joan of Arc, Syed Ahmad Shaheed may be grouped in the latter category. All these men did well and are even today well known figures in history.
We will first examine the issue in relation with the fact 'Whether the hero had an exact knowledge and sufficient time' to assess decisions that he made and which ultimately elevated him to the pedestal of a hero in history! This is important but very often forgotten or not understood at all by many. We will take the 'Rebels' or the 'Freedom Fighters' of 1857 as an example. All existing facts as we know them today prove that these 'Rebels' never really understood the real power and potential of the English East India Company.
This document provides a lengthy critique of Barack Obama's memoir about his presidency. The reviewer believes Obama lacked strategic vision and resolution, especially regarding the wars in Afghanistan and policies towards Pakistan. They criticize Obama for exaggerating the threat from al-Qaeda and for failing to acknowledge or address Pakistan's support for the Taliban. The reviewer also faults Obama and his advisers like Gates for lacking a clear strategy in Afghanistan and making poor decisions like deploying troops to Helmand province. Overall, the reviewer finds Obama's memoir to be intellectually dishonest and lacking in substantive analysis of his foreign policy decisions.
PAKISTAN ARMYS KARGIL BATTLE AND NASEEM ZEHRAS BOOKAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Naseem Zehra's book analyzing the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. The critic finds numerous factual inaccuracies and faults in Zehra's research and analysis. He argues she failed to properly analyze the mindset and motivations of key figures like Lt. Gen. Javed Hassan who underestimated India and helped launch the ill-fated Kargil operation. The critic also argues Zehra was too late in publishing her analysis 20 years after the event. Overall, he finds the book contains many incorrect facts, incomplete analysis, and lacks objective research needed to truly understand the causes and failures of the Kargil conflict.
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
This document contains excerpts from interviews with several retired Pakistani Army generals about their impressions of General Zia-ul-Haq, who was the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan from 1976 to 1988. The generals criticize Zia for institutionalizing corruption, prioritizing politics over the army, and damaging institutions through his one-man rule. They also question why Zia was selected as COAS, noting he was seen as incompetent but good at sycophancy. His Afghan policy is criticized for neglecting the political angle and opportunities for an alternative government.
Why Military Defeat in 1971-The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army betw...Agha A
The document provides background information on Major General Yahya Khan who became the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1966 and later seized power in 1969. It discusses Yahya Khan's career and qualifications, noting that he was seen as professionally competent but selected for political reasons by Ayub Khan. After becoming Army Chief, Yahya Khan oversaw reorganizations of the army including establishing new corps headquarters and divisions to address shortcomings revealed in the 1965 war with India.
The document summarizes and critiques a book written by Carey Schofeld called "Inside the Pakistan Army". It makes the following key points:
1) The book was commissioned and supported by the Pakistan Army but provided a superficial and non-critical analysis that failed to analyze major operations or strategic issues and instead focused on small tactical incidents.
2) The author was given extensive access to the Army's officers and operations but produced a disappointing work that was more of a public relations piece than serious analysis.
3) By publishing allegations about the suspicious death of a general in a British newspaper, the author may have damaged her relationship with the Pakistani military and raised questions about what other sensitive information she learned during her research
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
Realism, heroism, bravery, boldness or cowardiceAgha A
'Heroism' and 'realism', 'bravery' or 'cowardice' are powerful words pregnant with multiple meanings and thus often misunderstood in common discussion. This is not exactly an article but a cursory examination of how certain individuals in various stages of world history made remarkable achievements by being 'Heroic' 'Realistic' etc.
The 'Hero' is a man who does not surrender in face of overwhelming odds and thus emerges 'victorious' or is perceived by posterity to have been morally victorious despite having been physically destroyed.
Khalid Bin Waleed, Napoleon, Alexander, Churchill etc may be grouped in the first cate-gory and Joan of Arc, Syed Ahmad Shaheed may be grouped in the latter category. All these men did well and are even today well known figures in history.
We will first examine the issue in relation with the fact 'Whether the hero had an exact knowledge and sufficient time' to assess decisions that he made and which ultimately elevated him to the pedestal of a hero in history! This is important but very often forgotten or not understood at all by many. We will take the 'Rebels' or the 'Freedom Fighters' of 1857 as an example. All existing facts as we know them today prove that these 'Rebels' never really understood the real power and potential of the English East India Company.
This document provides a lengthy critique of Barack Obama's memoir about his presidency. The reviewer believes Obama lacked strategic vision and resolution, especially regarding the wars in Afghanistan and policies towards Pakistan. They criticize Obama for exaggerating the threat from al-Qaeda and for failing to acknowledge or address Pakistan's support for the Taliban. The reviewer also faults Obama and his advisers like Gates for lacking a clear strategy in Afghanistan and making poor decisions like deploying troops to Helmand province. Overall, the reviewer finds Obama's memoir to be intellectually dishonest and lacking in substantive analysis of his foreign policy decisions.
PAKISTAN ARMYS KARGIL BATTLE AND NASEEM ZEHRAS BOOKAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Naseem Zehra's book analyzing the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. The critic finds numerous factual inaccuracies and faults in Zehra's research and analysis. He argues she failed to properly analyze the mindset and motivations of key figures like Lt. Gen. Javed Hassan who underestimated India and helped launch the ill-fated Kargil operation. The critic also argues Zehra was too late in publishing her analysis 20 years after the event. Overall, he finds the book contains many incorrect facts, incomplete analysis, and lacks objective research needed to truly understand the causes and failures of the Kargil conflict.
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
This document contains excerpts from interviews with several retired Pakistani Army generals about their impressions of General Zia-ul-Haq, who was the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan from 1976 to 1988. The generals criticize Zia for institutionalizing corruption, prioritizing politics over the army, and damaging institutions through his one-man rule. They also question why Zia was selected as COAS, noting he was seen as incompetent but good at sycophancy. His Afghan policy is criticized for neglecting the political angle and opportunities for an alternative government.
Why Military Defeat in 1971-The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army betw...Agha A
The document provides background information on Major General Yahya Khan who became the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1966 and later seized power in 1969. It discusses Yahya Khan's career and qualifications, noting that he was seen as professionally competent but selected for political reasons by Ayub Khan. After becoming Army Chief, Yahya Khan oversaw reorganizations of the army including establishing new corps headquarters and divisions to address shortcomings revealed in the 1965 war with India.
1965 war -Staff College Quetta's Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
1965 war -Staff College Quettas Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24922.98244
Project: Military History
Agha H Amin
This document provides a review of the book "Descent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid. The reviewer notes that while Rashid's analysis is thought-provoking, the book contains numerous factual errors in dates, places, and events. It also shows bias against the Taliban and makes sweeping judgements without citations. However, Rashid's examination of Pakistan's role and the security issues it faces is penetrating. Overall, the reviewer finds the book a commercial work rather than idealistic reporting, but still a useful contribution for sparking more research.
This document provides a review of the book "Descent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid. The reviewer notes that while Rashid's analysis is thought-provoking, the book contains numerous factual errors in dates, events, and details. It also shows bias against the Taliban and makes sweeping judgements without fully exploring alternative perspectives. However, the reviewer believes the book can still inspire valuable discussion and research on its complex topics, despite some commercial motivations in its presentation.
German assessment of islam and nonsense theories of pan islamismAgha A
This document contains a long analysis critiquing overly simplistic views of pan-Islamism and arguing that history, ethnicity, and geopolitics are more complex realities that are often ignored. It discusses how certain historical Muslim figures are portrayed differently by different groups and eras. It also notes how religion alone has rarely been the sole basis for statehood, giving examples of how ethnicity and national interests often outweighed religious solidarity between states. The document advocates for a more nuanced understanding of history that considers these various factors rather than only focusing on abstract religious concepts.
Sikandar Ahmad was an exceptional and intellectually brilliant officer that the author met while serving in the military in Pakistan. Despite his talents, Sikandar often clashed with superiors due to their jealousy of his abilities and outspoken nature. The author credits Sikandar with polishing his knowledge of history and teaching him military law. Sikandar had a long career serving in different regiments but continued to face opposition from less capable officers. The author lost contact with Sikandar after 2000 when he had retired from the military.
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
Lieutenant Colonel Raja Sultan Mahmood was a brave Pakistani officer who went missing in December 1971 during the war between Pakistan and India in Bangladesh. He was originally commanding the 22nd Baloch Regiment but relinquished command due to a disagreement with his GOC. He was then assigned to command the 32nd Baloch Regiment. While leading the 32nd Baloch Regiment at night, his group ran into an Indian ambush. Lieutenant Colonel Raja Sultan Mahmood was martyred with many bullets in his chest, while the 32nd Baloch Regiment fled the battlefield, abandoning his body. The Indian forces buried him but his body was never recovered by Pakistan. He is remembered as a heroic officer by both Pakistani and Indian accounts of
Ambush survey afghanistan,british army and FM 31 21Agha A
1) The document discusses the background leading up to Britain's involvement in Afghanistan, known as the Fourth Afghan War. It notes that the US trained and funded Pakistani special forces (SSG) and intelligence (ISI) from 1955-1979, which later fought against Western forces.
2) General Musharraf deceived the US while preserving Pakistani Taliban assets and extracting $25 billion from the US as an "ally". Britain followed the US without a clear strategic aim, sending troops to Helmand in 2006 to "win hearts and minds" under the misleading politician Tony Blair.
3) British troops in Helmand were vulnerable targets divided into small groups, walking into a trap as their presence threatened Pakistan over Baluch
This document provides a book review of Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad's two volume history of the Baloch Regiment from 1820 to 1956. The reviewer, A.H. Amin, summarizes the contents and scope of the books. He acknowledges both the difficulty of writing such a comprehensive regimental history spanning 180 years as well as constraints imposed by official sponsorship. While praising many aspects of the work, Amin also points out several factual errors in the first volume that could have been avoided by consulting standard historical references.
PAKISTAN MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME 18 INSIDE WAZIRISTANAgha A
This document provides a book review of "Memories of a Soldier" by Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain. The reviewer makes the following key points:
1. While interesting as a personal narrative, the book lacks substance as a serious military work. It fails to cite important primary sources on events like the Kashmir war.
2. The book makes questionable claims that contradict established histories, such as Pakistani military leadership having no knowledge of plans to send tribal forces into Kashmir.
3. Insights on biased promotions under Ayub Khan and the 1965 war center around exaggerating the author's own role. The book omits meaningful discussion of the 1971 war.
4. In re
This document criticizes Western media and governments for hypocritically portraying Islamist extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda as the primary threats, while ignoring their own role in destabilizing the Middle East through misguided interventions. It argues that the US and UK have a long history of covertly supporting radical Islamist militants when it suits their geopolitical interests, such as against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, resulting in unforeseen blowback. Most terrorist attacks target Muslim countries and communities, while the actual threat posed to Western countries is statistically small.
29 Cavalry Tank Squadron Dislocates an irresolute Corps Commander later India...Agha A
29 Cavalry Tank Squadron Dislocates an irresolute Corps Commander later Indian Army Chief and the great battle is totally ignored by Pakistan Army official historian
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanAgha A
The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book. It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time: format, grammar, and design. Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. Specific instructions include checking headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, images, and grammar. The document also provides printing recommendations and contact information for the digital proofer.
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
1965 war -Staff College Quetta's Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
1965 war -Staff College Quettas Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24922.98244
Project: Military History
Agha H Amin
This document provides a review of the book "Descent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid. The reviewer notes that while Rashid's analysis is thought-provoking, the book contains numerous factual errors in dates, places, and events. It also shows bias against the Taliban and makes sweeping judgements without citations. However, Rashid's examination of Pakistan's role and the security issues it faces is penetrating. Overall, the reviewer finds the book a commercial work rather than idealistic reporting, but still a useful contribution for sparking more research.
This document provides a review of the book "Descent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid. The reviewer notes that while Rashid's analysis is thought-provoking, the book contains numerous factual errors in dates, events, and details. It also shows bias against the Taliban and makes sweeping judgements without fully exploring alternative perspectives. However, the reviewer believes the book can still inspire valuable discussion and research on its complex topics, despite some commercial motivations in its presentation.
German assessment of islam and nonsense theories of pan islamismAgha A
This document contains a long analysis critiquing overly simplistic views of pan-Islamism and arguing that history, ethnicity, and geopolitics are more complex realities that are often ignored. It discusses how certain historical Muslim figures are portrayed differently by different groups and eras. It also notes how religion alone has rarely been the sole basis for statehood, giving examples of how ethnicity and national interests often outweighed religious solidarity between states. The document advocates for a more nuanced understanding of history that considers these various factors rather than only focusing on abstract religious concepts.
Sikandar Ahmad was an exceptional and intellectually brilliant officer that the author met while serving in the military in Pakistan. Despite his talents, Sikandar often clashed with superiors due to their jealousy of his abilities and outspoken nature. The author credits Sikandar with polishing his knowledge of history and teaching him military law. Sikandar had a long career serving in different regiments but continued to face opposition from less capable officers. The author lost contact with Sikandar after 2000 when he had retired from the military.
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
Lieutenant Colonel Raja Sultan Mahmood was a brave Pakistani officer who went missing in December 1971 during the war between Pakistan and India in Bangladesh. He was originally commanding the 22nd Baloch Regiment but relinquished command due to a disagreement with his GOC. He was then assigned to command the 32nd Baloch Regiment. While leading the 32nd Baloch Regiment at night, his group ran into an Indian ambush. Lieutenant Colonel Raja Sultan Mahmood was martyred with many bullets in his chest, while the 32nd Baloch Regiment fled the battlefield, abandoning his body. The Indian forces buried him but his body was never recovered by Pakistan. He is remembered as a heroic officer by both Pakistani and Indian accounts of
Ambush survey afghanistan,british army and FM 31 21Agha A
1) The document discusses the background leading up to Britain's involvement in Afghanistan, known as the Fourth Afghan War. It notes that the US trained and funded Pakistani special forces (SSG) and intelligence (ISI) from 1955-1979, which later fought against Western forces.
2) General Musharraf deceived the US while preserving Pakistani Taliban assets and extracting $25 billion from the US as an "ally". Britain followed the US without a clear strategic aim, sending troops to Helmand in 2006 to "win hearts and minds" under the misleading politician Tony Blair.
3) British troops in Helmand were vulnerable targets divided into small groups, walking into a trap as their presence threatened Pakistan over Baluch
This document provides a book review of Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad's two volume history of the Baloch Regiment from 1820 to 1956. The reviewer, A.H. Amin, summarizes the contents and scope of the books. He acknowledges both the difficulty of writing such a comprehensive regimental history spanning 180 years as well as constraints imposed by official sponsorship. While praising many aspects of the work, Amin also points out several factual errors in the first volume that could have been avoided by consulting standard historical references.
PAKISTAN MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME 18 INSIDE WAZIRISTANAgha A
This document provides a book review of "Memories of a Soldier" by Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain. The reviewer makes the following key points:
1. While interesting as a personal narrative, the book lacks substance as a serious military work. It fails to cite important primary sources on events like the Kashmir war.
2. The book makes questionable claims that contradict established histories, such as Pakistani military leadership having no knowledge of plans to send tribal forces into Kashmir.
3. Insights on biased promotions under Ayub Khan and the 1965 war center around exaggerating the author's own role. The book omits meaningful discussion of the 1971 war.
4. In re
This document criticizes Western media and governments for hypocritically portraying Islamist extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda as the primary threats, while ignoring their own role in destabilizing the Middle East through misguided interventions. It argues that the US and UK have a long history of covertly supporting radical Islamist militants when it suits their geopolitical interests, such as against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, resulting in unforeseen blowback. Most terrorist attacks target Muslim countries and communities, while the actual threat posed to Western countries is statistically small.
29 Cavalry Tank Squadron Dislocates an irresolute Corps Commander later India...Agha A
29 Cavalry Tank Squadron Dislocates an irresolute Corps Commander later Indian Army Chief and the great battle is totally ignored by Pakistan Army official historian
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanAgha A
The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book. It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time: format, grammar, and design. Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. Specific instructions include checking headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, images, and grammar. The document also provides printing recommendations and contact information for the digital proofer.
Similar to amazon books intellectually dishonest and protecting STEVE COLLS MASSIVE INACCURACIES AND FALSE CLAIMS-A.pdf (20)
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
Major Agha H. Amin was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in 1983. He served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions over his military career. In his civilian career, he performed projects in infrastructure and transmission lines in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. He has authored over 120 books and journals on military topics. The document goes on to describe a battle of Pandu fought by the 4/10 Baluch battalion against India in the 1947-48 Kashmir war, and criticizes the omission of accurate accounts of the battle from official Pakistani military histories.
Battles of Najafgarh , Gangiri and Delhi RidgeAgha A
- The 6th Dragoon Guards regiment arrived in Bengal, India from England in November 1856 and was stationed in Meerut at the time of the 1857 rebellion.
- During the rebellion, the regiment saw action at Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, Delhi, and helped destroy a rebel battery at Eidgah with no reported casualties.
- It lost a few men at the battles of Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, and in minor actions in July 1857 but overall emerged from the rebellion relatively lightly compared to other British units.
- However, the limited historical sources available in Pakistan make it difficult for researchers there to find all details on the regiment's role and casualties during
The battalion was part of an infantry brigade deployed at Sulaimanke Headworks during the 1965 war with India. It saw little serious action as it primarily engaged Indian border police posts that were no match for regular Pakistani army battalions. The battalion suffered only 3 fatal casualties for the entire war, showing it faced little militarily credible opposition. While the battalion performed well, it must be remembered that it faced inferior Indian border police rather than other army units.
This document summarizes the performance of the 9 Punjab battalion during the 1965 war with India. The battalion was part of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army and was tasked with capturing the town of Chhamb. Despite having significant superiority in tanks and artillery, the 12th Division failed to cross the Tawi River on the first day. The 9th Punjab battalion suffered 15 killed and 31 wounded but managed to form a bridgehead across the Tawi. After the war, the battalion was praised for its performance and received several awards, though its strategic impact was limited due to the overall failure of Operation Grand Slam.
The battalion was deployed as a guard battalion but parts saw action in 1965 war including C Company commanded by Major Anis. C Company withdrew from its position exposing the rear of 16 Punjab to Indian attack, effectively sealing 16 Punjab's fate. C Company's withdrawal doomed 16 Punjab and was described as cowardly and the cause of 16 Punjab's debacle. While most of 8 Punjab saw no action, C Company under Major Anis performed poorly and was to blame for 16 Punjab's defeat.
1) The battalion was deployed as part of 11 Division along the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor according to maps.
2) The battalion faced a brigade-level attack from the Indian army using three infantry battalions and a tank squadron.
3) A captain from the Pakistani artillery played a crucial role by engaging the attacking forces with 60 medium shells, repulsing the Indian attack.
The battalion was deployed in September 1965 as part of Operation Grand Slam, relieving the 13th Punjab battalion near Dalpat-Chak Kirpal. According to Brigadier Rizvi, the battalion attacked towards Fatwal along with 13 Lancers, advancing up to 6 miles near Kasur and suffering 9 killed and 21 wounded. However, records list the battalion as losing either 9, 11, or 10 killed. The battalion had little impact as it joined the war late when the focus had shifted, and did not receive any awards despite actions in the Rann of Kutch prior to the war.
NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT IN 1857-59 BATTLESAgha A
This document provides biographical and career details of Major Agha.H.Amin, who was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983. It discusses his education, various military and civilian positions held over his career, publications authored, and contact information. The document also briefly describes a study aid about British infantry battalions that participated in the battles of 1857-59 in India, including their roles, operations, casualties, and contributions to the outcome of the war.
The 2nd Battalion of the Punjab Regiment fought in the 1965 war against India. While it received several gallantry awards, the document argues that its role was exaggerated and it did not actually face most of the major Indian attacks. Only one company saw direct fighting on the first day, and it dispersed against heavy odds. The battalion was deployed away from the main sites of battle and did not face significant enemy forces apart from this initial engagement. Its impact on the decisive Battle of Chawinda was marginal.
This document provides information about Major Agha.H.Amin, including his military and civilian career experiences. It notes that he was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983, attended Saint Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman Christian College Lahore, and served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions in the military. It also lists some of his civilian career projects and publications. The document provides his contact email addresses.
1ST BATTALION WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT IN 1857-59 BATTLES.pdfAgha A
- 1st Battalion HM 8th Foot was stationed in India when the 1857 rebellion broke out. It was involved in securing areas around Delhi.
- At the siege of Delhi in September 1857, it suffered 46 of its total 57 fatal casualties and played a marginal role in the assault.
- Overall it saw minor action in other battles, with limited casualties. The majority of its casualties occurred at the decisive battle of Delhi.
Northumberland Fusiliers in 1857-59 Battles.pdfAgha A
The 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers) was stationed in Mauritius when it was called to reinforce British forces in India during the 1857 uprising. The battalion arrived in Calcutta in July and August 1857. It participated in key battles including relieving Arrah where it suffered two casualties, the first relief of Lucknow where it suffered heavy losses and helped ensure the relief's success, the defense of the Lucknow garrison, and operations through 1858. The battalion performed outstandingly and suffered high casualties of 62 men, including five officers killed in action, primarily during the relief of Lucknow. Its role was pivotal in some of the major battles, but relatively minor in others
43 BALUCH IN 1971 AND INDIAN OFFICER WHO SAW THEMAgha A
1) The document analyzes the performance of the 43rd Baluch battalion in the 1971 war, which suffered heavy casualties after being poorly employed by incompetent commanders in the 88th Brigade.
2) When the 5th East Bengal battalion defected to the Indian side, the 43rd Baluch battalion was brought in to replace it, even though they were inexperienced and unprepared for the situation.
3) In an attack by Indian forces guided by defectors, the 43rd Baluch battalion suffered the highest fatalities of any battalion on the western front due to being put into a vulnerable position by the failed leadership of the 88th Brigade commander and 10th Division commander.
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
4th Punjab Infantry now 9 FF Pakistan Army and 42 Highlanders led the Final ...Agha A
The 4th Punjab Infantry battalion arrived in Calcutta in November 1857, meaning it missed the decisive battles of the war, including the siege of Delhi and the relief and evacuation of Lucknow. The battalion's participation in the battle of Cawnpore was minimal and it suffered no casualties. The battalion played a significant role in the final assault on Lucknow in March 1858, leading the assault on Martiniere with the 4th Punjab Infantry while the 42nd Highlanders and 90th Foot attacked frontally. The British enjoyed overwhelming artillery superiority, evidenced by the 42nd Highlanders suffering only 10 fatal casualties over 10 days of operations culminating in the final capture of Lucknow.
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
Predictably Improve Your B2B Tech Company's Performance by Leveraging DataKiwi Creative
Harness the power of AI-backed reports, benchmarking and data analysis to predict trends and detect anomalies in your marketing efforts.
Peter Caputa, CEO at Databox, reveals how you can discover the strategies and tools to increase your growth rate (and margins!).
From metrics to track to data habits to pick up, enhance your reporting for powerful insights to improve your B2B tech company's marketing.
- - -
This is the webinar recording from the June 2024 HubSpot User Group (HUG) for B2B Technology USA.
Watch the video recording at https://youtu.be/5vjwGfPN9lw
Sign up for future HUG events at https://events.hubspot.com/b2b-technology-usa/
4th Modern Marketing Reckoner by MMA Global India & Group M: 60+ experts on W...Social Samosa
The Modern Marketing Reckoner (MMR) is a comprehensive resource packed with POVs from 60+ industry leaders on how AI is transforming the 4 key pillars of marketing – product, place, price and promotions.
State of Artificial intelligence Report 2023kuntobimo2016
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a multidisciplinary field of science and engineering whose goal is to create intelligent machines.
We believe that AI will be a force multiplier on technological progress in our increasingly digital, data-driven world. This is because everything around us today, ranging from culture to consumer products, is a product of intelligence.
The State of AI Report is now in its sixth year. Consider this report as a compilation of the most interesting things we’ve seen with a goal of triggering an informed conversation about the state of AI and its implication for the future.
We consider the following key dimensions in our report:
Research: Technology breakthroughs and their capabilities.
Industry: Areas of commercial application for AI and its business impact.
Politics: Regulation of AI, its economic implications and the evolving geopolitics of AI.
Safety: Identifying and mitigating catastrophic risks that highly-capable future AI systems could pose to us.
Predictions: What we believe will happen in the next 12 months and a 2022 performance review to keep us honest.
The Building Blocks of QuestDB, a Time Series Databasejavier ramirez
Talk Delivered at Valencia Codes Meetup 2024-06.
Traditionally, databases have treated timestamps just as another data type. However, when performing real-time analytics, timestamps should be first class citizens and we need rich time semantics to get the most out of our data. We also need to deal with ever growing datasets while keeping performant, which is as fun as it sounds.
It is no wonder time-series databases are now more popular than ever before. Join me in this session to learn about the internal architecture and building blocks of QuestDB, an open source time-series database designed for speed. We will also review a history of some of the changes we have gone over the past two years to deal with late and unordered data, non-blocking writes, read-replicas, or faster batch ingestion.
Global Situational Awareness of A.I. and where its headedvikram sood
You can see the future first in San Francisco.
Over the past year, the talk of the town has shifted from $10 billion compute clusters to $100 billion clusters to trillion-dollar clusters. Every six months another zero is added to the boardroom plans. Behind the scenes, there’s a fierce scramble to secure every power contract still available for the rest of the decade, every voltage transformer that can possibly be procured. American big business is gearing up to pour trillions of dollars into a long-unseen mobilization of American industrial might. By the end of the decade, American electricity production will have grown tens of percent; from the shale fields of Pennsylvania to the solar farms of Nevada, hundreds of millions of GPUs will hum.
The AGI race has begun. We are building machines that can think and reason. By 2025/26, these machines will outpace college graduates. By the end of the decade, they will be smarter than you or I; we will have superintelligence, in the true sense of the word. Along the way, national security forces not seen in half a century will be un-leashed, and before long, The Project will be on. If we’re lucky, we’ll be in an all-out race with the CCP; if we’re unlucky, an all-out war.
Everyone is now talking about AI, but few have the faintest glimmer of what is about to hit them. Nvidia analysts still think 2024 might be close to the peak. Mainstream pundits are stuck on the wilful blindness of “it’s just predicting the next word”. They see only hype and business-as-usual; at most they entertain another internet-scale technological change.
Before long, the world will wake up. But right now, there are perhaps a few hundred people, most of them in San Francisco and the AI labs, that have situational awareness. Through whatever peculiar forces of fate, I have found myself amongst them. A few years ago, these people were derided as crazy—but they trusted the trendlines, which allowed them to correctly predict the AI advances of the past few years. Whether these people are also right about the next few years remains to be seen. But these are very smart people—the smartest people I have ever met—and they are the ones building this technology. Perhaps they will be an odd footnote in history, or perhaps they will go down in history like Szilard and Oppenheimer and Teller. If they are seeing the future even close to correctly, we are in for a wild ride.
Let me tell you what we see.
ViewShift: Hassle-free Dynamic Policy Enforcement for Every Data LakeWalaa Eldin Moustafa
Dynamic policy enforcement is becoming an increasingly important topic in today’s world where data privacy and compliance is a top priority for companies, individuals, and regulators alike. In these slides, we discuss how LinkedIn implements a powerful dynamic policy enforcement engine, called ViewShift, and integrates it within its data lake. We show the query engine architecture and how catalog implementations can automatically route table resolutions to compliance-enforcing SQL views. Such views have a set of very interesting properties: (1) They are auto-generated from declarative data annotations. (2) They respect user-level consent and preferences (3) They are context-aware, encoding a different set of transformations for different use cases (4) They are portable; while the SQL logic is only implemented in one SQL dialect, it is accessible in all engines.
#SQL #Views #Privacy #Compliance #DataLake
End-to-end pipeline agility - Berlin Buzzwords 2024Lars Albertsson
We describe how we achieve high change agility in data engineering by eliminating the fear of breaking downstream data pipelines through end-to-end pipeline testing, and by using schema metaprogramming to safely eliminate boilerplate involved in changes that affect whole pipelines.
A quick poll on agility in changing pipelines from end to end indicated a huge span in capabilities. For the question "How long time does it take for all downstream pipelines to be adapted to an upstream change," the median response was 6 months, but some respondents could do it in less than a day. When quantitative data engineering differences between the best and worst are measured, the span is often 100x-1000x, sometimes even more.
A long time ago, we suffered at Spotify from fear of changing pipelines due to not knowing what the impact might be downstream. We made plans for a technical solution to test pipelines end-to-end to mitigate that fear, but the effort failed for cultural reasons. We eventually solved this challenge, but in a different context. In this presentation we will describe how we test full pipelines effectively by manipulating workflow orchestration, which enables us to make changes in pipelines without fear of breaking downstream.
Making schema changes that affect many jobs also involves a lot of toil and boilerplate. Using schema-on-read mitigates some of it, but has drawbacks since it makes it more difficult to detect errors early. We will describe how we have rejected this tradeoff by applying schema metaprogramming, eliminating boilerplate but keeping the protection of static typing, thereby further improving agility to quickly modify data pipelines without fear.
A presentation that explain the Power BI Licensing
amazon books intellectually dishonest and protecting STEVE COLLS MASSIVE INACCURACIES AND FALSE CLAIMS-A.pdf
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from Agha H Amin on October 6, 2022
bought this book in kabul for 98 dollars
Ghost Wars- The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan,
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,
2001, written by Steve Coll, published in 2004 by Penguin
Press
Reviewed by Major Agha H Amin (retired)
I first saw...
2. amazon books
intellectually dishonest
and protecting STEVE
COLLS MASSIVE
INACCURACIES AND
FALSE CLAIMS
amazon books intellectually dishonest and protecting STEVE COLLS MASSIVE
INACCURACIES AND FALSE CLAIMS
• October 2022
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.12955.95523
• Project:
• INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY
• Agha H Amin
3. Ghost Wars- The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan,
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,
2001, written by Steve Coll, published in 2004 by Penguin
Press
Reviewed by Major Agha H Amin (retired)
I first saw Ghost Wars with my friend Professor Rasul Amin at his
Kabul office in Kolala Pushta in July 2004.
I read the book in 2004-2005 and made notes but was unable to
write a review for various reasons.
So this book review 1 years late but still relevant as Ghost Wars
is still relevant and will remain relevant for many years to come ,
or lets say many decades to come !
On page-6 Coll analyses that US had no Afghan policy beyond a
vague wish for peace and prosperity.
Colls narrative is a stark analysis of US CIAs failures as a credible
intelligence agency in ignoring Ahmad Shah Massoud in at least
the initial phase in Afghanistan in 1992-94.
Coll proceeds smoothly in his analysis but on page.60 makes two
4. major factual errors , which were unnecessary and avoidable !
This is just like Stephen Cohen thoughtlessly stating in his
famous book Pakistan Army that there were no All Muslim units in
British Indian Army , an absolute distortion of history !
So here on page.60 we find Steve Coll stating fallaciously “
Mohammad Zia ul Haq was a young captain in a Punjabi unit of
Britains Colonial Army when London’s exhausted government
finally quit India in 1947”.
Now why does Mr. Coll state such absolute nonsense , based on
no facts in an otherwise brilliant book ?
Because he has heard that Pakistan Army and British Indian Army
were Punjabi shows !
The harsh fact Mr Coll is that 13 Lancers in which Zia was
commissioned had only one third Punjabis ! Its class composition
when Zia joined in 1945 was a Pathan Squadron , a Muslim
Rajput Squadron , again non Punjabi and one Punjabi Sikh Squadron ?
So how does this make 13 Lancers a Punjabi unit ?
And why Steve Coll has to produce such non factual statements ?
Zia was sent on an adverse report in 1945-46 to Guides Cavalry
which at that time had Sikh , a Dogra and a Pathan Squadron .
These two facts are probably unknown to Coll ?
Coll states on page.60 that His father had been an Anglophilic
civil servant ? Zias father was a head clerk or something like that
and not a civil servant who in India and Pakistan are officers of
grade 17 and above.
On page.64 converts Akhtar Abdul Rehman into son of a Pathan
medical doctor from Peshawar , while Akhtar Abdul Rehmans
father was a Jullundhur Pathan from East Punjab.Pathan by race
but a Punjabi by language and upbringing ! Just as much as
Eisenhower may be a German !
Coll highights that Akhtar Abdul Rehman was a champion boxer
and wrestler but probably does not know that Abdul Rehman had
near zero war record !
ISI civilian Sohail Naqvi in an interview with me in 2000-2001
while I was editor Defence Journal and he was serving at SMS
recounted that Rahman was known to his neighbours in Pakistan
Military Academy in early 1960s as wife basher, whose neighbor
officers complained that they were disturbed from his frequent
wife bashing !
5. Incidentally Pakistani generals have a notorious wife bashing
tradition.Pakistani general K.M Sheikh serving as ambassador at
Tokyo broke his wife Shehla Legharis arm in early 1960s !
On page -65 Coll shifts ISI headquarters to Pindi from Islamabad
! It is an Americans privilege to do anything he feels like from
changing class composition of 13 Lancers or Guides, to location of
ISI headquarters.
On page.65 Coll fallaciously states that ISI was staffed down the
line by army officers and enlisted men.
In reality ISIs major cadre and its backbone are its civilian staff
who have no connection with the army at all.Armed forces
personnel join ISI on deputation periods of 2 to 5 years and
revert to their parent services.
On page-70 Coll quotes CIA station chief Hart making an
interesting remark about Soviets in Afghanistan attacking
Pakistan.Thus Coll quotes Hart as stating “ the fuckers haven’t
got the balls”.
Ironically the same was true for US forces in Afghanistan
in 2001 to 2014 .Proving to be the same fuckers as stated
by Hart in not having the balls to attack Pakistan despite
knowing that Pakistan was supporting Afghan insurgents.
History does repeat itself Mr Coll !
On page-73 Colls claim of Saudi Air Force providing air
cover to Karachi is also highly questionable ! In 1971
Indian air force was attacking Karachi at will, so where
was this air cover Mr Coll ? And the source Badeeb that
you quote from ORBIS appears to be a chronic liar !
Interestingly Indian Air Force managed to hit a civilian
house in Karachi belonging to Pakistans future army chief
Generals Begs brother, I think a colonel or major in the
army !
On page-103 Coll quotes Pakistans ISI chief General Akhtar as
stating his strategy as Kabul must burn !
Now this was one nonsense gimmickal phrase of Akhtar.
I asked my distant relative and close friend Colonel Salman who
was teacher of all who mattered in Afghan War from Massoud to
Haqqani , Hekmatyar down to Mullah Omar and OBL.
Salman known as Colonel Faizan in Afghanistan had the following
to state :---
6. Akhtar Abdul Rehman was not a particularly brilliant man
and had memorized some phrases like Kabul must burn .
He had limited operations to Kabul because he wanted
publicity. I was it as a narrow way of waging guerrilla war.
It may be noted that the pioneer of Afghan operations was
Brigadier Raza Ali a special forces officer with an
outstanding service profile.Akhtar Abdul Rehman
developed a personality clash with Brigadier Raza Ali and
sidelined him and placed him in logistics. Akhtar Abdul
Rehman preferred artillery officers who were narrow in
mindset and knew little about guerrilla warfare.
Akhtar Abdul Rehman inducted Brigadier Yusuf because he
was a non commando and was controllable.
Yusuf had no concept of guerrilla warfare but his induction
did not matter as the basic team of SSG commando officers
was intact and ran the real show.
According to Colonel Salman Akhtar Abdul Rahman bears a
great deal of blame for Afghanistans failure as he had
simply no North of Hindu Kush strategy !
All these failures escape the Solomons sagacity and wisdom of
Steve Coll !
On page 166 Coll performs an ingenious US change of race and
converts ISIs Colonel Imam who was a Punjabi from Chakwal into
a Pathan .
On page 253 Penguin Book editors fail in detecting spelling
mistake of word wrecked as wracked !
If we believe Colls statement that CIA was created to prevent
another Pearl Harbour then 9/11 was a grand intelligence failure
of CIA ! But Mr Coll no one was held accountable !
Steve Colls glorification of Coffer Black is questionable !
Coffer Black glorified in Steve Colls Ghost Wars also joined
Blackwater after his retirement.as Vice President
It is common knowledge that Coffer was the main reason for
USA ’s phenomenal intelligence failure against Al Qaeda.
Coffer’s ideas about intelligence revolved around abduction and
elimination ! Black’s limited mentality may be imagined from the
fact that he told Gary Schroen a seasoned CIA professional that
he wanted Usama Bin Laden’s severed head shipped to him in dry
ice.Schroen retorted that he could not find dry ice in Afghanistan
7. ! Schroen states that he was shocked to hear in his three decade
long career that an intelligence professional wanted a man dead
rather than captured alive.Black also told Gary to severe Laden’s
head with a machete !The CIA itself it may be noted later
dismissed Black for inefficiency !
The fact that Coffer Black was appointed as Coordinator for
counter terrorism with the rank of Ambassador at large in
October 2002 speaks volumes for the quality of US policy in the
so called war on terror.
On page 336 Coll again performs another masterly trick in change
of ethnicity when he converts Aimal Kansi’s ethnicity into Baluch
from Pashtun ! I don’t think that New York Times Book Reviews
noted this despite all claims of total wisdom !
On 349 Coll starts traffic at Salang Tunnel whereas as far as I
know Salang was closed and inaccessible to traffic in 1994-2001
and Shibar Pass was used.
On page 371 again Coll Turns Aimal Kansi into Baluch !
And once again on 373 ! My question is what made it so difficult
for Coll to find Kansi’s ethnicity ?
Colls information and assessment about Nawaz Sharifs firing
Pakistan Army Chief Karamat on page 437-38 is totally incorrect
and flawed.
Actual facts are as below :---
In September 1998 then Army chief General Karamat started
pressurizing the political leadership to include the army in the
political decision making .
Nawaz had done his homework well.With the ISI firmly under the
prime ministers command under Lieutenant General Ziauddin one
senior officer Zulfiqar presently chairman WAPDA had been sent
to Ukraine to find details of kick backs given to General Jahangir
Karamat in the Ukraianian tank deal with Pakistan.
Full evidence was prepared of Jahangirs complicity in taking kick
backs.Once Karamat asserted his political ambitions Nawaz
threatened him with prosecution for taking kick backs !
Thus Jahangir Karamat’s unceremonial exit from power ! USA’s
likely agent of change had been removed !
8. On page 438 Coll demonstrates his total lack of knowledge about
Corps of Engineers as an arm of service which never produced
army chiefs !
Does Mr Coll not know that US Armys most eminent leaders Lee ,
Meade and Mac Arthur were from Corps of Engineers !
On page 475 Mr Coll performs yet another magicians trick in
raising social status of Generals Musharrafs father from a cypher
clerk into an Imperial bureaucrat.
Musharrafs father was promoted to officer rank long after 1943 to
which Coll refers. And this happened in 1960s or so. There is thus
simply no question of Musharraf having been an officer in 1943.
Why cannot US authors stay out of making unnecessary stories
about events without serious hard work and efforts ?
Again on page 475 Coll is wrong in saying Pakistans leading
military academy , because Pakistan unlike USA had only one
officer candidate training school .
On page 486 Colls questionable claims about Angela Duile and
Marwans conversations are un supported with any references.
But Col can do it because he is an American prophet.
On page 504 Coll thrusts a battle honour on General Mahmud into
assigning him with the glory of being the frotline commander at
Kargil ! Whereas Mahmud hardly went within 100 km near the
fighting in Kargil and over saw the operation from safety of his
corps headquarters in Pindi , while Pakistani army men were
cowardly abandoned to be picked and buried by Indians as non
army Mujahids !
By and large Colls book is extremely interesting back ground
history , but limited analytical value and misses the larger parts
of the overall strategic picture about why Pakistan acted as it did
and why US policy about Afghanistan was so myopic.
Coll also misses the point that many offers were made by many
parties to the US for eliminating OBL but at heart the Americans
were just not interested in eliminating Bin Laden despite all token
claims that Colls sources in CIA made and were transmitted into