Brazilis New DirectionWendy HunterJournal of Democracy.docx

Brazilis New Direction
Wendy Hunter
Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 2, April 2003, pp.
151-162
(Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2003.0034
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BRAZIL’S NEW DIRECTION
Wendy Hunter
On 27 October 2002, the voters of Brazil chose Luiz Inácio Lula
da
Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) to be their next president,
giving him
a wide margin of victory with 61.3 percent in a two-candidate
runoff
against José Serra of the Social Democratic Party (PDSB). Does
the

election—on his fourth try—of this lathe operator turned trade
union
leader and the ascendance of his leftist party signal a historic
shift in
Brazilian politics? What are the implications of a Lula
presidency for
democracy in Brazil, and what is the larger situation of that
democracy
now?
Should 2002 be seen as marking a new era in Brazilian politics?
Is it
the start of a period in which a programmatic leftist party that
has cham-
pioned popular participation, accountability, and redistributive
change
supplants the political clientelism, social elitism, and
technocratic policy
making for which Brazil is known? Or is it wiser to focus on the
prag-
matic adjustments that the PT has made, the continuing sway of
conservative forces, and the multitude of constraints—political
and eco-
nomic, domestic and international—that will hem in efforts to
make
major changes?
On the one hand, the election of a candidate who is a true
outsider is
a dramatic break with the pattern of Brazilian politics since the
postauthoritarian period began in 1985. President José Sarney
(1985–
90), who inaugurated the civilian regime, had been a leading
member of
the official government party under the military regime that
ruled from

1964 to 1985. His successor, the disgraced Fernando Collor de
Mello
(1990–92), had similar political origins. After serving as an
opposition
Wendy Hunter is associate professor of government at the
University
of Texas–Austin. Her current research investigates the effects of
democratization, economic globalization, and international
diffusion
on decisions that affect social policy and human capital
formation in
Latin America.
Journal of Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003
Latin America’s Lost Illusions
Journal of Democracy152
Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) senator during the
military
period, Fernando Henrique Cardoso played a leading role in
brokering
Brazil’s transition to democracy, forging an array of
compromises with
outgoing actors and solidifying his establishment credentials,
albeit as
a moderate social democrat affiliated initially with the PMDB
and then
the PDSB.
Sarney, Collor, and Cardoso all came from elite backgrounds in
a

society where class origins still mean a great deal. While the
former
two hailed from oligarchic families in the Northeast, Cardoso
was the
son and grandson of army generals and was a distinguished
academic
who had spent part of his career teaching social sciences at
Stanford
and Cambridge universities. Lula is the son of hardscrabble
tenant farm-
ers from the poverty-stricken Northeast. With his election, the
exclusive
club of Brazilian presidents has broadened its membership.
The PT now holds 91 of the 513 Chamber of Deputies seats and
14
of the 81 Senate seats, making it the single largest party in
Congress. In
1986, it controlled 16 of 487 lower-house seats and had no
Senate seats.
The story behind the increase is one of steady growth in every
election,
not merely in the large industrial cities of the country but also
in less-
developed regions such as the Northeast, an oligarchic bastion.
Although
it is not without internal factions, the PT is the most
ideologically co-
herent and disciplined party in a field dotted with parties whose
politicians possess few principled commitments and have been
known
to switch allegiances in order to get ahead.
Leaving the Left Behind?
While rejecting the patronage-based politics and social elitism

asso-
ciated with the right, the PT has also tried to distance itself
from some
of the orthodoxies of the old left, including populism,
corporatist labor
ideology, and excessive centralization. The party’s hallmark is
its em-
brace of participation, accountability, and transparency, as
exemplified
in the participatory-budgeting programs for which PT-run
municipal
governments have become well known. Core PT supporters
include
members of the largest labor confederation, the Central Unica
dos
Trabalhadores; middle-class intellectuals; elements of the
Catholic
Church; and new social movements such as the one that defends
the
cause of Brazil’s landless agricultural workers.
The relative tranquility of the 2002 campaign is noteworthy as
well.
In 1989, when the PT ran a strong race (it nearly beat Collor),
there was
severe left-right polarization and a spate of antidemocratic
machina-
tions as traditional contenders—the military, big business, and
large
landowners—warned that chaos would follow a PT victory.
While the
most recent election stimulated financial circles to express
concern about
the economic impact of a Lula presidency, the public conduct of
other

Wendy Hunter 153
elites suggested a basic acceptance of the outcome that
eventually tran-
spired. That their respect for the electoral process was strong
enough to
override their (presumed) substantive preferences suggests a
significant
maturing of Brazilian democracy.
All this notwithstanding, other signs suggest that the 2002
election
results should be interpreted neither as a massive rejection of
the
Cardoso administration’s market-oriented approach to
development
nor as a resounding endorsement of the PT’s program, an
impression
made all the stronger when one considers that all the other PT
candi-
dates combined drew barely half the number of votes that Lula
himself
received.1
The PT’s dominant faction, known as the Articulaç~ao, has
turned
ever more pragmatic. While party moderates began to distance
them-
selves from socialist rhetoric and symbolism even before Lula’s
third
bid for the presidency in 1998, further edging away from
radicalism
took place as the 2002 race loomed. Throughout the campaign,
beyond

making superficial changes toward a “lighter” image, Lula
strove to
project moderation. He pledged to work within the political
principles
enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, and to be mindful of the
needs of
markets both at home and abroad. He expressed his commitment
to
fiscal responsibility, debt repayment, low inflation, and most
notably
the International Monetary Fund. He also promised to pursue
new poli-
cies to boost employment, wages, and exports while fighting
poverty
and inequality. He condemned the violent tactics of the
Movement of
Landless Rural Laborers (MST) while acknowledging that the
prob-
lem of landlessness desperately needed to be addressed. He
broke with
the party’s previously restrictive coalition policy and forged a
crucial
link to the rightist Liberal Party (PL), whose leader is a
business entrepre-
neur and whose ranks include voters from Brazil’s conservative-
leaning
evangelical Christian churches. The words “socialist” and
“socialism”
were absent from the PT’s official 2002 platform. In short, the
Lula
who ran in 2002 was not the Lula who had run in 1989, 1994, or
1998.
It was this moderation—combined with an electorate
exasperated by
the lost promise of Cardoso’s economic policies—that enabled
Lula to

shatter his customary 30 percent ceiling and take 46.4 percent in
the
first round, thereby setting up his landslide victory over Serra
in the
runoff.
The exigencies of electoral politics and economic globalization,
coupled with the self-examination that PT leaders undertook
after los-
ing the 1998 presidential election, induced a move to the
middle. At the
time of this writing in late February 2003, the new government
seems to
be holding its course. The appointment of an economic team
headed by
figures such as Finance Minister Antônio Palocci and Central
Bank presi-
dent Henrique Meirelles, is perhaps the clearest evidence of
this. Both
intend to guarantee fiscal and monetary stability. Meirelles is a
former
director of the Bank of Boston and ex-federal deputy elected on
the
center-left PSDB ticket.
Anatomy of a Victory
A key point in Lula’s favor and a big problem for Serra was
simply
that the latter—a man with more administrative experience and
argu-

ably more technical competence than Lula—was Cardoso’s
handpicked
successor. The outgoing president had become widely popular
after tam-
ing inflation with the 1994 Real Plan, but fell from grace in the
wake of
the 1999 currency devaluation and a recession that hurt real
wages as
well as employment. The public perception was that Cardoso
preferred
price stability and the approval of foreign lenders to growth and
jobs
for Brazilians. By 2002, sizeable shares of people polled before
the runoff
said that they were planning to vote for Lula as a protest against
Cardoso.2
Besides losing the presidency, the PSDB and its allies had to
endure
substantial losses in both houses of Congress as well.3 Voters
did not
want to risk the economic stability that Cardoso’s policies had
achieved,
nor did they want to reject the market model altogether, yet they
did
want change.
A splintering of the political center and right contributed
crucially to
the PT’s success as well. In 1989, centrist and right-leaning
forces had
managed to close ranks before facing Lula in a runoff, but they
could
not repeat the feat in 2002. Moreover, no single candidate had
suffi-
cient personal appeal to prevail among the voters of the newly

fragmented coalition.
Recognition of the continuing strength of conservative forces in
the
political system provides further perspective on the PT’s recent
advances.
The Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the Party of the Brazilian
Demo-
cratic Movement (PMDB) continue to have substantial weight in
the
Chamber of Deputies and Senate.4 Among their ranks
(especially in the
PFL) are scores of politicians known for their strongly
conservative
views and their control over patronage networks. For the most
part, the
political elite remains narrow in social terms as well.
Embodying this
image is former Brazilian president José Sarney (PMDB), the
new presi-
dent of the Senate. Cardoso resorted to using state resources to
“buy”
the legislative support of the political class on a number of key
occa-
sions. It is less certain that Lula will rely on such a strategy to
get things
done. As of this writing, he can count on 250 votes in the
Chamber and
30 in the Senate, too little to guarantee the passage of ordinary
legisla-
tion, much less constitutional amendments, which require 257
and 308
votes, respectively.5 Further weakening the PT’s grip on the
political
system is its thin representation among Brazil’s influential
governors:

Only 3 states out of 27 have PT chief executives, while the
opposition
PSDB and PMDB have a total of 12 governorships. The
opposition par-
Wendy Hunter 155
ties’ control over state governments will give these parties
significant
leverage when it comes to various federal reform efforts and
policies.
Ironically, the party that in many ways would seem most
ideologically
open to Lula’s platform, Cardoso and Serra’s PSDB, is in the
opposi-
tion. While PSDB politicians claim they will not be as
obstructionist as
the PT was when it was in opposition, it is too early to tell
whether they
mean those words. Legislators from the PMDB could play a
significant
swing role as well. Lula will need to cultivate ideologically
sympathetic
members of the PSDB and PMDB in order both to broaden his
coalition
and to provide a counterweight to the most conservative
elements within
his own camp. For now it appears certain that Lula will have to
work
with narrower congressional support than Cardoso enjoyed
throughout
most of his term, with all that this implies regarding the
maneuvering
room available to the new president.

The Question of Political Stability
Could a PT-led government—especially if the economy
deteriorates
or the polity becomes polarized—present a threat to the stability
of de-
mocracy? Brazilian democracy has survived a number of serious
crises
since the 1985 return to civilian rule. These include President
Collor’s
1992 impeachment on corruption charges and subsequent
resignation;
the failure of no fewer than seven economic-reform packages
between
1985 and 1993; political turmoil during the interim presidency
of Itamar
Franco (1993–94) that threatened to result in a Fujimori-style
self-coup;
and the 1999 currency devaluation, which threatened the
country’s hard-
won economic stability and undermined the broad support that
Cardoso
had previously enjoyed. Over the same period, political changes
occurred
that might have presaged unrest. Civilians eventually
challenged the
armed forces over numerous political prerogatives that senior
military
officers had inherited from the authoritarian period and had
used to exer-
cise tutelage over the new democracy in its initial years.6 The
Collor
government reduced the military’s once-dominant presence in
the intel-
ligence and national-security agencies. President Cardoso

abolished
separate ministries for the army, navy, and air force and
transferred many
of their functions to a civilian-run defense ministry. Taken
together, the
presidents since 1985 represent a movement from right to left
across the
ideological spectrum. Whereas Sarney and Collor had been
loyalists un-
der the military regime, Cardoso came home from exile to
spearhead the
institutionalized opposition as Senate leader of the MDB. As
president,
he moved to the center but retained some social democratic
inclinations.
Lula, an “authentic” member of the working class and former
leader of
the “new unionism,” is identified with a party of a far more
radical tradi-
tion and vision than Cardoso’s MDB or more recent PSDB.
In the midst of these and related developments, Brazilian
democracy
has proven remarkably resilient and sustainable. Even in the
worst of
times, capitalists have continued to invest in the Brazilian
economy,
social tensions have rarely resulted in debilitating mass
protests, and
the military has kept its saber-rattling within limits. Relative to
the pre-

vious democratic era, elite groups have been quiescent, never
threatening
to topple governments, much less the democratic regime itself.
Brazil’s
third-wave democracy is more stable than its second-wave
democracy
(1945–64), and has shown surprising increases in adaptability
since its
inception in 1985.7
At first glance, this resiliency is surprising. Brazil is well
known for
social conditions—deep poverty, sharp inequalities, teeming
urban
slums, and weak social safety nets—that are not usually
associated with
democratic durability. The polity, moreover, features both
strong
presidentialism and a highly fragmented party system—a one-
two punch
that should, in theory, undermine coherent policy making and
render
conflicts tougher to solve.8 Moreover, opinion polls suggest
that citi-
zens feel a less than wholehearted commitment to democracy. In
the
2002 Latinobarómetro survey, only 37 percent of Brazilian
respondents
agreed with the statement, “Democracy is preferable to any
other kind
of government.” This is 20 percentage points below the average
for Latin
America—a region with a tenuous relationship to democratic
govern-
ment.9 Moreover, it represents a steep decline from the 50
percent who

expressed support for democracy in 1996 and 1997, and stands
as one
of the sharpest drops on this measure in Latin America.10
What then accounts for Brazil’s impressive democratic stability
since
1985? To begin with, the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of
Brazil-
ian society make it hard to organize for any massive change.
Stark
barriers divide the urban and rural poor, formal and informal
workers.
The growth of different branches of industry and of the service
sector
has created further divisions, preventing even organized
workers from
advancing their demands in a united fashion. Ideological
fragmentation
and varying degrees of militancy further limit the labor
movement’s
potential to challenge and transform the status quo. Instead, as
in the
corporatist system that President Getúlio Vargas established in
the 1930s
(albeit to a lesser degree), workers advance their narrow
interests, often
to the detriment of the working class more collectively.
The persistence of conservative forces and the ongoing reliance
on
patronage networks, especially in poor rural and urban areas,
act like an
anchor, steadying democracy but also limiting it. Powerful
elites in-
cluding landowners, business interests, and politicians of the
right

continue to have substantial representation in Congress.11 One
estimate
holds that landed elites controlled about 30 percent of the seats
in the
Chamber of Deputies during the Cardoso administration.12
Family-based
oligarchies persist in states such as Maranh~ao, Rio Grande do
Norte,
and Santa Catarina. Central to the national-level influence of
these oli-
Wendy Hunter 157
garchies and other conservative forces is the overrepresentation
of rural
areas in the heavily malapportioned Chamber of Deputies. The
politics
of clientelism—sometimes with a modern twist—is still alive
and well
in some parts of Brazil.
While Brazil’s political system safeguards elite interests, it also
of-
fers channels of influence to new forces that might otherwise
take an
“antisystem” stand. An electoral system based on open-list
proportional
representation with a relatively large number of members
elected, on
average, from each district keeps entry barriers low and gives
space to
new outside forces such as parties advocating popular interests
and
inclusionary practices. That a party like the PT was able to

integrate
activists and make steady electoral headway throughout the
1980s and
1990s no doubt helped to legitimate democracy in the eyes of
core PT
members. Innovation and success in government—most notably
at the
municipal level—helped the PT to widen its coalition, which in
turn
gave the moderate leadership within the party a boost and eased
fears
about the PT’s advance.
The marked prodemocratic shift in post–Cold War international
norms
has also shielded Brazilian democracy. The country’s
commitment to a
market-oriented transnational economic order raises the costs of
a break-
down in democratic rules and procedures. Should domestic
factors be
insufficient to secure democratic stability, external forces such
as pres-
sure from other democracies could serve as final safeguards.
Indeed,
they may already have done so: In late 1993, when democracy’s
pros-
pects were arguably at their lowest ebb of the entire post-1985
period,
persons close to President Itamar Franco began sounding out
elite sup-
port for a Fujimori-style executive coup. They got few takers, in
part
perhaps because there were fresh memories of how U.S.
condemnation
had helped to scotch an attempted presidential putsch in

Guatemala ear-
lier that same year.
Malign Rules and Practices
While Brazil’s “third wave” democracy has proven remarkably
adap-
tive and stable, it has been less impressive in other ways,
bearing out
the observation that democratization is a complex process in
which
change unfolds unevenly.13 Informal practices and patterns as
well as
formal rules diminish the quality of Brazilian democracy.
The persistence of extreme poverty bars legions of Brazil’s
citizens
from meaningful participation in the democratic system.
Absolute lev-
els of deprivation are stark, with about 50 out of 175 million
deemed
poor, an incidence that is above average for a middle-income
country
(estimated per-capita GDP in 2000 was US$7,400 in
purchasing-power–
parity terms). The population as a whole is poorly educated,
especially
in relation to Brazil’s overall level of development. In cities
and the
countryside alike, poverty renders voters vulnerable to the
machina-

tions of patronage-wielding politicians who buy votes with
handouts.
This perverts the participatory ideal of democracy. It also
diminishes
the potential for formal democratic par-
ticipation to generate policies meant to
advance human welfare in more system-
atic ways.14 While electoral rights were
broadened in 1985 to include illiterates,
this segment of the population (estimated
at 15 percent by the World Bank) is
among the most likely to be manipulated
by politicians who rely on patronage net-
works and are indifferent or even opposed to institutionalized
policies
aimed at poverty reduction.
Pronounced social inequality poses its own challenges to
democratic
ideals. Levels of income inequality in Brazil are among the
highest in
the world. Roughly 63 percent of total income goes to the
wealthiest 20
percent of the population, while the poorest 20 percent gets a
mere 2.5
percent.15 Government policy on taxes and public benefits
favors the
most affluent as well. As a case in point, the World Bank
estimates that
“less than one percent of social security spending reaches the
poorest
ten percent of Brazilians, while about fifty percent is cornered
by the
wealthiest ten percent.”16 This reflects a pension system that

evolved by
incorporating privileged categories of public servants and
private-sec-
tor employees over time, leaving most of those in the informal
sector to
fend for themselves. The most outrageous example of
corporatist privi-
lege is the system of lifetime pensions paid to unmarried adult
daughters
of deceased military officers, numbering presently some 58,000
women,
many of whom have been all but legally married for decades.
The
Cardoso government gave new attention and resources to the
social area,
but did little to narrow stark differences in people’s civil status
and
public entitlements. Inequality on this scale effectively means
that Bra-
zilians enjoy widely varied rights as citizens.
Unequal treatment is sharply manifest in the legal sphere as
well.
Poor people are frequent targets of arbitrary police violence and
have
little recourse when they are victimized. The law often goes
unenforced
against private thugs or paramilitaries when they assault rural
unionists
and their followers. Corruption is widespread among politicians
and
public officials. In a recent 91-country ranking of corruption
(from best
to worst), Transparency International placed Brazil 46th, far
below Chile,
Costa Rica, and members of the OECD.17 While public

authorities launch
many more investigations than they did before 1985, and guilty
offi-
cials sometimes lose their posts, the prospect of convicted
offenders
going to jail is almost nil. While the double standards of the
legal sys-
tem are not necessarily codified, a uniform system of rights and
Pronounced social
inequality poses its
own challenges to
democratic ideals.
Wendy Hunter 159
obligations among Brazilians does not exist in practice. As a
conse-
quence, the institutions of law and justice lack legitimacy and
the
realization of democratic citizenship remains limited.18
Of the formal rules that dilute the quality of democracy, the
most sa-
lient concern the electoral system. As noted above,
representation in the
Chamber of Deputies is lopsidedly rural due to longstanding
malapportionment. There is a huge gap between the share of
legislative
seats allocated to urban electoral districts and the share of the
population
that actually lives in them. It is generally accepted that in
federal systems
the upper house of the national legislature will represent

geographic units
of varying population more or less equally. Yet Brazil has
lower-house
malapportionment that exceeds the Latin American average and
greatly
exacerbates the skewing effects that already stem from the way
the Sen-
ate is apportioned.19 The city of S~ao Paulo alone, for instance,
is more
than 50 seats short of its proportional share in the Chamber of
Deputies.
Even those not committed to the one person, one vote ethic
should
recognize on practical grounds that such a situation can hamper
governability. By creating a rural bias, malapportionment
generally
strengthens the patronage-wielders and weakens more
progressive
forces.20 It invites chronic conflict between a conservative-
leaning,
malapportioned legislature and a president chosen by something
that
closely resembles a national plebiscite. Relatedly, as Richard
Snyder
and David Samuels point out, malapportionment can contribute
to the
“proliferation of subnational authoritarian enclaves.”21 That
Brazil’s
Congress acts as a megaphone amplifying the voices of
conservatives
almost certainly contributes to stability, but it is just as clear
that this
exacts a price in terms of coherent governance.
Brazil’s unique system of open-list proportional representation

and
districts of high average magnitude is similarly double-edged.
While
the openness and flexibility of this electoral system facilitate
the entry
of small parties, thus giving voters more options and bolstering
stabil-
ity, weighing against these advantages is the negative effect on
governability. Volumes have been dedicated to analyzing and
dilating
upon these consequences.22 Suffice it to say here that current
electoral
arrangements have encouraged the proliferation of weak and
undisci-
plined patronage-oriented parties, reinforced personalistic
leadership,
and obstructed the legislative process. Brazil’s electoral rules
also di-
m i n i s h a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , r a i s i n g t h e c h a n c
e s o f p o o r l e g i s l a t i v e
performance and even corruption and other forms of
malfeasance. Since
one top vote-getter can lay claim to additional legislative seats
for his
or her party, even politicians who as individuals lack the
confidence of
voters may end up holding office.
The deepening of democracy in Brazil therefore demands
reforms in
various spheres. If the poor are to become full citizens and not
merely
the objects of demagogues and patronage handouts, the country
will

have to find ways of raising levels of education and material
wealth.
Socioeconomic inequality and distinctions in social privileges
must
narrow until there is a modicum of common ground among
citizens.
The civil component of citizenship must also be extended.
Brazilians
need to be able to count on state institutions to secure their civil
rights,
either as protections or immunities. All individuals—regardless
of so-
cial status—must be equally subject to the rule of law. Finally,
toward
the greater goal of enhancing governability, political reforms
must be
undertaken to strengthen parties, enhance accountability, and
correct
for distortions in representation.
Addressing these and related issues will pose a series of
formidable
challenges for the new government. In light of the political
system’s
capacity to absorb change, there is little doubt that it would take
a crisis
of unprecedented proportions to derail Brazilian democracy
altogether.
The big question is whether the multiple constraints at hand and
Lula’s
commitment to pursuing a pragmatic political course will
ultimately
allow his government to carry out even the most basic of

reforms in
these areas.
Can Lula Come Through?
What prospects exist for a PT-led government to deepen
democracy
along these lines? Alleviating extreme poverty and enhancing
social
equity are top priorities. The government sent a strong public
message
to this effect in showcasing its Zero Hunger program, a PT-
designed
policy innovation aimed at eradicating malnutrition among 23
million
Brazilians. It has also pledged to reform social security in
equity- and
efficiency-enhancing ways—a goal that eluded even the
politically skill-
ful Cardoso—although doing so risks alienating core PT
supporters who
benefit from the current system, especially unionized public-
sector
workers, schoolteachers, and university professors. As has
happened
time and time again, however, measures to strengthen the rule
of law
and reform political institutions will likely be postponed for the
sake of
attending to urgent economic and social demands. The political
capital
it would require to take on these formidable problem areas,
coupled
with the lack of immediately obvious benefits to voters from
even suc-
cessful reform efforts, render them low priorities.

At center stage are the economy and the social sphere. Lula has
prom-
ised a new economic model that will raise exports, employment,
wages,
and government expenditures to alleviate poverty, improve
social ser-
vices, and enhance public security. He will need to walk a
tightrope
between making good on social commitments and respecting
Brazil’s
very tight economic constraints, which include debt repayment
and bud-
getary austerity. In advancing his progressive social agenda he
will have
to keep conservative antagonists at bay. In addressing the
country’s se-
Wendy Hunter 161
vere economic problems, he will need to keep critics on the left
in check,
including trade unions, the landless movement, and perhaps
most of all,
the radical elements within his own party, who have already
begun to
demand greater decision-making influence over the government.
Expectations run high—especially in relation to employment,
wages,
and poverty alleviation—and failure to fulfill core promises
could re-
sult in bitter disappointment. Approximately 70 percent of
respondents

in one recent poll expressed confidence that the government
would re-
duce poverty and unemployment. Nearly three-quarters said that
they
thought Lula would make a good-to-excellent president. This
compares
with 66 percent for Cardoso at a similar point in his
administration.23
Such high hopes mean that Lula will have to produce results
quickly
in order to govern effectively. Present circumstances test Lula’s
leader-
ship talents like never before. So far, he has shown imagination
and
creativity in this regard. The flagship Zero Hunger program, for
instance,
is politically unassailable since it speaks to such a basic need
and can
be accomplished within reasonable financial limits. It has
quickly be-
come the darling of major institutions such as the World Bank
and the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization. It aims to generate the
kind of
immediate concrete results that will be crucial to sustaining the
popu-
larity required to implement much-needed structural reforms in
the
economy. Will the extraordinary talent and fortitude that it took
for Lula
to rise from poverty to the presidency of a major country like
Brazil
help him defy the odds at a broader national level? Only time
will tell,
and yet one thing is already clear: The very fact that he is

president
speaks volumes about how far Brazilian democracy has come.
NOTES
I would like to thank Kurt Weyland, Timothy Power, and
Natasha Borges Sugiyama for
their help with this article.
1. Reported in Anthony W. Pereira and Timothy J. Power, “Lula
Lá: Implications of
the 2002 Elections in Brazil,” Latin American Studies
Association Forum 33 (Winter
2003): 8–10.
2. Reported in “Latin America Opinion Alert,” Office of
Research, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002.
3. The PSDB suffered a net loss of 23 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies and 3 seats
in the Senate.
4. The PMDB holds 19 seats in the Senate and 74 in the
Chamber of Deputies. The
PFL has 19 seats in the Senate and 84 in the Chamber.
5. As of this writing in late February 2003, there appears to be a
chance that the
PMDB might join the government. This would bring the
coalition’s numbers to 319 in
the Chamber and 49 in the Senate.
6. See Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil:
Politicians against Sol-
diers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

7. For a lengthy substantiation of these claims, see Kurt
Weyland, “The Growing
Sustainability of Brazil’s Low-Quality Democracy,” in Frances
Hagopian and Scott
Mainwaring, eds., Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of
Democratization in Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming).
8. These features are emphasized in the chapter on Brazil in
Juan J. Linz and Alfred
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press,
1996).
9. See the article by Marta Lagos on pp. 163–73 in this issue.
10. Marta Lagos, “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin
America,” Journal of De-
mocracy 12 (January 2001): 138.
11. See Timothy J. Power, The Political Right in
Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites,
Institutions, and Democratization (University Park, Pa.:
Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2000).
12. Kurt Weyland, “The Growing Sustainability of Brazil’s
Low-Quality Democ-

racy.”
13. Philippe Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Democracy and
the Representation of
Social Groups,” American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March–June
1992): 422–49. See also
Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power, “Still Standing or
Standing Still: The Brazil-
ian Democratic Regime Since 1985,” in Kingstone and Power,
eds., Democratic Brazil:
Actors, Institutions, and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
14. Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: Failures of
Reform in Brazil (Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).
15. The GINI coefficient hovered between .605 and .572 under
Cardoso, with slight
improvement over time. These numbers mean that Brazil has
one of the most severely
unequal patterns of income distribution on the planet.
16. World Bank, Brazil: Critical Issues in Social Security
(Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 2001), 3.
17. See www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html.
18. See James Holston and Teresa P.R. Caldeira, “Democracy,
Law, and Violence:
Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship,” in Felipe Agüero and
Jeffrey Stark, eds., Fault
Lines of Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Latin America
(Miami: North-South Center
Press, 1998).

19. See the table on malapportionment in Latin America,
Richard Snyder and David
Samuels, “Devaluing the Vote in Latin America,” Journal of
Democracy 12 (January
2001): 148.
20. Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third
Wave of Democratiza-
tion: The Case of Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999).
21. Richard Snyder and David Samuels, “Devaluing the Vote in
Latin America,”
147.
22. See in particular Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy
in Brazil and Scott
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of
Democratization.
23. Reported in “Latin America Opinion Alert,” Office of
Research, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002.
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Lecio Morais and Alfredo Saad-Filho
Brazil beyond Lula: Forging Ahead or Pausing for Breath?
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31
Lecio Morais is an economics adviser to the Brazilian Chamber
of Deputies. Alfredo Saad-Filho
teaches in the Department of Development Studies of the
University of London’s School of
Oriental and African Studies.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 177, Vol. 38 No. 2,
March 2011 31-44
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X10395890
© 2011 Latin American Perspectives
Brazil beyond Lula
Forging Ahead or Pausing for Breath?
by
Lecio Morais and Alfredo Saad-Filho
A review of the achievements of the Lula administration and an
examination of the
contrasting political and social programs that disputed the
Brazilian presidential elec-
tions in October 2010 reveal that there has been significant
progress toward the consoli-
dation of a social democratic welfare state in Brazil and that
further progress is possible

but far from guaranteed under the new administration.
Keywords: Brazil, Elections, Lula, Dilma Rousseff,
Neoliberalism
The Brazilian presidential elections in October 2010 ostensibly
posited a
choice between the independent diplomacy and the moderately
redistributive
policies implemented in Lula’s second administration (2007–
2010) and a return
to the rigidly neoliberal policies imposed by his predecessor,
Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). This contrast is not strictly
accurate, because
Lula’s first administration (2003–2006) maintained the
macroeconomic policy
framework inherited from its predecessor. Although there was
an important
policy shift in Lula’s second administration, continuities
remained, especially
around the inflation-targeting framework managed by the
country’s Central
Bank. More significant, the elections counterposed two
incompatible political
alliances representing opposing views of citizenship and sharply
distinct devel-
opment projects.
This article reviews Lula’s administration, highlighting the
significance of
its achievements from the point of view of the left (on his
election and first
administration, see Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006; Morais and
Saad-Filho, 2003;
2005; and Saad-Filho, 2003; 2007). It focuses on this

administration’s imple-
mentation of “neo-developmentalist” policies and the gradual
(re-)emergence
of elements of a welfare state in Brazil—the articulation of a
“national” capi-
talism driven by an alliance between the “national”
bourgeoisie,1 the popular
organizations, the informal and rural sector workers, and the
state. The
authors argue that the left should promote the extension and
radicalization of this
project. This position is elaborated in six sections. This
introduction is the first.
The second and third survey Lula’s two administrations,
highlighting the
implications of the economic policy shift that took place in
2007. The fourth
examines the social and political changes in the Brazilian state
and the incre-
mental democratization of a deeply elitist society. The fifth
reviews the 2010
32 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
elections. The conclusion summarizes the argument and outlines
some of the
key challenges facing the new administration.
THE FIRST LULA ADMINISTRATION

In earlier publications, we have argued that Lula was elected by
a losers’ alli-
ance, a coalition of social groups that had been penalized by
Cardoso’s project
of subordinated internationalization and financialization of the
economy. This
alliance included, first, the unionized urban and rural working
class, especially
the skilled and semiskilled manual and office workers, the
middle and lower
ranks of the civil service, sections of the professional middle
class, and many
informal but relatively secure workers. They had been the main
sources of sup-
port for the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT)
and historically
defended a nationalist, redistributive, and expansionary
economic strategy.
Second, it included large segments of the unorganized and
unskilled working
class, among them many informal and unemployed workers of
the metropoli-
tan peripheries. They supported Lula in 2002 because of his
perceived commit-
ment to redistribution through welfare provision and,
conjuncturally, because
of the PT’s alliance with part of the Catholic hierarchy and
several evangelical
churches, which are influential among this segment of the
working class (see
Singer, 2009). Third, most national capitalists had been
disappointed by
the failure of Cardoso’s neoliberal growth strategy and were
exhausted by the
prolonged stagnation of the Brazilian economy, the onslaught of

transnational
capital, and the pressure of cheap imports after the
liberalization of trade and
finance in the early 1990s. This group demanded state support
to improve its
competitive position.2 Fourth, several right-wing oligarchs and
local politicians
supported Lula because they expected the PT to be sensitive to
the plight of
Brazil’s poorer regions and therefore to transfer more resources
to them.
Lula’s commitment to “change with stability” became critically
important
in the run-up to the elections, when the country was battered by
severe finan-
cial and balance-of-payments turbulence, reinforcing the
perception that his
administration was vulnerable and that it was imperative to
stick to economic
orthodoxy. In addition to this, the fragmentation of the
Brazilian political sys-
tem requires the construction of complex alliances in order to
pass legislation.
Since the “core” left-wing parties in Lula’s coalition controlled
less than one-
third of Congress, a legislative majority required the search for
an “outer circle”
of (unreliable) allies.3 Finally, the executive could never rely
on the judicial
system, which is often as conservative as it is corrupt.
At the start of his administration, Lula tightened up the “core”
macro-
economic policies introduced by the previous administration,
including infla-

tion targeting, Central Bank independence, large fiscal
surpluses, free capital
mobility, and flexible exchange rates. The government
maintained the exist-
ing support for export-oriented agribusinesses, although
subsidies were also
made available to family agriculture and welfare programs were
expanded.
No privatizations were reversed, and progress on land reform
was extremely
slow.4 In pursuit of the Holy Grail of Brazilian diplomacy,
permanent mem-
bership in the UN Security Council, Brazil agreed to a U.S.
request to lead the
UN stabilization mission in Haiti.
Morais and Saad-Filho / BRAZIL BEYOND LULA 33
Lula’s government disarticulated the Brazilian left in two ways.
First, since
the foundation of the PT in the early 1980s, no political party
has been able to
prosper to the left of it; the PT brought together hundreds of
thousands of mili-
tants and the leadership of the most militant social
organizations (see Branford
and Kucinski, 1995; 2003). Thus, the government never had to
confront a sig-
nificant left opposition except within the PT, and these

dissidents were dealt
with administratively. Most abandoned the party in the wake of
the 2005 polit-
ical crisis (see below), migrating to the new Partido do
Socialismo e Liberdade
(Party of Socialism and Freedom—PSOL) or joining other small
radical organi-
zations, and many abandoned politics altogether. In this sense,
Lula’s election
marked the end of an era for the Brazilian left and the failure of
the world’s first
post–social-democratic and post-Leninist mass party (see Saad-
Filho, 2007).
Second, the Brazilian president can influence the appointment
of thousands
of civil servants at all levels of the administration. Lula’s
appointments brought
into the state hundreds of progressive political, trade union, and
nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) cadres, creating what was described
as the “capture”
or the “nationalization” of the social movements (with the
significant excep-
tion of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra [Landless
Peasants’
Movement—MST]) (see Oliveira, 2006). For this reason, too,
the organized left
was unable to pressure the government to break with
neoliberalism.
Within two years the administration found itself in a political
cul-de-sac.
The disarticulation of the left and Lula’s isolation from his
traditional support-
ers forced the government to rely upon the unorganized

workers, the national
capitalists, and the regional oligarchy, but their support was
always condi-
tional upon the performance of the economy (to satisfy their
self-interested
demands for markets and profits and to generate the resources
for transfers
and handouts). Unfortunately for the government, its orthodox
policies failed
to catalyze sufficient private (domestic and foreign) investment.
Growth of
the gross domestic product (GDP) was patchy (see Table 1), and
most social
and employment indicators either stagnated or deteriorated.5
The administration soon had to face another challenge.
Realizing its vulner-
ability and aware of Lula’s bid for reelection in 2006, sections
of the bourgeoi-
sie aligned with Cardoso’s neoliberal strategy launched a
vicious attack in
mid-2005, focusing on the PT’s regular “purchase” of votes in
Congress (the
grotesque escândalo do mensalão). The media pursued these
stories relentlessly,
eventually claiming the scalps of two prominent ministers
(including Lula’s
likely successor), the president and the treasurer of the PT, and
several cadres
of the administration. The tide of sleaze came close to bringing
down the gov-
ernment. Space limitations prevent a detailed analysis here, but
the scandal
showed, first, that many PT cadres were amateurs, compared
with the more
experienced politicians in rival parties (one activist was

apprehended when
an airport X-ray machine revealed wads of cash stuffed in his
underwear).
Second, these scandals were not minor, but they were easily
trumped in mag-
nitude by those of the previous administration, which were
never scrutinized
by the press or the justice system with similar rigor. Third, the
scandals rarely
involved cases of illicit enrichment; corruption was mostly for
the benefit of
the PT and the government, suggesting that it may be
impossible to run a
competitive party and govern a fragmented neoliberal
democracy without
resorting to shady funding practices. At the peak of the scandal,
Lula found
that his government could not count on the support of the
(dis)organized left
or rely on the oligarchy. He retreated to the poor urban
peripheries and the
Northeast region, where the government’s social programs made
him popular
(see Marques et al., 2009), and renewed his commitment to
domestic capital,
which never failed to support his administration.

THE POLICY SHIFT
Despite the damage wrought by the mensalão, Lula fought a
vigorous reelec-
tion campaign and trounced his main rival, Geraldo Alckmin,
from Cardoso’s
Partido Social Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Social
Democratic Party–
PSDB), by 61–39 percent of the vote in the second round of the
2006 elections.
Lula recomposed his top team and announced, at his second
inauguration, the
realignment of his administration (see Boito, 2010). This policy
shift expressed,
in part, Lula’s frustration with the inability of orthodox policies
to deliver
growth; most recently, the Central Bank had raised interest rates
in response
to the threat of inflation in 2004, and this had sharply reduced
GDP growth in
the following year. Sluggish economic performance was
incompatible with
the political stabilization of Lula’s government. The policy shift
also responded
to the imperative to reconstitute the administration’s base of
political support,
given its isolation from the organized left, most of the political
elite, the more
internationalized fractions of capital, and the middle classes.6
The government
introduced a strategy of “national economic development” and
appointed
heterodox economists and nationalist diplomats to the Ministry
of Finance,
the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, the Institute of Applied

Economic Research,
and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development
(Banco Nacional
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social—BNDES), which has
become the
largest development bank in the world.7 The Central Bank
remained untouched
TABLE 1
Basic Macroeconomic Variables
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
GDP (US$bn) 6,918 6,907 6,991 6,974 7,276 7,413 7,616 7,990
8,313 8,217 8,671
GDP per capita
(2009 US$) 6,900 6,910 6,990 6,970 7,280 7,410 7,620 7,990
8,310 8,220 8,670
GDP growth
(real per
capita, %) 2.8 -0.2 1.2 -0.2 4.3 1.9 2.7 4.9 4.0 –
1.2 5.5
Inflation rate
(CPI, %) 6.0 7.7 12.5 9.3 7.6 5.7 3.1 4.5 5.9 4.3
5.3
Domestic
public debt
(% GDP) 45.5 48.4 50.5 52.4 47.0 46.5 44.0 41.0 38.4
42.8 41.4
Real interest

rate (annual
average) 10.1 8.4 3.8 15.8 8.8 14.3 11.1 5.9 7.2
4.8 4.9
*estimate.
Sources: Monthly bulletins and Press Notes of the Central Bank
of Brazil (http:// www.bcb.gov.br) and
Ipeadata (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br).
because it was politically impossible to restrict its independence
or change the
inflation-targeting regime. Despite their inability to control
monetary or exchange
rate policy, the neo-developmentalists were successful in
implementing activ-
ist and redistributive fiscal and financial policies, aiming to
maintain high
international reserves, raise aggregate demand, redistribute
income, expand
consumer credit for the poor, and provide subsidized credit for
productive
investment in Brazil as well as in new ventures abroad. These
policies have
been able to temper the Central Bank’s orthodoxy.
At the end of 2005, Brazil repaid ahead of time the US$23.3
billion Cardoso-

era International Monetary Fund loan that had helped it to
weather the 2002
balance-of-payments crisis and that signaled Lula’s continuing
commitment
to neoliberal policies.8 Early in 2007, the government
introduced a “growth
acceleration program” focusing on infrastructure, transport, and
energy that
expanded public investment from 0.4 to 0.7 percent of GDP
within a year
(Barbosa and Souza, 2010: 15). These initiatives were supported
by expanded
investment by the state-owned enterprises, especially Petrobras,
the oil conglom-
erate. The state-owned banks (BNDES, Banco do Brasil, and
Caixa Economica
Federal) vigorously expanded their credit lines for investment,
house con-
struction, and consumption, while private “national champions”
were sup-
ported by the federal government with subsidized credit,
preferential contracts,
and share purchases by the state-owned banks and pension
funds, and their
expansion abroad was actively promoted by the state. These
policies were
opposed by the PSDB, but they helped to raise the country’s
investment rate
from 15.9 percent of GDP in 2005 to 19.0 percent in 2008. The
growth of global
liquidity and demand during that period supported the expansion
of Brazil’s
foreign trade and contributed to the increase of inward as well
as outward
investment flows. The latter, in turn, led to the rapid
transnationalization

of Brazilian capital, which was actively supported by the
country’s new
diplomacy. The international reserves grew rapidly, helping to
stabilize
the exchange rate and dislocate the threat of balance-of-
payment crises (see
Table 2). Since this policy shift, the Brazilian economy has
been growing
strongly (despite a “dip” after the global crisis), breaking with
the pattern of
low growth since 1981.
Having secured the alliance with “domestic” capital and
renewed its com-
mitment to the organized workers and civil servants (the latter
through higher
wages and the targeted expansion of the bureaucracy), the
administration
extended social provision in three ways: first, through the
growth of its social
programs, especially Bolsa Família, which currently reaches
11.4 million house-
holds; second, through the expansion of social security
coverage, which rose
from 45 percent of the workforce in 2002 to 51 percent in
2010;9 and third,
through a rapid (real) increase of the minimum wage by 67
percent between
2003 and 2010 (real GDP rose by 37 percent in this period). The
higher mini-
mum wage raised the floor of the labor market and triggered a
simultaneous
increase of federal transfers to pensioners, the unemployed, and
the disabled.
Larger public-sector investment and expanded social provision

did not
destabilize public finances because the expansion of public-
sector activity was
largely funded by the additional tax revenues and social security
contribu-
tions that resulted from faster economic growth and the
formalization of the
labor market. The primary fiscal surplus fell only by 0.2 percent
of GDP, to
2.3 percent, between 2003–2005 and 2006–2008. Fiscal
activism, higher mini-
mum wages, and the expansion of domestic credit and social
provision helped
to create a virtuous circle of growth supported by domestic
investment and mass
consumption. Employment growth in the metropolitan areas
increased from
156,000 jobs per year during the Cardoso administration to
499,000 per year
since the mid-2000s (see Table 3).10 The Gini coefficient fell
from 0.57 in 1995 to
0.52 in 2008,11 and poverty declined from 35 percent of
households in 2001 to 21
percent in 2009,12 while 32 million individuals (of a population
of 193 million)
entered the “middle class.”13 These gains have been

concentrated in the poorer
regions, with average real wages in the Northeast rising by 24
percent, twice
the national figure. There has also been a striking convergence
of incomes in
the South and Center-West toward the higher levels in the
Southeast, which
includes São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
The neo-developmentalist strategy survived the onset of the
global crisis
and sustained the country’s rapid recovery. The government
responded to the
crisis with aggressive countercyclical policies, including higher
spending (pub-
lic sector and Petrobrás investment peaked at 2.6 percent of
GDP in 2009, and
a mass housing program was introduced, costing 1.2 percent of
GDP) and tax
rebates worth 0.3 percent of GDP. The state-owned banks
sharply increased
the availability of credit to offset the contraction of loans by the
private institu-
tions (BNDES lending alone expanded by 3.3 percent of GDP in
2009), while the
Central Bank cut interest rates, deployed US$72 billion to
provide export
credit and stabilize the exchange rate, and injected another 3.3
percent of GDP
into the support of financial institutions. These policies were
assisted by the
further expansion of the social programs, which grew from 6.9
percent of GDP
in 2002 to 8.6 percent in 2008 and 9.3 percent in 2009. The
stabilization of
aggregate demand raised the nominal fiscal deficit from 1.9

percent of GDP
TABLE 2
Balance of Payments (US$ billion)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
Exports 55.1 58.2 60.4 73.1 96.5 118.3 137.8 160.6 197.9
153.0 144.9
Imports 55.8 55.6 47.2 48.3 62.8 73.6 91.4 120.6 173.1
127.7 132.6
Trade balance -0.7 2.6 13.1 24.8 33.6 44.7 46.5 40 24.8
25.3 12.8
Current account -24.2 -23.2 -7.7 4.7 11.7 14.0 13.6 1.6 -28.2
-24.3 -35.1
Foreign direct
investment 32.8 22.5 16.6 10.1 18.2 15.2 18.8 34.6 45.1
25.9 22.6
Brazilian FDI -2.3 2.3 -2.5 -0.2 -9.5 -2.5 -28.2 -7.1 -20.4
10.1 - 5.6
Portfolio flows (net) 7.0 0.1 -5.1 5.3 -4.8 4.9 9.6 48.4 1.1
50.3 43.0
Balance of payments -24.2 -23.2 -7.6 4.2 11.7 14 13.6 1.6 -
28.2 46.7 34.5
Foreign debt 216.9 209.9 210.7 214.9 201.4 169.5 172.6 193.2
198.3 198.2 243.8
Foreign debt/GDP (%) 36.0 41.1 46.7 38.8 30.3 19.2 16.1 14.7
12.1 12.3 12.7
International reserves 33.0 35.9 37.8 49.3 52.9 53.8 85.9
180.3 206.8 239.1 275.2
International reserves/
GDP (%) 5.5 7.0 8.4 8.9 8.0 6.1 8.0 13.7 12.6 14.8 14.3
Exchange rate (R$/

US$, average) 1.83 2.35 2.93 3.07 2.92 2.43 2.18 1.95 1.84
1.99 1.77
*estimate.
of Brazil (http://www.bcb.gov.br) and
at the end of 2008 to 4.1 percent in 2009, while the domestic
public debt rose
from 40.5 percent of GDP to 43.0 percent (Barbosa and Souza,
2010: 22–23).
However, after an initial slowdown, the economy rebounded,
and GDP is
expected to grow by 7.5 percent in 2010—faster than at any
time since the
mid-1980s.
Lula’s second administration also pursued an aggressive foreign
policy.
Brazilian diplomats have sought to counterbalance U.S.
influence in South
America and support the global expansion of Brazilian
capital.14 They led the
effort to sink the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the
Americas, which was

supported by the neoliberal fraction of the bourgeoisie (and the
PSDB), and
Brazil has shored up the so-called pink-wave administrations in
Argentina,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela (see Lievesley and
Ludlam, 2009).
In line with this strategy of global projection and support for
domestic capital,
Brazil opened 40 new embassies and deftly explored the U.S.
difficulty in
maintaining its global hegemony in the wake of the invasion of
Iraq and the
ongoing global crisis. This strategy has been supported by
Brazil’s economic
power and its peaceful image: the country has a large and
diversified econ-
omy, but its armed forces are weak; it has no military tensions
with its neigh-
bors and is constitutionally prohibited from building or storing
nuclear
weapons. Since 2008, when the G-7 was compelled to seek G-20
support to
manage the global crisis, Brazilian diplomacy has positioned
itself strategi-
cally to represent other developing countries. This has spilled
over into the
international climate-change negotiations, and Brazil even
attempted, together
with Turkey, to broker a deal to resolve the dispute over Iran’s
nuclear policy.
Although some of these initiatives failed, they have signaled
Brazil’s emer-
gence as a diplomatic power.
CHANGES IN THE STATE

This policy mix was very popular in the country, and it largely
restored
Lula’s base of support among the organized and unorganized
workers, national
capitalism, and some sectors of the oligarchy. After eight years
in govern-
ment, national opinion polls showed that more than 80 percent
of the voters
considered Lula’s government “excellent” or “good” while only
4 percent
TABLE 3
Sectoral Distribution of Employment
Workers Employed
(million, end of year)
Employment Growth During Each
Administration
Sector 1994 2002 2010 FHC % Lula %
Manufacturing 5.5 5.5 8.2 0.0 0.9 2.6 47.8
Construction 1.1 1.1 2.4 0.0 0.1 1.3 116.2
Services 9.7 14.0 21.0 4.4 45.1 7.8 55.7
Public administration 5.1 6.8 8.3 1.7 33.1 1.5 22.8
Other 2.3 1.3 1.6 –1.1 –46.0 0.4 30.4
Total 23.7 28.7 42.3 5.0 21.2 13.7 47.6
Sources: Ministry of Labor and http://www.caged.gov.br.

considered it “bad” or “very bad.” In the poorer regions, the
positive
responses exceeded 90 percent. Despite these strengths, Lula’s
popularity was
heavily skewed, and his government remained isolated from
large swathes of
the middle classes and from the associated and dependent
fraction of capital.
Throughout his career and especially since 2005, Lula was
vilified by the
right-wing media15 and by the traditional (upper-) middle
classes, who dis-
paraged his “populist” and trade union roots and lack of formal
education.
They ridiculed his missing finger, lost in a work accident, and
laughed at his
ungrammatical Portuguese. The media measured Lula’s
government against
very different standards from those applied to its bourgeois
predecessors.
This hatred was not because of narrow economic concerns: Lula
insisted,
probably rightly, that the elite had never made as much money
as they did
during his government. These fractions of the elite had two
irresolvable objec-
tions to his administration.
First, they resented the loss of privileges associated with the
expansion of

citizenship. Redistribution of income, however marginal, lifted
millions from
absolute poverty and into the “middle class.” Consumer credit
helped many
poor Brazilians to visit shopping centers, travel by air, frequent
supermarkets,
and buy automobiles. Brazilian roads and airports are clogged,
and their pre-
vious users complain bitterly about the lack of space to
accommodate every-
one. These groups are equally dissatisfied with their loss of
political prominence
and the realization that they have become unable to drive
Brazilian politics
(see Singer, 2009).
Second, the nationalization of the social movements changed
the Brazilian
state. For the first time, poor citizens could recognize
themselves in the bureau-
cracy and relate to friends and comrades who had become
“important” in
Brasília. These personnel changes, backed up by the policy
shifts since 2007,
increased the legitimacy of the state and supported the claim of
the poor to a
larger share of the products of their labor. These changes are
evident on the
ground. This does not necessarily amount to collective action,
and in some cases
it is inimical to it, but the affirmation of citizenship is centrally
important for a
democracy. These changes have been called a “democratic
revolution” by some
left-wing analysts (see, e.g., Wu, 2010). This is an
exaggeration, but it illustrates

the significance of the new relationship between citizens and
the state.
The achievements of Lula’s administration are in no way
revolutionary, but
they are real enough. Some of them remain limited or are deeply
problematic
for the left. For example, the liberalization of trade and capital
flows and the
neoliberal economic policies transformed the country’s
economic base in the
1990s. Domestic capital became much more closely integrated
with foreign
capital; thousands of companies closed down because of foreign
competition,
were purchased by foreign firms, or became assembly platforms
processing
imported inputs for sale in global markets. Other firms
upgraded technologi-
cally and survived, but only at the expense of tens of thousands
of skilled jobs
(see OIT, 1999). The bourgeoisie remains deeply divided about
these pro-
cesses, but most capitalists have adjusted to these new
modalities of global
integration, and a large number of firms (including Odebrecht
[construction],
Ambev [beverages], Gerdau [steel], and Friboi [processed
foods]) are now
expanding abroad. However, the (re)integration of Brazil’s
economic base and
the internalization of additional links of strategic value chains
would require

more aggressive industrial policies than those which the
administration has
been either able or willing to consider. Problems of a different
order are asso-
ciated with the government’s social programs, which have
improved the
distribution of income despite the government’s failure to
redistribute pro-
ductive assets. Subsidies to private universities have expanded
the opportuni-
ties available to poor students, but they have been contested by
many left-wing
academics and students. Finally, government policies on
environmental pro-
tection and support for indigenous communities have achieved
positive
results, but they have been challenged by several NGOs as
either token or
counterproductive.
Such progress is clearly insufficient to satisfy the distributive
and demo-
cratic aims of the left. Brazil remains one of the most unequal
countries in the
world, and more could have been achieved in eight years.
However, the
obstacles faced by Lula’s government suggest that a more
ambitious agenda
would have been feasible only through the mobilization of the

working class
to confront the traditional elites and the aggressive deployment
of public
resources to fund faster welfare gains and deliver strategic
investments. These
destabilizing options were never considered by the Lula
administration, which
chose a gradualist strategy backed up by minimal legislative and
regulatory
changes. Despite his reluctance to break with neoliberalism,
Lula pursued a
neo-developmentalist program bringing together the organized
workers and
a sizable fraction of domestic capital, and his administration
enjoyed the sup-
port of the vast majority of the poor.
In this light, the 2010 elections imposed a choice between two
political, economic,
and social projects and two visions of the Brazilian state.
Neither was revolutionary,
anticapitalist, or even unambiguously anti-neoliberal, but they
were supported
by strikingly different social alliances. One was about broader-
based economic
growth, the expansion of citizenship, continuing (if intrinsically
limited) redis-
tributional gains, and the incremental democratization of the
state, while the
other was about the renewal of elite control of the state,
economy, and society
and the promotion of neoliberal dependent development.
THE ELECTIONS
The first phase of the presidential campaign, between July and

September
2010, focused primarily on welfare and national development
policies. The
main opposition candidate, São Paulo governor José Serra
(PSDB), attempted
to balance the conflicting imperatives of recognizing Lula’s
overwhelming
popularity, reflecting Serra’s political profile, and holding
together a right-
wing coalition of internationalized capital, right-wing oligarchs,
the tradi-
tional elite, and the upper middle classes.16 Serra is a
development economist
turned center-right politician who was exiled during Brazil’s
military dictator-
ship. Regardless of the protests of his coalition, Serra’s
campaign supported
activist industrial policies and even same-sex marriage, but this
strategy
failed. Faced with two candidates overtly supporting the
government, the
poorer voters flocked to Lula’s candidate, Dilma Rousseff, and
her 10-party
center-left coalition. Support for Serra in the opinion polls
tumbled, and
Dilma was poised to win a decisive victory in the first round.17

Dilma Rousseff rose through the ranks of the state
administration in Rio
Grande do Sul, initially in the Partido Democrático Trabalhista
(Democratic
Labor Party—PDT) and later in the PT. She was appointed
minister of energy
in 2002. Her ministry introduced the “Light for All” program of
mass electrifi-
cation and developed a new regulatory regime for the sector
after the combination
of privatizations with underinvestment under Cardoso forced the
government
to ration electricity in 2001. When Lula’s government was
decapitated by the
corruption scandals in 2005, Dilma was promoted to chief of
staff. She had a
leading role in articulating the government’s industrial policy
and designing
the exploration contracts for the new “pre-salt” oil reserves,
which may turn
Brazil into a major exporter of refined petroleum products.
These contracts
were heavily criticized by the press and the political right for
being costly,
“unduly” restricting the operations of the oil majors, barring the
export of crude
oil, “arbitrarily” vesting ownership of the reserves in the state,
and “needlessly”
imposing a leading role for Petrobras in all prospecting areas.
Facing a humiliating defeat, Serra switched tactics. His
campaign, which
was openly supported by the media, adopted a stridently right-
wing rhetoric
focusing on three issues. First, it accused Lula of promoting the
“Venezuelization

of Brazil” through his personal domination of the state,
attempting to impose
his own successor, and wishing to abolish press freedom.18
Second, the gov-
ernment was, again, accused of corruption, leading to the
dismissal of one
minister. Third, Dilma Rousseff was subjected to fearsome
personal attacks in
the media, in religious services, and through anonymous
pamphlets and bill-
boards. She was accused of involvement in corruption and of
being against
religion, for abortion, a homosexual, and a terrorist.19 Scabrous
rumors sug-
gested that she had stated that “not even Jesus could make her
lose” (a calcu-
lated affront to Christian voters), and her “former lover” was
“suddenly”
discovered and paraded around, loudly demanding an allowance
“like any
other abandoned woman.”20
Donations poured into Serra’s coffers, while the press slyly
promoted a
“third force” to “further the debate in the second round”: in the
last weeks
before the election, they anointed the former environment
minister, Marina
Silva—a candidate everyone knew could not win but who could
pull unde-
cided voters away from Dilma. Dilma’s support in the opinion
polls fell mar-
ginally, while Serra’s stagnated and Marina’s climbed rapidly.
Dilma finished
the first round, on October 3, with 47 percent of the votes,
against Serra’s

33 percent and Marina’s 19 percent. Four candidates to the left
of the PT coali-
tion together polled 0.9 percent (radical left candidates had
scored 9.5 percent
of the vote in 2006). The voting pattern was clear: Dilma won in
the poorer
states of the North and Northeast and in most of the Southeast
(except São
Paulo state) and lost in the richer Southern states. Within each
state, her vote
was heavily concentrated in the poorer neighborhoods and
among the least-
educated voters (see, e.g., Folha de S. Paulo, October 22, 2010).
Serra won in São
Paulo and in the richer states in the “arch of agribusiness”
across the Center-
West and among the wealthier and better-educated voters.
Although the elite onslaught prevented Dilma’s victory in the
first round,
the government coalition did well in the elections. It won 17 out
of 27 state
governments, 74 percent of the Senate, and 68 percent of the
Chamber of
Deputies. However, these numbers are largely notional, because
only one-third

of seats is held by the left parties in the coalition (the PT, the
Partido Comunista
do Brazil, the PDT, and the Partido Socialista Brasileiro).21
With 22 ill-
tempered and poorly disciplined parties in Congress,
painstaking negotia-
tions will become inevitable whenever there is a difficult vote.
In the second
round, on October 31, the government alliance, supported by the
vast majority
of the social movements, the organized left, the unorganized
workers, and a
large section of national capital, won another 5 state
governments, and Dilma
reached 56 percent of the vote against Serra’s 44 percent.
CONCLUSION
Dilma Rousseff will face three difficult tasks in government.
First, she
needs to keep her coalition together while building upon the
developmental
and redistributive policies she has inherited in order to sustain
her base of
support. This is a difficult challenge, since the global economic
environment
is likely to remain unfavorable. Second, she must protect herself
from attacks
by the elite; however, she lacks Lula’s charisma, track record,
and popular
roots, and she has the additional vulnerability, in the political
context of con-
temporary Brazil, of being a woman. Third, Lula never
attempted to disman-
tle the right-wing media oligopoly, because this was bound to
generate severe

political instability. Nevertheless, this nettle must be grasped in
order to
expand the government’s policy space and allow democracy to
flourish. Two
secondary challenges are bringing together a strong and
cohesive team that
can represent both the coalition supporting her government and
Lula’s politi-
cal role. Lula is likely to withdraw from domestic politics at
least temporarily
(postponing as long as possible the decision whether to run for
the presidency
in 2014); in the meantime, he could devote his energies to
“global” initiatives,
for example, around South-South cooperation.
Dilma’s victory does not signal the start of a socialist
transformation in Brazil.
Her government is not even committed to dismantling
neoliberalism and build-
ing a democratic system of accumulation; it is also supported by
an unwieldy
coalition. Nevertheless, it is enormously important for the left
to support her
administration. Despite the ongoing neoliberal offensive in
several countries,
Brazil demonstrates the viability of alternative policies, and it
supports and
offers a demonstration effect for more ambitious experiments
elsewhere in
Latin America. Further advances are possible, but they depend
on the ability
of the mass organizations and the popular movement to
articulate a plausible
alternative to neoliberalism and to push the government to
deploy its legiti-

macy and resources in support of this project. These pressures
must emerge from
below. The Brazilian state lacks the instruments and political
will to go far
beyond what it has already achieved: the alternative to mass
mobilization is
the consolidation of a national capitalist alternative including a
bland social
democratic consensus offering diminishing returns for the
majority.
One of the drivers of the cooperation between the government
and the social
movements around a progressive program might be the tension
between the
mildly nationalist and distributive policies that the government
is likely to
choose and the demands of the constellation of forces from
which it must seek
continuing support. Currently, these are heavily determined by
economic and
social status: bluntly speaking, the “traditional” rich stand to
one side and the
poor to the other, and the national bourgeoisie depends on the
support of the
working class to control the country’s foreign and economic

policies. This
cleavage poses clear dangers to Brazil’s political stability, but it
also harbors
the greatest potential for the advancement of a left program
since the demo-
cratic transition in the mid-1980s.
NOTES
1. The concepts of “national” (internal) bourgeoisie and
“comprador” (neoliberal) bour-
geoisie are developed by Boito (2010). This distinction draws
upon the relationship between
these fractions of capital and global capital(ism): the former
seeks independent opportunities for
accumulation in Brazil and abroad on its own terms and with
state support (e.g., trade and finan-
cial restrictions and preferential financial arrangements). It does
not advocate autarchy or even
an import-substitution strategy, and it is not narrowly
“nationalistic.” In contrast, the latter is
materially and ideologically committed to a strategy of
associated and dependent accumulation
predicated upon (neo)liberal policies, especially free trade and
financial flows under a U.S.-led
institutional umbrella. There is no necessary relationship
between these fractions of capital and
their sectoral investments (manufacturing, construction,
banking, insurance, agribusiness, and so
on) or their political profiles (neither of them is necessarily
more “progressive”). Historically,
both fractions have been heavily represented in government, but
the neoliberal bourgeoisie was
politically dominant during the Collor (1990–1992)
administration while the national bour-
geoisie was relatively more influential under Lula, especially

after 2006.
2. The São Paulo Confederation of Industry opposed Cardoso’s
policies and supported mass
demonstrations and even a workers’ general strike in 1996,
demanding a developmental policy
shift (see Boito, 2010).
3. Lula’s center-left alliance, including the Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT), the Partido
Socialista Brasileiro (PSB), the Partido Liberal (PL), the
Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB), the
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), the Partido Verde (PV), and
the Partido Democrático Trabalhista
(PDT), elected 35 percent of the federal deputies and 31 percent
of senators. The centrist and
right-wing Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
(PMDB), the Partido Trabalhista
Brasileiro (PTB), and the Partido Progressista (PP) joined the
coalition in 2003, while the PDT left.
The government could count notionally on 72 percent of
deputies and 60 percent of senators.
4. There is a vast left literature criticizing Lula’s first
administration; for a taster, in addition
to the works cited previously, see Oliveira (2006) and Paulani
(2003).
5. Open unemployment peaked at 12.7 percent in 2003 and fell
gradually to 9.2 percent in
2010; the percentage of discouraged workers also fell in this
period from 2.1 to 1.0 percent of the
labor force (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br).
6. “Among Brazilians with higher education, the rejection of
Lula jumped 16 percentage

points, rising from 24 percent in August to 40 percent today”
(Folha de S. Paulo, October 23, 2005,
quoted in Singer, 2009: 84).
7. The theoretical underpinnings of “neo-developmentalism”
have been discussed exten-
sively in the journal Revista de Economia Política.
8. This event signaled a structural shift in Brazil’s balance-of-
payments constraint: the coun-
try had overcome its traditional external vulnerability in the
context of the ongoing shift in
global liquidity and the erosion of U.S. hegemony. Currently,
domestic capital accumulation has
become structurally less vulnerable to temporary fluctuations in
global liquidity.
9. Monthly employment survey, http://www.ibge.gov.br.
10. Approximately 5 million formal jobs were created during
the Cardoso administration and
nearly 14 million during Lula’s. During this entire period the
country needed to create 2 million
new jobs annually simply to absorb its growing workforce.
11. See Barbosa and Souza (2010: 39) and
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/
trabalhoerendimento/pnad2005/sintese/tab1_5_4.pdf.
12. National Household Sample Survey, http://www.ibge.gov.br.

13. The definitions of “poor” and “middle-class” are based on
income data and elaborated by
the independent Getúlio Vargas Foundation. http://cps/fgv.br.
14. The creation of the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUL), as the germ of a future
common market, is symptomatic of Brazil’s diplomatic and
commercial focus on South America
rather than on Latin America as a whole. In contrast, Mexico
and the small Central American
republics are perceived to be too close to the United States to be
amenable to the influence of
Brazil or MERCOSUR.
15. There are four national newspapers in Brazil, each one in
the hands of a “traditional”
family based in the Southeast. All of them vociferously oppose
the government. The commercial
TV networks are also aligned with the opposition.
16. For an illustration of the views of international capital, see
the editorial in the Financial
Times, October 27, 2010.
17. A second round with two candidates takes place if no
candidate obtains more than half
of the votes in the first.
18. This accusation is baseless, and press freedom remains
protected by solid constitutional
guarantees. Symptomatically, former PT president José Dirceu
was asked in a campaign debate

whether there was “too much press freedom” in Brazil. He
responded that no one who has lived
through a dictatorship could believe in “excess” freedom. All
the main newspaper headlines
immediately reported that Dirceu had stated that “there is too
much press freedom in Brazil” (see,
e.g., one of the original reports in
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/fz1909201001.htm
and the subsequent apology in
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/fz3009201009.htm).
19. Dilma joined a left-wing urban guerrilla organization during
the bleakest years of the
military dictatorship, in the late 1960s; she was arrested in
1970, tortured for three weeks, and
imprisoned for three years.
20. See, e.g., http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrWFmbvc4YY
and http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=cu29qqCJCF4.
21. The left “core” of the government coalition has 165 seats
(out of 513) in the Chamber of
Deputies and 23 in the Senate (out of 81); its “outer circle” of
center-right allies has 186 deputies
and 37 senators. The left-wing opposition (the Partido do
Socialismo e Liberdaded [PSOL]) has
3 deputies and 2 senators, while the right-wing opposition (the
Partido Social Democrático
Brasileiro [PSDB] and the so-called Democrats) has 108
deputies and 19 senators. The remaining
51 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are held by “undecided” or
wavering parties.
REFERENCES

Barbosa, N. and J. A. P. Souza
2010 “A inflexão do governo Lula: política econômica,
crescimento e distribuição de
renda,” in E. Sader and M. A. Garcia (eds.), Brasil entre o
passado e o futuro. São Paulo:
Boitempo.
Boito Júnior., A.
2010 “A nova burguesia nacional no poder.” MS.
Branford, S. and B. Kucinski
1995 Brazil, Carnival of the Oppressed: Lula and the Brazilian
Workers’ Party. London: Latin
American Bureau.
2003 Politics Transformed: Lula and the Workers’ Party in
Brazil. London: Latin American Bureau.
Lievesley, G. and S. Ludlam (eds.)
2009 Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social
Democracy. London: Zed Books.
Marques, R. M., M. G. Leite, A. Mendes, and M. R. J. Ferreira
2009 “Discutindo o papel do programa Bolsa Família na decisão
das eleições presidenciais
brasileiras de 2006.” Revista de Economia Política 29 (1): 114–
132.
Mollo, M. L. R. and A. Saad-Filho
2006 “Neoliberal economic policies in Brazil (1994–2005):
Cardoso, Lula, and the need for a
democratic alternative.” New Political Economy 11 (1): 99–123.
Morais, L. and A. Saad-Filho
2003 “Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory? Lula, the
Workers’ Party, and the prospects
for change in Brazil.” Capital & Class 81: 17–23.

2005 “Lula and the continuity of neoliberalism in Brazil:
strategic choice, economic impera-
tive, or political schizophrenia?” Historical Materialism 13 (1):
3–32.
OIT (Organização Internacional do Trabalho) (ed.)
1999 Abertura e ajuste do mercado de trabalho no Brasil. São
Paulo: Editora 34.
Oliveira, F.
2006 “Lula in the labyrinth.” New Left Review 42: 5–22.
Paulani, L.
2003 “Brasil delivery: a política econômica do governo Lula.”
Revista de Economia Política 23 (4):
58–73.
Saad-Filho, A.
2003 “New dawn or false start in Brazil? The political economy
of Lula’s election.” Historical
Materialism 11 (1): 3–21.
2007 “Neoliberalism, democracy, and economic policy in
Brazil,” in P. Arestis and A. Saad-Filho
(eds.), Political Economy of Brazil: Recent Economic
Performance. London: Palgrave.

Singer, A.
2009 “Raízes sociais e ideológicas do Lulismo.” Novos Estudos
85: 83–102.
Wu, V.
2010 “Por que a grande mídia e a oposição resolveram jogar
sujo.” Carta Maior, September 21.
http://www.cartamaior.com.br/templates/materiaMostrar.cfm?m
ateria_id=16980&boletim
_id=764&componente_id=12686.
137
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 178, Vol. 38 No. 4,
July 2011 137
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X11408786
© 2011 Latin American Perspectives
Erratum
Morais, Lecio and Alfredo Saad-Filho
2011 “Brazil beyond Lula: Forging ahead or pausing for
breath?” Latin
American Perspectives 38(2):31–44.
In Table 1 (p. 34) the figures for the first two lines, GDP
(US$bn) and GDP
per capita (2009 US$), were incorrect. The table with correct
figures is given

below.
TABLE 1
Basic Macroeconomic Variables
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
GDP (US$bn) 602.2 510.4 451.0 553.6 663.8 882.4 1,072.0
1,313.9 1,637.5 1,614.1 1,921.3
GDP per capita 6,918 6,907 6,991 6,974 7,276 7,413 7,616
7,990 8,313 8,217 8,671
(2009 US$)
GDP growth 2.8 -0.2 1.2 -0.2 4.3 1.9 2.7 4.9 4.0 -1.2 5.5
(real per
capita, %)
Inflation rate 6.0 7.7 12.5 9.3 7.6 5.7 3.1 4.5 5.9 4.3 5.3
(CPI, %)
Domestic 45.5 48.4 50.5 52.4 47.0 46.5 44.0 41.0 38.4 42.8 41.4
public debt
(% GDP)
Real interest 10.1 8.4 3.8 15.8 8.8 14.3 11.1 5.9 7.2 4.8 4.9
rate (annual
average)
*estimate.
of Brazil (http://www.bcb.gov.br) and
Brazilian Democracy as a Late Bloomer: Reevaluating the
Regime
in the Cardoso-Lula Era

Timothy J. Power
Latin American Research Review, Volume 45, Special Issue, pp.
218-247
(Article)
Published by Latin American Studies Association
DOI: 10.1353/lar.2010.0034
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Florida
International University (24 Feb 2014 10:46 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/lar/summary/v045/45.S.power.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/lar/summary/v045/45.S.power.html
Latin American Research Review, Special Issue © 2010 by the
Latin American Studies Association.
B R A Z I L I A N D E M O C R A C Y A S
A L A T E B L O O M E R
Reevaluating the Regime in the Cardoso-Lula Era
Timothy J. Power
University of Oxford
Abstract: This article reviews the state of Brazilian democracy
at the close of the
Cardoso-Lula era. Brazil has now completed a quarter century
of competitive poli-

tics, the longest democratic period in the country’s history.
Although evaluations
of the regime’s prospects were often pessimistic in the 1985–
1993 period, the per-
formance of democracy improved markedly after the Plano Real
stabilization plan
in the mid-1990s, which was followed by signifi cant policy
achievements under
presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Party of Brazilian
Social Democracy, or
PSDB) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Workers’ Party, or PT).
Since 1995, the axis
of national politics has turned on the competition between the
PSDB and allies
versus the PT and allies. Under this emerging bicoalitional
architecture, several
key policy domains have been objects of consensus between the
two camps, which
has led to major policy advances; however, certain policy areas
remain outside the
zone of consensus and pose enduring challenges. Despite the
improving quality of
democracy, the mass public continues to display a surprisingly
high level of indif-
ference to the regime type.
After twenty-one years of military dictatorship, Brazil became a
po-
litical democracy on March 15, 1985.1 As the age of democracy
passes the
quarter century mark, interpretations of the regime are
noticeably more
positive than they were in the early posttransition years. In the
late 1980s
I thank Leonardo Avritzer, Philip Oxhorn, João Paulo Peixoto,

Nancy Postero, Jeffrey W.
Rubin, Laurence Whitehead, Joel Wolfe, and several anonymous
reviewers for comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
1. In this article, I understand democracy as political democracy
rather than economic,
cultural, or social democracy. Political democracy, or
polyarchy, as Dahl (1971) termed it,
is defi ned by the existence of political procedures that permit
robust political contesta-
tion and broad participation (i.e., competitive elections with the
possibility of alternation in
power) and by the simultaneous presence of legal and
constitutional guarantees (i.e., civil
and political rights) that allow the central democratic
institutions to function unimpeded.
Although such a minimalist defi nition of democracy is often
dissatisfying in normative
terms, it is analytically profi table to divorce the procedural
side of democracy from the
substantive outputs of the regime, precisely because such a defi
nitional separation allows
us to assess the interrelationships between the two. Such a
causal assessment is an objective
of the present study of Brazil.

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BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY AS A LATE BLOOMER 219
or early 1990s, the typical analyst might have paraphrased the
old joke
about Brazil as the perpetual “country of the future” and
wondered aloud
whether the country would always be an unconsolidated
democracy. But
in 2010, this is no longer the case. The regime initiated in 1985
is no longer
a new democracy in any meaningful sense of the word, either in
historical
perspective with earlier Brazilian regimes or in comparative
perspective
with neighboring Latin American countries. Apart from sheer
longevity,
the regime has also placed some signifi cant policy
achievements on the
table, whether in macroeconomic performance, social welfare,
executive-
legislative relations, or global activism. Moreover, with the
passage of
time, Brazilian democracy has come to be viewed relatively
favorably in
regional perspective, having managed to avoid some of the more
spec-
tacular ills that have affl icted several neighboring countries
(e.g., fi nancial
default, party system collapse, populism, secessionism, and
replacement

of presidents by dubious constitutional means). The post-1985
regime is
defi ned positively not only by what it is but also by what it is
not.
Through sheer perseverance, the current Brazilian regime has
already
passed what might be called the Woody Allen test of democratic
consoli-
dation: 90 percent of life is simply showing up. It has also
passed more
conventional tests of democratic consolidation, such as Samuel
Hunting-
ton’s (1991) two-turnover rule (two successfully handled
alternations in
partisan control of the government) or Juan Linz’s and Alfred
Stepan’s
(1996) more subjective litmus test, which is whether relevant
actors accept
democracy as “the only game in town.” In sharp contrast to the
1980s,
when analysts fretted over various potential veto players that
might trun-
cate or undermine democracy (e.g., the armed forces, right-wing
landown-
ers, organized business groups, the Globo television network),
one of the
most outstanding features of Brazilian democracy today is the
absence of
any major antisystem actor with political clout. Yet despite
passing vari-
ous tests of endurance and having shown objectively improved
perfor-
mance since the mid-1990s, the democratic regime continues to
confront
unresolved questions and daunting challenges. It is only through

juxta-
posing both achievements and challenges that we can
understand Brazil-
ian democracy as a lived regime.
A comprehensive assessment of Brazilian democracy would
require a
lengthy monograph, and space considerations preclude an
adequate re-
counting of political history since 1985. This article therefore
limits itself
to identifying some key themes and issues that are central to a
holistic
appraisal of the regime. In doing so, I put forth three arguments
and one
puzzle. The three arguments are as follows. First, despite
ongoing short-
comings and challenges, the post-1985 regime represents the
high-water
mark of democratic experience in Brazilian history. Second, and
general-
izing rather broadly, the regime has had at least two identifi
able phases:
a relatively underperforming period from 1985 to 1993,
followed by an
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220 Latin American Research Review
objectively more successful period from 1994 to the present.
Third, after
twenty-fi ve years of democracy, the tally sheet of regime

performance is
becoming increasingly clear. By this, I mean that it is
reasonably possible
to distinguish the policy domains in which palpable successes
have been
achieved from those in which reforms or “solutions” have been
notably
lacking. In (briefl y) reviewing policy domains of both types, I
reach the
rather unsurprising conclusion that the areas of success are the
ones in
which a broad, cross-party consensus has emerged since the
mid-1990s,
and the areas of stagnation are the ones in which necessary
reforms have
failed to acquire stable political sponsorship.
These three arguments are accompanied by a puzzle, one that is
con-
nected to a disjuncture of democracy. Thanks to the
pathbreaking work of
scholars such as O’Donnell (1993), Holston and Caldeira
(1999), and many
others, we often think of the main disjuncture in contemporary
Brazil as
the contradiction between liberal democratic forms and illiberal
demo-
cratic practice (i.e., competitive politics combined with a
woefully inad-
equate rule of law). There is little doubt that these scholars are
correct, but
here I draw attention to a second disjuncture, one that has
received much
less attention in the literature. Simply put, Brazilian democracy
is strongly
legitimate at the elite level but weakly legitimate at the mass

level. Al-
though this sort of contradictory pattern can emerge in the life
cycle of al-
most any political regime, in Brazil, the data have been
remarkably consis-
tent. Year in and year out, in good times and in bad, Brazil
ranks near the
bottom of Latin America in terms of popular preference for
democracy as
a regime type, and we do not know why.
In this article, I develop the three arguments outlined earlier
and try
to shed some light on the enduring puzzle. I give the greatest
amount of
attention to identifying the areas of consensus and dissensus in
public
policy. However, I also attempt to unravel the puzzle of why—
despite elite
support for democracy, objective political stability, reasonable
policy suc-
cesses, the absence of important antisystem actors, a string of
largely un-
controversial landslide elections, and occasionally stratospheric
approval
ratings for presidential incumbents—ordinary Brazilians seem
decidedly
unimpressed with political democracy.
BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Apart from the current regime, Brazil has had only one other
experi-
ence with political democracy, lasting from 1946 to 1964.
Comparing the
1946 regime to the 1985 regime is a useful exercise because it

demonstrates
how the criteria for “democraticness” have shifted over time.
When con-
trasted with the vigor of the current regime, the democracy of
the imme-
diate postwar years appears rather limited.
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BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY AS A LATE BLOOMER 221
A key difference concerns the constraints of the past: it appears
that the
preceding authoritarian experience shaped the 1946 regime
much more
than the 1985 regime. This is true both in politics and in
economics. All
the elected presidents of the 1946 regime save one (Jânio
Quadros, who
served for seven months) emerged from the political machine
that Getúlio
Vargas forged between 1930 and 1945. In the current
democracy, although
the fi rst two presidents (José Sarney and Fernando Collor) were
oligarchic
clients of the 1964–1985 military regime, politicians who built
their careers
in opposition to dictatorship have governed Brazil
uninterruptedly since
1992. In the economic sphere, the elites of the 1946 regime
followed the
basic lines of import substitution and state-led development as
laid down

in the Vargas years, whereas the current regime has invested far
more en-
ergy in economic reform and has made a partial but still
important course
correction in the direction of a market-friendly model. Because
democ-
racy is a moving target, the early (and mostly negative)
assessments of
Brazilian democracy published in the late 1980s and early 1990s
could not
yet perceive these important discontinuities with the past.
Moreover, although the 1946 democracy is commonly described
as hav-
ing lasted for eighteen years, that period was in fact marked by
several
instances of what the contemporary political science literature
would call
presidential interruptions (Hochstetler 2006) or breakdowns
(Llanos and
Marsteintredet 2010), not to mention two hastily implemented
modifi ca-
tions of the system of government. The suicide of Vargas in
1954, the op-
position to Juscelino Kubitschek’s and later João Goulart’s
taking of offi ce,
and the aborted presidency of Quadros created signifi cant
political insta-
bility. Nine different men took the presidential oath of offi ce
between Jan-
uary 1946 and September 1961 (Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Vargas,
Café Filho,
Carlos Luz, Nereu Ramos, Kubitschek, Quadros, Ranieri
Mazzilli, and
Goulart). The system of government changed from presidential
to parlia-

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