Bonn Juego (2016), Duterte-style Populism: The Philippines in the Geopolitical Economy of Southeast Asia Presentation notes for the forum jointly organized by NIAS - the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, ADI - Asian Dynamics Initiatives, and SEASS - Southeast Asia Signature Series, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 22 November 2016.

1. Duterte-style Populism:
The Philippines in the
Geopolitical Economy of Southeast Asia
Bonn Juego
Guest Researcher, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Presentation to the forum organized by NIAS - the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies,
ADI - Asian Dynamics Initiative, and SEASS - Southeast Asia Signature Series,
University of Copenhagen
22 November 2016
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2. AGENDA
EMERGENT PHENOMENA IN PHILIPPINE POLITICAL ECONOMY TODAY
1. Duterte-style Populism
2. Limits and Risks of Duterte’s Police-Centric Approach to
the War on Drugs
3. Dutertenomics
4. Philippines as ASEAN@50 Chair in 2017
5. Duterte’s Foreign Relations Strategies
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3. Rodrigo Duterte: a Heterodox Politician
Elected: 9 May 2016; President: 30 June 2016
partly TRADITIONAL
• veteran local political boss
• exposed to Filipino political
wheeling and dealing
• from a local and regional political
family in Davao City, Mindanao,
and the Visayas
partly UNORTHODOX
• anti-establishment rhetoric
• uncouth public behavior
• vulgar speech
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4. Duterte’s Electoral Victory and Popularity
39 % popular votes; 91 % initial trust rating
Many interrelated factors why Duterte won, but two stand out:
1. BETTER CAMPAIGN STRATEGY OVER WEAKER RIVALS
 issues: most basic (day-to-day concerns) + most fundamental (problems of the socio-economy)
 catch-all politics: anti-corruption; law & order (cuts across classes and the political spectrum )
 zeitgeist: campaign discourse (”Change” beats ”Continuity”)
 anti-elite, anti-Imperial Manila, anti-inefficiencies, anti-corruption, anti-criminality, anti-
disorder
 stood out as different
 tangible local governance achievements (20+ years as Mayor of Davao City)
 reputation or image as a strong leader with modest lifestyle
 resonated with ”dominant discourse” in Filipino society and culture
 ruled social media, a convenient tool for populism
2. PROTEST VOTE
 against shortcomings, or ineffectiveness, of EDSA Republics
 against hypocrisy of 30-year liberal-democratic regime
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5. 5

6. 6

7. Duterte’s Populism as a Discourse
(Contradictions: a source of strength, and also its own weakness)
• Discursive inconsistencies
– saying different things in
different occasions
• Ideological incoherence
– Effects: ”catch-all” politics
and ”divide and rule”
• Rhetoric-Action
(dis)connection
– Speech: ”what he says”
– Action: ”what he does”
– Consequences: ”what actually
happens”; ”what has
happened”
• A source of both:
– Strength: big tent; coalition-
building or alliance-forming;
catch-all; popular support; all-
encompassing legitimacy
– Weakness: in terms of policy-
making and institution-
building (which require
consistency, coherence, and
coordination)
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8. Mapping Populism Discourse
Election Period
(populist campaign)
Governance
(populist in power)
Consequences
(intended and
unintended)
• Campaign rhetoric,
slogan, promises
• What is promised?
• What is being said?
• What is being done?
• What is happening?
• What has
happened?
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9. Duterte’s Left- and Right-wing Populism
LEFT-wing Populism
• Self-proclaimed ”leftist” and ”socialist”
– but without a socialist program, no
socialist party, does not belong to a
leftist social movement
• Anti-established institutions in the
Philippines
– US imperialism
– Landed oligarchy
– Catholic Church
• Peace with long-running ”ideological”
armed communist rebels and Islamic
separatist groups
RIGHT-wing Populism
• Prominence in governance style
and in speech:
– Authoritarianism
– Military mind
– Police action
• Fascination with Marcos era
Martial Law
• War or state violence against
criminality and illegal drugs
problems
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• So far, Duterte has shown more right-wing, than left-wing, populism.
• Much better for Duterte and the Philippines to swing to left-wing populism.

10. Two Most Divisive, Controversial, Unpopular
Issues and Political Positions of Duterte
Extrajudicial Killings
• ~5,000 killed (since 1 July 2016)
Undermine:
 Human rights
 Due process
 Rule of law
– Condonation of these killings?
– But even if those killings are not
state-sponsored or state-
orchestrated, Duterte’s
government must do something to
stop it!
Hero’s Burial for dictator Marcos
MARCOS IS NOT A HERO!
• Perpetuating ”culture of impunity”
• The Marcoses’ long-term project to re-
write history. (Historical revisionism)
• Failure of ”people power” and the
EDSA Republics
– Revolutions must be both ”political” and
”economic”
– Southeast Asian elite families: their
economic wealth easily regenerates into
political power
• A divided, or co-opted, left movement
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EFFECTS:
1. re-activating the opposition
2. dividing groups of supporters

11. Duterte - Vice President Tandem:
Different Support Base
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12. Duterte Supporters from Different Groups
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Duterte-Marcos Duterte-Cayetano Duterte-Robredo Duterte-Far Left
• Most aggressive
• Marcos loyalists
• Anti-Yellow
• Right-wing
authoritarian,
dictatorial
tendencies
• Aggressive
support for
Duterte
• Critical of
Marcos
• Critical of Yellow
• Moderate
Duterte
supporters
• Anti-Marcos
• Yellow sympathy
• Tactical alliance
(if not, co-opted)
• Anti-Marcos
• Anti-Yellow

13. Duterte’s Slogan: ”Change is coming.”
#partnersforchange
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE
Objectives and Promises
• Criminality and Illegal drugs
• Poverty and inequality
• Oligarchy
• Corruption, red tape, and
government inefficiencies
Dominant discourses where
SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE must also come
1. CULTURE OF VIOLENCE
 Conflicts dealt with through violence, physical
harm, or death
2. CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
 The rich, the influential, the politically-
connected, and the powerful can get away
from their crimes, if not exempted from
punishment
3. CULTURE OF MACHISMO AND SEXISM
 Misogyny; victim-blaming
4. DISREGARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 The problem is not human rights in principle,
but it is the 'absence' of human rights in
practice.
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14. Duterte-speak:
Messianic and Dominant Discourses
• MESSIANIC COMPLEX and
motherhood statements
– Fatherly image: ”Tatay Digong”
– Simple solutions to complex problems
– ”Egotism”: That he is the only one with
the political will; that he is the only
one who can do ’it’.
– Binaries: ”good citizens and bad
criminals”; ”elites and ordinary people”
• DOMINANT DISCOURSES (Prevailing
psyche in PH society and culture)
– Machismo
– Sexism
– Violence
– Disregard for human rights
– Desire for social order
– The need for discipline among citizens
• LANGUAGE
– street language (”salitang kalye”)
– anti-intellectualism; smart-shaming
– sound bites and one-liners
– witty, humorous comments
– jokes
– expletives, cuss words, dirty finger
– vulgar, cursing, swearing
– political incorrectness, uncouth,
undiplomatic
– crazy quotes (e.g., rape, Hitler, Viagra)
– hyperbole, exaggerations
– doublespeak
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15. Populism and Social Media
• Philippines as ”social media capital of the
world”, ”social networking capital of the
world” (in Facebook and Twitter use)
• Duterte’s populist netizens’ protest against
mainstream, traditional media: ”Stop
destabilizing the Philipines.”
• SOCIAL MEDIA: effectively facilitates
populist appeal and legitimacy
 ”Memes” and YouTube wars: creative
and effective images; short-messages
with high impact emotions
 Trolls: internet provocateurs promoting
hate, fake news and black propaganda
 But the more serious problems are not
trolls, but real people, the loose
cannons behaving badly, boldly
expressing hate and political
incorrectness.
• Online war: Dutertards versus Yellowtards
• Argumentation tendencies: The political
becomes personal.
 Personalistic and personal
 Groupthink, including incidence of
cyberbullying (#enemiesofchange)
 Conflicts have caused breaking
friendship – unfriend, unfollow,
block, restrict
 Logical fallacies: especially, ad
hominem
 Name-calling, or labelling
 Casualties: evidence, facts, truth,
reason
 Confirmation bias: evidence denial;
truth or what’s best is based on what
idol says and does
 Anti-intellectualism, smart-shaming
 Condescending, or patronizing
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16. Political and Social Psychology
in a Populist Moment and a Populist Movement
• GROUPTHINK
– We (the good allies) versus They (our evil enemies)
– Online: tribalistic; gangsterism
– Bandwagon effect and peer pressure to be ”in”, and
to belong to the popular
– ”Lucifer effect”
• CONFIRMATION / COGNITIVE BIASES
– blind and deaf to evidence and facts
– selective information in support of preconceived
beliefs and loyalties
– personality-based argumentation and other logical
fallacies (especially ad hominem)
– Online trolling
– Charisma
– Personality cult: obsessive admiration to a leader
– Fanaticism and idolatry
– Bigotry and demagoguery
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17. Public Debate in ”a Populist Moment”:
from ”EXIT” to ”VOICE and LOYALTY”
A REFLECTION AND ARTICULATION OF REALITY:
 the state of people’s sociopolitical
consciousness
 quality of education and level of public
discourse
POSITIVE EFFECTS:
 increasing awareness and participation of
people in public debate through social media
 actively informing themselves about political
and economic issues and concepts
NEGATIVE EFFECTS:
 ”groupthink” and ”confirmation bias”
behavior
 gutter level exchanges, trolling, bullying, fake
news, character assassinations,
misinformation, lies, regime of mendacity
”LIBERAL” OPPOSITION’S COMPLAINTS AND
CONTRADICTIONS:
 before: exit - political apathy of citizenry
– liberal response: dialogue; debate;
popular education; AMO – arouse,
mobilize, organize
 now: populist political voice and loyalty
boldly articulated through social media
 liberal response: ranging from fire-
against-fire to censorship
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18. Duterte’s War on Drugs: Data
as of November 2016
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19. Local Popularity of Drug War
• Fear of individuals for themselves
and for their families to be
victimized by illegal drug abuse and
drug-related crimes
• For some, hatred by those
personally victimized by illegal drug
traffickers and users
• Popular frustration and anger
against failure of previous
administrations to seriously address
illegal drugs and criminality
• Priority given to public security and
personal safety vis-a-vis crimes
• High trust given to Duterte’s
political will
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20. Populism and Human Rights
• Populism’s dichotomy: between good and bad citizens
– i.e., only criminals should fear an iron-fist law and order regime
– (But human rights violations are indiscriminate!)
• Human lives and human rights: biggest casualties in the war on drugs
• Mal-education about human rights principles.
– Human rights have been wrongly associated with the defense of criminals, rather than
the protection of the weak, the vulnerable, and the victims against the capacity of state
and non-state entities for abuse of power.
• The problem is not human rights principles, but the absence of human rights!
– Anger must be directed at ”hypocritical liberals,” not on the virtues of human rights.
• Forgotten in public consciousness:
– Human rights institutions (CHR) have been continuously made inutile and worthless
even by three decades of liberal-democratic EDSA republics.
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21. Duterte’s Policing Approach to
the Supply and Demand Problem of Illegal Drugs
• Duterte’s war on drug:
a supply-side approach
– Simple, quick solutions
to complex problems
• The law of the instrument:
– ”If all you have is a
hammer; everything
looks like a nail.”
– If all the government
has is the police, all
socio-economic issues
look like police
problems.
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22. Police-centric approach to illegal drugs….
Problematic:
• Attacking the poor
• Why let the police
address socio-
economic causes of
the drug problem:
 Poverty and
inequality
 Unemployment
 Homelessness
 School problems
 Addiction
 Loneliness
 Family problems
 Migration
Secret to success of Duterte’s war on drugs:
• If socio-economic reform programs take the
leading role in this war, rather than the police!
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23. Different approaches to different substances
• Differentiate between users
and pushers.
 Drug users who only
harm themselves are
and should not be
treated as criminals.
• Police- and criminal-based
approach to illegal drug
trafficking and peddling.
• Rehabilitative and health-
based approach for victim-
less users.
• Different
approaches/penalties to
different substances:
 Between synthetic
(shabu) and organic
(marijuana)
Solutions must be based on:
 Evidence and rationality
 Medical science
 Local PH needs, capacities, and capabilities
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24. DUTERTENOMICS
 Law & Order regime for progress and business stability
 War against Drugs and Criminality of the underground economy
 Peace process with communist rebels (CPP-NPA-NDF), Islamic separatists (MILF, MNLF)
 Philippine Capitalism with Chinese characteristics
 on top of existing FDIs and ODAs from Japan, US, South Korea, and the EU
 neoliberal policy continuity (i.e., capitalist market-oriented governance)
 industrialization
 coal-powered?; ”national champions” from the Filipino business oligarchy?
 ”golden age of infrastructure”
 human capital investment (education gets the highest budget priority)
 rhetoric to end labour contractualization practices
 AmBisyon 2040
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25. Good “market signals” and “initial conditions” for Dutertenomics
 Political capital (solid government institutional
support; clean government perception)
 Economic capital (7.1 % GDP and credit ratings
upgrade: “path-dependence” of growth,
development, FDI)
 Social capital (popular mass support and
legitimacy)
+ new Chinese capital for infrastructure investments (active AIIB
membership, OBOR role)
+ continuity of Japanese ODA and investments
+ US BPOs most likely to stay (cost and risk analysis from the point of
view of business)
+ EU’s GSP+ grant
+ OFW remittances’ counter-cyclical effect
+ rising entrepreneurship: MSMEs
+ Opportunities to pursue national industrialization: due to peso
depreciation, imminent protectionism in the US and EU
+ promising sectors like CARS program, shipbuilding, etc.
??? Agriculture modernization ??? (political will for
genuine land reform + need for technological innovation to
manage law of diminishing returns)
The Challenge:
• Translate all these asap to
increasing employment,
real wages, and the general
standards of living of the
Filipinos.
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26. The Philippines as ASEAN@50 Chair, 2017
CONTINUITY
in ASEAN Political Economy
• Democratization and human rights:
expected not priority areas
– ”a peaceful coexistence among
authoritarianisms”
• ASEAN Economic Community (ASEAN
Vision 2025)
– towards one neoliberal capitalist
regional economy embedded in ten
different political-cultural regimes
• Open-ended future of ASEAN regionalism
– largely depends on national
bourgeoisies , or domestic political
economy
– state-capital relations (national state
- domestic capitalists – foreign
capital): coercion, cooptation, or
consent?
DIFFERENT
in ASEAN Geopolitics
• South China Sea maritime
and territorial disputes
– more advances for China;
– US being kept at bay
• a friendlier China???
• a more aggressive US???
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27. ASEAN: Regionalization Without Democratization
“peaceful coexistence among
authoritarianisms”
– semi-authoritarianism
• Malaysia, Singapore
– history of military rule
• Myanmar and Thailand
– one-party states
• Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
– monarchical state
• Brunei
– former dictatorships
• Indonesia, the Philippines
– authoritarian features
• the Philippines under Duterte
“Authoritarian
Neoliberalism”
neoliberal economies
embedded in authoritarian
polities

28. ASEAN Convergence Club Model
— Unity in Economics; Diversity in Politics and Cultures —
Region-wide convergence on
one neoliberal capitalist economic system
operating in
ten different political and cultural frameworks

29. SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY:
Neoliberalism vs Authoritarian Oligarchies
Neoliberalism of the AEC Protectionism of the Oligarchies

30. Duterte’s Foreign Relations Strategy:
Some observed elements, so far….
1. ”Neocolonial analysis” prominent in the 1970s
– may have influenced Duterte’s view on PH underdevelopment and critique against
dependency relations and US imperialism
2. ”Hedging” between geopolitical rivals US and China to advance PH national interests
– but many flip-flopping statements (including strong rhetoric against US during meetings
with China and Russia)….
3. Elements of Cold War ”non-aligned” strategy of a Third World country
– in practice: not zero-sum, not totally anti-US, nor totally anti-EU;
– but also sounded to ”lean to one side” (i.e., to China and Russia)
4. ”Look East”
– friendlier to Asian neighbors China, Japan, and ASEAN member states
5. Pragmatic economic cooperation (with China, without ceding favorable PCA ruling)
– Foreign policy for domestic economic development
• While Duterte understands that the US is the most important partner of China, his understanding of Russia-
China relationship is passe,if not wrong. China has always had uncertain, if not problematic, relationship
with Russia.
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31. Philippine Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics???
(pragmatic economic cooperation)
• Contemporary global
political economy:
– Old capitalist centers of US,
EU, and Japan on prolonged
economic crises
– Duterte’s only 6-year term,
and vision for “golden age of
infrastructure” which only
Chinese capital appears able
and willing to provide at this
time….
• Search for new [sub-
imperialist?] allies:
– During the APEC 2016, Xi
Jinping invited Duterte to
observe the BRICS
18-21 October 2016: Duterte’s state visit in China
• USD 24 billion = 9b soft loans and credit line
+ 15b investments
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CRITICAL AREAS FOR THE PHILIPPINES WHEN
DEALING WITH CHINESE STATE-CAPITAL:
1. Labor (ensure local content)
2. Environment (renewables and green tech )

32. Tensions and Risks of Duterte’s critical approach to US,
and new friendship with China and Russia
• Americanized socialization of
Filipinos:
a) military and police
b) diplomatic corps
c) social, political, economic,
and cultural institutions
d) scholars and academics
e) the general population
• Sino-phobia
• Russo-phobia
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(Charismatic populist politician’s
effect on his followers’ psyche….)
POLITICS can change a culture,
mentality and worldview….

33. Donald TRUMP in Asia’s Geopolitical
Equation: Different Game Plans
• Uncertainties. But the US Establishment, the US
military-industrial-Wall Street complex, is driven by the
structural imperative to maintain their global
hegemony.
• Populists like Trump may win elections easily, but might
find it difficult to implement their campaign rhetoric
while in power.
• Duterte-Trump Relations: could be a “populist peace” -
a peaceful coexistence among populisms???
• Trumps’ protectionist predisposition: but “free trade”
may be utilized for US national economic interests.
• US-China will be “living in interesting times”
 Xi Jinping’s China will continue to regard US as
its most important partner
 Trump’s campaign strongly critical of China’s
protectionist economic policies. (Trade war?)
• US-Russia / Trump-Putin relations
 Hillary Clinton camp’s dossier against Trump:
Russophobia and war-mongering.
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34. Duterte and Great Power Politics
(Third World’s policy choices in-between great power rivals)
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DUTERTE’S KEY CARDS IN HIS GEOPOLITICAL PROJECTION GAME:
1. Permanent Court of Arbitration’s favourable ruling for the Philippines
2. Duterte’s bold personality and character
3. Reputation of the Philippines as solid and strategic ally of the US in Asia

35. Duterte’s ”Look East”
foreign relations and development policy
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POTENTIALS:
• South-South relations may be good.
• But be careful of giant ’Southern’ economies like China.
• Attract ’good’ investments in line with national
development goals.

36. Example Research Project on Populism: Mapping Duterte’s
Foreign Policy Statements about US and China
Election Period
(populist campaign)
Governance
(populist in power)
Consequences
(intended and
unintended)
• Nationalist rhetoric
 ”jet ski”
hyperbole to
PH waters and
territories in
the disputed
areas
• Friendlier to China
 also, to Russia
• Critical of the US, while
continuing PH-US military
exercises
• Friend/Enemy statements
about the US
• Friendly reaching out to US
President-elect Donald Trump
• Effect: too early to
tell
• Intended: assume
”in good faith”
• Unintended: ???
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37. Final Remarks
• The ”Philippine Populist Moment” : a crisis of liberal democracy and identity politics
– ”catch-all” politics: contradictions as sources of populism’s strength and weakness
– ”divide-and-rule” effect: source of populist’s further strength; absence of solid opposition
from political parties and social movements
• Duterte’s ”indifferent” personality may be an asset to usher in difficult and much-needed
reforms in the country.
• Duterte must make his outstanding ”socio-economic team” – rather than the police – take the
leading and most important role in the war against drugs and criminality.
• Allow the Philippines to make mistakes in their current geopolitical experiments.
– PH must take advantage of intense geopolitical rivalry for Asian regional hegemony
between US and China, while keeping its favorable PCA ruling, to further develop its
domestic economy.
• Challenge for education in the age of populism: nurturing ”critical thinking”
• Challenge for alternative futures:
– a sociopolitical movement that combines identity politics + class politics
– potentials of ”left-wing populism” (i.e. democratic socialism, social democracy, or else) to
beat ”right-wing populism”
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38. Tak.
Salamat.
Thank you.
Bonn Juego
bonn.juego@jyu.fi
22 November 2016, Copenhagen
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